Political Law Part V: Article VI – The Legislative Department

POLITICAL LAW PART V

ARTICLE VI – THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
1. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

a. Define legislative power

– Basic concepts of the grant of legislative power:

1. it cannot pass irrepealable laws

2. principle of separation of powers

3. non-delegability of legislative powers

– reason for principle that the legislature cannot pass irrepeablable laws

– Separation of Powers

Read:

a. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139

b. PLANAS VS. GIL, 67 Phil. 62
c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178
d. GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106

e. Bondoc vs. HRET, Sept. 26, 1991

f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106

b. Nature of legislative power

c. What are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers to the legislature?

d. Explain the doctrine of non-delegation power.

e. Permissive delegation of legislative power.

1) Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI (Emergency powers to the President in case of war or other
national emergency, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as Congress may
provide, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by Resolution of Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
2) Sec. 28 (2) of Article VI. The Congress may by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the government.
– Other exceptions: traditional

3. Delegation to local governments

The reason behind this delegation is because the local government is deemed to know better the
needs of the people therein.

a. See Section 5 of Article X

b. Read:

aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 Phil. 660

bb. PEOPLE VS. VERA, 65 Phil 56

A law delegating to the local government units the power to fund the salary of probation officers
in their area is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection of the laws. In areas where
there is a probation officer because the local government unit appropriated an amount for his
salaries, convicts may avail of probation while in places where no funds were set aside for
probation officers, convicts therein could not apply for probation.

a. Reason for the delegation

4) Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies

5) Delegation to the People (Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution and Section 32, Article
VI—The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress of
local legislative body after the registration of a petition thereof signed by at least 10% of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof.

f. Delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies.

1) What is the completeness test? The sufficiency of standard test?

Read: 1. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive
Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities.

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.

Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:

All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.

Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the
name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon
recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed
barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a
resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided,
however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may “not
be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress or of
the corresponding provincial board “upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
affected” and the “recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which
the proposed barrio is situated.” Petitioner argues, accordingly: “If the President, under this new
law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”

Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive
orders are based, provides:

The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal
district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein,
may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other
than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or
portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require:
Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall
first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory
under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-
General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the
Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several
officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.

Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section
does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of
Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such
claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere
transfer of territory from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality
(Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov’t of the P.I. ex
rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) in
consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries
of two municipalities.

It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid
or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an
administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect
the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature.

Although 1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:

(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and

(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate
such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted
within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the
power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for
a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do
not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:

… may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require.

At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we
assumed that the phrase “as the public welfare may require,” in said Section 68, qualifies all
other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs.
Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld “public welfare” and “public interest,”
respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law.
But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements must be construed in
relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute
precedents and have no binding effect. The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon
the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national
roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular
Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of
speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to
the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
2 TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 (Most representative)
1. US VS. ANG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled “An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose,” the material provisions of
which are as follows:

Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with
the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purpose of this Act, to wit:

(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.

August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice
should be sold.

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with
the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the
Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the
provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said
Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at
the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order
No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the
authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months’ imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in
finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused
guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.

The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved
July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919;
and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself
was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.

The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it
authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted
that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any
cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very
terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of
the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it
may be issued “for any cause,” and leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion
of the Governor-General. The Act also says: “For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature does not specify or define
what is “an extraordinary rise.” That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Act also says that the Governor-General, “with the consent of the Council of State,” is authorized
to issue and promulgate “temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes
of this Act.” It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or
how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when
they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or
defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the
Governor-General to say what is or what is not “a cause,” and what is or what is not “an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice,” and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency
measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid
and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should
be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There
may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not
have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and
issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers
are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make
the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The
Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to
make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to
the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is
for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional.
Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which
rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally
delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the
Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and
the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-
General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law.
If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize
the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the
Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other
hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act
remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-
General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving
the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act
could not possibly be put in use as an act in conformity to which all fire insurance policies were
required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and
provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to
the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form
and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in
futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
4. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208
5. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA 757 (Affecting National
interest)
6. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, December 18, 1989
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the
administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must
both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate
be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.

It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and
the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.

Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others,
to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications
which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith.
And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the
requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective
competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in
Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided
that the national economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications
systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates.

II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due
process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit
of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an “initial evaluation,”
which is a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side
before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the
consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to
respondents. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is
adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are
necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process.

Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of the
administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where an order
applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function involved is adjudicatory.
Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question need not be preceded
by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent NTC’s legislative function but
because the assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing
proceedings on petitioner’s application for a certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner
is not the only primary source of data or information since respondent is currently engaged in a
continuing review of the rates charged.

We find merit in petitioner’s contention.

In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made a categorical
classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when
it is legislative, thus:

Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules
and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may
partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of
fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a
profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the
latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove
the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion
drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent
performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands
previous notice and hearing.

This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines
vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit:

It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is
legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer,
Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: ‘If the nature of the
administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not
necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty
or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the
case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) … It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: ‘Aside from statute, the
necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the
proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the
great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and
hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body
acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public
administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and
immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be
affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes
of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently
superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial
evaluation of petitioner’s financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an
explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a
corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending
contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen
percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better
position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it
charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies
attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore,
inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner’s ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its
rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering
the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay
involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the
inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.

At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the
questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that
notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.

g. May rules and regulations promulgated by administrative bodies/agencies have the force of
law? penal law? In order to be considered as one with the force and effect of a penal law, what
conditions must concur? See U.S. vs. GRIMMAUD, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) or the 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION – a reviewer – Primer by FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, 1987 edition.
5. PEO. VS. ROSENTHAL, 68 Phil. 328
6. US VS. BARRIAS, 11 Phil. 327
7. VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA 270

h. Delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of Art. XVII.

i. Classify the membership of the legislative department. Differentiate their qualifications,

elections/selections and as to the participation of the Commission on Appointments in order to
validate their membership.

j. Manner of election and selection

1) Read again TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108

2. Sections 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be
elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided for by law.
3. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
4. Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next following their
election.

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.

Qualifications, term of office, etc., of a senator or member of the House of Representatives.

2. Sections 5. [1] The House of representatives shall be composed of not more than
250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
[2] The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three (3) consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, ½ of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women youth, and such other sectors, as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
[3] Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least one hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.
[4] Within 3 years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on standards provided in this section
Section 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least 25 years of
age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
1 year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Read:

1. ANTONIO BENGSON III VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL and TEODORO CRUZ, 357 SCRA 545
 Rep. Act No. 2630
“Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine Citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed
Forces of the United states, acquired US citizenship, MAY REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY TAKING AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND REGISTERING THE SAME WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRY IN
THE PLACE WHERE HE RESIDES OR LAST RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES. The said
Oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.”

2. Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution

“Section 2. Natural born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform an act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
Citizenship in accordance with par. 3* , Section 1 shall be deemed natural born citizens.”
OCAMPO VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARIO CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK
JIMENEZ, June 15, 2004

Who takes the place of the winning candidate as a Member of the House of Representatives
who was disqualified after he was proclaimed as such?

Facts:
The petitioner and Mark Jimenez were candidates for Congressman of the 6th District of manila
for the May 14, 2001 elections. Mark Jimenez won over the petitioner with 32,097 votes as
against petitioner’s 31,329 votes.

3. Petitioner filed an electoral protest before the HRET based on the following grounds:
1] misreading of ballots; 2] falsification of election returns; 3]substitution of election returns; 4]
use of marked, spurious fake and stray ballots; and 5] presence of ballots written by one or two
persons.

4. On March 6, 2003, the HRET issued its Decision in the case of ABANTE, ET AL. VS.
MARI CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, et al., declaring Mark Jimenez “ ineligible for the
Office of Representative of Sixth District of Manila for lack of residence in the District. Mark
Jimenez filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.

