CREATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
the action will be ventilated and given final resolution.'"
TAN vs COMELEC
Petitioner: Patricio Tan, Felix Ferrer, Juan M. Hagad, Sergio
Hilado, Virgilio Gaston, Conchita Minaya, Teresita Estacio,
Desiderio Deferia, Romeo Gamboa, Alberto Lacson, Fe Hofilena,
Emily Jison, Nieves Lopez And Cecilia Magsaysay
Respondents: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS And THE
PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
Citation: GR No. 73155
Date of Promulgation: July 11, 1986
Ponente: Alampay
FACTS:
 Petitioners: residents of Negros Oriental, in the various cities
and municipalities therein
- Prompted by the enactment of BP Blg. 885-A (An Act
Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be
known as the Province of Negros Del Norte), which took
effect on December 3, 1985, filed in this Court a case for
Prohibition on December 23, 1985
o To stop COMELEC from conducting the
plebiscite, pursuant to the implementation of
law
o The plebiscite was scheduled on January 3,
1986
 BP 8854-A provides THAT:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos
and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante,
Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador
Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros,
are hereby separated from the province to be known as the
Province of Negros del Norte.
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the
southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of
Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south
and the territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of
Negros on the west, north and east, comprising a territory of
4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.
SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province
shall be the City of Cadiz.
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed
new province which are the areas affected within a period of
one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act.
After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros
del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite,
the President of the Philippines shall appoint the first officials
of the province.
SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct
and supervise the plebiscite herein provided, the expenses
for which shall be charged to local funds.
SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approva
 Petitioners’ Contentions:
1. BP 885 is unconstitutional, and it is not in complete
accord with the Local Government Code, as in Article XI,
Sec. 3 of the Constitution
2. See 197 of LGC1
 Court was in recess during the Christmas holidays, and was
unable to timely consider the Petition for Prohibition
 January 4, 1986: Petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading,
averring that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them
was held on January 3, 1986 as scheduled but that there are
still serious issues raised in the instant case affecting the
legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which
should properly be passed upon and resolved by this Court
- The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the
territory of Negros del Norte, namely: the Cities of Silay,
Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto.
Because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of
the province of Negros Occidental, petitioners found
need to change the prayer of their petition "to the end
1 SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created
if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square
kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand
persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the
Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last
three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the
population and income of the mother province or provinces at the
that the constitutional issues which they have raised in
- At the same time, they asked that the effects of the
plebiscite which they sought to stop be suspended until
the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision on
the very fundamental and far-reaching questions that
petitioners have brought out
 Since the Petitioners have acknowledged in their
Supplemental Petition that their Initial Petition was
already moot and academic, they prayed that:
1. A Writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent
Commission on Elections to desist from issuing official
proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on
January 3, 1986.
2. Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the
voters of the Province of Negros Occidental other than
those living within the territory of the new province of
Negros del Norte to be not in accordance with the
Constitution
3. a writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the
respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the
holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified
voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as
now existing shall participate, at the same time making
pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3,
1986 has no legal effect, being a patent legal nullity
4. a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the
respondent Provincial Treasurer, to desist from ordering
the release of any local funds to answer for expenses
incurred in the holding of such plebiscite until ordered by
the Court.
5. respondent COMELEC hold in abeyance the issuance
of any official proclamation of the results of the
forestated plebiscite.
 During the pendency of the case, former Sen. Ambosio
Padilla filed a Motion to Appear as amicus curiae, to which
the court granted
 January 7, 1986: Respondents was directed to file their
Comment
 Respondents’ Answer:
1. the challenged statute.-Batas Pambansa 885, should be
accorded the presumption of legality.
2. They submit that the said law is not void on its face and
that the petition does not show a clear, categorical and
undeniable demonstration of the supposed infringement
of the Constitution.
3. Respondents state that the powers of the Batasang-
Pambansa to enact the assailed law is beyond question.
They claim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not
infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the
Local Government Code have been complied with.
Furthermore, they submit that this case has now become
moot and academic with the proclamation of the new
Province of Negros del Norte.
4. Respondents argue that the remaining cities and
municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental not
included in the area of the new Province of Negros del
Norte, de not fall within the meaning and scope of the
term "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3 of
Art. XI of our Constitution.
5. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate the Constitution,
invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo
Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to
the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128
SCRA 61)
6. Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations that the
requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers as so
prescribed in the Local Government Code for a new
province to be created has not been satisfied, as
Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise the
new province of Negros del Norte, would only be about
2,856.56 square kilometers and which evidently would
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under
this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two or more islands.
The average estimated annual income shall include the income
alloted for both the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of
trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income.
 be lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the
governing statute
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Provincial Treasurer be prohibited from
disbursing any public funds fin connection with the
plebiscite? MOOT AND ACADEMIC
2. W/N the holding of a plebiscite conformed with the
constitutional requirements?
3. W/N the case of Paredes vs Hon. Exec Sec applicable in
this case?
4. W/N the plebiscite was null and void?
HELD:
1. MOOT AND ACADEMIC
There is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the
Province of Negros Occidental has not disbursed, nor was
required to disburse any public funds in connection with the
plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as so disclosed in the
Comment to the Petition filed by the respondent Provincial
Treasurer of Negros Occidental dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo,
pp. 36-37). Thus, the prayer of the petitioners that said Provincial
Treasurer be directed by this Court to desist from ordering the
release of any public funds on account of such plebiscite should
not longer deserve further consideration
2. NO
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be
created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority
of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision
makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a
majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected"
whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to
conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros
Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the
division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be
created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and
simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be
affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros
Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered.
