Portrait of A Colonizer H. M. Douglas in Colonial Nigeria, 1897-1920

Portrait of a Colonizer: H. M.
Douglas in Colonial Nigeria, 1897-1920

Author(s): Felix K. Ekechi
Source: African Studies Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 25-50
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/524609
Accessed: 19-07-2018 15:37 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to African Studies Review
This content downloaded from 132.248.9.8 on Thu, 19 Jul 2018 15:37:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
PORTRAIT OF A COLONIZER:
H. M. DOUGLAS IN COLONIAL NIGERIA,
1897-1920
Felix K. Ekechi
Despite the increasing effort of Africanist scholars, and particularly historians,

to decolonize African history by focusing greater attention on the role of Africans
than Europeans in the unfolding of African history, historical interest in the
influence of Europeans in Africa remains. This is perhaps reflected in the
continuing appearance of studies devoted to European activities in Africa.1
However, there are those who, perhaps justifiably, question the need or value for
such studies, given the trend in African studies today to de-emphasize imperial
history and to accent "real" African history (Ranger, 1979; Bennett, 1981).2 Yet
there are others who argue, rather persuasively, that studies of European activities
in Africa should still be encouraged either because we do not as yet know all that
we need to know about Europeans in Africa (Ranger and Weller, 1975), or
because we now have ample data with which to reconsider aspects of European
presence in Africa (Hopkins, 1976). Indeed, seen from this perspective of
revisionist historiography, some of the recent studies of Europeans in Africa not
only enhance our knowledge of the dynamics of African and European interaction
but also enable us to either reject or modify many of the familiar assumptions and
theories about Europeans in Africa (Hopkins, 1976; Ranger, 1979; Igbafe, 1979;
Newbury, 1978).
It is indeed against this background of revisionist historiography that this
present essay is attempted. It seeks, on the one hand, to reconsider the popular
image of European colonial administrators as men who were characteristically
genial, kindhearted, and unselfishly dedicated to the welfare of their African
wards (Burns, 1949; Heussler, 1963; Bradley, 1966; Gann and Duignan, 1978).
Using our subject, H. M. Douglas, as the paradigm of colonial despotism, we
intend to dispel the misleading notion that European colonial administrators
treated Africans with considerable kindness and tolerance (Gann and Duignan,
1978: 339; Heussler, 1963: 203). On the contrary it will be argued, among other
things, that many European colonial officials, and particularly the earlier
administrators, were not only imperious and overbearing but consciously callous
and brutal towards Africans. Furthermore, it will be suggested that European
oppression and acts of violence toward Africans, as exemplified in Douglas'
behavior, stemmed from European racial perceptions about Africans to which
African Studies Review, vol. XXVI, no. 1, March 1983.
25
26 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW
many scholars have given considerable at

Hammond and Jablow, 1977). Thus, despite
on a single British colonial administrat
contribution to the study of colonial admin
In this sense it may provide evidence fo
Africa. Finally, this essay is being attempt
British colonial rule in the Owerri area, a re
been largely neglected by both Nigerian and
THE IMPERIAL AUTOCRAT
Students of European imperialism in Africa tend to agree at least o

fact-i.e., that European colonial officials in Africa (as elsewhere) were
characteristically authoritarian and autocratic. Indeed whatever else may be said of
the early colonial administrators, especially district commissioners (DCs), there is
no question that they were the "uncrowned monarchs" of the areas they ruled,
and that they ruled with iron fists. At the time of the fieldwork for this study in
1975 and 1979, for instance, the overwhelming consensus of the local people at
Owerri regarding Douglas was that he was extraordinarily autocratic, peculiarly
difficult to deal with, and extremely overbearing. His violent temper, authoritarian
personality, and insensitivity towards the local Africans, it is said, made him
distinctly unpopular throughout the whole of the Owerri district. "Of all the DCs
that ever lived here," recalled Owerri elders, "Douglas was unquestionably the
most difficult and the most cruel." Like Nwaelekebe (nickname for the DC at
Oguta), informants recounted, "he treated our people really bad" (interview at
Owerri, September 16, 1975). It is against this background of colonial tyranny and
oppression that we will examine the career of Harold Morday Douglas in Nigeria.
Little is known of Douglas prior to his colonial service in Nigeria. Born in
1874, he joined the British overseas service in 1894 and remained in active service
until 1920 when he was forced by circumstances to retire. After serving as British
Acting Vice-Consul at Las Palmas, Canary Islands (1894-97),3 Douglas came to
Nigeria in 1897 as Acting District Commissioner at Calabar, Eastern Nigeria. As
was customary with British colonial administration, Douglas moved involuntarily
from one station to another and, by 1920, served in different administrative
capacities, his highest rank being that of a second class Resident. On May 10,
1902, he became the first district commissioner at Owerri, apparently because of
his "distinguished service" during the Arochukwu Expedition of 1901-02.4 In
recommending Douglas for a medal award, the Commander of the Aro Field
Force wrote, "Mr. H. M. Douglas was very useful to me at the time of the Obegu
raid and acted with energy on several occasions during the operations"
(CO520/14, "Report in Connection with the Aro Field Force Operations, 1902,"
by Lt.-Colonel Montanaro).
With varying degrees of serenity and agitation, Owerri elders, some of whom
were adults at the time, narrated their early colonial experience under Douglas:
"It is hard for you, my son," informants said to this writer, "to grasp the degree
of our suffering and the fear that was generated in our minds at the time." They
talked about the "disastrous wars of the whiteman" which, in their view,
portended the end of the world; the destruction of homes and farms; the
obliteration of entire villages, and the heavy casualties that resulted (interview
with Owerri elders, Sept. 16 and 19, 1975; interview at Obinze, Oct. 10, 1979).
The reference to the "disastrous wars of the whiteman" meant, of course, the
H. M. DOUGLAS IN COLONIAL NIGERIA 27
series of military aggressions which Douglas and his suc

the different communities in the Owerri district for t
British rule in the area. Though euphemistically kno
pacification, these military operations proved extremely
but, as we shall see later, the Africans fought back
(Nwabara, 1977: 97-161).
Like many of his contemporaries in various parts
unrelenting African opposition to the imposition of
possible exception of Owerri Town, which was fully occ
reported "all the country is decidedly hostile to the
Extract of report on the Owerri District, 1905; here
Since the prestige of the white man seemed to be th
administration (Gann and Duignan, 1978: 215), it was na
defied Douglas' authority would be severely punished
Moor told Nigerians in Benin (Tamuno, 1972: 360),
independence were over; now the white man is "king" a
says a thing will be that is what will be." The root c
Douglas and the Africans thus ranged from peremptory
to build court and rest houses, or to surrender uncondit
and other diverse forms of colonial officialdom. When
comply with such demands, punitive military measures
1966; Ikime, 1977). The Eziama debacle of 1904 clea
Morel once described as British "intolerant imperialism
Like many of their neighbors, the people of Eziama re
the alien government or to make roads as ordered b
demonstrate to them "that the Government was their master" and was resolved
to control all the country, Douglas thereupon declared war on Eziama in early
March 1904. According to Douglas, "all the compounds of Eziama were
destroyed" and the people compelled to parley with the administration. Again in
Douglas' words, "the Chiefs afterwards came and agreed to do everything the
Government laid down; they were told at once to make roads" (Annual Report,
1906; report by Douglas dated July 4, 1904). Admittedly the Eziama people had
been "taught a sharp lesson" for refusing to surrender their ancient
independence. However, it was one thing to command and another thing to be
obeyed. For despite the harshness of their treatment, the Eziamas remained as
intransigent as ever. None of the chiefs, who allegedly had "agreed to do
everything the Government laid down," could actually persuade the people to
make the roads as earlier prescribed. The police constable, who was detailed to
enforce Douglas' orders, testified that he stayed at Eziama for a good two months
"in order to make sure that the roads were built," but failed to make the people
do the work as authorized (ibid.). For their continued stubborn challenge to
Government authority, Douglas thereupon adopted the standard colonial strategy
of seizing Eziama chiefs and elders as hostages so as, in Douglas' words, "to see
if the removal of the Chiefs would have any effect in inducing them to make their
roads" (ibid.). It was this dramatic action that finally broke Eziama resistance,
simply because of the fear of losing their cherished elders. For during the early
colonial era, Africans, particularly the elderly, who were sent to prison, often died
there-primarily because of unfamiliar surroundings, bad food, the unsanitary
condition of the colonial prison, diseases (dysentery and pneumonia), and harsh
treatment. In fact, as one colonial bureaucrat put it, to send an African to prison
in the early colonial days meant that "he has been sentenced to death"
(CO583/87, Minute by Harding, May 19, 1920). Having thus relented, the
Eziama people then constructed the roads and attended the Native Court as
Douglas had ordered. Through the use of force, Eziama was thus brought under
firm British colonial rule.
The so-called colonial development of Africa "for trade and civilization"
involved not only military aggression but also a considerable amount of coercive
African labor. Forced labor was the chief instrument for "the development of the
colonial estate" (Cohen, R., 1979). In our area of study (as elsewhere), resistance
to forced labor was considerable. As will be shown later, Douglas was an
enthusiastic road builder-a hard taskmaster-as the Africans often called him.
Thus, road construction virtually became his preoccupation throughout his entire
tenure of office at Owerri. Non-compliance with his authority to enforce road
construction, as the case of Eziama demonstrated, resulted in prompt and
devastating retribution. To Douglas and his European contemporaries, in fact,
African resistance to forced labor appeared irrational since, as the officials argued,
Africans constructed roads in precolonial days at the behest of their political
leaders; why, then, should they refuse to do so now? What seems to have eluded
the imperialists, however, is the fact that, in precolonial times, Africans worked
for their own welfare; whereas in the colonial era they were compelled to work for
someone else's interests. Whatever the argument, British imperialists insisted that
Africans must construct roads in return for the Pax Britannica they now enjoyed.
Governor Egerton emphasized this point in his defense of forced labor in Nigeria.
All that these people are called upon to do in return for the establishment of
peace and settled government, of freedom from oppression or ill-treatment by
their chiefs, the stoppage of all the abominable practices of cannibalism and
torture, the constant fear of raids by neighbouring towns ... is that they are to
keep clean the paths of their district and where necessary construct new ones
(CO520/46, Egerton to CO, May 28, 1907).5
In places where chiefs exercised the despotic power bestowed on them by the
colonial government, there were various degrees of compliance: roads were built,
waterways were cleared, native courts and rest houses were erected and,
superficially, at least, all seemed to be well. In reports from such places, in fact,
one reads ad nauseam this constant refrain: "The Natives are friendly," "the
mood of the Natives is satisfactory," and so on. In reality, all was not well;
colonial exploitation and oppression rankled; discontent was rife and the situation
needed just a spark to unleash the flame of rebellion. Such was the situation in
Norie, in the then Ngor Court area by 1905. Chief Nwogu of Norie was said to
have exacted too much compulsory labor from his people. They reportedly
complained that demands for road work and head porterage (carrier system) had
become onerous and increasingly burdensome. Besides, the African laborers
rendered free labor and neglected their homes and occupations. As was the case
elsewhere, Chief Nwogu was warned to stop enforcing the labor law. Allegedly
loyal to the colonial administration, he brushed off the complaints. So, in January
1905, he was reported to have been murdered by his rebellious people.
Naturally, the death of a chief, said to be a "friend of the Government,"
provoked hostile reaction in the administrative circles. In fact, upon learning of
the tragic death of Chief Nwogu, Douglas promptly issued summonses for the
arrest and prosecution of the alleged culprits. The court messenger, who was sent
to Norie to arrest the alleged criminals, was however chased away by enraged
villagers. Even the attempt by the assistant district