As a result of said disqualification of Jimenez, the petitioner claimed that all the votes cast for
the former should not be counted and since he garnered the second highest number of votes, he
should be declared winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and be proclaimed the duly elected
Congressman of the 6th District of manila.
Issues:

Are the votes of Mark Jimenez stray votes and should not be counted?
Whether the petitioner as second places should be proclaimed winner since the winner was
disqualified?

Held:

1. There must be a final judgment disqualifying a candidate in order that the votes of a
disqualified candidate can be considered “stray”. This final judgment must be rendered BEFORE
THE ELECTION. This was the ruling in the case of CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA. Hence,
when a candidate has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day he was
voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The reason behind this is that the
people voted for him bona fide and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to
be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.

2. The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of

votes does not entitle the second placer to be declared the winner. The said principle was laid
down as early as 1912 and reiterated in the cases of LABO VS. COMELEC, ABELLA VS.
COMELEC and DOMINO VS. COMELEC.

Section 7. The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of 3
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June
next following their election.
No member of the House of Representative shall serve for a period of more than 3
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

a. On the manner of nomination and appointment of Sectoral representatives to the Hose of

Representatives.

Read: 1. Exec. Order No. 198, June 18, 1987

2.. DELES VS. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS,
September 4, 1989

b. On gerrymandering

Read: CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763

4. Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special
election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of representatives thus elected shall serve only the unexpired term.
Read: 1. LOZADA vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337
 COMELEC cannot call a special election (for the legislative districts whose Congressmen
resigned or died while in office) without a law passed by Congress appropriating funds for the
said purpose.
2. RA 6645-RE: Filling up of Congress Vacancy, December 28, 1987

5. Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be
determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the full term of all the members of the Senate and the House of representatives approving such
increase.

a. How much is the present salary of the members of Congress? P204,000.00 [P17,000.00 per
month] as per Section 17, Art. XVIII of the Constitution. The President’s salary is P300,000.00
per annum, while the VP, Speaker, Senate President and Chief Justice is P240,000.00 per
annum. The Chairman of the Constitutional Commissions salary is P204,000.00 and the
members, P180,000.00 per annum.

b. Read:

1. Section 17, Article 18) (P300,000.00 for the President; P240,000.00 for VP, Senate
President; Speaker; Chief Justice; P204,000.00 for Senators, Representatives, Chairmen of CC;
P180,000.00 for members of the Constitutional Commissions)
2. PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 15 SCRA 479;
3. LIGOT VS. MATHAY, 56 SCRA 823

6. Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress
is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

a. Privilege from arrest

Read: Martinez vs. Morfe, MARTINEZ VS. MORFE, 44 SCRA 22

b. Freedom of Speech and debate

Read:

1) OSMENA VS. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863

2) JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876
7. Section 12. All members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon
assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They
shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the
filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
 8. Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned and controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for
which he was elected.

Read:

1) ADAZA vs. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431

After taking his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress) , he is deemed to have
resigned his position as Governor of Negros Oriental because as a legislator, he is not allowed
to hold any other office in the government.
2) PUNZALAN vs. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153
A provincial governor who took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa as “appointed
member” for being a member of the Cabinet is allowed to return to his former position as
Governor if he resigns from the Batasan. This is so because he was just an “appointed” member
as distinguished from the Adaza Case. (Note: It appears that an appointed member of the
Batasan is placed in a better position than the elected members)

3) Compare with Section 10, Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution

9. Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally

appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial bodies and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any
government owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Read:

1) VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI, 113 SCRA 39

2) PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 31

What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly. So a member of Congress
who is a stockholder of the corporation involved in a case is not allowed to appear under the
guise that he is appearing as such, not as counsel for the corporation.

10. Sections 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the 4th Monday of July
for its regular season, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in
session for such number of days as it may determine until 30 days before the opening of its
next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President
may call a special session at any time.
Section 16. [1] The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives,
its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
[2] A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members
in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
[3] Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for
disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall mot exceed sixty days.

NOTE: In the cases of:

1. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN; and

2. REP. PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,

-the Supreme Court held that a member of Congress may also be suspended by the
Sandiganbayan in accordance with Section 13 of RA 3019. This preventive suspension applies to
all public officials, including members of Congress. Otherwise, the same will be considered class
legislation if Senators and Congressmen who commit the same is exempt from the preventive
suspension imposed therein.

Other than the foregoing, a member of Congress can be suspended by the Congress itself.

[4] Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on
any question shall, at the request of one fifth of the members present, be entered in the journal.
Each House shall also keep a record of its proceedings.
[Neither House during the sessions of the Congress, shall without the consent of the other,
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any place than that which the 2 Houses shall be sitting.

Read:

1) AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17, Read also the motion for reconsideration dated March
14, 1949

2) Disciplinary measures on erring members

Read: OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863

3) Dual purpose for keeping a journal

4) Journal entry and enrolled bill theories; which is conclusive over the other?

Read:

U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729

The journal prevails over extraneous evidence like accounts of newspaper journalists and
reporters as to what the proceedings all about.
b. MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1
CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347

The enrolled bill prevails over the journal. If the enrolled bill provides that it is urea
formaldehyde is the one exempt from tax, and not urea and formaldehyde which appears in the
journal which was really approved, the former prevails and only CURATIVE LEGISLATION
COULD CHANGE THE SAME, NOT JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.

d. MORALES vs. SUBIDO, 27 Phil. 131

e. ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS, 56 SCRA 714
(NOTE: The journal prevails over the enrolled bill on all matters required to be entered in the
journals, like yeas and nays on the final reading of a bill or on any question at the request of 1/5
of the members present. )
5) Differentiate a “regular” from a “special” session.
11. Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election contests relating to election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be composed
of 9 members, 3 of whom shall be justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of
Representatives as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior justice in the Electoral tribunal shall
be its Chairman.

See Sec. 2 (2) of Art. IX-C and last par. Sec. 4, Art. VII

Read:

1) LAZATIN VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80007, January 25, 1988

2) FIRDAUSI ABBAS, ET AL. VS. THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,October
27, 1988
3)ENRILE VS. COMELEC & SANCHEZ; ENRILE VS. COMELEC & RAZUL AND
SANCHEZ VS. COMELEC, Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 57
4. BONDOC VS. HRET, supra
11. Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the Senate
President, as ex-oficio chairman, 12 senators and 12 members of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the commission shall not vote,
except in case of a tie. The commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
30 session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority of all the members.

Read:

1. RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December 21, 1989

If the changes in the political party affiliations of the members of Congress is substantial so as to
dramatically decrease the membership of one party while reducing the other, the number of
representatives of the different parties in the Commission on Appointments may also be changed
in proportion to their actual memberships. (NOTE: In Cunanan vs. Tan, the membership of the
Senators was only “temporary” so as not to result in the change of membership in the
Commission on Appointments)
2. GUINGONA VS. GONZALES, October 20, 1992
Since 12 Senators are members of the Commission on Appointments, in addition to the Senate
President as the head thereof, every two (2) Senators are entitled to one (1) representative in the
Commission. Parties, however, are not allowed to “round off” their members, I.e., 7 Senators
are entitled to 3 representatives in the Commission on Appointments, not 4 since 7/2 is only 3.5.
Further, there is nothing in the Constitution which requires that there must be 24 members
of the Commission. If the different parties do not coalesce, then the possibility that the total
number of Senators in the CA is less than 12 is indeed a reality. (Example: Lakas—13 Senators;
LDP—11 Senators. In this case, Lakas is entitled to 6 members in the CA (13/2= 6.5) while LBP
would have 5 members (11/2= 5.5)
3. GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993 (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration
of the October 20, 1992 Decision)

To be discussed later together with Sec. 16, Art. VII.

