APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case.
The NLRC, however, reversed
G.R. No. 196142 March 26, 2014
CASTILLO, et. al., Petitioners, vs. PRUDENTIALIFE PLANS, INC.,
Respondent.
Under the CBA of Prudentialife and PPEU-FFW (bargaining agent of
the company’s rank-and-file employees), Prudentialife employees
were granted an optical benefit allowance of P2,500.00 to subsidize
prescription eyeglasses for those who have developed vision
problems in the course of employment. Many Prudentialife
employees – petitioners included – availed thereof and
Prudentialife was flooded with requests for reimbursement for
eyeglasses the employees supposedly purchased fromAlavera
Optical.Eventually, it became apparent that the transactions
between the said employees andAlavera Optical were spurious.
The availing employees, with the exclusion of the petitioners,
admitted that they are aware of the fraudulent nature of the
transactions. Prudentialife then issued individual Notices of
Termination to the availing employees, including the petitioners.
The company concluded that the said employees are guilty of
dishonesty which, under their Personnel Manual, is punishable by
dismissal.
Petitioners subsequentlyfiled a Complaint for illegal dismissalagainst
Prudentialife. They are of the position that they were illegally
dismissed based on a charge of dishonesty that was not proved, but
was mainly founded on suspicion, conjecture and suppositions.
They insisted that their transactions with Alavera Optical were valid
and done in the ordinary course of business.
such decision. According to the Commission, the admissions of the
other employees do not prove petitioners’ participation in the
scheme. Prudentialife failed to submit independent evidence to
show the petitioners’ guilt, and that petitioners were not given the
opportunity to meet and cross-examine Prudentialife’s witnesses or
those employees who admitted the presence of an illegal scheme to
profit by the optical benefit provision in the CB; thus, their
statements are inadmissible.
Such ruling was reversed by the CA, finding that based on the
written statements of the other participants to the scheme,
petitioners are guilty of dishonesty. According to the CA, since the
instant case is a labor case, only substantial evidence – and not guilt
beyond reasonable doubt – is required in establishing petitioners’
liability.
ISSUE: WON the admissions of the petitioners’ co-employees may
be used as evidence to prove the petitioners’ involvement in the
fraudulent scheme.
HELD: YES.
The written statements of petitioners’ co-employees admitting
their participation in the scheme are admissible to establish the
plan or scheme to defraud Prudentialife; the latter had the right to
rely on them for such purpose. The argument that the said
statements are hearsay because the authors thereof were not
presented for cross-examination does not persuade; the rules of
evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before the NLRC,
which are summary in nature and decisions may be made on the
basis of position papers.The Court stressed that the affidavit or
statement of a co-employee in a labor case may prove an
employee’s guilt or wrongdoing if it recites crucial details of his
involvement.
Besides, the petitioners’ guilt has been established by evidence
other than these statements. It appears that they knew that even
though they were not paying for the eyeglasses, Alavera Optical
would issue an official receipt falsely showing that the eyeglasses
have been paid for. They then used such receipt to obtain
reimbursement from Prudentialife. It was further discovered that
their eyeglasses either had no grade or did not match the
prescription issued to them. By availing of the CBA benefit, the they
falsely represented to Prudentialife that they have developed vision
problems.
G.R. No. 208567 November 26, 2014
JEANETTE V. MANALO, et. al., Petitioners, vs. TNS PHILIPPINES,
and GARY OCAMPO, Respondents.
Petitioners herein were hired by TNS as field personnel. They were
made to sign a project-to-project employment contract. On October
21, 2008, however, they were advised by TNS that their
employment contracts will no longer be renewed. As such, they
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The LA dismissed the complaint. The NLRC, however, reversed such
decision. TNS apparently did not adduce in evidence employment
contracts relating to the latest employment of the complainants.
In the absence of proof that the subsequent employment of the
complainants continued to be on a project-to-project basis under a
contract of employment, complainants are considered to have
become regular employees. According to the NLRC, the failure to
present contract of project employment means that the
employees are regular. The NLRC ultimately ruled that, being
regular employees, petitioners were illegally dismissed. A motion
for reconsideration was thereafter filed by TNS where the latter
presented termination reports as additional evidence. The NLRC
nonetheless dismissed said motion.
