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First published Fri Sep 28, 2007; substantive revision Wed Jan 17, 2018
Philosophy in Al-Andalus developed later than in the East; it grew among
Muslims and Jews, since both communities were nurtured by a common
Arabic. The Muslim community was much larger and it defined the cultural
space, a significant part of which was made by Arabic translations of Greek
scientifical and philosophical works.
By the midst of the 10th century CE, materials related to the circle of
the Brethren of Purity were known in al-Andalus probably brought in by
Maslama Ibn Qasim al-Qurtubi (d. 353/964). But philosophy in its proper sense
is first found in Shelomo Ibn Gabirol or Avicebron (1021–1058). The great
figure of Medieval Judaism who was active in Saragossa was also a talented
philosopher. He preceded, by over two generations, the first Muslim
philosophers of Al-Andalus: Abu s-Salt Umayya ibn ʽAbd al-ʽAziz ibn Abi s-Salt
ad-Dani (d. 1134) and Ibn Bâjja, or Avempace (d. 1139), the latter being active
also in that northern town.
The reasons for the later development of philosophy in Muslim Al-Andalus,
therefore, cannot be explained only by the fact that the country was situated
far away from that nurturing source. The cause is likely that philosophy was
never central to the Islamic intellectual constellation and that it flourished in
peripheral areas, geographical as well as doctrinal. The greatest evidence is
Ibn Sina (d. 1037) who lived in the Iranian provinces, never visited Baghdad
and enjoyed the patronage of princes friendly to the Shiʻa. Al-Andalus was
peripheral in geographical, but not in doctrinal, terms. The country followed
Sunni orthodoxy and the Malekite school of law prevailed while Ash‛arite
theology was weakly cultivated. When Abu l-Qasim Saʽid Ibn Saʽid (d. 1070)
devoted a chapter of his world history of the sciences and philosophy to Al-
Andalus, his information about philosophy was significantly scarce (Saʽid
1998: 96–108; 1991: 58–78). In spite of the circumstances retarding its
development, philosophy in Al-Andalus blossomed into maturity with Ibn Bâjja.
C.E. dates are used in the entry unless an Anno Hegirae date is also written;
in this case they are separate by a slash—A.H. is set before and C.E. after it.
No transliteration characters are used except for Ibn Bâjja, where ‘â’ indicates
a long ‘a’ vowel.
• 1. Life and Circle
• 2. Organization of the Sciences
• 3. Logic
• 4. Mathematical sciences
• 5. Natural philosophy and necessity
• 6. Soul and knowledge
• 7. Ethics and metaphysics
• Bibliography
• A. Primary Literature
• B. Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries
3. Logic
Avempace inserted his classification of the sciences into the Eisagoge, a
treatise whose aim is to discover the simple universal categories underlying
the parts of the sentences. His master Alfarabi added the chapters on
definition, borrowed from the Aristotelian Analytica Posteriora. Alfarabi had
also introduced, at the beginning and in his enumeration of the parts of the
sentence, the distinction between “sound” (lafẓ) and “meaning” (ma‛nà) and
said:
Every predicate and every subject is either a sound signifying a
meaning or a meaning signified by a certain sound, and every
meaning signified by a sound is either universal or individual.
(Eisagoge, Dunlop 1956: 119.1–2)
Avempace observes that “subject” and “predicate” are ambiguous terms
because they may refer to meanings as well as to sounds, and what Alfarabi
considers in this book are the meanings, not the sounds (IB-taaliq: 30. 6–8).
According to their meaning, both parts of the sentence are either universal or
individual. Avempace then follows Alfarabi and divides universal parts into
simple and composite: simple parts of the sentence are genus, species,
specific difference, property, and accident. Composite parts are the definition,
the description, and “an expression the composition of which is restricted, and
is neither a definition nor a description” (IB-taaliq: 30. 16–17). Avempace’s
meaning here can only be understood by reading Alfarabi’s Eisagoge. Alfarabi
defined it as an expression which
is made up of species and an accident, as when we say of Zayd that
he is a white man and sometimes it is made up of accidents, as when
we say of Zayd that he is an excellent secretary. (Eisagoge, Dunlop
1956, translation p. 137)[11]
The nine categories or sorts are parts of the syllogisms (IB-taaliq: 30. 18–19),
according to Avempace and his observations on “subject” and “predicate” are
linked to the sciences which are built on syllogisms. The philosophical
sciences, dialectic and sophistry, have universal subjects and predicates.
