Europes Refugee Crisis

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Europe's refugee crisis: A comparative analysis of Germany and France
Thesis · September 2016

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Europe's Refugee Crisis:
A comparative Analysis of Germany and France
By Maria Muzalevskaya
Thesis prepared for

the Degree of Master of Arts, International Affairs
Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies,
Boston University
Approved: Professor Vivien Schmidt
August 22, 2016

Table of contents
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………...2
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………3
The European refugee crisis……………………………………………………………………….3
Literature review…………………………………………………………………………………..9
Chapter One. Refugee and Immigration policy………………………………………………16
1.1. Germany……………………………………………………………………………………..17
1.2. France......................................................................................................................................19
Chapter Two. Rise of Far Right Parties………………………………………………………22
2.1.Politics of immigration: the mainstream and the far right…………………………………...23
2.2. Germany……………………………………………………………………………………..25
2.2.1. Predecessors to modern far right parties………………………………………….........27
2.2.2. The Alternative for Germany ………………………………………………………….30
2.2.3. The Pegida movement………………………………………………………………….32
2.2.4. German U-turns as a sign of far right popularity? …………………………………….35
2.3. France………………………………………………………………………………………..37
2.3.1. Origins of the National Front…………………………………………………………..38
2.3.2. The National Front and the refugee crisis……………………………………………...42
2.4. Far right: balance the leaders’ position in shaping states’ policies?.......................................45
Chapter Three. New Identity?....................................................................................................47
3.1. Germany……………………………………………………………………………………..48
3.3.1. German ethno-cultural identity and its Turkish Muslims……………………………...48
3.2. France………………………………………………………………………………………..55
3.2.1. French Republicanism…………………………………………………………………55
3.3. Identity as a comprehensive explanation?..............................................................................61
Chapter Four. Role of Personality…………………………………………………………….62
4.1. Angela Merkel’s pragmatism………………………………………………………………..64
4.2. François Hollande’s “descente aux enfers”…………………………………………………68
4.3. German dominance?...............................................................................................................73
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………74
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………….78
1
Abstract
The European migration crisis has gained worldwide attention with diverse policy
positions from EU member states. Before this crisis, the EU was an example of a strong union
with relatively consolidated common positions. However, today member states have preferred to
keep their sovereignty in solving the problem of refugee distribution. As the crisis has evolved,
Angela Merkel’s active role in managing the crisis has been intensively discussed. France, in
turn, has shown cautiousness in its approach to refugee taking. This thesis examines the
continuous changes in the positions of Germany and France, and the reasons for their selected
approaches to tackling the crisis. Specifically the paper explains what role the domestic political
processes, such as far right party politics, identity and leadership play in the decision-making of
two countries. The paper argues that in this crisis Angela Merkel has been motivated by her
personal policy preferences, while Françcois Hollande has been constrained by domestic
opposition in the face of the National Front and the collapse of his own legitimacy. The issue is
developed through scholarly articles as well as international and domestic media resources,
including European, German and French political statements.
Key words: Refugee crisis, Angela Merkel, François Hollande domestic politics, far right,
leadership, national identity, Alterative for Germany, National Front, Muslims.
2
Introduction
The European refugee crisis
Beginning in 2011, an unprecedented number of people began migrating in response to the
numerous Arab uprisings, which spread chaos and instability through the Middle East.
According to the Report of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department of the European
Union Commission, an estimates 12.4 million people were newly displaced due to conflict or
persecution in 2015 only. Syria remains the world’s largest source country of refugees during
2015 with over 4.9 million people. 1 This time not only Turkey but Europe as well is facing an
upsurge of incoming migrants. So far Europe has received 1.1 million asylum applications this
year, compared to 630,000 for the whole of 2014. 2 In May the President of the European
commission Jean-Claude Juncker has said, “in former times we were working together…we
were in charge of a big piece of history. This has totally gone.” What has happened with Europe
are the signs of deep trouble. Economic growth has stagnated. European values and the identity
of member states are questioned. Unemployment rates have reached their highest levels in some
EU states. Support of far right parties is on the rise. Terrorist attacks by native-born citizens have
raised security fears all over the continent. Moreover, all this is compounded by the huge flow of
incoming asylum seekers which seems to be a burden for the future of the EU, according to
numerous recent polls. 3
In the midst of this major crisis, France and Germany have taken very different and
unexpected positions. Most surprising was that both reversed long-standing approaches to
1
“Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons - Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection - European Commission,”
July 8, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what-we-do/humanitarian-aid/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons_en.