apprehend those involved in the murder proved equ
Douglas' Report on the Norie Rebellion, May 20, 190
Operations, Oct. 1904-June 1905," hereafter "FOP,
apprehend the individual or individuals responsible f
because of stiff opposition to Norie, may have impelled
Collective Punishment Ordinance, which states, in part,
town is responsible for any crime perpetrated by a few
such actions are often "instigated by the community and carried out by
individuals." In that case, the ordinance stipulated, "The punishment of the
actual perpetrator is not sufficient; the [entire] community must be made to
suffer" (CO520/103, Egerton to Harcourt, May 17, 1911). Consequently Douglas
declared war on Norie on April 21, 1905-invariably to punish the people for
their "defiant attitude towards the Government" (FOP, 1904-05).
The Norie war, which ultimately resulted in the conquest of Norie and her
neighbors in the Ngor Court area, is more popularly remembered as the war of
Nkwala (Ogu Nkwala), presumably because the decisive battle was fought at the
Nkwo Ala market. Though not as well known as the Aro War of 1902, or the
Owa Revolt (1904-06), or even the Ahiara Expedition (1905), it nevertheless
constituted one of the major wars of Igbo resistance to British imperialism.
Moreover, though the war ended sooner than the Owa or Ahiara military
encounters, it approximated them in scale-both in territorial terms and the
mobilization of military manpower (cf. Nwabara, 1977: 122-23).6 In fact, the
Norie war was considered of major significance in the context of British colonial
wars; hence Douglas was specially congratulated by the Secretary of State and
awarded a distinguished medal for suppressing the "violent" rebellion (Colonial
List, 1921). In the wider perspective if Igbo colonial resistance to European
occupation, the Norie war was equally significant. First, unlike most Igbo colonial
wars, this war was preceded by elaborate military preparations. Upon learning of
the government plans to invade them, the different villages of Norie forged a
military alliance by swearing an oath and resolving to fight the white man,
whatever the consequences. Thus, instead of the standard village by village
encounters characteristic of British-Igbo military engagements, this was a
collective war of resistance-the people's war. Other war preparations, like the
making of medicine and the digging of trenches, critical aspects of precolonial
Igbo warfare (Basden, 1966a: ch. XIX; Ukpabi, 1977), were also made. Secondly,
the Norie war was one of those colonial wars which the colonial soldiers wished
they had never fought; resistance was strenuous and casualties were high (FOP,
1904-05).7
Invariably, the war preparations enabled the Norie to defend their homeland
rather effectively, at least initially. In fact, official accounts of the war emphasize
the point that the colonial troops experienced "great difficulty in effecting an
entrance" into the town (FOP, 1904-05). Using their trenches and the fortified
stockades, Norie warriors harassed the enemy. Defeat loomed so large that the
British commanding officer, Lieutenant Halfpenny, had frantically to request
reinforcements. Even as the soldiers advanced from the south, they were attacked
by neighboring towns-especially Ovoro. For nearly one month war raged. Captain
P. K. Carre provided this description of the military confrontation.
After advancing for a distance of one-half m

Oram was rushed at the point of bayonet, and
directed upon the retreating natives at the far
was then destroyed.... [Then] at 2:30 p.m. we
three natives with guns were surprised and sho
(Nigeria National Archives, Ibadan: Calprof
July 10, 1905).
By late May the war was over and the colon

of the superior firepower, war of attrition,
according to Major Trenchard, generally r
themselves- apparently because this was not
the area.8 As would be expected, the war wa
column's operations during the battle of N
"An example was made by destroying all com
1904-05, in Egerton to Lyttelton, July 22, 19
Otikpo obodo (destroyer of towns), given to
certainly apropos.
For Douglas and his soldiers, certainly, t
people in the Ngor Court area was of special
towns and some 137 villages had been "pacif
authority and rule. Moreover, the officials se
accented the prestige of the white man in
words of Capt. Carre, "the prompt and seve
must prove a useful factor in raising the Go
District, and be of assistance in bringing an
(Nigeria Archives, Ibadan: Calprof 10/3, R
doubt that this punitive measure left an endu
in the minds of the people towards Douglas
whole. Especially galling to them was the wa
farms, the chief anchors of their social and
in the Ngor area remained a thorn in the fle
be appreciated from the following report, wh
cooperation of the Ngor people in the 1914 w
recruitment during the war, the district office
The labourers' corps raised at Owerri in M
criterion of the order and organization in the
The Ngor ... country, as might have been anticipated, proved the most
satisfactory; their quota came in promptly, the men were fit, and gave no
trouble while in the station (Nigeria Archives, Enugu; OW346/17 RIVProf
8/5/353, Report on the Owerri Division for the Half year ending 30th June,
1917).9
Surely, severe punishments proved quite unnerving and unsettling to African

societies and, to a large extent, forced them to recognize the immense power of
the colonial government (Afigbo, 1971: 437). Yet, neither massive force nor the
severity of destruction deterred many societies from resisting intolerable European
intrusion. Consequently, colonial resistance continued until well into the 1920s
and even 1930s, despite the calculated Christian missionary efforts to induce the
Africans to accept European imperialism (Nigeria Archives, Enugu: OWDIST
9/6/3, Report on the Owerri Division, January-June, 1920).10 Given the
consequences for resisting the imposition of colonial rule, one wonders why
Africans, by and large, opted for dogged resistance ra

Professor Tamuno (1972: 55-57) provides a succinct answer. Despite
overwhelming odds, he writes, "several people mounted desperate resistance in
their attempts to protect their cherished pre-colonial values and institutions."
Furthermore, he went on, "there were limits to the degree of administrative
interference and injustice which they could tolerate without resistance whatever
the consequences." It was basically Douglas' expansionist policy and unceasing
interference in the precolonial values and institutions of the Africans in the
Owerri district that gave rise to the series of resistance movements of 1905, the
chief of which was the Ahiara uprising of that year.
Ahiara, a part of the former Mbaise clan (now Ahiazu Local Government area
in Imo State), first experienced British imperialism during the Arochukwu
Expedition (1901-02), when food and animals were commandeered by the
soldiers and able-bodied men were forced to carry military stores for the
expeditionary force. By 1905 anti-colonial sentiment in the area had reached its
highest crescendo. "The Ahiaras," wrote Douglas, "have refused to submit and
are now sending messages to ask when the Government intends visiting them"
for a fight (Extract OD, 1905). Not only did the Ahiara people refuse to parley
with the colonial government but, like many of their other Nigerian neighbors,
they firmly rejected the British ideology of free trade. Thus, when Douglas
proclaimed in March 1905 that all the roads in the Ahiara sector should be kept
open to all traders and strangers alike, and that all traditional levies on the roads
should be discontinued, Ahiara leaders responded in characteristic fashion.
Believing that this free trade ultimatum compromised their political sovereignty,
and aware of the economic implications of the policy (since the free trade policy
would dry up revenue derived from travellers' fees), the leaders responded by
closing their roads to traders and strangers suspected of government sympathies
(Extract, OD, 1905). It should be remembered that, in Africa generally, and
Igboland in particular, African rulers augmented their revenues by collecting tolls
from travellers and traders who ventured into their domains. Such travellers' fees,
of course, were important sources of power and wealth which Africans were
naturally reluctant to give up (Meek, 1937; Sundstr6m, 1965). In Nigeria, of
course, the standard British policy was that "all the roads and waterways in the
country are free for trade and [that] no tolls must be levied on those using them
because they don't happen to belong to the country [sic] through which they
pass" (Nigeria Archives, Ibadan: Calprof 8/2, memo to the Officers of the
Akwete Expedition, Feb. 26, 1896). Considering the Ahiara action as a direct
challenge to his authority, therefore, Douglas ordered a punitive military action
against Ahiara in early March 1905. The military measure, however, failed to
resolve the escalating Anglo-Ahiara conflict. It was the celebrated Ahiara
Expedition of December 1905-April 1906 that finally brought Ahiara and her
neighbors into the imperial and cultural orbit of the state and the church."
The punitive military action against Ahiara and the other Mbaise towns in
1905 was the result of the killing of one Dr. Stewart, a British medical officer,
who was attached to the Southern Nigeria Military Regiment. Dr. Stewart was
captured and killed at Onicha, Ezinihitte in Mbaise as he accompanied an
expeditionary force. His death was probably due to a mistaken identity, for he was
thought to be the DC at Owerri-i.e., H. M. Douglas, the bugbear of Africans
(Meek, 1937: 11; Hensley, 1948). Haywood and Clarke (1964: 80) explained
Dr. Stewart's tragic fate in the following mann

