Learning of the cancellation of FLDCs TLA, petitioner, through its
SECOND DIVISION officer-in-charge, wrote Minister Maceda a letter dated October 10, 1986,
[G.R. No. 111088. June 13, 1997]
C & M TIMBER CORPORATION (CMTC), petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL C.
ALCALA, Secretary of the Department of Environment &
Natural Resources, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, and HON. RENATO C. CORONA,
Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari by which C & M Timber Corporation
seeks the nullification of the order dated February 26, 1993 and the
resolution dated June 7, 1993 of the Office of the President, declaring as of
no force and effect Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued to
petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA No. 106, with the expiry date June 30,
1997, covers 67,680 hectares of forest land in the municipalities of
Dipaculao and Dinalongan in the Province of Aurora and the Municipality of
Maddela in Quirino province.[1]
It appears that in a letter dated July 20, 1984[2] to President Marcos,
Filipinas Loggers Development Corporation (FLDC), through its president
and general manager, requested a timber concession over the same area
covered by petitioners TLA No. 106, alleging that the same had been
cancelled pursuant to a presidential directive banning all forms of logging in
the area. The request was granted in a note dated August 14, 1984 by
President Marcos who wrote, as was his wont, on the margin of the letter of
FLDC: Approved.[3]
Accordingly, on September 21, 1984, the Ministry of Natural
Resources, as it was then called, issued TLA No. 360, with the expiry date
September 30, 1994, to FLDC, covering the area subject of TLA No. 106. In
1985, FLDC began logging operations.
On June 26, 1986, then Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto M.
Maceda suspended TLA No. 360 for FLDCs gross violation of the terms and
conditions thereof, especially the reforestation and selective logging
activities and in consonance with the national policy on forest
conservation.[4] On July 26, 1986, Minister Maceda issued another order
cancelling the license of FLDC on the ground that in spite of the suspension
order dated June 26, 1986, said concessionaire has continued logging
operations in violation of forestry rules and regulations.[5]
requesting revalidation of its TLA No. 106.[6]As FLDC sought a
reconsideration of the order cancelling its TLA, petitioner wrote another letter
dated February 13, 1987,[7] alleging that because of the log ban imposed by
the previous administration it had to stop its logging operations, but that
when the ban was lifted on September 21, 1984, its concession area was
awarded to FLDC as a result of [FLDCs] covetous maneuvers and unlawful
machinations. (Petitioner was later to say that those behind FLDC, among
them being the former Presidents sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba, were very
influential because of their very strong connections with the previous Marcos
regime.)[8] Petitioner prayed that it be allowed to resume logging operations.
In his order dated May 2, 1988,[9] Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., of
the DENR, declared petitioners TLA No. 106 as of no more force and effect
and consequently denied the petition for its restoration, even as he denied
FLDCs motion for reconsideration of the cancellation of TLA No.
360. Secretary Factoran, Jr. ruled that petitioners petition was barred by
reason of laches, because petitioner did not file its opposition to the
issuance of a TLA to FLDC until February 13, 1987, after FLDC had been
logging under its license for almost two years. On the other hand, FLDCs
motion for reconsideration was denied, since the findings on which the
cancellation order had been based, notably gross violation of the terms and
conditions of its license, such as reforestation and selective logging activities
appear to be firmly grounded.
Both petitioner CMTC and FLDC appealed to the Office of the
President. Petitioner denied that it was guilty of laches. It alleged that it had
sent a letter to the then Minister of Natural Resources Rodolfo del Rosario
dated September 24, 1984 protesting the grant of a TLA to FLDC over the
area covered by its (petitioners) TLA and, for this reason, requesting
nullification of FLDCs TLA.
In a decision dated March 21, 1991,[10] the Office of the President,
through then Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos, affirmed the DENRs order of
May 2, 1988. Like the DENR it found petitioner guilty of laches, the alleged
filing by petitioner of a protest on September 24, 1984 not having been duly
proven. The decision of the Office of the President stated:[11]
As disclosed by the records, this Office, in a letter of June 1, 1989, had
requested the DENR to issue a certification as to the
authenticity/veracity of CMTCs aforesaid Annex A to enable it to
resolve this case judiciously and expeditiously. Said letter-request
pertinently reads:
x x x C & M Timber Corporation has attached to its Supplemental Petition
For Review, dated June 1, 1988, a xerox copy of (Annex A) of its letter to the
Minister of Natural Resources Rodolfo del Rosario, dated September 24,
1984, prepared by its counsel, Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing, protesting
against the award of the contested area to Filipinas Loggers Development
Corporation and requesting that it be annulled and voided.
Considering that the aforementioned Annex A constitutes a vital defense to
C & M Timber Corporation and could be a pivotal factor in the resolution by
this Office of the instant appeal, may we request your good office for a
certification as to the authenticity/veracity of said document (Annex A) to
enable us to resolve the case judiciously and expeditiously.
In reply thereto, the DENR, thru Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Romulo
D. San Juan, in a letter of July 7, 1989, informed this Office, thus:
xxx
Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged aforementioned Annex
A, no such document could be found or is on file in this Office.
This Office, therefore, regrets that it can not issue the desired certification as
to the authenticity/veracity of the document.
On September 10, 1990, this Office requested an updated comment of the
DENR on (a) the duplicate original copy of Annex A; (b) a xerox copy of
Page 164, entry No. 2233, of the MNRs logbook tending to show that
the original copy of Annex A was received by the MNR; and (c) a xerox copy
of Page 201 of the logbook of the BFD indicating that the original copy of
Annex A was received by BFD from the MNR.
On October 26, 1990, DENR Assistant Secretary San Juan endorsed to this
Office the updated comment of Director of Forest Management Bureau
(FMB) in a 2nd endorsement of October 25, 1990, which pertinently reads as
follows:
Please be informed that this Office is not the addressee and repository of the
letter dated September 24, 1984 of Atty. Norberto Quisumbing. This Office
was just directed by then Minister Rodolfo del Rosario to act on the
purported letter of Atty. Quisumbing and as directed, we prepared a
memorandum to the President which was duly complied with as shown by
the entries in the logbook. Annex A, which is the main document of the
letter-appeal of C & M Timber Corporation is presumed appended to the
records when it was acted upon by the BFD (now FMB) and forwarded to the
Secretary (then Minister). Therefore this Office is not in a position to certify
as to the authenticity of Annex A.
Clearly therefore, CMTCs reliance on its Annex A is misplaced, the
authenticity thereof not having been duly proven or established. Significantly,
we note that in all the pleadings filed by CMTC in the office a quo, and
during the hearing conducted, nothing is mentioned therein about its letter of
September 24, 1984 (Annex A). Jurisprudence teaches that issues neither
averred in the pleadings nor raised during the trial below cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal (City of Manila vs. Ebay, 1 SCRA 1086, 1089);
that issues of fact not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court
need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal (Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA
592, 595); and that parties, may not, on appeal, adopt a position inconsistent
with what they sustained below (People v. Archilla, 1 SCRA 698, 700-701)
The Office of the President also declined to set aside the DENRs order