2
The UNHCR, A New Beginning: Refugee Integration in Europe, Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR, 2013,
http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/31#_ga=1.90101784.2076822820.1469038440.
3
Harry Cooper, "Europeans Fear Refugees Threaten Jobs, Increase Terrorism: Poll," The Politico. July 12, 2016,
http://www.politico.eu/article/europeans-pew-poll-muslims-terrorism-jobs-integration-news/.
3
immigration and refugees, with Germany standing for an open arms approach and France, in
turn, a country with a long history of immigration policy, has shown a shift in her approach to
refugee taking. France, where ten percent of the population is Muslim immigrants, having come
from its colonies after the Second World War, announced that only 30,000 refugees would be
hosted this year, while in Germany at least sixty percent of the population has supported
Merkel’s decision to take a million refugees. The position makes the German case in particular
unique in Europe, and difficult to follow for any other countries.
The main interest of the present research came from the continuous changes in the
positions of member states toward refugee resettlement, states which have preferred to be driven
by self-interest instead of cooperation. Before this crisis, the EU was the perfect example of an
organization which was built up on such cornerstones as consistency, solidarity, and friendship. 4
However, what we see today is the EU’s crisis within a crisis. The EU institutions have proven
their inefficiency in taking consolidated measures particularly in regard to equal distribution of
coming refugees. It has asked for a collective response to the crisis by means of burden sharing,
but has met resistance from many member states (Hungary, UK, Denmark and others).
The refugee crisis exacerbates an already-widespread moral panic and fear in EU member
states where economic and migration policies have already badly affected the well-being and
security of the country’s inhabitants. Migrants have become representative of disappearing jobs,
alien values, and crime. Plus, the fact that the majority of these migrants are Muslims has
aggravated the current situation with refugees. Under these pressures, EU member states have
changed their courses of actions, specifically on the question of developing a common refugee
4
European Commission. “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.” Chapter IV (May 2008): 47-66.
The largest mass departure that Europe faced after the establishment of UNHCR was after Hungarian revolution in
1956. Member states acted in solidarity. A collective effort characterized the response to the crisis in Vietnam in the
80s. During the Yugoslavian crisis member states agreed on a compromise in the form od temporary protection.
4
policy. Therefore, the present research will analyze how selected EU member states have
responded and how their response can be explained.
In order to make the argument valid, the present research will focus on the role of domestic
political processes in the changing of positions (decision-making) of Germany and France on
refugee policy in the current migration crisis as well as the role of its leaders, Angela Merkel and
François Hollande, as legitimate head of states. Given the fact that for many years the Franco-
German relationship was decisive in the European Council, today we see how two countries have
implicitly changed their approaches under unexpected circumstances such as the refugee crisis.
While France, originally an immigrant country, has agreed to take only thirty thousands refugees,
Germany has shown an unprecedented commitment by opening the country to more than a
million refugees. Simply stated, Germany has taken the initiative, and in so doing the balance of
power has shifted from previously Franco-German dominance to only Germany today. 5
The aim of the research is not to contrast policies of the two countries, but to deepen the
reader’s understanding of refugee policy decision-making and explain the variation of domestic
and psychological factors in the changing positions of Angela Merkel and François Hollande.
In tackling the crisis, Angela Merkel has relied on her individual policy preferences, which
are mostly motivated by humanitarian concerns and her personal beliefs. Having grown up under
the communist regime, the Chancellor is familiar with the feeling of being surrounded by walls.
Thus, she acted decisively, despite facing a serious potential backlash domestically. François
Holland’s hands, in turn, were tied nationally because of domestic opposition in face of the
5
After a series of crises, including Eurozone debt, Russian aggression in Ukraine and sudden surge in migrants and
refugees it has been clear that Germany became the leader of Europe. Scholars and media started referring to
Germany as a ‘geo-economic’ power or a ‘reluctant hegemon.’
See Hans Kundrani, The Paradox of German Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Stephen F. Szabo,
Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-Economics (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014); Simon Bulmer and William E.
Paterson, “Germany as the EU’s Reluctant Hegemon? Of Economic Strenght and Political Constraints,” Journal of
European Public Policy, vol.20, no.10, 2013, pp. 1,387-405;
5
National Front and an increasing loss of credibility among his voters. The challenges posed by
economic failure, immigration, radical Islam and an absence of bold decisions on the part of the
ruling party and its leader to address these issues has resulted in an increasingly fragmented party
system, on the one hand, and growing anxiety or indifference among French voters, on the other
hand. The European elections of May 2014 showed that the success of the National Front in
these elections was an acute illustration of the collapse of François Hollande’s legitimacy.