Being exhausted by nightfall [as he accompanie
came across a native hut, where he lay down to
an old woman, alerted the tribe to his presence
still asleep. His body was cut up into small piec
fetish, with the idea that those eating a portion w
by any white man and be released from his domin
This account is somehow incorrect. First, Dr.

asleep," nor was he captured in "a native hu
captured on the road between Udo and Onicha
paraded publicly from one town to another, an
in Onicha where he was killed (Ekechi, 1974
severed and shared among the different sections of the Mbaise clan as a
demonstration of collective grievance. Wrongly believing they had gotten even
with the DC who killed their elders, the people thus preserved the head as their
heirloom-a government search in 1932 yielded no results.
Whatever the circumstances surrounding this tragedy, it provoked immediate
shock and outrage within the Nigerian colonial administration. On the assumption
that Ahiara was solely responsible for the death of Dr. Stewart, the divisional
commissioner accordingly instructed Douglas to "exact full reparation for this
outrage" during the proposed punitive action against Ahiara (C0520/32, Fosbery
to Douglas, Nov. 20, 1905). The planned military action against Ahiara coincided
with the annual dry season operation in Southern Nigeria. When, therefore, the
proposal was submitted to the Colonial Office for approval, an economy-minded
senior official questioned the wisdom of these ever-escalating military operations
which, he said, were often advocated by warlike and hysterical officials. These
operations, he argued, needed to be reviewed in light of the increasing financial
burden they imposed on British tax-payers.
Our responsibilities in this region are already serious, indefinite and ever-
expanding, and a heavy burden continues to be thrown on British finances. I
should like to know the policy in pursuit of which this vast "pacificatory" work
is to be pursued, and what relation its cost bears to the other needs of the
colony, and to the claims of the more settled districts (C0520/32, Minutes,
December 1905).
Despite metropolitan hesitations, the proposal was approved and the Ahiara
expedition commenced on December 7, 1905, under the general command of
Major (later Viscount) Hugh Montague Trenchard, perhaps the greatest destroyer
of towns in Eastern Nigeria.12 Resistance to the military invasion was fierce.
Indeed, Trenchard conceded, there was hardly any town "that has not fired at us"
throughout the operation (C0520/32, Report by Trenchard, December 22, 1905).
High Commissioner Thorburn also confirmed the seriousness of the resistance,
and anticipated a prolonged military action "before the Ahira country is
adequately punished" for the murder (C0520/35, Thorburn to Elgin, January 5,
1906). By April 1906, however, the invasion was over, and the people were
subjugated and disarmed.
The Ahiara expedition is a story of brutality and savagery on the part of the
colonial government. Casualties were high and destruction was widespread; the
human misery, as local hitorians recently recollected, "defies description." In fact,
according to Mbaise elders, the war of 1905 was an ordeal "we have never, never
experienced in our lives. We can never forget it" (

March 3, 1975).13 According to local account, many
obliterated, and farms and yam barns were totally burn
of prisoners were captured, some of whom were sen
Onitsha where many died (CO520/81, Egerton to Crewe
were said to have been either bludgeoned to death or bu
It was this unforgettable experience that probably in
statement by the Mbaise Local Council in 1956: "Whe
this region, they did not come as friends but as ene
Jones Commission on the Position and Status of Chiefs
The colonial administration, of course, justified the atr
military operation on grounds that the murder of Dr.
brutal and the disposal of the corpse was unspeakabl
called] for the most examplary punishment" possible
Elgin, Jan. 5, 1906).
The degree of hostility towards European imperialism
depended on the nature of the local colonial experience. It is therefore
understandable that anti-imperialist sentiment in Mbaise should be quite
pronounced. In fact, for almost all of the colonial period, hatred of the colonial
government and its agents remained extremely high in the area. Native courts,
court messengers, and even court clerks fell victim to the wrath of the local
people, a situation that compelled administrative officers at Owerri to label Mbaise
towns as "bad and dangerous" (NNAE:OWDIST 5/2/3, Tew to Provincial
Commissioner, Aug. 3, 1910). For the government, in fact, the Mbaise region
remained a "hostile country, and dangerous for Europeans" to settle (Nigeria
National Archives, Enugu:OWDIST 24/1/2, Given to Fairweather, Feb. 22, 1911,
hereafter NNAE). Even by the 1940s and 1950s anti-colonial sentiment in the
area remained unabated.
Thus, when a British researcher proposed to conduct field work in Mbaise in
1949, the district officer at Owerri was understandably apprehensive. "I think
Mr. Ardener should be informed that he may meet with ... opposition in the
crowded Mba-Ise area," he wrote to the Resident. "Any European stranger," he
stressed, "who comes to live in the Mbaise area ... would meet with suspicion
and lack of cooperation ... especially at the present time" (Nigerian nationalism
was at its peak) (NNAE:OWDIST 7/1/8, No. OW7732, Powell to Resident,
April 1, 1949). Although Mr. Edwin Ardener (now at Oxford) was not harassed
by the local inhabitants, he and his wife, however, became the cynosure of all
eyes in the area. The Ardeners, also, were suspected as imperial agents by the
educated elite who, in fact, raised objection to the presence of this "European
mystery" couple in Mbaise. "I need not emphasize that the present situation in
Nigeria has made us suspect even the best intention of the whiteman," the local
nationalist wrote to the district officer (NNAE:OWDIST 7/1/8, Iwunna to DO,
March 8, 1950; Eastern Nigeria Guardian, April 19 and May 8, 1950).
THE SCOURGE OF AFRICANS
In the eyes of the Africans Douglas was Beke ojoo (i.e., a bad Englishm
the very embodiment of the "ugly European," and a man who, in the words
an Owerri elder, would have been "sold far, far away into slavery" in
precolonial days (interview with Nze Okereke, Sept. 19, 1975). The reaso
this strong and bitter feeling about Douglas derived largely from his overb
attitude towards the Africans, his au

pathological addiction to violence. Afri
African government officials were ofte
A prominent man from Owerri, for
assaulted at the market square in 1903 by Douglas. Chief Nwagbaraocha
Anumudu was allegedly rough-handled for coming late to a meeting summoned
by Douglas-clear evidence that he was out of touch with the culture of the
people he ruled. Piqued and frustrated by Douglas' irreverence, Chief Anumudu
relinquished his warrant of appointment as a chief, perhaps as a way of avoiding
further insults and humiliations on his person. A similar story is told of Chief
Ekeocha of Obinze (near Owerri), said also to have been physically assaulted by
Douglas for failing to strictly enforce the compulsory labor law regarding road
construction. Having, like Chief Anumudu, experienced the violation of his
sacred body by a young and brash imperialist, Chief Ekeocha also surrendered his
warrant to a younger relative who, it seemed, could better cope with an eccentric
DC (interview with Owerri elders, Sept. 16, 1975; with Obinze elders, Oct. 10,
1979).
Because Douglas was a "bad Englishman," it was natural that Africans, and
particularly the elders, would avoid any occasions that would bring them into
direct contact with him. In fact, to the elders, Douglas was more than a tyrant; he
was for all practical purposes a dangerous man, since he had no qualms in
violating the sacred bodies of men in high social and religious position. In
precolonial African societies, it should be remembered, where religion influenced
social sanctions (Meek, 1937; Mair, 1977; Green, 1947; Basden, 1966a, 1966b),
the desecration or degradation of the sacred body of men with supernatural
authority was considered serious offense and called for severe punishments. This
may perhaps explain the extreme reaction of Chief Ogalanya of Uli, who told a
Roman Catholic priest in 1906 that if he were the DC from Owerri (i.e.,
Douglas), he would have cut off his head (Jordan, 1949: 40).
Indeed, Harold M. Douglas was a scourge of the Africans, and his tyranny and
cruelty was not limited to the elderly. In fact, he was a terror to the local African
populace. In 1905, for example, an Anglican catechist testified that he saw
Douglas "beating and kicking" a young man at the Owerri market square for no
apparent reason. Alphonsus C. Onyeabo (made bishop in 1937) reported to
Bishop Tugwell that he witnessed Douglas maltreating Africans in the open
square, and that when he attempted to mediate, he was physically threatened,
apparently for failing to keep his distance (CMS: G3/A3/0, Report on Owerri,
Dec. 1905). Angered by this obvious insult on his associate, Tugwell sternly
reprimanded Douglas in his letter of December 18, 1905, and also called his
attention to the widespread discontent in his district.
From what I have heard from the people as I passed through your District, and
from what I heard subsequently from those who accompany me, your system
of administration appears to be well nigh unbearable. The people complained
bitterly of your harsh treatment of them, while those who accompanied me do
not cease to speak in the strongest terms of your unbearable manner towards
them. They say they have never received such treatment at the hands of a
British officer (CMS: G3/A3/0, Tugwell to Douglas, Dec. 18, 1905).
Finally, Tugwell enjoined Douglas to "Adopt a kindlier and more generous

