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JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC.
vs.
SPS. MANGUDADATU
Respondent-Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the 12thJudicial Region in Tacurong City,
Sultan Kudarat, a Complaint for damages against Petitioner Jonathan
Landoil International Co., Inc. ("JLI").
On July 3, 2001, petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Decision dated June
19, 2001. On July 18, 2001, it filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and
Change of Venue which was deemed admitted but later denied.
On December 12, 2001, petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution
dated December 4, 2001. Alleging that it had yet to receive a copy of an
Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial, petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash/Recall Writ of Execution.
On January 7, 2002, its counsels -- Attys. Jaime L. Mario Jr. and Dioscoro G.
Peligro -- submitted separate withdrawals of appearance. On the same date,
the law firm Ong Abad Santos & Meneses filed an Entry of Appearance with
Supplement to Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution. To its Supplement,
petitioner attached the Affidavits of Attys. Mario and Peligro attesting that
they had not yet received a copy of the Order resolving the Omnibus Motion
for New Trial.
On the same day, January 7, 2002, petitioner received a Sheriff’s Notice
dated December 26, 2001, regarding the public auction sale of its properties.
Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash.
On January 23, 2002, petitioner received a copy of respondents’ Vigorous
Opposition (Re: Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution, and its
Supplement) dated January 16, 2001. Attached to this pleading were two
separate Certifications supposedly issued by the postmaster of Tacurong
City, affirming that the Order denying the Motion for New Trial had been
received by petitioner’s two previous counsels of record.21 The Certification
pertaining to Atty. Peligro alleged that a certain Michelle Viquira had received
on October 19, 2001, a copy of the Order intended for him.22 The
Certification as regards Atty. Mario stated that he had personally received his
copy on December 21, 2001.
On January 24, 2002, petitioner personally served counsel for respondents a
Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Attys. Mario and
Peligro.4 The Deposition was intended to prove that petitioner had not
received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus Motion for New Trial.
At 9:30 a.m. on January 28, 2002, the deposition-taking proceeded as
scheduled -- at the Business Center Conference Room of the Mandarin
Oriental Hotel in Makati City -- before Atty. Ana Peralta-Nazareno, a notary
public acting as deposition officer. At 12:00 noon of the same day,
respondents sent petitioner a fax message via JRS Express, advising it that
they had filed a Motion to Strike Off from the records the Notice to Take
Deposition; and asking it not to proceed until the RTC would have resolved
the Motion, a copy of which it eventually received later in the day, at 3:10
p.m.
On January 29, 2002, separate Notices were sent by Atty. Nazareno to Attys.
Mario and Peligro, as witnesses, for them to examine the transcript of their
testimonies. On the same date, Atty. Nazareno filed via registered mail a
Submission to the RTC attaching (1) a Certification that the witnesses had
been present and duly sworn to by her; (2) a transcript bearing their
signatures, attesting that it was a true record of their testimonies; (3) a copy
of the Notice to Take Deposition delivered to her; and (4) a copy of the
Notice signed by respondents’ counsel.29
During the February 1, 2002 hearing on the Motion to Quash, petitioner
submitted its (1) Formal Offer of Exhibits, together with the documentary
exhibits marked during the deposition-taking; (2) Reply to respondents’
Vigorous Opposition to the Motion to Quash; and (3) Opposition ad Cautelam
to respondents’ Motion to Strike Off the Notice to Take Deposition.
Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, seeking to
hold in abeyance the February 21, 2002 RTC Resolution and the December
4, 2001 Writ of Execution. Petitioner alleged that since it had not received the
Order denying its Motion for New Trial, the period to appeal had not yet
lapsed. It thus concluded that the judgment, not being final, could not be the
subject of a writ of execution.
The CA ruled that petitioner could no longer avail itself of a deposition under
Rule 23 of Rules of Court, since trial had already been terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can no longer avail of the taking of oral
depositions when trial already has been terminated.
HELD: NO.
A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or over property that is the subject of the action;
or, without such leave, after an answer has been served.60 Deposition is
chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement
the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between
the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for
trial.61 The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of
discovery, is "well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise
relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within
the bounds of the law."62
Limitations would arise, though, if the examination is conducted in bad faith;
or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is
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the subject of the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or
encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.63
The Rules of Court65 and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a
deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial.
Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken
even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being
actually called to the witness stand. In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes,66 we
allowed the taking of the witnesses’ testimonies through deposition, in lieu of
their actual presence at the trial.
Thus, "[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any
action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition
against the taking of depositions after pre-trial." There can be no valid
objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and
executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have become
numerous or complicated.
In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding,69 depositions are allowed as a
"departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial
judge." Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with
the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the
summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has been
submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility
exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court).