Therefore, Angela Merkel has been more concerned by the longer-term consequences of the
refugee crisis for the EU as a whole, while François Hollande has been more worried about the
shorter-term outcomes of the refugee flows, which might have worsened his position
domestically.
The analysis is mainly based on the exploration of such domestic factors as the cultural
identity of the state, particularly in what way it might shape the state’s interests and decision-
making; the development of far right parties and movements and their influence on the changing
position of mainstream parties and their leaders; and the personal factors in the decision-making
of Angela Merkel and François Hollande, suggesting that at some point decision-making might
be the result of individual political leadership.
The research is structured as follows. I start out by presenting the theoretical background of
the refugee policies of both countries in the past in order to show the shift in the policies today.
This leads us to the understanding that member states set their own migration positions,
particularly in the refugee question and do not have enough of a common legal framework to
cooperate on a mutual basis. The next three chapters will focus on understanding why Germany
pursues a pro-immigrant stance and accomplishes moral obligations towards refugees, while
6
France although it does not refuse to deal with the situation, takes a much smaller number of
refugees.
For the purposes of this paper, I analyze some of the domestic factors that might have
influenced the position of the leaders. One of the sections looks at such domestic factors as the
development of far right parties in time in both countries. Under far right parties the present
paper will use the definition of Cas Mudde, who identified five key features of the far right:
nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the belief in a strong state. 6 The
subsequent section will focus on such far right parties and movements as Alternative for
Germany (AfD) and the Pegida movement in Germany and the National Front (FN) in France.
This leads me to say that the success of individual parties and the extent to which they shape the
mainstream politics differ in both countries.
Another section explores the cultural identity of the state, which I define in terms of its
internal aspects, following a constructivist approach which assumes that all interests come from
identities. 7 Aside from individual characteristics and psychology, governmental politics, and
structure, it is often assumed that individuals must be affected to some degree by the differences
in their societies, their historical experiences, value systems and language structures. 8 Especially
in the situation of identity change, when old identities are abandoned and new ones are chosen
and embraced, the analysis in this section will be informed by the constructivists in order to
understand whether certain values become the basis for a certain policymaking. Since
constructivist concepts of culture, identity, ideas, discourse, and roles have been used to explain
6
Cas Mudde, "Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed: A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged
Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP’86)", European Journal of Political Research, 27/2, (1995): 206.
7
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
231.
8
Valerie M. Hudson, "Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda," In Culture and Foreign Policy,
(Lynne Rienner, 1997):1-26.
7
why positions of some states defy realist and liberal expectations, national identity needs to be
understood as existing in parallel with the values or interests of the state. As for identity, this
paper develops Wendt’s understanding on international politics by emphasizing that international
politics are socially constructed. Material forces matter but not as much as identities and interests
that are constructed through human association. 9 Since constructivists also often assume a
strong connection between culture at the mass-societal level and policymaking at the elite level,
this paper tries to see how multiple identities of citizens and migrants are aggregated and
whether societal identities influence elites and states’ policy preferences. 10 Particularly, the
chapter will include a comprehensive analysis of the interaction of German and French identities
with the cultural identities of newcomers. It will help the reader to understand that on the one
hand, different cultures and values are vital for the articulation of the interests and policies of the
state; on the other hand, it is not the sole issue in the decision-making of the leader.
The third chapter brings in the role of personality in the decision-making process,
particularly during the current crisis. This part shows that amid all possible factors, which might
have shaped the leader’s decision-making domestically and internationally, the role of
personality, personal beliefs and past political history all matter significantly in the decision-
making.
Although the research gives a deep analysis of the three factors mentioned above, it does
not necessarily mean that there are no additional factors that help explain what caused Germany
and France to distance themselves from their previous policies toward refugees. The present
paper does not take into account such factors as the role of leaders’ advisors, institutions, lobby
9
Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International
Organization Int. Org. 46.02 (Spring, 1992): 394.
10
John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," International
Organization Int Org 53, no. 04 (1999): 765-803.
8
groups, and many other aspects. Moreover, the generalizability of the results is limited due to the
limited number of case studies analyzed in the research. Another limitation is that the crisis is
ongoing and the present research does not claim any final truths for its results because it is still
too early to know which events are important and which are inconsequential. Finally, the present
research does not take into account the reaction of Germany and France to the recent terror
attacks in Europe.
Literature review
While many theories on state behavior in international relations (IR) are contested, it is
usually inappropriate to see them as competing theories. Instead, each is based on certain
assumptions and constrained within certain conditions. While various theories may lead to more
compelling conclusions, none is definitely wrong or right. Rather, each might be applied in
examining and analyzing domestic and external factors and their influence on a state’s behavior.