attitude towards a subject people"-an admonition that apparently fell on deaf
ears!
This Owerri incident was by no means an isolated cas
pattern of oppression. For in 1914, while serving as
Douglas habitually flogged and violently kicked his hou
severe punishment on subordinate African officials
Mr. Braid, the government interpreter, who was rendered unconscious by
Douglas' blow in 1914. According to Douglas, Braid had insolently and
disrespectfully "talked back" to him on being asked to discharge some duty. Said
Douglas, "[I was] so furious at his insolence that I sprang up and struck him
twice with my fist, knocking him down." The violent attack resulted in Mr. Braid
sustaining head and facial injuries that required treatment at the hospital
(C0583/30, Douglas to Lt.-Governor, January 17, 1915). Upon recovering from
the brutal attack, Braid reported the matter to the governor and claimed that all
he said to Douglas was "I did what you told me, sir" (ibid., Braid to Governor
[n.d.], encl. in Lugard to Harcourt, January 29, 1915). The governor viewed
Douglas' "intemperate action" as a gross violation of official conduct, and
reprimanded him sharply. He warned him quite clearly that his reprehensible
action would militate against his promotion (C0583/30, Lt.-Governor to Douglas,
January 28, 1915). The Nigerian press was even more critical. The Nigerian Times
(clippings in CO0583/30), for example, chastized Douglas for being too
overbearing towards Africans and accused him of brazen "intolerance and ill-
treatment of subordinates." The African educated elite made it abundantly clear
to Douglas that, without the services of the Africans, British administration in
Africa would have been crippled, given the relatively small number of European
personnel available. To the educated African elite, it seemed Douglas' penchant
for beating Africans demonstrated not only callousness but also racial arrogance,
charges that Douglas viewed with considerable concern. In his view the press
charges were "vicious" and calculated attempts "to get me into as much trouble
as possible." He added, "the whole matter appears to me to savour of malicious
persecution on the part of the writers of the papers" (C0583/30, Douglas to Lt.-
Governor, January 17, 1915). Yet, he never really confronted the issue of racism.
For, as it seems, racial prejudice inspired his brutality on Africans. Of course,
racism, which a former official in Nigeria impressed upon his compatriots to
eschew, was the basis of European oppression of Africans. Writing under the
pseudonym "RETIBAL" (Nigerian Daily Times, Nov. 15, 1929), the official
reflected:
The African may condone individual cruelty or injustice, he may put up with
what appears to him oppressive laws and taxation, for he is good-hearted and
bears no malice, but racial prejudice hurts his sensitivities, rancours in his
heart, and becomes the root source of all sedition. Therefore let us eradicate
the evil from amongst ourselves. It avails us nothing.
RACIAL PREJUDICE AND EUROPEAN OPPRESSION

Throughout colonial Africa Europeans - administrators, missionarie
businessmen, and even white settlers-inflicted corporal punishment on African
with wreckless abandon. The flogging of Africans was particularly common, an
this was not limited to the young generation. Douglas, for example, was said to
have habitually flogged men publicly while at Owerri, and also to have ev
flogged chiefs at the native courts! (interview with Owerri Elders, Sept. 28, 197
with Osigwe Mere and Nze Okereke, Sept. 16 and 19, 1975, respectively). T
crucial question here is: why did Douglas and

corporal punishment indiscriminately on
same on whites, either in Africa or in Eu
countenance the public flogging of the wom
countries?
This study purports to show that Doublas' ruthlessness towards the Africans
was not simply due to his being an eccentric; rather, his action was a clear
reflection of the pervasive European racial prejudice towards Africans. It is indeed
by viewing his actions in this broader perspective that an understanding of
Douglas' inhumanity to Africans to Africans becomes more meaningful. While we
have little direct evidence to prove that Douglas was a negrophobist per se in view
of the fact that he did not express any overt racist views, yet, it is possible to
deduce from his actions the underpinnings of racism.
Several opinions have been expressed as to why Europeans inflicted harsh
punishments on Africans. Charles Elliot, for instance, speculated that isolation in
a remote station at times drove European officials to acts of violence towards
Africans. This "solitary existence," explained Elliot, "is not conducive to the
well-being of the Europeans," for "when on outstation work there is often a
temptation to inflict irregular punishment" on the African subjects (Gann and
Duignan, 1978: 231). Sir Charles, however, insisted that European infliction of
irregular and cruel punishments represented neither "a case of sadism" nor "lust
or any sort of pleasure" on the part of the victimizers. Rather, he argued, "it
arises from anger and exasperation." But since the infliction of corporal
punishment was by no means confined to officials in forlorn stations, explanations
other than sheer human anger and exasperation must be sought elsewhere.
Physical and mental illness, as well as sheer contempt for the Africans, have
also been suggested as explanations for the violent aggression directed at the
Africans. Sir Walter Egerton, governor of Southern Nigeria (1903-1912), for
instance, argued in 1907 that illness, at times, had the effect of making a
European official to "temporarily lose his control of his nerves and [so] act as he
would not think of in good health in mind and body" (C0520/46, Egerton to CO,
May 28, 1907). Perhaps mental or physical illness may have been a factor to the
equation. However, we argue that European aggression towards Africans was
fundamentally inspired by racism. In other words, European racial perceptions of
Africans predisposed them to treat Africans rather shabbily. Of course, scholars
like Curtin (1964), Hammond and Jablow (1977), Cohen (1980), and many
others have ably shown how European images or stereotypes of Africans
determined their modes of action towards the latter. Indeed, during the
precolonial and colonial periods, Africans were generally perceived as children,
"wild as a colt" (Hammond and Jablow, 1977: 65), to be disciplined and thus
"raised slowly in the scale of civilization" (Gann and Duignan, 1978: 339). Racial
representations, it seems, articulated and sustained black/white relations or
cleavages. Thus Caroline Ifeka-Moller (Ranger, 1979: 467) argues that "Racial
symbols represented political inequalities through colour categories and expressed
European command of the means of domination as a 'natural' consequence of
white moral virtue," a point of view fully borne out by Major Trenchard's
contention that force (violence) was the most expeditious "method of
emphasising the white man's right to rule" (Boyle, 1962: 79). Scholars of a
different persuasion, of course, disagree with our thesis. "European behavior
[towards Africans]," wrote Gann and Duignan (1978: 3

more by situational needs than by racial theories."
That racial ideology essentially shaped European attitude
be further demonstrated by a careful examination of t
related cases involving the Chief Justice of Nigeria, on th
Holt on the other. On September 24, 1908, Mrs. Mary Osbo
Justice of Southern Nigeria, was sued in a London court by
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) for infli
punishment on her West African maid, Gambia. Gambia
severely flogged and beaten by Mrs. Osborne on the gro
insubordinate, a charge Gambia denied (London Times
admitted, however, having gossiped about Mrs. Osborne's i
which she was ruthlessly flogged and beaten. The girl t
Mrs. Osborne held her down and placed her foot on her
several times, and thus left scars on her body. Justice Alger
the rationale for the punishment: "The only way to cor
contended, "was to flog them" (Times, Oct. 12, 1908). Th
of his wife's brutal action is therefore clear. Disregarding
the case, the court found the Osbornes guilty of cruel and
but waived prison terms on grounds of "the seriousness
received." Instead the Osbornes were asked to simply pa
Oct. 12, 1908).
The violence perpetrated on Gambia, and the racial prejudice that inspired it,
attracted the attention of Mrs. Osborne's neighbors. The Osbornes were thus
sternly reprimanded both privately and publicly (in court). This letter from one of
his neighbors merits quoting in full as it partly illustrates our contention that
racism lay at the root of European violence against Africans.
I called to see you on two occasions with regard to the way in which
Mrs. Osborne spoke to my wife concerning the two little maids you left there
[wrote Mr. Steven]. I wish to say that, if you and Mrs.Osborne are treating
your servants in a way that will stand the test of Eternity, I am sure you have
no need to be at all upset by what we have both felt.... I witness before God
that I've seen nothing in them ... that would deserve flogging. Would you find
English girls to endure what they do? Please forgive me [for] being plain, but
the position you ... hold should be quite enough to make you realize your
responsibility before God. Now I wish to say I write this as a friend in
confidence and as my duty as a Christian, praying, as I have done before, that
you will both be willing to let Christ rule your lives, as without him trouble will
never cease in this life or in the life that is to come, which may be very soon
(London Times, Oct. 12, 1908).
Apparently not content with the judgment rendered by the court, Inspector
Thompson of the NSPCC protested to the Colonial Office regarding
Mr. Osborne's racist remark (CO520/73, NSPCC to CO, Oct. 13, 1908). One
would have expected a man in Mr. Osborne's position to be more discreet; but he
was, after all, a product of his society and age. Thus, the under-secretary of state
at the Colonial Office minuted that "the thrashing probably did 'Gambia' a great
good" (CO520/73, Minutes by Antrobus, Oct. 13, 1908), obviously sustaining the
view that black people needed to be disciplined. While, however, deprecating
Mr. Osborne's "injudicious" racial statement, he nevertheless felt it would be
impolitic to engage in any debate with the NSPCC on the matter. He therefore
recommended: "Better simply acknowledg

say that Lord Crewe is inquiring into t
(C0520/73, Draft (letter) to Robert J. Par
That racial stereotypes influenced Europ
illustrated by the Lever-Morel controvers
Huxley debate (1944) about Kenya. In 1911
imperialism in Africa, questioned the justi
lands in the Congo by "land monopolists,
make waste of his country in order to acq
the public interest" (London School of Eco
April 25, 1911). Since W. H. Lever, a m
directly involved in the Congo land que
him that the alienation of African lands a
African farmer. "His future and his happ
upon his being able to retain possession of
to buy and sell in the produce thereof" (M
1911). Morel's apparent negrophilism wa
the intelligent guidance from the white m
resources. Since Lever's argument in favor
lands derived essentially from an ingraine
reply to Morel's negrophilist stand merits
If you can show me any part of the world
own country or the United States of Amer
organizing ability to use his land I should un
Cotton planting in Nigeria is going to be a ho
can organize the industry and develop it....
happiness of any man either black or whi
something he is unable to develop. John Brig
congenial occupation with a sense of progres
happiness. I do not think that organizing,
tracts of country is a congenial occupation f
ability in that direction in Liberia nor in H
prospered marvellously in the United States
the white man.... I do not think you are like
black man unless you study his capabilitie
April 18, 1911).
The above quotation clearly epitomized L