The Rules of Court vests in the trial court the discretion to order whether a
deposition may be taken or not under specified circumstances that may even
differ from those the proponents have intended.
Northwest Airlines Inc. vs CA
FACTS:
Camille Cruz, then a teenage girl who would be travelling alone for the first
time, purchased from petitioner Northwest Airlines a round-trip ticket for a
flight from Manila to Boston via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure
date from Manila to Boston was August 27, 1992 in economy class while the
scheduled return flight from Boston to Manila in business class was on
December 22, 1992.
On November 25, 1992, Cruz re-scheduled her return flight from Boston to
Manila to December 17, 1992. Accordingly, petitioner booked her on
Northwest flight NW005 C (Flight 5) with route as follows: Boston to Chicago;
Chicago to Tokyo; and, Tokyo to Manila. Petitioner reconfirmed the flight
scheduled on Decembder 17, 1992 at least 72 hours prior to the said
scheduled flight. However, a day before her flight she was informed that
instead of following her original itinerary, Cruz should instead board the TWA
flight from Boston to Kennedy International Airport in New York. She then
proceeded to the airport, but was later informed that flight she was to take
was cancelled. Private respondents apprehension was further aggravated
when she was informed that she was issued the wrong ticket to Seoul
instead of Tokyo and her accommodation was downgraded from business
class to economy. Hence, private respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner for breach of contract of carriage.
Petitioner filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim alleging therein that
flight on which private respondent was originally booked was cancelled due
to maintenance problems and that the airline had done its best to book Cruz
on the next available flight.
Trial progressed until 1995 when it was petitioners turn to present its witness
on three scheduled dates. Two of the settings were cancelled when
petitioners counsel filed notice for oral deposition of one Mario Garza,
witness for petitioner, in New York. Private respondent filed her opposition
and suggested written interrogatories instead. However, in an Order dated
July 26, 1995, the trial court denied private respondents opposition, thus
allowing the deposition to proceed. The oral deposition took place in New
York , two days before the issuance of the trial courts order allowing the
deposition to proceed.
The records show that although it was the Honorable Consul Milagros R.
Perez who swore in the deponent, she thereafter designated Attorney
Gonzalez as Deposition Officer.
At the hearing, petitioner presented the deposition record of its witness while
private respondent reserved her right to cross-examine and present rebuttal
evidence. Cruz questioned the conduct of the oral deposition as irregular and
moved for suppression of the same on the following grounds:
1. deposition was taken on July 24, 1995 despite the fact the Court only ruled
on the matter on July 26, 1995.
2. No certification given by the officer taking the deposition that the same is
true record of the testimony by the deponent in violation of section 20, Ruole
24
3. deposition was not securely sealed in an enveloped secred with title of the
action and marked Deposition of (here insert the name of witness) in violation
of Rule 24, Section 20 of the Rules of Court.
4. The officer taking the deposition did not give any notice to the plaintiff of
the filing of the deposition in violation of Rule 24, Section 21 of the Rules of
Court.
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5. The person designated as deposition officer is not among those persons
authorized to take deposition in foreign countries in violation of Rule 24,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court.
6. There is no showing on record that the deponent read and signed the
deposition in violation of Rule 24, Section 19 of the Rules of Court.
Private respondents motion was denied, the trial court admitted petitioners
formal offer of evidence. On appeal, CA granted private respondents petition
to disallow the deposition.
ISSUE: WON the oral deposition should be admitted into evidence.
HELD: NO
The deposition was not a mode of discovery but rather a direct testimony by
respondents witness and there appears a strategy by respondent to exclude
petitioners participation from the proceedings. In this case, two days of trial
were cancelled and notice for oral deposition was given in lieu of third date.
The place of deposition is not easily within reach for it required time to get a
travel visa, book a flight and substantial travel fare is needed to obtain round
trip ticket from manila to New York and back to Manila.
Under Section 11 rule 24 it provides: In a foreign state or country,
depositions shall be taken (a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.
The deposition document clearly indicates that while the consul swore in the
witness and the stenographer, it was another officer in the Philippine
Consulate who undertook the entire proceedings thereafter. Respondent
Northwest argues on the presumption of regularity of official functions and
even obtained a certification to this effect plus an assertion that none of the
participants in the Consulate were in any way related to the respondent or
their counsel. But presumptions should fail when the record itself bears out
the irregularity.
Petition denied, the order did not conform to the essential requirements of
law and may reasonably cause material injury to the adverse party.
