G.R. No.

149453 October 7, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG
and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners,
vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus Motion;1 (b) Motion
for Reconsideration;2 (c) Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration;3 (d) Motion To Set for Oral
Arguments.4

The Omnibus Motion

The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003 Resolution of this Court which granted
the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The respondent thereafter prays to allow Associate Justices
Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Conchita C. Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S.
Azcuna to voluntary inhibit themselves or, absent their consent, rule that such inhibition is in order and
to recuse them from further deliberating, discussing or, in any manner, participating in the resolution of
the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration. The respondent
points out that the aforenamed members of the Court were appointed by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and after the case at bar was submitted for the
decision of the Court. He asserts that although A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC5 specifically provides that it applies
only to the divisions of the Court, it should likewise apply to this case, in light of the April 1, 2003
Resolution of this Court which set aside its Resolution dated May 28, 2002, apart from the constitutional
issues raised by the respondent in his motion for reconsideration and its supplement. As such, according
to the respondent, the instant case should be unloaded by Justice Callejo, Sr. and re-raffled to any other
member of the Court.

The Court resolves to deny the respondent’s motion for lack of merit.

The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent filed an urgent motion for the
recusation of Justices Renato C. Corona and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez for the reason that they were
appointed to the Court after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and did not participate in the integral
portions of the proceedings. Justices Corona and Austria-Martinez refused to inhibit themselves and
decided to participate in the deliberation on the petition.6 On March 18, 2003, the respondent filed a
motion with the Court for the recusation of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. on account of his voluntary
inhibition when the case was pending before the Court of Appeals.
On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the respondent’s Motion dated March 18,
2003. The respondent thereafter filed his motion for reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of
the Court in which he prayed, inter alia, for the inhibition of Justice Callejo, Sr. under A.M. No. 99-8-09-
SC and that the case be re-raffled to another member of the Court who had actually participated in the
deliberation and the rendition of its May 28, 2002 Resolution. The respondent likewise sought the
inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna, again for the reason that they were
appointed to the Court after the oral arguments on February 19, 2002 and after the case had already
been submitted for decision.

On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the aforesaid motions of the respondent.7 The
Court ruled that A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC is applicable only to cases assigned to the divisions of the Court:

The respondent’s reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99-8-09 is misplaced. As admitted by the
respondent, the said circular is applicable only to motions for reconsideration in cases assigned to the
Divisions of the Court. For cases assigned to the Court En Banc, the policy of the Court had always been
and still is, if the ponente is no longer with the Court, his replacement will act upon the motion for
reconsideration of a party and participate in the deliberations thereof. This is the reason why Justice
Callejo, Sr. who had replaced retired Justice De Leon, prepared the draft of the April 1, 2003 Resolution
of the Court.8

The Court also ruled that there was no need for its newest members to inhibit themselves from
participating in the deliberation of the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration:

Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna were not yet
members of the Court during the February 18, 20029 oral arguments before the Court, nonetheless they
were not disqualified to participate in the deliberations on the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the May 28, 2002 Resolution of the Court or of the instant motion for reconsideration. Neither is Justice
Callejo, Sr. disqualified to prepare the resolution of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent. When the Court deliberated on petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, Justices Conchita
Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Adolfo S. Azcuna were already members of the Court.

It bears stressing that transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the February 18, 2002 hearing and
oral arguments of the parties are parts of the records of this case. Said transcripts are available to the
parties or to any member of the Court. Likewise, Attys. Rene A.V. Saguisag and Felix Carao, Jr. may not
yet have been the counsel of the respondent on February 18, 2002 but by reading the said transcripts
and the records of this case they are informed of what transpired during the hearing and oral arguments
of the parties.10

It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the respondent in his omnibus motion had already been passed
upon and resolved by this Court. The respondent did not make any new substantial arguments in his
motion to warrant a reconsideration of the aforesaid resolutions.

Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna only
after they had already concurred in the Court’s Resolution dated April 1, 2003. Case law has it that a
motion for disqualification must be denied when filed after a member of the Court has already given an
opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale being that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate
upon the action of the Court, only to raise an objection of this sort after a decision has been rendered.11

The Motion to Set the Case for Oral Arguments

The Court denies the motion of the respondent. The parties have already extensively discussed the
issues involved in the case. The respondent’s motion for reconsideration consists of no less than a
hundred pages, excluding the supplement to his motion for reconsideration and his reply to the
petitioners’ comment on his motion. There is no longer a need to set the instant case for oral
arguments.

The Issue as to the Application of the Time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure – Whether Prospective or Retroactive

The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court and thereafter
reinstate its Resolution of May 28, 2002.

He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying
penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP) should be applied
prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable
to the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise
apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was
purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to
a speedy disposition of his case. It is primarily a check on the State to prosecute criminal cases diligently
and continuously, lest it loses its right to prosecute the accused anew. The respondent argues that since
Section 8 is indubitably a rule of procedure, there can be no other conclusion: the rule should have
retroactive application, absent any provision therein that it should be applied prospectively. Accordingly,
prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29,
1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondent’s right to due process and
equal protection of the law.

The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused.
In this case, the State had been given more than sufficient opportunity to prosecute the respondent
anew after the March 29, 1999 dismissal of the cases by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even
before the RRCP took effect on December 1, 2000. According to the respondent, the petitioners filed the
Informations with the RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in
violation of his right to a speedy trial, and that such filing was designed to derail his bid for the Senate.

In their comment on the respondent’s motions, the petitioners assert that the prospective application of
Section 8 is in keeping with Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part that
the rules of procedure which the Court may promulgate shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantial rights. While Section 8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude
the equally important right of the State to public justice. If such right to public justice is taken away,
then Section 8 can no longer be said to be a procedural rule. According to the petitioners, if a procedural
rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive
application. They contend that the right of the accused to a speedy trial or disposition of the criminal
cases applies only to outstanding and pending cases and not to cases already dismissed. The petitioners
assert that the "refiling of the cases" under Section 8 should be taken to mean as the filing of the
criminal complaint with the appropriate office for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation,
and not the actual filing of the criminal complaint or information in court for trial. Furthermore,
according to the petitioners, the offended parties must be given notices of the motion for provisional
dismissal of the cases under Section 8 since the provision so expressly states. Thus, if the requisite
notices to the heirs of the deceased would be taken into consideration, the two-year period had not yet
even commenced to run.