The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area
subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed
province of Negros del Norte.
We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should
conform to said constitutional requirement but eliminates the
participation of either of these two component political units. No
amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent
province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part
of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry
out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote
autonomy of local government units. The alleged good intentions
cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our
Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a
requirement must first be observed, respected and complied with.
No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed
fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy
of local government units but at the same time transgress, ignore
and disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI
Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no different from one
who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the Idol therein.
We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the
petition should be dismissed because the motive and wisdom in
enacting the law may not be challenged by petitioners. The
principal point raised by the petitioners is not the wisdom and
motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution
which is a proper subject of judicial inquiry.
3. NO
What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending
a little support to respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings
and pronouncements made by this Court in the case of Governor
Zosimo Paredes versus The Honorable Executive Secretary to the
President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6).
In said case relating to a plebiscite held to ratify the creation of a
new municipality from existing barangays, this Court upheld the
legality of the plebiscite which was participated in exclusively by
the people of the barangay that would constitute the new
municipality.
This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by
respondents. What is, however, highly significant are the prefatory
statements therein stating that said case is "one of those cases
where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway"
and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the
expression unit or units affected." The ruling rendered in said case
was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise
its discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how
the pertinent provision of the Constitution should be correctly
interpreted.
The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable
Executive Secretary, et al. (supra) should not be taken as a
doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein
that "it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when certain
Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new
one, all the voters therein are affected."
It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case
of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, invoked by respondents, We
find very lucidly expressed the strong dissenting view of Justice
Vicente Abad Santos, a distinguished member of this Court, as he
therein voiced his opinion, which We hereunder quote:
2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it
means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to
be divided such as in the case at bar or an of the people of two or
more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the
Constitutional provision.
This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the—
forerunner of the ruling which We now consider applicable to the
case at bar, In the analogous case of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr., versus
the Honorable Commission on Elections, L-56022, May 31, 1985,
136 SCRA 633, this dissent was reiterated by Justice Abad
Santos as he therein assailed as suffering from a constitutional
infirmity a referendum which did not include all the people of
Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum was intended to
ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to give up
some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting opinion
served as a useful guideline in the instant case.
Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is
now afforded the present Court. The reasons in the mentioned
cases invoked by respondents herein were formerly considered
acceptable because of the views then taken that local autonomy
would be better promoted However, even this consideration no
longer retains persuasive value.
4. YES
In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed
for by petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the
respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of
another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire
province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate
and that this Court make a pronouncement that the plebiscite held
on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on
January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the
provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court
is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite,
because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional
infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and
also because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte
is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of
such new province which should justify the holding of another
plebiscite does not exist.
Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has
been gained by the new province of Negros del Norte because of
the appointment of the officials thereof, must now be erased. That
Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should be announced. Its
existence should be put to an end as quickly as possible, if only to
settle the complications currently attending to its creation. As has
been manifested, the parent province of Negros del Norte has
been impleaded as the defendant in a suit filed by the new
Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional Trial Court of
Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C, for the
immediate allocation, distribution and transfer of funds by the
parent province to the new province, in an amount claimed to be
at least P10,000,000.00.
The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the
legality of the province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact
that this created province does not even satisfy the area
requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government
Code, as earlier discussed.
It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the
exhibits submitted by the petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19
and 91), that the new province has a territory of 4,019.95 square
kilometers, more or less. This assertion is made to negate the
proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area of the new province
cannot be more than 3,500 square kilometers because its land
area would, at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers, taking
into account government statistics relative to the total area of the
cities and municipalities constituting Negros del Norte.
Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the Local
Government Code speaks of the territory of the province to be
created and requires that such territory be at least 3,500 square
kilometers, what is contemplated is not only the land area but also
the land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction
and control. It is even the submission of the respondents that in
this regard the marginal sea within the three mile limit should be
considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new
province. Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect, and
fallacious.
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most
revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the
word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government
Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that
"territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land
area and excludes the waters over which the political unit
exercises control.
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous."
Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all
or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent (Webster's New
World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when
employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used
when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two
solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a
statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with
or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs.
Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the
sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory"
the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the
legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the
term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial
waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first
paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land
area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be
given the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636).
The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of
construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).
The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which
respondents make is an artificial or strained construction of the
disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested
from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely
different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain
meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to follow
in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or
artificial meaning of its words and out of harmony of the statutory
scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs. Hutchings, 85 L. Ed.,
p. 909).
It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a
small land area but which has a long, narrow, extended coast line,
(such as La Union province) can be said to have a larger territory
than a land-locked province (such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose
land area manifestly exceeds the province first mentioned.
Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned
state was marred by "dirty tricks", in the introduction and passing
of Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in secret haste" pursuant to sinister
designs to achieve "pure and simple gerrymandering; "that recent
happenings more than amply demonstrate that far from
guaranteeing its autonomy it (Negros del Norte) has become the
fiefdom of a local strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; emphasis supplied).
It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only
because the merits of this case can be resolved without need of
ascertaining the real motives and wisdom in the making of the
questioned law. No proper challenge on those grounds can also
be made by petitioners in this proceeding. Neither may this Court
venture to guess the motives or wisdom in the exercise of
legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or unwise actions
taken by tools of a political machinery rests ultimately, as recent
events have shown, on the electorate and the power of a vigilant
people.
Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the
people of the Province of Negros Occidental and even by our
Nation. Commendable is the patriotism displayed by them in
daring to institute this case in order to preserve the continued
existence of their historic province. They were inspired
undoubtedly by their faithful commitment to our Constitution which
they wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite the setbacks and
the hardships which petitioners aver confronted them, they
valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A happy
destiny for our Nation is assured as long as among our people
there would be exemplary citizens such as the petitioners herein.
WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared
unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros
del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are
also declared null and void.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I congratulate my brethren for the unanimous decision we issue
today striking down an Act approved in "deep secrecy and
inordinate haste" apparently on the last day of session of the
Batasang Pambansa on December 3, 1985 and signed on the
same day by the then President of the authoritarian regime. The
Act provided for the partitioning of the province of Negros
Occidental and would substantially alter its boundaries by lopping
off the progressive cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and
municipality of Victorias with seven other municipalities to
constitute the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Negros
Occidental would thereby lose 4,019.95 square kilometers in area
and seven of fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economic
progress and welfare of the whole province.
The discredited Commission on Elections of the time played its
customary subservient role by setting the plebiscite with equal
"indecent haste" for January 3, 1986, notwithstanding that the Act
itself provided for an ample period of 120 days from its approval
within which to inform the people of the proposed dismemberment
and allow them to freely express and discuss the momentous
issue and cast their vote intelligently. This was learned by
petitioners through an item in the printed media one day before
they filed the present rush petition on December 23, 1985 to seek
a restraining order to atop the plebiscite, even as no printed copies
of the Act as finally enacted and approved were available to them
and the Act had not been published, as required by law, for its
effectivity. As petitioners ruefully state: "it was in vain hope" for
everything had apparently been timed for the Christmas holidays;
the Court was in Christmas recess and "there was no chance to
have their plea for a restraining order acted upon speedily
enough." In fact, it was only on January 7, 1986 that the Court took
cognizance of the petition and required respondents' comment.
The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was "to have the
creation of the new Province a fait accompli by the time elections
are held on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is
unmistakably so that the new Governor and other officials shall by
then have been installed in office, ready to function for purposes
of the election for President and Vice-President." Thus, the
petitioners reported after the event: "With indecent haste, the
plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up and proclaimed
by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government
officials headed by Governor Armando Gustilo was appointed;
and, by the time the elections were held on February 7, 1986, the
political machinery was in place to deliver the 'solid North' to ex-
President Marcos. The rest is history. What happened in Negros
del Norte during the elections-the unashamed use of naked power
and resources contributed in no small way to arousing 'people's
power' and steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage
and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino today.
(Record, pp. 9, 41).
The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional.
Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of, viz. the
plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte
and the appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited
holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new
province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of
the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of
Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and
La Carlota and the Municipalities of La Castellana, Isabela,
Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan,
Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan
,Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and
disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then
prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province may be created or
divided or its boundary substantially altered without "the approval
of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected." It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the
province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed
new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters
of the whole and entire province of Negros Occidental have to
participate and give their approval in the plebiscite, because the
whole province is affected by its proposed division and substantial
alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters
of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as
absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for
the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the
majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
The argument of fait accompli viz. that the railroaded plebiscite of
January 3, 1986 was held and can no longer be enjoined and that
the new province of Negros del Norte has been constituted, begs
the issue of invalidity of the challenged Act. This Court has always
held that it "does not look with favor upon parties 'racing to beat
an injunction or restraining order' which they have reason to
believe might be forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing
and pendency of the appropriate petition therefor. Where the
restraining order or preliminary injunction are found to have been
properly issued, as in the case at bar, mandatory writs shall be
issued by the Court to restore matters to the status quo ante."
(Banzon v. Cruz, 45 SCRA 475, 506 [1972]). Where, as in this
case, there was somehow a failure to properly issue the
restraining order stopping the holding of the illegal plebiscite, the
Court will issue the mandatory writ or judgment to restore matters
to the status quo ante and restore the territorial integrity of the
province of Negros Occidental by declaring the unconstitutionality
of the challenged Act and nullifying the invalid proclamation of the
proposed new province of Negros del Norte and the equally invalid
appointment of its officials.
TORRALBA vs MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT
Petitioner: Clementino Torralba and Resolution Rugay
Respondents: Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan Del
Sur and its Municipal Officers
Citation: GR No. L-59180
Date of Promulgation: January 29, 1987
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera
FACTS:
 Petitioners: challenged the constitutionality (Sec. 3, Article
XI of the 1973 Constitution2) of the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 56 on February 1, 1980, creating the
Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan Del Sur
 BP 56:
Sec. 1. The barangays of Ilihan, Sinai, Sibagat, El Rio,
Afga, Tabontabon, Perez, Magsaysay, Santa Cruz, Santa
Maria, San Isidro, Villangit, Del Rosario, Anahauan
Mahayahay, and San Vicente, all in the Municipality of
Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur, are hereby separated
from said municipality to form and constitute an independent
2Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Municipality of Sibagat without affecting in any manner the
legal existence of the mother Municipality of Bayugan.