There are different explanations for the causal mechanisms of a changing state’s external
behavior in international relations. The most widely used conception was introduced by Kenneth
Waltz, consisting of three levels of analysis: international-level explanations, which look to a
state’s position in the international system; domestic-level explanations, which focus on the
domestic factors such as society, culture, and political institutions of individual nation-states; and
individual-level explanations, which look to the personal or psychological characteristics of
individual statesmen. 11 Taking into account the fact that the international approach focuses more
on the role of powers in IR instead of domestic constraints, the present research will apply
domestic and individual-level explanations.
11
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1959).
9
Generalizing a theoretical framework of the causal factors of a state’s decision-making
internationally, it is important to note that all sophisticated IR theories consequently ended up
conceding that domestic factors are indispensible participants in foreign policy-making. And
here neither realism nor institutionalism plays as important a role as liberal and constructivist
hypotheses, which highlight domestic and social conditions as an increasingly central factor in a
state’s behavior in international relations. In contrast to realism and institutionalism, where all
states have the same goals and behaviors, self-interested actors pursuing wealth or survival, the
basic insight of liberalism is that individual states have unique behaviors in international
relations. 12 This theory helps to understand variations in changing positions of a state’s behavior
internationally. However, it does not focus on the role of the social aspects in a state’s decision-
making to the same degree as constructivists.
In order to understand the key components of a state’s behavior in liberal theory, one must
consider Andrew Moravcsik’s piece on liberalism, which gives an explicit analysis of the
variants of liberal theory. In his view States are not simply ‘black boxes’ seeking to survive and
prosper in an anarchic system. They are configurations of individual and group interests, where
ideological beliefs may also be important.
Specifically he distinguishes three type of liberalism: ideational, commercial, and
republican. Each stresses a specific element of liberal theory: social demands (state preferences),
including variation of social preferences on national unity, legitimate political institutions, and
12
John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar
Economic Order,” International Organization 36, no. 02 (March 1982): 520.
10
socio-economic regulation; incentives for transborder economic transactions; and the nature of
domestic representation. 13
Overall, as Andrew Moravcsik highlights, liberal theory remains a comprehensive
alternative to realism and institutionalism, as well as to constructivism. Firstly, neither realism
nor institutionalism explain the changing substantive goals and purposes over which states
conflict and cooperate. Secondly, liberal theory offers an explanation for historical change in the
international system, whereas scholars like Waltz, Giplin, and others focus on the static patterns
of state behavior or repeating cycles of the rise and decline of great powers. 14 Therefore, liberal
theorists stress the importance of three variants as national self-determination and social
citizenship, which will be touched upon in the present research, the development of economic
integration, and liberal democratic governance. 15 Finally, it explains the complexity of states’
interdependence in modern times, whereas realism and constructivism do not give a solid
explanation of the emergence of pacific, interdependent states and unions, for example like the
European Union.
Constructivism, although not yet formulated as a theory, shares some societal-level
normative and ideational forces with liberalism. 16 However, in contrast to liberalism,
constructivists often assume a strong connection between culture at the societal level and
policymaking at the elite level. On the one hand constructivist research on identities concludes
that there is a single national identity that is shared between elites and the masses. 17 On the other
13
Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International
Organization 51, no. 4 (October 1, 1997): 524.
14
Ibid,, 535.
15
Ibid., 535.
16
Juliet Kaarbo, “A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory,” International
Studies Review 17, no. 2 (March 17, 2015): 199.
17
Ibid., 202.
11
hand, some constructivists claim a disconnection between the elite and masses but see cultural
values and identities developing at the societal level and shaping elites decision-making. 18
Constructivists explain the importance of the relationship between culture and a state’s behavior
based on four general pathways. First, culture helps to define the basic goals of collectivity.
Many interests “depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived
identity of others.” 19 Culture may do much to determine the general policy objectives that are to
be pursued. 20 Secondly, culture shapes perception of the external environment. It conditions the
range of issues to which attention is devoted by influencing what people notice. 21 Moreover,
culture shapes the identification of the behaviors available for advancing the state’s interests in a
particular context. Finally, culture influences the evaluation process of the available options and
thus the choices that are made among them. 22
According to the constructivist approach, the interests of states are shaped by their
identities, while state identities, as well as interests, are subject to change in the process of
interaction. State behavior is generally seen as a part of culture, which most constructivists
define as socially shared beliefs. Overall, constructivists acknowledge that norms, culture,
environment, and behavior are changing factors of a state’s decision-making.