Tolentino
DE LOS REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-27263; March 17, 1975
FACTS:
Petitioners Rogelio de los Reyes and Aurelio de los Reyes filed two separate
complaints against the herein private respondents with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. Before the trial court set a date for the hearing, petitioners
served notice upon the counsel of respondent Wong Chu King that they
would take the deposition of defendant-respondent Wong Chu King, upon
oral examination, pursuant to the provision of Section 1, Rule 24 of the
revised Rules of Court, on August 8, 1966 at 9:30 a.m., at the Office of the
Municipal Secretary of Makati, Rizal, the oral examination to continue from
day to day until completed. Petitioners caused the issuance by the trial court,
through its Deputy Clerk of Court, of a subpoena to defendant-respondent
Wong Chu King and a subpoena duces tecum to the President of respondent
La Campana Fabrica de Tabacos, Inc., or his duly authorized representative,
commanding them to appear on said date, time, place before the Notary
Public mentioned in the Notice To Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination.
On August 8, 1966, the date set for the taking of the deposition, at around
10:00 a.m. while counsel for the petitioners was waiting for the prospective
deponent in the Office of the Notary Public before whom the deposition
would be taken, the counsel for petitioners received from one of the lawyers
for the private respondents an Ex Parte Urgent Motion asking the trial court
to relieve the defendants-respondents from attending the taking of the
deposition scheduled on the same date and for the court to provide
safeguards for the immediate return of all documents produced or examined
right after any day's proceeding. Petitioners filed a motion citing defendants-
respondents for contempt for their failure to appear during the scheduled
taking of deposition and an Opposition to the ex-parte urgent motion.
While the ex-parte urgent motion and the motion for contempt were still
pending resolution by the trial court, private respondents filed their Motion To
Set Civil Cases Nos. 9306 and 9307 for trial. Petitioners filed their opposition
to the motion to set and prayed for the issuance of a judgment by default
against the defendants-respondents.
The trial Judge denied the motion to declare the defendants-respondents in
default and in contempt of court and at the same time directed the plaintiffs-
petitioners to submit instead written interrogatories before the Court would
determine the date when the deposition could be held and taken.
On October 12, 1966, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an action for
certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Order insofar as it directly the
herein petitioners to submit written interrogatories before it could determine
the date of the taking of the deposition of herein respondent Wong Chu King.
In a decision promulgated February 8, 1967, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners maintain that under the Rules of Court, a party is authorized to
take the testimony of any person, whether a party to the case or not, by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories after the filing of
the answer without need for a leave of court. The choice of whether the
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deposition be taken upon oral examination or written interrogatories, the
petitioners aver, depends on the party exercising such right. Considering the
benefits and advantages of an oral examination over that of written
interrogatories, the petitioners chose the former. Petitioners now claim that
the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the questioned Order subjects
the taking thereof to the leave of court and, therefore, the petitioners claim,
the issuance of said order was without or in excess of the court's jurisdiction.
Respondents, on the other hand, aver that although the right of a party to
take the deposition of any person, whether a party or not, upon oral
examination or written interrogatories exists in our jurisdiction, the said right
is not unfettered or absolute. The use of this right by any party is subject to
sound restriction in the discretion of the court. The respondents maintain that
the taking of deposition for purposes of discovery, being merely one of the
remedies that may be availed of only as a legitimate aid to litigation, should
be controlled by the court.
ISSUE:Whether or not the trial Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction or
authority when he issued the Order directing the plaintiffs to submit instead
written interrogatories before the Court could definitely determine the date
when the deposition would be held.
RULING:
We cannot subscribe to the petitioners' view that the choice as to the mode
of taking the testimony of a deponent, whether upon oral examination or
written interrogatories, rests exclusively upon the party exercising such right.
If the theory advanced by the petitioners were to be adopted, the exercise of
this right is bound to be abused and utilized for harassment. It is for this
reason that Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24, of the Rules of Court, were
incorporated to serve as safeguards and protection from abuse. A trial Judge
must possess certain measure of control over the right of parties in the taking
of depositions in order to prevent abuse. Under Section 16 of the Rules of
Court, the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make an
order that the deposition be taken only on written interrogatories. Evidently
the trial court exercises a certain degree of discretion in connection with the
taking of a deposition.
Therefore, the trial Judge in the present case neither exceeded his
jurisdiction nor abused his discretion when he issued the questioned Order
directing that written interrogatories be submitted before determining the date
when the deposition would be taken.
Sps Zepeda vs. China Banking Corp
G.R. No. 172175; October 9, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners Spoused Zepeda obtained a loan with China Bank secured by a
real estate mortgage. Petitioners subsequently encountered difficulties in
paying their loan obligations hence they requested for restructuring which
was allegedly granted by Chinabank. Hence, they were surprised when
respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the subject property where it
emerged as the highest bidder. Respondent bank was issued a Provisional
Certificate of Sale and upon petitioners’ failure to redeem the property,
ownership was consolidated in its favor.
Spouses Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification of foreclosure proceedings
and loan documents with damages against respondent. According to them
the foreclosure proceedings should be annulled for failure to comply with the
posting and publication requirements. They also claimed that they signed the
Real Estate Mortgage and Promissory Note in blank and were not given a
copy and the interest rates thereon were unilaterally fixed by the respondent.