Sec. 2. The boundaries of the new Municipality of
Sibagat will be: Beginning at the point of intersection of the
Cabadbaran-Old Bayugan and Surigao del Sur boundaries;
thence in a southernly direction following the Old Bayugan
and Cabadbaran, Old Bayugan and Butuan City, Old
Bayugan and Las Nieves boundaries, until it reaches the
point of intersection of Old Bayugan, Esperanza and the
Municipality of Las Nieves; ...
Sec. 3. The seat of government of the newly created
municipality shall be in Barangay Sibagat.
Sec. 4. Except as herein provided, all provisions of laws,
now or hereafter applicable to regular municipalities shall be
applicable to the new Municipality of Sibagat.
Sec. 5. After ratification by the majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite to be conducted in the area or areas affected
within a period of ninety (90) days after the approval of this
Act, the President (Prime Minister) shall appoint the Mayor
and other Officials of the new Municipality of Sibagat.
 Petitioners: residents and taxpayers of Butuan City
- Clementino Torralba: Member, Sangguniang
Panlungsod
 Respondent Municipal Officers: local officials of the new
Municipality
 Petitioners’ Contentions:
1. the Local Government Code must first be enacted to
determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any
province, city, municipality, or barrio;
2. that since no Local Government Code had as yet been
enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute
could not have possibly complied with any criteria when
respondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null and
void.
 LGC: enacted on February 10, 1983, so that when BP 56 was
enacted, the Code was not yet in existence
- Plebiscite had also been conducted among the
people/units affected by the creation of new municipality
- Officials had also been elected
ISSUE:
1. W/N BP No. 56 is valid even though LGC has not yet
been enacted at that time?
HELD:
Yes.
We find no trace of invalidity of BP 56. The absence of the Local
Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor
was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create
municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973
Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of
territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the
Local Government Code. It contains no requirement that the Local
Government Code is a condition sine qua non for the creation of
a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new
municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local
Government Code. What the Constitutional provision means is
that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or
dissolution of local government units should conform with the
criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of
such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the
creation of the new local government unit should be approved by
the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said
requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the
unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new
local government unit (parag. 5, Petition; p. 7,
Memorandum).lwphl@itç In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is
not questioned herein. The officials of the new Municipality have
effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their
functions. A dejure entity has thus been created.
It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a
municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In the
absence of any constitutional limitations a legislative body may
Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected.
Create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient
administration of government (I McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, 3rd ed., 509). The creation of the new Municipality
of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then vested
by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
We are not unmindful of the case of Tan vs. COMELEC (142
SCRA 727 [1986]), striking down as unconstitutional BP Blg. 885
creating a new province in the Island of Negros known as the
Province of Negros del Norte, and declaring the plebiscite held in
connection therewith as illegal There are significant differences,
however, in the two cases among which may be mentioned the
following. in the Tan case, the Local Government Code already
existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3
December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP Blg. 885
in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new
province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas, in
contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the Local
Government Code that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit or
units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a
plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." In fact, as previously
stated, no question is raised herein as to the legality of the
plebiscite conducted. Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite
area for the creation of a new province was not complied with in
BP Blg. 885. No such issue in the creation of the new municipality
has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste" attended the
enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite
thereafter in the Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56 creating the
Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of
legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the period specified
in that law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur on the assumption that the required plebiscite, although
not questioned here, nevertheless complied with Article XI,
Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, and was duly held "in the unit
or units affected," i.e. not only in the proposed municipality but
also in the mother municipality, in line with Tan v. Commission on
Elections (142 SCRA 727), reversing Paredes v. Executive
Secretary (128 SCRA 6) and Lopez v. Metro Manila Commission
(136 SCRA 633) insofar as these cases held that the plebiscite
could be confined only to the political unit proposed to be created.
METRO MANILA COMMISSION vs GEMILIANO LOPEZ
GEMILIANO LOPEZ vs MMC
G.R. No. L-56022 May 31, 1985
GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., for himself and all other
interested parties similarly situated in Metropolitan Manila,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
G.R. No. L-56124 May 31, 1985
GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR. and REYNALDO B. ARALAR, for
themselves and all other interested parties similarly situated
as themselves in Metropolitan Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE METROPOLITAN MANILA COMMISSION,
respondent.
FACTS:
 Presidential Decree No. 824: CREATING THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AND THE METROPOLITAN
MANILA COMMISSION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
- Response to a felt need for a central government o
establish and administer program and provide services
common to" the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and
Caloocan as well as thirteen municipalities
- Section 2 provides that: Territorial Jurisdiction. The
Commission shall have jurisdiction over the cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan and the
municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las
Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque,
Marikina, Muntinlupa, and Taguig in the province of
Rizal; and the municipality of Valenzuela, in the province
of Bulacan, all of which together shall henceforth be
known as Metropolitan Manila. "
- It is worth noting that such a problem was by no means
unique and confined to the Philippines. Recent decades
have witnessed a growing erosion in public confidence in
the ability of local government units as traditionally
organized to fulfill their responsibilities and discharge
their functions effectively, efficiently, and satisfactorily.
- The growth in population in Manila, the three other cities,
and the adjacent municipalities has been unchecked
since the end of World War II. There was of course the
bright promise of a better fife especially so with the
proliferation of commercial firms and the establishment
of industries. The lure has thus proved irresistible. The
result has been the ever increasing inability of the
separate local governments to cope with the ensuing
serious problems.