a notion other Europeans held firmly as
Morel's sincerity of motive in advocating
called upon him to temper his African
"you do not build a halo round the black m
being which it will take him hundreds of
to become." Sticking firmly to his ster
contended that it was virtually impossible
America, to raise himself by his bootstrap
(Morel Papers, Lever to Morel, April 18
that African leaders today would concur. I
antagonistic to European economic or com
who should determine the direction of ec
Africa to be truly economically viable and
(land) must necessarily be controlled b
European role in Africa, Morel insisted, should be direc

through technological knowledge and labor-saving appli
and its resources for the benefit of Africans. He went on:
In my view the only justification for our assumption of

regions is that it shall lead to the enrichment and moral and material
betterment of their peoples; that it shall be directed towards making their land
more valuable and more productive to them by giving them markets, by
imparting to them that technical knowledge which we have acquired.... (Morel
to Lever, April 19, 1911).
Admittedly, there is a streak of middle-class noblesse oblige in the foregoing

statements; yet there is something more fundamental than the apparent Euro-
African cooperation. The crucial question in relation to Lever's contention is,
indeed, whether the African is capable of initiating economic development on his
own without reliance on the white man. If the answer is affirmative, as surely it is,
then Lever's claims of racial inferiority is a farce. Hence Morel's long rejoinder:
You asked me, in effect, to show you where in West Africa the native is
utilizing and developing his land. Very well. But first, one point. You quote
Liberia. Why, Liberia is certainly an object lesson. But it is an object lesson
which strengthens, not weakens, my case. What passes under the name of
Liberia is a collection of 40,000 descendants of slaves shipped back from the
United States to Africa, divorced from their race, Europeanised, dumped down
on the West Coast, and then expected to be anything but what-they are.
Liberia is not a testimony to the failure of the policy I advocate: but testimony
to the failure of the Philanthropic School. Liberia is an artificial produce which
has nothing to do with African life and stands wholly outside it....
I take you to Senegal where the native, his own land ower, covers vast
stretches of country with groundnut cultivation, exporting that product to the
value of over [pounds] 1,250,000 ... I take you to the Gambia where, under
the same conditions, a similar industry has sprung up. I take you to the Gold
Coast where the native, again his own landowner, has in a few years built up
an export industry in cocoa which has grown from nothing to three-fourths of a
million sterling. I take you to Southern Nigeria where hundreds of thousands
of natives, their own landowners, are employed in the oil and palm kernel
industry, exporting nearly four millions sterling of those articles per annum....
(Morel to Lever, April 19, 1911).
Lever remained characteristically unconvinced. Without European tutelage, he

argued, Africa would remain underdeveloped "for centuries" to come (Lever to
Morel, April 27, 1911). Even by 1924 he remained solidly hooked to this
ideology. At a dinner party in honor of the Governor of Nigeria, Sir Hugh
Clifford, Lord Leverhulme said: "I am certain that West African races have to be
treated very much as one would treat children when they are immature and
underdeveloped.... I say this with my little experience, that the African native
would be happier, produce best, and live under conditions of prosperity when his
labour is directed and organised by his white brother who has all these millions of
years' start ahead of him" (West Africa, July 26, 1924). Lever's racial arrogance
was not an aberration; it was a pervasive trait in European society. Colonial
administrators and even distinguished British writers subscribed to the necessity of
European tutelage-if Africa was to rise from its decades of underdevelopment
(Oliver and Matthew, 1963: 456; Perham, 1960). Indeed, it appears that racial
prejudice and oppression are inseparable, at l
DOUGLAS THE ROADBUILDER
Nowhere else, perhaps, was Douglas's intolerant imperialism more p

than in the execution of his philosophy of progress symbolized in "th
up of the country" through the construction of roads. Like Rudbeck
Cary's Mister Johnson, Douglas firmly believed in road constructi
instrument of modernization, not necessarily in the sense that Africans
understood the term (Rodney, 1972; Crowder, 1968), but in the sense of
rendering Nigeria exploitable, economically and culturally.
Ever since the nineteenth century European adventurers in Africa had
advocated the development of better communication systems for the promotion of
Afro-European trade and for the introduction of European civilization in Africa.
For John Whitford, the British commercial wizard in West Africa from the 1860s,
the advance of European economic and cultural imperialism in Africa lay in the
building of roads and railways (Whitford, 1877: 333-35). Improved
communications would not only increase the volume of trade, Whitford argued,
but "would immeasurably aid the [Christian] missionaries in their effort to civilise
the Africans" (McPhee, 1926: 108). This notion of civilizing Africa through the
agency of commerce and Christianity was, of course, a pervasive obsession of
Europeans in the nineteenth century. Considering themselves the torchbearers of
civilization in Africa, the Christian missions zealously joined in the stampede for
resources and souls, their explanation being that "to civilise [Africa] without
Christianity is a dangerous proceeding" (Boer, 1979: 138).
Of course, modern infrastructural developments in Africa occurred during the
colonial period. In our region of study, Douglas appears to be the chief architect
of infrastructural change, especially road building. With almost missionary zeal he
embarked on road construction in the Owerri district right from his assumption of
office in 1902 until his transfer to Onitsha in 1906. By the end of his official stay
at Owerri, he had constructed over two hundred miles of motorable roads, many
of them radiating from Owerri and linking the different towns and villages in the
district. In doing this, it seems, he laid the foundation of the communications
revolution in present Imo State, especially in the Owerri sector. It was Douglas'
energetic and enthusiastic road building activities that earned him the popular
nomenclature of Beke ogbu ama, the great White road builder. And even though
the Africans resented the methods he and his successors employed in the opening
up of the country, they nevertheless view the advent of the British as marking the
era of modern communications development, and Douglas as the pioneer of
mmepe, i.e., development. "It was Douglas," remarked an unabashed African
admirer of colonialism in Nigeria, "who brought mmepe: he opened up our
country by his road building" programs (interview with Nze Okereke of Owerri,
Sept. 19, 1975). But there were Africans who also expressed the view that
improved communications, while aiding socioeconomic development, inevitably
"brought trouble and social disruption," a point that colonial officials themselves
could not ignore (interview with Obinze elders, Oct. 10, 1979).14
Douglas' performance in road construction naturally won praise from his
superiors as well as from contemporary Christian missionaries.15 To Governor
Egerton, an enthusiastic supporter of road building himself, Douglas was an
exemplary taskmaster. After touring the different districts of Southern Nigeria on
bicycle in 1905, Egerton was greatly impressed with Douglas' work and cited him
as a model for others to emulate. In many parts of Sou

noted in his journal, roads were either too narrow or not w
Cross River District of Eastern Nigeria, for example,
disappointed that there were "no properly constructed road
upon Mr. Charles Patridge for immediate action. "I h
Mr. Patridge the necessity of calling upon the various villag
the road making required and to maintain the roads made" (C0520/31,
"Overland journey from Lagos to Calabar via Ibadan, 1905": 37, hereafter
"Overland journey, 1905"). In the Owerri district, in contrast, the governor
seemed quite pleased with the "good work" that Douglas had done in the area of
road construction. Of special delight was the appearance of the roads, described as
broad and "wonderfully good." "These roads," commended the governor,
are nearly 40 feet wide.... The surface is wonderfully good considering that no
side drains have been dug nor has any portion of the forty-foot-way been
properly formed for wheel traffic.... The width of the roadway is sufficient to
allow for the erection of the telegraph line without interfering with the traffic
and without the Telegraph Construction Party having additional clearing to do
("Overland journey, 1905": 33).
Not only was the governor impressed by the network of roads that criss-crossed
the entire Owerri district, he also praised Douglas for the "excellent Rest Houses
[located] at convenient distances all along the roads"-evident testimony to
Douglas' effective mobilization of African labor. Overall, the governor rated
Douglas far above his contemporaries in the field of road building. "Mr. Douglas
has done wonderfully good work in his District. There is no district in the
Protectorate that can compare with Douglas' for the roadwork that has been
done" ("Overland journey, 1905": 33). For his exemplary work Egerton assured
Douglas of continued moral and financial support in his energetic drive to open
this part of the Igbo hinterland for maximal British exploitation ("Overland
journey, 1905": 33).
For Egerton, of course, road building was a vital component of the European
"civilizing" mission (CO520/92, Egerton to CO, March 18, 1910), a notion he
invariably shared in common with many of his colonial compatriots. According to
Joyce Carey (n.d.: 51), Africans have never had good communication systems and
"could make no progress without them." Viewed from the ideology of the
civilizing mission, therefore, the development of better communication systems in
Africa was yet another manifestation of the European sense of responsibility
toward the undeveloped Africans. Indeed, insisted the writer in the British
missionary journal Lightbearer of May 1909, "the opening of the lines of
communication and transport [in Nigeria] is no mere selfish enterprise on a
narrow basis of racial domination and supremacy. Pride of Empire assuredly there
is, and rightly so. But ... to our pride in the genius of the race we add confidence
that the millions of Africans who watch our progress, partly in awe, partly in
bewilderment, partly with suspicion, will be made more prosperous by our
advent" (Boer, 1979: 174).
Despite these platitudinous statements, the fact of the matter is that
administrative, military, and economic considerations provided the principal
impulse for the so-called communications revolution. Faced initially with
unrelenting African resistance, and eager to exploit the resources of the colonial
estate, administrative officials embarked on the development of transport facilities.
According to Governor Egerton, improved communications were absolutely
necessary "to facilitate the passage of tr