Poetry and rhetoric have individual subjects and universal predicates.
Rhetoric employs one or more individual subjects as well as predicates in
cases in which the syllogism resorts to an image or to corroboration[12].
Avempace knew the difficulties of bringing together the
Porphyrian Eisagoge with the Aristotelian corpus as well as the need to
classify and organize the sciences. He did not leave us a systematic treatise,
but only wrote comments on Alfarabi’s writings. In spite of it, we can perceive
a model that starts with the division of “meaning” into individual and
universal, continues with the distinction between simple and composite
universals, inserts the doctrine of the categories, moves toward the
construction of syllogisms, and develops into the variety of sciences according
to their syllogistic nature or not. Let us deal with the place of the categories.
The Oxford manuscript marks a new chapter in the text with the heading “Of
his discourse at the beginning of the Eisagoge”. Here Avempace divides
“meanings” into two kinds: intelligibles (ma‛qulat) and individuals (IB-taaliq:
42. 7). Intelligibles can exist either in the mind or in something outside of it
and they are associated mainly with the universals. Avempace quotes
Aristotle’s definition of the universal: “That which is by its nature predicated
of more than one thing” (De interp. 17a 39) but he borrows the quotation from
Alfarabi who commented on the sentence (Eisagoge, Dunlop 1956: 119. 4–13).
Avempace has two interpretations for the passage. The first says: “that which
is by its nature” refers to an actual resemblance so that universals contain
similar individuals “at one and the same time”. By contrast, the second
interpretation does not limit the universals to any moment, and Avempace
writes:
[Aristotle] intended with the expression “that which is by its nature”
the natural [character of the universal] and its disposition to
resemble more than one, which does not imply that the resemblance
exists in its actualization. For it is not impossible for the eclipse,
insofar it is intelligible, to have a resemblance; further it is not
impossible for the eclipse to be predicated of many. (IB-taaliq: 46. 4–
6)
The concepts of possibility and impossibility come into action and the
universal is defined as having the possibility to resemble more than one, “the
possibility inhering in the meaning insofar as it is intelligible” (IB-taaliq: 46.
10–11). On the contrary, the individual lacks such possibility; rather, it is
impossible for the individual to resemble more than one.
Any relation, i.e., the Aristotelian category, in order to exist needs two
possibilities, one for each subject of the relation in contrast to the other nine
categories, in which one possibility in one subject is sufficient. Resemblance is
a relation, since it is to be predicated on two, and both are properties of the
classes of intelligibles as well as of their individuals. The intelligible relations
exist in the categories, not because of their own essence. To sum up, only the
intelligibles possess the possibility of resembling more than one and are
predicted to possess many.
For Avempace, the main purpose of the Eisagoge is to explain the concepts
that underlie the ten Aristotelian categories. The first interpretation of “that
which is by its nature” is more appropriate to this purpose because the second
interpretation affects all beings, but the categories do not affect all beings and
they deal with existents insofar as the mind acquires them. These concepts
are of two kinds: simple and composite. The simple ones are the five
universals and the three composite are the definition, the description and the
aforementioned “restricted composition”.
Avempace affirms that the five predicables are not primitive concepts, but
constitute correlations between two universals falling within the rules of
individuals and classes. He says: “Genus, species, property and accident are
correlates (iḍafa) which are inherent to the intelligibles regarding the quantity
of their subjects” (IB-taaliq: 50). Genus, species and property are essences
inhering in a shared subject; by contrast, the accident is not an essence and
exists outside the subject. The specific difference is related only to the
individual and may be grasped without reference to the universal.
Avempace’s annotations to Alfarabi’s Kitab al-Madkhal are more innovative
than they might seem at first sight. He points out that the Eisagoge should not
be limited to the exposition of the five “sounds”—maybe six, if the individual is
added[13]—and that a particular science was needed to lay the foundations for
the Organon. He conceives this science as a formal theory of individuals and
classes that is followed by the theory of definition and description.
Avempace wrote annotations on other logical books of Alfarabi that were
edited by M. T. Danishpazhuh (1989) and by Majid Fakhry (IB-taaliq), whose
edition is complete. New editions are being prepared by the Center of
Averroic Studies in Fes, Morocco.