In his consolidated reply to the comment of the petitioners, the respondent asserts that the State is
proscribed from refiling a criminal case if it can be shown that the delay resulted in a violation of the
right of the accused to due process. In this case, there was an inordinate delay in the revival of the
cases, considering that the witnesses in the criminal cases for the State in March 1999 are the same
witnesses in 2001. The State had reasonable opportunity to refile the cases before the two-year bar but
failed to do so because of negligence; and perhaps institutional indolence. Contrary to the petitioners’
contention, the respondent posits that the revival of the cases contemplated in Section 8 refers to the
filing of the Informations or complaints in court for trial. The operational act then is the refiling of the
Informations with the RTC, which was done only on June 6, 2001, clearly beyond the two-year bar.

The Court finds the respondent’s contentions to be without merit.

First. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of
the Constitution which reads:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused.
It must be noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to reinforce the constitutional
right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case. The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by
the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the
benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed
resolution that:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two
years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused
and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression,
unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing
the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and
speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into
account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed
that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be
respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a
denial of justice.12

In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court, in the interest of justice, may
make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation make the rule prospective. The
retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a rule is not automatically determined by the provision of the
Constitution on which the dictate is based. Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own
distinct functions, its own background or precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice,
and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved.13

Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute.14 To paraphrase the
United States Supreme Court per Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court in defining the limits of adherence
may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relating forward.15

The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the
Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia, to
determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of
the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending before it if in its opinion their
application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall
apply.16

The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective application only does not proscribe the
prospective application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to be given
retroactive and prospective effect. If the statutory purpose is clear, the provisions of the law should be
construed as is conducive to fairness and justice, and in harmony with the general spirit and policy of
the rule. It should be construed so as not to defeat but to carry out such end or purpose.17 A statute
derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved. To construe it in a manner that disregards
or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law.18 In Cometa v. Court of Appeals,19 this Court
ruled that "the spirit rather than the letter of the statute determines its construction; hence, a statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent."20 While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not
there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we
defer not to the "letter that killeth" but to the "spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmaker’s
will."21

In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively
and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose
for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional
dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would be a denial of the State’s
right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the
present case as the respondent insists, considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed
by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A
retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the
State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.

Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC) provisionally dismissed a criminal case with the express
consent of the accused in 1997. The prosecution had the right to revive the case within the prescriptive
period, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On December 1, 2000, the time-bar
rule under Section 8 took effect, the prosecution was unable to revive the criminal case before then.

If the time-bar fixed in Section 8 were to be applied retroactively, this would mean that the State would
be barred from reviving the case for failure to comply with the said time-bar, which was yet to be
approved by the Court three years after the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. In contrast, if the
same case was dismissed provisionally in December 2000, the State had the right to revive the same
within the time-bar. In fine, to so hold would imply that the State was presumed to foresee and
anticipate that three years after 1997, the Court would approve and amend the RRCP. The State would
thus be sanctioned for its failure to comply with a rule yet to be approved by the Court. It must be
stressed that the institution and prosecution of criminal cases are governed by existing rules and not by
rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or ideal existence
before it was approved by the Court. The past cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application
of the new rule.

In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the criminal cases
provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, this Court explained, thus:

The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year
period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the
new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had
considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court
applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until
March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period
fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would
have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This
is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to
the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the
administration of justice.

The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 199922 should be excluded in the computation of the
two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not
be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to
revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the
two-year period under the new rule.1a\^/phi1.net As the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice
Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People, 351 US 12 (1956):

We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and,
therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights …

The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should
not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein
provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice of hardship" to the State
and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.23

Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter’s opinion in Griffin v. People,24 he said, "it is much more
conducive to law’s self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective content to
a new pronouncement of law. That this is consonant with the spirit of our law and justified by those
considerations of reason which should dominate the law has been luminously expounded by Mr. Justice
Cardozo shortly before he came here and in an opinion which he wrote for the Court."

Parenthetically, the respondent himself admitted in his motion for reconsideration that Judge Agnir, Jr.
could not have been expected to comply with the notice requirement under the new rule when it yet
had to exist:

99. Respondent submits that the records are still in the same state of inadequacy and incompletion. This
however is not strange considering that Section 8, Rule 117 had not existed on March 29, 1999, when
the criminal cases were dismissed, and then Judge Agnir did not have its text to guide his actions. How
could the good judge have complied with the mandate of Section 8, Rule 117 when it yet had to exist?25

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent, procedural laws are
retroactive.26 Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr.
before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. When the petitioners filed the Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-
99-81689 had long since been terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned
from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but from
December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect. While it is true that the Court applied Section 8 of
Rule 11027 of the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court and not to cases
already terminated with finality.

The records show that after the requisite preliminary investigation conducted by the petitioners in
accordance with existing rules, eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
were filed with the RTC on June 6, 2001, very well within the time-bar therefor. The respondent cannot
argue that his right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases as enshrined in the
Constitution had been violated.28
The respondent’s plaint that he was being singled out by the prospective application of the new rule
simply because before the Court issued its April 1, 2003 Resolution, he announced his candidacy for the
presidency of the Republic for the 2004 elections has no factual basis whatsoever.29 The bare and
irrefutable fact is that it was in this case where the issue of the retroactive/prospective application of
the new rule was first raised before the Court. The ruling of the Court in its April 1, 2003 Resolution and
its ruling today would be the same, regardless of who the party or parties involved are, whether a
senator of the Republic or an ordinary citizen.

The respondent’s contention that the prospective application of the new rule would deny him due
process and would violate the equal protection of laws is barren of merit. It proceeds from an erroneous
assumption that the new rule was approved by the Court solely for his benefit, in derogation of the right
of the State to due process. The new rule was approved by the Court to enhance the right of due
process of both the State and the accused. The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases as much
as the accused.