communication, make it possible to mainta
than would otherwise be necessary" (C052
1904). Allan McPhee (1926: 126) said prett
the military, administrative, and economic
transportation. In fact, by 1914, many of th
built and the British administration was en
region of Nigeria "far more thoroughly than of yore," as the divisional
commissioner admitted (Afigbo, 1971: 448).
Whatever the reasons for the development of the communication systems,
there is no question that the colonial government was the chief beneficiary
(Crowder, 1969; Rodney, 1972) and that the Africans paid a heavy price for this
colonial legacy since forced labor was the chief basis for the development of the
colonies. The construction of roads and railways, as well as the clearing of
waterways, was made possible by the massive mobilization of coerced African
labor. In Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, administrative officials compelled
Africans, through the chiefs, to work on the roads and the railways or to clear the
waterways. Initially laborers were not paid, and even when wages were paid later,
both road and railway work remained unattractive.16 Failure to comply with the
forced labor ordinance resulted, as we have already seen in the cases of Eziama
and other towns, not only in the "visit" of the soldiers, but more exasperatingly
in the flogging and imprisonment of African resistors. Even chiefs who opposed
the oppressive compulsory labor law were flogged, or fined, or removed, thus
illustrating the enormous and arbitrary power of colonial administrators. As for
Doublas, his intolerant imperialism in Nigeria allowed for no African opposition
or resistance in whatever form. His drastic treatment of Chief Njemanze of
Owerri is a case in point.
Early in his administration at Owerri, Douglas was said to have clashed with
Chief Njemanze, the most prominent chief in Owerri up to 1920. According to
local opinion, Chief Njemanze raised an objection to Douglas' road building policy
on grounds that the work involved was onerous and exploitative (unpaid labor).
Perhaps a more plausible explanation of his protest was the vast stretches of farm
land that were being devastated, many of the farm lands, it is said, belonging to
him. Given that agriculture was (and still is) the principal occupation of the
Owerri Igbo, Njemanze's objection seems justified and far from being a typical
example of African "opposition to development and civilization" as the colonial
officials would have us believe. In any case, Chief Njemanze's opposition resulted
in his being declared persona non grata at Owerri. Consequently he was
temporarily deported to Degema in the Niger Delta (interview with Owerri elders,
Sept. 16, 1975; Oct. 1979).17 This dramatic action invariably confirmed the local
people's opinion of Douglas as Beke ojoo (bad Englishman). As local informants
pointed out, if a "big man" like Njemanze, an Ogaranya (i.e., a wealthy and
powerful man), could be disciplined in such a summary manner, who else would
be safe under Douglas? By the time Chief Njemanze returned, however, he had
mellowed significantly and, like most of the African chiefs, he thereupon actively
participated in the colonial labor recruitment.
Resistance to forced labor, as already noted, was widespread not simply
because it was unremunerative, or because it posed a serious danger to life and
limb, but also because it was an infringement of the people's freedom and liberty.
Being "excessively keen on individual liberty," the Igbo thus resented being
forced to work for the imperial government at the

occupations. Even though they equally hated being
preferred taxation to forced labor, for, in their minds
tax, he was totally free from forced labor. To the colo
hand, this Igbo philosophical bent was "dangerous" beca
it would exempt the people "from all obedience to authority" and thus create
difficulties "in obtaining locally labour for roads, buildings, etc." This Igbo sense
of individual liberty, said the Resident, should be "restrained" as far as is
practicable (RHL; Oxford: MSS.Afr.s.783, "Annual Report on the Onitsha
Province, 1928"). It should also be noted that abuses of the compulsory labor law
by the chiefs contributed significantly to the unrelenting resistance. Not only were
chiefs often ruthless in the enforcement of the labor law, but many of them
enhanced their power and wealth substantially as a result of their labor
recruitment services (Uzoechi, 1981). In essence, colonial African chiefs, by
wrongly exercising the enormous power bestowed on them, became full partners
in colonial oppression and exploitation.
There were occasions, of course, when angry Africans warned their chiefs not
to come again with messages or orders from the whiteman, simply because the
colonial exactions had become too burdensome and downright degrading
(C0583/32, Lugard to CO, No. 605, June 24, 1915). Even when laborers
ultimately received paltry wages for their labor, they still protested against the
abuses of forced labor. "It is no good our earning money if the Warrant Chiefs
took it all from us," they complained [C0583/49, Boyle to CO (Conf.),
November 10, 1916]. In fact, in town after town there were reports of court
messengers being beaten up as they came to arrest those who refused to turn out
for roadwork. High-handed European taskmasters, as well as unscrupulous chiefs,
inevitably facted the hostile reactions of frustrated Africans. The cases of Crewe-
Read, a British colonial officer in Nigeria, and Chief Nwogu of Norie, already
cited, come readily to mind. Like Douglas, Crewe-Read often flogged chiefs who
failed to attend the Native Court or young men who did not turn out to work on
the roads as a rule (Tamuno, 1972: 321-23). In 1906 he was murdered by
exasperated Africans, a retaliatory violence which even the British Colonial Office
considered justified (Ekechi, 1972: 151). Other British private citizens, who
favored European imperialism in Africa, blamed Crewe-Read for doing things
"contrary to all justice and common sense" (Tamuno, 1972: 322).
CONCLUSION
Despite the favorable recommendations from his superiors in the ear

as an energetic political officer and roadbuilder, Douglas was not really
of the Nigerian authorities. Several reasons account for this including,
Douglas' deplorable temperament and rebellious character, as well
vituperative attacks on the administration. In fact, it was Douglas' surp
telling criticism of the Nigerian administrative system and "those at t
affairs" in Nigeria and England that almost completely ruptured his rela
the authorities and thus caused his forced retirement from Nigerian se
1920.
The distance between Douglas and the Nigerian colonial authorities se
have widened considerably between 1914 and 1918 when, as a seco
Resident, Douglas became very critical of what he called the "iniquitous
of administration in Nigeria. Much of his displeasure with the adm
derived from the exasperating red tape in

of senior officials towards junior admi
conditions of service in Nigeria; and the
of European junior staff by the senior o
blistering attacks on the administratio
"decreased prospects" for promotion in the service, having received no
promotion himself "for over 12 years" and was thus left to stagnate at his
maximum salary of 1,000 pounds (NNAE: CSE5/14/2, No. C11/1919, Douglas to
Secretary, December 28, 1918).19 He deplored the allegedly poor salaries of
administrative officers in a Nigeria that was supposedly "one of the richest
Colonies in the [British] Empire with an ever increasing revenue";20 he
condemned outright the "invidious distinctions" in rank in the administration
which, according to him, made it possible for senior officials to enjoy higher
comforts at the expense of the junior staff; and he expressed great displeasure at
the "unreasonable" reduction in the allowances paid to administrative officers
under the guise of financial exigency (ibid.).21
What appears to have exasperated Douglas even more was the inequitable
system of rewards in the government by which senior officials were rewarded
handsomely, at times having their salaries "raised up to 50%," while giving little
consideration to the overworked and underpaid junior officials. After "extended
tours and extra work" the latter asked to be remunerated accordingly, the
government, said Douglas, simply "offered a sop ... [to] keep them quiet" (ibid.).
Such glaring inequities in the "system," contended Douglas, not only "cause
irritation and annoyance," but "are enough to rouse men, who have hitherto
been content to remain passive," to demand better treatment. Yet the
administration remained unresponsive; instead the officers "are told they are not
considering the public interest." Given this "unsympathetic treatment" from the
government, the "intolerable sweating" of officers that has been allowed to exist
and the general decline of conditions of service, should it be surprising, Douglas
asked, that "there are not a more dissatisfied lot of men to be found [anywhere]
in the Empire than in Nigeria?" (ibid.). And why, Douglas again asked, were
officials generally reluctant to raise their voice against the ugly situation of things
in Nigeria? In his view, the reasons were obvious: "Junior officers are afraid to
speak for fear of injuring their prospects and seniors, too, for that matter, even
though they have got as high as they can reasonably expect to get and some ...
may possibly be thinking of an I. S. O. or C. M. G. as the price of their silence"
(ibid.).
Douglas seemed particularly irritated by and, in fact, intensely angry at the
deliberate effort being made by the senior officials in Nigeria to make things very
difficult for the junior staff simply to enhance their position. To quote Douglas:
A feeling, I am sure, exists that it redounds to the credit if not at times to the
pecuniary advantage of higher officials if they can cut down the allowances of
junior officers or in any way save a few pounds to the Government or increase
the revenue by making trivial pecuniary demands on the officials.... (ibid.).
As for the general deterioration of service conditions, and the mounting

frustration and discontent among the administrative staff, Douglas had no qualms
in laying the blame on the Governor-General, Sir (later Lord) Frederick Lugard.
Had Lugard been less preoccupied with the amalgamation of Nigeria, and thus
kept "more in touch with his officers," Douglas charged in 1914, he "would
probably have saved a deal of heart-burning and gen