When the case reached the CA, the appellate court found, inter
alia, that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
apparently refused to consider the additional pieces of evidence
submitted by TNS during the determination of the motion’s
merits. It stressed that the technical rules of evidence were not
binding in labor cases, that even if the evidence was not submitted
to the LA, the fact that it was duly introduced on appeal before the
NLRC was enough basis for it to admit them.
ISSUE: WON the CA’s conclusion is correct.
HELD: NO.
Nowhere in the NLRC resolution denying TNS' motion for
reconsideration can it be found that the belated submission of the
evidence in question was the sole basis of denial. The NLRC also
took into consideration the records of the case, including those
belatedly submitted, and despite review of these records, it still
found the evidence insufficient to overturn its decision against
TNS.
While the technical rules of evidence are not binding on labor
tribunals, such a rule, however, is not a license for parties to a case
to be remiss in their duty to present every and all proofs, at the
earliest opportunity, that will best support their claim and help
the courts to fully, exhaustively and speedily resolve the
controversy.
G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008
ROLANDO SASAN, SR., et. al., Petitioners, vs. NLRC, EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK and HELPMATE, INC., Respondents.
Petitioners herein filed separate complaints against E-PCIBank and
Helpmate for illegal dismissal. The latter two however denied
having illegally dismissed the former. For its part, E-PCIBank averred
that it entered into a Contract for Services with Helpmate, an
independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to
the bank. Helpmate, on the other hand, asserted that petitioners
were part of its pool of janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank.
When the aforesaid Contract for Services expired, E-PCIBank no
longer renewed the same. Helpmate then designated petitioners to
new work assignments, but the latter refused to comply with the
same. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners were dismissed by
Helpmate.
The LA held Equitable PCI Bank and Helpmate jointly and solidarily
liable to petitioners, concluding that Helpmate is a labor-only
contractor. E-PCIBank and Helpmate consequently appealed to the
NLRC. In support of its allegation that it was a legitimate job
contractor, Helpmate submitted before the NLRC several
photocopied documents which it did not present before the LA.
The NLRC took into consideration the said documentary evidence
and, on the basis thereof, declared Helpmate as a legitimate job
contractor. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the NLRC erred in accepting the said pieces of
evidence.
HELD: NO.
Rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not
controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed
to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law
and procedure in the interest of substantial justice. As such, the
NLRC may consider evidence submitted by the parties for the first
time on appeal. The same is not prejudicial the other party for the
latter could submit counter-evidence.
For the same reasons, petitioners’ protestations against the
documentary evidence submitted by Helpmate because they were
mere photocopies (evidently invoking the best evidence rule
under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court) are likewise
unmeritorious. Notably, certified true copies of these documents
acceptable under the Rules of Court were furnished to the
petitioners.
Petitioners herein were afforded every opportunity to be heard and
to seek reconsideration of the adverse judgment against them. They
had every opportunity to strengthen their positions by presenting
their own substantial evidence to controvert those submitted by the
private respondents before the NLRC, and CA. It cannot win its case
by merely raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness
of the adverse parties’ evidence.
RELEVANCE AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 205590, September 02, 2015
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. LIGAYA M. PASIMIO,
Respondent.
Ligaya Pasimio filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of
money and damages. In her complaint, she alleged having a peso
and dollar time deposit accounts with PNB which have matured.
When she sought to withdraw her deposit money, however, PNB
refused to oblige. PNB claimed that Pasimio is without right to insist
on their withdrawal, the deposited amount having already been
used in payment of her outstanding loan obligations to the bank.
Amongst others, the bank presented as evidence various promissory
notes and other loan documents duly signed by Pasimio and her
husband.
Pasimio denied obtaining any loan from PNB and receiving the
corresponding loan proceeds. While she conceded that she indeed
sign certain documents (i.e., the loan documents in question), she
professed not understanding what they really meant. She basically
alleged that she was a mere victim of a nefarious lending scam
orchestrated by PNB Sucat’s branch manager and customer
relations officer.