- A public corporation was thus created "to be known as
the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and
attributes of a corporation including the power to make
contracts, sue and be sued, acquire, purchase,
expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property and
such other powers as are necessary to carry out its
purposes." It is administered by a Commission
 Petitioners (second case): assail the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 824
- They rely on this provision: "No province, city,
municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected." 8 The Local Government Code was not
enacted until 1983
ISSUES:
1. W/N PD No. 824 is unconstitutional?
HELD:
NO.
For reasons to be set forth, it will be made apparent that such a
challenge is far from formidable. It does not suffice to call for a
declaration of unconstitutionality. Moreover, the last vestige of
doubt has been removed by the present constitutional provision
adopted in the plebiscite on January 27, 1984. Thus in the Article
on Batasang Pambansa it is expressly provided: "The Batasang
Pambansa which shall be composed of not more than 200
Members unless otherwise provided by law, shall include
representatives elected from the different provinces with their
component cities, highly urbanized cities as may be declared by
or pursuant to law, and districts in Metropolitan Manila, those
elected or selected from the various sectors as may be provided
by law, and those chosen by the President from Members of the
Cabinet. Each district in Metropolitan Manila shall comprise, as far
as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. The
elective representatives shall be apportioned by law among the
provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities, and
the districts of Metropolitan Manila in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, but the provinces with component cities and
highly urbanized cities shall have at least one representative each.
The provinces and cities shall have at least the same total number
of representatives as under the 1935 Constitution." 10
The recognition of the existence to Metropolitan Manila cannot be
expressed any clearer. There can be no legal justification then for
a declaration of unconstitutionality. Presidential Decree No. 824 is
not tainted with constitutional infirmity. (Cinopy-paste ko lahat
yung mga points discussed kaya mahaba para wala tayo ma-miss
na detail)
1. In Presidential Decree No 824 reference was made to
"the referendum held on February 27, 1975 [wherein] the
residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the President to
restructure the local governments of the four cities and 13
municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of the manager or
commission form of government," with the terms and conditions
being left to the discretion of the President. 11 It was then pointed
out that "the rapid growth of population and the corresponding
increase of social and economic requirements in the contiguous
communities referred to above has brought into being a large area
that calls for [development both] simultaneous and unified." 12 For
"many public services [then] rendered by local governments
separately for themselves [ought to] be ad. ministered more
efficiently and more economically, to the common benefit of the
cities and municipalities in the area, if they are integrated and
harmonized, under a system of central planning [treating as a
common problem the] separate municipal needs." 13 It "is Vital to
the survival and growth of the aforementioned Greater Manila
Area that a workable and effective system be established for the
coordination, integration and unified management of such local
government services or functions" 14 therein, There is necessity
for "the unified metropolitan services or functions [to] be planned,
administered, and operated [based on] the highest professional
technical standards." 15 The foregoing constitutes the justification
for and the objective of such Presidential Decree.
2. There is relevance to this opening paragraph in the
recent case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary: 16 "The
constitutional question raised in this declaratory relief proceeding
treated as a special civil action for prohibition, one of first
impression, arose from the issuance of a proclamation by the
President, directing that a plebiscite be conducted in certain
barangays, all within the municipality of Mayoyao, Province of
Ifugao, segregated under a Batas Pambansa, "to determine
whether the said barangays shall become a new municipality be
known as the Municipality of Aguinaldo, Province of Ifugao." In
such proclamation, respondent Commission on Elections was
charged with the duty of supervising the conduct of such plebiscite
and empowered to promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to implement the proclamation. It is alleged that Batas
Pambansa Blg. 86 is unconstitutional for being violative of Article
XI, Section 3 of the Constitution. The basis for such contention is
that the statute excluded from the plebiscite the voters from the
poblacion and other barangays of the Municipality of Mayoyao
except those mentioned in the Act." 17 The proclamation was
issued on November 11, 1980, at least three years before the
enactment of the local government code. The petition based on
Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, the very same provision
relied upon in this case, was dismissed. There were twelve (12)
votes in favor of such dismissal, two of the Justices 18 voting to
dismiss the petition on the ground that it had become moot and
academic, the plebiscite having been duly held and the certificate
of canvass and proclamation disclosing that out of the 2,409 total
votes being cast in the plebiscite, 2,368 were cast in favor of the
creation of the new municipality. 19 Justice Abad Santos
dissented on the ground that the people in the barangay of the
municipality of Aguinaldo should likewise have voted in the
plebiscite, not only those of the barangays that constituted the
new municipality. The Court did take note of the plausibility of such
an approach but came to the conclusion that the constitutional
provision on the need for a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be satisfied even if
"those voters who are not from the barangay to be separated
[were] excluded in the plebiscite." 20 It cannot be argued therefore
that the plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute
Metropolitan Manila, having manifested their will, the
constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has been
satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite
in February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code.