One of the weaknesses of the constructivist approach is that culture and identity are not
deterministic. In addition, there are still few empirical studies done on identity construction, and
18
Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (United States: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1998).
19
Peter J Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996);
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
20
Sidney Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture," in Political Culture and Political Development
(Princeton University Press, 1965), 517; Yitzhak Klein, “A Theory of Strategic Culture,” Comparative Strategy 10,
no. 1 (January 1991).
21
Verba 1965, 513; Katzenstein 1996.
22
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political
Change (Baltimore, MD, United States: Cornell University Press, 1993).
12
how multiple identities are combined and how they influence elites and foreign policy choices. 23
The most frequent and serious criticism concerns the difficulty of defining and measuring
cultural variables. 24 For example, foreign policy analysis, which examines how domestic
political and decision-making factors affect actors’ choices and policies, stresses the complexity
of relationship between public opinion and values and elite decision-making. Foreign policy
analysis argues that elites and masses may disagree on their country’s identity. According to
Risse et al., elite and mass attitudes toward the Euro differed over a long period, partly due to
different conceptions of German identity. 25 Rathbun, for example, argues that the Christian
Democratic Party in Germany used peacekeeping policies on purpose to “habituate” the public to
acceptance of German participation in military interventions, which goes against a constructivist
interpretation of a passive, antimilitaristic culture that shaped German foreign policy. Media and
framing influences on opinion also challenge the notion that mass views are a stable and
independent source of a state’s decision-making. Overall, research on the influence of public
opinion on state decision-making has turned toward analysis of other factors that affect this
relationship. For example, Foyle states that leaders’ beliefs about the necessity of considering
public opinion affect the role that the public will play in state decision-making. 26
Overall a focus on the social context in which IR occurs leads constructivists to emphasize
issues of identity as well as culture. At that point it helps to understand that States are not only
self-interested and rational actors, pursuing survival, power, or wealth, but also that their
decision-making might be complicated by varying identities and beliefs within the country. On
23
Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and
1999 (United States: Cornell University Press, 2002).
24
Lucian W. Pye, "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture,"
ed. Charles M. Bonjean, in The Idea of Culture in the Social Sciences, ed. Louis Schneider (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1973), 65-76.
25
Juliet Kaarbo, “A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory,” International
Studies Review 17, no. 2 (March 17, 2015): 202.
26
Ibid., 198.
13
the one hand, the behavior of Germany and France in the current refugee crisis might be
explained through a constructivist’s approach. On the other hand, the issue of identity and culture
does not cover such aspects of domestic policy as the role of political parties and leadership in
state decision-making. Yet this is elucidated by neoclassical realism, which stresses the role of a
wide range of domestic political and decision-making factors such as political traditions and
identities, domestic institutions and coalition building or states’ perceptions of past experience.
Some neoclassical realists focus on domestic policy and state-society relations. 27 Others place
greater stress on such factors as nationalism and ideology. 28 Finally, there are some among
neoclassical realists who focus on the role of human beings, political leaders, and elites in
foreign policy decision-making. 29
Although the effects of personality on decision-making are difficult to quantify, for the
purpose of this research we cannot afford to ignore individual differences between the leaders
themselves in decision-making during the refugee crisis. As political scientist James Barber
remarked, “ Every story of a decision-making is really two stories: an outer one in which a
rational man calculates and an inner one in which an emotional man feels. The two are forever
connected.” 30 The role of personality in state decision-making is the result of cognitive
processes, background, personal characteristics, motives, and beliefs. 31 It was social
psychologists and personality theorists, rather than political scientists, who demonstrated the
27
Colin Dueck, "Neoclassical Realism and the National Interest: Presidents, Domestic Politics, and Major Military
Interventions," ed. Norrin Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro, in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,
ed. Steven Lobell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 139-169.
28
Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Neoclassical Realism and Identity: Peril Despite Profit across Taiwan Strait," ed. Norrin
Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro, in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven Lobell
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 99-138.
29
Anders Wivel, “Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The Promise and Limitations of
Realist Foreign Policy Analysis,” Journal of International Relations and Development 8, no. S4 (November 30,
2005): 361.
30
Cited in Robert S. Hirschfield, The power of the presidency, (New York: Aldine Transaction, 1982), 371.
31
Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout, Man-Milieu Relationship Hypothesis in the Context of International
Politics. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956).
