E. Consti Commissions

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, G.R. No. 192791

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
- versus - CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON PERALTA,
AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR, BERSAMIN,
Respondent. DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 24, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Political Law Review E. Constitutional Commissions Page 1 of 207

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, Dennis
A. B. Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of
Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and
accordingly prays that a judgment issue declaring the
unconstitutionality of the appointment.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

(President Macapagal-Arroyo) appointed Guillermo N. Carague
(Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term
of seven (7) years, pursuant to the 1987 Constitution.[1] Caragues term
of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008.
Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo

appointed Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar) as the third member of the COA
for a term of seven (7) years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2,
2011.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and

during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was
designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April
14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and
appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11,
2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly
indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of
title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as

COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is
yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such
chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February
2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura)

was appointed as COA Commissioner to serve the unexpired term of
Villar as Commissioner or up to February 2, 2011.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter
dated February 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III,
signified his intention to step down from office upon the appointment
of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan
(Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this
petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has

become stale,[2] or when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy
owing to the onset of supervening events,[3] so that a resolution of the
case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or
use.[4] In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a
petitioner would be entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by
the dismissal of the basic petition.[5] As a general rule, it is not within
Our charge and function to act upon and decide a moot
case. However, in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[6] We acknowledged
and accepted certain exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus:
The moot and academic principle is not a magical

formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot

and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution, second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved,
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of

Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant
case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and
academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the
mootness rule discussed in David, namely: there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; the case involves a situation of exceptional
character and is of paramount public interest; the constitutional issue
raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar and the public; and the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review.[7] The situation presently obtaining is definitely of
such exceptional nature as to necessarily call for the promulgation of
principles that will henceforth guide the bench, the bar and the public
should like circumstance arise. Confusion in similar future situations
would be smoothed out if the contentious issues advanced in the
instant case are resolved straightaway and settled definitely. There
are times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case,
it nevertheless cries out to be addressed. To borrow from Javier v.
Pacificador,[8] Justice demands that we act then, not only for the
vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the
guidance of and as a restraint in the future.

Both procedural and substantive issues are raised in this
proceeding. The procedural aspect comes down to the question of
whether or not the following requisites for the exercise of judicial
review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz: (1) there must be
an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court; (2) the
question before it must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person
challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must
be the very litis mota of the case.[9]
To Villar, all the requisites have not been met, it being alleged in
particular that petitioner, suing as a taxpayer and citizen, lacks the
necessary standing to challenge his appointment.[10] On the other
hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), while recognizing the
validity of Villars appointment for the period ending February 11, 2011,
has expressed the view that petitioner should have had filed a petition
for declaratory relief or quo warranto under Rule 63 or Rule 66,
respectively, of the Rules of Court instead of certiorari under Rule 65.
Villars posture on the absence of some of the mandatory
requisites for the exercise by the Court of its power of judicial review
must fail. As a general rule, a petitioner must have the necessary
personality or standing (locus standi) before a court will recognize the
issues presented. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, We
defined locus standi as:
x x x a personal and substantial interest in the case

such that the party has sustained or will sustain a direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term interest means a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere

incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[11]
To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has

sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of a government
action, or have a material interest in the issue affected by the
challenged official act.[12] However, the Court has time and again
acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded
certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material
interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a
constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake.[13] The rule
on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to
which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject
of transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-
traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act.[14] In David, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before
the so-called non-traditional suitors may be extended standing to sue,
thusly:
1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal

disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in
the validity of the election law in question;

3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes their prerogatives as
legislators.
This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it

obviously has far-reaching implications, and there is a need to
promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in
future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow
petitioner to institute the instant petition.
Anent the aforestated posture of the OSG, there is no serious

disagreement as to the propriety of the availment of certiorari as a
medium to inquire on whether the assailed appointment of
respondent Villar as COA Chairman infringed the constitution or was
infected with grave abuse of discretion. For under the expanded
concept of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution, the corrective
hand of certiorari may be invoked not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.[15] Grave abuse of discretion denotes:
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive

duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law.[16]
We find the remedy of certiorari applicable to the instant case

in view of the allegation that then President Macapagal-Arroyo
exercised her appointing power in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion.
This brings Us to the pivotal substantive issue of whether or not

Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and
after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA
commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under,
and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution, which reads:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall

be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years withoutreappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term
of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. (Emphasis added.)[17]
And if valid, for how long can he serve?

At once clear from a perusal of the aforequoted provision are
the defined restricting features in the matter of the composition of
COA and the appointment of its members (commissioners and
chairman) designed to safeguard the independence and impartiality
of the commission as a body and that of its individual
members.[18] These are, first, the rotational plan or the staggering
term in the commission membership, such that the appointment of
commission members subsequent to the original set appointed after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution shall occur every two
years; second, the maximum but a fixed term-limit of seven (7) years
for all commission members whose appointments came about by
reason of the expiration of term save the aforementioned first set of
appointees and those made to fill up vacancies resulting from certain
causes; third, the prohibition against reappointment of commission
members who served the full term of seven years or of members first
appointed under the Constitution who served their respective terms
of office; fourth, the limitation of the term of a member to the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor; and fifth, the
proscription against temporary appointment or designation.
To elucidate on the mechanics of and the adverted

limitations on the matter of COA-member appointments with fixed but
staggered terms of office, the Court lays down the following
postulates deducible from pertinent constitutional provisions, as
construed by the Court:
1. The terms of office and appointments of the first set of

commissioners, or the seven, five and three-year termers referred to in
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, had already expired. Hence,
their respective terms of office find relevancy for the most part only in

understanding the operation of the rotational plan. In Gaminde v.
Commission on Audit,[19] the Court described how the smooth
functioning of the rotational system contemplated in said and like
provisions covering the two other independent commissions is
achieved thru the staggering of terms:
x x x [T]he terms of the first Chairmen and

Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the
1987 Constitution must start on a common date [February
02, 1987, when the 1987 Constitution was
ratified] irrespective of the variations in the dates of
appointments and qualifications of the appointees in order
that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three
years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year
interval between the expiration of the terms.
x x x In case of a belated appointment, the interval

between the start of the terms and the actual appointment
shall be counted against the appointee.[20] (Italization in
the original; emphasis added.)
Early on, in Republic v. Imperial,[21] the Court wrote of two

conditions, both indispensable to [the] workability of the rotational
plan. These conditions may be described as follows: (a) that the terms
of the first batch of commissioners should start on a common date;
and (b) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability
before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired
balance of the term. Otherwise, Imperial continued, the regularity of
the intervals between appointments would be destroyed. There
appears to be near unanimity as to the purpose/s of the rotational
system, as originally conceived, i.e., to place in the commission a new

appointee at a fixed interval (every two years presently), thus
preventing a four-year administration appointing more than one
permanent and regular commissioner,[22] or to borrow from
Commissioner Monsod of the 1986 CONCOM, to prevent one person
(the President of the Philippines) from dominating the
commissions.[23] It has been declared too that the rotational plan
ensures continuity in, and, as indicated earlier, secure the
independence of, the commissions as a body.[24]
2. An appointment to any vacancy in COA, which arose from an
expiration of a term, after the first chairman and commissioners
appointed under the 1987 Constitution have bowed out, shall, by
express constitutional fiat, be for a term of seven (7) years, save when
the appointment is to fill up a vacancy for the corresponding
unserved term of an outgoing member. In that case, the appointment
shall only be for the unexpired portion of the departing commissioners
term of office. There can only be an unexpired portion when, as a
direct result of his demise, disability, resignation or impeachment, as
the case may be, a sitting member is unable to complete his term of
office.[25] To repeat, should the vacancy arise out of the expiration of
the term of the incumbent, then there is technically no unexpired
portion to speak of. The vacancy is for a new and complete seven-
year term and, ergo, the appointment thereto shall in all instances be
for a maximum seven (7) years.
3. Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution prohibits
the reappointment of a member of COA after his appointment for
seven (7) years. Writing for the Court in Nacionalista Party
v. De Vera,[26] a case involving the promotion of then COMELEC
Commissioner De Vera to the position of chairman, then Chief Justice
Manuel Moran called attention to the fact that the prohibition against
reappointment comes as a continuation of the requirement that the

commissionersreferring to members of the COMELEC under the 1935
Constitutionshall hold office for a term of nine (9) years. This sentence
formulation imports, notes Chief Justice Moran, that reappointment is
not an absolute prohibition.
4. The adverted system of regular rotation or the staggering of
appointments and terms in the membership for all three constitutional
commissions, namely the COA, Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
and Civil Service Commission (CSC) found in the 1987 Constitution was
patterned after the amended 1935 Constitution for the appointment
of the members of COMELEC[27] with this difference: the 1935 version
entailed a regular interval of vacancy every three (3) years, instead
of the present two (2) years and there was no express provision on
appointment to any vacancy being limited to the unexpired portion
of the his predecessors term. The model 1935 provision reads:
Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission

on Elections composed of a Chairman and two other
members to be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall
hold office for a term of nine years and may not be
reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first
appointed, one shall hold office for nine years, another for
six years and the third for three years. x x x
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of
the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the
commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the
same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or
upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited

reappointment and is a nullity ab initio. Attention is drawn in this
regard to the Courts disposition in Matibag v. Benipayo.[28]
Villars promotional appointment, so it is argued, is void from the

start, constituting as it did a reappointment enjoined by the
Constitution, since it actually needed another appointment to a
different office and requiring another confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.
Central to the adjudication of the instant petition is the correct

meaning to be given to Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) of the Constitution on
the ban against reappointment in relation to the appointment issued
to respondent Villar to the position of COA Chairman.
Without question, the parties have presented two (2) contrasting

and conflicting positions. Petitioner contends that Villars appointment
is proscribed by the constitutional ban on reappointment under the
aforecited constitutional provision. On the other hand, respondent
Villar initially asserted that his appointment as COA Chairman is valid
up to February 2, 2015 pursuant to the same provision.
The Court finds petitioners position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in
regarding the word reappointment as, in context, embracing any and
all species of appointment.
The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain

and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.[29] This is known as the
plain meaning rule enunciated by the maxim verba legis non est

recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.[30]
The primary source whence to ascertain constitutional intent or
purpose is the language of the provision itself.[31] If possible, the words
in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning, save where
technical terms are employed. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration illustrates the verbal legis rule in this wise:
We look to the language of the document itself in our

search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but
that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words
in which constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain
that it should ever be present in the peoples
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts
to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus there are cases where
the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.[32] (Emphasis supplied.)
Let us dissect and examine closely the provision in question:

be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for
three years, without reappointment.Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term
of the predecessor. x x x (Emphasis added.)
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be

appointed by the President for a term of seven years, and if he has
served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or
extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner
who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the
full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the
Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven
years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of
Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to
prevent the president from dominating the Commission by allowing
him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
The same purpose obtains in the second sentence of Sec. 1(2). The
Constitutional Convention barred reappointment to be extended to
commissioner-members first appointed under the 1987 Constitution to
prevent the President from controlling the commission. Thus, the first
Chairman appointed under the 1987 Constitution who served the full
term of seven years can no longer be extended a reappointment.
Neither can the Commissioners first appointed for the terms of five
years and three years be eligible for reappointment.This is the plain
meaning attached to the second sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D).

On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a
promotional appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as
the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further
qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the
appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion
of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional
appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the
rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission
membership such that the aggregate of the service of the
Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be
appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years
so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed
by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly

precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to
Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances
or conditions.
It may be argued that there is doubt or ambiguity on whether Sec.

1(2), Art. IX(D), as couched, allows a promotional appointment from
Commissioner to Chairman. Even if We concede the existence of an
ambiguity, the outcome will remain the same. J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc.[33] teaches that in case of doubt as to the import and react of a
constitutional provision, resort should be made to extraneous aids of
construction, such as debates and proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention, to shed light on and ascertain the intent of the framers or
the purpose of the provision being construed.

The understanding of the Convention as to what was meant by the
terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the
deliberation goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of
the people when they ratified it. The Court applied this principle in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the

intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in
construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils,
if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which
the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated
to effect that purpose.[34] (Emphasis added.)
And again in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping

with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain
and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people

in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.[35](Emphasis added.)
Much weight and due respect must be accorded to the intent

of the framers of the Constitution in interpreting its provisions.
Far from prohibiting reappointment of any kind, including a
situation where a commissioner is upgraded to the position of
chairman, the 1987 Constitution in fact unequivocally allows
promotional appointment, but subject to defined parameters. The
ensuing exchanges during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission (CONCOM) on a draft proposal of what would eventually
be Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the present Constitution amply support the
thesis that a promotional appointment is allowed provided no one
may be in the COA for an aggregate threshold period of 7 years:
MS. AQUINO: In the same paragraph, I would propose

an amendment x x x. Between x x x the sentence which
begins with In no case, insert THE APPOINTEE SHALL IN NO
CASE SERVE AN AGGREGATE PERIOD OF MORE THAN SEVEN
YEARS. I was thinking that this may approximate the
situation wherein a commissioner is first appointed as
chairman. I am willing to withdraw that amendment if there
is a representation on the part of the Committee that there
is an implicit intention to prohibit a term that in the
aggregate will exceed more than seven years. If that is the
intention, I am willing to withdraw my amendment.
MR. MONSOD: If the [Gentlewoman] will read the

whole Article, she will notice that there is no reappointment
of any kind and, therefore, as a whole there is no way
somebody can serve for more than seven years. The

purpose of the last sentence is to make sure that this does
not happen by including in the appointment both
temporary and acting capacities.
MS. AQUINO. Yes. Reappointment is fine; that is

accounted for. But I was thinking of a situation wherein a
commissioner is upgraded to a position of chairman. But if
this provision is intended to cover that kind of situation, then
I am willing to withdraw my amendment.
MR. MONSOD. It is covered.
MR. FOZ. There is a provision on line 29 precisely to

cover that situation. It states: Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired portion of the predecessor.
In other words, if there is upgrading of position from
commissioner to chairman, the appointee can serve only
the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
MS. AQUINO: But we have to be very specific x x x

because it might shorten the term because he serves only
the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
MR. FOZ: He takes it at his own risk. He knows that he

will only have to serve the unexpired portion of the term of
the predecessor. (Emphasis added.)[36]
The phrase upgrading of position found in the underscored

portion unmistakably shows that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987
Constitution, for all its caveat against reappointment, does not per
se preclude, in any and all cases, the promotional appointment or

upgrade of a commissioner to chairman, subject to this proviso: the
appointees tenure in office does not exceed 7 years in all. Indeed,
such appointment does not contextually come within the restricting
phrase without reappointment twice written in that section. Delegate
Foz even cautioned, as a matter of fact, that a sitting commissioner
accepting a promotional appointment to fill up an unexpired portion
pertaining to the higher office does so at the risk of shortening his
original term. To illustrate the Fozs concern: assume that Carague left
COA for reasons other than the expiration of his threshold 7-year term
and Villar accepted an appointment to fill up the vacancy. In this
situation, the latter can only stay at the COA and served the
unexpired portion of Caragues unexpired term as departing COA
Chairman, even if, in the process, his (Villars) own 7-year term as COA
commissioner has not yet come to an end. In this illustration, the
inviolable regularity of the intervals between appointments in the
COA is preserved.
Moreover, jurisprudence tells us that the word reappointment

means a second appointment to one and the same office.[37] As
Justice Arsenio Dizon (Justice Dizon) aptly observed in his dissent
in Visarra v. Miraflor,[38] the constitutional prohibition against the
reappointment of a commissioner refers to his second appointment to
the same office after holding it for nine years.[39] As Justice Dizon
observed, [T]he occupant of an office obviously needs no such
second appointment unless, for some valid cause, such as the
expiration of his term or resignation, he had ceased to be the legal
occupant thereof. [40] The inevitable implication of Justice Dizons
cogent observation is that a promotion from commissioner to
chairman, albeit entailing a second appointment, involves a different
office and, hence, not, in the strict legal viewpoint, a reappointment.

Stated a bit differently, reappointment refers to a movement to one
and the same office. Necessarily, a movement to a different position
within the commission (from Commissioner to Chairman) would
constitute an appointment, or a second appointment, to be precise,
but not reappointment.
A similar opinion was expressed in the same Visarra case by the

concurring Justice Angelo Bautista, although he expressly alluded to
a promotional appointment as not being a prohibited appointment
under Art. X of the 1935 Constitution.
Petitioners invocation of Matibag as additional argument to

contest the constitutionality of Villars elevation to the COA
chairmanship is inapposite. In Matibag, then President Macapagal-
Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman and Resurreccion Borra and Florentino Tuason as
Commissioners, each for a term of office of seven (7) years. All three
immediately took their oath of, and assumed, office. These
appointments were twice renewed because the Commission on
Appointments failed to act on the first two ad interim appointments.
Via a petition for prohibition, some disgruntled COMELEC officials
assail as infirm the appointments of Benipayo, et al.
Matibag lists (4) four situations where the prohibition on

reappointment would arise, or to be specific, where the proviso [t]he
Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term
of seven years without reappointment shall apply. Justice Antonio T.
Carpio declares in his dissent that Villars appointment falls under a
combination of two of the four situations.

Conceding for the nonce the correctness of the premises
depicted in the situations referred to in Matibag, that case is of
doubtful applicability to the instant petition. Not only is it cast against
a different milieu, but the lis mota of the case, as expressly declared
in the main opinion, is the very constitutional issue raised by
petitioner.[41] And what is/are this/these issue/s? Only two defined
issues in Matibag are relevant, viz: (1) the nature of an ad
interim appointment and subsumed thereto the effect of a by-
passed ad interim appointment; and (2) the constitutionality of
renewals of ad interim appointments. The opinion defined these issues
in the following wise: Petitioner [Matibag] filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason as Chairman and Commissioners of the
COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, et al. violate the constitutional
provisions on the independence of COMELEC, as well as on the
prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its
Chairman and members. As may distinctly be noted, an upgrade or
promotion was not in issue in Matibag.
We shall briefly address the four adverted situations outlined

in Matibag, in which, as there urged, the uniform proviso on no
reappointmentafter a member of any of the three constitutional
commissions is appointed for a term of seven (7) yearsshall
apply. Matibag made the following formulation:
The first situation is where an ad interim appointee

after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
serves his full 7-year term. Such person cannot be
reappointed whether as a member or as chairman

because he will then be actually serving more than seven
(7) years.
The second situation is where the appointee, after

confirmation, serves part of his term and then resigns before
his seven-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be
reappointed whether as a member or as chair to a
vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment
will result in the appointee serving more than seven years.
The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed

to serve the unexpired portion of someone who died or
resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired
term. Such person cannot be reappointed whether as a
member or as chair to a vacancy arising from retirement
because a reappointment will result in the appointee also
serving more than seven (7) years.
The fourth situation is where the appointee has

previously served a term of less than seven (7) years, and
a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not
result in his serving more than seven years, a
reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term
is also prohibited because his situation will be similar to
those appointed under the second sentence of Sec. 1(20),
Art. IX-C of the Constitution [referring to the first set of
appointees (the 5 and 3 year termers) whose term of office
are less than 7 years but are barred from being reappointed
under any situation].[42] (Words in brackets and emphasis
supplied.)

The situations just described constitute an obiter dictum, hence
without the force of adjudication, for the corresponding formulation
of the four situations was not in any way necessary to resolve any of
the determinative issues specifically defined in Matibag. An opinion
entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case or one expressed
upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the case
is an obiter.[43]
There can be no serious objection to the scenarios depicted in

the first, second and third situations, both hewing with the proposition
that no one can stay in any of the three independent commissions for
an aggregate period of more than seven (7)
years. The fourth situation, however, does not commend itself for
concurrence inasmuch as it is basically predicated on the postulate
that reappointment, as earlier herein defined, of any kind is prohibited
under any and all circumstances. To reiterate, the word
reappointment means a second appointment to one and the same
office; and Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution and similar
provisions do not peremptorily prohibit the promotional appointment
of a commissioner to chairman, provided the new appointees tenure
in both capacities does not exceed seven (7) years in all. The
statements in Matibag enunciating the ban on reappointment in the
aforecited fourth situation, perforce, must be abandoned, for,
indeed, a promotional appointment from the position of
Commissioner to that of Chairman is constitutionally permissible and
not barred by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX (D) of the Constitution.
One of the aims behind the prohibition on reappointment,

petitioner urges, is to ensure and preserve the independence of COA
and its members,[44] citing what the dissenting Justice J.B.L Reyes

wrote in Visarra, that once appointed and confirmed, the
commissioners should be free to act as their conscience demands,
without fear of retaliation or hope or reward. Pursued to its logical
conclusion, petitioners thesis is that a COA member may no longer
act with independence if he or she can be rewarded with a
promotion or appointment, for then he or she will do the bidding of
the appointing authority in the hope of being promoted or
reappointed.
The unstated reason behind Justice J.B.L. Reyes counsel is that

independence is really a matter of choice. Without taking anything
away from the gem imparted by the eminent jurist, what Chief Justice
Moran said on the subject of independence is just as logically sound
and perhaps even more compelling, as follows:
A Commissioner, hopeful of reappointment may strive

to do good. Whereas, without that hope or other hope of
material reward, his enthusiasm may decline as the end of
his term approaches and he may even lean to abuses if
there is no higher restrain in his moral character. Moral
character is no doubt the most effective safeguard of
independence. With moral integrity, a commissioner will be
independent with or without the possibility of
reappointment.[45]
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his

promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely
fresh 7-year termfrom February 2008 to February 2015given his four (4)-
year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past
pronouncements made by this Court, starting in De Vera,
then Imperial, Visarra,and finally Matibag. While there had been

divergence of opinion as to the import of the word reappointment,
there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be
a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both
positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view
would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service
limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak
havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession. Imperial,
passing upon the rotational system as it applied to the then
organizational set-up of the COMELEC, stated:
The provision that of the first three commissioners

appointed one shall hold office for 9 years, another for 6
years and the third for 3 years, when taken together with
the prescribed term of office for 9 years without
reappointment, evinces a deliberate plan to have a
regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the
commission, by having subsequent members appointable
only once every three years.[46]
To be sure, Villars appointment as COA Chairman partakes of a

promotional appointment which, under appropriate setting, would
be outside the purview of the constitutional reappointment ban in Sec
1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution. Nonetheless, such appointment,
even for the term appearing in the underlying appointment paper,
ought still to be struck down as unconstitutional for the reason as shall
be explained.
Consider:

In a mandatory tone, the aforecited constitutional provision
decrees that the appointment of a COA member shall be for a fixed
7-year term if the vacancy results from the expiration of the term of
the predecessor. We reproduce in its pertinent part the provision
referred to:

be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without
reappointment. x x x Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only forthe unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. x x x
Accordingly, the promotional appointment as COA Chairman of

Villar for a stated fixed term of less than seven (7) years is void for
violating a clear, but mandatory constitutional prescription. There can
be no denying that the vacancy in the position of COA chairman
when Carague stepped down in February 2, 2008 resulted from the
expiration of his 7-year term. Hence, the appointment to the vacancy
thus created ought to have been one for seven (7) years in line with
the verbal legis approach[47] of interpreting the Constitution. It is to
be understood, however, following Gaminde, that in case of a
belated appointment, the interval between the start of the term and
the actual appointment shall be counted against the 7-year term of
the appointee. Posing, however, as an insurmountable barrier to a full
7-year appointment for Villar is the rule against one serving the
commission for an aggregate term of more than seven (7) years.
Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the
term of office of a public official, the appointing authority is without
authority to specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer than

what the law provides. If the vacancy calls for a full seven-year
appointment, the President is without discretion to extend a
promotional appointment for more or for less than seven (7) years.
There is no in between. He or she cannot split terms. It is not within the
power of the appointing authority to override the positive provision of
the Constitution which dictates that the term of office of members of
constitutional bodies shall be seven (7) years.[48] A contrary reasoning
would make the term of office to depend upon the pleasure or
caprice of the [appointing authority] and not upon the will [of the
framers of the Constitution] of the legislature as expressed in plain and
undoubted language in the law.[49]
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have

had, under any circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA
Chairman, for a full 7-year appointment, as the Constitution decrees,
was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had
already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A
shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid
as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the
clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so
appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of
office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent
Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be
appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a
result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor
(Carague).Such appointment to a full term is not valid and
constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than
seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.

On the other hand, a commissioner who resigned before serving
his 7- year term can be extended an appointment to the position of
chairman for the unexpired period of the term of the latter, provided
the aggregate of the period he served as commissioner and the
period he will serve as chairman will not exceed seven (7) years. This
situation will only obtain when the chairman leaves the office by
reason of death, disability, resignation or impeachment. Let us
consider, in the concrete, the situation of then Chairman Carague
and his successor, Villar. Carague was appointed COA Chairman
effective February 2, 2001 for a term of seven (7) years, or up to
February 2, 2008. Villar was appointed as Commissioner on February
2, 2004 with a 7-year term to end on February 2, 2011. If Carague for
some reason vacated the chairmanship in 2007, then Villar can resign
as commissioner in the same year and later be appointed as
chairman to serve only up to February 2, 2008, the end of the
unexpired portion of Caragues term. In this hypothetical scenario,
Villars appointment to the position of chairman is valid and
constitutional as the aggregate periods of his two (2) appointments
will only be five (5) years which neither distorts the rotational scheme
nor violates the rule that the sum total of said appointments shall not
exceed seven (7) years. Villar would, however, forfeit two (2) years of
his original seven (7)-year term as Commissioner, since, by accepting
an upgraded appointment to Caragues position, he agreed to serve
the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. As illustrated
earlier, following Mr. Fozs line, if there is an upgrading of position from
commissioner to chairman, the appointee takes the risk of cutting
short his original term, knowing pretty well before hand that he will
serve only the unexpired portion of the term of his predecessor, the
outgoing COA chairman.