Respondent bank’s motion to dismiss was denied, hence it filed an answer
with special affirmative defenses and counterclaim. It also filed a set of
written interrogatories with 20 questions.
The trial court denied Chinabank’s affirmative defenses for lack of merit as
well as its motion to expunge the complaint for being premature.
Aggrieved, respondent bank filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which
was granted by the Court of Appeals. It held that the trial court gravely
abused, ruling that compelling reasons warrant the dismissal of petitioners’
complaint because they acted in bad faith when they ignored the hearings
set by the trial court to determine the veracity of Chinabank’s affirmative
defenses; they failed to answer Chinabank’s written interrogatories; and the
complaint states no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure of petitioners
to answer respondent’s written interrogatories as provided for in Section 3(c),
Rule 29 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
The consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply
where the party upon whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to
answer a particular question in the set of written interrogatories and despite
an order compelling him to answer the particular question, still refuses to
obey the order.
In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written
interrogatories, not just a particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank
should have filed a motion based on Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule
29.
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CONCRETE AGGREGATES CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PRISCILA S. AGANA, Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 24, and VIVIEN S. SORIGUEZ
Does Rule 26 of the Revised Rules of Court require a party to respond to a
Request for Admission of matters raised in his pleadings? Will his failure to
place under oath his denials in his response to the request be deemed an
admission of the matters sought to be admitted?
FACTS
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling Bituminous Concrete Mix, Ready Mix Concrete
and other construction materials. It has several plant sites in the country one
of which is the Cebu plant site situated in Tuyan, Naga, Cebu. Private
respondent on the other hand is engaged in the business of providing
security services to various establishments under the name and style 101
Security and Detective Services.
Sometime in October 1990 petitioner retained the services of private
respondent for its Cebu plant site. On 8 November 1991 it terminated the
services of private respondent alleging that it was dissatisfied with the latter's
services because she failed to prevent and promptly investigate a theft case
which occurred in its Cebu plant site.
On 6 October 1992 private respondent Vivien S. Soriguez instituted an action
with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu[1] for collection of unpaid fees for her
security services rendered to petitioner. She also claimed that the termination
of her services was unlawful so that she should be awarded moral damages.
Petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was justified because private
respondent was answerable for the losses it incurred arising from the theft
attributable to her fault. Petitioner thus claimed that there was legal set-off or
compensation regarding the unpaid fees due private respondent and the
amount of the stolen articles owned by petitioner.
On 30 August 1993 petitioner sent private respondent a Request for
Admission by the latter of her responsibility of the theft that occurred on 5
June 1991 at the Cebu plant site.[2]Thereafter private respondent through
counsel filed a Manifestation and Reply to the Request for Admission.[3] It
was not under oath.
On 8 October 1993 petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment positing
that private respondent impliedly admitted the matters set forth in the
Request for Admission by failing to respond under oath as required under
Sec. 2, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court.[4] Petitioner contended that the
manifestation and reply not being verified was ineffectual and thus should be
stricken off the records. Private respondent countered that her reply although
not under oath effectively denied the matters set forth in the request.
Public respondents ruled in favor of private respondent holding that the
circumstances warranted a relaxation of the rules in the interest of justice.[5]
Respondent courts further ruled that a summary judgment was improper
because the dispute involved factual issues which could only be resolved in a
full-blown hearing.[7]
After the trial court denied its motion for reconsideration petitioner elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals in a special civil action for certiorari but the
latter likewise denied the petition for lack of merit; hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE
The pivotal issue in this case is the effect of the Request for Admission filed
by petitioner and, consequently, whether private respondent may be
considered to have impliedly admitted the matters referred to in the request
when she filed a manifestation and reply that was not under oath.
RULING
We deny the petition.
The Request for Admission of petitioner does not fall under Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court. As we held in Po v. Court of Appeals[9] and Briboneria v.
Court of Appeals,[10] Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of
interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity
of the allegations in a pleading. That is its primary function. It does not refer
to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.