12-a. Section 19. The electoral tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be
constituted within 30 days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have
been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on
Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman
or a majority of all its members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein
conferred upon it.
13. Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be
open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the
Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and
expenses incurred for each member.
14. Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
Read: 1) ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO, 87 Phil. 29

“A witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of
the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the
witness’ right to due process of law.”

Power of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation; question hour

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN

DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. No. 16977, April
20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Facts:
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia,
the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project.

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations dated
September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral
Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R.
Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and
Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to
attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the
following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005
entitled “Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive
Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005”; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator
Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled “The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping
Capital of the World”; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1,
2005 entitled “Clear and Present Danger”; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria
Ana Consuelo Madrigal – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security
to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the
Military in the So-called “Gloriagate Scandal”; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by
Senator Biazon – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to
Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the
Philippines.

Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of
Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter dated September 27, 2005, requested for its
postponement “due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his] utmost personal
attention” while “some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent
operational matters.”

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita a letter[1] dated September 27, 2005 “respectfully request[ing] for the
postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the
Executive Department have been invited” in order to “afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation.”
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote[2] Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators “are
unable to accede to [his request]” as it “was sent belatedly” and “[a]ll preparations and
arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week.”

Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter from the President of
the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the
NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on
the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured.

On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued E.O. 464, “Ensuring Observance
of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,” which, pursuant to Section 6
thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with

Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the
separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of
the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in
writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.

SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –

(a) Nature and Scope. – The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental
to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public
Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially
known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the
public interest.

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and
the public officers covered by this executive order, including:

1. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered
by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national
security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).
3. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998);
4. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
5. Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:
1. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department
heads are covered by the executive privilege;
2. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
3. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher
and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege;
4. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviserare covered by the executive privilege; and
5. Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials
enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of
powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early
history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may
keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for
vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S.
Constitutional Convention said: “Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of
any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
diminished.”

Considering that no member of the executive department would want to appear in the above
Senate investigations in aid of legislation by virtue of Proc. No. 464, the petitioners filed the
present petitions to declare the same unconstitutional because the President abused her powers in
issuing Executive Order No. 464.

I S S U E S:

1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;

2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern;
and

3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O.
464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

H E L D:

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of
whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review are present is
in order.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[3]
Invoking this Court’s ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v.
Ongpin[4] and Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,[5] respondents assert that to
be considered a proper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.[6]
The Supreme Court, however, held that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in
assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be
direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives,[7] this Court held that when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
I

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the

Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. (Underscoring supplied)
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v.
Nazareno,[8] a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that
the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista
and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a
leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his
refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the
Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senate’s power to punish Arnault for contempt,
this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete;
so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.[9] . . . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be
deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with
the power to legislate.[10] The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those
which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the
most familiar with and informed on executive operations.

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, “with process to enforce it,” is grounded on
the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive
officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by
parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[11] the inquiry itself might not
properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such
inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to
avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need
for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less
room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of
legislation.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power
of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or
House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of
an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that
the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that
obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in
aid of legislation.

Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not
be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation” under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.[12]

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section
21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power
of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the
absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its
application to appearances of department heads in the question hour is therefore
CONSTITUTIONAL.
It is different insofar as Sections 2 and 3 are concerned. Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the
public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior
officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national
security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section(i.e.
department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security
Adviser), are “covered by the executive privilege.”
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given
the title of Section 2 — “Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege” —, it is evident
that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision is
intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege
may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in
the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress.
Thus, the case holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information
rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-
deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried
open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative
and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per
se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for
the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not
given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding
of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power
of inquiry of Congress.

In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

2
E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right to information on matters of
public concern. There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right
to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecumissued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual
citizen.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however,
any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation,
is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to
information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress
— opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government
officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus
holds Valmonte v. Belmonte
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open
dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the
issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.[14] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is,
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of
inquiry.

The implementation of Proc. 464 before it was published in the Official Gazette as
illegal. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance
before it was implemented. This is clear from the doctrine laid down in the case of TANADA
VS. TUVERA.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive
Order No. 464 (series of 2005), “Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
Purposes,” are declared VOID.
Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Nov. 20, 1991

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring
the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of
Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39)
corporations.

Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee’s inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of
legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a “purely private
transaction” which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into;
and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. 1Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore,
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the
Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be “in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” It follows then that the rights of persons
under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to
be compelled to testify against one’s self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may
refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed
legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.

As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction
of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it
vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.

Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees
any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate
inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry,
resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be
made.

A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement
which was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo “Baby”
Lopa of “having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies.” As a consequence thereof, Mr.
Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had
“taken over ” the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz
himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31
August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations
of a “takeover” on his (Lopa’s) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.

The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988,
to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to
vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of
Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile’s) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of
Companies are “baseless” and “malicious.” Thus, in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among
others, as follows:

It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really “in aid
of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the
aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo
Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter
that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the
Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In
John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held :
… The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That
power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well
as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic,
or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes
into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But
broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the
private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was
freely conceded by Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law
enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate
task of Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the
investigators or to “punish” those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)

Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since congress may only
investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot
inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of
the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into
mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the
Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. …

Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations

but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal
proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, 26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan
(6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination
not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit

We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be
compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it is
only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued,
would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the
judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.

Investigation in aid of legislation; Executive Privilege

ROMULO L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. (En Banc)
THE FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s
Republic of China. In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in
the Senat

At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3)
pending bills in the Senate.

Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities

and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He
was summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007.
However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was “out of town” during the
other dates.

In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the
NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into
a government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan from the Chinese
Government.

On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours.
He disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos
offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated
that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer
the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project,[15][6] (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,[16][7] and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve.[17][8]
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring
him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007.
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
requested respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of
executive privilege. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo Neri to appear and
testify again on 20 November 2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it will be recalled that
Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively discussed the ZTE / NBN project, including his
conversation with the President thereon last 26 September 2007.
Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri asked for time to
consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita, 488
SCRA 1 (2006).
Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive privilege on the
following questions, to wit:

a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?

b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told
about the alleged bribe?
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and
correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered executive
privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9,
2002).
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic
of China.
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of
executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. Thus, on
November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt. The Letter reads:

Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National Defense and
Security require you to show cause why you should not be cited in contempt under Section 6,
Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
(Blue Ribbon).

The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007.

On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not
his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were
those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege, thus:

It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have cooperated with the task
of the Senate in its inquiry in aid of legislation as shown by my almost 11 hours stay during the
hearing on 26 September 2007. During said hearing, I answered all the questions that were
asked of me, save for those which I thought was covered by executive privilege, and which was
confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15 November 2007. In good faith, after that
exhaustive testimony, I thought that what remained were only the three questions, where the
Executive Secretary claimed executive privilege. Hence, his request that my presence be
dispensed with.
In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista,
stating, among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the
President; and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive
national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving
high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in
the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of petitioner’s request that he “be furnished in
advance” as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare for the hearing.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari assailing
the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007.
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to
his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued
the Orderdated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and
ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time
that he would appear and give his testimony. The said Order states:
ORDER
For failure to appear and testify in the Committee’s hearing on Tuesday, September 18, 2007;
Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday, November 20, 2007,
despite personal notice and Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and received by him, which
thereby delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed, impeded and obstructed the
inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for failure to explain satisfactorily why he
should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29 November 2007), herein attached) ROMULO
L. NERI is hereby cited in contempt of this (sic) Committees and ordered arrested and
detained in the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he will appear
and give his testimony.

The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this Order and make a
return hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its enforcement.