In the extreme hypothetical situation that Villar vacates the
position of chairman for causes other than the expiration of the
original term of Carague, the President can only appoint the
successor of Villar for the unexpired portion of the Carague term in line
with Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution. Upon the expiration of the
original 7-year term of Carague, the President can appoint a new
chairman for a term of seven (7) full years.
In his separate dissent, my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice

Mendoza, takes strong exception to the view that the promotional
appointment of a sitting commissioner is plausible only when he is
appointed to the position of chairman for the unexpired portion of the
term of said official who leaves the office by reason of any the
following reasons: death, disability, resignation or
impeachment, not when the vacancy arises out as a result of the
expiration of the 7-year term of the past chairman. There is nothing in
the Constitution, so Justice Mendoza counters, that restricts the
promotion of an incumbent commissioner to the chairmanship only in
instances where the tenure of his predecessor was cut short by any of
the four events referred to. As earlier explained, the majority view
springs from the interplay of the following premises: The explicit
command of the Constitution is that the Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President x x x for a term of
seven years [and] appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. To repeat, the
President has two and only two options on term appointments. Either
he extends an appointment for a full 7-year term when the vacancy
results from the expiration of term, or for a shorter period
corresponding to the unexpired term of the predecessor when the
vacancy occurs by reason of death, physical disability, resignation or

impeachment. If the vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment,
the Chief Executive is barred from extending a promotional
appointment for less than seven years. Else, the President can trifle
with terms of office fixed by the Constitution.
Justice Mendoza likewise invites attention to an instance in

history when a commissioner had been promoted chairman after
the expiration of the term of his predecessor, referring specifically to
the appointment of then COMELEC Commissioner Gaudencio Garcia
to succeed Jose P. Carag after the expiration of the latters term in
1959 as COMELEC chairman. Such appointment to the position of
chairman is not constitutionally permissible under the 1987
Constitution because of the policy and intent of its framers that a COA
member who has served his full term of seven (7) years or even for a
shorter period can no longer be extended another appointment to
the position of chairman for a full term of seven (7) years. As revealed
in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission that crafted the
1987 Constitution, a member of COA who also served as a
commissioner for less than seven (7) years in said position cannot be
appointed to the position of chairman for a full term of seven (7) years
since the aggregate will exceed seven (7) years. Thus, the adverted
Garcia appointment in 1959 made under the 1935 Constitution
cannot be used as a precedent to an appointment of such nature
under the 1987 Constitution. The dissent further notes that the
upgrading remained uncontested. In this regard, suffice it to state that
the promotion in question was either legal or it was not. If it were not,
no amount of repetitive practices would clear it of invalidating taint.
Lastly, Villars appointment as chairman ending February 2, 2011

which Justice Mendoza considers as valid is likewise unconstitutional,

as it will destroy the rationale and policy behind the rotational system
or the staggering of appointments and terms in COA as prescribed in
the Constitution. It disturbs in a way the staggered rotational system
of appointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution.
Consider: If Villars term as COA chairman up to February 2, 2011 is
viewed as valid and constitutional as espoused by my esteemed
colleague, then two vacancies have simultaneously occurred and
two (2) COA members going out of office at once, opening positions
for two (2) appointables on that date as Commissioner San
Buenaventuras term also expired on that day. This is precisely one of
the mischiefs the staggering of terms and the regular intervals
appointments seek to address. Note that San Buenaventura was
specifically appointed to succeed Villar as commissioner, meaning
she merely occupied the position vacated by her predecessor whose
term as such commissioner expired on February 2, 2011. The result is
what the framers of the Constitution doubtless sought to avoid, a
sitting President with a 6-year term of office, like President Benigno C.
Aquino III, appointing all or at least two (2) members of the three-man
Commission during his term. He appointed Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan as
Chairman for the term ending February 2, 2015 upon the
relinquishment of the post by respondent Villar, and Heidi Mendoza
was appointed Commissioner for a 7-year term ending February 2,
2018 to replace San Buenaventura. If Justice Mendozas version is
adopted, then situations like the one which obtains in the Commission
will definitely be replicated in gross breach of the Constitution and in
clear contravention of the intent of its framers. Presidents in the future
can easily control the Commission depriving it of its independence
and impartiality.

To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of
the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three
constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of
office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term
of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of

seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in
the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain

causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will
likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or

CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who
served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any
position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the
Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the
prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the

Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to
the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the
departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on

reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the
predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that
the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies
that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement
to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or
Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment
involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner
to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not,
in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed

or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
WHEREFORE the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appointment of

then Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of
the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose
term of office as such chairman has expired, is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 191672 November 25, 2014
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE
III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The independence of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) is explicitly
mandated under Section 1,1 Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Additionally, Section 2,2 Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution prohibits
its Members, during their tenure, from holding any other office or
employment.
These constitutional provisions3 are central to this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition brought to assail the designation of Hon.
Francisco T. Duque III, Chairman of the CSC, as a member of the
Board of Directors or Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the (a)
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); (b) Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), (c) the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home Development
Mutual Fund (HDMF).
Antecedents

On January 11, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
appointed Duque as Chairman of the CSC. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed Duque’s appointment on February 3, 2010.
On February 22, 2010,President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864
(EO 864), whose complete text is quoted as follows:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 864
INCLUSION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION IN THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES/DIRECTORS OF THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PHILIPPINE
HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, EMPLOYEES’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE HOME
DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND
WHEREAS, Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution provides that the civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution

mandates, among others, that the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), as the central personnel agency of the government,
shall establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service, and shall
strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability; WHEREAS, Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order
No. 292) expressly states that the Chairman of the CSC shall
bea member of the Board of Directors or of other governing
bodies of government entities whose functions affect the
career development, employment, status, rights, privileges,
and welfare of government officials and employees, such as

the Government Service Insurance System, Foreign Service
Board, Foreign Trade Service Board, National Board for
Teachers, and such other similar boards as may be created
by law;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 24,

1972, explicitly empowers the President of the Republic of the
Philippines to reorganize the entire Executive Branch of the
National Government, as a vital and priority measure to
effect the desired changes and reforms in the social,
economic and political structure of the country;
WHEREAS, Section 18 (a), ArticleIV of Republic Act No. 7875

(An Act Instituting a National Health Insurance Program For All
Filipinos and Establishing the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation For The Purpose) or otherwise known as the
"National Health Insurance Act of 1995", Section 42 (G) of
Republic Act No. 8291 (An Act Amending Presidential Decree
No. 1146, as amended, Expanding and Increasing the
Coverage of Benefits of the Government Service Insurance
System, Instituting Reforms Therein and For Other Purposes) or
otherwise known as "The Government Service Insurance
System Act of 1997, Article 176, Chapter 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 626 (Employees’ Compensation and State
Insurance Fund), and Presidential Decree No. 1530 (Instituting
a System of Voluntary Contributions for Housing Purpose[s]) or
otherwise known as the "Pag-ibig Fund" reveal that while the
Chairman of the CSC is not included in the list of those who
could sit as a member of the Board of Directors of the
Philhealth or of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS, ECC and the
Pag-ibig Fund, said laws did not expressly repeal Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
and Presidential Decree No. 1; WHEREAS, it is settled that
repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed
to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws
existing on the subject;

WHEREAS, a scrutiny of the mandated functions and duties of
the Board of Trustees of the GSIS, ECC and HDMF and the
Board of Directors of the PhilHealth shows that the same are
all geared towards the advancement of the welfare of
government officials and employees, which functions fall
within the province of the CSC;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,

President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby order and direct:
Section 1. The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission shall

sit as an Ex-Officio member of the Board of Trustees of the
Government Service Insurance System, Employees’
Compensation Commission and the Home Development
Mutual Fund and the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation pursuant to Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987).
Section 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 22nd day of February, in the

year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Ten.4
Pursuant to EO 864, Duque was designated as a member of

the Board of Directors or Trustees of the following
government-owned or government- controlled corporations
(GOCCs): (a) GSIS; (b) PHILHEALTH;(c) ECC; and (d) HDMF.
On April 8, 2010, petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as

taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant
petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as well as
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No.
292 (EO 292), otherwise known as The Administrative Code of
1987, and the designation of Duque as a member of the
Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and

HDMF for being clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2,
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
The Case
The Court is confronted with the proper interpretation of Section 1 and
Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 14, Chapter
3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 to ascertain the constitutionality of the
designation of Duque, in an ex officio capacity, as Director or Trustee
of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF.
Petitioner asserts that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book
V of EO 292 violate the independence of the CSC, which was
constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and
political pressures due to the significance of its government
functions.5 He further asserts that such independence is violated by
the fact that the CSC is not a part of the Executive Branch of
Government while the concerned GOCCs are considered
instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the Government.6 In this
situation, the President may exercise his power of control over the CSC
considering that the GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member are
attached to the Executive Department.7
Petitioner argues that Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292
unduly and unconstitutionally expands the role of the CSC, which is
primarily centered on personnel-related concerns involving
government workers, to include insurance, housing and health
matters of employees in the government service.8 He observes that
the independence of the CSC will not be compromised if these
matters are instead addressed by entering into a memorandum of
agreement or by issuing joint circulars with the concerned agencies,
rather than allowing a member of the CSC to sit as a member of the
governing Boards of these agencies.9

Petitioner notes that the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF do not mention that the CSC Chairman sits as a member of their
governing Boards in an ex officiocapacity.10 Such being the case, the
President may not amend the charters, which are enacted by
Congress, by the mere issuance of an executive order.11
Petitioner posits that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book
V of EO 292 violate the prohibition imposed upon members of
constitutional commissions from holding any other office or
employment.12 A conflict of interest may arise in the event that a
Board decision of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning
personnel-related matters is elevated to the CSC considering that
such GOCCs have original charters, and their employees are
governed by CSC laws, rules and regulations.13
In their Comment, respondents maintain that Duque’s membership in
the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is
constitutional. They explain that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3,
Title IA, Book V of EO 292 preserve the independence of the CSC
considering that GOCCs with original charters such as the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are excluded from the supervision and
control that secretaries and heads exercise over the departments to
which these GOCCs are attached.14 Ultimately, these GOCCs are
exempted from the executive control of the President.15
As to the matter of conflict of interest, respondents point out that
Duque is just one member of the CSC, or of the Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, such that matters resolved by these
bodies may be resolved with or without Duque’s
participation.16 Respondents submit that the prohibition against
holding any other office or employment under Section 2, Article IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution does not cover positions held without
additional compensation in ex officio capacities. Relying on the

pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,17 they
assert that since the 1987 Constitution, which provides a stricter
prohibition against the holding of multiple offices by executive
officials, allows them to hold positions in ex officio capacities, the
same rule is applicable to members of the Constitutional
Commissions.18 Moreover, the mandatory tenor of Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 clearly indicates that the CSC
Chairman’s membership in the governing bodies mentioned therein
merely imposes additional duties and functions as an incident and
necessary consequence of his appointment as CSC Chairman.19
Respondents insist that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292, as well as the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF, are consistent with each other. While the charters of these
GOCCs do not provide that CSC Chairman shall be a member of their
respective governing Boards, there islikewise no prohibition
mentioned under said charters.20 EO 864, issued in conformity with
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, could not have
impliedly amended the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF because the former relates to the law on the CSC while the
latter involve the creation and incorporation of the respective
GOCCs.21 As their subject matters differ from each other, the
enactment of the subsequent law is not deemed to repeal or amend
the charters of the GOCCs, being considered prior laws.22
Issue
Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors
or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio
capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and violate the
constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices
for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions?
Our Ruling

The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the
constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292,
but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in
an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
1.
Requisites of judicial review
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of
judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
motaof the case.23
Here, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) only disputes the locus
standi of petitioner who has filed this suit in his capacity as taxpayer,
concerned citizen and lawyer.24 In view of the earlier dispositions by
the Court in similar public law cases initiated by petitioner, we again
affirm his locus standito bring a suit of this nature. In Funa v. Agra,25 the
Court has recently held:
x x x [T]he locus standi of the petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned
citizen and a lawyer to bring a suit ofthis nature has already been
settled in his favor in rulings by the Court on several other public law
litigations he brought. In Funa v. Villar, for one, the Court has held:
To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has
sustained or will sustain a "direct injury" as a result of a government

action, or have a "material interest" in the issue affected by the
challenged official act. However, the Court has time and again acted
liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain
individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material interest
affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a
constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule on locus
standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which
the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental
import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs,
such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in
the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured
by the operation of a law or any other government act. In David, the
Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called "non-
traditional suitors" may be extended standing to sue, thusly:
1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity
of the election law in question;
3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early;
and
4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously
has "far-reaching implications," and there is a need to promulgate
rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous
cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to
institute the instant petition.20 (Bold emphasis supplied)

In Funa v. Ermita, the Court recognized the locus standi of the
petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer because
the issue raised therein involved a subject of transcendental
importance whose resolution was necessary to promulgate rules to
guide the Bench, Bar, and the public in similar cases.
The Court notes, however, that during the pendency of this petition,
Duque’s designation as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and PHIC could have terminated or been rendered invalid by
the enactment of Republic Act No. 10149,26 thus causing this petition
and the main issue tendered herein moot and academic. Pertinent
provisions of Republic Act No.10149, which took effect on June 6,
2011, state:
SEC. 13. Number of Directors/Trustees.—The present number of
Directors/Trustees provided in the charter of the GOCCs shall be
maintained.
SEC. 14. Ex Officio Alternates.—The ex officio members of the GOCC
may designate their respective alternates who shall be the officials
next-in-rank to them and whose acts shall be considered the acts of
their principals.
SEC. 15. Appointment of the Board of Directors/Trustees of GOCCs.—
An Appointive Director shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines from a shortlist prepared by the GCG.
The GCG shall formulate its rules and criteria in the selection and
nomination of prospective appointees and shall cause the creation
of search committees to achieve the same. All nominees included in
the list submitted by the GCG to the President shall meet the Fit and
Proper Rule as defined un this Act and such other qualifications which
the GCG may determine taking into consideration the unique
requirements of each GOCC. The GCG shall ensure that the shortlist

shall exceed by at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of directors
/trustees tobe appointed. In the event that the President does not see
fit to appoint any of the nominees included in the shortlist, the
President shall ask the GCG to submit additional nominees.
xxxx
SEC. 17. Term of Office.—Any provision in the charters of each GOCC
to the contrary notwithstanding, the term of office of each Appointive
Director shall be for one(1) year, unless sooner removed for cause:
Provided, however,That the Appointive Director shall continue to hold
office until the successor is appointed. An Appointive Director may be
nominated by the GCG for reappointment by the President only if one
obtains a performance score of above average or its equivalent or
higher in the immediately preceding year of tenure as Appointive
Director based on the performance criteria for Appointive Directors
for the GOCC.
Appointed to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. The appointment of a director to fill such vacancy shall
be in accordance with the manner provided in Section 15 of this Act.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all incumbent
CEOs and appointive members of the Board of GOCCs shall, upon
approval of this Act, have a term of office until June 30, 2011, unless
sooner replaced by the President: Provided, however, That the
incumbent CEOs and appointive members of the Board shall continue
in office until the successor have been appointed by the President.
A moot and academic case is one thatceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value.27
2.
Unconstitutionality of Duque’sdesignation as member

of the governing boards of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF
Nonetheless, this Court has exercised its power of judicial review in
cases otherwise rendered moot and academic by supervening
events on the basis of certain recognized exceptions, namely: (1)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involves a
situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;
(3) the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review.28
The situation now obtaining definitely falls under the requirements for
the review of a moot and academic case. For the guidance of and
as a restraint upon the future,29 the Court will not abstain from
exercising its power of judicial review, the cessation of the controversy
notwithstanding. We proceed to resolve the substantive issue
concerning the constitutionality of Duque’s ex officio designation as
member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF.
The underlying principle for the resolution of the present controversy
rests on the correct application of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-
A of the 1987 Constitution, which provide: Section 1. The Constitutional
Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit.
Section 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his
tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage
in the practice of any profession or in the active management or
control of any business which in any way may be affected by the
functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted
by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or

instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
"independent."Although their respective functions are essentially
executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of
the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the
Constitutional Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the
applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own
discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review
on certiorariby the Court as provided by Section 7, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution.30 To safeguard the independence of these
Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others,31 imposes under
Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and
disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen their
integrity, to wit:
(a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;
(b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
(c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business
which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office; and
(d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract
with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any
of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-
owned or – controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.32
The issue herein involves the first disqualification abovementioned,
which is the disqualification from holding any other office or
employment during Duque’s tenure as Chairman of the CSC. The
Court finds it imperative to interpret this disqualification in relation to
Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution and the
Court’s pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary.

Section 7, paragraph (2),Article IX-B reads:
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof,including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.
In Funa v. Ermita,33 where petitioner challenged the concurrent
appointment of Elena H. Bautista as Undersecretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communication and as Officer-in-
Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority, the Court reiterated the
pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v.The Executive Secretary on
the intent of the Framers on the foregoing provision of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed
to hold other office or employment in the government during their
tenure when such is allowed by law orby the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may
do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other
words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
xxxx
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to
holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their

tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal
severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is
prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to bea positive
and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language
used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended
to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a
member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),Article VII; or acting
as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and
(3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.34
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet
position (i.e., President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general
rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can
hold any other office or employment in the Government during his
tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position.
Respondents insist that Duque’s ex officio designation as member of
the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is
allowed by the primary functions of his position as the CSC Chairman.
To support this claim, they cite Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V
of EO 292, to wit:
Section 14. Membership of the Chairman in Boards.—The Chairman
shall be a member of the Board of Directors or of other governing
bodies of government entities whose functions affect the career
development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of

government officials and employees, such as the Government
Service Insurance System, Foreign Service Board, Foreign Trade
Service Board, National Board for Teachers, and such other similar
boards as may be created by law.
As to the meaning of ex officio, the Court has decreed in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary that –
x x x x The term ex officiomeans "from office; by virtue of office." It refers
to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the
official position." Ex officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office." An
ex officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his
title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. x
xx
xxxx
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part
of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right
to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.
The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by
the compensation attached to his principal office. x x x35
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as
the central personnel agency of the government and is principally
mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness,
and courtesy in the civil service; to strengthen the merit and rewards
system; to integrate all human resources development programs for
all levels and ranks; and to institutionalize a management climate

conducive to public accountability. Its specific powers and functions
are as follows:
(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions
on the merit system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying
into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent
laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service
and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and
effective personnel administration in the government;
(4) Formulate policies and regulations for the administration,
maintenance and implementation of position classification and
compensation and set standards for the establishment, allocation
and reallocation of pay scales, classes and positions;
(5) Render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service
matters which shall be binding on all heads of departments, offices
and agencies and which may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari;
(6) Appoint and discipline its officials and employees in accordance
with law and exercise control and supervision over the activities of the
Commission;
(7) Control, supervise and coordinate Civil Service examinations. Any
entity or official in government may be called upon by the
Commission to assist in the preparation and conduct of said
examinations including security, use of buildings and facilities as well
as personnel and
transportation of examination materials which shall be exempt from
inspection regulations;

(8) Prescribe all forms for Civil Service examinations, appointments,
reports and such other forms as may be required by law, rules and
regulations;
(9) Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarily
confidential, highly technical or policy determining;
(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the
development and retention of qualified and competent work force in
the public service;
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments,
and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such
decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the
Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and
executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30)
daysfrom receipt of a copy thereof;
(12) Issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum for the production
of documents and records pertinent to investigation and inquiries
conducted by it in accordance withits authority conferred by the
Constitution and pertinent laws;
(13) Advise the President on all matters involving personnel
management in the government service and submit to the President
an annual report on the personnel programs;
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel
matters in the Civil Service including extension of Service beyond
retirement age;
(15) Inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of the
departments, agencies, bureaus, offices, local government units and

other instrumentalities of the government including government-
owned or controlled corporations; conduct periodic review of the
decisions and actions of offices or officials to whom authority has
been delegated by the Commission as well as the conduct of the
officials and the employees in these offices and apply appropriate
sanctions when necessary;
(16) Delegate authority for the performance of any functions to
departments, agencies and offices where such functions may be
effectively performed;
(17) Administer the retirement program for government officials and
employees, and accredit government services and evaluate
qualifications for retirement;
(18) Keep and maintain personnel records of all officials and
employees in the Civil Service; and
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel
agency and such other functions as may be provided by law.36
On the other hand, enumerated below are the specific duties and
responsibilities of the CSC Chairman, namely:
(1) Direct all operations of the Commission;
(2) Establish procedures for the effective operations of the
Commission;
(3) Transmit to the President rules and regulations, and other guidelines
adopted by the Chairman which require Presidential attention
including annual and other periodic reports;
(4) Issue appointments to, and enforce decisions on administrative
discipline involving officials and employees of the Commission;
(5) Delegate authority for the performance of any function to officials
and employees of the Commission;

(6) Approve and submit the annual and supplemental budget of the
Commission; and
(7) Perform such other functionsas may be provided by law.37
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC
Chairman’s membership in a governing body is dependent on the
condition that the functions of the government entity where he will sit
as its Board member must affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government
officials and employees. Based on this, the Court finds no irregularity
in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters
affecting the career development, rights and welfare of government
employees are among the primary functions of the CSC and are
consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC Chairman’s
membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived
from his position as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section
14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
However, there is a need to determine further whether Duque’s
designation as Board member of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF is in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and the condition
laid down in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292. It is
necessary for this purpose to examine the functions of these
government entities under their respective charters, to wit:
The GSIS Charter, Republic Act No. 8291
SECTION 41. Powers and Functions of the GSIS. — The GSIS shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
(a) to formulate, adopt, amend and/or rescind such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and
purposes of this Act, as well as the effective exercise of the powers

and functions, and the discharge of duties and responsibilities of the
GSIS, its officers and employees;
(b) to adopt or approve the annual and supplemental budget of
receipts and expenditures including salaries and allowances of the
GSIS personnel; to authorize such capital and operating expenditures
and disbursements of the GSIS as may be necessary and proper for
the effective management and operation of the GSIS;
(c) to invest the funds of the GSIS, directly or indirectly, in accordance
with the provisions of this Act;
(d) to acquire, utilize or dispose of, in any manner recognized by law,
real or personal property in the Philippines or elsewhere necessary to
carry out the purposes of this Act;
(e) to conduct continuing actuarialand statistical studies and
valuations to determine the financial condition of the GSIS and taking
into consideration such studies and valuations and the limitations
herein provided, re-adjust the benefits, contributions, premium rates,
interest rates or the allocation or re-allocation of the funds to the
contingencies covered;
(f) to have the power of succession;
(g) to sue and be sued;
(h) to enter into, make, perform and carry out contracts of every kind
and description with any person, firm or association or corporation,
domestic or foreign;
(i) to carry on any other lawful business whatsoever in pursuance of,
or in connection with the provisions of this Act;
(j) to have one or more offices in and outside of the Philippines, and
to conduct its business and exercise its powers throughout and in any
part of the Republic of the Philippines and/or in any or all foreign

countries, states and territories: Provided, That the GSIS shall maintain
a branch office in every province where there exists a minimum of
fifteen thousand (15,000) membership; (k) to borrow funds from any
source, private or government, foreign or domestic, only as an
incident in the securitization of housing mortgages of the GSIS and on
account of its receivables from any government or private entity;
(l) to invest, own or otherwise participate in equity in any
establishment, firm or entity;
(m) to approve appointments in the GSIS except appointments to
positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical in nature according to the Civil Service rules and
regulations: Provided, That all positions in the GSIS shall be governed
by a compensation and position classification system and
qualifications standards approved bythe GSIS Board of Trustees based
on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and
responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be
comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private
sector and shall be subject to the periodic review by the Board no
more than once every four (4) years without prejudice to yearly merit
reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability;
(n) to design and adopt an Early Retirement Incentive Plan (ERIP)
and/or financial assistance for the purpose of retirement for its own
personnel;
(o) to fix and periodically review and adjust the rates of interest and
other terms and conditions for loans and credits extended to
members or other persons, whether natural or juridical;
(p) to enter into agreement with the Social Security System or any
other entity, enterprise, corporation or partnership for the benefit of
members transferring from one system to another subject to the

provision of Republic Act No. 7699, otherwise known as the Portability
Law;
(q) to be able to float proper instrument to liquefy long-term maturity
by pooling funds for short-term secondary market;
(r) to submit annually, not later thanJune 30, a publicreport to the
President of the Philippines and the Congress of the Philippines
regarding its activities in the administration and enforcement of this
Act during the preceding year including information and
recommendations on broad policies for the development and
perfection of the programs of the GSIS;
(s) to maintain a provident fund, which consists of contributions made
by both the GSIS and its officials and employees and their earnings,
for the payment of benefits to such officials and employees or their
heirs under such terms and conditions as it may prescribe;
(t) to approve and adopt guidelines affecting investments, insurance
coverage of government properties, settlement of claims, disposition
of acquired assets, privatization or expansion of subsidiaries,
development of housing projects, increased benefit and loan
packages to members, and the enforcement of the provisions of this
Act;
(u) any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, to authorize
the payment of extra remuneration to the officials and employees
directly involved in the collection and/or remittance of contributions,
loan repayments, and other monies due to the GSIS at such rates and
under such conditions as itmay adopt. Provided, That the best interest
of the GSIS shall be observed thereby;
(v) to determine, fix and impose interest upon unpaid premiums due
from employers and employees;

(w) to ensure the collection or recovery of all indebtedness, liabilities
and/or accountabilities, includingunpaid premiums or contributions in
favor of the GSISarising from any cause or source whatsoever, due
from all obligors, whether public or private. The Board shall demand
payment or settlement of the obligations referred to herein within thirty
(30) days from the date the obligation becomes due, and in the event
of failure or refusal of the obligor or debtor to comply with the
demand, to initiate or institute the necessary or proper actions or suits,
criminal, civil or administrative or otherwise, before the courts,
tribunals, commissions, boards, or bodies of proper jurisdiction within
thirty (30) days reckoned from the expiry dateof the period fixed in the
demand within which to pay or settle the account;
(x) to design and implement programs that will promote and mobilize
savings and provide additional resources for social security expansion
and at the same time afford individual members appropriate returns
on their savings/investments. The programs shall be so designed as to
spur socio-economic take-off and maintain continued growth; and
(y) to exercise such powers and perform such other acts as may be
necessary, useful, incidental or auxiliary to carry out the provisions of
this Act, or to attain the purposesand objectives of this Act.
The PHILHEALTH Charter, Republic Act No. 7875
SEC. 16. Powers and Functions – The Corporation shall have the
following powers and functions:
(a) to administer the National Health Insurance Program;
(b) to formulate and promulgate policies for the sound administration
of the Program;
(c) to set standards, rules, and regulations necessary to ensure quality
of care, appropriate utilization of services, fund viability, member
satisfaction, and overall accomplishment of Program objectives;