Due process has never been and perhaps can never be precisely defined.1a\^/phi1.net It is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. The phrase
expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness, a requisite whose meaning can be as opaque as its
importance is lofty.30 In determining what fundamental fairness consists of in a particular situation,
relevant precedents must be considered and the interests that are at stake; private interests, as well as
the interests of the government must be assessed. In this case, in holding that the new rule has
prospective and not retroactive application, the Court took into consideration not only the interests of
the respondent but all other accused, whatever their station in life may be. The interest of the State in
the speedy, impartial and inexpensive disposition of criminal cases was likewise considered.

The Respondent Failed to Comply with the Essential Prerequisites of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure

The respondent argues that the issue involved in the Court of Appeals is entirely different from the issue
involved in the present recourse; hence, any admissions he made in the court below are not judicial
admissions in this case. He asserts that the issue involved in the CA was whether or not he was placed in
double jeopardy when he was charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
despite the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; whereas the issue in this Court
is whether the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 was barred by Section 8,
Rule 117 of the RRCP. The respondent avers that the proceedings in the appellate court are different
from those in this Court.

The respondent posits that this Court erred in giving considerable weight to the admissions he made in
his pleadings and during the proceedings in the CA. He stresses that judicial admissions may only be
used against a party if such admissions are (a) made in the course of the proceedings in the same case;
and (b) made regarding a relevant fact, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 and Section 26, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Evidence. He contends that contrary to the ruling of the Court, when he filed his motion for the
judicial determination of probable cause in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, he thereby
prayed for the dismissal of the said cases. His motion carried with it, at the very least, the prayer for the
dismissal of the criminal cases. Absent a finding of probable cause, Judge Agnir, Jr. had no recourse but
to dismiss the criminal cases. Moreover, the respondent avers that his motion included the general
prayer "for such other reliefs as may be equitable in the premises." The respondent also points out that
the public prosecutor agreed to the averments in his motion as the latter did not even file any motion
for the reconsideration of Judge Agnir, Jr.’s order dismissing the cases.

The respondent further contends that the Court is not a trier of facts. It has no means to ascertain or
verify as true the contrasting claims of the parties on the factual issues, a function best left to the trial
court as the trier of facts. He posits that there is a need for the case to be remanded to the RTC to
enable him to present evidence on whether or not Judge Agnir, Jr. complied with the notice
requirements of Section 8. Echoing the May 28, 2002 ruling of this Court, the respondent contends that
it is not fair to expect the element of notice under Section 8 to be litigated before Judge Agnir, Jr., for
the said rule was not yet in existence at the time he filed his motion for a determination of probable
cause.

The respondent avers that the requirement for notices to the offended parties under Section 8 is a
formal and not an essential requisite. In criminal cases, the offended party is the State and the role of
the private complainant is limited to the determination of the civil liability of the accused. According to
the respondent, notice to the prosecution provides sufficient safeguard for the private complainant to
recover on the civil liability of the accused based on the delicts; after all, the prosecution of the offense
is under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.

The contentions of the respondent have no merit.

First. The issue posed by the respondent in the CA and in this Court are the same. To recall, in Civil Case
No. 01-100933,31 the respondent32 sought injunctive relief from the RTC of Manila on his claim that in
conducting a preliminary investigation in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, the petitioners
thereby placed him in double jeopardy under Section 7, Rule 117 of the RRCP.33 When the RTC denied
his plea for injunctive relief, the respondent filed his petition for certiorari in the CA, again invoking his
right against double jeopardy, praying that:

13. Inasmuch as the case subject of the "preliminary investigation" was dismissed for the reasons
mentioned, there currently exists no complaint upon which a valid investigation can be had in light of
the clear provisions of Rule 110 which requires the existence of a "sworn written statement charging a
person with an offense" as basis for the commencement of a preliminary investigation under Rule
112.1awphi1.nét

For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly the same offenses over which he had been duly arraigned
and a plea validly entered before the Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 57) before its
remand to the QC RTC. Hence, to proceed therewith on similar charges will put him in jeopardy of being
twice punished therefor (Article III, §21, Constitution).34
The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689 by Judge Agnir, Jr. amounted to a judgment of acquittal; hence, he could no longer be
charged and prosecuted anew for the same offense without violating his right against double jeopardy.
However, the respondent filed a second amended petition wherein he invoked for the first time Section
8 of Rule 117 of the RRCP:

(e) the new criminal cases for Murder filed by respondents against petitioner and the other accused on
June 6, 2001 (docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112) and pending before respondent
Judge Yadao (Annex B) is dismissible on its face as they involve exactly the same accused, facts, and
offenses which had previously been dismissed by the QC RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on
March 29, 1999, hence, can no longer be revived two (2) years after such dismissal in accordance with
the clear provisions of Section 8, Rule 117.35

Indeed, the CA granted the respondent’s petition based on Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP. In this case,
the respondent invoked the same rule and the Constitution. Thus, during the oral arguments in this
Court, the respondent, through counsel, admitted that he was indeed invoking Section 8 anew and the
provisions of the Constitution on double jeopardy:

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

You are saying that Sen. Lacson can no longer be prosecuted forever for that crime, for the killing of the
11 in 1995?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is my submission, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Let us see your reason for it?

ATTY. FORTUN:36

First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not?

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:37

Allow me to qualify the effects of double jeopardy occur with permanent dismissal that is my
submission.

ATTY. FORTUN:38

No, no, I am not talking of the effects, I am talking of the doctrine, you are not invoking the doctrine of
double jeopardy?

ATTY. FORTUN:
Your Honor, double jeopardy does not apply Section 8, 117 they are (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

That is right.

ATTY. FORTUN:

They are two different claims.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

That is what I am trying to rule out so that we do not have to discuss it.

ATTY. FORTUN:

Very well, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

You are not invoking double jeopardy?

ATTY. FORTUN:

As I mentioned we are saying that the effects of a permanent dismissal vest the effects (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

No, I am not talking of the effects, I am asking about the application, you are not asking the Court to
apply the doctrine of double jeopardy to prevent a prosecution of Mr. Lacson?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Because the element of double jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

So, the answer is yes?

ATTY. FORTUN:

No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a permanent dismissal vests the rights of double jeopardy
upon the accused who invokes it.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

What you are saying is the effects, I am not asking about the effects, I will ask that later.

ATTY. FORTUN:
They are two different (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Later, I am asking about doctrines. Since you are not invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy you are
resting your case win or lose, sink or sail on the application of 8,117?