which is bound to occur where unredressed grievanc
Finally, Douglas directed his jabs at the officials
accusing them of sheer callousness and ingratitud
deceased officials the latters' accumulated leave p
remarked Douglas, "that a Government ... could d
say anything from a few pounds to five hundred or
justly earned leave pay because he had the misfortune to die before he could
enjoy it." Indeed, insisted Douglas, it seemed grossly "unjust" for the
government to assume "that because a man dies before he has been able to enjoy
the earned leave, Government has no further liability" (ibid.). As might be
expected, authorities in Nigeria and in England were, naturally, outraged by
Douglas' broadsides. To the Deputy Governor, for example, Douglas had not
only "overstep[ped] the widest limits of criticism," but by also circulating his
views to junior officers,22 he had indeed "done all that lies in his power to create
disloyalty in the service both [in] this Government" and at the Colonial Office.
Hence his recommendation that Doublas should be disciplined accordingly
(NNAE: CSE 5/14/1, Moorhouse to Milner, January 24, 1919). Surely, noted a
senior official at the Colonial Office, "Government cannot afford to tolerate such
attacks from a senior European officer if it hopes to maintain discipline among the
subordinate staff" (C0583/73, minutes).23 Accordingly, the Colonial Secretary
directed the governor of Nigeria to demand Douglas' immediate resignation.
"Should he fail to do so," concluded the Secretary, "he should be brought before
the Executive Council [and censured]" (NNSE: CSE 5/14/2, No. C11/11919).
Thus, by 1920 Douglas had been forced out of Nigeria, and was to spend his last
days in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), where he died on May 24, 1926.
Throughout this essay we have attempted to portray Douglas as a veritable
example of a European colonial despot in contrast to the extravagant claims of
colonial apologists and propagandists. Many of these writers have perpetuated the
myth that the people of the colonies were ruled by the "right type of officers"
whose superb education in the English public schools and universities inculcated
in them valuable qualities of self-control, fair play, a sense of noblesse oblige, and
a humanitarian attitude towards the less favored races (Heussler, 1963; Gann and
Duignan, 1978). In fact to Lord Lugard, the special education of these English
"gentlemen" rendered them virtually incorruptible. "There is no danger of such
men falling a prey to that subtle moral deterioration which the exercise of power
over inferior races produces in men of a different type and which finds expression
in cruelty," he wrote in his Dual Mandate (1922: 132). It is however apparent
from our study that Douglas was certainly not the "right type of officer"; nor did
such an officer exist except in the wild imagination of the colonial propagandists.
In addition to highlighting aspects of Douglas' career in Nigeria, we have also
attempted to place his "unbearable administration" in the wider perspective of
European colonial oppression. Specifically, it has been argued that there seems to
have been a direct correlation between racial prejudice and European oppression
of Africans, a point of view that is in fact sustained by studies elsewhere (Jordan,
1968). By analyzing the relationship between Douglas and the African peoples, it
has been possible to provide new perspectives on aspects of European colonialism
in Africa. Also, this study provides a composite picture of a "typical" colonial
paternalist, who equated the advancing of British imperial interests with African
"development." In other words, by militarily subduing African societies and by
transforming the communication systems s

materialize, Douglas believed, like many of h
European colonialism was essentially for the
an essential part of paternalist thought," ob
see a clear distinction between 'us' and 'them'
manipulate the situation in such a way that t
areas."
NOTES
1. Cf. Heussler (1963), Gann and Duignan (1978), Kirk-Greene (1981), Murr
(1978), Luwel (1978), Ranger (1979), Santi and Hill (1980).
2. Ranger (1979: 463) reported that the topic "Whites in Africa-Past, Pre
Future" selected for the 1978 African Studies Association of the United Ki
"aroused some controversy" and that a correspondent, presumably African,
protest: "Now that Africa is nearly free from imperialism and exploitation ...
intellectuals from British universities are conspiring to draw a new map of Afr
3. I am indebted to Miss B. M. H. Parks of the Commonwealth office Library
(1967) and Mr. G. E. S. Njoku, Nigeria National Archives, Enugu (1979) for
the references on Douglas.
4. For a full record of Douglas' service in Nigeria see: the Colonial Office List,
Southern Nigerian Civil List, 1910; Ekechi (forthcoming).
5. Christian missionaries in Nigeria also emphasized the blessings of the Pax Br
reflected in this statement (Boer, 1979: 134): "the fruits of European conqu
Sudan appear in the abolition of slavery...; in the prevention of endless triba
the opening up of the lands and linking them with the sea through the building
railways and river steamers; and in the establishment of justice, righteous
peace." See also ibid., p. 171.
6. About 137 villages were involved, but no population figures are available.
7. The exact number of Africans killed or wounded will never be known. Info
characteristic hyperbole, put the casualties at "many, many people killed" an
(irilari) wounded. The government reported, however, that four of its sold
killed and fifty-three wounded.
8. In most areas of West Africa, and Igboland in particular, night or surprise att
rare, and convention governed the conduct of war. A formal declaration of
often preceded by a notice of warning, thus "giving an enemy time to prep
attack and an opportunity for parleying and for sending women, children and t
to safety" (Smith, 1976: 53). It was against this traditional background of w
which time and place were stated, that many Igbo communities invited th
administration "to state the hour and place" of war, and "we shall be there
Oxford: MSS.Afr.s.374(4), Colonel Gerald Adams Papers, "Force of Argumen
9. In 1938 the local administration also reported of a successful attempt to esta
oil plantation at Umuneke Ngor, the headquarters of the Native Court. "Con
importance is attached to the future value of demonstration plots in encourag
tree] planting, and it is hoped that we shall be able to establish more in 1939
commented (Nigeria National Archives, Enugu: OWDIST 10/1/3, "Annua
1938-Owerri Division," para. 53).
10. Of the role of the Christian missions, the district officer wrote in 1920, "D
period under review there have been no serious disturbance.... This state of affairs
superficially is quite satisfactory and possibly the ever increasing number of Mission
Schools helps to lessen the tendency towards acts of violence." In his half year report
for 1919, the DO also remarked with obvious satisfaction that "no disturbance of any
kind took place." In fact, he went on, "on no occasion was it necessary to send out
more than three constables to uphold the authority of the law and as a rule one or two
sufficed for that purpose. This is perhaps a hopeful sign that Owerri may soon be classed
as an entirely settled area. The influence of the Churches

influence undoubtedly tends to diminish crimes of violence
(Nigeria National Archives, Enugu: OWDIST 9/5/6, No. 42/
the Owerri Division, January to June 30th, 1919).
11. The conquest of Mbaise resulted in the establishment of a
opening of mission stations in the different towns, starti
Christian missionaries were co-partners of European imperia
is, as Nigerians say, another Ireland, for the largest num
priests, and nuns in Imo State come from Mbaise. From 1932
of fierce inter-group conflict arising from sectarian differences - in fact
intolerance-which continues to undercut Mbaise sense of political and cultural identity
(Ekechi, forthcoming; Nwala, 1978: 31-35).
12. For a sympathetic biolgraphy see Boyle (1962). Trenchard's papers are housed at Rhodes
House Library, Oxford. My attempts to use them in 1968 proved unsuccessful because
of the 50-year embargo placed on the materials. Although he proved to be a successful
soldier, "Trenchard's formal education left much to be desired, and he barely passed his
army entrance examination.... 'Boom,' as he was called, was tough, powerful, and a
natural leader of men" (Gann and Duignan, 1978: 112).
13. I am particularly indebted to the late Okeahialam Elem (c. 95 years) of Onicha,
Ezinnihitte for information on this matter. For more detail see Ekechi (1974).
14. Reporting of the impact of the so-called "extraordinary development" in Eastern
Nigeria on women, R. B. Adams (Colonial Annual Reports, 1925) remarked that women
"have been gradually asserting themselves in this country" as a result of travelling and
the spread of new ideas. Consequently, he continued, "wives have rebelled against the
old position of servitude to which they were doomed. Women must progress now that
they have started and no doubt eventually in Nigeria will be heard the shrill cry of
'votes for women'."
15. The Reverend T. J. Dennis, the resident Anglican missionary to Owerri, was particularly
impressed with the extensive network of roads obviously because they facilitated
Christian missionary enterprise (CMS:ACC/89/F1, Dennis' Letter Journals, April 11,
1905).
16. Although Governor Egerton advocated paying laborers more than the prevailing 6d. per
day to attract Africans to work on the roads and railways ("Overland Journey, 1905":
3), his senior officials insisted on free and compulsory labor. "I cannot see how any
alteration of the present system [of unpaid labor] would prove of any use," since the
people paid no taxes in lieu of free service, argued the official in charge of local colonial
affairs (C0520/43, memo on Compulsory Labor by F. S. James, 1907).
17. Informants not from Chief Njemanze's village suggested the he was deported because of
his slave-dealing activities and not primarily as a result of the opposition to Doublas'
roadbuilding policy.
18. Douglas was of course not alone in decrying the red tape that seemed to hamper
administrative efficiency. A contemporary characterized British administration in Nigeria
as "[so] full of red tape that there is no room to turn around" (RHL: MSS.Afr.s.1375,
Wordworth to Hilton, 11.1.1900).
19. Most colonial officials complained about slow advancement in the colonial service
(Bradley, 1966; Burns, 1949). Douglas' problems seemed compounded by his personal
idiosyncrasies and his apparently poor performance in language examinations. He of
course complained of being transferred constantly from one language area to another,
thus making it difficult for him to master any one language (C0583/73, enclosures), but
his case was not unique. Involuntary mobility from one language area to another was
universal among colonial administrative officials in Africa (Bradley, 1966: chs. 4-8; Gann
and Duignan, 1978: 233). However, neither administrative efficiency nor expert
knowledge of African languages alone ensured promotion, as the former Lt.-Governor
of Southern Nigeria revealed (Lagos Daily Times, November 15, 1929). Subservience or
"playing the game" of social acceptance was crucial. "In all circles good manners and
right conduct tell for promotion more than else

own life as in England...; it is the Machine that
20. For comparative salary scales elsewhere in A
219).
21. Despite the many difficulties inherent in travelling from one place to another,
administrative officials actually liked to travel because of the additional income derived
from their tours. Not surprisingly, therefore, when travel allowances were either
curtailed or eliminated, officials were often incensed (cf. RHL: MSS.Afr.s.1373,
Woodworth to Geoffrey, 6.2.1904).
22. Douglas admitted circulating his critical letters "to as many officers as I have been able
to," presumably because most of the junior officials were as aggrieved as himself.
Indeed, claimed Douglas, "all are in entire agreement with the opinion expressed"
(NNAE:CSE 5/14/2, Douglas to Secr., December 28, 1918).
23. Cf. similar angry reaction to governor Clifford's criticism of the Lugardian system of
administration in Nigeria (C0520/80, Minutes on Clifford to Milner, December 1919).
REFERENCES
Afigbo, A. E. (1971) "The Consolidation of British imperial administration in Nig