(d) to formulate and implement guidelines on contributions and
benefits; portability of benefits, cost containment and quality
assurance; and health care provider arrangements,payment,
methods, and referral systems;
(e) to establish branch offices as mandated in Article V of this Act;
(f) to receive and manage grants, donations, and other forms of
assistance;
(g) to sue and be sued in court;
(h) to acquire property, real and personal, which may be necessary
or expedient for the attainment of the purposes of this Act;
(i) to collect, deposit, invest, administer, and disburse the National
Health Insurance Fund in accordance with the provisions of this Act;
(j) to negotiate and enter into contracts with health care institutions,
professionals, and other persons, juridical or natural, regarding the
pricing, payment mechanisms, design and implementation of
administrative and operating systems and procedures, financing, and
delivery of health services;
(k) to authorize Local Health Insurance Offices to negotiate and enter
into contracts in the name and on behalf of the Corporation with any
accredited government or private sector health provider
organization, including but not limited to health maintenance
organizations, cooperatives and medical foundations, for the
provision ofat least the minimum package of personal health services
prescribed by the Corporation;
(l) to determine requirements and issue guidelines for the
accreditation of health care providers for the Program in accordance
with this Act;

(m) to supervise the provision of health benefits with the power to
inspect medical and financial records of health careproviders and
patients who are participants in or members of the Program, and the
power to enter and inspect accredited health care institutions,
subject to the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the
Corporation;
(n) to organize its office, fix the compensation of and appoint
personnel as may be deemed necessary and upon the
recommendation of the president of the Corporation;
(o) to submit to the President of the Philippines and to both Houses of
Congress its Annual Report which shall contain the status of the
National Health Insurance Fund, its total disbursements, reserves,
average costing to beneficiaries, any request for additional
appropriation, and other data pertinent to the implementation of the
Program and publish a synopsis of such report in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation;
(p) to keep records of the operations of the Corporation and
investments of the National Health Insurance Fund; and
(q) to perform such other acts as it may deem appropriate for the
attainment of the objectives of the Corporation and for the proper
enforcement of the provisions of this Act
The HDMF Charter, Republic Act No. 9679
SEC. 13. Powers and Functions of the Fund.– The Fund shall have the
powers and functions specified in this Act and the usual corporate
powers:
(a) To formulate, adopt, amend and/or rescind such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and
purposes of this Act, as well as the effective exercise of the powers

and functions, and the discharge of duties and responsibilities of the
Fund, its officers and employees;
(b) To adopt or approve the annual and supplemental budget of
receipts and expenditures including salaries and allowances of the
Fund personnel, to authorize such capital and operating expenditures
and disbursements of the Fund as may be necessary and proper for
the effective management and operation of the Fund;
(c) To submit annually to the President of the Philippines not later than
March 15, a report of its activities and the state of the Fund during the
preceding year, including information and recommendations for the
development and improvement thereof;
(d) To invest not less than seventy percent (70%) of its investible funds
to housing, in accordance with this Act;
(e) To acquire, utilize, or dispose of, in any manner recognized by law,
real or personal properties to carry out the purposes of this Act;
(f) To set up its own accounting and computer systems; to conduct
continuing actuarial and statistical studies and valuations to
determine the financial viability of the Fund and its project; to require
reports, compilations and analysis of statistical and economic data,
as well as make such other studies and surveys asmay be needed for
the proper administration and development of the Fund;
(g) To have the power of succession; to sue and be sued; to adopt
and use a corporate seal;
(h) To enter into and carry out contracts of every kind and description
with any person, firm or association or corporation, domestic or
foreign;
(i) To borrow funds from any source, private or government, foreign or
domestic;

(j) To invest, own or otherwise participate in equity in any
establishment, or entity; to form, organize, invest in or establish and
maintain a subsidiary or subsidiaries in relation to any of its purposes;
(k) To approve appointments in the Fund except appointments to
positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical in nature according to the civil service rules and regulations:
Provided, That all positions in the Fund shall be governed by a
compensation and position classification system and qualification
standards approved by the Fund's Board of Trustees based on a
comprehensive job analysis, wage compensation study and audit of
actual duties and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the
compensation plan shall be comparable with prevailing
compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to the
periodic review of the Board no more than once everyfour (4) years
without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on
productivity and profitability. The Fund shall, therefore, be exempt
from any laws, rules and regulations on salaries and compensations;
(l) To maintain a provident fund, which shall consist of contributions
made by both the Fund and its officers and employees and their
earnings, for the payment ofbenefits to such officials and employees
or their heirs under such terms and conditions as it may prescribe;
(m)To design and adopt an early retirement incentive plan (ERIP) for
its own personnel;
(n) To establish field offices and to conduct its business and exercise
its powers in these places; (o) To approve restructuring proposalfor the
payment of due but unremitted contributions and unpaid loan
amortizations under such terms and conditions as the Board ofTrustees
may prescribe;

(p) To determine, fix and impose interest and penalties upon unpaid
contributions due from employers and employees;
(q) To ensure the collection and recovery of all indebtedness, liabilities
and/or accountabilities, including unpaid contributions in favor of the
Fund arising from any cause or source or whatsoever, due from all
obligors, whether public or private; to demand payment of the
obligations referred to herein, and in the event of failure or refusal of
the obligor or debtor to comply with the demand, to initiate or institute
the necessary or proper actions or suits, criminal, civil, administrative,
or otherwise, before the courts, tribunals, commissions, boards or
bodies of proper jurisdiction: Provided, however, That the Fund may
compromise or release, in whole or in part, any interest, penalty or civil
liability to the Fund in connection with the collection of contributions
and the lending operations of the Fund, under such terms and
conditions as prescribed by the Board of Trustees: Provided, further,
That the Board may, upon recommendation of the Chief Executive
Officer, deputize any member of the Fund's legal staff to act as
special sheriff in foreclosure cases, in the sale or attachment of the
debtor's properties, and in the enforcement ofcourt writs and
processes in cases involving the Fund. The special sheriff of the Fund
shall make a report to the proper court after any action taken by him,
which shall treat such action as if it were an act of its own sheriffs in all
respects;
(r) To design and implement other programs that will further promote
and mobilize savings and provide additional resources for the mutual
benefit of the members with appropriate returns on the
savings/investments. The program shall be so designed as to spur
socioeconomic take-off and maintain continued growth;
(s) To conduct continuing actuarialand statistical studies and
valuations to determine the financial condition of the Fund and taking

into consideration such studies and valuations and the limitations
herein provided, readjust the benefits, contributions, interest rates of
the allocation or reallocation of the funds to the contingencies
covered; and
(t) To exercise such powers and perform such acts as may be
necessary, useful, incidental or auxiliary to carry out the provisions of
this Act.
The ECC Charter, Presidential Decree No. 626
ART. 177. Powers and duties. - The Commission shall have the following
powers and duties:
(a) To assess and fix a rate of contribution from all employers;
(b) To determine the rate of contribution payable by an employer
whose records show a high frequency of work accidents or
occupational disease due to failure by the said employer to observe
adequate safety measures;
(c) To approve rules and regulations governing the processing of
claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed
by the System;
(d) To initiate policies and programs toward adequate occupational
health and safety and accident prevention in the working
environment, rehabilitation other than those provided for under Art.
190 hereof, and other related programs and activities, and to
appropriate funds therefor. (As amended by Sec. 3, P.D. 1368).
(e) To make the necessary actuarial studies and calculations
concerning the grant of constant help and income benefits for
permanent disability or death, and the rationalization of the benefits
for permanent disability and death under the Title with benefits
payable by the System for similar contingencies; Provided; That the

Commission may upgrade benefits and add new ones subject
toapproval of the President; and Provided, Further, That the actuarial
stabilityof the State Insurance Fund shall be guaranteed; Provided,
Finally, that such increases in benefits shall not require any increases
in contribution, except as provided for in paragraph (b) hereof. (As
amended by Sec. 3, P.D. 1641).
(f) To appoint the personnel of its staff, subject to civil service law and
rules, but exempt from WAPCO law and regulations;
(g) To adopt annually a budget of expenditures of the Commission
and its staff chargeable against the State Insurance Fund: Provided,
that the SSS and GSIS shall advance on a quarterly basis the
remittances of allotment of the loading fund for this Commission's
operational expenses based on its annual budget as duly approved
by the Ministry of Budget and Management. (As amended by Sec. 3,
P.D. 1921).
(h) To have the power to administeroath and affirmation, and to issue
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum in connection with any
question or issue arising from appealed cases under this Title.
(i) To sue and be sued in court;
(j) To acquire property, real or personal, which may be necessary or
expedient for the attainment of the purposes of this Title;
(k) To enter into agreements or contracts for such services or aid as
may be needed for the proper, efficient and stable administration of
the program;
(l) To perform such other acts as it may deem appropriate for the
attainment of the purposes of the Commission and proper
enforcement of the provisions of thisTitle. (As amended by Sec. 18,
P.D.850). (Emphasis supplied.)

The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective
charters with various powers and functions to carry out the purposes
for which they were created. While powers and functions associated
with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career
development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of
government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and
functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and
functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and
exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may
exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived
from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing intereston unpaid
or unremitted contributions,38 issuing guidelines for the accreditation
of health care providers,39 or approving restructuring proposals in the
payment of unpaid loan amortizations.40 The Court also notes that
Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem,41 a form
of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an
ex officioposition by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription
set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes
against the principle behind an ex officio position, and must,
therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices,
Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC.
Under Section 17,42Article VII of the Constitution, the President
exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch.
An office that is legally not under the control of the President is not

part of the Executive Branch.43 The Court has aptly explained in
Rufino v. Endriga:44
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the
Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of
the independent constitutional bodies, ormust be a quasi-judicial
body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office,
entity, or agency has no legal and constitutional basis for its existence.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of
government.1âwphi1 The CCP is also not one of the independent
constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a
local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall underthe Executive
branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency
"not placed by law or order creating them under any specific
department" falls "under the Office of the President."
Since the President exercises control over "all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily
exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive
branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of all
executive . . . offices," x x x Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution does not exempt any executive office — oneperforming
executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies
— from the President’s power of control. There is no dispute that the
CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial
functions.
The President’s power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all
officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are
appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to
revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving
the exercise of discretion.

In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and
exercises "control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution where an
officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President.
The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested
with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive
branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the
control of the President is a lost command whose existence is
withoutany legal or constitutional basis. (Emphasis supplied)
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have
the status of a government corporation and are deemed attached
to the Department of Health45 and the Department of
Labor,46 respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall
under the Office of the President.47 The corporate powers of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised through their governing
Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the
Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and
the members of their respective governing Boards are under the
control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a
member of a government entity that is under the control of the
President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by
the 1987 Constitution.
3.
Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality
of Duque’s designation as member of the
governing Boards of theGSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF - The De FactoOfficer Doctrine
In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-
A of the 1987 Constitution, Duque did not validly hold office as Director
or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concurrently with

his position of CSC Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be
considered as a de jure officer while he served his term as Director or
Trustee of these GOCCs. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all
respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office
has not expired.48
That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure
as a Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. In
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,49 the Court has said:
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be
considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered. Ithas been held that "in cases where there
is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had
possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining
thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in
an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other
compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly,
supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public
should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed
from all liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem,
allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by
virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may
therefore be retained by them.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, ifthe office is an appointive office, and
whose appointment is valid on its face.50 He may also be one who is
in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
volunteer.51 Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as

valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public
or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.52
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions
of Duque as a Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and
HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the
officer legally appointed and qualified for the office.53 This
clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity and integrity
of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority
emanates from the State. Duque's official actions covered by this
clarification extend but are not limited to the issuance of Board
resolutions and memoranda approving appointments to positions in
the concerned GOCCs, promulgation of policies and guidelines on
compensation and employee benefits, and adoption of programs to
carry out the corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and
HDMF.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court UPHOLDS
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292; ANNULS AND VOIDS Executive Order No. 864
dated February 22, 2010 and the designation of Hon. Francisco T.
Duque III as a Member of the Board of Directors/Trustees of the
Government Service Insurance System; Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation; Employees Compensation Commission; and Home
Development Mutual Fund in an ex officio capacity in relation to his
appointment as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATIVE of Sections 1 and 2, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution; and DECLARES that Hon. Francisco T. Duque III
was a de facto officer during his tenure as Director/Trustee of the
Government Service Insurance System; Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation; Employees Compensation Commission; and Home
Development Mutual Fund.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 173264

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
NITA P. JAVIER, Promulgated:

Respondent. February 22, 2008
x-------------------------------------------------------------
--------x

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated September 29, 2005, as well as its Resolution of June 5,
2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 88568, which set aside the resolutions and orders of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) invalidating the appointment of
respondent as Corporate Secretary of the Board of Trustees of the
Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS).
The facts are undisputed.
According to her service record,[2] respondent was first employed as

Private Secretary in the GSIS, a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC), on February 23, 1960, on a confidential status. On July
1, 1962, respondent was promoted to Tabulating Equipment Operator
with permanent status. The permanent status stayed with respondent
throughout her career. She spent her entire career with GSIS, earning
several more promotions, until on December 16, 1986, she was appointed
Corporate Secretary of the Board of Trustees of the corporation.
On July 16, 2001, a month shy of her 64th birthday,[3] respondent

opted for early retirement and received the corresponding monetary
benefits.[4]
On April 3, 2002, GSIS President Winston F. Garcia, with the approval

of the Board of Trustees, reappointed respondent as Corporate Secretary,

the same position she left and retired from barely a year earlier. Respondent
was 64 years old at the time of her reappointment.[5] In its Resolution, the
Board of Trustees classified her appointment as confidential in nature and
the tenure of office is at the pleasure of the Board.[6]
Petitioner alleges that respondent's reappointment on confidential

status was meant to illegally extend her service and circumvent the laws on
compulsory retirement.[7] This is because under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8291, or the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, the
compulsory retirement age for government employees is 65 years, thus:
Sec. 13. x x x
(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate

authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at
sixty-five (65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of
service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen (15) years of
service, he may be allowed to continue in the service in
accordance with existing civil service rules and regulations.
Under the civil service regulations, those who are in primarily confidential
positions may serve even beyond the age of 65 years. Rule XIII of the
Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, as
amended, provides that:
Sec. 12. (a) No person who has reached the compulsory

retirement age of 65 years can be appointed to any position in
the government, subject only to the exception provided under
sub-section (b) hereof.
xxxx

b. A person who has already reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 can still be appointed to
a coterminous/primarily confidential position in the
government.
A person appointed to a coterminous/primarily

confidential position who reaches the age of 65 is considered
automatically extended in the service until the expiry date of
his/her appointment or until his/her services are earlier
terminated.[8]
It is for these obvious reasons that respondent's appointment was

characterized as confidential by the GSIS.
On October 10, 2002, petitioner issued Resolution No. 021314,

invalidating the reappointment of respondent as Corporate Secretary, on
the ground that the
position is a permanent, career position and not primarily confidential.[9]
On November 2, 2002, the CSC, in a letter of even date, through its

Chairperson Karina Constantino-David, informed GSIS of CSC's invalidation
of respondent's appointment, stating, thus:
Records show that Ms. Javier was formerly appointed as

Corporate Secretary in a Permanent capacity until her
retirement in July 16, 2001. The Plantilla of Positions shows that
said position is a career position. However, she was re-
employed as Corporate Secretary, a position now declared as
confidential by the Board of Trustees pursuant to Board
Resolution No. 94 dated April 3, 2002.

Since the position was not declared primarily confidential
by the Civil Service Commission or by any law, the appointment
of Ms. Javier as Corporate Secretary is hereby invalidated.[10]
Respondent and GSIS sought to reconsider the ruling of petitioner. CSC

replied that the position of Corporate Secretary is a permanent (career)
position, and not primarily confidential (non-career); thus, it was wrong to
appoint respondent to this position since she no longer complies with
eligibility requirements for a permanent career status. More importantly, as
respondent by then has reached compulsory retirement at age 65,
respondent was no longer qualified for a permanent career
position.[11] With the denial of respondent's plea for reconsideration, she
filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals.
On September 29, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision setting aside the

resolution of petitioner invalidating respondent's appointment.[12] The CA
ruled that in determining whether a position is primarily confidential or
otherwise, the nature of its functions, duties and responsibilities must be
looked into, and not just its formal classification.[13] Examining the functions,
duties and responsibilities of the GSIS Corporate Secretary, the CA
concluded that indeed, such a position is primarily confidential in nature.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA

on June 5, 2006.
Hence, herein petition.
The petition assails the CA Decision, contending that the position of

Corporate Secretary is a career position and not primarily confidential in

nature.[14] Further, it adds that the power to declare whether any position
in government is primarily confidential, highly technical or policy
determining rests solely in petitioner by virtue of its constitutional power as
the central personnel agency of the government.[15]
Respondent avers otherwise, maintaining that the position of Corporate

Secretary is confidential in nature and that it is within the powers of the GSIS
Board of Trustees to declare it so.[16] She argues that in determining the
proper classification of a position, one should be guided by the nature of
the office or position, and not by its formal designation.[17]
Thus, the Court is confronted with the following issues: whether the courts
may determine the proper classification of a position in government; and
whether the position of corporate secretary in a GOCC is primarily
confidential in nature.
The Court's Ruling
The courts may determine the proper

classification of a position in government.
Under Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, civil
service positions are currently classified into either 1) career service and 2)
non-career service positions.[18]
Career positions are characterized by: (1) entrance based on merit and
fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations,
or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for
advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure.[19]

In addition, the Administrative Code, under its Book V, sub-classifies career
positions according to appointment status, divided into:
1) permanent which is issued to a person who meets all the requirements for
the positions to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate
eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and
standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; and 2) temporary which is
issued, in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when it becomes
necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, to a person who meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the
appropriate civil service eligibility; provided, that such temporary
appointment shall not exceed twelve months, and theappointee may be
replaced sooner if a
qualified civil service eligible becomes available.[20]
Positions that do not fall under the career service are considered non-
career positions, which are characterized by: (1) entrance on bases other
than those of the usual tests of merit and fitnessutilized for the career service;
and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is co-
terminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure,
or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.[21]
Examples of positions in the non-career service enumerated in the

Administrative Code are:
Sec. 9. Non-Career Service. - x x x

The Non-Career Service shall include:
(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who
hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their
personal or confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards
with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in
the government is in accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical
skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall
exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific
work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of
direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel. (Emphasis
supplied)
A strict reading of the law reveals that primarily confidential positions fall
under the non-career service. It is also clear that, unlike career positions,
primarily confidential and other non-career positions do not have security
of tenure. The tenure of a confidential employee is co-terminous with that
of the appointing authority, or is at the latter's pleasure. However, the
confidential employee may be appointed or remain in the position even
beyond the compulsory retirement age of
65 years.[22]
Stated differently, the instant petition raises the question of whether the
position of corporate secretary in a GOCC, currently classified by the CSC
as belonging to the permanent, career service, should be classified as
primarily confidential, i.e., belonging to the non-career service. The current
GSIS Board holds the affirmative view, which is ardently opposed by
petitioner. Petitioner maintains that it alone can classify government

positions, and that the determination it made earlier, classifying the position
of GOCC corporate secretary as a permanent, career position, should be
maintained.
At present, there is no law enacted by the legislature that defines or sets

definite criteria for determining primarily confidential positions in the civil
service. Neither is there a law that gives an enumeration of positions
classified as primarily confidential.
What is available is only petitioner's own classification of civil service

positions, as well as jurisprudence which describe or give examples of
confidential positions in government.
Thus, the corollary issue arises: should the Court be bound by a classification
of a position as confidential already made by an agency or branch of
government?
Jurisprudence establishes that the Court is not bound by the classification

of positions in the civil service made by the legislative or executive
branches, or even by a constitutional body like the petitioner.[23] The Court
is expected to make its own determination as to the nature of a particular
position, such as whether it is a primarily confidential position or not, without
being bound by prior classifications made by other bodies.[24] The findings
of the other branches of government are merely considered initial and not
conclusive to the Court.[25] Moreover, it is well-established that in case the
findings of various agencies of government, such as the petitioner and the
CA in the instant case, are in conflict, the Court must exercise its
constitutional role as final arbiter of all justiciable controversies and
disputes.[26]

Piero v. Hechanova,[27] interpreting R.A. No. 2260, or the Civil Service Act
of 1959, emphasized how the legislature refrained from declaring which
positions in the bureaucracy are primarily confidential, policy determining
or highly technical in nature, and declared that such a determination is
better left to the judgment of the courts. The Court, with the ponencia of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, expounded, thus:
The change from the original wording of the bill (expressly

declared by law x x x to be policy determining, etc.) to that
finally approved and enacted (or which are policy
determining, etc. in nature) came about because of the
observations of Senator Taada, that as originally worded the
proposed bill gave Congress power to declare by fiat of law a
certain position as primarily confidential or policy determining,
which should not be the case. The Senator urged that since the
Constitution speaks of positions which are primarily confidential,
policy determining or highly technical in nature, it is not within
the power of Congress to declare what positions are primarily
confidential or policy determining. It is the nature alone of the
position that determines whether it is policy determining or
primarily confidential. Hence, the Senator further observed, the
matter should be left to the proper implementation of the laws,
depending upon the nature of the position to be filled, and if
the position is highly confidential then the President and the Civil
Service Commissioner must implement the law.
To a question of Senator Tolentino, But in positions that

involved both confidential matters and matters which are
routine, x x x who is going to determine whether it is primarily
confidential? Senator Taada replied:

SENATOR TAADA: Well. at the first instance, it is the
appointing power that determines that: the nature of
the position. In case of conflict then it is the Court that
determines whether the position is primarily
confidential or not.
I remember a case that has been decided by the
Supreme Court involving the position of a district
engineer in Baguio, and there. precisely, the nature
of the position was in issue. It was the Supreme Court
that passed upon the nature of the position, and
held that the President could not transfer the district
engineer in Baguio against his consent.
Senator Taada, therefore, proposed an amendment to

section 5 of the bill, deleting the words to be and inserting in lieu
thereof the words Positions which are by their nature policy
determining, etc., and deleting the last words in
nature. Subsequently, Senator Padilla presented an
amendment to the Taada amendment by adopting the very
words of the Constitution, i.e., those which are policy
determining, primarily confidential and highly technical in
nature. The Padilla amendment was adopted, and it was this
last wording with which section 5 was passed and was enacted
(Senate Journal, May 10, 1959, Vol. 11, No. 32, pp. 679-681).
It is plain that, at least since the enactment of the 1959 Civil

Service Act (R. A. 2260), it is the nature of the position which
finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential,
policy determining or highly technical. Executive
pronouncements can be no more than initial determinations
that are not conclusive in case of conflict. And it must be so, or

else it would then lie within the discretion of title Chief Executive
to deny to any officer, by executive fiat, the protection of
section 4, Article XII, of the Constitution.[28] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
This doctrine in Piero was reiterated in several succeeding cases.[29]
Presently, it is still the rule that executive and legislative identification or

classification of primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical
positions in government is no more than mere declarations, and does not
foreclose judicial review, especially in the event of conflict. Far from what is
merely declared by executive or legislative fiat, it is the nature of the position
which finally determines whether it is primarily confidential, policy
determining or highly technical, and no department in government is
better qualified to make such an ultimate finding than the judicial branch.
Judicial review was also extended to determinations made by petitioner. In
Grio v. Civil Service Commission,[30] the Court held:
The fact that the position of respondent Arandela as provincial

attorney has already been classified as one under the career
service and certified as permanent by the Civil Service
Commission cannot conceal or alter its highly confidential
nature. As in Cadiente where the position of the city legal officer
was duly attested as permanent by the Civil Service
Commission before this Court declared that the same was
primarily confidential, this Court holds that the position of
respondent Arandela as the provincial attorney of Iloilo is also a
primarily confidential position. To rule otherwise would be

tantamount to classifying two positions with the same nature
and functions in two incompatible categories.[31]
The framers of the 1987 Constitution were of the same
disposition. Section 2 (2) Article IX (B) of the Constitution provides that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according

to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable,
and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.
The phrase in nature after the phrase policy-determining, primarily

confidential, or highly technical was deleted from the 1987
Constitution.[32] However, the intent to lay in the courts the power to
determine the nature of a position is evident in the following deliberation:
MR. FOZ. Which department of government has the power or

authority to determine whether a position is policy-determining
or primarily confidential or highly technical?
FR. BERNAS: The initial decision is made by the legislative body

or by the executive department, but the final decision is done
by the court. The Supreme Court has constantly held that
whether or not a position is policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, it is determined not by
the title but by the nature of the task that is entrusted to it. For
instance, we might have a case where a position is created
requiring that the holder of that position should be a member of
the Bar and the law classifies this position as highly
technical. However, the Supreme Court has said before that a
position which requires mere membership in the Bar is not a
highly technical position. Since the term 'highly technical'

means something beyond the ordinary requirements of the
profession, it is always a question of fact.
MR. FOZ. Does not Commissioner Bernas agree that the general
rule should be that the merit system or the competitive system
should be upheld?
FR. BERNAS. I agree that that it should be the general rule; that
is why we are putting this as an exception.
MR. FOZ. The declaration that certain positions are policy-

determining, primarily confidential or highly technical has been
the source of practices which amount to the spoils system.
FR. BERNAS. The Supreme Court has always said that, but if the
law of the administrative agency says that a position is
primarily confidential when in fact it is not, we can always
challenge that in court. It is not enough that the law calls it
primarily confidential to make it such; it is the nature of the duties
which makes a position primarily confidential.
MR. FOZ. The effect of a declaration that a position is policy-

determining, primarily confidential or highly technical as an
exception is to take it away from the usual rules and provisions
of the Civil Service Law and to place it in a class by itself so that
it can avail itself of certain privileges not available to the
ordinary run of government employees and officers.
FR. BERNAS. As I have already said, this classification does not

do away with the requirement of merit and fitness. All it says is
that there are certain positions which should not be determined
by competitive examination.