The five sections of Alfarabi (Farabi 1986: 63–73) contain general indications
on how to proceed with the study of logic; they are propaedeutic guidelines.
Avempace feels the need for an explanation why these indications are given.
“Knowledge in any art is conceptualization (tasawwur) of the meanings of this
art and assent (tasdiq) to what is made a concept in it” (IB-taaliq: 64. 2–3).
Once again, he resorts to conceptualization and assent as the basic tools of
our knowledge.
In the first section Alfarabi refers to expressions that have different meanings
in the colloquial and in the technical language. When the grammarian
hears raf‛, he understands the vowel of the nominative case, and not ‘lifting a
weight’ as the unlearned man does. Avempace pays attention to the distinction
between term (sound, lafẓ) and meaning (ma‛nà): man listens to a sound, and
gets the meaning that he conceptualized. He may have conceptualized a first
meaning but he must learn that the term has more than one meaning and how
the various meanings are derivate. This learning happens by means either of a
strong mind or of instruction.
The second section classifies knowledge into argumentative and intuitive
knowledge. The third section deals with the difference between the essential
and the accidental. Avempace reminds his readers of the role of
conceptualization: learning means to produce a concept (tasawwur) out of the
meanings and “each concept consists of attributes existing in the object”. The
concept aims at attributes that exist essentially and discards what is
accidental. This section is very useful for conceptualization and assent,
because only the essential is taken in the definition (IB-taaliq: 65).
The Alfarabian fourth section describes the various senses of anterior and
posterior: in time, by nature, in precedence, in excellence, as cause to effect.
Avempace sees the distinction as the way to understand equivocity—primary
and derivative sense, and focuses on three senses of anterior and posterior: as
cause, in excellence and in precedence because the three kinds concern
conceptualization and assent. Priority in cause means that essential things
precede other essential things and the concept has to abide by this priority.
Priority in excellence means that essential is more excellent than accidental
and the concept has to show it. Priority in cause and in excellence are
“degrees” that are applied to the matching concepts in the soul. As for the
assent, the distinction helps man to grasp its levels: to apprehend the
intelligible, the generally accepted, and the simply accepted when the case is
required, and not in a uniform way. It also helps to memorize because “if
matters are ordered within the mind, they are easily memorized and
reminded” (IB-taaliq: 69).
The fifth section is the longest and analyses simple and composite terms (lafẓ);
Alfarabi distinguishes three kinds of simple terms: name (ism), word (kalima),
and instrument (adah) which correspond to the grammarians’ distinction
between name, verb and particle. Avempace justifies the section saying:
Any learner of a logical art must have an ability to distinguish the
signs (dalal) of the terms in order to conceptualize the meanings of
this art in his mind; he obtains the meanings from the terms pointing
to them. (IB-taaliq: 71. 9–11)
His idea of science can be defined as obtaining concepts from meanings and
producing them in his mind, as opposite to memorization. Learning by heart
all the terms would never be a science and Avempace adds that understanding
“everything written in a book” implies understanding the meanings of the
terms contained in it. The ability to discern (mayz) the signs of the terms is
the key condition to learn any theoretical art. Although the ability exists in
most people, the vast majority stifle it from a very young age and Avempace
blames this behavior as the main cause for the ignorance, and not the natural
lack of ability to discern.
Avempace wrote annotations to Alfarabi’s books on the
Aristotelian Categories, De interpretatione, and to the First and Second
Analytics, that were accompanied by “exercitations” (irtiyaḍ). His annotation
on the First Analytics contains his views on Aristotle’s purpose in introducing
the syllogism:
The purpose of Aristotle in his book “Analytics” is to discourse on the
syllogistic potency (al-quwa al-qiyasiyya) because he considered that,
if he discoursed on the action of the syllogistic potency, he had to do
it on the syllogism, just as when he discoursed on the natural
potency, he had to do it on medicine, that is its art. (IB-taaliq: 184. 7–
9)
Avempace explains what he understands under “syllogistic potency”: Aristotle
sometimes would say that many conclusions result from one syllogism, and
sometimes not only one, and this possibility is interpreted as “syllogistic
potency”. According to Avempace, when Aristotle argues: Every man is an
animal and every animal is sensible, thus every man is sensible,[14] he means
that by action of the syllogistic potency the conclusion ‘a certain animal is a
man’ follows from the assertion ‘every man is an animal’.