of July 31, 1986, cancelling FLDCs TLA No. 360, after finding the same to
be fully substantiated.
Petitioner and FLDC moved for reconsideration. In its order dated
January 25, 1993,[12] the Office of the President, through Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. It held that even assuming that CMTC did file regularly its
letter-protest of September 24, 1984 with MNR on September 25, 1984,
CMTC failed to protect its rights for more than two (2) years until it opposed
reinstatement of FLDCs TLA on February 13, 1987. Within that two (2) year
period, FLDC logged the area without any opposition from CMTC. In the
same order, the Office of the President, however, directed the reinstatement
of FLDCs TLA No. 360, in view of the favorable report of the Bureau of
Forest Development dated March 23, 1987. Later, the Presidents office
reconsidered its action after the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources Angel C. Alcala, on February 15, 1993, expressed concern that
reinstatement of FLDCs TLA No. 360 might negate efforts to enhance the
conservation and protection of our forest resources. In a new order dated
February 26, 1993,[13] the Office of the President reinstated its March 21,
1991 decision.
Petitioner again moved for a reconsideration of the decision dated
March 21, 1991 and for its license to be revived/restored. Petitioners motion
was, however, denied by the Office of the President on June 7, 1993 [14] in a
resolution signed by Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato
C. Corona. The Presidents office ruled:
 The above Order of February 26, 1993 was predicated, as stated
therein, on a new policy consideration on forest conservation and
protection, unmistakably implied from the Presidents handwritten
instruction. Accordingly, this Order shall be taken not only as an
affirmation of the March 21, 1991 decision, but also as
a FINAL disposition of the case and ALL matters incident thereto, like
CMTCs motion for reconsideration, dated April 16, 1991.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that laches cannot be imputed
to it because it did not incur delay in asserting its rights and even if there
was delay, the delay did not work to the prejudice of other parties,
particularly FLDC, because the cancellation of the FLDCs TLA was
attributable only to its own actions. Petitioner also denies that its license had
been suspended by reason of mediocre performance in reforestation by
order of then Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro O. Pea. It says that it
did not receive any order to this effect. Finally,petitioner claims that the
denial of its petition, because of a new policy consideration on forest
conservation and protection, unmistakably implied from the Presidents
handwritten instruction, as stated in the resolution of June 7, 1993 of the
Office of the President, would deny it the due process of law. Petitioner
points out that there is no total log ban in the country; that Congress has yet
to make a pronouncement on the issue; that any notice to this effect must be
stated in good form, not implied; and that in any case, any new policy
consideration should be prospective in application and cannot affect
petitioners vested rights in its TLA No. 106.
We find the petition to be without merit.
First. As already stated, the DENR order of May 2, 1988, declaring
petitioners TLA No. 106 as no longer of any force and effect, was based on
its finding that although TLA No. 106s date of expiry was June 30, 1997 it
had been suspended on June 3, 1983 because of CMTCs mediocre
performance in reforestation and petitioners laches in failing to protest the
subsequent award of the same area to FLDC. There is considerable dispute
whether there was really an order dated June 3, 1983 suspending petitioners
TLA because of mediocre performance in reforestation, just as there is a
dispute whether there indeed was a letter written on September 24, 1984 on
behalf of petitioner protesting the award of the concession covered by its
TLA No. 106 to FLDC, so as to show that petitioner did not sleep on its
rights.
The alleged order of June 3, 1983 cannot be produced. The Office of
the Solicitor General was given until May 14, 1997 to secure a copy of the
order but on May 7, 1997 the OSG manifested that the order in question
could not be found in the records of this case in which the order might
be.[15] Earlier, petitioner requested a copy of the order but the DENR,
through Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe, said that based
from our records there is no file copy of said alleged order. [16]
On the other hand, the alleged letter of September 24, 1984 written by
Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing, protesting the award of the concession in
question to FLDC cannot be found in the records of the DENR either. The
Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the DENR certified that Despite
diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged [letter], no such document could
be found or is on file in this Office.[17] In a later certification, however, Ofelia
Castro Biron of the DENR, claimed that she was a receiving clerk at the
Records and Documents Section of the Ministry of Natural Resources and
that on September 25, 1984 she received the letter of Atty. Quisumbing and
placed on all copies thereof the stamp of the MNR. She stated that the copy
in the possession of petitioner was a faithful copy of the letter in question. [18]
The difficulty of ascertaining the existence of the two documents is
indeed a reflection on the sorry state of record keeping in an important office
of the executive department. Yet these two documents are vital to the
presentation of the evidence of both parties in this case. Fortunately, there
are extant certain records from which it is possible to determine whether
these documents even existed.
With respect to the alleged order of June 3, 1983 suspending
petitioners TLA No. 106 for mediocre performance in reforestation, the Court
will presume that there is such an order in accordance with the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official functions inasmuch as such order
is cited both in the order dated May 2, 1988 of the DENR, declaring as of no
force and effect TLA No. 106, and in the decision dated March 21, 1991 of
the Office of the President affirming the order of the DENR. It is improbable
that so responsible officials as the Secretary of the DENR and the Executive
Secretary would cite an order that did not exist.
On the other hand, with respect to the letter dated September 24,
1984, there are circumstances indicating that it existed. In addition to the
aforesaid certification of Ofelia Castro Biron that she was the person who
received the letter for the DENR, the logbook of the Ministry of Natural
Resources contains entries indicating that the letter was received by the
Bureau of Forest Development from the MNR.[19] DENR Assistant Secretary
Romulo San Juan likewise informed the Office of the President that the
Bureau of Forest Management prepared a memorandum on the aforesaid
letter of September 24, 1984,[20] thereby implying that there was such a
letter.
On the premise that there was an order dated June 3, 1983, we find
that after suspending petitioners TLA for mediocre performance in
reforestation under this order, the DENR cancelled the TLA, this time - Benjamin Cuaresma
because of a Presidential directive imposing a log ban. The records of G.R.
No. 76538, entitled Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co. v. Deputy Executive Secretary, You are hereby reminded to insure full compliance with this order to stop
the decision in which is reported in 190 SCRA 673 (1990), contain a copy of logging operations by all licensees above mentioned and submit a report on
the memorandum of then Director Edmundo V. Cortes of the Bureau of the pullout of equipment and inventory of logs within five days upon receipt
Forest Development to the Regional Director of Region 2, in Tuguegarao, hereof.
Cagayan, informing the latter that pursuant to the instruction of the President
and the memorandum dated August 18, 1983 of then Minister Teodoro Q.
Pea, the log ban previously declared included the concessions of the ACTION
companies enumerated in Cortes memorandum, in consequence of which DESIRED : For your immediate implementation.
the concessions in question were deemed cancelled. The memorandum of
Director Cortes stated: EDMUNDO V. CORTES