RTC eventually rendered judgment in favor of Pasimio, finding that
Pasimio had proven by convincing evidence that she did not obtain
any loan accommodation from PNB. Further, the trial court held
that there was no evidence showing the release by PNB of the loan
proceeds to Pasimio. The CA affirmed, ruling further that PNB is
guilty of gross negligence and, thus, must suffer the consequences
of its transactions with Pasimio. The appellate court based such
conclusion on the testimony of another bank client, Virginia Pollard,
who testified to being a victim of irregular bank transactions of PNB
Sucat.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA is correct in holding PNB guilty of gross
negligence.
2. WON the RTC and CA are correct in ruling in favour of
Pasimio.
HELD:
1. NO.
There is no sufficient evidence to support the CA's finding of gross
negligence. Pollard’s testimony should not have been considered
proof that what she underwent is what actually transpired between
Pasimio and PNB. Under the res inter alios acta doctrine, acts and
declarations of persons strangers to a suit should, as a rule, be
irrelevant as evidence. Pollard's transaction with PNB is entirely
different and totally unrelated to Pasimio's dealings with the bank.
It was erroneous for the appellate court to declare PNB grossly
negligent in its transactions with Pasimio when the only evidence it
had discussed on the matter was Pollard's testimony. It may be true
that the PNB was grossly negligent in dealing with Pollard, but this
does not automatically mean that PNB was grossly negligent toward
Pasimio as well.
2. NO.
A promissory note is the best evidence of the transaction embodied
therein. A person who signs such an instrument is bound to honor it
as a legitimate obligation duly assumed by him through the
signature he affixes thereto. Further, a mere denial of the receipt of
the loan, which is stated in a clear and unequivocal manner in a
public instrument, is not sufficient to assail its validity. To overthrow
the recitals of such instrument, convincing and more than merely
preponderant evidence is necessary. Accordingly, the promissory
notes bearing Pasimio and her husband’s signatures must be upheld
in the absence of strong, complete, and conclusive proof of their
nullity.
It should also be noted that Pasimio did not question the
genuineness and due execution of the notes. By signing the same,
she is deemed to acknowledge receipt of the corresponding loan
proceeds. She cannot therefore plausibly set up the defense that
she did not apply for any loan, and receive any consideration
therefor in order to escape her liabilities under the notes.
Moreover, each promissory note was supported by a corresponding
loan application form and disclosure statement, all of which carried
Pasimio's signatures. It can thus be perceived that Pasimio took the
necessary steps to contract loans from PNB and was aware of their
terms and conditions. The Court found it hard to believe as well
that, as a well-educated and accomplished woman, Pasimio would
sign several pieces of bank documents involving millions of pesos
without knowing what they meant.
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there
can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of
the writing.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 194612 January 27, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FLORO
MANIGO y MACALUA, Accused-Appellant.
An Information for rape was filed against FLORO MANIGO y
MACALUA. The prosecution’s evidence was based heavily on the
narration of the incident by “AAA,” the 13 year-old victim. A certain
Dr. Perez likewise testified that there is indeed a laceration on
“AAA’s” hymen and a scratch, swelling or redness on the posterior
portion of the minor’s vagina.
In his defense, Manigo raised denial and alibi. According to him, he
could not have raped "AAA" since on the day of the alleged incident,
he was at their home. In fact, the first time he saw "AAA" was when
he was made to stand in a police line-up with several detainees for
identification.
The RTC ultimately accorded full faith and credence to the narration
of "AAA” and her positive identification of the appellant. Manigo
however questioned the credibility of AAA. He points to several
flaws in "AAA’s" testimony, to wit: (1) she did not make a particular
description of the tricycle used at the time of the commission of the
crime; (2) her description of Manigo’s physical features during the
trial is different from what she stated in her affidavit; and, (3)
"AAA’s" out-of-court identification of Manigo is doubtful. The CA,
nonetheless, sustained the trial court’s findings.
Issue: WON AAA’s testimony is credible enough to sustain a
conviction.
HELD: YES.