ATTY. FORTUN:

On the constitutional right of the accused under Section 16 of Article 3 which is speedy disposition of
cases which implemented 8,817, that is our arguments in this bar.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Are you not resting on 8,117?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

So, you are resting on 8,117?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Not exclusive, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

And the Constitution?

ATTY. FORTUN:

The Constitution which gave life to 8,117.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

To speedy disposition?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Can a Court, let us see your theory then – your theory rest on two provisions: first, the Rules of Court
8,117 and Second, the Constitution on speedy disposition?

ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.39

Second. The respondent’s answers to the questions of Madame Justice Josefina Salonga during the
hearing in the CA where he admitted, through counsel, that he gave no express conformity to the
dismissal of the cases by Judge Agnir, Jr., were in relation to Section 8 of Rule 117 and not to Section 7 of
Rule 117 on double jeopardy, thus:

JUSTICE SALONGA:

Do we get it from you that it is your stand that this is applicable to the case at bar?

ATTY. FORTUN:

It is my submission, that it is, Your Honor. In addition, of course, to my proposition that Mr. Lacson is
covered by the rule on double jeopardy as well, because he had already been arraigned before the
Sandiganbayan prior to the case being remanded to the RTC.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

You are referring to those cases which were dismissed by the RTC of Quezon City.

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?

ATTY. FORTUN:

It was in that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a judicial
determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, [Jr.] upon the
presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits,
made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the
issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed except [if] it
is with the express conformity of the accused.

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?

ATTY. FORTUN:

There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement which would
normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including other provisional dismissal.
My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful
on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact, they ask the accused to come forward, and the judge
himself or herself explains the implications of a provisional dismissal.40

The respondent, through counsel, even admitted that despite his plea for equitable relief in his motion
for a judicial determination of probable cause in the RTC, he did not agree to a provisional dismissal of
the cases. The respondent insisted that the only relief he prayed for before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that
warrants for his arrest be withheld pending a finding of probable cause. He asserted that the judge did
not even require him to agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases:

JUSTICE ROSARIO:

You were present during the proceedings?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE ROSARIO:

You represented the petitioner in this case?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge Agnir, [Jr.] who
is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of
Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination of probable
cause?

ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what should the
Court do?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a
copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said: "Wherefore, it is
respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to
present private complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the
warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until
resolution of this incident."

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

There is no general prayer for any further relief?

ATTY. FORTUN:

There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Don’t you surmise Judge Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer for
just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a situation where
there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree
to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal, did you not file any motion for reconsideration of the
order of Judge Agnir, [Jr.] that the case should be dismissed?

ATTY. FORTUN:

I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already been
arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by
Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step in addition to
rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further because it probably could prejudice the interest of my
client.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Continue.41

In his memorandum, in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the respondent
declared in no uncertain terms that:

Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without
jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC. Upon raffle, the case was
assigned to Branch 91. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the
dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSG’s claim.42

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her attorney, in the course of
judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. It is a voluntary
concession of fact by a party or a party’s attorney during such judicial proceedings, including admissions
in pleadings made by a party.43 It may occur at any point during the litigation process. An admission in
open court is a judicial admission.44 A judicial admission binds the client even if made by his counsel.45 As
declared by this Court:

... [I]n fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of attorney of record, who is, for the
purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made ... for the purpose of
dispensing with proof of some fact, ... they bind the client, whether made during, or even after the
trial."46

When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that he did not
give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact admitted that one of the
essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent.

The respondent’s contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during the hearing in the CA
cannot be used in the present case as they were made in the course of a different proceeding does not
hold water. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings before the Court was by way of an appeal
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, from the proceedings in the CA; as such, the present
recourse is but a mere continuation of the proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a new trial, but
a review of proceedings which commenced from the trial court, which later passed through the CA. The
respondent is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA, and such admissions so hold him in
the proceedings before this Court. As categorically stated in Habecker v. Clark Equipment Company:47

... [J]udicial admissions on issues of fact, including those made by counsel on behalf of a client during a
trial, are binding "for the purpose of the case ... including appeals."

While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it finds no probable
cause, absent the express consent of the accused to such provisional dismissal, the latter cannot
thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar a revival thereof. Neither may the accused do so simply because the
public prosecutor did not object to a motion of the accused for a judicial determination of probable
cause or file a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the case. Even a cursory
reading of the respondent’s motion for a judicial determination of probable cause will show that it
contained no allegation that there was no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the
respondent’s arrest as a prayer for the dismissal of the cases. The respondent was only asking the court
to determine whether or not there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and in
the meantime, to hold in abeyance the issuance of the said warrant. Case law has it that a prayer for
equitable relief is of no avail, unless the petition states facts which will authorize the court to grant such
relief.48 A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by
the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is resolved or decided beyond them is coram non judice and
void.49

Third. There is no need for the Court to remand the instant case to the trial court to enable the
respondent to adduce post facto evidence that the requisite notices under Section 8 had been complied
with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court has thoroughly examined the voluminous records from the
Sandiganbayan and the RTC50 and found no proof that the requisite notices were even served on all the
heirs of the victims. The respondent himself admitted that, as held by this Court, in its May 28, 2002
Resolution, "Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with the mandate under Section 8 because said
rule had yet to exist."51

One final matter. The records show that Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were assigned,
through the customary raffle of cases, to Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City, the same branch which
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 99-81679 to 99-81689.52 In the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City was directed to try and decide Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with reasonable dispatch. The Court notes, however, that in
Administrative Order No. 104-96, it designated six branches of the RTC of Quezon City53 as special
courts, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659. Since the accused in the
said cases are charged with murder, which under Rep. Act No. 7659, is classified as a heinous crime, the
above cases should be consolidated and re-raffled by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City to a
branch thereof designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panfilo M. Lacson’s Omnibus Motion and Motion to Set
for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and its Supplement are
DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby
DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same
with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a special
court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.

Puno, J., maintains his dissent.

Vitug, J., maintains his dissent and reiterate his opinion on the Court’s resolution of 28 May 2002.

Ynares-Santiago, J., see separate dissenting opinion.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see dissenting opinion.

Carpio, J., no part.

Corona, J., on leave.

Tinga, J., no part.