A cursory reading of petitioner's Request for Admission clearly shows that it
contains the same material averments in his Answer to respondent's
Complaint in the trial court. Petitioner merely recopied or reproduced in its
Request for Admission its affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleged in
its Answer. As we held in Po v. CA,[11] petitioner's request constitutes an
utter redundancy and a useless, pointless process which the respondent
should not be subjected to. In the first place, what the petitioner seeks to be
admitted by private respondent is the very subject matter of the complaint. In
effect, petitioner would want private respondent to deny her allegations in her
verified Complaint and admit the allegations in the Answer of petitioner
(Manifestation and Reply to Request for Admission). Plainly, this is illogical if
not preposterous. Respondent cannot be said to have admitted the
averments in the Answer of petitioner just because she failed to have her
response to the request placed under oath since these are the very matters
she raises in her verified Complaint in the court below. The following
allegations specifically contained therein are self-evident:
9. That, in compliance thereto (sic) (referring to the request for investigation),
herein plaintiff, through her authorized representative, went at (sic) the place
and conducted the necessary investigation and found out that the herein
plaintiff was not responsible for those alleged losses simply because of the
following, to wit:
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a. Those alleged losses like Blower, Oil Filter, transmission and others were
taken and brought outside the guarded place by certain Danny Baterna,
driver of defendant, as reflected in the Log Book of the plaintiff .x x x x [12]
Clearly, therefore, private respondent need not reply to the Request for
Admission because her Complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in
the Answer of petitioner which were merely reproduced in the request. In Uy
Chao v. De la Rama Steamship[13] we observed that the purpose of the rule
governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents is
to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will
not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by
reasonable inquiry.
In the aforesaid cases of Po and Briboneria we held that
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by
his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be
required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to
the complaint.[14]
To this we add that a party should not be made to deny matters already
averred in his complaint. At this point, it is necessary to emphasize what this
Court laid down in the same Po and Briboneria cases:
A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the
allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant
evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the
request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or
defense.[15]
Since the answer of private respondent to the request is no longer required in
the instant case, it therefore becomes unnecessary to dwell on the issue of
the propriety of an answer that is not under oath. Even assuming that a
response to the request is needed, private respondent had already
substantially complied with the requirement of the law when she specifically
denied the material allegations of the petitioner in her Manifestation and
Reply to the Request for Admission. Although not under oath the reply to the
request readily showed that the intent of private respondent was to deny the
matters set forth in the Request for Admission. That the reply is not under
oath is merely a formal and not a substantive defect. This procedural lapse
may be dispensed with if the circumstances call for the dispensing of the rule
in the interest of justice. While we commend petitioner's zeal in promoting
faithful adherence to the rules of procedure we cannot ignore the well-
entrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be liberally construed as to do
substantial justice.[16]
There being genuine issues of fact between the private parties, public
respondents correctly denied the motion of petitioner for summary judgment.
Where facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested proceedings for
summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.[17] Trial courts have limited
authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is
clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.[18] Verily, there is a need to
determine by presentation of evidence if respondent is really liable for the
stolen articles and for violating its contract for security services with
petitioner. Until these issues are determined no legal compensation can take
place between the parties. This factual dispute can only be resolved by trying
the case on the merits, a process which need not take long to conclude.[19]
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the respondent
Court of Appeals, as well as by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, the instant
petition is DENIED and the records of this case are remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings.
SALVADOR BRIBONERIA vs COURT OF APPEALS; G.R. No. 101682;
December 14, 1992
FACTS: On 23 May 1988, petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, plaintiff, filed a
complaint for Annulment of Document and Damages, with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against private
respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
alleging that he, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the
registered owners of a parcel of land with a residential house thereon located
at Amsterdam Street Provident Village, J. de la Peña, Marikina, Metro-
Manila. He alleged that he was surprised to learn that his wife Nonita A.
Briboneria sold to defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa by means of a Deed of
Absolute Sale for he never authorized or empowered Nonita or anybody for
or on his behalf to enter into any transaction regarding the sale, transfer or
conveyance of the property. As a result thereof, he was denied the use and
enjoyment of his properties since defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa had even
leased the premises to another who in turn had prohibited him from entering
the premises.
In due time, private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, as defendant, filed her
answer admitting some allegation but denies the rest for lack of knowledge
and/or information sufficient to form a judgment as to the truths thereof.
After issues in the case had been joined, petitioner served on the private
respondent Mag-isa a request for admission served to his counsel Atty
Alfredo A. Alto
On 10 November 1988, the private respondents filed with the court a quo
their Answer to Request for Admission, alleging that most if not all the
matters subject of petitioner's request for admission had been admitted,
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denied and/or clarified in their verified answer, and that the other matters not
admitted, denied and/or clarified were either irrelevant or improper.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for summary Judgment, claiming that the
Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private respondents beyond
the ten (10) day period fixed in the request and that the answer was not
under oath; that, consequently the private respondents are deemed to have
admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for
admission, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. The private
respondents filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, while
the petitioner filed a reply.
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the order of the trial court
setting aside the Petioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that the
said order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. On 13 August 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
dismissing the petition. Thus this petition.