For instance, I have just mentioned a position in the Atomic
Energy Commission. Shall we require a physicist to undergo a
competitive examination before appointment? Or a
confidential secretary or any position in policy-determining
administrative bodies, for that matter? There are other ways of
determining merit and fitness than competitive
examination. This is not a denial of the requirement of merit and
fitness.[33](Emphasis supplied)
This explicit intent of the framers was recognized in Civil Service Commission
v. Salas,[34] and Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
v. Rilloraza,[35] which leave no doubt that the question of whether the
position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS is confidential in nature may be
determined by the Court.
The position of corporate secretary in a government owned

and controlled corporation, currently classified as a permanent
career position, is primarily confidential in nature.
First, there is a need to examine how the term primarily confidential in nature
is described in jurisprudence. According to Salas,[36]
Prior to the passage of the x x x Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No.
2260), there were two recognized instances when a position
may be considered primarily confidential: Firstly, when the
President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil
Service, has declared the position to be primarily confidential;
and, secondly in the absence of such declaration, when by the
nature of the functions of the office there exists "close intimacy"
between the appointee and appointing power which insures

freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom
from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential
matters of state.[37] (Emphasis supplied)
However, Salas declared that since the enactment of R.A. No. 2260
and Piero,[38] it is the nature of the position which finally determines
whether a position is primarily confidential or not, without regard to existing
executive or legislative pronouncements either way, since the latter will not
bind the courts in case of conflict.
A position that is primarily confidential in nature is defined as early as 1950

in De los Santos v. Mallare,[39] through the ponencia of Justice
Pedro Tuason, to wit:
x x x These positions (policy-determining, primarily

confidential and highly technical positions), involve the highest
degree of confidence, or are closely bound up with and
dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or
are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the good of
the service itself demands that appointments coming under this
category be terminable at the will of the officer that makes
them.
xxxx
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than

ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position
that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the
office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of
[discussion, delegation and reporting] without embarrassment

or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. x x x[40] (Emphasis supplied)
Since the definition in De los Santos came out, it has guided numerous other
cases.[41] Thus, it still stands that a position is primarily confidential when by
the nature of the functions of the office there exists close intimacy between
the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse
without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal
trust or confidential matters of state.
In classifying a position as primarily confidential, its functions must not

be routinary, ordinary and day to day in character.[42] A position is
not necessarily confidential though the one in office may sometimes
handle confidential matters or documents.[43] Only ordinary confidence is
required for all positions in the bureaucracy. But, as held
in De los Santos,[44] for someone holding a primarily confidential position,
more than ordinary confidence is required.
In Ingles v. Mutuc,[45] the Court, through Chief Justice

Roberto Concepcion as ponente, stated:
Indeed, physicians handle confidential matters. Judges, fiscals

and court stenographers generally handle matters of similar
nature. The Presiding and Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals sometimes investigate, by designation of the Supreme
Court, administrative complaints against judges of first instance,
which are confidential in nature. Officers of the Department of
Justice, likewise, investigate charges against municipal judges.
Assistant Solicitors in the Office of the Solicitor General often
investigate malpractice charges against members of the
Bar. All of these are confidential matters, but such fact does not

warrant the conclusion that the office or position of all
government physicians and all Judges, as well as the
aforementioned assistant solicitors and officers of the
Department of Justice are primarily confidential in
character.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
It is from De los Santos that the so-called proximity rule was derived. A
position is considered to be primarily confidential when there is a primarily
close intimacy between the appointing authority and the appointee,
which ensures the highest degree of trust and unfettered communication
and discussion on the most confidential of matters.[47] This means that
where the position occupied is already remote from that of the appointing
authority, the element of trust between them is no longer
predominant.[48] On further interpretation in Grio, this was clarified to mean
that a confidential nature would be limited to those positions not separated
from the position of the appointing authority by an intervening public
officer, or series of public officers, in the bureaucratic hierarchy.[49]
Consequently, brought upon by their remoteness to the position of the

appointing authority, the following were declared by the Court to be not
primarily confidential positions: City Engineer;[50]Assistant Secretary to the
Mayor;[51] members of the Customs Police Force or Port Patrol;[52] Special
Assistant of the Governor of the Central Bank, Export
Department;[53] Senior Executive Assistant, Clerk I and Supervising Clerk I
and Stenographer in the Office of the President;[54] Management and
Audit Analyst I of the Finance Ministry Intelligence Bureau;[55] Provincial
Administrator;[56] Internal Security Staff of the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR);[57] Casino Operations Manager;[58] and
Slot Machine Attendant.[59] All positions were declared to be not primarily

confidential despite having been previously declared such either by their
respective appointing authorities or the legislature.
The following were declared in jurisprudence to be primarily

confidential positions: Chief Legal Counsel of the Philippine National
Bank;[60] Confidential Agent of the Office of the Auditor,
GSIS;[61] Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan;[62] Secretary to the City
Mayor;[63] Senior Security and Security Guard in the Office of the Vice
Mayor;[64] Secretary to the Board of a government corporation;[65] City
Legal Counsel, City Legal Officer or City Attorney;[66] Provincial
Attorney;[67] Private Secretary;[68] and Board Secretary II of the Philippine
State College of Aeronautics.[69]
In fine, a primarily confidential position is characterized by the close

proximity of the positions of the appointer and appointee as well as the high
degree of trust and confidence inherent in their relationship.
Ineluctably therefore, the position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS, or any

GOCC, for that matter, is a primarily confidential position. The position is
clearly in close proximity and intimacy with the appointing power. It also
calls for the highest degree of confidence between the appointer and
appointee.
In classifying the position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS as primarily

confidential, the Court took into consideration the proximity rule together
with the duties of the corporate secretary, enumerated as follows:[70]
1. Performs all duties, and exercises the power, as

defined and enumerated in Section 4, Title IX, P.D. No. 1146;

2. Undertakes research into past Board resolutions,
policies, decisions, directives and other Board action, and
relate these to present matters under Board consideration;
3. Analyzes and evaluates the impact, effects and
relevance of matters under Board consideration on existing
Board policies and provide the individual Board members
with these information so as to guide or enlighten them in
their Board decision;
4. Records, documents and reproduces in sufficient
number all proceedings of Board meetings and disseminate
relevant Board decisions/information to those units
concerned;
5. Coordinates with all functional areas and units
concerned and monitors the manner of implementation of
approved Board resolutions, policies and directives;
6. Maintains a permanent, complete, systematic and
secure compilation of all previous minutes of Board
meetings, together with all their supporting documents;
7. Attends, testifies and produces in Court or in
administrative bodies duly certified copies of Board
resolutions, whenever required;
8. Undertakes the necessary physical preparations for
scheduled Board meetings;
9. Pays honoraria of the members of the Board who
attend Board meetings;
10. Takes custody of the corporate seal and safeguards
against unauthorized use; and
11. Performs such other functions as the Board may direct
and/or require.

The nature of the duties and functions attached to the position points to its
highly confidential character.[71] The secretary reports directly to the board
of directors, without an intervening officer in between them.[72] In such an
arrangement, the board expects from the secretary nothing less than the
highest degree of honesty, integrity and loyalty, which is crucial to
maintaining between them freedom of intercourse without embarrassment
or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust or confidential
matters of state.[73]
The responsibilities of the corporate secretary are not merely clerical or

routinary in nature. The work involves constant exposure to sensitive policy
matters and confidential deliberations that are not always open to the
public, as unscrupulous persons may use them to harm the
corporation. Board members must have the highest confidence in the
secretary to ensure that their honest sentiments are always and fully
expressed, in the interest of the corporation. In this respect, the nature of the
corporate secretary's work is akin to that of a personal secretary of a public
official, a position long recognized to be primarily confidential in
nature.[74] The only distinction is that the corporate secretary is secretary to
the entire board, composed of a number of persons, but who essentially
act as one body, while the private secretary works for only one
person. However, the degree of confidence involved is essentially the
same.
Not only do the tasks listed point to sensitive and confidential acts that the
corporate secretary must perform, they also include such other functions as
the Board may direct and/or require, a clear indication of a closely intimate
relationship that exists between the secretary and the board. In such a
highly acquainted relation, great trust and confidence between appointer
and appointee is required.

The loss of such trust or confidence could easily result in the board's
termination of the secretary's services and ending of his term. This is
understandably justified, as the board could not be expected to function
freely with a suspicious officer in its midst. It is for these same reasons that
jurisprudence, as earlier cited, has consistently characterized personal or
private secretaries, and board secretaries, as positions of a primarily
confidential nature.[75]
The CA did not err in declaring that the position of Corporate Secretary of
GSIS is primarily confidential in nature and does not belong to the career
service.
The Court is aware that this decision has repercussions on the tenure of other
corporate secretaries in various GOCCs. The officers likely assumed their
positions on permanent career status, expecting protection for their tenure
and appointments, but are now re-classified as primarily confidential
appointees. Such concern is unfounded, however, since the statutes
themselves do not classify the position of corporate secretary as permanent
and career in nature. Moreover, there is no absolute guarantee that it will
not be classified as confidential when a dispute arises. As earlier stated, the
Court, by legal tradition, has the power to make a final determination as to
which positions in government are primarily confidential or otherwise. In the
light of the instant controversy, the Court's view is that the greater public
interest is served if the position of a corporate secretary is classified as
primarily confidential in nature.
Moreover, it is a basic tenet in the country's constitutional system that public

office is a public trust,[76] and that there is no vested right in public office,
nor an absolute right to hold office.[77] No proprietary title attaches to a
public office, as public service is not a property right.[78] Excepting

constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.[79] The
rule is that offices in government, except those created by the constitution,
may be abolished, altered, or created anytime by statute.[80] And any
issues on the classification for a position in government may be brought to
and determined by the courts.[81]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 29, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 88568, as well as its Resolution of June 5,
2006 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
LUCIANO VELOSO, ABRAHAM G.R. No. 193677

CABOCHAN, JOCELYN DAWIS-
ASUNCION and MARLON M. Present:
LACSON,
Petitioners, CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,* and
REYES,** JJ.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Promulgated:

Respondent.
September 6, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing Decision No. 2008-088[1] dated September 26, 2008
and Decision No. 2010-077[2]dated August 23, 2010 of the
Commission on Audit (COA) sustaining Notice of Disallowance (ND)
No. 06-010-100-05[3] dated May 24, 2006 disallowing the payment of
monetary reward as part of the Exemplary Public Service Award
(EPSA) to former three-term councilors of the City of Manila authorized
by City Ordinance No. 8040.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance

No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of
Exemplary Public Service Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila
Who Have Been Elected for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the Same
Position. Section 2 thereof provides:
SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of

Appreciation, retirement and gratuity pay remuneration
equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three
(3) consecutive terms, subject to the availability of funds as
certified by the City Treasurer. PROVIDED, That [it] shall be
accorded to qualified elected City Officials on or before
the first day of service in an appropriated public ceremony
to be conducted for the purpose. PROVIDED FURTHER, That
this Ordinance shall only cover the Position of Mayor, Vice-
Mayor and Councilor: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That those
who were elected for this term and run for higher elective
position thereafter, after being elected shall still be eligible
for this award for the actual time served: PROVIDED FINALLY
That the necessary and incidental expenses needed to

implement the provisions of this Ordinance shall be
appropriated and be included in the executive budget for
the year when any city official will qualify for the Award.[4]
The ordinance was deemed approved on August 23, 2002.
Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments in

favor of the following former councilors:
Councilor/Reci Check Date Amount

pients
Abraham C. 353010 06/07/05 P1,658,989.
Cabochan 09
Julio E. Logarta, 353156 06/14/05 P1,658,989.
Jr. 08
Luciano M. 353778 06/30/05 P1,658,989.
Veloso 08
Jocelyn Dawis- 353155 06/14/05 P1,658,989.
Asuncion 08
Marlon M. 353157 06/14/05 P1,658,989.
Lacson 08
Heirs of Hilarion 353093 06/09/05 P1,628,311.
C. Silva 59
TOTAL P9,923,257.
00[5]
On August 8, 2005, Atty. Gabriel J. Espina (Atty. Espina),

Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila, issued Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-100(05)07(05)[6] with the following
observations:
1. The initial payment of monetary reward as part

of Exemplary Public Service Award (EPSA) amounting
to P9,923,257.00 to former councilors of the City

Government of Manila who have been elected for three
(3) consecutive terms to the same position as authorized by
City Ordinance No. 8040 is without legal basis.
2. The amount granted as monetary reward is

excessive and tantamount to double compensation in
contravention to Article 170 (c) of the IRR of RA 7160 which
provides that no elective or appointive local official shall
receive additional, double or indirect compensation unless
specifically authorized by law.
3. The appropriations for retirement gratuity to implement

EPSA ordinance was classified as Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses instead of Personal Services contrary
to Section 7, Volume III of the Manual on the New
Government Accounting System (NGAS) for local
government units and COA Circular No. 2004-008 dated
September 20, 2004 which provide the updated description
of accounts under the NGAS.[7]
After evaluation of the AOM, the Director, Legal and

Adjudication Office (LAO)-Local of the COA issued ND No. 06-010-100-
05[8] dated May 24, 2006.
On November 9, 2006, former councilors Jocelyn Dawis-

Asuncion (Dawis-Asuncion), Luciano M. Veloso (Veloso), Abraham C.
Cabochan (Cabochan), Marlon M. Lacson (Lacson), Julio E. Logarta,
Jr., and Monina U. Silva, City Accountant Gloria C. Quilantang, City
Budget Officer Alicia Moscaya and then Vice Mayor and Presiding
Officer Danilo B. Lacuna filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of
Disallowance.[9] In its Decision No. 2007-171[10] dated November 29,

2007, the LAO-Local decided in favor of the movants, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion of

former Vice- Mayor Danilo B. Lacuna, et al., is GRANTED
and ND No. 06-010-100-05 dated May 24, 2006 is hereby
ordered lifted as the reasons for the disallowance have
been sufficiently explained. This decision, however, should
not be taken as precedence (sic) to other or similar
personal benefits that a local government unit may extend
which should be appreciated based on their separate and
peculiar circumstances.[11]
Citing Article 170 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of

Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, the LAO-Local held that the monetary
reward given to the former councilors can be one of gratuity and,
therefore, cannot be considered as additional, double or indirect
compensation. Giving importance to the principle of local autonomy,
the LAO-local upheld the power of local government units (LGUs) to
grant allowances. More importantly, it emphasized that the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) did not disapprove
the appropriation for the EPSA of the City which indicate that the
same is valid.[12]
Upon review, the COA rendered the assailed Decision No. 2008-
088 sustaining ND No. 06-010-100-05.[13] The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in Decision No. 2010-077.[14] The
COA opined that the monetary reward under the EPSA is covered by
the term compensation. Though it recognizes the local autonomy of
LGUs, it emphasized the limitations thereof set forth in the Salary

Standardization Law (SSL). It explained that the SSL does not authorize
the grant of such monetary reward or gratuity. It also stressed the
absence of a specific law passed by Congress which ordains the
conferment of such monetary reward or gratuity to the former
councilors.[15] In Decision No. 2010-077, in response to the question on
its jurisdiction to rule on the legality of the disbursement, the COA held
that it is vested by the Constitution the power to determine whether
government entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing
government funds and to disallow irregular disbursements.[16]
Aggrieved, petitioners Veloso, Cabochan, Dawis-Asuncion and

Lacson come before the Court in this special civil action
for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COA. Specifically, petitioners claim that:
The respondent Commission on Audit did not only

commit a reversible error but was, in fact, guilty of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it ruled that the monetary award given
under the EPSA partakes of the nature of an additional
compensation prohibited under the Salary Standardization
Law, and other existing laws, rules and regulations, and not
a GRATUITY voluntarily given in return for a favor or services
rendered purely out of generosity of the giver or grantor.
(Plastic Tower Corporation vs. NLRC, 172 SCRA 580-581).
Apart from being totally oblivious of the fact that the

monetary award given under the EPSA was intended or
given in return for the exemplary service rendered by its
recipient(s), the respondent COA further committed grave
abuse of discretion when it effectively nullified a duly-

enacted ordinance which is essentially a judicial function.
In other words, in the guise of disallowing the disbursement
in question, the respondent Commission arrogated unto
itself an authority it did not possess, and a prerogative it did
not have.[17]
On November 30, 2010, the Court issued a Status Quo

Ante Order[18] requiring the parties to maintain the status
quo prevailing before the implementation of the assailed COA
decisions.
There are two issues for resolution: (1) whether the COA has the
authority to disallow the disbursement of local government funds; and
(2) whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the disallowance of P9,923,257.00 covering the EPSA of former three-
term councilors of the City of Manila authorized by Ordinance No.
8040.
In their Reply,[19] petitioners insist that the power and authority

of the COA to audit government funds and accounts does not carry
with it in all instances the power to disallow a particular
disbursement.[20] Citing Guevara v. Gimenez,[21] petitioners claim
that the COA has no discretion or authority to disapprove payments
on the ground that the same was unwise or that the amount is
unreasonable. The COA's remedy, according to petitioners, is to bring
to the attention of the proper administrative officer such expenditures
that, in its opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant.[22] While admitting that the cited case was decided by
the Court under the 1935 Constitution, petitioners submit that the
same principle applies in the present case.

We do not agree.
As held in National Electrification Administration v. Commission

on Audit,[23] the ruling in Guevara cited by petitioners has already
been overturned by the Court in Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Commission
on Audit.[24] The Court explained[25] that under the 1935
Constitution, the Auditor General could not correct irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of public funds,
but could only bring the matter to the attention of the proper
administrative officer. Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the COA
is vested with the authority to determine whether government entities,
including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing
government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of
these funds.
Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution gives a broad outline of
the powers and functions of the COA, to wit:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the

power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held
in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have
been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities

receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or
through the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control
system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the
Commission may adopt such measures, including
temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and
appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the
general accounts of the Government and, for such period
as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and
other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive

authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define
the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties.[26]
Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative

Code of 1987 echoes this constitutional mandate to COA.
Under the first paragraph of the above provision, the COA's audit
jurisdiction extends to the government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities,including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. Its jurisdiction likewise
covers, albeit on a post-audit basis, the constitutional bodies,

commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy,
autonomous state colleges and universities, other government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, and such
non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity from or through
the government. The power of the COA to examine and audit
government agencies cannot be taken away from it as Section 3,
Article IX-D of the Constitution mandates that no law shall be passed
exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise
whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of
the [COA].
Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the

COA is vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to
government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds
and property.[27] This includes the exclusive authority to define the
scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations.[28] The COA is endowed with enough latitude
to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds.[29] It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding
the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's,
property.[30] The exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance
system inherent in our form of government.[31]
The Court had therefore previously upheld the authority of the

COA to disapprove payments which it finds excessive and
disadvantageous to the Government; to determine the meaning of
public bidding and when there is failure in the bidding; to disallow

expenditures which it finds unnecessary according to its rules even if
disallowance will mean discontinuance of foreign aid; to disallow a
contract even after it has been executed and goods have been
delivered.[32]
Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within
the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
Now on the more important issue of whether the COA properly

exercised its jurisdiction in disallowing the disbursement of the City of
Manila's funds for the EPSA of its former three-term councilors.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of

administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-
created not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers
but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only
respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted
with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion.[33] It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning
its rulings.[34] There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the
judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice,
whim and despotism.[35]
In this case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of

the COA in issuing the assailed decisions as will be discussed below.

Petitioners claim that the grant of the retirement and gratuity
pay remuneration is a valid exercise of the powers of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod set forth in RA 7160.
We disagree.
Indeed, Section 458 of RA 7160 defines the power, duties,

functions and compensation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, to wit:
SEC. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and

Compensation. - (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section
16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate
powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:
xxxx
(viii) Determine the positions and

salaries, wages, allowances and other
emoluments and benefits of officials and
employees paid wholly or mainly from city funds
and provide for expenditures necessary for the
proper conduct of programs, projects, services,
and activities of the city government.

In the exercise of the above power, the City Council of Manila
enacted on December 7, 2000 Ordinance No. 8040, but the same was
deemed approved on August 23, 2002. The ordinance authorized the
conferment of the EPSA to the former three-term councilors and, as
part of the award, the qualified city officials were to be given
retirement and gratuity pay remuneration. We believe that the award
is a gratuity which is a free gift, a present, or benefit of pecuniary value
bestowed without claim or demand, or without consideration.[36]
However, as correctly held by the COA, the above power is not
without limitations. These limitations are embodied in Section 81 of RA
7160, to wit:
SEC. 81. Compensation of Local Officials and

Employees. The compensation of local officials and
personnel shall be determined by the sanggunian
concerned: Provided, That the increase in compensation
of elective local officials shall take effect only after the
terms of office of those approving such increase shall have
expired: Provided, further, That the increase in
compensation of the appointive officials and employees
shall take effect as provided in the ordinance authorizing
such increase; Provided however, That said increases shall
not exceed the limitations on budgetary allocations for
personal services provided under Title Five, Book II of this
Code: Provided finally, That such compensation may be
based upon the pertinent provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-seven fifty-eight (R.A. No. 6758), otherwise
known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.

Moreover, the IRR of RA 7160 reproduced the Constitutional
provision that no elective or appointive local official or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless
specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or title of any kind from
any foreign government. Section 325 of the law limit the total
appropriations for personal services[37] of a local government unit to
not more than 45% of its total annual income from regular sources
realized in the next preceding fiscal year.
While it may be true that the above appropriation did not exceed the
budgetary limitation set by RA 7160, we find that the COA is correct in
sustaining ND No. 06-010-100-05.
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8040 provides for the payment
of retirement and gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual
time served in the position for three (3) consecutive terms as part of
the EPSA. The recomputation of the award disclosed that it is
equivalent to the total compensation received by each awardee for
nine years that includes basic salary, additional compensation,
Personnel Economic Relief Allowance, representation and
transportation allowance, rice allowance, financial assistance,
clothing allowance, 13th month pay and cash gift.[38] This is not
disputed by petitioners. There is nothing wrong with the local
government granting additional benefits to the officials and
employees. The laws even encourage the granting of incentive
benefits aimed at improving the services of these employees.
Considering, however, that the payment of these benefits constitute
disbursement of public funds, it must not contravene the law on
disbursement of public funds.[39]

As clearly explained by the Court in Yap v. Commission on
Audit,[40] the disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of
government officers and employees should be granted to
compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the
salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be
commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein, additional
allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant
to the fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the government
officers and employees. Without this limitation, government officers
and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without
justification necessary other than that such sums are being paid to
someone employed by the government. Public funds are the property
of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view to
prevent dissipation and waste.[41]
Undoubtedly, the above computation of the awardees' reward is

excessive and tantamount to double and additional
compensation. This cannot be justified by the mere fact that the
awardees have been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Neither can it be justified that the reward is given as a
gratuity at the end of the last term of the qualified elective official. The
fact remains that the remuneration is equivalent to everything that the
awardees received during the entire period that he served as such
official. Indirectly, their salaries and benefits are doubled, only that
they receive half of them at the end of their last term.
The purpose of the prohibition against additional or double

compensation is best expressed in Peralta v. Auditor General,[42] to
wit:

This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental
principle that a public office is a public trust. It is expected
of a government official or employee that he keeps
uppermost in mind the demands of public welfare. He is
there to render public service. He is of course entitled to be
rewarded for the performance of the functions entrusted
to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration.
The intrusion of the thought of private gain should be
unwelcome. The temptation to further personal ends,
public employment as a means for the acquisition of
wealth, is to be resisted. That at least is the idea. There is
then to be an awareness on the part of the officer or
employee of the government that he is to receive only
such compensation as may be fixed by law. With such a
realization, he is expected not to avail himself of devious or
circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to
his position.[43]
Verily, the COA's assailed decisions were made in faithful

compliance with its mandate and in judicious exercise of its general
audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution.[44] The COA
adheres to the policy that government funds and property should be
fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and
property should be prevented.[45]
However, in line with existing jurisprudence,[46] we need not

require the refund of the disallowed amount because all the parties
acted in good faith. In this case, the questioned disbursement was
made pursuant to an ordinance enacted as early as December 7,

2000 although deemed approved only on August 22, 2002. The city
officials disbursed the retirement and gratuity pay remuneration in the
honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and
the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they
richly deserve such reward.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Decision No. 2008-088 dated

September 26, 2008 and Decision No. 2010-077 dated August 23, 2010
of the Commission on Audit, are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
recipients need not refund the retirement and gratuity pay
remuneration that they already received.
Accordingly, the Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on

November 30, 2010 is hereby RECALLED. In view, however, of this
Court's decision not to require the refund of the amounts already
received, the Commission on Audit is ORDERED to cease and desist
from enforcing the Notice of Finality of Decision[47] dated October 5,
2010.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 154952 July 16, 2012
HILARION F. DIMAGIBA, IRMA MENDOZA, and ELLEN
RASCO, Petitioners,
vs.
JULITA ESPARTERO, MA. BERNARDITA L. CARREON and MELINA SAN
PEDRO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated
May 30, 2002 and the Resolution2 dated August 28, 2002 of the Court
of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 61261.
Petitioners Hilarion Dimagiba (Dimagiba), Irma Mendoza (Mendoza),
and Ellen Rasco (Rasco) were employees of The Livelihood
Corporation (LIVECOR), a government-owned and controlled
corporation created under Executive Order No. 866. Petitioner
Dimagiba was the Group Manager, Asset Development and
Management Group; petitioner Mendoza was the
Division Chief III, Asset Development and Management Group; and
petitioner Rasco was the Project Evaluation Officer IV, Asset
Development and Management Group.
On March 8, 1990, LIVECOR and the Human Settlement Development
Corporation (HSDC), now known as Strategic Investment and
Development Corporation (SIDCOR), also a government-owned and
controlled corporation, created under Presidential Decree (P.D.)