Footnotes
1
Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 1563-1570.
2
Id. at 1391-1491.
3
Id. at 1513-1529.
4
Id. at 1493.
5
Rules on Who Shall Resolve Motions for Reconsideration in Cases Assigned to the Divisions of the
Court, effective April 1, 2000.
6
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 1179.
7
Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1496.
8
Id. at 1501.
9
February 18, 2002 should read February 19, 2002.
10
Id. at 1500-1501.
11
Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 161 SCRA 83 (1988).
12
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 1342.
13
Stovall v. Denno, 18 L.Ed.2d. 1199 (1967).
14
United States Fidelity & Guarantee Company v. United States, 52 L.Ed. 804 (1908).
15
Great Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Company, 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932).
16
Rule 144, Rules of Court, as amended:

These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1964. They shall govern all cases brought after they take
effect, and also all further proceedings in cases then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of
the court their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former
procedure shall apply.
17
Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 92 So. 193 (1921).
18
Pilipinas Kao, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 372 SCRA 548 (2001).
19
351 SCRA 294 (2001).
20
Id. at 304.
21
Id.
22
November 30, 1999 should read November 30, 2000.
23
Resolution dated April 1, 2003, pp. 25-26; Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1343-1344.
24
Supra.
25
Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1448.
26
Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002.
27
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
28
U.S. v. Panczko, 367 F. 2d. 737 (1966).
29
In its April 29, 2003 Resolution, the respondent’s allusion of loud whispers caused by a suspicion that
this Court or any member of this Court had been manipulated by politics in this government was
rejected by the Court, thus:
"The respondent’s allusion of loud whispers caused by a suspicion that this Court or any member of the
Court had been manipulated by politics in this government when it resolved to set aside its 28 May 2002
Resolution is downright irresponsible. Not too long ago, a distinguished member of the Court said:

Those who wear the black robes are enrolled in a noble mission; become different persons; forfeit their
past activities, friends and even relatives; and devote full time, attention and effort to the rather
reclusive and exclusive world of decision-making….

Quoting Rufus Choate, in part, a judge or justice in administering justice "shall know nothing about the
parties, everything about the case. He shall do everything for justice; nothing for himself; nothing for his
friend; nothing for his patron; nothing for his sovereign." All members of the Court acted on and
resolved petitioners’ motion for reconsideration as well as respondent’s motion to recuse Justice
Callejo, Sr. in light of their respective study of the records and the relevant laws and rules after due
deliberation…. (Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1499).
30
Lassite v. Department of Social Services, 68 L.Ed.2d. 640 (1981).
31
Entitled and docketed as Lacson v. Department of Justice, Civil Case No. 01-100933 for prohibition
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. (CA Rollo, p. 29).
32
There were 27 accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Except for Inspector Manuel
Alvarez, the said accused were also charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. Only the
respondent filed his petition in said case.
33
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the
following instances:

(a) the greater offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in Section 1(f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he
shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.
34
CA Rollo, pp. 8-9. (Underscoring supplied).
35
Id. at 110.
36
This should read "Justice Panganiban."
37
This should read "Atty. Fortun."
38
This should read "Justice Panganiban."
39
TSN, 19 February 2002, pp. 220-225. (Underscoring supplied).
40
TSN (CA Rollo), 31 July 2001, pp. 12-14. (Underscoring supplied).
41
Ibid., pp. 15-18. (Emphasis ours).
42
Memorandum of Petitioner; CA Rollo, p. 378.
43
Am Jur, Evidence, §770.
44
Ibid. §771.
45
Glick v. White Motor Company, 458 F.2d. 1287 (1972).
46
People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25 (1996), citing 31 C.J.S. 537.
47
797 F.Supp. 381 (1992), citing Glick v. White Motor Co., supra.
48
Branz v. Hylton, 265 N.W. 16 (1936).
49
15 Ruling Case Law, 854 and 328.
50
The records from the Sandiganbayan and the RTC which were elevated to this Court consisted of 11
volumes plus 11 additional folders per Letter dated April 26, 2002.
51
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 33; Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1423; Consolidated Reply, p. 28.
52
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 465.
53
Branches 76, 86, 95, 102, 103 and 219.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is to reiterate my dissent to the unbelievable about-face by the Court in the April 1, 2003 Resolution
confirmed and renewed in its latest Resolution.

The reasons for this continuing dissent are basically similar to those expressed in three Dissenting
Opinions to the April 1, 2003 Resolution.1 Nothing has changed in the history of the charges against
Senator Panfilo M. Lacson except the disturbing and unusual ruling of this Court now.

If the charges against Senator Lacson are to be relentlessly pursued, the pursuit must be done in a
constitutional and fair manner. It is the use of legal short-cuts, pained reasoning and the hasty
procedure after several years of inaction which constrain this dissent. If Senator Lacson is to be found
guilty of participation in multiple murder, it should be only after due process is followed.

The new majority Resolution is a volte-face, a complete turn-around from the previously unanimous
judgment dated May 28, 2002.

The 2002 Resolution of the Court remanded the Government’s petition to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City to ascertain important factual issues. The Resolution was concluded beyond doubt or
ambiguity without any dissenting vote.

The issues sought to be revived were all resolved two years ago. What the Court unanimously retired
should be allowed to rest. Instead, the Court now wants to allow the use of the strong arm of the law to
oppressively prosecute and persecute.1a\^/phi1.net

If the petitioners can show strong compelling reasons, newly discovered, or some deeply held
convictions based on a genuine sense of justice or irresistible considerations of equity, I could concur to
ignore established procedure.

Unfortunately, all I can discern here is allowing the use of the strong arm of the law to oppressively
prosecute a public officer whom the powers-that-be detest and whom they seek to render completely
ineffective.2

In the April 1, 2003 Resolution, I concurred with Mme. Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez who, like me,
started her long judicial career as a municipal trial judge and, later, judge of a regional trial court. I
agreed with the conclusion that the petitioner’s right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases
were violated and the filing of new informations constitute persecution. I concurred that in the
prosecution of an accused he must not be perceived as an intractable enemy, and that the over-
eagerness to prosecute respondent is a clear example of persecution.
There is nothing in the pleadings after our dissent to the April 1, 2003 Resolution or in the discussions of
the respondent’s motion for reconsideration that shows our May 28, 2002 Resolution was wrong or that
the Court was correcting an injustice when it suddenly reversed itself.