Rape is generally unwitnessed and oftentimes, the victim is left to
testify for herself. Thus, in resolving rape cases, the victim's
credibility becomes the primordial consideration. If a victim's
testimony is straightforward, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or
significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility and the
accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.
It is also noteworthy that the narration of "AAA" is further
supported by the medical findings of Dr. Perez. The SC stressed that
where a victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physical findings
of penetration, there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual
intercourse did take place.
Insofar as the alleged inconsistency between "AAA’s" statements in
her affidavit and testimony in open court is concerned, the Court
held that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness, the latter should be given more weight since
affidavits being taken ex-parte are usually incomplete and
inaccurate. Besides, the inconsistency respecting the physical
appearance of appellant has no bearing on the principal question of
whether appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. Neither will
the failure of "AAA" to describe the tricycle dent her credibility.
Further, AAA’s out-of-court identification of Manigo substantially
passed the totality of circumstances test laid down by the Court in
Vidar v. People, to wit: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the
crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that the out-of-court
identification was defective, the defect was cured by the
subsequent positive in-court identification for the ‘inadmissibility of
a police line-up identification should not necessarily foreclose the
admissibility of an independent in-court identification.’"
Lastly, Manigo’s defenses of denial and alibi were correctly rejected
in view of "AAA’s" positive testimony and unflawed identification of
Manigo as the culprit. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses
and "must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently
and positively ascertained the identity of the accused." Positive
testimony prevails over negative testimony. Also, for his defense of
alibi to prosper, appellant must prove not only that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must also
satisfactorily establish that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
G.R. No. 181683, October 07, 2015
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, Respondent.
On March 20, 1993, NPC’s Power Barge 104 was stationed at the
Makar Wharf in General Santos City when Luzon Shipping’s MV
Lorcon Luzon "hit and rammed" the former. NPC thus filed a
Complaint for Damages against Lorenzo Shipping. The RTC
eventually issued a decision absolving Lorenzo Shipping of liability.
It concluded that NPC failed to establish Lorenzo Shipping's
negligence.
Upon NPC’s appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision, ordering
Lorenzo Shipping to pay NPC the amount of P876,286.00 as actual
damages amongst others. This decision was however amended by
the same court later on. It reduced NPC’s award to P300,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, noting that the
amount of actual damages was not proven by NPC.
NPC now contends that it was able to show by "competent
testimonial and documentary evidence" that it must be
compensated for actual damages in the amount of P876,826.00.
Such pieces of evidence pertained to by NPC were a bill of expenses
(which, notably, was not properly identified in accordance with Rule
132, Section 30 of the ROC), the testimony of Power Barge 104’s
Manager Nelson Homena who gave an estimate amount of the
damages sustained by the barge, and a Disbursement Voucher as
proof of payment to PHILSECO for drydocking repairs of Power
Barge 104.
ISSUE: WON NPC satisfactorily proved that it is entitled to the
aforesaid actual damages.
HELD: NO.
It is basic that any material presented as evidence will not be
considered unless duly admitted by the court before which it is
presented. Just as basic is that a private document offered as
authentic evidence shall not be admitted unless its due execution
and authenticity are established in the manner specified by Rule
132, Section 30 of the ROC.
The bill of expenses presented by NPC is considered a private
document. Accordingly, the provisions under Rule 132, Section 30
of the ROC must have been complied with. NPC failed in this
respect. Thus, said material is considered as inadmissible for not
having been properly identified.
Admissibility of evidence and weight accorded to evidence are two
distinct affairs. "Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules on evidence."
When evidence has "such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence," it is said to be relevant.
When evidence is not excluded by law or by the Rules, it is said to
be competent. The weight accorded to evidence is properly
considered only after evidence has been admitted. To this end,
courts evaluate evidence in accordance with the rules stipulated by
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Not having been admitted, the bill of expenses does not form part
of the body of evidence worthy of judicial consideration. NPC is thus
left to rely on the testimony of Nelson and on the presented
Disbursement Voucher. However, these pieces of evidence fall short
of the standard required for proving pecuniary loss, which shall be
the basis for awarding actual damages. As regards Nelson Homena's
testimony, all he did was give an estimate of P1,000,000.00.