MEMORANDUM ORDER (Emphasis added)

TO : The Regional Director It thus appears that petitioners license had been cancelled way back in
Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan 1983, a year before its concession was awarded to FLDC. It is noteworthy
that petitioner admits that at the time of the award to FLDC in 1984 petitioner
FROM : The Director was no longer operating its concession because of a log ban although it
claims that the suspension of operations was only temporary. As a result of
the log ban, the TLA of petitioner, along with those of other loggers in the
DATE : 24 August 1983 region, were cancelled and petitioner and others were ordered to stop
operations. Petitioner also admits that it received a telegram sent on August
SUBJECT : Stopping of all logging operations 24, 1983 by Director Cortes of the BFD, directing it to stop all logging
in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino operations to conserve our remaining forests.[21] It is then not true, as Atty.
Quisumbing stated in protesting the award of the concession to FLDC, that
REMARKS : the logging ban did not cancel [petitioners] timber license agreement.
Now petitioner did not protest the cancellation of its
Following Presidential Instructions and Memorandum Order of Minister TLA. Consequently, even if consideration is given to the fact that a year
Teodoro Q. Pea dated 18 August 1983, and in connection with my previous later, on September 24, 1984, its counsel protested the grant of the
radio message, please be informed that the coverage of the logging ban in concession to another party (FLDC), this failure of petitioner to contest first
Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya provinces include the following concessions the suspension of its license on June 3, 1983 and later its cancellation on
which are deemed cancelled as of the date of the previous notice: August 24, 1983 must be deemed fatal to its present action.
Second. Except for the letter of its counsel to the Minister of Natural
- Felipe Ysmael Co., Inc. Resources, which it reiterated in its letter to the President of the Philippines,
- Industries Dev. Corp. petitioner took no legal steps to protect its interest. After receiving no
- Luzon Loggers, Inc. favorable response to its two letters, petitioner could have brought the
- C & M Timber Corporation necessary action in court for the restoration of its license. It did not. Instead it
- Buzon Industrial Dev. Corporation waited until FLDCs concession was cancelled in 1986 by asking for the
- Dominion Forest Resources Corp. revalidation of its (petitioners) on TLA No. 106.
- FCA Timber Development Corp.
- Kasibu Logging Corp. Petitioners excuse before the DENR is that it did not pursue its protest
- RCC Timber Company because its president, Ricardo C. Silverio, had been told by President
Marcos that the area in question had been awarded to the Presidents sister,
Mrs. Fortuna Barba, and petitioner was afraid to go against the wishes of the
former President.[22] This is a poor excuse for petitioners inaction. In Felipe
Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary,[23] a similar excuse
was given that Ysmael & Cos license had been cancelled and its concession
awarded to entities controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of then
President Marcos. For this reason, after the EDSA Revolution, Ysmael & Co.
sought in 1986 the reinstatement of its timber license agreement and the
revocation of those issued to the alleged presidential cronies. As its request
was denied by the Office of the President, Ysmael & Co. filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court. On the basis of the facts stated, this Court
denied the petition: (1) because the August 25, 1983 order of the Bureau of
Forest Development, cancelling petitioners timber license agreement had
become final and executory. Although petitioner sent a letter dated
September 19, 1983 to President Marcos seeking reconsideration of the
1983 order of cancellation of the BFD, the grounds stated there were
different from those later relied upon by petitioner for seeking its
reinstatement; (2) because the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take
judicial recourse to have the earlier administrative actions [cancelling its
license and granting another one covering the same concession to
respondent] reviewed by the court through a petition for certiorari is
prejudicial to its cause. Such special civil action of certiorari should have
been filed within a reasonable time. And since none was filed within such
period, petitioners action was barred by laches; and (3) because executive
evaluation of timber licenses and their consequent cancellation in the
process of formulating policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands is
a prerogative of the executive department and in the absence of evidence
showing grave abuse of discretion courts will not interfere with the exercise
of that discretion.
This case is governed by the decision in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc.
v. Deputy Executive Secretary.
Third. It is finally contended that any policy consideration on forest
conservation and protection justifying the decision of the executive
department not to reinstate petitioners license must be formally enunciated
and cannot merely be implied from the Presidents instruction to his
subordinates and that, at all events, the new policy cannot be applied to
existing licenses such as petitioners.
The Presidents order reconsidering the resolution of the Presidential
Legal Adviser (insofar as it reinstated the license of FLDC) was prompted by
concerns expressed by the then Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources that said reinstatement [of FLDCs license] may negate our efforts
to enhance conservation and protection of our forest resources. There was
really no new policy but, as noted in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc., a mere
reiteration of a policy of conservation and protection. The policy is contained
in Art. II, 16 of the Constitution which commands the State to protect and
promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature. There is therefore no merit in
petitioners contention that no new policy can be applied to existing licenses.
As to petitioners contention that the cancellation of its license
constitutes an impairment of the obligation of its contract, suffice it for us to
quote what we held in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co. Inc. v. Deputy Executive
Secretary:[24]
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent
Minister Maceda of the MNR, which were affirmed by the Office of the
President, will disclose public policy considerations which effectively forestall
judicial interference in the case at bar.
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of
implementing the policy to develop and conserve the countrys natural
resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber
license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the
previous dispensation. . . .
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the
renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands
and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced
ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed,
most especially in this country. . . .
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious
problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary
will stand clear. . . . More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a
private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the
pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses,
permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do
not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(33) and 20 of
Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R.
No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon,
SO ORDERED.
Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
SESINANDO MERIDA, G.R. No. 158182 amended, for cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] a lone narra
Petitioner,
Present: tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod

Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO, (Tansiongco) claims ownership.[6]
- versus - AZCUNA,
CORONA, and
LEONARDO-DE The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998,
CASTRO, JJ.
Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property.
Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent. June 12, 2008 barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998,[7] Royo summoned petitioner to a

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the

felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did
DECISION
so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner,

CARPIO, J.: bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto

The Case de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calixs written authorization signed

by Calixs wife.[8]

This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 28 June 2002 and the

Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The 28 June On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the

2002 Decision affirmed the conviction of petitioner Sesinando Merida Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo

(petitioner) for violation of Section 68,[3] Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. When Hernandez

705),[4] as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The Resolution dated 14 confronted petitioner about the felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier

May 2003 denied admission of petitioners motion for reconsideration. [5] claim to Royo that he cut the tree with Calixs permission. Hernandez

ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.
The Facts
 On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and ordered

petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other the seized lumber forfeited in Tansiongcos favor.[12] The trial court dismissed

DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property and petitioners defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions

saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calixs permission. With

Hernandez took custody of the lumber,[9] deposited them for safekeeping this finding and petitioners lack of DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court

with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial.
conducted an investigation on the matter.[10]
Petitioner also contended that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction

Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial over the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and

Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial Prosecutor) charging petitioner with not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the

violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. During the preliminary penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive.

investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit reiterating his claim that The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
he cut the narra tree with Calixs permission. The Provincial

Prosecutor[11] found probable cause to indict petitioner and filed the

In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
Information with the trial court (docketed as Criminal Case No. 2207).
courts ruling but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the governments

favor.[13] The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding that
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including
petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in
Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez who testified on the events leading to the
the Mayod Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also
discovery of and investigation on the tree-cutting. Petitioner testified as the
found nothing irregular in the filing of the complaint by Tansiongco instead of
lone defense witness and claimed, for the first time, that he had no part in
a DENR forest officer considering that the case underwent preliminary
the tree-cutting.
investigation by the proper officer who filed the Information with the trial

court.
The Ruling of the Trial Court

On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive portion of

In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty
its ruling, sentenced petitioner to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years
as charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
of reclusion temporal. However, in the body of its ruling, the Court of

Appeals held that the penalty to be imposed on [petitioner] should be (14) In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion countered that (1) the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even
temporal,[14] the same penalty the trial court imposed. though Tansiongco, and not a DENR forest officer, filed the complaint

against petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its 705, as amended.