3. Nor is there any question as to the Presidential authority
to issue Presidential Decree No. 824 creating Metropolitan Manila
in 1975. There was at the time no interim Batasang Pambansa. It
was the President who was then entrusted with such
responsibility. So it was held in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, 21 decided in January of 1975. The ponencia of Justice
Makasiar dispelled "all doubts as to the legality of such law-
making authority by the President during the period of Martial Law,
* * *." 22 As the opinion went on to state: "The entire paragraph of
Section 3(2) is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a
recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the
incumbent President during the period of Martial Law." 23
4. The sole petitioner in the other case 24 is likewise now
Assemblyman Gemiliano C Lopez, Jr, of Metropolitan Manila. It is
a mandamus petition to require respondent Commission on
Elections to order the elections for members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the four cities and
thirteen towns of Metropolitan Manila. As was ,stated in the
Memorandum of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, the
fact that it is a suit for mandamus is an admission of the validity of
Presidential Decree No. 824. 25 Nor would mandamus lie, it being
provided therein that "the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed
of as many barangay captains as may be determined and chosen
by the Commission, and such number of representatives from
other sectors of the society as may be appointed by the President
upon recommendation of the Commission." 26 The Solicitor
General can, therefore plausibly assert: "This demonstrates that
the petition's charge, that there is no duly constituted
Sangguniang Bayan, in Metro Manila Area is untrue, and that the
citizenry therein do have a voice in decision-making, through the
respective Sangguniang Bayans of each of the political units
therein." 27 The Decree itself thus supplies the refutation to the
contention of petitioner.
5. The point has been raised, however, that unless
Presidential Decree No. 824 be construed in such a way that
along with the rest of the other cities and municipalities, there
should be elections for the Sangguniang Bayan, then there is a
denial of the equal protection provision of the Constitution. The
point is not well-taken. In a recent decision, 28 this Court
reiterated the concept of equal protection in these words: "The
applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a denial of
this constitutional mandate whether the assailed act is in the
exercise of the police power or the power of eminent domain is to
demonstrate "that the government act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by
the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds
no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally
and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that
all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions
not being different, both in the priveleges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall
be given to every person under circumstances, which, if not
Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding on the rest." That same formulation applies as well
to taxation measures. The equal protection clause is, of course,
inspired by the noble concept of approximating the Ideal of the
law's benefits being available to all and the affairs of men being
by the serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very
essence of the Idea of law. There is, however, wisdom, as well as
realism, in these words of Justice Frankfurther: "The equality at
which the "equal protection" clause aims is not a disembodied
equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins "the equal
protection of the laws, and the laws are not abstract propositions.
They do not relate to abstract units A, B and C, but are
expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties, addressed
to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies.
The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact
or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same." 29
It is clear that under the equal protection clause, classification is
not forbidden. As was so well put by Justice Laurel as ponente in
the leading case People v. Vera: 30 "Class legislation
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But
classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or
capriciously is permitted. * * * The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinction which make
real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it
must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class." 31 All such elements are
present. There is no need to set forth anew the compelling
reasons that called for the creation of Metropolitan Manila. It is
quite obvious that under the conditions then existing — still
present and, with the continued growth of population, attended
with more complexity — what was done a response to a great
public need. The government was called upon to act. Presidential
Decree No. 824 was the result. It is not a condition for the validity
of the Sangguniang Bayans provided for in the four cities and the
thirteen municipalities that the membership be Identical with those
of other cities or municipalities. There is ample justification for
such a distinction. It does not by any means come under the
category of what Professor Gunther calls suspect classification.
32 There is thus no warrant for the view that the equal protection
guarantee was violated.
6 Reference was made earlier to Article VIII, Section 2 of
the Constitution where there is express recognition of the juridical
entity known as Metropolitan Manila. Such express constutional
affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law calls, as earlier
noted, for the dismissal of these petitions, there being no legal
justification for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential
Decree No. 824. Nor was it the first time that there has been
acknowledgment in law of the creation of Manila. Thus according
to the Election Code of 1978, "there shall be 160 regional
representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa apportioned
among the thirteen regions of the nation in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio" with Region IV. with 19
representatives comprising "Metro Manila as follows: Cities of
Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, and Pasay; and the municipalities of
Valenzuela, Malabon, Navotas, Makati, Paranaque, Las Pinas,
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Muntinlupa, Marikina, Pateros,
and Taguig." 33 Then there is this provision found in Presidential
Decree No. 1396 creating the Ministry of Human Settlements"
"SEC. 3. Establishment of the National Capital Region — In view
of the critical importance of the Metropolitan Manila Region in
human settlement development. it is hereby declared and
established as the National Capital Region of the Republic of the
Philippines, and its administration as such is hereby vested in the
Secretary of Human Settlements. The pertinent provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 824, creating the Metropolitan Manila
Commission, are hereby accordingly amended." 34 The fact of
such regional representation was once again made clear in the
April 7, 1981 amendments to the Constitution. Thus: "SEC. 2. The
Batasang Pambansa which shall be composed of not more than
200 members unless provided by law, shall include
representatives elected from the regions of the Philippines, those
elected or selected from various sectors as may be provided by
law, and those chosen by the President from the members of the
Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among
the regions in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration."
35 Lastly, in addition to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution
as approved on January 27, 1984, its accompanying ordinance
reads as follows: "SECTION 1. For purposes of the election of
Members of the regular Batasang Pambansa on the second
Monday of May 1984 and subsequent elections and until
otherwise provided by law, the Members of the Batasang
Pambansa, other than the sectoral representatives and those
chosen by the President from the Cabinet, shall be apportioned to
the different provinces with their component cities, highly
urbanized cities and the representatives districts of Metropolitan
Manila as follows: "National Capital Region: Manila six (6) Quezon
City, four (4); Caloocan, two (2); Pasay, one (1); Makati, one (1);
Malabon, one (1); Navotas and Valenzuela, two (2); San Juan and
Mandaluyong, one (1); Taguig, Pateros and Muntinlupa, one (1)."