Certainly, a mere estimate does not suffice as proof of actual
pecuniary loss. As regards the NPC Disbursement Voucher, all it
attests to is a release of funds in favor of PHILSECO covering no
specific transaction.
G.R. No. 187727, September 02, 2015
TOMASA J. SABELLINA, Petitioner, v. DOLORES BURAY, et. al.,
Respondents.
Tomasa Sabellina filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
herein respondents. Tomasa claimed that she is the owner of the lot
in question, which she inherited after her parents' death pursuant
to a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement. She further alleged that she
allowed the respondents to construct their houses on the lot on
condition that they would vacate the property when she needed it.
However, the respondents refused to vacate when she eventually
requested them to do so. She mainly offered her tax declarations,
affidavits executed by her and Elena Jaramillo, and a promissory
agreement from one of the respondents, Roberto Acido, to prove
her allegations of prior possession and tolerance.
The respondents denied such allegations. They claimed inter alia
that the DENR declared the subject lot alienable and disposable,
that they had possessed the subject lot in good faith since the 1970s
and had acquired it through acquisitive prescription. They
presented, amongst others, joint-affidavit, affidavits of Romeo
Mapiot and Jener Daayata, receipts from their sale of squash and
payment of water utilities, and a right of way easement as proof of
their occupancy of the subject lot for more than thirty years.
The MCTC ruled in favor of Tomasa, holding that she sufficiently
established her cause of action while the respondents failed to
substantiate their allegation. This was affirmed by the RTC. The CA
however reversed the decisions of the lower courts. It held that
while the respondents' allegations of occupation were unsupported
by evidence, the petitioner failed to establish by competent
evidence her allegation of tolerance.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner sufficiently established her cause of
action.
HELD: NO.
It is apparent that Tomasa is the rightful owner of the subject lot.
However, this case is an ejectment proceeding where possession,
not ownership, is the central issue. In ejectment cases, the plaintiff
must sufficiently establish the character of the defendant's entry
into the property through competent evidence. Tomasa, however,
failed to discharge this burden.
The tax declarations and the Promissory Agreement alleged to be
executed by Roberto does not shed light on the circumstances of all
the respondents' entry into the property. Further, the Court did not
appreciate Elena's affidavit since the former cannot determine
whether Elena has actual personal knowledge of the facts or
learned about them through second-hand information. Thus, her
affidavit has very little probative value. Tomasa’s affidavit, lastly,
only makes the sweeping statement that the respondents entered
the subject lot with her consent and occupied it by mere tolerance.
Tomasa clearly failed to present convincing proof of her allegation
of tolerance. There is no competent evidence to support her claim
other than her own self-serving affidavit repeating her allegations in
the complaint. Allegations are not evidence and without evidence,
bare allegations do not prove facts.
On the other hand, the respondents also failed to substantiate their
claim that they have been occupying the subject lot for more than
thirty years. The respondents' only relevant evidence to prove their
allegations are their joint-affidavit and the affidavits of Romeo
Mapiot and Jener Daayata. The other pieces of evidence mentioned
earlier have no probative value as regards the circumstances of
their entry and the length of their occupation over the property.
Also, like Tomasa, the joint affidavit of the respondents merely
repeats their self-serving allegations in the answer.
However, this is inconsequential considering that Tomasa failed to
overcome the burden of evidence in the first place. When the
evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt as to
which side the evidence preponderates, the plaintiff fails upon that
issue.
COLLATERAL MATTERS
G.R. No. 192250 July 11, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HERMOGENES
DE GUZMAN @ Mong, Accused-Appellant.
Hermogenes De Guzman was charged with the crime of Murder for
the killing of Noriel Urieta. De Guzman pleaded not guilty. For the
prosecution, Ignacio Flores testified that on April 20, 2002, at
around 11:00PM, after he and Urieta had finished their third bottle
of beer, De Guzman suddenly appeared and stabbed Urieta without
any reason or provocation. Flores noted that the light of the
"moron" coming from the "peryahan" illuminated the table where
they were drinking, enabling him to see the face of the perpetrator
whom he identified to be De Guzman. A certain Elmer Honato then
came to their aid but left to seek a physician at the barangay hall.