Resolution dated 14 May 2003, did not admit his motion for having been
The Issues
filed late.[15]

Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:

The petition raises the following issues:[17]

I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705

AS AMENDED PROHIBITING THE CUTTING,
GATHERING, COLLECTING AND REMOVING TIMBER 1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207
OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS FROM ANY FOREST
even though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a
LAND APPLIES TO PETITIONER.
DENR forest officer; and
II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA
TREE CUT IN PRIVATE LAND CONTESTED BY VICAR 2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
CALIX AND PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT OSCAR
TANSIONGCO IS COVERED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. amended.
705 AS AMENDED.

III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE The Ruling of the Court

THE CHARGE EVEN WITHOUT THE STANDING
AUTHORITY COMING FROM THE
INVESTIGATING FORESTOFFICER OF THE The petition has no merit.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES AS MANDATED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D.
705 AS AMENDED.
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE FILED BY
PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE
INVESTIGATING OFFICER AS REQUIRED BY SECTION We sustain the OSGs claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED WHO MUST BE THE
ONE TO INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE SAME.[16] Criminal Case No. 2207. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised
Rules) list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by specified
individuals,[18] non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction
from trying such cases.[19] However, these cases concern only defamation
and other crimes against chastity[20] and not to cases concerning Section 68
of PD 705, as amended. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an
interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705
provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of
any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or
employee, or any of the deputized officers or
officials, shall immediately be investigated by the
forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was
allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the
evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the
complaint or report, the investigating forest officer
shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate
official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases and file an information
in Court. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon[21] that the phrase reports and
complaints in Section 80 refers to reports and complaints as might be
brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest officers or
employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the
deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in
their presence.[22]
Here, it was not forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development or any of the deputized officers or officials who reported to
Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private
citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez
cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine if there is
prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report.[23] At any rate,
Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the
Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for
petitioners alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its
part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as
the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction. [24]
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts [25] penalized under PD 705,
provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or
Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations,
or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the
penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
 The court shall further order the confiscation in tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calixs permission.
favor of the government of the timber or any forest
However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question.
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed
as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and We sustain the lower courts rulings that petitioners extrajudicial admissions
tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest
products are found. (Emphasis supplied) bind him.[30] Petitioner does not explain why Royo and Hernandez, public

officials who testified under oath in their official capacities, would lie on the

Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, stand to implicate petitioner in a serious criminal offense, not to mention that

gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products from any the acts of these public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity. Further,

forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or petitioner does not deny presenting Calixs authorization to Royo and

removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private Hernandez as his basis for cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property.

land without any authority;[26] and (3) the possession of timber or other Petitioner has no use of Calixs authorization if, as he claimed during the trial,

forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest he did not cut any tree in the Mayod Property.

laws and regulations.[27] Petitioner stands charged of having cut, gathered,

collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod

land[28] without x x x the necessary permit x x x thus his liablity, if ever, Property constitutes timber under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD

should be limited only for cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] 705 does not define timber, only forest product (which circuitously includes

timber, under the second category. Further, the prosecution evidence timber.)[31] Does the narra tree in question constitute timber under Section

showed that petitioner did not perform any acts of gathering, collecting, or 68? The closest this Court came to defining the term timber in Section 68

removing but only the act of cutting a lone narra tree. Hence, this case was to provide that timber, includes lumber or processed log.[32] In other

hinges on the question of whether petitioner cut x x x timber in the Mayod jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified

Property without a DENR permit.[29] dimensions[33]or certain stand age or rotation age.[34] In Mustang Lumber,

Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[35] this Court was faced with a similar task of having
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts rulings.
to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - lumber - to determine whether

possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In ruling in the

On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property
affirmative, we held that lumber should be taken in its ordinary or common
without a DENR permit, petitioner adopted conflicting positions. Before his
usage meaning to refer to processed log or timber, thus:
trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra
 The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either
timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest
products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of Processing plant, which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical
set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs
and other forest raw materials
into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or
processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the
term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Websters Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs
after being prepared for the market. Simply put, lumber is
a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to
the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute
should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning. And in so far as possession
of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended,
makes no distinction between raw and procesed timber.
Neither should we.[36] x x x x (Italicization in the original;
boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term timber under Section 68
cannot be taken in its common acceptation as referring to wood used for or
suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery.[37] Indeed, tree saplings or
tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables,
or chairs cannot be considered timber.[38]
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted
the same into several pieces of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6
and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111 board feet x x x. These
measurements were indicated in the apprehension receipt Hernandez
issued to petitioner on 26 January 1999 which the prosecution introduced in
evidence.[39] Further, Hernandez testified that the larger portion of the felled
log left in the Mayod Property measured 76 something centimeters [at the
big end] while the smaller end measured 65 centimeters and the length was
2.8 meters.[40] Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to
lumber was timber fit for building or for carpentry or joinery and thus falls
under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified
Theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall
be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding
article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value
of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty
shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand
pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
 Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin
temporal, as the case may be. Hernandezs testimony that these amounts, as stated in the apprehension