1396, entered into a Trust Agreement3 whereby the former would
undertake the task of managing, administering, disposing and
liquidating the corporate assets, projects and accounts of HSDC. In
HSDC Board Resolution No. 3-26-A4 dated March 26, 1990, it was
provided that in order to carry out the trust agreement, LIVECOR
personnel must be designated concurrently to operate certain basic
HSDC/SIDCOR functions, thus, LIVECOR personnel, namely, petitioners
Dimagiba and Mendoza were designated as Assistant General
Manager for Operations and Head, Inter-Agency Committee on
Assets Disposal and as Treasurer and Controller, respectively. The
same resolution provided for the designees' monthly honoraria and
commutable reimbursable representation allowances (CRRA).
Petitioner Rasco was designated as Technical Assistant to the Officer-
in-Charge (OIC), also with CRRA, under HSDC Board Resolution No. 05-
19-B5 dated May 19, 1993.
In a letter6 dated November 14, 1997, the Department of Budget and
Management informed LIVECOR of the approval of its
organization/staffing pattern modifications which resulted in the
abolition of petitioners' positions. As a result, petitioners were
separated from the service effective June 30, 1998 and were each
given a separation package7 as follows:
Dimagiba Mendoza Rasco

1. Separation ₱608,580. ₱815,021. ₱519,125.
Pay 00 91 16
2. Gratuity 165,600.00 132,150.00 112,555.0
Pay 0
3. Terminal 352,075.48 58,398.18 22,633.25
Pay

4. Last Month
Gross
Salary 17,410.00 15,815.00 13,555.50
5. Service 10,000.00 10,000.00 10,000.00
Award
TOTAL ₱1,153,66 ₱1,031,38 ₱678,169.

5.48 5.00 91
The HSDC resolved to terminate petitioners' services because the
latter's separation from LIVECOR would no longer allow them to
perform their functions at the HSDC. However, the HSDC, through its
OIC, Jose Rufino, wrote the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) and sought its opinion on the legality of HSDC's
granting gratuity pay to petitioners.
On April 8, 1998, the OGCC rendered Opinion No. 078,8 series of 1998,
which resolved among others the grant of gratuity pay to petitioners.
The OGCC found that it is within the power of the Board to grant
reasonable Gratuity Pay/Package to petitioners subject to the usual
rules of the
Commission on Audit (COA) pertaining to allowances/benefits and
disbursements of funds.
On May 19, 1998, the HSDC Board passed Resolution No. 05-19-
A9 terminating petitioners' services but resolved to grant petitioners
their Gratuity Package/Pay, as follows:
1. MR. HILARION DIMAGIBA is hereby granted a Gratuity Package as
follows:
1.1 Gratuity Pay in the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P700,000.00);

1.2 Termination of LBP Lease Agreement No. 282-C/Lease Schedule I
(Nissan Sentra UDC 919) effective 15 July 1998 in favor of Mr.
Dimagiba, with Mr. Dimagiba paying LBP Leasing Corporation all
charges, fees penalties, etc., including pre-termination charges;
2. MS. IRMA MENDOZA is hereby granted a Gratuity Pay in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (P180,000.00) PESOS;
3. MS. ELLEN RASCO is hereby granted a Gratuity Pay in the amount
of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00).
RESOLVED FURTHER, That the total budgetary requirement and
disbursement of the above Gratuity Pay is hereby approved and
allocated from Corporate Funds;
RESOLVED FINALLY, That the Officer-in-Charge and the Trustee of
corporate funds are hereby directed and authorized to disburse funds
and execute the necessary documentation, acts and deeds relative
to the immediate and full implementation of this resolution.10
In a Memorandum dated July 17, 1998 issued by LIVECOR
Administrator Manuel Portes (Portes), it was stated that any payment
of gratuities by the HSDC/SIDCOR to LIVECOR officers concurrently
performing HSDC functions shall not be processed without prior
clearance from him as the same shall be first cleared with the COA
and OGCC to avoid any legal problem. Portes then sought the
opinion of LIVECOR’s Resident COA Auditor, Alejandro Fumar,
regarding petitioners' claim for additional gratuity, who opined that
such gratuity payment would amount to double compensation.
Subsequently, petitioners wrote a letter11 dated July 29, 1998
addressed to Portes requesting for the processing of their HSDC
gratuity pay. Attached in their letter were OGCC Opinion No. 078 and
a letter12 from the Presidential Management Staff (PMS), dated June
29, 1998, concurring with the OGCC's opinion.

Portes then instructed respondent Atty. Ma. Bernardita L. Carreon
(Carreon), Attorney IV of LIVECOR’s Legal Services Department and a
designated member of Special Task Force for HSDC, to draft a letter
seeking clarification on OGCC Opinion No. 078. He likewise requested
the LIVECOR Legal Services Department to issue an opinion on the
matter of petitioners' HSDC/SIDCOR gratuity pay.
In a Memorandum13 dated August 25, 1998 addressed to Portes,
respondent Atty. Julita A. Espartero (Espartero), then LIVECOR'S Chief
Legal Counsel, wrote that petitioners' designation as HSDC officers
would not entitle them to receive any gratuity pay because:
First, the purpose for which Mr. Dimagiba, Ms. Mendoza and Ms. Rasco
were elected or designated as SIDCOR officers is already made clear
in the subject Resolution which provides as follows, viz: WHEREAS, in
order to carry out the trust, LIVECOR personnel must be
designated/elected concurrently to operate certain basic SIDCOR
corporate offices/positions.
The election or designation of Mr. Dimagiba, Ms. Mendoza and Ms.
Rasco as SIDCOR officers were not intended to be independent of or
separate from their employment with LIVECOR but was made
precisely because of their being LIVECOR personnel tasked to carry
out the Trust Agreement between SIDCOR and LIVECOR.
Second, Mr. Dimagiba, Ms. Mendoza and Ms. Rasco do not receive
salaries or wages from SIDCOR but CRREs. This clearly shows that they
are not organic SIDCOR employees but, as heretofore indicated,
LIVECOR officers merely holding concurrent positions in SIDCOR.
The reason for the above-mentioned arrangement (grant of CRREs
and not salaries or wages) is that: "While dual appointments in two
government- owned corporations are permissible, dual
compensation is not."

To allow Mr. Dimagiba, Ms. Mendoza and Ms. Rasco, therefore, to
receive gratuity pay/package apart from what they are entitled to
receive or have already received from LIVECOR will be to subvert or
indirectly circumvent the above-stated legal principle.
Third, not being organic SIDCOR employees but LIVECOR officers
merely holding concurrent positions in SIDCOR, Mr. Dimagiba, Ms.
Mendoza and Ms. Rasco cannot be said to have been "separated"
from SIDCOR.14
In the meantime, petitioners had requested respondent Melina San
Pedro (San Pedro), LIVECOR's Financial Analyst, to sign and process
the disbursement vouchers for the payment of their gratuity pay but
the latter refused to do so because of the adverse opinion of the
LIVECOR Legal Department and based on the memorandum issued
by Portes.
In October 1998, Portes was replaced by Atty. Salvador C. Medialdea
(Atty. Medialdea) to whom petitioners subsequently referred the
matter of their gratuity payment. In a letter15 dated June 14, 1999,
Atty. Medialdea sought clarification from the OGCC regarding its
Opinion No. 078. The OGCC responded with the issuance of its
Opinion No. 019,16 s. 2000 on January 31, 2000, where it declared that
HSDC Resolution No. 05-19-A, granting gratuities in favor of petitioners,
could not be implemented as the intended beneficiaries were
prohibited by law from receiving the same, citing Section 8 of Article
IX-B of the Constitution, i.e., proscription on double compensation.
On October 27, 1998, petitioners filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a Complaint-Affidavit charging Administrator Portes,
Atty. Christine Tomas-Espinosa, Chief of Staff of the Office of the
Administrator, respondents Espartero, Carreon, and San Pedro, with
grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the

service, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
functions, and violation of Section 5 (a), Republic Act (RA) No. 6713.
In their complaint-affidavit, petitioners alleged that respondents
conspired in refusing to release their gratuity pay and that such refusal
for an unreasonable length of time despite repeated demands
constituted the offenses charged.
Respondents filed their respective Counter-Affidavits denying the
charges against them. Respondent Espartero contended that her
actions relative to the processing of gratuity pay merely consisted of
rendering an opinion that such gratuity would amount to double
compensation, while respondent Carreon alleged that her only
participation with regard to petitioners' claims for additional gratuity
was to draft a letter addressed to the OGCC. On the other hand,
respondent San Pedro claimed that her refusal to affix her signature
on petitioners' disbursement vouchers for the release of said gratuity
pay was based on the memorandum of Administrator Portes
preventing LIVECOR officers and employees from acting on any
claims for gratuity without the latter's prior approval.
On June 2, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered its Decision,17 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, respondents JULITA
ESPARTERO, BERNARDITA CARREON and MELINA SAN PEDRO are
hereby found guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty, Oppression, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service, Inefficiency and
Incompetence, and Violation of Section 5 (a), Republic Act No. 6713,
and are hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service
coupled with the accessory penalties of cancellation of their
eligibilities, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits as well as
disqualification of reemployment in the government service pursuant

to Sections 9, 17 and 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
On the contrary, the instant complaint against respondents MANUEL
PORTES and CHRISTINE TOMAS-ESPINOSA is DISMISSED for being moot
and academic, they being already out of the government service
without prejudice to any civil or criminal actions filed against them.
Furthermore, pursuant to Section 15 (2), Republic Act No. 6770, the
incumbent Administrator of the Livelihood Corporation and other
public officers concerned are hereby directed to facilitate the
processing and payment of complainants’ gratuity in accordance
with HSDC Board Resolution No. 05-19-A, s. 1998.
The Honorable Administrator, Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR), 7/F
Hanston Building, Emerald Avenue, Pasig City, is hereby tasked to
implement this Decision in accordance with law informing this Office
of the action taken thereon within ten (10) days upon receipt hereof.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Civil Service Commission
for their guidance and reference.
SO ORDERED.18
In so ruling, the Ombudsman stated that the prohibition on double
compensation would not apply to pensions or gratuities because they
are gifts or bounty given in recognition of the employees' past
services. It found that the HSDC Board had the discretion and
authority to decide on matters which were within its competence and
jurisdiction, such as granting of benefits and retirement gratuities to its
officers and employees. It concluded that payment of petitioners'
gratuities did not involve judgment or discretion on LIVECOR's part,
hence, a ministerial act; and that Resolution No. 05-19-A which
granted the gratuity pay to petitioners directed LIVECOR as HSDC's

trustee to disburse funds and execute the necessary documentation
for the full implementation of the same.
Respondents filed their motions for reconsideration, which the
Ombudsman disposed in an Order19 dated August 8, 2000 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, except as to the finding of guilt on respondent
ESPARTERO’s alleged violation of Section 5 (a), Republic Act No. 6713,
the assailed June 23, 2000 DECISION is affirmed with finality.20
SO ORDERED.
On September 7, 2000, the Ombudsman issued an Order21 directing
the implementation of its decision; thus, LIVECOR's Final Notice of
Dismissal from Service were subsequently served on respondents.
Petitioners' gratuity pay were then released.
Respondents filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 with
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction. The CA issued a TRO22 and later granted the writ of
preliminary injunction.23
On May 30, 2002, the CA rendered its assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision
of the Office of the Ombudsman, dated June 2, 2000, and the Order
dated August 8, 2000, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Reinstating petitioners to their positions held prior to their dismissal
from office with full backwages and benefits;
2. Ordering private respondents to return the gratuity packages
received from HSDC; and

3. Granting a permanent and final injunction enjoining the Office of
the Ombudsman from executing the assailed decision and Order.24
The CA found that the gratuity packages received by petitioners from
HSDC constituted the prohibited additional or double compensation
under the Constitution. It found no evidence to support the
Ombudsman decision finding respondents guilty of the administrative
charges as they acted accordingly as public officers. Anent the issue
of the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the CA ruled that
petitioners filed their appeal within the 15-day period prescribed
under Section 4 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, relying on the case of
Fabian v. Desierto.25 However, since there was no clear
pronouncement that appeals of Ombudsman decision in
administrative cases cannot be made under Section 4 of Rule 43, the
dismissal of the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 10-
day period provided under Section 27 of RA 6770, or the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, would result to glaring injustice to respondents; and that
dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon
especially if it will result to injustice.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated August 28, 2002.
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioners raise the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN
IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR REVIEW DESPITE
BEING FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF TEN (10) DAYS SET
BY SECTION 27 OF REPUBLIC ACT 6770.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE GRATUITIES GRANTED TO PETITIONERS DIMAGIBA, MENDOZA AND
RASCO BY HSDC CONSTITUTE DOUBLE COMPENSATION PROHIBITED
UNDER ARTICLE IX (B), SECTION 8 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION DESPITE

THE FACT THAT SAID GRATUITIES CLEARLY FALL UNDER THE EXCEPTION
UNDER THE SAME PROVISION.26
Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that the CA erred in acting
on the petition which was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary
period for filing the same as provided under Section 27 of RA 6770.
They claim that respondents received the Ombudsman order denying
their motion for reconsideration on August 25, 2000 and filed a motion
for extension of time with the CA on September 11, 2000, which was
the 15th day from receipt of the order, relying on our ruling in Fabian
v. Desierto27 and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners cite the
cases of Lapid v. CA28 and Barata v. Abalos, Jr.29 to support the
application of the 10-day period for filing the petition in the CA from
receipt of the Ombudsman order.
We are not persuaded.
Section 27 of RA 6770 provides as follows:
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders
of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.
xxxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision
imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of
not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt
of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

The then Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise
contain a similar provision. Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 0730 provides as follows:
Sec. 7. Finality and Execution of Decision - Where the respondent is
absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall
be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision
shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt
thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in
Section 27 of R.A. 6770.
In Fabian v. Desierto,31 we declared unconstitutional Section 27 of RA
6770 and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and any other provision of
law implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for
appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. We held that such provision was
violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution as it expanded our
appellate jurisdiction without our advice and concurrence; and that
it was also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only
to a review of judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or
other courts authorized by law. We then said:
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with
the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative

disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43.32
Subsequently, in Lapid v. CA33 which involved the issue of whether or
not the decision of the Ombudsman finding then Governor Manuel
Lapid administratively liable for misconduct and imposing on him a
penalty of one year suspension without pay is immediately executory.
We then ruled:
x x x The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation
of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters included in
said Section 27, including the finality or non-finality of decisions, are
not affected and still stand.34
Thus, we said that since the penalty imposed on Lapid which was one
year suspension was not among those enumerated under Section 27
as final and unappealable, an appeal timely filed by Lapid will stay
the immediate implementation of the decision of the Ombudsman
appealed from.
Later came the case of Barata v. Abalos, Jr.35 which was decided in
2001. The issue brought to us then was whether the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the Ombudsman decision
exonerating respondent Mayor Abalos, Jr. of an administrative
charge is not appealable, which we answered in the negative. We
also said that even on the assumption that appeal is allowed, the
same can no longer prosper, thus:
This notwithstanding, even on the assumption that appeal is allowed,
the same can no longer prosper. As correctly pointed out by private
respondent, since the Order dated September 10, 1999 of the
Ombudsman denying the motion for reconsideration was received by
petitioner on October 15, 1999, petitioner had until October 25, 1999

to appeal in accordance with Section 27, R.A. 6770 or at the most,
until November 24, 1999, if he availed of the 30-day extension
provided under Section 2, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
However, the petition was filed with the Court of Appeals only on
February 1, 2000, way beyond the reglementary period.36
Thus, it appeared that the period provided under Section 27 of RA
6770 which is ten days must be observed in filing a petition with the
CA assailing the Ombudsman decision in administrative case.
In this case, respondents filed with the CA their motion for extension of
time to file petition for review under Rule 43 on September 11, 2000,
i.e., on the 15th day from receipt of the Ombudsman order denying
their motion for reconsideration, and filed the petition on September
19, 2000. At the time the petition was filed, the matter of which
reglementary period must apply, whether 10 days under Section 27 of
RA 6770 or 15 days under Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, had
not been established with definiteness until the Barata case was
decided later. Considering that the Fabian ruling stated that Rule 43
of the Rules of Court should be the proper mode of appeal from an
Ombudsman decision in administrative cases, and Section 4 of Rule
43 provides for 15 days from receipt of the order appealed from, the
motion for extension to file petition which was filed on the 15th day
from receipt of the Ombudsman order is considered timely filed.
Moreover, as correctly stated by the CA, dismissal of appeals on
purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result to
unfairness as in this case. In Baylon v. Fact-Finding Intelligence
Bureau,37 we cited reasons or justifications to resist the strict
adherence to procedure, to wit: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor and
property; (2) counsel's negligence without the participatory
negligence on the part of the client; (3) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (4) the merits of the case; (5) a cause not

entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules; (6) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (7) the other party will not
be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Here, the Ombudsman found respondents guilty of the charges filed
against them and imposed upon them the penalty of dismissal from
the service. The penalty of dismissal is a severe punishment, because
it blemishes a person's record in government service.38 It is an injury to
one's reputation and honor which produces irreversible effects on
one's career and private life. Worse, it implies loss of livelihood to the
employee and his family.39 If only to assure the judicial mind that no
injustice is allowed to take place due to a blind adherence to rules of
procedure, the dismissal on technicality of respondents' petition,
which is aimed at establishing not just their innocence but the truth,
cannot stand.40
As to the second issue, petitioners contend that the gratuity given to
them by the HSDC Board cannot be considered as additional or
double compensation which is prohibited by the Constitution.
We find no merit in this argument.
The additional grant of gratuity pay to petitioners amounted to
additional compensation prohibited by the Constitution.
As provided under Section 8 of Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless
specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any
foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double,
or indirect compensation.

Clearly, the only exception for an employee to receive additional,
double and indirect compensation is where the law allows him to
receive extra compensation for services rendered in another position
which is an extension or is connected with his basic work. The
prohibition against additional or double compensation, except when
specifically authorized by law, is considered a "constitutional curb" on
the spending power of the government. In Peralta v. Mathay,41 we
stated the purpose of the prohibition, to wit:
x x x This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle
that a public office is a public trust. It is expected of a government
official or employee that he keeps uppermost in mind the demands
of public welfare. He is there to render public service. He is of course
entitled to be rewarded for the performance of the functions
entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration.
The intrusion of the thought of private gain should be unwelcome. The
temptation to further personal ends, public employment as a means
for the acquisition of wealth, is to be resisted. That at least is the ideal.
There is then to be awareness on the part of an officer or employee
of the government that he is to receive only such compensation as
may be fixed by law. With such a realization, he is expected not to
avail himself of devious or circuitous means to increase the
remuneration attached to his position.42x x x
The gratuity pay being given to petitioners by the HSDC Board was by
reason of the satisfactory performance of their work under the trust
agreement. It is considered a bonus and by its very nature, a bonus
partakes of an additional remuneration or compensation.43 It bears
stressing that when petitioners were separated from LIVECOR, they
were given separation pay which also included gratuity pay for all the
years they worked thereat and concurrently in HSDC/SIDCOR.
Granting them another gratuity pay for the works done in HSDC under

the trust agreement would be indirectly giving them additional
compensation for services rendered in another position which is an
extension or is connected with his basic work which is prohibited. This
can only be allowed if there is a law which specifically authorizes them
to receive an additional payment of gratuity. The HSDC Board
Resolution No. 05-19-A granting petitioners’ gratuity pay is not a law
which would exempt them from the Constitutional proscription
against additional, double or indirect compensation.
Neither does the HSDC law under P.D. 1396 contain a provision
allowing the grant of such gratuity pay to petitioners.1âwphi1 Section
9 of P.D. 1396 provides:
Section 9. Appointment, Control and Discipline of Personnel. – The
Board, upon recommendation of the General Manager of the
Corporation, shall appoint the officers, and employees of the
Corporation and its subsidiaries; fix their compensation, allowances
and benefits, their working hours and such other conditions of
employment as it may deem proper; grant them leaves of absence
under such regulations as it may promulgate; discipline and/or
remove them for cause; and establish and maintain a recruitment
and merit system for the Corporation and its affiliates and subsidiaries.
The above-quoted provision applies to the persons appointed as
employees of the HSDC and does not extend to petitioners who were
LIVECOR employees merely designated in HSDC under a trust
agreement. The fact that they were not HSDC employees was
emphatically stated in Resolution No. 3-26-A passed by the HSDC
Board of Directors on March 26, 1990, where it was provided that "in
order to carry out the trust agreement, LIVECOR personnel must be
designated/elected concurrently to operate certain basic SIDCOR
corporate offices and positions."

Petitioners claim that the proscription against double compensation
does not include pensions and gratuity.1âwphi1
We are not persuaded. We quote with approval what the CA said,
thus:
The second paragraph of Section 8, Article IX specifically adds that
"pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double
or indirect compensation." This has reference to compensation
already earned, for instance by a retiree. A retiree receiving pensions
or gratuities after retirement can continue to receive such pension or
gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which
another compensation is attached.
The grant to designees Dimagiba et al. of another gratuity from HSDC
would not fall under the exception in the second paragraph as the
same had not been primarily earned, but rather being granted for
service simultaneously rendered to LIVECOR and HSDC. Hence, to
allow the release of the second gratuity from HSDC would run afoul
over the well-settled rule that "in the absence of an express legal
exception, pension or gratuity laws should be construed as to
preclude any person from receiving double compensation.44
We thus find no reversible error committed by theCA in granting the
petition filed by respondents and reversing the Ombudsman decision
finding them guilty of the administrative charges.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated May
30, 2002 and the Resolution dated August 28, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR G.R. No. 169752

THE PREVENTION OF
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS,
Petitioners, Members:
PUNO, C.J.
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO-MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
DIR. RODULFO J. ARIESGA
(in his official capacity as Director
of the Commission on Audit), MS.
MERLE M. VALENTIN and MS.
SUSAN GUARDIAN (in their official
capacities as Team Leader and
Team
Member, respectively, of the audit Promulgated:

Team of the Commission on Audit),
Respondents. September 25, 2007
x------------------------------------------------------
-----x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 2 of Rule 64,
filed by the petitioner assailing Office Order No. 2005-021[1] dated
September 14, 2005 issued by the respondents which constituted the
audit team, as well as its September 23, 2005 Letter[2] informing the
petitioner that respondents audit team shall conduct an audit survey
on the petitioner for a detailed audit of its accounts, operations, and
financial transactions. No temporary restraining order was issued.
The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred

years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by
the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was created,
was composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The
objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be
to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the
protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do
and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the
suffering of animals and promote their welfare.[3]
At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation
Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet in existence. Act No. 1285 antedated
both the Corporation Law and the constitution of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Important to note is that the nature of the

petitioner as a corporate entity is distinguished from
the sociedad anonimasunder the Spanish Code of Commerce.
For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare

and enforcing laws for the protection of animals, the petitioner was
initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend
violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to
share one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and collected through its
efforts for violations of the laws related thereto. As originally worded,
Sections 4 and 5 of Act No. 1285 provide:
SEC. 4. The said society is authorized to appoint not to

exceed five agents in the City of Manila, and not to exceed
two in each of the provinces of the Philippine Islands who
shall have all the power and authority of a police officer to
make arrests for violation of the laws enacted for the
prevention of cruelty to animals and the protection of
animals, and to serve any process in connection with the
execution of such laws; and in addition thereto, all the
police force of the Philippine Islands, wherever organized,
shall, as occasion requires, assist said society, its members
or agents, in the enforcement of all such laws.
SEC. 5. One-half of all the fines imposed and

collected through the efforts of said society, its members or
its agents, for violations of the laws enacted for the
prevention of cruelty to animals and for their protection,
shall belong to said society and shall be used to promote
its objects.
(emphasis supplied)

Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the
privilege to retain a portion of the fines collected for violation of
animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 148,[4] which reads, in its entirety, thus:
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
Section 1. Section four of Act Numbered Twelve hundred

and eighty-five as amended by Act Numbered Thirty five
hundred and forty-eight, is hereby further amended so as
to read as follows:
Sec. 4. The said society is authorized to appoint

not to exceed ten agents in the City of Manila,
and not to exceed one in each municipality of
the Philippines who shall have the authority to
denounce to regular peace officers any
violation of the laws enacted for the prevention
of cruelty to animals and the protection of
animals and to cooperate with said peace
officers in the prosecution of transgressors of
such laws.
Sec. 2. The full amount of the fines collected for violation of

the laws against cruelty to animals and for the protection
of animals, shall accrue to the general fund of the
Municipality where the offense was committed.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, November 8, 1936. (Emphasis supplied)
Immediately thereafter, then President Manuel L. Quezon issued

Executive Order (E.O.) No. 63 dated November 12, 1936, portions of
which provide:
Whereas, during the first regular session of the National

Assembly, Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred
Forty Eight was enacted depriving the agents of the
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of their
power to arrest persons who have violated the laws
prohibiting cruelty to animals thereby correcting a serious
defect in one of the laws existing in our statute books.
xxxx
Whereas, the cruel treatment of animals is an offense

against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the
Government is duty bound to enforce;
Now, therefore, I, Manuel L. Quezon, President of the

Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by
the Constitution, hereby decree, order, and direct the
Commissioner of Public Safety, the Provost Marshal General
as head of the Constabulary Division of the Philippine Army,
every Mayor of a chartered city, and every municipal
president to detail and organize special members of the
police force, local, national, and the Constabulary to
watch, capture, and prosecute offenders against the laws
enacted to prevent cruelty to animals. (Emphasis supplied)

On December 1, 2003, an audit team from respondent Commission
on Audit (COA) visited the office of the petitioner to conduct an audit
survey pursuant to COA Office Order No. 2003-051 dated November
18, 2003[5] addressed to the petitioner. The petitioner demurred on
the ground that it was a private entity not under the jurisdiction of
COA, citing Section 2(1) of Article IX of the Constitution which specifies
the general jurisdiction of the COA, viz:
Section 1. General Jurisdiction. The Commission on Audit

shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue
and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters, and on a
post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and
officers that have been granted fiscal autonomy under the
Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and
universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-
governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly
or indirectly, from or through the government, which are
required by law or the granting institution to submit to such
audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where
the internal control system of the audited agencies is
inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures,
including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary
and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep
the general accounts of the Government, and for such

period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers
and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.(Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner explained thus:
a. Although the petitioner was created by special legislation,

this necessarily came about because in January 1905 there
was as yet neither a Corporation Law or any other general law
under which it may be organized and incorporated, nor a
Securities and Exchange Commission which would have
passed upon its organization and incorporation.
b. That Executive Order No. 63, issued during the

Commonwealth period, effectively deprived the petitioner of
its power to make arrests, and that the petitioner lost its
operational funding, underscore the fact that it exercises no
governmental function. In fine, the government itself, by its
overt acts, confirmed petitioners status as a private juridical
entity.
The COA General Counsel issued a Memorandum[6] dated May 6,

2004, asserting that the petitioner was subject to its audit authority. In
a letter dated May 17, 2004,[7]respondent COA informed the
petitioner of the result of the evaluation, furnishing it with a copy of
said Memorandum dated May 6, 2004 of the General Counsel.
Petitioner thereafter filed with the respondent COA a Request for Re-
evaluation dated May 19, 2004,[8] insisting that it was a private
domestic corporation.