Respondent stresses the need for compliance with the rule of law, the primacy of the Constitution over
acts of State, and the independence of the judiciary. When respondent urges the Court to remember
that it is not a trier of facts, he raises a fundamental threshold question. It involves the application of
what has been described as an immutable principle of justice,3 the essence of ordered liberty,4 so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,5 a canon of civilized
decency,6 a guarantee against the oppressions and usurpations of royal prerogatives,7 and a
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason and obedience to the dictates of justice.8 He is asking for
due process.

Under the Constitution, this Court resolves "cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved."9 It is therefore not a trier of facts.

The Court itself in the April 1, 2003 Resolution summarized the facts to be resolved:

1. Whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused;

2. Whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party;

3. Whether the two-year period to revive it has already lapsed;

4. Whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the two year period;

5. Whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases were dismissed by then Judge
Agnir;

6. Whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three other victims; and

7. Whether the multiple murder cases against respondent are being revived within or beyond the two-
year bar.10

The facts to be resolved requires submission of evidence. They are material facts because proof of their
actuality is needed to enable the Court to render judgment on the basic issues raised. Evidence to prove
the facts in issue have to be introduced in accordance with the principles of substantive law and the
rules of pleading, practice and procedure. The facts are in dispute because one party alleges their
existence while the other denies them, both with some show of reason.11 If the unanimous judgment in
2002 is to be reversed by a new majority, a remand to ascertain these facts outlined is imperative.

Facts have to be established by evidence, not by inferences, not by suppositions, and certainly not by
the augury of divination. Yet, the majority precisely proceeded to do it that way.

If the facts material to the Court’s judgment were found by the new majority from the records, how
could the unanimous Court have missed so many of these significant facts in 2002?
If doubts are to be resolved and suppositions and fallacies avoided, every method of getting the truth
through adversarial proceedings before a trial court must be explored. Let the Regional Trial Court which
is a trier of facts do the job.

If, for instance, the Court suddenly discovers that there has been no trial, not even a pre-trial in the
almost two decades a case has been pending; if the questions raised are complicated, complex and
tricky; if there is no evidence in the records, no transcripts of stenographic notes and no exhibits; the
Court would have to refer the factual issues to a trial court. It should not arrive at a summary judgment
based on the pleadings before it. This is what the new majority has done.

A key factual issue is the applicability to the cases against respondent of the rule on provisional dismissal
found in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 8 of Rule 117 thereof provides:

Provisional Dismissal – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of
any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after the issuance of the order without the
case having been reviewed. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revised.

The determination of whether or not the above rule applies in this case entails factual issues. Has the
two-year period expired? Was the dismissal of the cases with the express consent of the accused? Was
there notice to the offended party? By their very nature, these questions justify a remand to the trial
court.

The new majority first tackles the application of the two-year time bar in Rule 117 to this case. The
criminal cases were dismissed by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999. The Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure took effect the following year on December 1, 2000. If the new rule is not applied
retroactively, would the old rule, where there was no time bar, apply?

The new majority rules that the time bar should apply only prospectively. I find this decision disturbing if
it is indicative of a novel approach to individual liberties.1a\^/phi1.net The Bill of Rights is a statement of
the liberties of individuals protected against exertions of government power. The ponencia seeks to
protect the "rights" of the State against its citizens and invokes the Bill of Rights in the process.

The Bill of Rights refers to fundamental individual rights and the guaranteed protection is against
Government or any of its officials. It cannot be invoked against actions of private parties unless private
action is backed by government power.

Government exercises powers not rights. When the Constitution provides that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,"13 the "person" referred to is not the
State. When we mention in our decisions that the State also deserves due process, it is merely a quaint
way of saying that the law and the rules should be followed if intended to protect State interests. But
never should the rights of a citizen be weighed against the non-existent rights of the State which should
be recognized and denominated as the powers of the State.

There is sometimes a balancing of individual rights against State power where public interest is involved.
The individual is always at a terrific disadvantage when a basic right is weighed against the awesome
powers of a State. There is no need for balancing in this case.

If the issue involved is protection of a citizen against overzealous criminal prosecutions, the reason for
ruling against him should never be due process rights of the State. The Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno in the April 1, 2003, with which I also concurred, discusses the origin of the amended
rule, its nuances and reasons for being, and the inflexibility of the permanent time bar once the two-
year period is reached. The Rule is intended to protect the rights of the accused, not to make it easier
for the Government to prosecute him. Here, the Court wants us to allow the use of a protection for the
citizen against that citizen. Its enactment becomes counter-productive. The extensive and learned
discussion of the Honorable Chairman of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court is glossed
over. It should be re-read.

The amended rule is intended to prod the Government into a more faithful and accountable
performance of duty, to avoid the tyrannical Damocles’ sword hanging indefinitely over a person whom
the Government wants to coerce into indeterminate submission, and to stop the malaise of public
officers who are shiftless and lethargic and who are prodded into action only after the passage of
interminable time or when revenge or a desire to vex and oppress suddenly surfaces.

If the rule is a just rule, if its objectives are salutary and if its enforcement will mean an enlargement of
individual rights, why should a recent accused enjoy it to the exclusion of those with pending cases
when it was enacted? Justice should be for everyone especially those accused where prosecution and
trial have dragged for years and years. A rule should not protect the incompetence or lethargy of
Government prosecutors.

I submit that the new rule should be made retroactive. This interpretation is in line with simple justice.
The statement of the majority that the due process protections of the State and those of the individual
should be equal is dangerous for a Supreme Court to utter.

With all due respect, the justifications in the ponencia display an insensitivity to individual liberties. The
spirited defense of the powers of the State in the context of individual freedoms is bewildering to say
the least. It is hoped that such a cavalier approach to the Bill of Rights is a passing aberration and that
the Court will again stand firmly as the constitutional bulwark against State power and oppression. The
Court should not remain silent and, more important, should take a firm stand when a citizen is harassed
and persecuted by the formidable powers of Government.