When it became apparent that Honato will no longer come back,
Flores went home nd left Urieta.
Notably, however, Flores admitted that he did not know De Guzman
and it was on the night of the stabbing incident that he first saw him
and that he came to know of the name of De Guzman from the
policemen.
De Guzman, on the other hand, denied the charge against him,
stating that he was in a drinking spree at the house of a relative on
the day of the incident from 8:00AM until 12:00AM. He further
testified that he does not personally know the victim, his wife, nor
Flores.
RTC convicted De Guzman. It rejected the unsubstantiated defense
of alibi proffered by De Guzman in the face of the positive
identification of Flores pointing him as the perpetrator of the crime.
The CA affirmed such decision and added that the facts established.
ISSUE: WON De Guzman’s guilt has indeed been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD: NO.
There are serious doubts on the veracity of the malefactor's
identity. It is almost as if it was merely contrived to pin criminal
culpability upon De Guzman.
First, the condition of visibility at the time of the stabbing incident
did not lend credence to Flores’ testimony. The incident took place
during nighttime in a place where the only source of light was the
illumination of a "moron" coming from a "peryahan." Moreover, it is
clear that the stabbing incident was so swift for ample observation
and Flores, who had three bottles of beer, was admittedly very
afraid. Under these circumstances, the Court finds the positive
identification of De Guzman by Flores hazy.
The identification of an accused by an eyewitness is a vital piece of
evidence and most decisive of the success or failure of the case for
the prosecution. In the case at bench, however, the inconclusive
and unreliable identification by Flores of De Guzman as the culprit
failed to break the barrier of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Second, Flores' story about Honato does not make sense. It appears
strange that Honato should proceed to the barangay hall to look for
a doctor when natural instinct and reason would dictate that he and
Flores should have brought Urieta straight to the hospital. It
appears even stranger that this Honato was not presented in court
to corroborate the testimony of Flores.
Furthermore, the reaction of Flores, in hurriedly going home and
leaving Urieta alone to die, was unnatural and contrary to common
human experience. The failure of Flores to lend a touch of realism
to his tale leads to the conclusion that he was either withholding an
incriminating information or was not telling the truth.
The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of
a witness is its compatibility with human knowledge, observation
and common experience of man.20 Thus, whatever is repugnant to
the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience
becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.
Consistently, the Court has ruled that evidence to be believed must
proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself as to hurdle the test of conformity with the
knowledge and common experience of mankind.21 In the case at
bench, the testimony of Flores, the lone eyewitness of the
prosecution does not bear the earmarks of truth and, hence, not
credible.
Third, the Court finds disturbing how the police officers were able to
identify De Guzman as the killer of Urieta. It is undisputed that on
the day following the stabbing incident, De Guzman was invited by
the police officers to the municipal hall, was informed by them that
he was a suspect in the commission of a crime and then placed
behind bars.
Also, on April 21, 2002, Gina, the wife of the victim, executed her
Sinumpaang Salaysay23 wherein she declared, among others, that
she came to know the identity and the name of the assailant from
the police officers.
Two days after the incident in question or on April 22, 2002, Flores
executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and gave his account of the
stabbing incident only because Police Officer Gamba together with
the father and the wife of Urieta came to his house.26 Even so,
nowhere in the record does it show that Flores gave the police
officers a description of the physical features and attributes of the
assailant. During the trial, he admitted that he did not know De
Guzman or his name at the time of the stabbing incident.
The foregoing sequence of events clearly reveals that the police
officers had already a suspect, De Guzman, in the killing of Urieta,
even before Flores could give his statement and despite the
absence of any description from Flores himself as to how the culprit
looked like. Curiously, no police officer was called to the witness
stand to shed light on the matter.
This gray area in the case of the prosecution is fatal to its cause and
casts serious doubt on the veracity and credibility of its evidence.
The Court is likewise puzzled as to how the prosecution came into
possession of the alleged murder weapon marked as Exhibit "B."
