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G.R. No.

L-3714 January 26, 1909

MONTANO vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

TRACEY, J.: (Stephanie M. Santoalla)

FACTS:

Isabelo Montano presents a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription of a piece of land in the barrio
of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery.

This petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by the entity known as Obras
Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United
States, and the latter, that it was the absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said fishery.

The Court of Land Registration in its decision dismissed the said oppositions in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial. From
this decision only counsel for the Director of Public Lands appealed to this court.

ISSUE:

The issue was, whether or not “government land” has the same meaning as “public land”.

HELD:

Negative

In order to avoid misapprehension it was pointed out the phrase "public lands" is held to be equivalent to "public
domain," and does not by any means include all lands of Government ownership, but only so much of said lands as are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement by homestead and other like general laws.

Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous items; the first includes not only the second,
but also other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to public use or subject to private right. In other
words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the "public lands" and other real estate which is not part
thereof.

It was the object of Congress not to work such a result but, on the contrary, in furtherance of the purposes of the treaty
of Paris, to recognize and safeguard such property. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Land Registration is affirmed,
without costs.

_____________________________________________

Government property was of two kinds — first, that of public use or service, said to be of public ownership, and second,
that of having a private character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they retain their
public character are inalienable. Those of the second are not. Therefore, there is much real property belonging to the
Government which is not affected by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of public lands. Examples in point
are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal or other governmental uses.

A marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides belong to the State and is not susceptible to appropriation by
occupation, has no application in the present case inasmuch as in said case the land subject matter of the litigation was
not yet titled.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT,
respondents., Januray 17, 2005

Alienation of Public Agricultural Lands

(Stephanie M. Santoalla)

FACTS:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land. The application sought a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title over the land.

The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles opposed the petition. The court issued an order of
general default against the whole world except as to Angeles and the government.

The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Maming, wherein he renounced all his
rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.
Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon
started occupying the same.

Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements,
planted trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes
due on the subject land.

Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any
objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration.

The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since
the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the
land was not alienable or disposable.

The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession
by the occupant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even
start.

HELD:

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) – that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and;
that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was
not yet even considered an independent state.

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption
is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title under Section 14(1) had been met by Naguit. The parcel
of land had been declared alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land evidenced by the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time she purchased
the property; as well as the tax declarations executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954, which strengthened one's
bona fide claim of ownership.
3. MENGUITO VS REPUBLIC (GR NO 134308. 12/14/2000) (modes of disposition)

FACTS:

A petition for review assailing the Court of Appeals Sept 30, 1997 decision against the Menguito’s –the
petitioners, with promulgated resolution 10-Mos. later reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City. The RTC decision confirmed the application for the titling of the parcel of land with aggregate area of 2112
sqm located at Brgy Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila, in favor of the Menguito’s.

The application of TCT was brought by the operation of the Land Registration of Authority as amended by the Property
Registration Decree No. 1529 proceeding to declare:

1. That its applicants –the Menguito’s, are owners, in fee simple, these 11 parcels of land.

2. Listing the applicants lot title numbers, attendant documents given with their respective Technical Descriptions.

For the said application, the RTC of Pasig issued a notice of its initial hearing against the whole world
publishing the same at Abante Tabloid on April 5, 1989. Seven days earlier, however, March 30, 1989, the Office of
Solicitor General, filed its contention as:

1. Applicants nor its predecessor’s in interest were neither in open, continuous, exclusive, adverse and notorious
possession or occupation of the land they applied for since 1945.

2. Applicants don’t have competent and sufficient evidence of bonafide acquisition –without open, uninterrupted-
continuous, exclusive, adverse or notorious occupation of the lot in the concept of the owner and so appearing not
genuine or indicative of pretended possession.

3. Titling from fee simple with Spanish grant title were not anymore available after Feb 16, 1976 as required by PD 892. 4.
That the said parcel of land applied for is part of the public domain and belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines –and not subject to private appropriation.

The OSG thus stated its valid opposition on the presented documents by the applicants leaving its prayers that
said application be denied and land in question be reverted to the ownership of the Republic of the Philippines.
At the appellate court, the RTC’s decision favoring the registrations of the land applied were reversed and thus this
petition.

ISSUE: WON the CA’s did not err in its decision to reverse the trial court findings.

HELD:

No. The petition is without merit. The Court cited Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, provide the
registration the registration of the title of lands in this wise; “(b) Who by themselves, or their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation of the land in the concept of the owner.” The Court
thus observed that the petitioners have insufficient evidence on this.” The Court likewise pointed that; the applicants to
avail the OCT they must overcome the presumption that the land they applied for forms part of the public domain and if
so, it has to be shown as re-classified or alienated to a private person by the state. Otherwise, the land remain
inalienable public domain. To overcome this, an incontrovertible or clear and convincing evidence must be presented.
The court observed that applicants possession were tacked only as far back as 1948 to its predecessors of
interest –the same must have shown that their predecessors in interest were in possession of the property by
some 30-years back or 1938 before WW-2. The court find the petitioners failed to show it even as they claimed that
Cirilo Menguito once declared the land for tax purposes in 1943 –yet failed to show documentary evidence to support
the claim. The court therefore find no reason to modify the appellate court’s decision -thus denied the petition and
declared cost against petitioner.
“Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

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