Petiotioner’s Contention: He claims that the material facts and documents
described in the request for admission are relevant evidentiary matters
supportive of his cause of action and not mere reiterations and/or
reproductions of those alleged in the complaint. He further argues that the
private respondents have impliedly admitted the material facts and
documents subject of the request for admission on account of their failure to
answer the request for admission within the period fixed therein, and for said
answer not being under oath.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not matters of fact and the documents requested to be
admitted are mere reiterations and/or reproductions of those alleged in the
complaint
2. Whether or not a request for admission must be served directly on a party,
and not his counsel, in order that said request can be considered as validly
served
HELD: 1. YES. A cursory reading of the petitioner's complaint and his
request for admission clearly shows, as found by respondent appellate court,
that "the material matters and documents set forth in the request for
admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint which private
respondents either admitted or denied in their answer."
In the case of Po vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that A party should not
be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and
concerning which there is no issue nor should he be required to make a
second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A
request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the
allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant
evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the
request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or
defense. . . .
2. Directly to the party and not to the counsel. Thus, in the present case there
is no valid service.
Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the request for admission must be
served directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is
directed cannot be deemed to have admitted the genuineness of any
relevant document in and exhibited with the request or relevant matters of
fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer the request for
admission.
As a general rule as provided for under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court is that all notices must be served upon counsel and not upon party.
However, the general rule cannot apply where the law expressly provides
that notice must be served upon a definite person. Moreover, Section 2,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court does not control the mode of service of request
for admission. It should be observed that the orders, motions and other
papers mentioned in said section have this property in common: they have to
be filed with the court. A request for admission, on the other hand, need not
be filed with the court; it was intended to operate extra-judicially and courts
are not burdened with the duty to determine the propriety or impropriety of
the request for admission. Such Section shall not control the mode of service
of request for admission.
In the present case, it will be noted that the request for admission was not
served upon the private respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel, Atty.
Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa, therefore, cannot be deemed to
have admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for admission
for having failed to file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the
request. WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
REY LAADA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA
HEMEDEZ
G. R. N0. 102390 / February 1, 2002 / DE LEON, JR., J.:
Facts:
1. NLRC issued a TRO against Union of Filipino Employees (UFE) who
declared a strike on account of alleged unfair labor practices committed by
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Nestle Philippines, Inc. (Nestle), from blocking, barricading and obstructing
the points of ingress and egress from Nestles Cabuyao plant.
2. To enforce the TRO, Nestle sought the assistance of both the 224th
Philippine Constabulary (PC) Company in Laguna, under the command of
petitioner PC/Capt. Rey Laada, and the members of the Cabuyao police
department and fire brigade.
3. To transfer its products from the Cabuyao factory to its warehouse in
Taguig, Metro Manila during the strike, Nestle hired the trucks of the
Alimagno brothers, Constancio, Jr., who was then the Officer-in-Charge of
Cabuyao, and Jesus.
4. Alexander Asinas of the UFE and Francis Santos of Nestle agreed to
constitute a panel to discuss about the said trucks. In apparent bad faith,
Santos signaled both the PC contingent to disperse the strikers.
5. PC contingent began hitting the strikers with truncheons as water cannons
from fire trucks assisted them in the dispersal operation that resulted in the
arrest of (14) strikers and injuries to many others. Stones were thrown by
strikers but (5) trucks succeeded in leaving the compound.
6. Driving on his way home from his masteral class at the University of the
Philippines College of Public Health, Dr. Vied Vemir Garcia Hemedez arrived
in the area and stopped his car not knowing that the 6th ten-wheeler truck
owned by Jesus Alimagno and driven by Pacifico Galasao, was then leaving
the Nestle compound in full speed.
7. To avoid stones being thrown at his direction, Galasao was driving in a
crouching position. Considering the length of the truck that was also
overloaded, Galasao lost control of it, he abruptly swerved the truck to the
left to avoid the strikers. However, he did not stop nor slow it down, the truck
went diagonally across to the left side of the road, bumped the car of Dr.
Hemedez, and dragged it until the car turned upside down and also side-
swept a house off the road, rammed down a beauty parlor, and run over and
killed (2) persons sitting on a bench near the parlor facing the Iglesia ni
Cristo chapel.
8. The truck stopped as it crashed into the chapels reinforced concrete wall
and post. Galasao rose from his seat, got off the truck, and, apparently
anticipating an attack, proceeded to the chapel.
9. Pinned down, Dr. Hemedez was able to ask someone to inform his
parents, his brothers of Dr. Hemedez, namely, Roel, Emeterio and Rogelio,
Jr., followed by their mother, Mrs. Eliza Hemedez, and her daughter, Andora,
arrived tried to pull him but to no avail.
10. Roel asked the PC soldiers to unload or allow them to unload the trucks
cargo but Capt. Laada refused to unload the cargo of the truck for fear that
the cargo might be looted. They pleaded again but still refused, (2) hours
later when the cargo was finally unloaded.
11. Dr. Hemedez was finally pulled out but died shortly after arrival at the
hospital due to Intra-thoracic hemorrhage, massive, due to severe impact
(Vehicular Accident).