receipt he issued, are his estimates based on prevailing local price. [41]
2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken
than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more RPC, the prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated
than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
estimate of such fact.[42] In the absence of independent and reliable
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty
in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is
over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos. under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 attendant circumstances of the case.[43] In People v. Dator[44] where, as here,
pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos. the accused was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if amended, for possession of lumber without permit, the prosecutions
such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
evidence for the lumbers value consisted of an estimate made by the
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the
theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in apprehending authorities whose apparent lack of corroboration was
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of compounded by the fact that the transmittal letter for the estimate was not
the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value
exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five presented in evidence. Accordingly, we imposed on the accused the
preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
. minimum penalty under Article 309(6)[45] of the RPC.[46]
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is
not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account
the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his family. the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we find it proper to impose on petitioner,

under the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4)
The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
measuring 111 board feet were valued at P3,330. However, if the value of

the log left at the Mayod Property is included, the amount increases
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the
to P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the prosecution relied on
Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals with the modification

that petitioner Sesinando Merida is sentenced to four (4) months and one (1)

day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 March 14, 1995
AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, Regional Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region VIII, Tacloban
City, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON, 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Hinunangan Silago, Southern Leyte, respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
At around 10:00 o'clock of November 14, 1992, police officers of the
Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte apprehended Dionisio Golpe
while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck and
logs were impounded. A complaint was filed against Basilio Cabig, the
alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the preliminary investigation,
respondent Judge Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case exists
against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as the
owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was not charged in the complaint.
Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources filed the instant complaint against respondent Judge
alleging that his order releasing the truck used in the transport of illegally cut
forest products violated Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, Section 68 and 68-A1and Administrative Order No. 59, Series
of 1990.2 Complainant claims that respondent Judge has no authority to
order the release of the truck despite the non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the
complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of San Juan, Southern Leyte for
appropriate disposition as the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office.
In his comment, respondent Judge explained that after conducting the
preliminary investigation, he found that Golpe, the owner of the truck, is
principally engaged in the hauling of sand and gravel and the delivery of
hollow blocks. On his way home after delivering hollow blocks in Barangay
Sto. Niño II, he met his friend Cabig who requested him to load sliced lumber
and deliver the same at Brgy. Lungsod-daan, Hinundayan to be used for the
construction of a barangay high school building. They were apprehended
when the truck had a flat tire. After changing the tire, both the lumber and
the truck were ordered deposited at the police station of Hinunangan.
Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser participation in the
crime of illegal logging and, being a mere accessory, he might be utilized by
the Acting Chief of Police as prosecution witness against Cabig. More
importantly, the fact that the complaint charged only Cabig, respondent
Judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, ordered the release of the
truck owned by Golpe.
The Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator recommended
that a formal investigation be conducted. An excerpt from its Memorandum
states:
We find the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory.
While he is authorized to conduct preliminary investigation
in all cases of violations of P.D. 705, as amended,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines, Sec. 68-A thereof provides that it is the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative
who may order the confiscation and disposition of the
forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
There may be some facts that are not extant in the records
which can only come out during a formal investigation to
better establish clear culpability or exoneration over the
respondent.
 In view thereof, and to give respondent an opportunity to
clear himself, it is respectfully recommended that this
matter be referred to Acting Executive Judge Leandro T.
Loyao, Jr., RTC, Branch 26, San Juan, Southern Leyte, for
investigation, report and recommendation within sixty days
from receipt of the records.3
In the Resolution of November 8, 1993, the Court resolved to refer the case
to Acting Executive Judge Leandro T. Loyao, Jr., RTC, Branch 26, San
Juan, Southern Leyte, for investigation, report and recommendation, within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.4
During the first two hearing dates, complainant was unable to attend but sent
his representatives, DENR lawyer Constantino Esber and legal assistant
Romeo Gulong. Respondent Judge appeared with his counsel. However, on
the third hearing date, respondent Judge failed to appear as he suffered a
stroke and was hospitalized. Thereafter, DENR counsel Esber manifested
that their office has filed a motion for reinvestigation and for the turnover of
the jeep to the PNP and subsequently, to the DENR. He also manifested
that the complainant is submitting the administrative matter for resolution
and recommendation without adducing evidence against respondent.
Respondent's counsel did not object to complainant's manifestation. The
counsel of both complainant and respondent jointly agreed to submit the
case for appropriate action.
The Investigating Judge's confidential report, in part, states:
In view of this development in the course of an intended
investigation this investigator could not elicit additional
facts than are found in the records, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory. Respondent was given an opportunity to
explain the unfavorable circumstances against him but he
was overtaken by a serious illness. So much was
expected from the complainant to supply the facts not
extant in the records, but he lost interest in substantiating
his April 1993 report to the Supreme Court. In fact, he was
submitting this administrative matter for resolution without
adducing evidence against respondent.
Except for the 21 January 1994 motion for reinvestigation
of DENR counsel Esber which sought for the inclusion of
jeep owner and driver Dionisio Golpe in the criminal
information, there is nothing new that can be added to the
facts found by the Honorable Deputy Court Administrator
as reflected in his Memorandum for the Honorable Chief
Justice dated 12 October 1993.
There being no actual investigation conducted, no
additional facts could be reported and consequently, there
is no basis for a recommendation on the basis of facts.
This investigator can only recommend appropriate action
by the Supreme Court on the basis of the facts already
extant in the records with a prayer for consideration of
respondent plight especially so since on account of this
investigation his health has deteriorated and may affect
his efficiency output as a judge. Perhaps, allowing him to
bow out of the service with honor and corresponding
benefits.5
During the pendency of this case, respondent Judge filed for disability
retirement. His application was approved but his pension was not released
pending the outcome of this case.
We find respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven by
Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable, hence, he is not subject to any
disciplinary sanction.
According to the Revised Penal Code, Art. 45, first paragraph: "[E]very
penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instrument or tools with which
it was committed." However, this cannot be done if such proceeds and
instruments or tools "be the property of a third person not liable for offense."
In this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut lumber,
cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein be
convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not
indicted. Hence, there was no justification for respondent Judge not to
release the truck.
Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on Pres. Decree No. 705,
Sec. 68-A and Adm. Order No. 59, the DENR Secretary or his duly
authorized representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained
or gathered forest products and all conveyances used in the commission of
the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws.
However, as complainant himself likewise pointed out, this power is in
relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR.
We do not find that when respondent Judge released the truck after he WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
conducted the preliminary investigation and satisfied himself that there was
no reason to continue keeping the truck, he violated Pres. Decree No. 705 SO ORDERED.
and Adm. Order No. 59. The release of the truck did not render nugatory the
administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. The confiscation
proceedings under Adm. Order No. 596 is different from the confiscation
under the Revised Penal Code, which is an additional penalty imposed in the
event of conviction. Despite the order of release, the truck can be seized SESINANDO MERIDA, G.R. No. 158182
again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to include the Petitioner,
truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done as Present:
manifested before the lower court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59.
Section 12 thereof categorically states that "[t]he confiscation of the PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to any CARPIO,
criminal action which shall be filed against the owner thereof or any person - versus - AZCUNA,
who used the conveyance in the commission of the offense." CORONA, and
LEONARDO-DE
Petitioner is of the opinion that under the circumstances, respondent Judge CASTRO, JJ.
should have turned over the truck to the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San Juan, Southern Leyte for
appropriate disposition. No doubt, this would have simplified matters and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
prevented the present situation from occurring wherein one government Respondent. June 12, 2008
official files a complaint against another. Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No. 59,
if the apprehension is not made by DENR field offices, deputized military x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other
forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field DECISION
offices and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action
and disposition. A period of about two weeks lapsed from the time the
seizure was made before a complaint was filed. During this period, the CARPIO, J.:
apprehending policemen had enough time to turn over the logs and the truck
to the nearest DENR field office for proper action and disposition since the The Case
duty to turn over the truck to the nearest DENR field office rests on the
officials apprehending the illegal logs. There being no mandatory duty on the
part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he should not be visited with This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 28 June 2002 and the
disciplinary sanction when he did not refer the same to the DENR field office
in San Juan, Southern Leyte. Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The 28 June