36 It would be, therefore, as contended by respondent
Commission to show lack of the fidelity to the Constitution if the
prayer for the abolition of the Metropolitan Manila, which is
expressly authorized and recognized by the fundamental law, be
granted.
7 One last point. It is undeniable, therefore, that the
creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is free from any
constitutional objection. There is, however, a question that may
arise in connection with the powers of the President over the
Commission. According to Presidential Decree No. 824: "The
Commission, the General Manager and any official of the
Commission shall be under the direct supervision and control of
the President. Notwithstanding any provision in this Decree, the
President shall the power to revoke, amend or modify any
ordinance, resolution or act of the Commission, the General and
the Commissioners." 37 It may give rise to doubts as to its validity
insofar as it confers the power of control on the President. That
control he certainly exercises under the present Constitution over
the ministries. 38 His power over local governments does not go
that far. It extends no further than general supervision. 39 These
doubts, however, do not suffice to nullify such a provision. They
can be set at rest. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad 40 shows the way.
After reiterating the classic doctrine of the presumption being
always in favor of constitutionality, Justice Malcolm, as ponente,
categorically declared: "To doubt is to sustain." 41 In this case,
the validity of Republic Act No. 2972 of the Philippine Legislature,
popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was
questioned. According to the opinion of Justice Malcolm: "A literal
application of the law would make it unlawful for any Chinese
merchant to keep his account books in any language other than
English, Spanish, or oral dialect. The petitioner say the law is
susceptible of that interpretation might, and probably would, cause
us to hold the law unconstitutional." 42 The construction adopted
to which the Court considered permissible is "that the law only
intended to require the keeping of such books as were necessary
in order to facilitate governmental inspection for tax purposes" 43
Such a conclusion was reached by the invocation of "an
elementary, a fundamental, and a universal rule of construction,
applied when considering constitutional questions, that when a
law is susceptible of two constructions one of which will maintain
and the other constructions one of which will maintain and the
other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former." 44
Succinctly put, that construction that would save is to be preferred
as against one that will destroy. As phrased by Chief Justices
Hughes in Crowell v. Bengson, 45 "if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided." 46 N•r does it
argue against the authoritative character of Justice Malcom's
ponencia in Yu Cong Eng that it was reversed in appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. 47 During the period of American
sovereignty, such jurisdiction validly be exercised. Its decision
then nullifying the Chinese Bookkeeping Law is the law of the
case. it does not follow, however, that the reasoning on which the
Philippine decisions was based is bereft of any legal significance.
It does not admit of doubt that Justice Malcolm and his brethren
considered fully the precise problem presented and the need for
such a measure to assure that the taxes to which the Philippine
government was entitled would be fully paid. It cannot be said that
the American Supreme Court — in this as in other cases of
Philippine origin — was as well-informed. It did not possess — it
could not possess — full awareness of the conditions then existing
in this country. After July 4, 1946, when the Philippine declared its
independence, therefore, it is not only understandable but also
proper that there be less reliance on American Supreme Court
decisions. What is undeniable as shown by the foregoing citations
of case — both Philippine and American — is that approach
followed by Justice Malcom in the interpretation of statutes to
avoid any doubt as to its validity remains a fundamental canon.
8 To show fidelity to his basic principle of construction is to
lend substance to the equally basic doctrine that the constitution
enters into and forms part of every statute. 48 Accordingly, the
presidential power of control over acts of the Metro Manila
Commission is limited to those that may be considered national in
character. There can be no valid objection to such exercise of
authority. It is undisputed that by virtue of the 1981 amendments
to the Constitution, once again, "there is one purpose which is
crystal-clear and is the establishment of a single, not plural,
Executive." 49 So it was affirmed in Free Telephone Workers
Union v. Minister of Labor. 50 There is significance to the fact that
the Local Government Code 51 does not include the Metro Manila
Commission. That is clear recognition that some of its attributes
are those of a national character. Where, however, the acts of the
Metro Manila Commission may be considered as properly
appertaining to local government functions, the power of the
President is confined to general supervision. As thus construed,
Section 13 clearly appears to be free from any constitutional
infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 56022 entitled Gemiliano
C. Lopez, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, and the petition in G.R.
No. 56124 entitled Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr. and Reynaldo B. Aralar
v. Metropolitan Manila Commission, are dismissed. No costs.
DECENTRALIZATION/ LOCAL AUTONOMY
REPUBLIC vs GONZALES
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondents: Policarpio Gonzales, Augusto Josue
Citation: GR No. L-45338-39
Date of Promulgation: July 31, 1991
Ponente: Feliciano
Facts:
 Republic: owner of 2 parcels of land in Taňong Malabon,
Metro Manila
- designated as Lots 1 and 2 of Plan MR-1018-D
- Lot I which adjoins F. Sevilla Boulevard has an area of
605 square meters;
- Lot 2, an interior lot abutting F. Sevilla Boulevard only on
its northern portion, is 664 square meters in area.
- This piece of property was formerly a deep swamp until
the occupants thereof, among them appellants
Policarpio Gonzales and Augusta Josue, started filling it.
Each of appellants who are brothers-in-law, constructed
a mixed residential and commercial building on the
interior part of Lot 2.
 April 14, 1955: The Pres. Ramon Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 144, entitled "Reserving for Street
Widening and Parking Space Purposes Certain Parcels of the
 Public Domain Situated in the Municipality of Malabon,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon."
- Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or
settlement and reserved for the purposes mentioned in
the Proclamation.