12. With the RTC, a civil case for damages – filed by parents of Dr. Hemedez
against Nestle, Jesus Alimagno, Francis Santos, Pacifico Galasao, and
PC/Capt. Rey Laada.
13. Nestle – set up a cross-claim against Galasao in order that he could
reimburse them should they be adjudged liable, and a counterclaim for
attorneys fees for what they called an unfounded suit.
14. Laada - filed a counterclaim for moral damages and attorneys fees
arising from the plaintiffs having unjustly impleaded him in the baseless suit
designed to be a speculative monetary claim against Nestle.
Procedural facts –
1. Hemedez spouses served the defendants a request for admission of the
truth of the facts set forth in their complaint and the genuineness of each of
the documents appended thereto. Through their respective counsel, Nestle
and Santos, Capt. Laada, and Alimagno and Galasao filed their verified
answer to the request for admission.
2. Spouses filed motion to strike out the defendants answers and/or declare
the matters sought to be admitted as impliedly admitted - contending that
under Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court the parties themselves and
not their counsel should personally answer the request for admission and
hence the answer filed by their counsel in their behalf was by nature based
on hearsay.
3. RTC Order – denied motion for lack of merit and held that the defendants
have substantially complied with the requirements of the rules by so
specifically denying the matters which they could not admit and indicating the
reasons why they could not admit or deny the specific matters sought to be
admitted, thus leaving such matter controverted.
4. Hemedez spouses sought a reconsideration through an omnibus motion
but was denied except the prayer to amend the complaint. RTC held that
particular stage of the proceedings, the court could not make a categorical
ruling as to the veracity of the denials made by defendants of certain facts
based on immateriality, irrelevancy or for lack of information until after it has
considered in a full blown trial all the evidence presented and pertinent to the
issue of the case.
5. On appeal to CA – annulled the lower courts Orders, granting the motions
to strike out the answers subject of the requests for admission and declaring
each of the matters requested to be impliedly admitted, and remanding the
case to the court a quo for proper proceedings.
Allegations of Nestle & Santos –
a. Nestle & Belltown Transport Services, Inc. had a trucking and hauling
agreement whereby latter agreed to make deliveries of the products of Nestle
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and assumed liability for any injuries or damages to properties that would
arise from the agreement.
b. Accident happened in the course of an illegal strike - the proximate cause
of death was the violent assault by the strikers against the truck.
c. The complaint should be dismissed for failure to implead UFE, its officers
and striking members, as indispensable parties.
d. Incident happened outside of Nestles premises, delayed unloading of the
cargo from the truck thus rested upon Belltowns sole judgment.
Allegations of Capt. Laada –
a. the unruly mobs attack on the trucks that built up a monstrous traffic jam
caused the incident.
b. they exerted all efforts to save all casualties and not just Dr. Hemedez.
Issue - whether or not an answer to a request for admission signed and
sworn to by the counsel of the party so requested is sufficient compliance
with the provisions of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court -- should a person to
whom a request for admission is addressed personally answer the request?
Held:
1. Rule 26 of the Rules of Court - SEC. 2. Implied admission - Each of the
matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted
unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than
ten (10) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court
may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed
serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either
denying specifically or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
2. Interpretation of the phrase the party to whom the request is directed -
when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission,
it should not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage
the services of counsel to make the response in his behalf. Indeed, the
theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously; otherwise, it will negate the
principles on agency in the Civil Code, as well as Sec. 23, Rule 138, of the
Rules of Court.
3. There is NO showing that petitioners Nestle and Santos did not authorize
their respective counsel to file in their behalf the respective answers
requested of them by private respondents in the latters written request for
admission. The subject matters of the request for admission are the same as
the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint for which private respondents have
filed their respective answers.
4. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate
the allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set forth relevant
evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the
request, whose purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or
defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the
Court of Appeals, pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.
5. In Briboneria v. Court of Appeals & in Concrete Aggregates Corporation v.
Court of Appeals - rule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended to
expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not
be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable
inquiry. Thus, if the request for admission only serves to delay the
proceedings by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose
for the rule will certainly be defeated.
6. Private respondents who should be most interested in the speedy
disposition of the case unfortunately and unwittingly caused its delay by a
request for admission that only achieved nothing but further delay in the
proceedings.
7. The consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are GRANTED. The
questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1991 is SET
ASIDE, and the Regional Trial Court of Laguna is ordered to proceed with
the case.
AIR PHIL CO. V PENNSWELL INC.
GR 172835
December 13, 2007
Facts: Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of air transportation services. On the other hand,
respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of
manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special
lubricants.
Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Under the
contracts, petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98
with interest at 14% per annum until the amount would be fully paid. For
failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts,
respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the
RTC.