Avempace links the inversion to the introduction of the fourth figure of the
syllogism in which the middle term is the predicate of the premise containing
the predicate of the conclusion and the subject of the other premise. “Since
[Aristotle] discourses on the action of the syllogistic potency, he keeps
perceiving the fourth figure that Galen thought he had ignored” (IB-taaliq: p.
184. 20–21).
The fourth figure is not rejected by Avempace, who tries to safeguard it by
using potency in a specific sense, “syllogistic potency”. He creates a wider
framework in which he places the “five sections” while the core belongs to the
standard syllogistic doctrine.
To this wider framework it belongs Avempace’s use of the syllogism in his
book on Coming-to-be and Passing-away. When man argues, he accomplishes
a kind of mental movement and the movers are the premises of the syllogism.
Avempace illustrates it with an example: A man takes our money and travels
with it towards Cairo. We go after him and we have to stop over in the
different places of his way up to when we reach the final point, Cairo.
Avempace explains us the story:
Since the existence of the final aim depends on the accomplishment
of a desire, to grasp it is pleasant, and since no other desire
accompanies it, it is pleasant with such a delight that no pain
interferes it, neither essentially nor accidentally. In all intermediate
degrees there is pleasure and pain, and in the first degree, that is
first matter, only pain. That final aim is permanent pleasure and first
matter is permanent pain. The desired thing is the first mover and
the final aim, so that it is both efficient and final cause.
The arrangement of the premises is similar to that of motion, while
the concept (tasawwur) is similar to first matter, and the existence of
the final aim is the accomplishment. (IB-taaliq: 35. 7–36. 3)
The reference to the syllogism, its premises and its conclusion is far distant,
but the topic how man can attain his perfection, and therefore his happiness is
present here as it is in most of Avempace’s writings as we will see.
4. Mathematical Sciences
Al-’Alawi’s exposition of three steps in the intellectual development of
Avempace does not conflict with Avempace’s view of the sciences. In fact,
Alfarabi was active in the three fields in addition to the preparatory logic. The
first of the three syllogistic sciences is mathematics that deals with objects
deprived of matter but endowed with number and measure. Mathematics
contains various sciences, among them music and astronomy.
The biographical sources are informed by Avempace’s expertise as a musician
and as a composer of muwashshaha poetry. In addition, he has left us a brief
composition on the melodies[15]. Avempace expounds on the therapeutic effect
of playing the ‛ud, lute, on the basis of universal harmony existing between
the heavenly spheres and the bodily nature, the humors. Each chord of the
lute is related to one of the four elements: fire, air, earth, water, and each
chord has a beneficial influence on each disease caused by one of the humors.
The chord called zir acts on the bile, the chord mathnà on the blood, the
chord mathlat on the black bile, and the chord bam on the phlegm. Avempace
instructs the player how to place the lute on his body and which finger plays
which chord. If the musician plays the lute in the right way, his day will be
most beautiful.
In his letter to Abu Ja‛far Yusuf Ibn Hasday (IB-coll-alawi: 77–81), Avempace
blames the astronomer az-Zarqalluh for not having properly understood
astronomy and attacks him for his “Treatise to refute the method employed by
Ptolemy to calculate the apogee of Mercury”. This work of az-Zarkalluh is not
extant. J. Samsó informs us that Ptolemy’s calculation of the apogee was
wrong by approximately 30º and that az-Zarkalluh calculated the apogee in
another work only with an error of 10º (Samsó 1993–1994: 676–677).
Avempace, however, criticizes the method that az-Zarkalluh employed.
Avempace wrote a letter to Abu Zayd ‛Abd ar-Rahman Ibn Sayyid al-Muhandis
(IB-coll-alawi: 84–87) about a preliminary question from the first book of
the Conic Sections of Apollonius of Perga (ca. 200 BC). In another letter to his
disciple ‛Ali Ibn al-Imam (IB-coll-alawi: 88–96) Avempace mentions Ibn Sayyid
as the discoverer of new procedures in geometry. In addition to this letter, one
passage in his Commentary on the Physics[16] and another in the Book of
animals (IB-BA: 74) deal with the Conic Sections in a sketchy way. Ahmed
Djebbar studied Ibn Sayyid and Avempace and gathered that both Andalusians
were innovative in their study of warped surfaces resulting from the
intersection of conic and non-conic surfaces[17].