1918." Civilizations 21, 4: 436-58.
Anene, J. C. (1966) Southern Nigeria in Transition: 1885-1906. Cambridge:
University Press.
Basden, G. T. (1966a) Among the Ibos of Nigeria. London: Frank Cass.
--. (1966b) Niger Ibos. London: Frank Cass.
Bennett, Norman R. (1981) "Europeans in Africa: A Mixed Bag" (book re
International Journal of African Historical Studies 14, 1: 165-66.
Boer, J. H. (1979) Missionary Messengers of Liberation in a Colonial Context: A C
the Sudan United Mission. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Boyle, A. (1962) Trenchard. New York: Norton.
Bradley, Kenneth. (1966) Once a District Officer. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Burns, Sir Alan. (1949) Colonial Civil Servant. London: Allen & Unwin.
--. (1957) In Defence of Colonies. London: Allen & Unwin.
Cary, Joyce. (n.d.) Britain and West Africa. London: Longman, Green & Co.
Cohen, Robin. (1979) forced Labor in Colonial Africa. London: Zed Press.
Cohen, William B. (1980) The French Encounter with Africans: White Respons
1530-1880. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Cookey, S. J. S. (1968) Britain and the Congo Question: 1885-1913. London: Longm
Crowder, Michael. (1968) West Africa under Colonial Rule. Evanston: Nort
University Press.
Curtin, Phillip D. (1964) The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 1780-1850
University of Wisconsin Press.
Ekechi, F. K. (1972) Missionary Enterprise and Rivalry in Igboland, 1857-1914. Lon
Cass.
. (1974) "Igbo Response to British Imperialism: The Episode of Dr. Stewart and the
Ahiara Expedition, 1905-1916," Journal of African Studies 1, 2: 145-57.
. (forthcoming) "Owerri in Transition: A Political History of Owerri, 1902-1947."
Owerri: Imo Newspapers.
Gann, L. H., and Peter Duignan. (1978) the Rulers of British Africa, 1870-1914. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
. (1979) African Proconsuls: European Governors in Africa. Stanford: Hoover Institution.
Green, M. M. (1947) Igbo Village Affairs. New York: Praeger.
Hammond, Dorothy, and Alta Jablow. (1977) The Myth of Africa. New York: The Library of
Social Science.
Haywood, A., and F. A. S. Clarke. (1964) The History of the Royal West African Frontier
Force. Aldershot: Yale and Polden.
Hensley, F. M. (1948) Niger Dawn. North Devon: Arthur H. St

Hetherington, Penelope. (1978) British Paternalism and Afric
Cass.
Heussler, Robert. (1963) Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service. New
York: Syracuse University Press.
Hopkins, A. G. (1976) "Imperial Business in Africa-Part 1: Sources," Journal of African
History 21, 1: 29-48.
Igbaafe, Phillip. (1979) Benin under British Administration. London: Longmans.
Ikime, Oboro. (1977) The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest. New York: Africana
Publishing Company.
Jordan, J. B. (1949) Bishop Shanahan of Southern Nigeria. Dublin: Clonmore & Reynolds.
Jordan, Winthrop D. (1968) White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550-1812.
Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Press.
Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. (1981) A Bibliographical Dictionary of British Colonial Governors.
Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
Lugard, Lord Frederick. (1922) The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. London:
Blackwood.
Luwel, Marcel. (1978) H. H. Johnston et H. M. Stanley sur le Congo. Bruxelles: Acad6mie

Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer.
Mair, Lucy. (1977) African Kingdoms. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
McPhee, Allan. (1926) The Economic Revolution in British West Africa. London: George
Routledge & Sons.
Meek, C. K. (1937) Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe: A Study in Indirect Rule. New York:
Barnes & Noble.
Murray-Brown. (1978) Faith and the Flag: The Opening of Africa. Winchester, Mass.: All
and Unwin.
Newbury, Colin. (1978) "Trade and Technology in West Africa: The Case of the Niger
Company, 1900-1920." Journal of African History 14, 4: 551-75.
Nwabara, S. N. (1977) Igboland: A Century of Contact with Britain, 1860-1960. New York:
Humanities Press.
Nwala, T. U. (1978) Mbaise in Contemporary Nigeria. New York: Gold and Maestro.
Oliver, Roland and Gervase Matthew. (1963) History of East Africa, Vol. 1. Oxford: The
Clarendon Press.
Perham, Margery, and Elspeth J. Huxley. (1944) Race and Politics in Kenya. London: Faber
& Faber.
Perham, Margery. (1960) The Observer, London, July 24, p. 26.
Ranger, T. 0. (1979) "White Presence and Power in Africa." Journal of African History 20, 4:
463-69.
Ranger, T. 0., and John Weller (eds.). (1975) Themes in the Christian History of Central
Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rodney, Walter. (1972) How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania
Publishing House.
Santi, Paul, and Richard Hill (eds.). (1980) The Europeans in the Sudan, 1834-1878. Oxford:
The Clarendon Press.
Smith, R. S. (1976) War and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa. London: Methuen.
Sundstrom, Lars. (1965) The Trade of Guinea. Lund: Studia Ethnographica.
Tamuno, T. N. (1972) The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898-1914.
New York: Humanities Press.
Ukpabi, S. C. (1977) "Igbo Warfare." Unpublished paper. Nsukka: University of Nigeria.
Uzoechi, Innocent. (1981) "The British Conquest and Administration of Udi Division,
1908-1930." Kent State University: M.A. Thesis.
Virey, Julien Joseph. (1824) Histoire naturelle du genre humain, 2. Paris: Crochard.
Whitford, John. (1877; 2nd ed. 1967) Trading Life in Western and Central Africa. New York:
Barnes & Noble.
Wright, Richard. (1964) White Man Listen. New
Archival and Oral Sources

Public Record Office. London: C0520/series: 14, 25, 31, 32, 35, 46, 73, 81, 92, 103.
CO583/series: 30, 87. Colonial Annual Reports, 1906, 1925. The Colonial Office List, 1921.
The Southern Nigeria Civil List, 1910.
Church Missionary Society. London: G3/A3/0 series (Niger Mission). ACC/89/F1
(Archdeacon Dennis Papers).
London School of Economics. London: E. D. Morel Papers (Box F8).
Rhodes House Library. Oxford: MSS. Afr. s. 783 (H. F. Matthews Papers). MSS. Afr. s. 375
(Col. Gerald Adams Papers). MSS. Afr. s. 1375 (Wordsworth Papers).
Nigeria National Archives. Ibadan (NNAI) and Enugu (NNAE): OWDIST 10/1/3; 7/5/6;
9/6/3; 24/1/2; 7/1/8 No. OW 7732. CSE 5/14/1; 5/14/2.
Newspapers: London Times, Oct. 12, 1908; Nigerian Daily Times, November 15, 1929;
Eastern Nigeria Guardian, April 19 and May 8, 1950; West Africa, July 26, 1924.
Oral Interviews, Owerri: 1975 and 1979. Except for Osigwe Mere (c. 100 years, 1975), Paul
Egejuru (c. 100 years, 1975), and Nze Okereke (c. 102, 1975), most of my informants
were in their 80s and 90s and so could vividly recount colonial experiences and events.

Portrait of A Colonizer H. M. Douglas in Colonial Nigeria, 1897-1920

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Portrait of A Colonizer H. M. Douglas in Colonial Nigeria, 1897-1920

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Portrait of a Colonizer: H. M.

Douglas in Colonial Nigeria, 1897-1920

Despite the increasing effort of Africanist scholars, and particularly historians,

African Studies Review, vol. XXVI, no. 1, March 1983.

many scholars have given considerable at

THE IMPERIAL AUTOCRAT

Students of European imperialism in Africa tend to agree at least o

series of military aggressions which Douglas and his suc

villagers. Even the attempt by the assistant district

After advancing for a distance of one-half m

By late May the war was over and the colon

Surely, severe punishments proved quite unnerving and unsettling to African

Africans, by and large, opted for dogged resistance ra

Dr. Stewart's tragic fate in the following mann

This account is somehow incorrect. First, Dr.

experienced in our lives. We can never forget it" (

THE SCOURGE OF AFRICANS

attitude towards the Africans, his au

Finally, Tugwell enjoined Douglas to "Adopt a kindlier and more generous

RACIAL PREJUDICE AND EUROPEAN OPPRESSION

crucial question here is: why did Douglas and

[towards Africans]," wrote Gann and Duignan (1978: 3

recommended: "Better simply acknowledg

The above quotation clearly epitomized L

European role in Africa, Morel insisted, should be direc

In my view the only justification for our assumption of

Admittedly, there is a streak of middle-class noblesse oblige in the foregoing

Lever remained characteristically unconvinced. Without European tutelage, he

prejudice and oppression are inseparable, at l

DOUGLAS THE ROADBUILDER

Nowhere else, perhaps, was Douglas's intolerant imperialism more p

as a model for others to emulate. In many parts of Sou

necessary "to facilitate the passage of tr

forced to work for the imperial government at the

Despite the favorable recommendations from his superiors in the ear

derived from the exasperating red tape in

As for the general deterioration of service conditions, and the mounting

probably have saved a deal of heart-burning and gen

transforming the communication systems s

as an entirely settled area. The influence of the Churches

right conduct tell for promotion more than else

Afigbo, A. E. (1971) "The Consolidation of British imperial administration in Nig

Hensley, F. M. (1948) Niger Dawn. North Devon: Arthur H. St

Luwel, Marcel. (1978) H. H. Johnston et H. M. Stanley sur le Congo. Bruxelles: Acad6mie

Wright, Richard. (1964) White Man Listen. New

Archival and Oral Sources

You might also like