On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order.[18][9] He insisted
that he has not shown “any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest.” He
emphasized his willingness to testify on new matters, however, respondent Committees did not
respond to his request for advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition
for certiorari he filed on December 7, 2007. According to him, this should restrain respondent
Committees from enforcing the show cause Letter “through the issuance of declaration of
contempt” and arrest.
In view of respondent Committees’ issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner filed on
February 1, 2008 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for
TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking to restrain the implementation of the said
contempt Order.
On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (a) enjoining respondent
Committees from implementing their contempt Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe
the status quo prevailing prior to the issuance of the assailed order, and (c) requiring
respondent Committees to file their comment.
Petitioner contends that respondent Committees’ show cause Letter and contempt Order
were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
He stresses that his conversations with President Arroyo are “candid discussions meant to
explore options in making policy decisions.” According to him, these discussions “dwelt on
the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials on the country’s
diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence
of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.” He also emphasizes that his claim of
executive privilege is upon the order of the President and within the parameters laid down
in Senate v. Ermita[19][10] and United States v. Reynolds.[20][11] Lastly, he argues that he is
precluded from disclosing communications made to him in official confidence under Section
7[21][12] of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees, and Section 24[22][13] (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1) petitioner’s testimony is
material and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2) there is no valid
justification for petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to
order petitioner’s arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.
I S S U E S:
1. What communications between the President and petitioner Neri are covered by the
principle of ‘executive privilege’?
1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege, by
order of the President, to cover (i) conversations of the President in the exercise of
her executive and policy decision-making and (ii) information, which might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China?
1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid testifying on his
conversations with the President on the NBN contract on his assertions that the said
conversations “dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters
relating to the impact of bribery scandal involving high government officials and the
possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines” x x x within
the principles laid down in Senate v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1 [2006])?
1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the following provisions of the
Constitution:
Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest)
Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust)
Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed)

and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers?

2. What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege?

3. Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest of
petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena?
H E L D:

At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit:

First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt Order?

There is merit in the petition.

At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita[23][18] becomes

imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the distinction between
the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under Sections 21 and 22,
respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the state
or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each
other, they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function.[24][19] Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to
conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.
This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process.
Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 22. The Court’s pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita[25][20] is clear:
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
I
The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by Executive Privilege

We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded.

The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the
proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.[26][21]
Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is,
has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or
House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is
through a valid claim of executive privilege.[27][22] This directs us to the consideration of the
question — is there a recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O.
464?
A- There is a Recognized Claim
of Executive Privilege Despite the
Revocation of E.O. 464
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish
our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings. Unlike the United States which has further accorded the concept with statutory
status by enacting the Freedom of Information Act[28][23] and the Federal Advisory Committee
Act,[29][24] the Philippines has retained its constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted
only by this Court in various cases. The most recent of these is the case of Senate v.
Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O. 464. In this
regard, it is worthy to note that Executive Ermita’s Letter dated November 15, 2007 limits its
bases for the claim of executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v.
Vasquez,[30][25] and Chavez v. PEA.[31][26] There was never a mention of E.O. 464.
While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,[32][27] have comprehensively discussed the
concept of executive privilege, we deem it imperative to explore it once more in view of the
clamor for this Court to clearly define the communications covered by executive privilege.
The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential
communications privilege.[33][28] In United States v. Nixon,[34][29] the U.S. Court recognized a
great public interest in preserving “the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the
President’s performance of his official duties.” It thus considered presidential
communications as “presumptively privileged.” Apparently, the presumption is founded on the
“President’s generalized interest in confidentiality.” The privilege is said to be necessary to
guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide “the President and those who
assist him… with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except
privately.”
In In Re: Sealed Case,[35][30] the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two
(2) kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the
other is the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to “communications,
documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations
and that the President believes should remain confidential.” The latter includes ‘advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated.”
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process
privilege, to decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional
principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role;
the second on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege,
the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers
final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones[36][31] As a consequence,
congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always
subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.
Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications privilege, In
Re: Sealed Case confines the privilege only to White House Staff that has “operational
proximity” to direct presidential decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass
only those functions that form the core of presidential authority, involving what the court
characterized as “quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power,” such as commander-in-
chief power, appointment and removal power, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the
sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers, the power to negotiate treaties,
etc.[37][32]
Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction. In Chavez v.
PCGG[38][38], this Court held that there is a “governmental privilege against public disclosure
with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters.”
In Chavez v. PEA,[39][39] there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v.
Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed.
As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly
recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our
Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-
chief,[40][40] appointing,[41][41]pardoning,[42][42] and diplomatic[43][43] powers. Consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor
of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may
be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.[44][44]
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and
policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.[45][45] Second, the communications are “received”
by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.

United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against
other interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutelyprotected
by the Constitution. The U.S. Court held:

[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.

The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,[46][46] where it was held
that presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be
overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations.
The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the
government “in the manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch.”[47][47] Here,
the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a
compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a
law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function
under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v.
Ermita ruled that the “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.” It is
conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an
inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the
content of the questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted.
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a
possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled in United
States v. Nixon[48][48] that “demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial”
outweighs the President’s “generalized interest in confidentiality.” However, the present case’s
distinction with the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon, there is a pending criminal
proceeding where the information is requested and it is the demands of due process of law and
the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be disclosed. This is the reason
why the U.S. Court was quick to “limit the scope of its decision.” It stressed that it is “not
concerned here with the balance between the President’s generalized interest in
confidentiality x x x and congressional demands for information.” Unlike in Nixon, the
information here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this
regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not
only on the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or the context in which the
claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to
protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case, Executive
Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential
communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and
diplomatic secrets.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.[49][50] We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did
not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the
September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the
exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law.
Some of these laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,[50][51] Article
229[51][52] of the Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k)[52][53] of R.A. No. 3019,
and Section 24(e)[53][54] of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These
are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential[54][55] and what our
Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is
a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find the information
subject of this case belonging to such kind.
More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to public information.
The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to
information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right
to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecumissued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not
follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the
people are exercising their right to information.

The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of
power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge
their power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right
to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional
precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and
privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided cases.

B- The Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked

We now proceed to the issue — whether the claim is properly invoked by the
President.Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the
matter.”[55][56] A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a “precise and certain
reason” for preserving their confidentiality.[56][57]
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It
serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that “this Office is
constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v.
Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.” Obviously, he is referring to the Office
of the President. That is more than enough compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical
letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
With regard to the existence of “precise and certain reason,” we find the grounds relied upon
by Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not “to leave respondent Committees in the
dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged.” The case of Senate v.
Ermita only requires that an allegation be made “whether the information demanded involves
military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.” The particular ground must
only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive.”[57][58] The
following statement of grounds satisfies the requirement:

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic
of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without
disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, [58][59] the Congress must not require the
executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the
information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate
and co-equal department.
II
Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order
It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show cause Letter dated
November 22, 2007, petitioner replied immediately, manifesting that it was not his intention to
ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were the three (3)
questions he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. In addition thereto, he submitted Atty.
Bautista’s letter, stating that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President and
specifying the reasons why his conversations with President Arroyo are covered by executive
privilege. Both correspondences include an expression of his willingness to testify again,
provided he “be furnished in advance” copies of the questions. Without responding to his
request for advance list of questions, respondent Committees issued the Order dated January 30,
2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at
the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, informing respondent
Committees that he had filed the present petition for certiorari.
Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order in
view of five (5) reasons:
First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order
suffers from constitutional infirmity.
Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v.
Ermita that the invitations should contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the need
for the inquiry,” along with “the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and
the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof.” Compliance with this requirement is
imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must be so to
ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry are respected
as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of Section 22.
Unfortunately, despite petitioner’s repeated demands, respondent Committees did not send him
an advance list of questions.
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees’ January 30, 2008 proceeding
reveals that only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present
during the deliberation. [59][61] Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation provides that:
“The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness
before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to
answer proper questions by the Committee or any of its members.”
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee. Apparently,
members who did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt
Order. Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30,
2008.
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise
violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance
with the “duly published rules of procedure.” We quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase ‘duly published rules of procedure’ requires the Senate of every Congress to publish
its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct
from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-
half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each
term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having
published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the
14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
And fifth, respondent Committees’ issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate.
It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive
privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as
“unsatisfactory” and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his
immediate arrest and detention.
A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He manifested several
times his readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He refused to answer the three (3)
questions because he was ordered by the President to claim executive privilege. It behooves
respondent Committees to first rule on the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of
their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily dismissing his explanation as “unsatisfactory.”
Undoubtedly, respondent Committees’ actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for
being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law. The same quality afflicted
their conduct when they (a) disregarded petitioner’s motion for reconsideration alleging that he
had filed the present petition before this Court and (b) ignored petitioner’s repeated request for
an advance list of questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to which he
claimed to be covered by executive privilege.
Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of contempt judiciously and
sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[60][63] Respondent
Committees should have exercised the same restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary
witness. He holds a high position in a co-equal branch of government.