In its Answer, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of
P592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four items. Petitioner
asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely altered the names
and labels of such goods. Petitioner asseverated that had respondent been
forthright about the identical character of the products, it would not have
purchased the items complained of. Hence this suit for Collection of Sum of
Money.
During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel
respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components
of the following products. The RTC rendered an Order granting the
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petitioner’s motion. CA reversed the same contending is falls under the
exemption-Trade Secrets therefore exempted from compulsory disclosure. It
being considered privileged information.
Issue: W/N CA erred in upholding RTC decision denying petitioner’s motion
to subject respondent’s products to compulsory disclosure.
Held: No. The products are covered by the exception of trade secrets being
divulged in compulsory disclosure. The Court affirms the ruling of the Court
of Appeals which upheld the finding of the RTC’s reversal that there is
substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its
proprietary rights over the detailed chemical composition of its products. The
Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are
among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as
embodied in the Constitution.
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound
known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary
to confide it. The definition also extends to a secret formula or process not
patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some
article of trade having a commercial value. American jurisprudence has
utilized the following factors to determine if an information is a trade secret,
to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer’s
business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others
involved in the business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the
information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing
the information; and
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained
through an independent source.
Also, Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of
privileged communication, to wit: (a) communication between husband and
wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) communication
between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and
penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however, other
privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the
following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of
published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they
voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; and
(d) bank deposits.
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things that may be
produced and inspected should not be privileged. The documents must not
be privileged against disclosure. On the ground of public policy, the rules
providing for production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize
the production or inspection of privileged matter; that is, books and papers
which, because of their confidential and privileged character, could not be
received in evidence. Such a condition is in addition to the requisite that the
items be specifically described, and must constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in the party’s
possession, custody or control.
The revelation of respondent’s trade secrets serves no better purpose to the
disposition of the main case pending with the RTC, which is on the collection
of a sum of money. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner received
respondent’s goods in trade in the normal course of business. To be sure,
there are defenses under the laws of contracts and sales available to
petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest of justice ought to favor
respondent as the holder of trade secrets. Weighing the conflicting interests
between the parties, SC rules in favor of the greater interest of respondent.
Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because
they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily
ascertainable by the public.
Josielene Lara Chan v. Johnny T. Chan
G.R. No. 179786
July 24, 2013
Abad, J.
This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the
production and submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital
record in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage where one of the issues
is his mental fitness as a husband.
Facts:
Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan filed before RTC of Makati City a petition for
the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan, the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of
their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and
support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient
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due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she
had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and
rehabilitation. Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who
failed in her wifely duties.
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when
he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to “be
allowed to submit in evidence” the records sought by subpoena duces tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered
by physician-patient privilege.
The RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also
denied her motion for reconsideration. The CA also denied Josielene’s
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on
the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the
physician-patient communication.
Held: (see #2)
NO. The CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request for
the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records.
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the
admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time
they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or
as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that
concern the patient’s health problems. Section 36, Rule 132, states that
objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for
admission in court.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for
subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin
before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced for
examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their
admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for
production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to
trial. However, the right to compel the production of documents under
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has a limitation: the
documents to be disclosed are not privileged.
To allow, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records
would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the
patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the
physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the
patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition
before the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in
fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that
confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character
of its records, invoking Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence. But,
trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that
Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence. Johnny
was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer.
Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.
Note: Concurring (Separate) Opinion of J. Leonen
I agree that the hospital records of respondent Johnny Chan may not be
produced in court without his/her consent. Issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum for its production will violate the physician-patient privilege rule under
Rule 130, Sec. 24(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, this privilege
is not absolute. The request of petitioner for a copy of the medical records
has not been properly laid.
Instead of a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, Josielene
Lara Chan should avail of the mode of discovery under Rule 28 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 28 pertains to the physical or mental examination of
persons. This may be ordered by the court, in its discretion, upon motion and
showing of good cause by the requesting party, in cases when the mental
and/or physical condition of a party is in controversy. Aside from showing
good cause, the requesting party needs only to notify the party to be
examined (and all other parties) and specify the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination, including the name of the
physician who will conduct the examination.
The examined party may obtain a copy of the examining physician's report
concerning his/her mental or physical examination. The requesting party
shall deliver this report to him/her. After such delivery, however, the
requesting party becomes entitled to any past or future medical report
involving the same mental or physical condition. Upon motion and notice, the
court may order the examined party to deliver those medical reports to the
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requesting party if the examined party refuses to do so. Moreover, if the

examined party requests a copy of the examining physician's report or if
he/she takes the examining physician's deposition, the request waives the
examined party's privileges when the testimony of any person who examined
or will examine his/her mental of physical status is taken in the action or in
any action involving the same controversy.