The statement that the ruling of the Court in 2003 and any ruling today would be the same, regardless
of who the parties involved are, whether a Senator, presidentiable, or an ordinary citizen is, in the light
of our judgment in this case, is not believable.
The bedrock issue underlying all aspects of the about-face decision sought to be reconsidered involves
the correct approach to the Bill of Rights. If the interpretation of the amended rule shows a back-sliding
of the Court’s traditional approach to individual liberty, that interpretation must be avoided. The history
of the due process clause goes back to the beginning of the era of enlightenment. It traces the step-by-
step wresting of rights from absolution and monarchy. There is no monarchy today but claims of
authority against liberty are vested in State power. The ponencia unwittingly dilutes a guarantee of
liberty against a misinterpretation of State power.

In the resolution of whether the rule should be applied retroactively, we must divorce the issue from the
various personalities involved, and focus simply on the principles of interpretation that have governed
this Court since its inception.

The ponencia declares that there is no express requirement for the revised rule to be given retroactive
application. It states that under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Rules shall not be applied "to actions
pending before it if in its opinion their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in
which event, the former procedure shall apply."12 Rule 144, for ready reference, provides:

These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1964. They shall govern all cases brought after they take
effect, and also all further proceedings in cases then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of
the court their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former
procedure would apply. (underscoring supplied.)

In the same breath, the ponencia expresses that "[s]tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will
be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that
sense and to that extent, procedural laws are retroactive."13 Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 are then characterized as having been long dismissed before the new rule took effect on
December 1, 2000. The ponencia goes on to state that:

[w]hen the petitioners filed the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6,
2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated. The two-year bar
in the new rule should not be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 but from December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect. While it is true that
the Court applied Section 8 of Rule 110 of the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending
with this Court and not to cases already terminated with finality. (Citations omitted, underscoring
supplied.)14

There is a fundamental inconsistency in the foregoing statements. If one were to apply Rule 144, as the
ponencia has done, this would mean characterizing Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as
being pending proceedings as of the effective date of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, since this
is what a plain reading of Rule 144 would require. This would go completely against the statement of the
same ponencia that characterizes Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as having long since
been terminated when the petitioner filed the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112. Were the proceedings pending as of the effective date of the Revised Rules, or had they already
been terminated? It is not pure legal quibbling to demand a consistent characterization of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. One cannot characterize these cases as pending, invoke their
pendency as basis for the non-retroactive application of Rule 117, Section 8, and then characterize them
as having been terminated in order to similarly deny the retroactive application of the new procedural
rules. The ponencia’s bases for the non-retroactive application of the revised rule are completely
impossible to reconcile.

Regardless of the characterization of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, I submit that Rule
117, Section 8 should be given retroactive application, consistent with the principles of statutory
construction of procedural rules.

Procedural laws, by definition, prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining
redress. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law, procedural
law – as distinguished from substantive law – is that which provides or regulates the steps by which one
who commits a crime is to be punished.15

In interpreting procedural rules, this Court, in the 1927 case of Hosana v. Diomano and Diomano,16 laid
down the rule that procedural rules will be construed as applicable to causes of action accrued, and
actions pending and undetermined, at the time of their passage, unless: (1) such actions are expressly
excepted; or (2) vested rights would be disturbed by giving them a retroactive application.17

The causes of action in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 – in which the Informations allege
essentially the same operative facts as those alleged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689,
with the primary difference that respondent is charged as a principal and no longer as an accessory –
had undoubtedly already accrued as of December 1, 2000, the effective date of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Thus, whether the criminal actions in question were "pending", or the causes of
action had merely "accrued", the retroactive application of the RRCP is called for.

Undoubtedly, there is no express exception to the retroactive application of Rule 117, Section 8. Thus,
unless vested rights are disturbed, its retroactive application is clearly mandated.

On this point, it has been held that the retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected.18 This is because of the fundamental
principle that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to nor arise from procedural laws. This is a
principle that we have enunciated in a long line of cases.19 A person has no vested right in any rule of
law which entitles him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit.20

The ponencia seems to hold that vested rights would indeed be disturbed if Rule 117, Section 8 were
given retroactive application. Specifically, this argument focuses on the State’s right to due process,
which purportedly would be violated by the retroactive application of the questioned procedural rule.
Thus, the ponencia asserts that:

when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively and not
retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for
which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional
dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would be a denial of the State’s
right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the
present case as respondent insists, considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by
Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 19, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive
application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to
the victims of crimes and their heirs.

xxxxxxxxx

The State would thus be sanctioned for its failure to comply with a rule yet to be approved by the Court.
It must be stressed that the institution and prosecution of criminal cases are governed by existing rules
and not by rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or
ideal existence before it was approved by the Court. The past cannot be erased by a capricious
retroactive application of the new rule.21

In making these assertions, the ponencia has undoubtedly placed a premium on the State’s right to
procedural due process.

The State’s right to due process must be viewed from proper perspectives. It cannot be said that such
right would be violated by a retroactive application of Rule 117, Section 8. It appears clear that the
invocation of due process is an attempt to cloak a flawed argument using a Constitutional precept. As
earlier intimated, the ponencia is unable to pinpoint with specificity exactly how the "due process right"
of the State had already vested as of the passage of the Revised Rules, and how this "vested right" could
be violated by the retroactive application of Rule 117, Section 8.

Stripped to its basics, procedural due process is a matter of nothing more or less than procedural
fairness. There would be nothing procedurally unfair about giving a retroactive application to Rule 117,
Section 8. Precisely, this Court is specifically empowered by the Constitution to promulgate such rules of
procedure, and, in the past, we have had no qualms about applying such rules of procedure
retroactively, ruling firmly that no vested rights are impaired even if the effect of the retroactive
application of such rules would be to divest a court or tribunal of its jurisdiction. In such instances, we
have advised the party-litigants that their rights have not been impaired.22

There is no cogent reason to depart from this principle even if, in this case, the People is one of the
party-litigants. Departing from the fundamental principle in this case seems to be an instance of
selective statutory construction to achieve the desire to attain a particular result.

If anything, the fact that the People is one of the party-litigants should call for a more vigilant
application of the Rules strictly against the People or the State and liberally in favor of the private
individuals who might be benefited by the retroactive application of the procedural rule.

Although it is true that the prosecutors would have no inkling, as of the provisional dismissal of the case
on March 29, 1999, that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure would contain Rule 117, Section 8, they
undoubtedly had notice as of the effective date thereof on December 1, 2000. From that date, they had
almost four months in which to revive Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, had there been a
need to do so. In cases involving purely private litigants, we have not hesitated in dismissing cases when
a party or parties have not been vigilant in protecting their rights.23 At the risk of being repetitive, there
is no reason to depart from this principle simply because the State is a litigant.