In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of judicial review could have been
avoided if powers are discharged with circumspection and deference. Concomitant with the
doctrine of separation of powers is the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal branch of the
government.

In this present crusade to “search for truth,” we should turn to the fundamental constitutional
principles which underlie our tripartite system of government, where the Legislature enacts
the law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered
separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a
system of checks and balances to prevent unwarranted exercise of power. The Court’s
mandate is to preserve these constitutional principles at all times to keep the political
branches of government within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their respective powers
and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can preserve the
stability of our democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law.

The respondents-Committees were therefore stopped from calling the petitioner and ask the
three(3) questions mentioned above in connection with his conversations with the President
being covered by the “executive privilege” rule.

Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Right to Privacy; Public disclosure
of government transactions; right to information on matters of public concern; right against self-
incrimination;
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate
Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),[61][4] “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations
by their respective Board of Directors.”
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J.
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting
him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The
purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.[62][6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.[63][7] At
the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an
Order[64][13] directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order
bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the Committees’
members.

On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio
in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate
premises where he was detained.

Hence, this petition.

I S S U E:
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b)
of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the merit of the
contention of Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners that their refusal to appear before
respondent Senate Committees is justified.

Ranged against it is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting respondent Senate
Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative
inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding, thus: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.
The Congress’ power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it
reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,[65][15] cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.[66][16] In
those earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to
legislate.
In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that
the power of inquiry is “an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function,”
thus:
Although there is no provision in the “Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it –
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does
not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must
be had to others who possess it.”
Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress’ power of inquiry, provisions on such power
made their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution.[67][18] Then
came the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was
therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence,
became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.[68][19]
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but
also of “any of its committee.” This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of
investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses
can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the
committees.[69][20]
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita,[70][21] where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the
power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article
VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’
power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision
granting such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes.[71][22] It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even
abolish.”[72][23] PCGG belongs to this class.

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in
the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution
stating that: “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain
powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the
officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the
government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust
extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words,
public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.[73][24]
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public
accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress
and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same
provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability. In Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Peña,[74][25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as
“obiter” the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O.
No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners.

He eloquently opined:

The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important
to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and
constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a)
were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability
“for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order,” the
constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so
viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of
members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987
Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the
1987 Constitution. x x x.

x x x x x x

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the
PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members
were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[75][26] reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned
upon by this Court even before the filing of the present petitions.

2) NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE VS. SANGGUNIANG

PANGLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE CITY, G.R. No. 72492, Nov. 5, 1987, 155 SCRA 421
Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the
power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of
witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the power to compel
the attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in the
investigation of matters affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted to NORECO
II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation
and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction
(Rollo, p. 46). It is also the position of the respondents that the contempt power, if not expressly
granted, is necessarily implied from the powers granted the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Rollo, pp.
48-49). Furthermore, the respondents assert that an inquiry into the installation or use of
inefficient power lines and its effect on the power consumption cost on the part of Dumaguete
residents is well-within the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and its committees.

1. A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative
power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local
government unit, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of
law, possess delegated legislative power. While the Constitution does not expressly vest
Congress with the power to punish non-members for legislative contempt, the power has
nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body as a means of preserving its authority and
dignity (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 [1950]); Amault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]), in
the same way that courts wield an inherent power to “enforce their authority, preserve their
integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice.”
(Commissioner v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716, 723 [1967]; In re Kelly 35 Phil. 944 950 [1916], and
other cases). The exercise by Congress of this awesome power was questioned for the first time
in the leading case of Arnault v. Nazareno, (87 Phil. 29 [1950]) where this Court held that the
legislative body indeed possessed the contempt power.

But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his
testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, 26, L.ed., 377.)

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and
information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure
of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and
authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers,
making each branch supreme within the real of its respective authority, it must have intended
each department’s authority to be full and complete, independently of the other’s authority or
power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal every
act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal
therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity. . . (Arnault v. Balagtas, L-
6749, July 30, 1955; 97 Phil. 358, 370 [1955]).

The aforequoted pronouncements in the two Arnault cases, supra, broke ground in what was then
an unexplored area of jurisprudence, and succeeded in supplying the raison d’ etre of this power
of Congress even in the absence of express constitutional grant. Whether or not the reasons for
upholding the existence of said power in Congress may be applied mutatis mutandis to a
questioned exercise of the power of contempt by the respondent committee of a city council is
the threshold issue in the present controversy.

3. The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as

that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial
branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the
legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess
it for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge
of legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three
independent and coordinate branches of government. The same thing cannot be said of local
legislative bodies which are creations of law.
4. To begin with, there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local
Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to
subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional
or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance
of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behaviour would be for
said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the
contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in
the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of
legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise
these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.

These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter and must be considered as an exception
to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal rules of interpretation in favor of local autonomy.
Since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power in any
government body inevitably poses a potential derogation of individual rights, i.e. compulsion of
testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally construed to have
impliedly granted such powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly presumed that the
sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government powers, have reposed these powers in all
government agencies. The intention of the sovereign people, through their representatives in the
legislature, to share these unique and awesome powers with the local legislative bodies must
therefore clearly appear in pertinent legislation.

There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative
bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the
Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and
Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to
claim that it can exercise these powers.

11. Sections 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of
the President, or upon the request of either House, as the Rules of each House shall provide,
appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the HR at least 3
days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions,
but may not cover matter matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in
executive session.
12. Section 23 [1] The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in a joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of
war.
[2] In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by a resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.

a. Note the limitations and restrictions for the delegation.

b. Note also that it could be withdrawn by mere resolution.

c. What is referred to by the phrase “next adjournment?”

d. Read:

1) ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN, 84 Phil. 369

– the first emergency powers cases
2) RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 Phil. 603
– the second emergency powers cases.
3) Republic Act No. 6826, Dec.20, 1989 which grants emergency powers to President
Aquino.
13. Sections 24. All appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
NOTE: In Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Supreme Court held that the E-VAT Law is
constitutional even if the same was the VERSION which came from the Senate, not from the
House of Representatives. This is so because the Senate is allowed to “propose amendments” to
bills which must exclusively originate from the House of Representatives.
14. Section 25 [1] The Congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by
the President for the operation of the government as specified in the budget. The form,
content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
[2 No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any provision or enactment
shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
[3] The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow
the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.
[4] A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and
shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the national treasurer, or to
be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.
[5] No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the house of Representatives, the
Chief justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the constitutional commissions may,
by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
[6] Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only
for the purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as
may be prescribed by law.
[7] If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the
preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Read: DEMETRIA vs. ALBA, 148 SCRA 208
17. Section 26. [1] Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
[2] No bill shall be passed unless it has passed 3 readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its members 3 days before
its passage, except when the President certifies as to its necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of the bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Read:
1) TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208
2) DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569
3) INSULAR LUMBER VS. CTA, 104 SCRA 710
4) LIDASAN VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496

The case questions the law entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur”, but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to
be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill”?

Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato
are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries
of the two provinces.

Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the
Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until “clarified by correcting legislation.”

Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the
statute “should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.”

It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one
statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language
sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single
subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be “expressed in the
title” of the bill. This constitutional requirement “breathes the spirit of command.” Compliance
is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to
read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247,
which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final
approval in the House of Representatives where the bill, being of local application, originated.

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to
inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and,
thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly
inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act, is bad.

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be
considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons
interested, should be kept in mind by the court.

With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title “An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur” 8 projects the
impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not
the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur,”
read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is
that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the
municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and
Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities
in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title
did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that
part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

5) ALALAYAN VS. NAPOCOR, 24 SCRA 172

6) CORDERO VS. CABATUANDO, 6 SCRA 418
7) TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 333
18. Section 27. [1] Every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto
it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall
enter the objections at large in its journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
consideration , 2/3 of all the members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
sent, together with the objections , to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by 2/3 of all the members of that House, it shall become a
law. In all such cases, the votes of each house shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its journal. The President
shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within 30 days after
the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he signed it.
[2] The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which
he does not object.

1) Read:

a. BENGZON VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 62 Phil. 912

b. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS VS. VALENCIA, 11 SCRA 486
c. NEPTALI GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, November 19, 1990

Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 (Section 55 [FY ’89] hereinafter), which was
vetoed by the President, reads:

SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations

Disapproved and /or Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the
President in the Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the
Constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by
the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of
appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall be deemed to
have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided in this Act.

We quote below the reason for the Presidential veto:

The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, this
Section would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the President,
but also that of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriation. A careful review of the legislative
action on the budget as submitted shows that in almost all cases, the budgets of agencies as
recommended by the President, as well as those of the Senate, the House of
Representatives, and the Constitutional Commissions, have been reduced. An unwanted
consequence of this provision is the inability of the President, the President of the Senate,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations even in
cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation of
essential public services and infrastructure projects.
I am vetoing this provision for the reason that it violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the
Constitution in relation to Sections 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No.
6670 which authorizes the President to use savings to augment any item of appropriations
in the Executive Branch of the Government.

The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55 of the
1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY’89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of
the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY’90), is unconstitutional and without effect.

The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the item veto power
accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto “provisions”
of an Appropriations Bill?

Petitioners contend that Section 55 FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY’90) are provisions and not
items and are, therefore, outside the scope of the item veto power of the President.
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987
Constitution reading, in full, as follows:

Sec. 27.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would
result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as
the item veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the
President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words,
the power given the Executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill
does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion
of the same item.

It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI, Section 27
[2], supra), is a verbatim reproduction except for the public official concerned. In other words,
also eliminated has been any reference to the veto of a provision. The vital question is: should
this exclusion be interpreted to mean as a disallowance of the power to veto a provision, as
petitioners urge?

The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An
item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill
(Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose
(Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States
Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252,
81 L. Ed., 312) declared “that an ‘item’ of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which
in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens
to be put into an appropriation bill.”

It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27
(2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the
President’s veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed.
This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct
and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto (Bengzon v. Secretary of
Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916 (1926); 2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J., The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, 1st ed., 154-155, [1988]).

The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision
without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable
part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate
that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words,
in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to
some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.

But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, we
are of the opinion that Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) are not provisions in the
budgetary sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill
unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to
some “particular appropriation” therein. The challenged “provisions” fall short of this
requirement. Firstly, the vetoed “provisions” do not relate to any particular or distinctive
appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the
Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the
face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made to the original recommendations
made by the President and to the source indicated by petitioners themselves, i.e., the “Legislative
Budget Research and Monitoring Office” (Annex B-1 and B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed
Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16
(FY ’90) although labelled as “provisions,” are actually inappropriate provisions that should be
treated as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power. (Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S
Rep. 2d, 157-158).
Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the
legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers
conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation
bill matters more properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governor’s constitutional power
to veto bills of general legislation … cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such
measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between
approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing “items” of expenditure essential to the
operation of government. The legislature cannot by location ot a bill give it immunity from
executive veto. Nor it circumvent the Governor’s veto power over substantive legislation by
artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on
an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the
constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in contravention
of the separation of powers doctrine … We are no more willing to allow the legislature to use its
appropriation power to infringe on the Governor’s constitutional right to veto matters of
substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the constitutional
powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as items
for purposes of the Governor’s item veto power over general appropriation bills.

Petitioners maintain, however, that Congress is free to impose conditions in an

Appropriations Bill and where conditions are attached, the veto power does not carry with
it the power to strike them out, citing Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 SE 2d 130, supra) and
Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486). In
other words, their theory is that Section 55 (FY’89) and Section 16 (FY’90) are such
conditions/restrictions and thus beyond the veto power.

There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how
money shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct “items” of appropriation, the Legislature
may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on
expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition
or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand (Fairfield v. Foster,
supra, at 320). That was also the ruling in Bolinao, supra, which held that the veto of a condition
in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related
was deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever.

The Power of augmentation and The Validity of the Veto

The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY’89) and Section 16 (FY’90) because they nullify
the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment
any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the
Constitution. Said provision reads:
Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations. (Emphasis ours).
If, indeed, the Legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the
Executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear.
A Presidential veto may be overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress
(1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[l], supra). But Congress made no attempt to
override the Presidential veto. Petitioners’ argument that the veto is ineffectual so that
there is “nothing to override” (citing Bolinao) has lost force and effect with the executive
veto having been herein upheld.
b. BENGZON VS. DRILON, April 15, 1992

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is
tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly
repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the
utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of
any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary
is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the
disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is
aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed.

Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court upheld the
authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from
savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The Court stated that:

There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And
once given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional
Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources
(Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way endangered because
the transfer is made within a department (or branch of government) and not from one department
(branch) to another.

The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:

Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting items
for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the
abovestated pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to
augment other items in the Judiciary’s appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional
provision on “fiscal autonomy.”

III

Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions
due them pursuant to RA 1797.

The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with pensions have been
enacted by practically all the states in the United States (State ex rel. Murray v, Riley, 44 Del
505, 62 A2d 236), and presumably in most countries of the world. Statutory provisions for the
support of Judges or Justices on retirement are founded on services rendered to the state. Where
a judge has complied with the statutory prerequisite for retirement with pay, his right to retire
and draw salary becomes vested and may not, thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v.
Whitehurst, 44 So ad 430)

Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the purpose of which is
to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire
therefrom with relative security, not only those who have retained their vigor but, more so, those
who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of
Judges and Justices Starting From the Sixth Year of their Retirement and After the Expiration of
the Initial Five-year Period of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315 [1990]).

As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.

This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates.
Through the years, laws were enacted and jurisprudence expounded to afford retirees better
benefits.

P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910 providing that the
lump sum of 5 years gratuity to which the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals were entitled was to be computed on the basis of the highest monthly aggregate of
transportation, living and representation allowances each Justice was receiving on the date of his
resignation. The Supreme Court in a resolution dated October 4, 1990, stated that this law on
gratuities covers the monthly pensions of retired Judges and Justices which should include the
highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances the retiree was
receiving on the date of retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and
Justices, supra).

The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional officers are unduly
favored is, again, a misimpression.

Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted men number in the tens
of thousands while retired Justices are so few they can be immediately identified. Justices retire
at age 70 while military men retire at a much younger age some retired Generals left the military
at age 50 or earlier. Yet the benefits in Rep. Act No. 1797 are made to apply equally to both
groups. Any ideas arising from an alleged violation of the equal protection clause should first be
directed to retirees in the military or civil service where the reason for the retirement provision is
not based on indubitable and constitutionally sanctioned grounds, not to a handful of retired
Justices whose retirement pensions are founded on constitutional reasons.

The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package of protections
given by the Constitution to guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary.

The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any institution given
the power to declare, in proper cases, that act of both the President and Congress are
unconstitutional needs a high degree of independence in the exercise of its functions. Our
jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress. Neither may it be increased without our advice and
concurrence. Justices may not be removed until they reach age 70 except through impeachment.
All courts and court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.
The President may not appoint any Judge or Justice unless he or she has been nominated by the
Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme Court’s supervision. Our salaries
may not be decreased during our continuance in office. We cannot be designated to any agency
performing administrative or quasi-judicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy.
The Judiciary is not only independent of, but also co-equal and coordinate with the Executive
and Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and section 30, Article VI, Constitution).

Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices of this
Court and the ground that there should be no “grant of distinct privileges” or “preferential
treatment” to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and, in effect, asks that
these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The integrity
of our entire constitutional system is premised to a large extent on the independence of the
Judiciary. All these provisions are intended to preserve that independence. So are the laws on
retirement benefits of Justices.

One last point.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that:

. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public funds, raised from
taxes on other citizens, will be paid off to select individuals who are already leading private lives
and have ceased performing public service. Said the United States Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Miller: “To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property
of the citizen, and with the other to bestow upon favored individuals . . . is nonetheless a robbery
because it is done under the forms of law . . .” (Law Association V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655)
(Comment, p. 16)

The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are
unbecoming of an office whose top officials are supposed to be, under their charter, learned in
the law.

Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L. Reyes,
Cecilia Muñoz Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals may no longer be in the active service. Still, the
Solicitor General and all lawyers under him who represent the government before the two courts
and whose predecessors themselves appeared before these retirees, should show some continuing
esteem and good manners toward these Justices who are now in the evening of their years.

All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To characterize them as
engaging in “robbery” is intemperate, abrasive, and disrespectful more so because the argument
is unfounded.

If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry to state that the then
quality of research in that institution has severely deteriorated.

In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW Association v. Topeka
but Citizen’s Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City (20 Wall. 655; 87
U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455 [1874]. Second, the case involved the validity of a statute authorizing
cities and counties to issue bonds for the purpose of building bridges, waterpower, and other
public works to aid private railroads improve their services. The law was declared void on the
ground that the right of a municipality to impose a tax cannot be used for private interests.

The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000 times since that
ancient period. Public use is now equated with public interest. Public money may now be used
for slum clearance, low-cost housing, squatter resettlement, urban and agrarian reform where
only private persons are the immediate beneficiaries. What was “robbery” in 1874 is now called
“social justice.” There is nothing about retirement benefits in the cited case. Obviously, the OSG
lawyers cited from an old textbook or encyclopedia which could not even spell “loan” correctly.
Good lawyers are expected to go to primary sources and to use only relevant citations.
The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues in the Judiciary
requesting adjustments in their pensions just so they would be able to cope with the everyday
living expenses not to mention the high cost of medical bills that old age entails. As Justice Cruz
aptly stated in Teodoro J. Santiago v. COA, (G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991);

Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to
provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to
continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he
deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous
retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is
the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the
weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able
to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.

For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the
government can not deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal
and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid
and subsisting. The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to
the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other
appropriations for the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated
November 28, 1991 is likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated.

2) What is a “pocket veto?”

3) What are the three ways by which a bill becomes a law?

3. PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ, 235 SCRA 506

What is the so-called “executive impoundment”?

It means that although an item of appropriation is not vetoed by the President, he however
refuses for whatever reason, to spend funds made possible by Congress. It is the failure to spend
or obligate budget authority of any type. Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three
(3) principal sources of authority of the President. [1] authority to impound given to him by
Congress, either expressly or impliedly; [2] the executive power drawn from his power as
Commander-in-chief; and [3] the Faithful execution clause of the Constitution.

Note that in this case the SC held that the Countryside Development Fund (CDF) of
Congressmen and Senators is CONSTITUTIONAL because the same is “set aside for
‘infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities,
and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by said Senators and
Congressmen.
19. Section 28. [1] The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
[2] The Congress, may by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the government.
[3] Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes
shall be exempt from taxation.
[4] No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of the Congress.
Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employed…directly or

indirectly for the benefit, use, or support of any sect, denomination, or system of
religion…except when such preacher, priest… is assigned to the AFP, or to any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium.

All money collected on any tax for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid
out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled
or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.

Read:

1. Garcia vs. Executive Sec., 211 SCRA 219

1-a) PEPSI COLA VS. THE CITY OF BUTUAN, 24 SCRA 789
2) PROVINCE OF ABRA VS. HERNANDO, 107 SCRA 104
3) APOSTOLIC PREFECT OF BAGUIO VS. TREASURER, 71 Phil. 547
4) PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331

4) AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201

5) MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987

Respondent Dr. Francisco A. Perez was named outstanding Health Worker for 1980 by the
Ministry of Health on January 22, 1981. Being such an awardee, Dr. Perez was granted by the
Ministry of Health a two-step salary increase in accordance with the merit increase program as
enunciated in Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 562. Thereafter, the Ministry of Health requested
the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City, which is paying Dr. Perez’ salary in full to
appropriate the amount corresponding to the merit increase in its current budget. For lack of legal
basis, the Bureau of Local Government opposed the proposed merit increase because the
provisions of LOI No. 562 apply only to officials/employees in the national government, and
consequently, awardee Dr. Perez was not entitled thereto, since he is an employee of the local
government as provided for in the charter of San Pablo City. This prompted Dr. Perez to request
the Ministry of Health to make the corresponding allocation to issue a notice of salary
adjustment effective January 1, 1981. The Minister of Justice, upon a query made by the
Ministry of Health, in his Opinion No. 177, Series of 1981, dated November 20, 1981,
acknowledged that the merit increase program applies only to the officials/employees of the
national government but declared Dr. Perez as one such official or employee and concluded that
the Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase to him. Relying on such opinion, the
Ministry of Health issued to respondent Dr. Perez on December 1, 1981 a notice of salary
adjustment which release of the amount was denied by the Office of the Budget and
Management which insisted that the awardee is an employee of the local or city government who
is not covered by the merit increase program. Dr. Perez made his appeal therefrom to the
Ministry of Health who forwarded it, recommending favorable action thereon to the Office of the
President of the Philippines. The latter referred the appeal to the Minister of the Budget who
affirmed his earlier decision of disallowing the merit increase and reiterating the same reasons. A
petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Budget and Management to pay the merit
increase was filed by Dr. Perez before the lower court which granted the aforementioned
favorable decision, subject matter of the present petition for review on certiorari before Us by
petitioners arguing that:

1. The position of private respondent as the City Health Officer of San Pablo City is
embraced in Sec. 7 of Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 1136 which states among other things that the
salary plan provided for in Sec. 8 of the same decree shall cover the City Officer, among other
officials, whose salary shall be paid out of city funds and therefore a local government employee
whose position does not appear in the list of national government employees defined under
another law (P.D. 985).

2. The constitution provides that no money shag be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Since there is no such appropriation, the Minister of
the Budget cannot be compelled to release the amount for the payment of the merit salary
increase because such allocation entails the exercise of judgment and discretion of the Minister
of the Budget which cannot be controlled by mandamus.