2002 Decision affirmed the conviction of petitioner Sesinando Merida

The Court takes this opportunity to enjoin the National Police, the DENR, the
prosecutors, and the members of the bench to coordinate with each other for (petitioner) for violation of Section 68,[3] Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD
a successful campaign against illegal logging. It behooves all the concerned
agencies to seriously strive for the attainment of the constitutionally-declared 705),[4] as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The Resolution dated 14
policy to "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
May 2003 denied admission of petitioners motion for reconsideration. [5]
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature"7 in order
to preserve our natural resources for the benefit of the generations still to
The Facts
come.
 On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that

Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other

Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property and

amended, for cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] a lone narra saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber.

tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Hernandez took custody of the lumber,[9] deposited them for safekeeping

Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion

(Tansiongco) claims ownership.[6] of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently

conducted an investigation on the matter.[10]

The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998,

Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial

Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial Prosecutor) charging petitioner with

barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998,[7] Royo summoned petitioner to a violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. During the preliminary

meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit reiterating his claim that

felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did he cut the narra tree with Calixs permission. The Provincial

so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, Prosecutor[11] found probable cause to indict petitioner and filed the

bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto Information with the trial court (docketed as Criminal Case No. 2207).

de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calixs written authorization signed

During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including
by Calixs wife.[8]
Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez who testified on the events leading to the

discovery of and investigation on the tree-cutting. Petitioner testified as the

On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the
lone defense witness and claimed, for the first time, that he had no part in
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo
the tree-cutting.
S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. When Hernandez

confronted petitioner about the felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier
The Ruling of the Trial Court
claim to Royo that he cut the tree with Calixs permission. Hernandez
ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber. In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty

as charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and ordered of reclusion temporal. However, in the body of its ruling, the Court of

the seized lumber forfeited in Tansiongcos favor.[12] The trial court dismissed Appeals held that the penalty to be imposed on [petitioner] should be (14)

petitioners defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion

that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calixs permission. With temporal,[14] the same penalty the trial court imposed.

this finding and petitioners lack of DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court

held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its

Resolution dated 14 May 2003, did not admit his motion for having been
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial.
filed late.[15]
Petitioner also contended that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:
over the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and

not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the
I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705
penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive. AS AMENDED PROHIBITING THE CUTTING,
GATHERING, COLLECTING AND REMOVING TIMBER
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS FROM ANY FOREST
LAND APPLIES TO PETITIONER.