During the trial, a knife with a red handle was shown to Flores who
specifically identified it to be the same bladed weapon used by De
Guzman in stabbing Urieta. The information, however, as to who
recovered that knife, and from whom it was seized remained a
mystery. At any rate, considering the visibility condition and other
attending circumstances on the night of the stabbing incident, the
Court indeed doubts how Flores could have positively identified the
murder weapon.
Lastly, it has not been shown that De Guzman had any motive for
killing Urieta. The brutal and gruesome attack on Urieta, clearly
manifested the intention of the perpetrator to purposely bring
death upon the victim. There was no evidence, however, that De
Guzman carried a grudge against the victim or his family, or even
knew the victim at all. Prosecution witnesses Flores and Gina even
attested that they did not know of any reason why De Guzman
killed Urieta. Generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal case
is immaterial and does not have to be proven. Proof of the same,
however, becomes relevant and essential when, as in this case, the
identity of the assailant is in question.
In light of the weakness in the prosecution's case, the alibi of De
Guzman assumes credence and importance. A finding of guilt must
rest on the evidence of the prosecution not on the weakness or
even absence of evidence for the defense. Thus, it is required that
every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be
duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test
of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. In the case at bench, the evidence for the
prosecution was unable to pass the exacting test of moral certainty
that the law demands.
[G.R. No. 106875. September 24, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NESTOR BABOR
and SONY BABOR,* accused-appellants.
Spouses Babor were charged with the crime of murder as
confederates thereof, and with further allegations of the attendant
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery
for the killing of Evangelino Camias. The prosecution anchored its
case mainly upon Felicidad Duhaylungsod's testimony, whereas the
defense had as witnesses the accused spouses themselves and their
daughter, Jonalyn Babor.
Duhaylungsod testified that she witnessed Nestor and Sony Babor
kill Evangelino Camias from her house. According to her, the Babors
were chasing a fleeing and bloodied Camias. Then, Sony lunged with
her weapon at Camias and hacked him three times on different
parts of the body. Nestor then delivered the fatal blow by stabbing
Camias on the chest. The three were all neighbors of Felicidad and
were known to her.
The defense on the other hand contended that it was Camias who
made the first attack after his failed attempt to sexually assault
Sony. Nestor, on his part, asserted that he had delivered just one
stabbing thrust on the victim. He had simply acted in defense of
himself and of his family and, therefore, the slaying of Camias was
justified under the circumstances. His wife, meanwhile, with
corroboration from Nestor and Jonalyn, insisted that she never laid
a hand on the victim. All three of them, likewise argued that
Duhaylungsod was nowhere at the scene of the crime when it was
committed.
Nevertheless, the trial court found the spouses guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. It accorded full credence on
the firm testimony of Duhaylungsod and the autopsy report
adduced on the cause of death of Camias which showed a total of
ten stab and hacking wounds on different parts of his body.
ISSUE: WON the circumstances of self-defense and defense of a
relative were duly established to justify the killing of the victim.
HELD: NO.
An accused relying on said justifying circumstances must prove the
same by means of sufficient, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.
The burden of proof rests upon him. And, where the prosecution
evidence, as in this case, renders extremely doubtful the veracity of
the defense version, said defenses cannot be granted any
evidentiary weight.
It clearly appears that after the spouses had turned the tide against
the deceased, with the latter already wounded and defensively
scrambling away from the house of the Babors, both appellants still
pursued Camias. It is apparent that the deceased was then no
longer the aggressor. It was thus indisputable that Camias’ unlawful
aggression had long ceased. Consequently, the element of
reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the
aggression could no longer be appreciated. Moreover, the number
of the wounds sustained by the deceased negates the assertion of
justifying circumstances by appellants. The autopsy report reveals
that Camias had sustained all of ten wounds and one even resulted
incompletely severing his right arm. These findings were further
corroborated by Duhaylungsod’s testimony.
The Court, nonetheless, appreciated in favor of Nestor and Sony the
mitigating circumstances of (1) immediate vindication of a grave
offense committed by the deceased against Sony, and (2) sufficient
provocation.