Acting on the said request, the General Counsel of respondent COA,
in a Memorandum dated July 13, 2004,[9] affirmed her earlier opinion
that the petitioner was a government entity that was subject to the
audit jurisdiction of respondent COA. In a letter dated September 14,
2004, the respondent COA informed the petitioner of the result of the
re-evaluation, maintaining its position that the petitioner was subject
to its audit jurisdiction, and requested an initial conference with the
respondents.
In a Memorandum dated September 16, 2004, Director Delfin Aguilar

reported to COA Assistant Commissioner Juanito Espino, Corporate
Government Sector, that the audit survey was not conducted due to
the refusal of the petitioner because the latter maintained that it was
a private corporation.
Petitioner received on September 27, 2005 the subject COA Office

Order 2005-021 dated September 14, 2005 and the COA Letter
dated September 23, 2005.
Hence, herein Petition on the following grounds:

A.
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO
ITS AUDIT AUTHORITY.
B.

PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT, THERE BEING
NO APPEAL, NOR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE
REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW AVAILABLE TO
IT.[10]
The essential question before this Court is whether the petitioner
qualifies as a government agency that may be subject to audit by
respondent COA.
Petitioner argues: first, even though it was created by special

legislation in 1905 as there was no general law then existing under
which it may be organized or incorporated, it exercises no
governmental functions because these have been revoked by C.A.
No. 148 and E.O. No. 63; second, nowhere in its charter is it indicated
that it is a public corporation, unlike, for instance, C.A. No. 111 which
created the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, defined its powers and
purposes, and specifically stated that it was An Act to Create a Public
Corporation in which, even as amended by Presidential Decree No.
460, the law still adverted to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines as a
public corporation, all of which are not obtaining in the charter of the
petitioner; third, if it were a government body, there would have been
no need for the State to grant it tax exemptions under Republic Act
No. 1178, and the fact that it was so exempted strengthens its position
that it is a private institution; fourth, the employees of the petitioner
are registered and covered by the Social Security System at the latters
initiative and not through the Government Service Insurance System,
which should have been the case had the employees been
considered government employees; fifth, the petitioner does not
receive any form of financial assistance from the government, since
C.A. No. 148, amending Section 5 of Act No. 1285, states that the full
amount of the fines, collected for violation of the laws against cruelty

to animals and for the protection of animals, shall accrue to the
general fund of the Municipality where the offense was
committed; sixth, C.A. No. 148 effectively deprived the petitioner of its
powers to make arrests and serve processes as these functions were
placed in the hands of the police force; seventh, no government
appointee or representative sits on the board of trustees of the
petitioner; eighth, a reading of the provisions of its charter (Act No.
1285) fails to show that any act or decision of the petitioner is subject
to the approval of or control by any government agency, except to
the extent that it is governed by the law on private corporations in
general; and finally, ninth, the Committee on Animal Welfare, under
the Animal Welfare Act of 1998, includes members from both the
private and the public sectors.
The respondents contend that since the petitioner is a body politic

created by virtue of a special legislation and endowed with a
governmental purpose, then, indubitably, the COA may audit the
financial activities of the latter. Respondents in effect divide their
contentions into six strains: first, the test to determine whether an entity
is a government corporation lies in the manner of its creation, and,
since the petitioner was created by virtue of a special charter, it is thus
a government corporation subject to respondents auditing
power; second, the petitioner exercises sovereign powers, that is, it is
tasked to enforce the laws for the protection and welfare of animals
which ultimately redound to the public good and welfare, and,
therefore, it is deemed to be a government instrumentality as defined
under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of which is
connected with the administration of government, as purportedly
affirmed by American jurisprudence; third, by virtue of Section
23,[11] Title II, Book III of the same Code, the Office of the President

exercises supervision or control over the petitioner; fourth, under the
same Code, the requirement under its special charter for the
petitioner to render a report to the Civil Governor, whose functions
have been inherited by the Office of the President, clearly reflects the
nature of the petitioner as a government instrumentality; fifth, despite
the passage of the Corporation Code, the law creating the petitioner
had not been abolished, nor had it been re-incorporated under any
general corporation law; and finally, sixth, Republic Act No. 8485,
otherwise known as the Animal Welfare Act of 1998, designates the
petitioner as a member of its Committee on Animal Welfare which is
attached to the Department of Agriculture.
In view of the phrase One-half of all the fines imposed and collected
through the efforts of said society, the Court, in a Resolution dated
January 30, 2007, required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
and the parties to comment on: a) petitioner's authority to impose
fines and the validity of the provisions of Act No. 1285 and
Commonwealth Act No. 148 considering that there are no standard
measures provided for in the aforecited laws as to the manner of
implementation, the specific violations of the law, the person/s
authorized to impose fine and in what amount; and, b) the effect of
the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions on whether petitioner continues to
exist or should organize as a private corporation under the
Corporation Code, B.P. Blg. 68 as amended.
Petitioner and the OSG filed their respective Comments. Respondents

filed a Manifestation stating that since they were being represented
by the OSG which filed its Comment, they opted to dispense with the
filing of a separate one and adopt for the purpose that of the OSG.

The petitioner avers that it does not have the authority to impose fines
for violation of animal welfare laws; it only enjoyed the privilege of
sharing in the fines imposed and collected from its efforts in the
enforcement of animal welfare laws; such privilege, however, was
subsequently abolished by C.A. No. 148; that it continues to exist as a
private corporation since it was created by the Philippine Commission
before the effectivity of the Corporation law, Act No. 1459; and the
1935 and 1987 Constitutions.
The OSG submits that Act No. 1285 and its amendatory laws did not
give petitioner the authority to impose fines for violation of
laws[12] relating to the prevention of cruelty to animals and the
protection of animals; that even prior to the amendment of Act No.
1285, petitioner was only entitled to share in the fines imposed; C.A.
No. 148 abolished that privilege to share in the fines collected; that
petitioner is a public corporation and has continued to exist since Act
No. 1285; petitioner was not repealed by the 1935 and 1987
Constitutions which contain transitory provisions maintaining all laws
issued not inconsistent therewith until amended, modified or
repealed.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The arguments of the parties, interlaced as they are, can be disposed

of in five points.
First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the charter test cannot
be applied.
Essentially, the charter test as it stands today provides:

[T]he test to determine whether a corporation is
government owned or controlled, or private in nature is
simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a
public function, or by incorporation under the general
corporation law? Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission, and are compulsory members of the
Government Service Insurance System. xxx (Emphasis
supplied)[13]
The petitioner is correct in stating that the charter test is predicated,

at best, on the legal regime established by the 1935 Constitution,
Section 7, Article XIII, which states:
Sec. 7. The National Assembly shall not, except by general

law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation
of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision
or instrumentality thereof.[14]
The foregoing proscription has been carried over to the 1973 and the
1987 Constitutions. Section 16 of Article XII of the present Constitution
provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general

law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation
of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to
the test of economic viability.

Section 16 is essentially a re-enactment of Section 7 of Article XVI of
the 1935 Constitution and Section 4 of Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution.
During the formulation of the 1935 Constitution, the Committee on

Franchises recommended the foregoing proscription to prevent the
pressure of special interests upon the lawmaking body in the creation
of corporations or in the regulation of the same. To permit the
lawmaking body by special law to provide for the organization,
formation, or regulation of private corporations would be in effect to
offer to it the temptation in many cases to favor certain groups, to the
prejudice of others or to the prejudice of the interests of the
country.[15]
And since the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced
by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows that the test cannot
apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No.
1285, enacted on January 19, 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in
general have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided.[16] All statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the
legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or
is necessarily implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the
doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect.[17]
There are a few exceptions. Statutes can be given retroactive effect

in the following cases: (1) when the law itself so expressly provides; (2)
in case of remedial statutes; (3) in case of curative statutes; (4) in case
of laws interpreting others; and (5) in case of laws creating new
rights.[18] None of the exceptions is present in the instant case.

The general principle of prospectivity of the law likewise applies to Act
No. 1459, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, which had been
enacted by virtue of the plenary powers of the Philippine Commission
on March 1, 1906, a little over a year after January 19, 1905, the time
the petitioner emerged as a juridical entity. Even the Corporation Law
respects the rights and powers of juridical entities organized
beforehand, viz:
SEC. 75. Any corporation or sociedad anonima formed,

organized, and existing under the
laws of the Philippine Islands and lawfully transacting busin
ess in the Philippine Islands on the date of the passage of
this Act, shall be subject to the provisions hereof so far as
such provisions may be applicable and shall
be entitled at its option either to continue business as such
corporation or to reform and organize under and by virtue
of the provisions of this Act, transferring all corporate
interests to the new corporation which, if a stock
corporation, is authorized to issue its shares of stock at par
to the stockholders or members of the old corporation
according to their interests. (Emphasis supplied).
As pointed out by the OSG, both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions
contain transitory provisions maintaining all laws issued not
inconsistent therewith until amended, modified or repealed.[19]
In a legal regime where the charter test doctrine cannot be applied,
the mere fact that a corporation has been created by virtue of a
special law does not necessarily qualify it as a public corporation.

What then is the nature of the petitioner as a corporate entity? What
legal regime governs its rights, powers, and duties?
As stated, at the time the petitioner was formed, the applicable law
was the Philippine Bill of 1902, and, emphatically, as also stated
above, no proscription similar to the charter test can be found therein.
The textual foundation of the charter test, which placed a limitation

on the power of the legislature, first appeared in the 1935
Constitution. However, the petitioner was incorporated in 1905 by
virtue of Act No. 1258, a law antedating the Corporation Law (Act No.
1459) by a year, and the 1935 Constitution, by thirty years. There being
neither a general law on the formation and organization of private
corporations nor a restriction on the legislature to create private
corporations by direct legislation, the Philippine Commission at that
moment in history was well within its powers in 1905 to constitute the
petitioner as a private juridical entity.
Time and again the Court must caution even the most brilliant scholars
of the law and all constitutional historians on the danger of imposing
legal concepts of a later date on facts of an earlier date.[20]
The amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear that the
petitioner was a private corporation and not an agency of the
government. This was evident in Executive Order No. 63, issued by
then President of the Philippines Manuel L. Quezon, declaring that the
revocation of the powers of the petitioner to appoint agents with
powers of arrest corrected a serious defect in one of the laws existing
in the statute books.

As a curative statute, and based on the doctrines so far discussed,
C.A. No. 148 has to be given retroactive effect, thereby freeing all
doubt as to which class of corporations the petitioner belongs, that is,
it is a quasi-public corporation, a kind of private domestic corporation,
which the Court will further elaborate on under the fourth point.
Second, a reading of petitioners charter shows that it is not subject to

control or supervision by any agency of the State, unlike government-
owned and -controlled corporations.No government representative
sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private
corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily
and solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may
exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations,
such as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a
common seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal
operations: the petitioner shall be managed or operated by its officers
in accordance with its by-laws in force. The pertinent provisions of the
charter provide:
Section 1. Anna L. Ide, Kate S. Wright, John L.

Chamberlain, William F. Tucker, Mary S.
Fergusson, Amasa S. Crossfield, Spencer Cosby, Sealy
B. Rossiter, Richard P. Strong, Jose Robles Lahesa, Josefina
R. de Luzuriaga, and such other persons as may be
associated with them in conformity with this act, and their
successors, are hereby constituted and created a body
politic and corporate at law, under the name and style of
The Philippines Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals.

As incorporated by this Act, said society shall have the
power to add to its organization such and as many
members as it desires, to provide for and choose such
officers as it may deem advisable,
and in such manner as it may
wish, and to remove members as it shall provide.
It shall have the right to sue and be sued, to use a

common seal, to
receive legacies and donations, to conduct social enterpr
ises for the purpose of obtaining funds, to levy dues upon
itsmembers and provide for their collection to hold real and
personal estate such as may be necessary for the
accomplishment of the purposes of the society, and to
adopt such by-laws for its government as may not be
inconsistent with law or this charter.
xxxx
Sec. 3. The said society shall be operated under the

direction of its officers, in accordance with its by-laws in
force, and this charter.
xxxx
Sec. 6. The principal office of the society shall be kept

in the city of Manila, and the society shall have full power
to locate and establish branch offices of the society
wherever it may deem advisable in the Philippine Islands,
such branch offices to be under the supervision and control
of the principal office.

Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by
the Social Security System at the latters initiative, and not through the
Government Service Insurance System, which should be the case if
the employees are considered government employees. This is another
indication of petitioners nature as a private entity. Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 8282,
otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997, defines the
employer:
Employer Any person, natural or juridical, domestic or

foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade,
business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind and
uses the services of another person who is under his orders
as regards the employment, except the Government and
any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities,
including corporations owned or controlled by the
Government: Provided, That a self-employed person shall
be both employee and employer at the same
time. (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a body politic

because its primary purpose is to secure the protection and welfare
of animals which, in turn, redounds to the public good.
This argument, is, at best, specious. The fact that a certain juridical
entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that circumstance
alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a
corporation may be private although its charter contains provisions of
a public character, incorporated solely for the public good. This class
of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which

are private corporations that render public service, supply public
wants,[21] or pursue other eleemosynary objectives. While purposely
organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required by
law to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of these
corporations are utility,[22] railroad, warehouse, telegraph,
telephone, water supply corporations and transportation
companies.[23] It must be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is
a species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type
of service the former renders to the public: if it performs a public
service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation.[24]
Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation
cannot be taken as a safe guide, for the fact is that almost all
corporations are nowadays created to promote the interest, good, or
convenience of the public. A bank, for example, is a private
corporation; yet, it is created for a public benefit. Private schools and
universities are likewise private corporations; and yet, they are
rendering public service. Private hospitals and wards are charged with
heavy social responsibilities. More so with all common carriers. On the
other hand, there may exist a public corporation even if it is endowed
with gifts or donations from private individuals.
The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is

public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the
corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as
the latters own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its
governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public;
otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces, chartered
cities, and barangays can best exemplify public corporations. They

are created by the State as its own device and agency for the
accomplishment of parts of its own public works.[25]
It is clear that the amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 revoked

the powers of the petitioner to arrest offenders of animal welfare laws
and the power to serve processes in connection therewith.
Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of the petitioner
requires the latter to render periodic reports to the Civil Governor,
whose functions have been inherited by the President, the petitioner
is, therefore, a government instrumentality.
This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all

corporations owe their very existence and powers to the State, the
reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of whatever
nature, whether they are public, quasi-public, or private
corporationsas creatures of the State, there is a reserved right in the
legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to determine
whether it acted within its powers. In other words, the reportorial
requirement is the principal means by which the State may see to it
that its creature acted according to the powers and functions
conferred upon it. These principles were extensively discussed
in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission
on Good Government.[26] Here, the Court, in holding that the subject
corporation could not invoke the right against self-incrimination
whenever the State demanded the production of its corporate books
and papers, extensively discussed the purpose of reportorial
requirements, viz:

x x x The corporation is a creature of the state. It is
presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public.
It received certain special privileges and franchises, and
holds them subject to the laws of the state and the
limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can
make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to
act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it
obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserve[d] right in
the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out
whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange
anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a
corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in
the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises
had been employed, and whether they had been abused,
and demand the production of the corporate books and
papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to this, that
an officer of the corporation which is charged with a
criminal violation of the statute may plead the criminality
of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To
state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may
lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless
protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a
corporation vested with special privileges and franchises
may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse
of such privileges. (Wilson v. United States, 55 Law Ed., 771,
780.)[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner is DECLARED a private

domestic corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The respondents are ENJOINED from

investigating, examining and auditing the petitioner's fiscal and
financial affairs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
January 18, 2016
G.R. No. 199440
MARY LOU GETURBOS TORRES, Petitioner,
vs.
CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON, in her capacity as Secretary General of
the Philippine National Red Cross and THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS of
the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, National
Headquarters,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review
on Certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated December
23, 2011 of petitioner Mary Lou Geturbos Torres seeking the reversal of
the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated June 30, 2011 that
affirmed Resolution No. 080691 dated April 2 l, 2008 and Resolution No.
081845 dated September 26, 2008, both of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) that imposed upon her the penalty of dismissal
from service as Chapter Administrator of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC), General Santos City Chapter for grave misconduct.
The facts follow.
When petitioner was the Chapter Administrator of the PNRC, General
Santos City Chapter, the PNRC Internal Auditing Office conducted an
audit of the funds and accounts of the PNRC, General Santos City
Chapter for the period November 6, 2002 to March 14, 2006, and
based on the audit report submitted to respondent Corazon Alma G.
De Leon (De Leon), petitioner incurred a "technical shortage" in the
amount of P4,306,574.23.

Hence, respondent De Leon in a Memorandum dated January 3,
2007, formally charged petitioner with Grave Misconduct for violating
PNRC Financial Policies on Oversubscription, Remittances and
Disbursement of Funds.
After the completion of the investigation of the case against
petitioner, respondent issued a Memorandum dated June 12, 2007
imposing upon petitioner the penalties of one month suspension
effective July 1-31, 2007 and transfer to the National Headquarters
effective August 1, 2007.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a
Memorandum dated June 28, 2007.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal addressed to the Board
of Governors of the PNRC through respondent and furnished a copy
thereof to the CSC. Petitioner addressed her appeal memorandum to
the CSC and sent copies thereof to the PNRC and the CSC.
Respondent, in a memorandum dated August 13, 2007, denied
petitioner's appeal.
The CSC, on April 21, 2008, promulgated a Resolution dismissing
petitioner's appeal and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal
from service. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the
CSC, but the same was denied.
Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA,
and in its assailed Decision dated June 30, 2011, the CA denied the
said petition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied on October 6, 2011.
Hence, the present petition with the following grounds relied upon:
GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC) HAS NO APPELLATE
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE;
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO REALIZE

THAT RESPONDENT DE LEON HAS NO INTENTION TO DISMISS
PETITIONER FROM THE SERVICE AND IT WAS SERIOUS ERROR ON
THE PART OF THE CSC TO MODIFY THE SAME OR TERMINATE
PETITIONER FROM THE SERVICE WITHOUT ANY AUTHORITY;
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE CSC HAS CONSTITUTIONAL

CONTROL OVER THE PNRC, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE CSC DID NOT ACQUIRE OR HAD LOST
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE; [and]
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

COMMENT (INITIATORY PLEADING) FILED BY THE KAPUNAN
LOTILLA FLORES GARCIA & CASTILLO LAW FIRM IN BEHALF OF
THE RESPONDENTS, DATED MARCH 31, 2009, IS NOT VERIFIED
NOR ACCOMPANIED BY A CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM
SHOPPING.
According to petitioner, this Court has decided that PNRC is not a

government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), hence, the
CSC has no jurisdiction or authority to review the appeal that she
herself filed. As such, she insists that the CSC committed grave abuse
of discretion in modifying the decision of respondent De Leon. She
further argues that the PNRC did not give due course to her notice of
appeal since petitioner's counsel erroneously addressed and filed her
notice of appeal to the office of respondent PNRC NHQ BOGs through
the office of respondent De Leon instead of filing it directly with the

CSC, and respondent De Leon denied due course to the notice of
appeal, thus, according to petitioner, there was no more appeal to
speak of. Petitioner also claims that she voluntarily served the
sentence of one month suspension and transfer of assignment before
her counsel erroneously filed the notice of appeal, hence, when the
notice of appeal was filed, the decision of respondent De Leon was
already final. Finally, petitioner asserts that the CA erred in not finding
that the comment filed by the law firm in behalf of the respondents,
dated March 31, 2009, violated the rules against forum shopping.
The petition lacks merit.
As ruled by this Court in Liban, et al. v. Gordon,3 the PNRC, although
not a GOCC, is sui generis in character, thus, requiring this Court to
approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
As discussed:
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none
like it not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public
service and official status accorded to it by the State and the
international community. There is merit in PNRC's contention that its
structure is sui generis.
xxxx
National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public
authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide
a range of services including disaster relief and health and social
programmes.
The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent
Societies (RCS) Position Paper, submitted by the PNRC, is instructive
with regard to the elements of the specific nature of the National
Societies such as the PNRC, to wit:

National Societies, such as the Philippine National Red Cross and its
sister Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, have certain specificities
deriving from the 1949 Geneva Convention and the Statutes of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the
Movement). They are also guided by the seven Fundamental
Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Humanity,
Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and
Universality.
A National Society partakes of a sui generis character. It is a protected
component of the Red Cross movement under Articles 24 and 26 of
the First Geneva Convention, especially in times of armed conflict.
These provisions require that the staff of a National Society shall be
respected and protected in all circumstances. Such protection is not
ordinarily afforded by an international treaty to ordinary private
entities or even non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This sui
generis character is also emphasized by the Fourth Geneva
Convention which holds that an Occupying Power cannot require
any change in the personnel or structure of a National Society.
National societies are therefore organizations that are directly
regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast to other
ordinary private entities, including NGOs.
xxxx
In addition, National Societies are not only officially recognized by
their public authorities as voluntary aid societies, auxiliary to the public
authorities in the humanitarian field, but also benefit from recognition
at the International level. This is considered to be an element
distinguishing National Societies from other organizations (mainly
NGOs) and other forms of humanitarian response.
x x x No other organization belongs to a world-wide Movement in
which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities

and duties in helping each other. This is considered to be the essence
of the Fundamental Principle of Universality.
Furthermore, the National Societies are considered to be auxiliaries to
the public authorities in the humanitarian field. x x x.
The auxiliary status of [a] Red Cross Society means that it is at one and
the same time a private institution and a public service organization
because the very nature of its work implies cooperation with the
authorities, a link with the State. In carrying out their major functions,
Red Cross Societies give their humanitarian support to official bodies,
in general having larger resources than the Societies, working towards
comparable ends in a given sector.
x x x No other organization has a duty to be its government's
humanitarian partner while remaining independent.
It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A.
No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its
enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution.
The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been
questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this
case before the Court now.
xxxx
By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just
like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost
sight of the PNRC's special status under international humanitarian law
and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging
its obligations under the Geneva Conventions. Although the PNRC is
called to be independent under its Fundamental Principles, it
interprets such independence as inclusive of its duty to be the
government's humanitarian partner. To be recognized in the

International Committee, the PNRC must have an autonomous status,
and carry out its humanitarian mission in a neutral and impartial
manner.
However, in accordance with the Fundamental Principle of Voluntary
Service of National Societies of the Movement, the PNRC must be
distinguished from private and profit-making entities. It is the main
characteristic of National Societies that they "are not inspired by the
desire for financial gain but by individual commitment and devotion
to a humanitarian purpose freely chosen or accepted as part of the
service that National Societies through its volunteers and/or members
render to the Community."
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement, can neither "be classified as an
instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality"
as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since
it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an
auxiliary of the State.
Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now
sufficiently established. Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of the government, nor a government-owned or -
controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained
in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so much so that respondent, under the
Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman
thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion
does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a "private corporation"
within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must
be organized under the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned
by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires
us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case
basis.4

In this particular case, the CA did not err in ruling that the CSC has
jurisdiction over the PNRC because the issue at hand is the
enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes, thus, in this particular
matter, the PNRC can be treated as a GOCC, and as such, it is within
the ambit of Rule I, Section 1 of the Implementing Rules of Republic
Act 67135, stating that:
Section 1. These Rules shall cover all officials and employees in the
government, elective and appointive, permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or non-career service, including military and
police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation,
regardless of amount.
Thus, having jurisdiction over the PNRC, the CSC had authority to
modify the penalty and order the dismissal of petitioner from the
service. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,6 as well as
decisions7 of this Court, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction on
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty
of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty (30) days salary. The CA, therefore, did not err when
it agreed with the CSC that the latter had appellate jurisdiction, thus:
The Court cites with approval the disquisition of the CSC in this regard:
The Commission is fully aware that under the Civil Service Law and
rules and jurisprudence, it has appellate jurisdiction only on
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty
of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty (30) days' salary.
In the instant case, although the decision appealed from states that
Torres was imposed the penalty of "one month" suspension from the
service, it is unequivocally spelled out therein that the period of her
suspension is from July 1-31, 2007." This specifically written period

unmistakably indicates that Torres was actually imposed the penalty
of thirty-one (31) days and not merely thirty (30) days or one (1)
month.1âwphi1
Petitioner submits that the actual duration of the period of her
suspension was only thirty (30) days since July 1, 2007 was a legal
holiday, it being a Sunday. This submission, however, is flawed
considering that she was imposed the penalty of "One Month
Suspension effective July 1-31, 2007" or for a period of thirty-one (31)
days.
Even granting that petitioner was imposed the penalty of suspension
for thirty (30) days only, it should be noted that she was also imposed
another penalty of "Transfer to the NHQ effective August 01, 2007."
Hence, the CSC would still have appellate jurisdiction.8
Neither can it be considered that the CSC had lost its appellate
jurisdiction because, as claimed by petitioner, she voluntarily served
the sentence of one month suspension and transfer of assignment
before her counsel filed the notice of appeal, hence, the decision of
the PNRC was already final even before a notice of appeal was filed
with the CSC. The CA was correct in finding that petitioner's appeal
was properly and timely made with the CSC under the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS). It ruled:
As enunciated in the cases cited by petitioner, a decision becomes
final even before the lapse of the fifteen-day period to appeal when
the defendant voluntarily submits to the execution of the sentence. In
the present case, however, it cannot be said that she voluntarily
served her penalty in view of the fact that she appealed therefrom.
Moreover, the service of the penalty is pursuant to Section 47 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS) which reads:

Section 47. Effect of filing. - An appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the
respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal, in the event he wins
the appeal.
Petitioner's claim that the Notice of Appeal and the Appeal
Memorandum were filed with the PNRC and not with the CSC
deserves scant consideration. Section 43 of the URACCS pertinently
provides:
Section 43. Filing of Appeals. -
xxx
A notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed
with the appellate authority, copy furnished the disciplining office. The
latter shall submit the records of the case, which shall be
systematically and chronologically arranged, paged and securely
bound to prevent loss, with its comment, within fifteen (15) days, to the
appellate authority.
An examination of the Notice of Appeal shows that the same was
addressed to the PNRC and copy furnished the CSC. On the other
hand, an examination of the Appeal Memorandum shows that the
same was addressed to the CSC and copies thereof were sent to both
the PNRC and the CSC. It is thus clear that a copy of the Notice of
Appeal was furnished the CSC and the Appeal Memorandum was
filed with it. While the rules required that the notice of appeal
including the appeal memorandum shall be filed with the CSC, it is
undeniable that furnishing a copy of the Notice of Appeal with the
CSC and filing with it the Appeal Memorandum substantially complied
with the rule. The important thing is that the Appeal Memorandum was
clearly addressed to the CSC.9

Anent the issue that respondents' Comment filed before the CA lacks
verification and a certificate of non-forum shopping, such is
inconsequential because a comment is not an initiatory pleading but
a responsive pleading. [T]he required certification against forum
shopping is intended to cover an "initiatory pleading," meaning an
"incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief."10 A
comment, required by an appellate tribunal, to a petition filed with it
is not a pleading but merely an expression of the views and
observations of the respondent for the purpose of giving the court
sufficient information as to whether the petition is legally proper as a
remedy to the acts complained of.11
Based on the above disquisitions, all other issues presented by
petitioner are rendered immaterial.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court dated December 23, 2011 of petitioner Mary Lou
Geturbos Torres is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated June 30, 2011, is therefore AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

En Banc
March 7, 2017
G.R. No. 197762
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD represented by CHAIRPERSON
BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MA. ANTHONETTE
VELASCO-ALLONES, and DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ARTURO M.
LACHICA, Petitioner
vs
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION represented by CHAIRMAN FRANCISCO
T. DUQUE III AND PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY
PERSIDA V. RUEDA-ACOSTA, DEPUTY CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEYS
MACAPANGCAT A. MAMA, SYLVESTRE A. MOSING, REGIONAL PUBLIC
ATTORNEYS CYNTHIA M. VARGAS, FRISCO F. DOMALSIN, TOMAS B.
PADILLA, RENATO T. CABRIDO, SALVADOR S. HIPOLITO, ELPIDIO C.
BACUYAG, DIOSDADO S. SAVELLANO, RAMON N. GOMEZ, MARIE G-
REE R. CALINAWAN, FLORENCIO M. DILOY, EDGARDO D. GONZALEZ,
NUNILA P. GARCIA, FRANCIS A. CALATRAVA, DATUMANONG A.
DUMAMBA, EDGAR Q. BALANSAG, PUBLIC ATTORNEY IV MARVIN R.
OSIAS, PUBLIC ATTORNEY IV HOWARD B. AREZA, PUBLIC ATTORNEY IV
IMELDA C. ALFORTE-GANANCIAL, Respondents
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
The dispute in this case concerns the classification of certain positions
in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).The Court is asked to determine,
in particular, whether these positions are properly included in the
Career Executive Service (CES); and whether the occupants of these
positions must obtain third-level eligibility to qualify for permanent
appointment. To resolve these questions, the Court must also
delineate the respective jurisdictions granted by law to the

competing authorities involved in this case - the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) and the Career Executive Service Board (CESB).
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,1 the CESB2 seeks the
reversal of the Decision3 and Resolution4 of the CSC declaring that
(a) it had the jurisdiction to resolve an appeal from a CESB
Resolution5 refusing to declassify certain positions in PAO; and (b) the
PAO positions involved in the appeal do not require third-level
eligibility.
The facts leading to the controversy are not in dispute.
On 24 September 2010, the PAO received a copy of the CESB Report
on the CES Occupancy of the Department of Justice (DOJ).6 This
document stated, among others, that out of 35 filled positions in the
PAO, 33 were occupied by persons without the required CES eligibility.
In response to the report, PAO Deputy Chief Public Attorney Silvestre
A. Mosing (Deputy Chief Mosing) sent a letter7 to CESB Executive
Director Maria Anthonette V. Allones. He informed her that the
positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, and
Regional Public Attorneys (subject positions) were already permanent
in nature pursuant to Section 68 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9406, which
accorded security of tenure to the occupants thereof.
A second letter dated 9 November 20109 was sent to the CESB by
Deputy Chief Mosing to reiterate its earlier communication. The letter
also contained supplementary arguments in support of the assertion
that the subject positions were permanent posts; hence, their
occupants may only be removed for cause provided by law. Based
on the foregoing premises, the PAO requested the deletion of its office
from the Data on CES Occupancy for the Department of Justice
(DOJ).

On 18 November 2010, the PAO received the reply sent to Deputy
Chief Mosing by the CESB, through Deputy Executive Director Arturo
M. Lachica.10 The latter informed Deputy Chief Mosing that the CESB
would conduct a position classification study on the specified PAO
positions to determine whether they may still be considered CES
positions in the DOJ.
The DOJ Legal Opinion
While the matter was pending, PAO Deputy Chief Mosing wrote a
letter to then DOJ Secretary Leila M. de Lima to inform her about the
communications sent by the PAO to the CESB.11 He also reiterated
the PAO's opinion that the subject positions must be considered
permanent in nature, and not subject to CES requirements.12
In a letter13 sent to Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta on
3 January 2011, Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Paras III elucidated the
legal opinion of the DOJ on the matter:
Based on the foregoing, your claim that the appointments of the top-
level officials of the PAO are permanent is without merit. For one, the
positions of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney
and Regional Public Attorneys are part of the CES. xxx
xxxx
Secondly, since the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief

Public Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys are
occupying CES positions, it is required by law that they should
be CES eligibles to become permanent appointees to the
said position. x x x.
xxxx
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the appointments

of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys
and Regional Public Attorneys are not permanent, despite

your claims to the contrary, considering that they do not
possess the required CES eligibility for the said positions. As
such, they cannot invoke their right to security of tenure even
if it was expressly guaranteed to them by the PAO Law.
xxxx
Considering that the appointments of the Chief Public

Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and Regional Public
Attorneys are temporary, they are required to subsequently
take the CES examination. In the absence of any evidence
that would show compliance with the said condition, it is
presumed that the top-level officials of the PAO are non-CES
eligibles; therefore they may be removed from office by the
appointing authority without violating their constitutional and
statutory rights to security of tenure.14
The DOJ also noted that the permanent nature of an appointment

does not automatically translate to an exemption from CES coverage,
as it is only the CESB that has the authority to exempt certain positions
from CES requirements.15 The DOJ further rejected the claim that the
occupants of the subject positions were exercising quasi-judicial
functions. It explained that while the lawyers of the PAO regularly
conduct mediation, conciliation or arbitration of disputes, their
functions do not entail the rendition of judgments or decisions - an
essential element of the exercise of quasi-judicial functions.16
The CSC Legal Opinion
It appears that while waiting for the CESB to respond to its letters, the
PAO wrote to the CSC to request a legal opinion on the same
matter.17 The PAO thereafter informed the CESB of the former's
decision to seek the opinion and requested the latter to issue no
further opinion or statement, oral or written, relative to the
qualifications of the PAO officials.18

On 7 January 2011, the CSC issued the requested legal
opinion.19 Citing its mandate as an independent constitutional
commission and its authority under the Administrative Code to "render
opinions and rulings on all personnel and other civil service matters,"
the CSC declared that third-level eligibility is not required for the
subject positions in the PAO:
The law is explicit that the positions [of] Chief Public Attorney, Deputy
Chief Public Attorney and Regional Public Attorney in PAO shall have
the same qualifications for appointment, among other things, as those
of the Chief State Prosecutor, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and
Regional State Prosecutor, respectively. These, of course include, the
eligibility requirement for these positions. x x x.
xxxx
The Prosecution Service Act of 2010 explicitly provides that

the Prosecutor General (the retitled position of Chief State
Prosecutor) has the same qualifications for appointment,
among other things, as those of the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals (CA). Further, the Senior Deputy State
Prosecutor and the Regional Prosecutor have the same
qualifications as those of an associate justice of the CA. x x x.
xxxx
No less than the Constitution provides that justices and judges

in the judiciary are required, among other things, practice of
law as requirement for appointment thereto. Pointedly, the
Presiding Justice and the Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals (CA) have the same qualifications as those provided
for in the Constitution for Justices of the Supreme Court[,]
which includes, among other requirements, practice of law.
This means that the Constitution and the Civil Service Law
prescribe RA 1080 (BAR) as the appropriate civil service
eligibility therefor. Accordingly, any imposition of a third-level
eligibility (e.g. CESE, CSEE) is not proper, if not, illegal under

the circumstances. In fact, even in the 1997 Qualification
Standards Manual of the Commission, all of these positions
require RA 1080 BAR eligibility for purposes of appointment.
xxxx
Thus, it is the Commission's op1mon that for purposes of

permanent appointment to the positions of Chief Public
Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney and Regional Public
Attorney, no thirdlevel eligibility is required but only RA 1080
(BAR) civil service eligibility.20
CESB Resolution No. 918

On 12 January 2011, the CESB issued Resolution No. 91821 (CESB
Resolution No, 918) denying the PAO's request to declassify the
subject positions. Citing the Position Classification Study22 submitted
by its secretariat, the CESB noted that the positions in question "require
leadership and managerial competence"23 and were thus part of the
CES. Hence, the appointment of persons without third-level eligibility
for these posts cannot be considered permanent. The CESB
explained:
WHEREAS, pursuant to its mandate to identify positions of equivalent
rank as CES positions, the Secretariat revisited its previous classification
as part of the CES [ ofj the above positions of PAO and conducted a
position classification of the above positions and arrived at the
following findings:
1. The positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy

Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public Attorneys
and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys who are all
presidential appointees fall within the criteria set
under CESB Resolution No. 299, s. 2009, namely:
a. The position is a career position;
b. The position is above division chief level;

c. The duties and responsibilities of the position
require the performance of executive or managerial
functions.
2. While Section 3 of Republic Act 9406 which

provides that:
SEC. 3. A new Section 14-A, is hereby

inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
the "Administrative Code of 1987", to read as
follows:
"SEC. 14-A Powers and Functions. - The PAO

shall independently discharge its mandate
to render, free of charge, legal
representation, assistance, and counselling
to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
administrative and other quasi-judicial
cases. In the exigency of the service, the
PAO may be called upon by proper
government authorities to render such
service to other persons, subject to existing
laws, rules and regulations."
The aforecited provision does not limit the mandate

of PAO to perform only non-executive functions. All
that the aforecited provision states is that the PAO is
mandated to render legal representation, assistance
and counseling to indigent persons in criminal, civil,
labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases,
free of charge. Notably, the positions of Chief Public
Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney, Regional
Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public
Attorneys evidently require leadership and
managerial competence.
xxxx

WHEREAS, it is undisputed that the subject pos1t10ns are CES
in nature and as such, the eligibility requirement for
appointment thereto is CES eligibility.
With regard to the question of its jurisdiction over the matter as against
that of the CSC, the CESB stated:
WHEREAS, under Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292, it is the Board
which has the mandate over Third-level positions in the Career Service
and not the CSC. Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292 provides:
Section 8. Classes of Positions in the Civil Service. - (l)

Classes of positions in the career service,
appointment to which requires examinations shall be
grouped into three major levels as follows:
xxxx
(c) The third-level shall cover positions in the

Career Executive Service.
(2) x x x Entrance to the third-level shall be prescribed

by the Career Executive Service Board.
WHEREAS, in the case of De Jesus v. People, G.R. No. 61998,

February 22, 1983, 120 SCRA 760, the Supreme Court ruled
that "where there are two acts, one of which is special and
particular and the other general which, if standing alone,
would include the same matter and thus conflict with the
special act, the special must prevail since it evinces the
legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute
and must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to
the general act."
WHEREAS, following the above-cited rule, it is clear that

Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292 is the exception to
[the] general act pertaining to the authority of the CSC;
xxxx

WHEREAS, it is clear that the mandate of the Board is in
accordance with existing laws and pertinent jurisprudence
on matters pertaining to the CES[.]24
Aggrieved by the CESB Resolution, the PAO filed a Verified Notice of

Appeal25 and an Urgent Notice of Appeal26with the CSC.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CSC
Before the CSC, the PAO assailed CESB Resolution No. 918 on the
following grounds: (a) the resolution was rendered contrary to R.A.
9406 in relation to R.A. 10071,27 the 1987 Constitution and the CSC
letter-opinion; and (b) the CESB usurped the legislative function of
Congress when the former required additional qualifications for
appointment to certain PAO positions. The PAO likewise asserted that
its appeal had been brought to the CSC, because the latter had the
power to review decisions and actions of one of its attached agencies
- the CESB.
In an Order28 dated 17 January 2011, the CSC directed the CESB to
comment on the appeal.
Instead of submitting a comment, however, the CESB filed a Motion
for Clarification29 to assail the authority of the CSC to review its
Decision. It asserted that the CSC had no jurisdiction to decide the
appeal given that (a) the appeal involved a controversy between
two government entities regarding questions of law;30 and (b) the
CESB was an autonomous agency whose actions were appealable
to the Office of the President.31 In addition, the CESB emphasized the
inability of the CSC to render an unbiased ruling on the case,
considering the latter's previous legal opinion on the appropriate
eligibility for key positions in the PA0.32
In a Decision33 dated 15 February 2011, the CSC granted the appeal
and reversed CESB Resolution No. 918.

As a preliminary matter, the CSC ruled that it could assume jurisdiction
over the appeal, which involved the employment status and
qualification standards of employees belonging to the civil service. It
was supposedly a matter falling within its broad and plenary authority
under the Constitution and the Administrative Code. The CSC also
declared that the authority of the CESB over third-level employees
was limited to the imposition of entry requirements and "should not be
interpreted as cutting off the reach of the Commission over this
particular class of positions."34 Moreover, the CESB was declared
subject to the revisory power of the CSC, given that an attached
office is not entirely and totally insulated from its mother
agency.35 With respect to the provision in the Integrated
Reorganization Plan36 on appeals from the CESB to the Office of the
President, the CSC construed this requirement as pertaining only to
disciplinary proceedings.37
On the merits, the CSC ruled in favor of the PAO officials. It declared
that the CESB would be in violation of R.A. 9406 if the latter would
require an additional qualification - in this case, third-level eligibility -
for purposes of permanent appointments to certain PAO positions:
The foregoing elaboration shows the qualifications of the subject PAO
positions under the existing laws. It is gleaned that nowhere in these
laws is there a reference to third-level eligibility and CESO rank as
qualification requirements for attaining tenurial security. All that the
laws uniformly prescribe for the positions in question is practice of law
for certain period of time, which presupposes a bar license. This being
the case, the CESB cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
the policies of the third-level, validly impose qualifications in addition
to what the laws prescribe. It cannot add another layer of
qualification requirement which is not otherwise specified in the
statutes. As an administrative agency, the CESB can only promulgate
rules and regulations which must be consistent with and in harmony
with the provisions of the laws, and it cannot add or subtract thereto.
Most evidently, therefore, in promulgating the assailed resolution,

which sets out additional qualifications for the subject positions in the
PAO, the CESB has overstepped the bounds of its authority. x x x.
In so saying, the Commission does not lose sight of the power

of the CESB to identify other positions equivalent to those
enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987 as being part
of the third-level or CES for as long as they come within the
ambit of the appointing prerogative of the President. Yet,
such grant of authority is derived from a general law (the
Administrative Code) and hence, it must be deemed
circumscribed or qualified by the special law governing the
PAO. Reiteratively, the PAO Law, in conjunction with other
laws, merely fixes practice of law as the principal qualification
requirement for the positions of Acosta, et al.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant

appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the CESB Resolution
No. 918 dated Jnaury 12, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
not being in conformity with law and jurisprudence. It is
declared that the following key positions in the Public
Attorney's Office do not require third-level eligibility and CESO
rank for purposes of tenurial security:
1. Chief Public Attorney;
2. Deputy Chief Public Attorneys;
3. Regional Public Attorneys; and
4. Assistant Regional Public Attorneys.38
The CESB sought reconsideration of the Decision, but its motion was
denied.39
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
On 9 August 2011, the CESB filed the instant Petition40 imputing grave
abuse of discretion to respondent CSC. It asserts that (a) the CSC has
no jurisdiction to review the Resolution of the CESB, given the latter's

autonomy as an attached agency; (b) CESB Resolution No. 918 should
have been appealed to the Office of the President, and not to the
CSC, in accordance with Article IV, Part III of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan. The subject PAO positions are supposedly part of
the CES, based on criteria established by the CESB.41 These criteria
were set pursuant to the latter's power to identify positions belonging
to the third-level of the civil service and to prescribe the requirements
for entry thereto. The Petition further reiterates the alleged inability of
the CSC to decide the case with impartiality.
In its Comment,42 the CSC contends that the Petition filed by the CESB
before this Court should be dismissed outright for being an improper
remedy and for violating the hierarchy of courts. The CSC further
asserts its jurisdiction over the PAO's appeal from the CESB Resolution
in this case. Citing its mandate as the central personnel agency of the
government based on the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative
Code, the CSC insists that it has broad authority to administer and
enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system
for all levels and ranks of the civil service. This authority allegedly
encompasses the power to review and revise the decisions and
actions of offices attached to it, such as the CESB. It also claims that
the present dispute involves a personnel action that is within its
jurisdiction.
Respondents PAO and its officials have also filed their own
Comment43 on the Petition. They assert that (a) the Petition should be
dismissed outright as it is tainted with serious procedural and
jurisdictional flaws; (b) the CSC properly exercised its jurisdiction when
it resolved the appeal in this case; and (c) CESB Resolution No. 918
contravened R.A. 9406 in relation to the 1987 Constitution, R.A. 10071
and the CSC letteropinion dated 7 January 2011.

Because the instant case involves the contradictory views of two
government offices, the Court likewise required the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the matter as the lawyer of
the government tasked to uphold the best interest of the latter.
On 28 February 2012, the OSG filed the required Comment.44 On the
issue of jurisdiction, it supports the view of the CSC and the PAO. It
cites the Constitution and the Administrative Code as the sources of
the authority of the CSC to review rulings of the CESB, particularly with
regard to personnel matters such as the reclassification of positions.
As to the merits of the case, the OSG asserts that the subject positions
in the PAO should be declassified from the CES. It points out that the
primary function of these PAO officials -- the provision of legal
assistance to the indigent - is specialized in nature; in contrast, their
managerial functions are merely incidental to their role. The OSG
further contends that the manifest intent of the law is to require PAO
officials to have the same qualifications as their counterpmis in the
National Prosecution Service (NPS). Consequently, the OSG argued
that the decision of the CESB to declassify certain posts in the NPS
should have likewise resulted in the declassification of the
corresponding positions in the PAO.
In its Reply to the Comment of the OSG,45 the CESB urges the Court
to adhere to the alleged limitations on the general authority of the
CSC over all matters concerning the civil service. In particular, the
CESB asserts its specific and exclusive mandate to administer all
matters pertaining to the third-level of the career service. Included in
these matters is the power to promulgate rules, standards and
procedures for the selection, classification, compensation and career
development of its members. Moreover, the CESB insists that it is an
agency within the Executive Department under the Integrated
Reorganization Plan; hence, its decisions are appealable only to the

Office of the President. Lastly, the CESB maintains that the subject
positions properly belong to the CES, considering that executive and
managerial functions must be exercised by the occupants thereof.
ISSUES
The following issues are presented for resolution:
(1) Whether a petition for certiorari and prohibition was the

proper remedy to question the assailed CSC Decision and
Resolution
(2) Whether the CSC had the jurisdiction to resolve the

appeal filed by the PAO and to reverse CESB Resolution No.
918
(3) Whether the CSC acted in accordance with law when it

reversed the CESB and declared that third-level eligibility is
not required for occupants of the subject PAO positions
OUR RULING
We DENY the Petition.
At the outset, we note that the CESB availed itself of an improper
remedy to challenge the ruling of the CSC. In any event, after a
judicious consideration of the case, we find that the CSC acted within
its jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO's appeal and reversed CESB
Resolution No. 918. The CSC also correctly ruled that third-level
eligibility is not required for the subject positions.
A petition for certiorari and prohibitinn is
not the appropriate remedy to challenge
the ruling of the CSC.
As a preliminary matter, this Court must address the objections of
respondents to the remedy availed of by the CESB to question the
ruling of the CSC.

Respondents contend that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by the CESB before this Court was improper, because the remedy
of appeal was available via a petition for review under Rule 43. On
the other hand, the CESB insists that a Rule 65 petition is proper,
because it is disputing the authority and jurisdiction of the CSC.
We find in favor of respondents.
It is settled that a resort to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and
prohibition is proper only in cases where (a) a tribunal, a board or an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Rule 65
of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the concurrence of both these
requisites:
Section l. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.1âwphi1
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy

of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of
all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided
in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of

any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are

without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
he rendered commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein,
or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true

copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule
46. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the second requirement is plainly absent. As respondents

correctly observed, there was an appeal available to the CESB in the
form of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 1 of Rule 43 specifically provides for appeals from
decisions of the CSC:
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or
final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments,
final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies
are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission,
Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission,
Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission,

Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.
xxxx
Section 5. How appeal taken. - Appeal shall be taken by filing

a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with
the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof
on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The
original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals
shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.
Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the
clerk of court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and
other lawful fees and deposit the sum of ₱500.00 for costs.
Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees
and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of
Appeals upon a verified motion setting forth valid grounds
therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the
petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and
deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
denial. (Emphasis supplied)
In an attempt to justify its resort to certiorari and prohibition under Rule

65, the CESB asserts that the allegations in its Petition - the patent
illegality of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CSC, as well as
the lack of jurisdiction and the grave abuse of discretion attending
the latter's ruling - are not suitable for an appeal under Rule 43. It
argues that since these grounds properly pertain to a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, this remedy is more appropriate.
We find the CESB's contention untenable. As previously
stated, certiorari and prohibition are proper only if both requirements
are present, that is, if the appropriate grounds are invoked; and an
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is unavailable.

Mere reference to a ground under Rule 65 is not sufficient. This Court
has, in fact, dismissed a Petition for Certiorari assailing another CSC
Resolution precisely on this ground. In Mahinay v. Court of
Appeals,46 the Court ruled:
As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper mode of
appeal from the decision of a quasi-judicial agency, like the CSC, is a
petition for review filed with the CA.
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court may be resorted to only when any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, petitioner clearly had the remedy of appeal

provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Madrigal Tran.\port,
Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation held:
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party,

the action for certiorari will not be entertained.
Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review)
and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative
or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be
a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own
negligence or error in one's choice of remedy
occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites
of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if
the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Here, the CESB could have appealed the CSC Decision and
Resolution to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. Hence,

the filing of the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is improper
regardless of the grounds invoked therein.
Moreover, we find no reason to allow the CESB to avail itself of the
extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition. Indeed, the
petition itself cites no exceptional circumstance47 other than the
supposed transcendental importance of the issues raised, "as the
assailed CSC Decision is gravely prejudicial to the mandate of the
Petitioner." Even when confronted by respondents with regard to the
availability of an appeal, the CESB still failed to cite any special
justification for its refusal to avail itself of an appeal. Instead, it opted
to focus on the nature of the grounds asserted in its Petition. For the
reasons stated above, a mere reference to grave abuse of discretion
cannot justify a resort to a petition under Rule 65.
Considering the failure of the CESB to offer a compelling explanation
for its insistence upon the special remedies of certiorari and
prohibition, the Court finds no justification for a liberal application of
the rules.
In any event, the contentions of the CESB are without merit. As will be
further explained, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the CSC. In resolving the appeal filed by the PAO, the CSC merely
exercised the authority granted to it by the Constitution as the central
personnel agency of the government.
The CSC acted within its }urisdiction
when it resolved the PAO's appeal and
reversed CESB Resolution No. 918.
At its core, this case requires the Court to delineate the respective
authorities granted by law to two agencies involved in the
management of government personnel - the CSC and the CESB. This
particular dispute involves not only the jurisdiction of each office over

personnel belonging to the third-level of the civil service, but also the
relationship between the two offices.
On the one hand, the CESB asserts its jurisdiction over members of the
CES. Specifically, it refers to the identification and classification of
positions belonging to the third-level, as well as the establishment of
the qualifications for appointment to those posts. The CESB further
emphasizes its autonomy from the CSC on the basis of this Court's
ruling that its status as an attached agency only pertains to policy and
program coordination.
The CSC, on the other hand, defends its authority to review actions
and decisions of its attached agencies, including the CESB. The CSC
further claims original and appellate jurisdiction over administrative
cases involving contested appointments, pursuant to its constitutional
mandate as the central personnel agency of the government.
In the interest of the effective and efficient organization of the civil
service, this Court must ensure that the respective powers and
functions of the CSC and the CESB are well-defined. After analyzing
and harmonizing the legal provisions pertaining to each of these two
agencies, the Court concludes that the CSC has the authority to
review CESB Resolution No. 918. We have arrived at this conclusion
after a consideration of (a) the broad mandate of the CSC under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code; and (b) the specific and
narrowly tailored powers granted to the CESB in the Integrated
Reorganization Plan and the Administrative Code.
As the central personnel agency of the
government, the CSC has broad authority
to pass upon all civil service matters.
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution entrusts to the CSC48 the
administration of the civil service, which is comprised of "all branches,

subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters."49 In particular, Section 3 of Article IX-B provides for the
mandate of this independent constitutional commission:
SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel
agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It
shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an
annual report on its personnel programs. (Emphases supplied)
The proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveal the

intention to emphasize the status of the CSC as the "central personnel
agency of the Government with all powers and functions inherent in
and incidental to human resources management."50 As a matter of
fact, the original proposed provision on the functions of the CSC
reads:
Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency
of the government. shall establish a career service, promulgate and
enforce policies on personnel actions, classif[y] positions, prescribe
conditions of employment except as to compensation and other
monetary benefits which shall be provided by law, and exercise alt
powers and functions inherent in and incidental to human resources
management, to promote morale, efficiency, and integrity in the Civil
Service. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an aimual
report on its personnel programs, and perform such other functions as
may be provided by law.51 (Emphases supplied)
Although the specific powers of the CSC are not enumerated in the
final version of 1987 Constitution,52 it is evident from the deliberations
of the framers that the concept of a "central personnel agency" was

considered all-encompassing. The concept was understood to be
sufficiently broad as to include the authority to promulgate and
enforce policies on personnel actions, to classify positions, and to
exercise all powers and functions inherent in and incidental to human
resources management:
MR. FOZ. Will the amendment reduce the powers and functions of the
Civil Service as embodied in our original draft?
MS. AQUINO: No, it will not. The proposed deletion of lines 35

to 40 of page 2 until line 1 of page 3 would not in any way
minimize the powers of the Civil Service (Commission]
because they are deemed implicitly included in the all-
embracing definition and concept of "central personnel
agency of the government." I believe that the lines we have
mentioned are but redundant articulation of that same
concept, unnecessary surplusage.
MR. FOZ. For instance, will the power or function to

promulgate policies on personnel actions be encompassed
by the Commissioner's amendment?
MS. AQUINO. It is not an amendment because I am retaining

lines 33 to 35. I proposed an amendment after the words
"career service.'' I am only doing away with unnecessary
redundancy.
MR. FOZ. Can we say that all of the powers enumerated in

the original provision are still being granted by the Civil
Service Commission despite the elimination of the listing of
these powers and functions?
MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, in the nature of a

central personnel agency, it would have to necessarily
execute all of these functions.