14
psychological dimensions of international relations. 32 The first attempt took the form of
psychobiography and psychohistory, which tried to explain behavior in terms of early childhood
experiences or development crisis in adulthood. 33 By the 1950s and 1960s social psychologists
put at the core of decision-making analysis individual needs and motivations of the leaders.
Alexander George focused on the content of individual belief systems in his study of the
“operational codes” of political leaders. He argued that an individual’s beliefs are
interdependent, consistent, hierarchically organized, and resistant to change. The cornerstones of
belief systems are philosophical beliefs about the nature of politics and conflict. 34 By the late
1960s scholars began analyzing crisis decision-making. They particularly focused on the impact
of stress caused by high risks, limited decision time, and surprise associated with international
crises. 35 For example, Robert Jervis’ study applied a “cognitive paradigm” to the analysis of
leader decision-making. He concludes that an individual’s cognitive predispositions or mindsets
play an important role in shaping his/her perceptions of reality. It leads to selective attention to
information for people to see what they expect to see based on prior beliefs. 36 His discussion on
the role of emotion or motivation in decision-making led to the notion of “motivated biases.”
Motivated biases are driven by people’s emotional needs, by their need to maintain self-esteem,
and by their interests. Such behavior is most likely to happen in decisions involving high risks.
32
Ross Stagner, “Some Factors Related to Attitude Toward War, 1938,” The Journal of Social Psychology 16, no. 1
(August 1942).
33
Peter Loewenberg, Decoding the Past: The Psychohistorical Approach (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1992).
34
Alexander L. George, “The ‘operational code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and
Decision-Making,” International Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (June 1969).
35
Charles Frazer Hermann, International Crises: Insights from behavioral research (New York: Free Press, 1972).
36
Robert Jervis, Perception and misperception in international politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1976).
15
The resulting stress from threats to basic values often leads decision-makers to deny those threats
or the need to make tradeoffs between values. 37
One of the weaknesses of this approach is that when analyzing the influence of personality
upon foreign policy, it is important to note that the different political environments surrounding
leaders might limit their freedom to take a certain decision. In democracy “personality factors
merge with cultural background factors and can often be explained in more generalizable group
terms.” 38 Therefore in the selected democratic countries of the present research, political leaders
in decision-making theoretically should reflect the attitudes of their citizens and cultural identity
of their country. Although this approach helps to understand the role of personality in state
decision-making, it dismisses the role of other constraining domestic factors, which will be
touched upon in the present research.
Given all strengths and weaknesses of various theoretical approaches to the understanding
of causal factors of state decision-making in international relations, present research will be
based on multidimensional investigations by analyzing in what way domestic factors as well as
the role of personality might or might not affect state position in the non-routine situation of
refugee crisis.
CHAPTER ONE. Refugee and immigration policy
Long before today, Europe became the destination of immigrants, including asylum
seekers and refugees because of its economic prosperity, security, respect for human rights, and
relative distance from conflict zones. Given the fact that the EU as a member of the international
community agreed to follow universally accepted rules and definitions for asylum seekers,
37
Ole R. Holsti, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-makers," in Political Science Annual,
ed. Cornelius P. Cotter (Indianopolis: BobbsMerrill, 1975), 235-319.
38 Philip G Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 13.
16
common migration policy including migrants’ integration and refugee resettlement still have not
been generated at the subnational level. This chapter helps us understand the difference in
approach between Germany and France to migrants, including refugees and the shift in the way
they reacted to the flow of refugees in fall 2015. For the purpose of this research, it is important
to provide information about member states relationship to refugees at the legislative level in the
past in order to follow the sudden changes within cultures of cooperation and friendship in
Europe.
Germany
To follow Germany’s refugee policy evolution, it is important to note that until late in the
20th century, Germany lacked a national strategy of integration. Germany’s current Immigration
Act only came into force in January 2005. The Act defines integration courses that consist of a
German language and an orientation course on the German legal system, history, society and
culture. Only if an immigrant meets the requirements does he/she have a right to ask for
residency as well as social and welfare benefits. 39
Immigration in Germany is mainly the result of an employment policy. “We are not a
country of immigration,” proclaimed the authorities in Germany. 40 Until recently, Germany has
not admitted its status as an immigrant country. There were four main sources of post-war
migration to Germany. First, Aussiedler migration, which took place between 1945 and 1955,
included mostly refugees who were persecuted in Soviet bloc countries. The second source was
the Gastarbeiter program, which recruited mainly ‘guest workers.’ The third major source of
post-war movement to Germany was by the family members of guest workers. 41 And the last
39
The UNHCR, A New Beginning: Refugee Integration in Europe (Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR, 2013): 47.
40
Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002.