Moreover, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.24 Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor
of the accused.25

By way of example, we have not hesitated in the retroactive application of such laws as Republic Act No.
7659, which lowered the penalties for certain crimes, insofar as the lower penalty was favorable to the
accused. In the cases of People v. Simon,26 People v. Manalo,27Danao v. Court of Appeals,28 and People v.
Piasidad,29 judgment had already been rendered by the respective trial courts against the respective
accused individuals in question. Pending appeal of the cases, the legislature passed R.A. 7659, effective
December 31, 1993. In addition to re-imposing the death penalty, R.A. 7659 lowered the penalty
imposable on individuals who had violated the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court invariably applied the
lower penalty retroactively, even if the crimes had been consummated, prosecution had been initiated,
and a decision had in fact already been rendered by the trial courts while the higher penalties were still
imposable.

As a more extreme example, in the 1996 case of Cruz v. Correctional Institution for Women in
Mandaluyong,30 the accused therein was already serving a final and executory penalty of reclusion
perpetua. During her service of this sentence, R.A. 7659 was passed, lowering the penalty imposable for
the crime for which she was convicted. Even if her sentence was already being served, this Court
retroactively applied R.A. 7659 and ordered her immediate release since she had already served the
maximum of her sentence.1a\^/phi1.net

From a particular perspective, granting the retroactive application of penal laws would likewise impair
the "vested" rights of the State in seeing to it that criminals are given just retribution. In such instances,
though, we have not hesitated in putting a primacy on the rights of the private individuals. The
retroactive application of Rule 117, Section 8 is thus called for.

We move on to another factual issue to illustrate that, if we have to change our minds – and I repeat
that our Resolution dated May 28, 2002 correctly resolved the issue – the Court should get the factual
answers through a remand.

Did the accused give express consent to the provisional dismissal of his case?

The Court in its first Resolution stated that "(i)t was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss
the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then, Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that
their dismissal bears his express consent."
Now, the majority finds the motion to dismiss as an inadequate mode of expressing consent. Obviously,
the Court wants a formal manifestation filed in court where an accused has to declare, "I hereby consent
to the provisional dismissal of my case."

The majority is asking too much. The amended Rule does not provide for a rigidly precise wording of
consent. There are no required magic words whose non-utterance would be fatal. There are no fixed
and supererogatory incantations, no pigeon-holes of ritual where set formalities must be fitted. When
an accused moves that his case be dismissed, that is a stronger mode of consent than merely saying, "I
hereby consent." When the respondent's counsel answered "none" to the question, "was there an
express conformity?", he was referring to a formal manifestation of "yes, your Honor, the accused
consents." There was no such pleading or manifestation. However, the lawyer's so-called "admission,"
taken out of context, cannot overrule the indubitable fact that the accused moved for a dismissal of his
case. An implied admission of counsel cannot be given greater weight than a consent given through a
formal motion to dismiss.

As Mr. Justice Cardozo said long ago: "The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the
precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today."31

The majority is abetting harassment and oppression when it rules that a motion to dismiss is not a
consent to dismissal. I have to dissent on this issue.

Was there notice to the offended party?

This is another factual issue that is best determined at the trial level. It calls for evidence.
The ponencia again relies on an ambiguous admission of counsel in the course of tricky cross-
examination that there was no formal notice.

It is probable that there was no formal notice in the form of a letter with a registry return card
accomplished by the recipient. The purpose of notice under the Rule is to let the offended party know
and to avoid complicity to prejudice the offended party. If the offended party was informed and had
knowledge of the forthcoming provisional dismissal, there was notice to him.

The matter of notice should be elicited from the offended party during trial. If the ponencia refuses to
treat a notice to the lawyer as a notice to his client, it should, at least, ask the client himself to affirm or
deny that he was informed about the provisional dismissal. The remand is called for in this regard. If a
lawyer is given notice on a material issue, he is assumed to have passed on the notice to his client. The
rule that notice to a lawyer is notice to the client should apply when the basic protection of the accused
is involved and the protection is part of the package of rights of an accused. There may be instances in
civil law or mercantile law where a formal notice, duly acknowledged by the addressee, is required. In
criminal law, any statute or rule intended to protect the rights of an accused should be interpreted in his
favor.

There is no question that the amended rule on provisional dismissal of criminal cases is intended to
protect the rights of an accused. The majority overlooks the fact that if the rule was supposed to help or
favor the State, there would have been no reason to introduce the amendment. The rule should have
been left the way it was. The rule was intended to curb inaction and abuses by government prosecutors.

In deciding cases of constitutional significance, the Court should be more concerned with substance
rather than form32 or some other consideration, with general principles than technical points, to support
judgments.

In one eloquent dissent of Mr. Justice Hugo Black of the United States Supreme Court, he stated that not
the least of the virtues of a provision of the Bill of Rights is the protection given to each member of the
smallest and most unorthodox minority.33 Respondent in the present case may not belong to the
smallest minority but he is clearly unorthodox and a member of the minority political party. We must
avoid not only any political color in our work but also the appearance of political color.

Appearances are unfortunately important in our functions and somehow, the public image of the Court
will suffer because of the way the Court has decided the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
who has become the target of powerful personalities in the political arena. Equating the awesome
powers of the State with individual freedoms and formally extending the protections of the Bill of Rights
to the State is not a healthy development. The Court should not give the impression that Bill of Rights
protections such as due process should equally extend to and protect the State in the same way that
they protect individual persons. Again, this is not only error; it is also not healthy for the development of
the law of the Constitution.

At any rate it is well to listen to Mr. Justice Black when he says that laws aimed at one political group
and I may add, at one political personage, however rational these laws may be in their beginning,
generate hatred and prejudices which rapidly spread beyond control. Too often it is fear which inspires
such functions and nothing is more reckless or contagious.

In the present case, the concern involves not a law enacted by Congress but a judgment rendered by the
Supreme Court. The importance of these kinds of decisions on national institutions and the
development of law cannot be ignored or denied.

WHEREFORE, I dissent from the majority resolution. I vote to grant the respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration and to reinstate the Court’s Resolution dated May 28, 2002.