MR. FOZ. And will the elimination of all these specific functions
be a source of ambiguity and controversies later on as to the
extent of the powers and functions of the commission?
MS. AQUINO. I submit that this would not be susceptible of

ambiguity because the concept of a central personnel
agency is a generally accepted concept and as experience
would bear out, this function is actually being carried out
already by the Civil Service Commission, except that we are
integrating this concept. I do not think that it would be
susceptible of any ambiguity.
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas). Yes, Commissioner

Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. This is more for clarification.
The original Section 3 states, among others, the functions of

the Civil Service Commission - to promulgate and enforce
policies on personnel actions. Will Commissioner Aquino
kindly indicate to us the corresponding provisions and her
proposed amendment which would encompass the powers
to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions?
MS. AQUINO. It is my submission that the same functions are

already subsumed under the concept of a central personnel
agency.
MR. REGALADO. In other words, all those functions

enumerated from line 35 on page 2 to line I of page 3
inclusive, are understood to be encompassed in the phrase
"central personnel agency of the government."
MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, except that on line 40

of page 2 and line 1 of the subsequent page, it was only
subjected to a little modification.

MR. REGALADO. May we, therefore, make it of record that
the phrase"... promulgate and enforce policies on personnel
actions, classify positions, prescribe conditions of
employment except as to compensation and other
monetary benefits which shall be provided by law" is
understood to be subsumed under and included in the
concept of a central personnel agency.
MS. AQUINO. I would have no objection to that.53 (Emphases

and underscoring supplied)
In accordance with the foregoing deliberations, the mandate of the

CSC should therefore be read as the comprehensive authority to
perform all functions necessary to ensure the efficient administration
of the entire civil service, including the CES.
The Administrative Code of 1987 further reinforces this view. Book V,
Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12 thereof enumerates the specific
powers and functions of the CSC while recognizing its comprehensive
authority over all civil service matters. Section 12, Items (1) to (5), (11),
(14), and (19), are of particular relevance to this dispute:
SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.-The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and

statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels
and ranks in the Civil Service;
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and

regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of
the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for

the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to
promote economical, efficient and effective
personnel administration in the government;

(4) Formulate policies and regulations for the
administration, maintenance and implementation of
position classification and compensation and set
standards for the establishment, allocation and
reallocation of pay scales, classes and positions;
(5) Render opinion and rulings on all personnel and

other Civil Service matters which shall be binding on
all heads of departments, offices and agencies and
which may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari;
xxxx
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted

by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and review
decisions and actions of its offices and of the
agencies attached to it. Officials and employees
who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or
rulings shall be liable for contempt of the
Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be
final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings
may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30)
days from receipt of a copy thereof;
xxxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments

and other personnel matters in the Civil Service
including extension of Service beyond retirement
age;
xxxx

(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a
central personnel agency and such other functions
as may be provided by law.
It is evident from the foregoing constitutional and statutory

provisions that the CSC, as the central personnel agency of
the government, has been granted the broad authority and
the specific powers to pass upon all civil service matters. The
question before the Court today is whether this broad
authority encompasses matters pertaining to the CES and
are, as such, recognized to be within the jurisdiction of the
CESB.
To allow us to understand the legal framework governing the

two agencies and to harmonize the provisions of law, it is now
necessary for the Court to examine the history and the
mandate of the CESB. It may thereby determine the proper
relation between the CSC and the CESB.
The CESB has been granted specific and limited powers

under the law.
On 9 September 1968, Congress enacted R.A. 5435

authorizing the President to reorganize different executive
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the government. The statute also created
a Commission on Reorganization with the mandate to study
and investigate the status of all offices in the executive
branch. This commission was also tasked to submit an
integrated reorganization plan to the President, and later on
to Congress, for approval. The Commission was given until 31
December 1970 to present its plan to the President.54
After the conduct of hearings and intensive studies, a

proposed Integrated Reorganization Plan55 was submitted to
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 31 December 1970.
The plan included a proposal to develop a professionalized
and competent civil service through the establishment of the

CES - a group of senior administrators carefully selected for
managerial posts in the higher levels.56 To promulgate
standards for the CES, the Commission on Reorganization
recommended the creation of the CESB:
To promulgate standards, rules and procedures

regarding the selection, classification, compensation
and career development of members of the Career
Executive Service, a Board is proposed to be
established. The Board shall be composed of high-
level officials to provide a government-wide view
and to ensure effective support for the establishment
and development of a corps of highly competent,
professional administrators.57
The plan was referred to a presidential commission for review,

but Martial Law was declared before the proposal could be
acted upon. Four days after the declaration of Martial Law,
however, the Integrated Reorganization Plan was approved
by former President Marcos through Presidential Decree No.
1.58This approved plan included the creation of the CES and
the CESB.
The CES was created to "form a continuing pool of well-

selected and development-oriented career administrators
who shall provide competent and faithful service."59 The
CESB was likewise established to serve as the governing body
of the CES60 with the following functions: (a) to promulgate
rules, standards and procedures for the selection,
classification, compensation and career development of
members of the CES;61 (b) to set up the organization and
operation of the civil service in accordance with the
guidelines provided in the plan;62 (c) to prepare a program
of training and career development for members of the
CES;63 (d) to investigate and adjudicate administrative
complaints against members of the CES.64

When the Administrative Code was enacted in 1987, the
CESB was given the additional authority to (a) identify other
officers belonging to the CES in keeping with the conditions
imposed by law;65 and (b) prescribe requirements for
entrance to the third-level.66
Based on the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the powers

granted to the CESB are specific and limited. This Court must
now determine whether it is possible to interpret these powers
in harmony with the broad constitutional mandate of the
CSC.
The specific powers of the CESB must be

narrowly interpreted as exceptions to the
comprehensive authority granted to the
CSC by the Constitution and relevant
statutes.
As we have earlier observed, the interplay between the

broad mandate of the CSC and the specific authority
granted to the CESB is at the root of this controversy. The
question we must resolve, in particular, is whether the CSC
had the authority to review and ultimately reverse CESB
Resolution No. 918, upon the appeal of the PAO.
For its part, the CESB contends that the Integrated

Reorganization Plan and the Administrative Code have
granted it the exclusive authority to identify the positions
belonging to the third-level of the civil service and to
prescribe the eligibility requirements for appointments
thereto.67 It thus asserts that the foregoing matters are
beyond the revisory jurisdiction of the CSC, and must instead
be appealed to the Office of the President in accordance
with the specific provisions of the aforementioned laws. This
special mandate must allegedly prevail over the general
authority granted to the CSC.

As to its status as an attached agency, the CESB cites this
Court's pronouncement in Eugenio v. CSC68on its autonomy
from its mother agency. The CESB contends that its
attachment to the CSC is only for the purpose of "policy and
program coordination."69 Allegedly, this attachment does
not mean that the former's decisions, particularly CESB
Resolution No. 918, are subject to the CSC's review.
On the other hand, the CSC asserts its jurisdiction to act upon
the appeal from CESB Resolution No. 918 by virtue of its status
as the central personnel agency of the government. It
contends that the CESB 's authority to prescribe entrance
requirements for the third-level of the civil service does not
mean that the CSC no longer has jurisdiction over that class
of positions. It also points out that the case involves a
personnel action that is within the jurisdiction conferred upon
it by law.
We uphold the position of the CSC.
It is a basic principle in statutory construction that statutes

must be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and
other laws.70 In this case, the specific powers of the CESB over
members of the CES must be interpreted in a manner that
takes into account the comprehensive mandate of the CSC
under the Constitution and other statutes.
The present case involves the classification of positions

belonging to the CES and the qualifications for these posts.
These are matters clearly within the scope of the powers
granted to the CESB under the Administrative Code and the
Integrated Reorganization Plan. However, this fact alone
does not push the matter beyond the reach of the CSC.
As previously discussed, the CSC, as the central personnel

agency of the government, is given the comprehensive
mandate to administer the civil service under Article IX-B,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution; and Section 12, Items (4),

(5), and (14) of the Administrative Code. It has also been
expressly granted the power to promulgate policies,
standards, and guidelines for the civil service; and to render
opinions and rulings on all personne1 and other civilservice
matters.71
Here, the question of whether the subject PAO positions

belong to the CES is clearly a civil service matter falling within
the comprehensive jurisdiction of the CSC. Further,
considering the repercussions of the issue concerning the
appointments of those occupying the posts in question, the
jurisdiction of the CSC over personnel actions is implicated.
It must likewise be emphasized that the CSC has been

granted the authority to review the decisions of agencies
attached to it under Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title
I, Book V of the Administrative Code:
SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.--The Commission

shall have the following powers and functions:
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases

instituted by or brought before it directly or
on appeal, including contested
appointments, and review decisions and
actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. Officials and employees who
fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or
rulings shall be liable for contempt of the
Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings
shall be final and executory. Such decisions,
orders, or rulings may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from
receipt of a copy thereof;

Since the CESB is an attached agency of the CSC,72 the
former's decisions are expressly subject to the CSC's review on
appeal.
Against the express mandate given to the CSC in the

foregoing provision, the contention of the CESB that its
decisions may only be appealed to the Office of the
President must fail. We note that the supporting
provision73 cited by the CESB in support of its argument refers
only to administrative cases involving the discipline of
members of the CES:
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and

procedures on the selection, classification,
compensation and career development of
members of the Career Executive Service. The Board
shall set up the organization and operation of the
Service in accordance with the following guidelines:
xxxx
h. Discipline. Investigation and adjudication

of administrative complaints against
members of the Career Executive Service
shall be governed by Article VI, Chapter II
and Paragraph I (d) of Article II, Chapter III
of this Part; provided that appeals shall be
made to the Career Executive Service Board
instead of the Civil Service Commission.
Administrative cases involving members of
the Service on assignment with the Board
shall be investigated and adjudicated by
the Board with the right to appeal to the
Office of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
In our view, the foregoing rule on appeals to the Office of the

President only covers disciplinary cases involving members of
the CES. It is evident that this special rule was created for that

particular type of case, because members of the CES arc all
presidential appointees. Given that the power to appoint
generally carries with it the power to discipline,74 it is only
reasonable for the president to be given the ultimate
authority to discipline presidential appointees. But this special
rule cannot apply to the matter at hand, because CESB
Resolution No. 918 did not involve a disciplinary case. Since it
was clearly outside the scope of the foregoing provision, the
Resolution did not come within the jurisdiction of the Office of
the President. It was therefore correctly appealed to the CSC.
From the above discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted

within its jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO's appeal. The
arguments of the CESB on this point must perforce be
rejected.
The CSC correctly ruled that third level

eligibility is not required for the subject
positions.
The Court now comes to the final issue for resolution - whether
the CSC ruled in accordance with law when the latter
declared that it was not necessary for occupants of the
subject PAO posts to possess third-level eligibility.
On this point, the CESB argues that third-level eligibility is

required for the positions pursuant to R.A. 9406 in relation to
R.A. 10071. It avers that R.A. 9406 requires the Chief Public
Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public
Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys to have the
same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries,
allowances and retirement privileges as the Chief State
Prosecutor, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, Regional State
Prosecutor and Assistant Regional State Prosecutor of the NPS
under P.D. 1275. The latter law is the old one that governs the
NPS and requires third-level eligibility for senior prosecutorial
posts. According to the CESB, R.A. 10071 cannot apply,
because R.A. 9406 could not have referred to a law that had

not yet been enacted at the time. It also asserts that the
subsequent declassification of prosecutors cannot benefit
members of the PAO, because the prosecutors exercise
quasi-judicial functions while the PAO members do not.
On the other hand, the CSC argues that nowhere in R.A. 9406,
P.D. 1275, R.A. 10071 or Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129 is there
a reference to third-level eligibility and CESO rank as
qualification requirements. It emphasizes that the CESB
cannot add to the provisions of these laws, which only require
the practice of law for a certain period of time and
presuppose a bar license. The PAO, for its part, maintains that
the posts concerned are highly technical in nature because
they primarily involve legal practice, and any managerial
functions performed are merely incidental to their principal
roles. It also claims that the legislature could never have
intended to require third-level eligibility for occupants of the
subject posts when it enacted R.A. 9406.
After a careful consideration of the relevant statutes and

rules, this Court agrees with the conclusion of the CSC. To
require the occupants of the subject PAO positions to possess
third-level eligibility would be to amend the law and defeat
its spirit and intent.
The CESB effectively amended the

law when it required the occupants
of the subject PAO positions to
obtain third-level eligibility.
The authority to prescribe qualifications for pos1t10ns in the

government is lodged in Congress75 as part of its plenary
legislative power to create, abolish and modify public offices
to meet societal demands.76 From this authority emanates
the right to change the qualifications for existing statutory
offices.77

It was in the exercise of this power that the legislature
enacted Section 5 of R.A. 9406, which provides for the
qualifications for the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief
Public Attorneys, Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant
Regional Public Attorneys:
SEC. 5. Section 16, Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of

Executive Order No. 292, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 16. The Chief Public Attorney and Other

PAO Officials. - The PAO shall be headed by
a Chief Public Attorney and shall be assisted
by two (2) Deputy Chief Public Attorneys.
Each
PAO Regional Office established in each of

the administrative regions of the country
shall be headed by a Regional Public
Attorney who shall be assisted by an
Assistant Regional Public
Attorney. The authority and responsibility for

the exercise of the mandate of the PAO and
for the discharge of its powers and functions
shall be vested in the Chief Public Attorney.
xxxx
The Chief Public Attorney shall have the

same qualifications for appointment, rank,
salaries, allowances, and retirement
privileges as those of the Chief State
Prosecutor of the National Prosecution
Service. The Deputy Chief Public Attorneys
shall have the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, salaries, allowances,
and retirement privileges as those of the

Assistant Chief State Prosecutor of the
National Prosecution Service.
xxxx
The Regional Public Attorney and the

Assistant Regional Public Attorney shall have
the same qualifications for appointment,
rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement
privileges as those of a Regional State
Prosecutor and the Assistant Regional State
Prosecutor of the National Prosecution
Service respectively.
At the time of the enactment of R.A. 9406, the qualifications

of officials of the NPS, to which the foregoing provision
referred, were provided by Section 3 of P.D. 1275:
Section 3. Prosecution Staff; Organization,

Qualifications, Appointment. The Prosecution Staff
shall be composed of prosecuting officers in such
number as hereinbelow determined. It shall be
headed by a Chief State Prosecutor who shall be
assisted by three Assistants Chief State Prosecutors.
The Chief State Prosecutor, the three Assistants Chief

State Prosecutors; and the members of the
Prosecution Staff shall be selected from among
qualified and professionally trained members of the
legal profession who arc of proven integrity and
competence and have been in the actual practice
of the legal profession for at least five (5) years prior
to their appointment or have held during like period,
any position requiring the qualifications of a
lawyer. (Emphases supplied)
Soon after, R.A. 10071 or the Prosecution Service Act of

201078 was passed. In updating the qualifications for senior

positions in the NPS, Congress again opted to refer to another
set of positions, this time in the judiciary:
SECTION 14. Qualifications, Rank and Appointment

of the Prosecutor General. - The Prosecutor General
shall have the same qualifications for appointment,
rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and
salaries, allowances, emoluments and other
privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and
disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement
and other benefits as those of the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals and shall be appointed by the
President.
SECTION 15. Ranks of Prosecutors. - The Prosecutors m

the National Prosecution Service shall have the
following ranks:
Rank Position/Title
Prosecutor V (I) Senior Deputy State

Prosecutors;
(2) Regional Prosecutors; and
(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors

of provinces or cities with at least twenty-five
(25) prosecutors and City Prosecutors of

cities within a metropolitan area established
by law Prosecutor IV (1) Deputy State
Prosecutors;
(2) Deputy Regional Prosecutors
(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors

of provinces or cities with less than twenty-
five (25) prosecutors; and

(4) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors or Deputy
City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with at
least twenty- five (25) prosecutors; and
Deputy City Prosecutors of cities within a
metropolitan area established by law.
xxxx
SECTION 16. Qualifications, Ranks and Appointments

of Prosecutors and Other Prosecution Officers. -
Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor V shall have
the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries,
allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall
be subject to the same inhibitions and
and other benefits as those of an Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals.
Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor IV shall have

the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries,
allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall
be subject to the same inhibitions and
and other benefits as those of a Judge of the
Regional Trial Court.

A reading of B.P. 129 reveals, in turn, that the Presiding Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals79are required to have the
same qualifications as the members of this Court. 80 On the other
hand, judges of the regional trial courts are governed by a separate
provision.81
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that occupants of the subject PAO
positions are only mandated to comply with requirements as to age,
citizenship, education, and experience. Since third-level eligibility is

not at all mentioned in the law, it would be improper for the CESB to
impose this additional qualification as a prerequisite to permanent
appointments.82 To do so would be to amend the law and to overrule
Congress.
While the CESB has been granted the power to prescribe entrance
requirements for the third-level of the civil service, this power cannot
be construed as the authority to modify the qualifications specifically
set by law for certain positions. Hence, even granting that the
occupants of the subject positions indeed exercise managerial and
executive functions as incidents of their primary roles, the CESB has no
power to impose additional qualifications for them. It cannot use the
authority granted to it by Congress itself to defeat the express
provisions of statutes enacted by the latter.
It is also beyond the power of the CESB to question or overrule the
specific qualifications imposed by Congress for the subject positions.
The legislature must be deemed to have considered the entirety of
the functions attendant to these posts when it enacted R.A. 9406 and
prescribed the relevant qualifications for each position. The choice
not to require third level eligibility in this instance must be respected -
not only by the CESB but also by this Court - as a matter that goes into
the wisdom and the policy of a statute.83
The intent of R.A. 9406 to establish
and maintain the parity in
qualifications between the senior
officials of the PAO and the NPS
must he respected.
This Court must likewise reject the CESB's contention that the
declassification of positions in the NPS (as a result of the enactment of
R.A. 10071) cannot benefit the PAO because of a supposed

difference in their functions. This argument goes against the express
terms and the clear intent of R.A. 9406 and is therefore untenable.
As stated previously, Section 5 of R.A. 9406 amended the
Administrative Code of 1987. The amendment was done to provide
for "the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries,
allowances, and retirement privileges" of senior officials of both the
PAO and the NPS. The deliberations of Congress on R.A. 9406 reveal
its intention to establish parity between the two offices. The lawmakers
clearly viewed these officers as counterparts in the administration of
justice:
Senator Enrile. Well, I agree with the gentleman. As I said, we should
equalize the prosecution and the defense. The PAO Office is actually
an arm of the same government to protect those who need
protection.
Senator Pimentel. That is right.
Senator Enrile. At the same time, the Prosecution Service is the

arm of the government to punish those who would need
punishment. So, these two perform the same class of service
for the nation and they should be equalized.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, I totally agree with that, that is why

precisely I made this observation that talking alone of starting
pay, the level of starting pay of a PAO lawyer should not be
lower than the starting pay of a prosecutor.
Now maybe at the proper time we can insert that

amendment.
Senator Enrile. I will be glad to receive the proposed

amendment.84 (Emphases supplied)

During the bicameral conference on the proposed bill, Senator
Franklin M. Drilon explained that equal treatment of the two offices
was essential:
SEN. DRILON. Yes, this is our amendment that the PAO chief should
have the same salary as the Chief State Prosecutor and down the line,
the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, etcetera. And I want to put this
on record because there are PAO lawyers here. There are PAO
lawyers here before us and we want to explain why we have placed
this.
xxxx
SEN. DRILON. All right. As I said - you know, I want to put on

record why we had tried to streamline the salary structure
and place it at the same level as the Chief State Prosecutor.
Because we do not want a salary distortion in the Department
of Justice where you have the PAO higher than the
prosecutors. That's why we want to put them on equal footing
rather than mag - you know, there'll be whipsawing. You
place the prosecutors below the PAO. I can assure you that
tomorrow the PAO will come to us - the prosecutors will come
to us and say, "Put us higher than the PAO lawyers." So you will
have whipsawing here.85
Although these statements were made to address the specific issue of

salary, this Court considers them as manifestations of the intent to
create and maintain parity between prosecutors and public
attorneys. In Re: Vicente S. E. Veloso,86 this Court considered similar
provisions in other laws as confirmations of the legislative intent to
grant equal treatment to certain classes of public officers:
Nonetheless, there are existing laws which expressly require the
qualifications for appointment, confer the rank, and grant the salaries,
privileges, and benefits of members of the Judiciary on other public
officers in the Executive Department, such as the following:

(a) the Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitor
Generals of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG);
and
(b) the Chief Legal Counsel and the Assistant Chief

Legal Counsel, the Chief State Prosecutor, and the
members of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) in
the Department of Justice.
The intention of the above laws is to establish a parity in

qualifications required, the rank conferred, and the salaries
and benefits given to members of the Judiciary and the
public officers covered by the said laws. The said laws seek to
give equal treatment to the specific public officers in the
executive department and the Judges and Justices who are
covered by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, and
other relevant laws. In effect, these laws recognize that public
officers who are expressly identified in the laws by the special
nature of their official functions render services which are as
important as the services rendered by the Judges and
Justices. They acknowledge the respective roles of those
public officers and of the members of the Judiciary in the
promotion of justice and the proper functioning of our legal
and judicial systems.
To fulfill the legislative intent to accord equal treatment to senior

officials of the PAO and the NPS, parity in their qualifications for
appointment must be maintained. Accordingly, the revised
qualifications of those in the NPS must also be considered applicable
to those in the PAO. The declassification of positions in the NPS should
thus benefit their counterpart positions in the PAO. There is no
justification for treating the two offices differently, given the plain
provisions and the rationale of the law.
This Court would render nugatory both the terms and the intent of the
law if it sustains the view of the CESB. We cannot construe R.A. 9046 in

relation to P.D. 1275 only, while disregarding the amendments brought
about by R.A. 10071. To do so would defeat the legislature's very
purpose, which is to equalize the qualifications of the NPS and the
PAO.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted
within its jurisdiction and authority as the central personnel agency of
the government when it passed upon the appeal filed by the PAO
from CESB Resolution No. 918. Further, there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CSC when it reversed the said resolution,
which refused to declassify the subject PAO positions. As the CSC
noted, the third-level eligibility required by the CESB as an additional
qualification for these posts contravened not only the express terms,
but also the clear intent of R.A. 9406.
For the reasons stated above, and as a consequence of the improper
remedy the CESB has resorted to, this Court must dismiss the instant
petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. CSC Decision No. 110067 and Resolution No. 1100719
dated 15 February 2011 and 1 June 2011, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, G.R. No. 192791

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Political Law Review E. Constitutional Commissions Page 1 of 207

The facts of the case are as follows:

On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and

Political Law Review E. Constitutional Commissions Page 2 of 207

Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura)

A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has

The moot and academic principle is not a magical

Political Law Review E. Constitutional Commissions Page 3 of 207

Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of

Political Law Review E. Constitutional Commissions Page 4 of 207

x x x a personal and substantial interest in the case

Political Law Review E. Constitutional Commissions Page 5 of 207

To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has

1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal

Political Law Review E. Constitutional Commissions Page 6 of 207

This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it

Anent the aforestated posture of the OSG, there is no serious

such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

Political Law Review E. Constitutional Commissions Page 7 of 207

We find the remedy of certiorari applicable to the instant case

This brings Us to the pivotal substantive issue of whether or not

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall

And if valid, for how long can he serve?

Political Law Review E. Constitutional Commissions Page 8 of 207

To elucidate on the mechanics of and the adverted

1. The terms of office and appointments of the first set of

Political Law Review E. Constitutional Commissions Page 9 of 207

x x x [T]he terms of the first Chairmen and

x x x In case of a belated appointment, the interval

Early on, in Republic v. Imperial,[21] the Court wrote of two

Political Law Review E. Constitutional Commissions Page 10 of 207

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Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission

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Villars promotional appointment, so it is argued, is void from the

Central to the adjudication of the instant petition is the correct

Without question, the parties have presented two (2) contrasting

The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain

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We look to the language of the document itself in our

Let us dissect and examine closely the provision in question:

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The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be

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In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly

It may be argued that there is doubt or ambiguity on whether Sec.

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A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the

And again in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping

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Much weight and due respect must be accorded to the intent

MS. AQUINO: In the same paragraph, I would propose

MR. MONSOD: If the [Gentlewoman] will read the

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MS. AQUINO. Yes. Reappointment is fine; that is

MR. MONSOD. It is covered.

MR. FOZ. There is a provision on line 29 precisely to

MS. AQUINO: But we have to be very specific x x x