41
Andrew Geddes, The politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe (London:SAGE publications, 2003): 79.
17
main source was asylum seekers who could get a refugee status in Germany under the Basic
Law, Article 16, which states “Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right of
asylum.” Even if an application was rejected, a victim had the right to stay and challenge this
decision before the courts. Such generous and internationally exceptional legislation was
explained by the fact that West Germany had turned too many Germans and Europeans into
refugees during the Nazi regime and now it could at least admit its “ugly” past. However, in
1993 the newly unified Germany amended Article 16 of the Basic Law, restricting severely the
right to political asylum. 42 The new Article 16 begins with same wording as the old article, but is
extended by a long list of speculations and restrictions. 43 A key change was the introduction of a
safe third country rule, meaning anyone who enters the country via a member state of the EU or
another state which has been qualified as safe is denied access to the asylum procedure. 44 This
amendment to the Basic Law was implemented because of the development of a massive
immigration from Central Europe and from former East German citizens into West Germany in
1990. Moreover, the rate of violent attacks against foreigners was at a high level.
Restrictive policy toward refugees and exclusion from access to asylum continued to be at
the forefront of political discourse during the 90s. In 1992, the government introduced a special
procedure at the airports, in which applicants without valid travel documents were detained in
‘international zones.’ Such new laws met criticism from political elites in Germany, because it
made getting access to the right of asylum impossible without entering illegally. In 1993, the
state continued to intensify the restrictive policy, thus adopting the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits
42
Alice Bloch, Refugees, Citizenship, and Social Policy in Europe (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire:
Macmillan Press, 1999).
43
Wolfgang Bosswick, "Development of Asylum Policy in Germany," Journal of Refugee Studies 13, no.1 (2000):
50.
44 Alice Bloch, Refugees, Citizenship, and Social Policy in Europe (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire:
Macmillan Press, 1999), 86.
18
Act, which separated welfare provisions for asylum seekers from general welfare, therefore
regularly providing most benefits in kind on a minimum level only. 45 Overall, the restriction
policy and implementation of the ‘safe third country’ rule, made access to asylum very restricted
even for genuine refugees.
Today, the current crisis shows how Germany completely reversed such policies by calling
Member States for European solidarity to share the burden equally. Indeed, Angela Merkel took
an unprecedented decision to resettle a million refugees in Germany in 2016.
France
France has a long tradition of positively encouraging immigration because of the concerns
46
dating back especially to the post-War time about low levels of population growth. In contrast
to Germany, France has its immigration roots dating back to colonialism. By the 1980s, twenty
five percent of people living in France were either immigrants or had at least one immigrant
relative.
Regarding French refugee policy, the ‘right of asylum’ was the fundamental principle of
republicanism. Particularly, during the French Revolution the defense of refugee rights was
centered on the evocation of ideals of natural rights, and the right of asylum was considered to be
indispensable right to the individual, derived from nature. 47 The recognition of the legal rights of
refugees in France was assured by the adoption in French law of the UN’s convention relating to
refugees. This became implemented on July 25th, 1952 with the passage of the ‘Law Relating to
the Right of Asylum’ (Loi relative au droit d’asile). 48 The law constituted the French office for
45 Wolfgang Bosswick, "Development of Asylum Policy in Germany," Journal of Refugee Studies 13, no.1 (2000):
52.
46 Andrew Geddes, The politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe (London:SAGE publications, 2003): 52.
47
Greg Burgess, Refuge in the Land of Liberty: France and Its Refugees, from the Revolution to the End of Asylum,
1787-1939 (Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 216.
48
Ibid., 213.
19
the Protection of Refugees and the Stateless (Office Francais de Protection des Refugies et
Apatrides- OFPRA), which determined whether the application of an individual for refugee
status met with the conditions of the convention. If OFPRA denied the claim, the alien had one
month to appeal to the Commission des recours des refugies. Under certain conditions, an alien
might appeal a decision of the Commission des recours to the Conseil d’Etat.
The fact that a reference to asylum seekers is a part of the French constitution reflects the
reputation of France as liberal and generous country of asylum. Especially during the early 70s,
France became a desirable country of resettlement for aliens fleeing persecution. First of all, an
alien who applied for asylum had a right to a temporary residence card and permission work.
Applicants unable to find work were entitled to unemployment benefits. They were also eligible
for housing allocations, medical care, and other benefits subsidized by the French government
through private organizations. 49 Indeed, as France made no serious effort to deport aliens whose
claims were eventually denied, a claim for asylum effectively led to permanent residence.