3. The decision declaring respondent Dr. Perez as an employee of the national government
would have far reaching effects such that all other city health officers and local officials similarly
situated would also be so entitled to an personal benefits given to national employee. Dr. Perez’s
exemplary accomplishment which merited for him the grant to a two-step increase must yield to
the overriding economic consideration of availability of funds which the government must set
aside for the purpose.
We do not agree with the arguments set down by petitioners. Private respondent invites Our
attention to the City Charter of San Pablo City (CA #5201, Sec. 87, May 7, 1940) more
specifically, Art. IV thereof, which provides that the position of a City Health Officer is not
included among the heads of the regular departments of the city but included among the national
officials performing municipal functions under the direct control of the Health Minister and not
the city mayor as provided for in Art. XIV of the same charter. Such principle is reiterated in the
Decentralization Act of 1967 which shows that the appointing authority is the Health Minister
and not the local officials. Petitioner Minister of the Budget admitted thru the testimony of its
representative, Alice S. Torres, chief of the Compensation and Position Classification and a
specialist thereon that the City Health Officer is under the administrative and technical
supervision of the Ministry of Health (p. 69, tsn, June 16, 1983, p. 72, Rollo). Be it noted that,
Section 7 of PD 1136 relied upon by petitioners provides that the basic salary of the City Health
Officer is paid from city funds. However, the last paragraph of the same Sec. 7, excludes the city
health officer from the classification of local government official as can be gathered from the
phrase “… except those occupied by (a) officials whose compensation is fixed in the
constitution, Presidential Decrees and other laws and (b) officials and employees who are under
the direct supervision and control of the National Government or its agencies and who are paid
wholly or partially from national funds.”

Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials irrespective of
the source of funds of their salary because the preservation of health is a national service. Also
their positions are partially funded by the national government. Some are receiving one-half of
their salary from the national funds and the other one-half from local funds.

We cannot likewise ignore the opinions of the Ministry of Justice cited by private respondent to
wit: 1) Opinion No. 26, Series of 1976 which categorically rules that “Officials and employees of
provincial and city health offices render service as officials and employees of the Bureau of
Health (Ministry of Health) and they are for that reason not local but national officials under the
direct supervision and control of the Ministry of Health; 2) Opinion No. 177, Series of 1981,
which is specific and definitive that the private respondent is a national government employee
and the Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase awarded to him. In this 1981 opinion, it
was explained in detail how the said funds corresponding to his merit increase could be legally
disbursed contrary to the unfounded speculations expressed by the petitioners.

Lastly, there is no basis in petitioner’s allegations that they cannot be compelled by mandamus as
the appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the Ministry of the
Budget whether or not to allocate. Respondent Dr. Perez has been proven to be a national
government official, hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more
particularly the Health Ministry wherein private respondent is its lone beneficiary for the year
1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes the ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the
request for allotment. Having failed to do so, he could be compelled by mandamus.
20. Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
TERESITA FABIAN VS. HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO, G.R. No. 129742,
September 16, 1998)
Regalado, J.

Section 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:

“In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for Certiorari within 10
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the Motion
for Reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court”
Issue:

Is Section 27 of RA 6770 constitutional?

Held:

Section 27 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional since it increases the appellate jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court without its advice and consent as provided under Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. As explained in FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. VS. CA, 237 SCRA
519, the aforesaid constitutional provision “was intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.”

Appeal of cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman covered by Section 27 of RA 6770
shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.

Read: MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987

21. Sections 32. The Congress, shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative
and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative
body after the registration of a petition therefore signed by at least 10% of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters thereof.

Read again RA 6735 & SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC & PIRMA

Reference:
Political Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan
College of Law, University of the Cordilleras
Baguio City
* “Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.”
[1] Annex “B,” id. at 52.
[2] Annex “C,” id. at 53.
[3] Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA
44, 133.
[4] G.R. No. 67752, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 657.
[5] G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987 (res).
[6] Rollo (G.R. No. 169777), p. 117.
[7] Supra note 39 at 136.
[8] 87 Phil. 29 (1950).
[9] Supra at 45, citing McGrain v. Daugherty 273 US 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580, 50
A.L.R. 1 (1927).
[10] Id. at 46.
[11] G.R. 89914, Nov. 20, 1991, 203 SCRA 767.
[12] Supra.
[13] Supra note 82 at 189.
[14] G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 256.
[15][6] Transcript of the September 26, 2007 Hearing of the respondent Committees, pp.91-
92.
[16][7] Id., pp. 114-115.
[17][8] Id., pp. 276-277.
[18][9] See Letter dated January 30, 2008.
[19][10] 488 SCRA 1 (2006).
[20][11] 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
[21][12] Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions
of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. –

Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public, either:

(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or

(2) To prejudice the public interest.
[22][13] SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. – The following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases. (e) A public
officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made
to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by
disclosure.
[23][18] Supra.
[24][19] Ibid.
[25][20] Ibid.
[26][21] Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil 32 (1950)
[27][22] Senate v. Ermita, p. 58.
[28][23] 5 U.S. C. § 552
[29][24] 51 U.S. C. app.
[30][25] 433 Phil. 506 (2002).
[31][26] G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, (360 SCRA 132 ).
[32][27] Supra.
[33][28] CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History,
Law, Practice and Recent Developments at p. 2.
[34][29] 418 U.S. 683.
[35][30] In Re: Sealed Case No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997.
[36][31] Id.
[37][32] CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History,
Law, Practice and Recent Developments at pp. 18-19.
[38][38] 360 Phil. 133 (1998).
[39][39] Supra.
[40][40] Section 18, Article VII.
[41][41] Section 16, Article VII.
[42][42] Section 19, Article VII.
[43][43] Section 20 and 21, Article VII.
[44][44] CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law
Practice and Recent Developments, supra..
[45][45] Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary,
2003 Ed. p. 903.
[46][46] 159 U.S. App. DC. 58, 487 F. 2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
[47][47] U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
[48][48] Supra.
[49][50] Citing Section 7, Article 3 of the Constitution.
[50][51] Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x
( c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. – Public officials and
employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified information officially known to
them by reason of their office and not made available to the public, either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
[51][52] Article 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. – Any public officer who shall
reveal any secret known to him by reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver
papers or copies of papers of which he may have charge and which should not be published, shall
suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, perpetual
special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos if the revelation of such secrets or
the delivery of such papers shall have caused serious damage to the public interest; otherwise,
the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification
and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
[52][53] Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him
on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in
advance of its authorized release date.
[53][54] Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communications. – The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following case: x x x
(a) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest
would suffer by the disclosure.
[54][55] In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra., the Supreme Court recognized matters
which the Court has long considered as confidential such as “information on military and
diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused.” It also stated that
“presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during close-door cabinet meetings
which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court or other collegiate courts, or executive
sessions of either House of Congress, are recognized as confidential. Such information cannot
be pried-open by a co-equal branch of government.
[55][56] United States v. Reynolds, supra..
[56][57] Unites States v. Article of Drug, 43 F.R.D. at 190.
[57][58] Senate v. Ermita, supra., p. 63.
[58][59] Id., citing U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 S. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 727, 32 A.L. R. 2d
382 (1953).
[59][61] Trancript of the January 30, 2008 proceedings, p. 29.
[60][63] Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510, November 6, 2000, 344
SCRA 519.
[61][4] Annex “E” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[62][6] Annex “F” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[63][7] Annex “G” of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[64][13] Annex “D” of the petition in G.R. No. 174318.
[65][15] 273 U.S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L. Ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1 (1927).
[66][16] No. L- 3820, 87 Phil. 29 (1950).
[67][18] Puno, Lecture on Legislative Investigations and the Right to Privacy, at p. 22.
[68][19] Bernas S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 2003 Ed. at
p.737.
[69][20] Bernas S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 2003 Ed. at
p.739.
[70][21] G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006.
[71][22] Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), pp. 194-195.
[72][23] Senate v. Ermita, Id.
[73][24] De Leon, De Leon, Jr. The Law on Public Officers and Election Law, p. 2.
[74][25] No. L-77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 558.
[75][26] 193 SCRA 282 (1991).