 Municipal Council of Malabon: then passed Resolutions2
authorizing the filing of ejectment cases against appellants so
that Proclamation No, 144 could be implemented
 June 23, 1955: Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pasig, Rizal
filed separate complaints against appellants for the recovery
of the portions of Lot 2 they were occupying.
 REPUBLIC: disputed the right of the Government to recover
the land occupied by them
 POLICARPIO’S ANSWER:
1. that Lot 2 was covered by a lease application, and later
a miscellaneous sales application, filed before the
Bureau of Lands;
2. that he had a municipal permit to construct a building as
well as a business license duly issued by the Office of
the Mayor of Malabon; and
3. that the lot occupied by him was not needed by the
Municipality of Malabon in the widening of F. Sevilla
Boulevard.
 Augusto: interposed almost the same defense
 Cases: tried jointly, by agreement
 Trial Court: orders defendants Policarpio Gonzales and
Augusto Josue and/or their agents, representatives,
successors-in-interest to vacate Lots 1 and 2 of Plan
MR1018-D as described in the complaint, and to remove at
their expense their respective buildings and/or improvements
erected and existing on said lots, and restore the possession
thereof to the Republic of the Philippines, and to pay the
corresponding costs in the respective cases.
 CA: di sinabi kung inaffirm or not, basta question of law daw
ang issue, that is yung legality nung proclamation, pero eto
naging arguments sa BRIEF
1. POLICARPIO AND JOSUE
a. The setting aside of the lots occupied by them for
parking space purposes only does not redound to
the public benefit as required by Sec. 83 of the
Public Land Act
b. the benefits, if any, that may be derived from the
proposed street-widening and parking space will be
confined to people who have cars, hence there
would be lacking the essential feature of property
reserved for public use or benefit
c. Appellants would restrict property reserved for
public use or benefit to include only property
susceptible of being utilized by a generally unlimited
number of people.
2. REPUBLIC
ISSUE:
1. W/N the property being claimed by the government
will be devoted for public use?
2. W/N Proclamation No. 144 is valid?
HELD:
1. YES
The conception urged by appellants is both flawed and obsolete
since the number of users is not the yardstick in determining
whether property is properly reserved for public use or public
benefit. In the first place, Section 83 above speaks not only of use
by a local government but also of "quasi-public uses or purposes."
To constitute public use, the public in general should have equal
or common rights to use the land or facility involved on the same
terms, however limited in number the people who can actually
avail themselves of it at a given time.8 There is nothing in
Proclamation No. 144 which excludes non-car-owners from using
a widened street or a parking area should they in fact happen to
be driving cars; the opportunity to avail of the use thereof remains
open for the public in general.
Besides, the benefits directly obtained by car-owners do not
determine either the validity or invalidity of Proclamation No. 144.
What is important are the long-term benefits which the proposed
street widening and parking areas make available to the public in
the form of enhanced, safe and orderly transportation on land.
This is the kind of public benefit envisioned by the Municipal
Council of Malabon, Rizal and which was sought to be promoted
by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 144.
2. YES.
Proclamation No. 144 specifically provided that the withdrawal of
Lots No. 1 and 2 shall be subject to existing private rights, if any
there be. Prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 144, appellants
had applied for miscellaneous sales applications over the lots
respectively occupied by them. Insofar as appellant Policarpio
Gonzales is concerned, it is not disputed that he had
acknowledged the ownership of the National Government of the
land applied for by him.9 Although not expressly stated, Augusto
Josue must be deemed to have similarly admitted that ownership
by the National Government since he filed a miscellaneous sales
application with the Bureau of Lands, an agency of the
Government, an application which can only be filed in respect of
tracts of public land, not private land.
The miscellaneous sales application, however, of appellant
Policarpio Gonzales had not been approved by the Bureau of
Lands at the time Proclamation No. 144 was issued; the land
therefore retained its character as land of the public domain. Upon
the other hand, the miscellaneous sales application of appellant
Augusto Josue had already been rejected in an Order of the
Director of Lands dated 8 January 1954.10 Accordingly, no private
rights had accrued and become vested in appellants. In both
cases, the lots remained public lands and were in fact subject to
the free disposition and control of the Government.
Appellants allege having built mixed residential and commercial
buildings on Lot 2.1âwphi1 The evidence of record discloses that
appellants had secured the appropriate municipal permits or
licenses therefor, that is, for the construction of said buildings as
well as the carrying on of business therein. However, since the
lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and
management of lands of the public domain was directly under the
executive control of the Director of Lands,11 and not of local
government officials, the Malabon Municipal Mayor must be held
to have exceeded his authority in allowing the use of lands of the
public domain to appellants by constructing thereon commercial
and residential use buildings, or any other kind of building for that
matter.
Sometime after Proclamation No. 144 was issued by the
President, appellants brought their predicament to the attention of
the President. The then Presidential Complaints and Action
Committee ("PCAC") conducted an investigation on the basis of
which it eventually recommended the exclusion from the
reservation of the lots affected, in line with the "Land for the
Landless" policy of President Magsaysay's administration.12 The
then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources similarly
recommended the exclusion of the portion of Lot 2 occupied by
appellants and forwarded to the Office of the President a draft of
a proposed amendment of Proclamation No. 144 specifically
excluding Lot 2 from the scope of application thereof .The
amendment, however, remained merely a proposal for failure on
the part of the President of the Philippines to act favorably
thereon.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The Decision dated 28 January 1967 of then Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against appellants.