II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA

In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial TREE CUT IN PRIVATE LAND CONTESTED BY VICAR
CALIX AND PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT OSCAR
courts ruling but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the governments TANSIONGCO IS COVERED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D.
705 AS AMENDED.
favor.[13] The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding that

petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE
THE CHARGE EVEN WITHOUT THE STANDING
the Mayod Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also AUTHORITY COMING FROM THE
INVESTIGATING FORESTOFFICER OF THE
found nothing irregular in the filing of the complaint by Tansiongco instead of DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
a DENR forest officer considering that the case underwent preliminary RESOURCES AS MANDATED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D.
705 AS AMENDED.
investigation by the proper officer who filed the Information with the trial

court. [IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE FILED BY
PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE
On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive portion of INVESTIGATING OFFICER AS REQUIRED BY SECTION
its ruling, sentenced petitioner to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED WHO MUST BE THE
ONE TO INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE SAME.[16]

In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
countered that (1) the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even
though Tansiongco, and not a DENR forest officer, filed the complaint
against petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:[17]
1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207
even though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a
DENR forest officer; and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
We sustain the OSGs claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 2207. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised
Rules) list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by specified
individuals,[18] non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction
from trying such cases.[19] However, these cases concern only defamation
and other crimes against chastity[20] and not to cases concerning Section 68
of PD 705, as amended. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an
interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705
provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of
any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or
employee, or any of the deputized officers or
officials, shall immediately be investigated by the
forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was
allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the
evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the
complaint or report, the investigating forest officer
shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate
official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases and file an information
in Court. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon[21] that the phrase reports and
complaints in Section 80 refers to reports and complaints as might be
brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest officers or
employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the
deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in
their presence.[22]
Here, it was not forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development or any of the deputized officers or officials who reported to
Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private
citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez
cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine if there is
prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report.[23] At any rate,
Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the
Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for
petitioners alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its
part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as
the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction. [24]
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts [25] penalized under PD 705,
provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or
Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations,
or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the
penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in
favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed
as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and
tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest
products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting,
gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products from any
forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land without any authority;[26] and (3) the possession of timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations.[27] Petitioner stands charged of having cut, gathered,
collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private
land[28] without x x x the necessary permit x x x thus his liablity, if ever,
should be limited only for cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]
timber, under the second category. Further, the prosecution evidence
showed that petitioner did not perform any acts of gathering, collecting, or
removing but only the act of cutting a lone narra tree. Hence, this case
hinges on the question of whether petitioner cut x x x timber in the Mayod
Property without a DENR permit.[29]
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property
without a DENR permit, petitioner adopted conflicting positions. Before his
trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra

tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calixs permission.
However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question.
We sustain the lower courts rulings that petitioners extrajudicial admissions
bind him.[30] Petitioner does not explain why Royo and Hernandez, public
officials who testified under oath in their official capacities, would lie on the
stand to implicate petitioner in a serious criminal offense, not to mention that
the acts of these public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity. Further,
petitioner does not deny presenting Calixs authorization to Royo and
Hernandez as his basis for cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property.
Petitioner has no use of Calixs authorization if, as he claimed during the trial,
he did not cut any tree in the Mayod Property.
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod
Property constitutes timber under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD
705 does not define timber, only forest product (which circuitously includes
timber.)[31] Does the narra tree in question constitute timber under Section
68? The closest this Court came to defining the term timber in Section 68
was to provide that timber, includes lumber or processed log.[32] In other
jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified
dimensions[33]or certain stand age or rotation age.[34] In Mustang Lumber,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[35] this Court was faced with a similar task of having
to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - lumber - to determine whether
possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In ruling in the
affirmative, we held that lumber should be taken in its ordinary or common
usage meaning to refer to processed log or timber, thus:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either
timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest
products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of Processing plant, which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical
set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs
and other forest raw materials
into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or
processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the
term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Websters Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs
after being prepared for the market. Simply put, lumber is
a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to
the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute
should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning. And in so far as possession
of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended,
makes no distinction between raw and procesed timber.
Neither should we.[36] x x x x (Italicization in the original;
boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term timber under Section 68
cannot be taken in its common acceptation as referring to wood used for or
suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery.[37] Indeed, tree saplings or
tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables,
or chairs cannot be considered timber.[38]
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted
the same into several pieces of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6
and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111 board feet x x x. These

measurements were indicated in the apprehension receipt Hernandez
issued to petitioner on 26 January 1999 which the prosecution introduced in
evidence.[39] Further, Hernandez testified that the larger portion of the felled
log left in the Mayod Property measured 76 something centimeters [at the
big end] while the smaller end measured 65 centimeters and the length was
2.8 meters.[40] Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to
lumber was timber fit for building or for carpentry or joinery and thus falls
under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified
Theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall
be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding
article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value
of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty
shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand
pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin
temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more
than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional
in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is
over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5
pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the
theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of
the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value
exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is
not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under
the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber
measuring 111 board feet were valued at P3,330. However, if the value of
the log left at the Mayod Property is included, the amount increases
to P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the prosecution relied on
Hernandezs testimony that these amounts, as stated in the apprehension day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and

receipt he issued, are his estimates based on prevailing local price.[41] twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.

This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken

for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the SO ORDERED.

RPC, the prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated

estimate of such fact.[42] In the absence of independent and reliable

corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty

under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the
attendant circumstances of the case.[43] In People v. Dator[44] where, as here,

the accused was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as

amended, for possession of lumber without permit, the prosecutions

evidence for the lumbers value consisted of an estimate made by the

apprehending authorities whose apparent lack of corroboration was

compounded by the fact that the transmittal letter for the estimate was not

presented in evidence. Accordingly, we imposed on the accused the

minimum penalty under Article 309(6)[45] of the RPC.[46]

Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account

the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we find it proper to impose on petitioner,

under the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4)

months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the

Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals with the modification

that petitioner Sesinando Merida is sentenced to four (4) months and one (1)