US VS JAMES (478 US 597)

Facts:

This litigation arose from serious accidents that occurred in the reservoirs of federal
flood control projects in Arkansas and Louisiana. In both accidents, recreational users
(water-skiers in Arkansas and a fisherman in Louisiana) of the reservoirs were injured or
drowned when they were swept through retaining structures after those structures were
opened by the United States Corps of Engineers to control flooding. Separate actions
were brought in Federal District Court against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. In the Arkansas case, the court held that although Government agents had
willfully and maliciously failed to warn of a known danger, the Government was immune
from damages under 33 U.S.C. 702c, which provides in part that "[n]o liability of any
kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or
flood waters at any place." In the Louisiana case, the court similarly granted summary
judgment for the United States despite the Government's concession that it negligently
failed to warn of the danger from the current caused by open gates. In a consolidated
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgments, holding that Congress intended
702c to immunize the Government from liability for damage resulting directly from
construction of flood control projects and for flooding caused by factors beyond the
Government's control, but had not intended to shield the negligent or wrongful acts of
Government employees either in the construction or continued operation of flood control
projects, including the failure to warn the public of hazards to their use of reservoirs.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 702c bars recovery against the Government in these
cases.

Ruling: 5/3

Yes. Section 702c bars recovery against the Government. 702c's language covers the
accidents at issue. The ordinary meaning of the word "damage" covers injury to both
property and person and cannot be considered ambiguous in that it might refer only to
damage to property. Moreover, the language "any damage" and "liability of any kind"
undercuts a narrow construction. Those words apply to all waters contained in or
carried through a federal flood control project for purposes of or related to flood control,
as well as to waters that such projects cannot control. The waters here clearly fall within
the statute's ambit. Pp. 604-605.

Dissenting opinion:

In my opinion, 702c applies only to property damage. The immunity provision absolves
the United States of liability for any "damage" by floods or floodwaters. The word
"damage" traditionally describes a harm to property (hence, "property damage"), rather
than harm to the person (usually referred to as "personal injury").

Jadewell Parking System Corp VS Lidua et al

Facts:

Jadewell Corp was authorized to render any motor vehicle immobilized by placing its
wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. Balajadia and the other respondents
dismantled, took and carried away the clamps attached to the wheel of the vehicles,
which took place on May 7,2003. Jadewell filed a complaint for robbery against the
respondents with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,2003. However, the
Information were filed with the MTC on October 2, 2003. Balajadia filed amotion to
quash for extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription. The
MTC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case and Jadewell‟s subsequent
motion for reconsideration .Jadewell’s petition for certiorari with RTC was likewise
denied. Hence, petition went to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May
23,2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense

Ruling:

No. It did not halted the prescription period. As provided in the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information in the court tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.

Phil. Consumer Foundation vs. National Telecommunication

Commission

F a c t s : On March 20, 1980, PLDT filed an application with NTC for the
approval of a Revised Schedule for its subscribers Investment
Plan(SIP). Consequently, NTC issued an ex-parte order which
provisionally approved the application. However, the approval was
set aside on the Supreme Court &ruled that "there was necessity of
a hearing by the commission before it should have acted on the
a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e P L D T s o t h a t p u b l i c could air it's opposition" .O n
Nov. 22, 1982, NTC permanently approved the new SIP rate s, in
contemplation of PD 217 that allows NTC "to see to it that the
therein declared policies for the telephone industry are
immediately implemented & for this purpose pertinent rules &
regulations may be promulgated…

I s s u e : Whether or not the respondents acted with grave abuse of d i s c r e t i o n w h e n

it approved the Revised SIP of PLDT in the absence of specific
rules and regulation implementing PD217 which is mandatory pre-
requisite for the approval of said SIP rates.

Ruling/Held: Yes. Accordingly the decision of NTC was annulled & set aside.I t i s
t h e d u t y o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t N T C t o p r o m u l g a t e r u l e s a n d regulation.
There is an outright confusion among the rights of PLDT, t h e c o n s u m e r s
and government itself. The increase of SIP rates is untimely,
considering the economic condition of the country. The approved
rates defeats the purpose of the decree which is to spread
ownership among the wide base of i n v e s t o r s .

CSC V Cortes
Facts:
On February 19, 2008 the Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) issued Resolution A 2008-19 approving the appointment to the position of
Information Officer V (IO V) of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes. Commissioner Eligio P.
Mallari, father of respondent Cortes, abstained from voting and requested the CHR to
render an opinion on the legality of the respondent's appointment. CHR Legal Division
rendered an opinion that respondent Cortes' appointment is not covered by the rule on
nepotism because the appointing authority, the Commission En Banc, has a personality
distinct and separate from its members. CSC-NCR held that the appointment of
respondent Cortes is not valid because it is covered by the rule on nepotism under
Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel
Actions. The CA nullified the resolution of the CSC and ordered that Cortes be
reinstated.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the appointment of respondent Cortes in
the CHR is not covered by the prohibition against nepotism.

Ruling:
Yes. The CA erred in their decision. Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in
favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the
following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or
office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.[1] Here, it is
undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first
degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari.
Therefore, CSC-NCR Decision dated September 30, 2008 invalidating the appointment
of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes for being nepotistic is hereby REINSTATED.
 MARSAMAN MINING AGENCY ET AL V NLRC

Facts:
Private respondent Wilfredo T. Cajeras was hired by petitioner MARSAMAN, the local
manning agent of petitioner DIAMANTIDES, as Chief Cook Steward on the MV
Prigipos, owned and operated by DIAMANTIDES, for a contract period of ten (10)
months. Cajeras started work on 8 August 1995, but less than two (2) months later, he
was repatriated to the Philippines allegedly by "mutual consent."

Private respondent Cajeras filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners with
the NLRC alleging that he was dismissed illegally, denying that his repatriation was by
mutual consent, and asking for his unpaid wages, overtime pay, damages, and
attorney's fees.

On 29 January 1996 Labor Arbiter resolved the dispute in favor of private respondent
Cajeras ruling that the latter's discharge from the MV Prigipos allegedly by "mutual
consent" was not proved by convincing evidence.

Petitioners appealed to the NLRC. On 16 September 1996 the NLRC affirmed the
appealed findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 12 November 1996.

Hence, the petition contending that, among other things, the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in ordering a monetary award beyond the maximum of three (3)
months' salary for every year of service set by RA 8042.

Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion

Ruling:
On the amount of salaries due private respondent, the rule has always been that an
illegally dismissed worker whose employment is for a fixed period is entitled to payment
of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment. On 15 July
1995, RA 8042 otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995" took effect, Sec. 10 of which provides:

Sec. 10. In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized
cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term whichever is less.

A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an
illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or three (3) months' salary for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract
concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more.

To follow petitioners' thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months
salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and
overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to
the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should
be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is
presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in the statue and to have used
them advisedly.

The questioned Decision and Resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission are AFFIRMED.