Unsuccessful applicants might be sent a letter by the state informing them that they had a certain
period of time to leave, but no effort was made to deport the aliens.
Starting in the late 80s, while the country was already overwhelmed with a large
population of third-world guest worker immigrants from the African continent, France began to
face an asylum crisis. The new refugee policy was being applied discreetly to avoid accusations
that France was abandoning its traditional defense of human rights around the world. During that
period it tightened controls on those asserting persecution at home, not only with a view to
deporting those staying illegally after being refused asylum but also in the hope of signaling to
prospective travelers that France is no longer an open door. Furthermore France announced it
49
Alexander Aleinikoff, “Political asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France: Lessons
for the US,” Journal of Law Reform, (Winter 1984): 214.
20
would no longer grant political-refugee status to citizens from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary explaining that democracy had returned to those countries. In the 1990s, asylum
restrictions and a trend toward lower recognition rates led to a decrease in the number of
applicants. The Refugee Office notes that having jumped from 34,400 in 1988 to 61,500 in 1989,
the number of new applicants for asylum fell slightly in 1990. 50 However, at the end of the
1990s the number of applications for asylum rose again. Since 1997, France has had a second
asylum status, the so-called territorial asylum. This status, which provides significantly fewer
rights, was originally created for refugees from the Algerian civil war but later was supposed to
be offered to all nationalities. The conservative government under Prime Minister Jean-Peirre
Raffarin reformed the asylum law once again in 2003. Eventually, processing times for asylum
applications were shortened, a new definition of the term refugee was introduced, and the
structure of the authorities was reorganized. 51
In May 2015, the government rejected the European Commission proposal to resettle
40,000 asylum seekers. At that time, it considered that the country had already taken on more
than its share of the burden. 52 However, since the crisis has further developed, François Holland
has decided to host only 30,000 refugees, which is much fewer than Germany. Soon after, it
sparked anti-immigrant reaction among the French. For example, according to the Human Rights
Watch Report, asylum seekers and migrants living in destitution in the port city of Calais
experience harassment and abuse at the hands of French police. Moreover, currently only a third
50
Alan Riding, “France Imposes a Tighter Political Refugee policy,” The New York Times, February 14, 1991
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/14/world/france-imposes-a-tighter-political-refugee-policy.html.
51
Kimberly Hamilton, Patrick Simon and Clara Veniard, “The Challenge of French Diversity,” Migration Policy
Institute, November 1, 2014, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/challenge-french-diversity.
52
Matthieu Tardis, “We have enough to deal with at home! France and the refugee crisis,” Heinrich Boll Stiftung
The Green Political Foundation, June 16, 2016, https://www.boell.de/en/2016/06/15/we-have-enough-deal-home-
france-and-refugee-crisis.
21
of those who seek asylum across France are provided with accommodation in reception
centers. 53
Overall, for France, the refugee issue remains highly delicate. In contrast to Germany in
the past, which enacted measures that streamlined the adjudication process by bringing more
judges into the process and restricting appeals, France has hardly changed its adjudication
process and has done little to deter the filing claims. 54 However today we see how France is
cautious towards the refugee crisis. The problem that lies ahead for France is how to structure
and implement policies that reduce the number of unreasonable claims without abandoning the
nation’s historical commitment to helping refugees.
CHAPTER TWO. Rise of Far Right Parties
Media discussions have been recently overwhelmed with reports about the rising support
for far right parties across Europe. Yet the alarmist reporting often does not have enough much-
needed historical analysis to explain the influence of far right rhetoric on the changing politics of
mainstream parties. Taking into account the fact that the current refugee crisis has intensified the
rise of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric in many European countries, it would be more
relevant to say that Europe as a whole was not attacked by “a far right earthquake,” as many
journalists claim today. 55 It is true that there is a changing dynamic in electorates’ support but, as
has been the case since the emergence of the so-called “third wave” of far right parties in the
early 1980s, the success of individual parties and their influence on politics has differed
53
The Human Rights Watch Report, “France: Migrants, Asylum Seekers Abused and Destitute,” January 20, 2015,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/20/france-migrants-asylum-seekers-abused-and-destitute.
54
Alexander Aleinikoff, “Political asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France: Lessons
for the US,” Journal of Law Reform, (Winter 1984): 214.
55
Cas Mudde, “The Far Right in the 2014 European Elections: Of Earthquakes, Cartels and Designer
Fascists,” Washington Post (Washington Post), May 30, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/05/30/the-far-right-in-the-2014-european-elections-of-earthquakes-cartels-and-designer-fascists/.
22
significantly across the continent. In that sense, there is a lot of controversy among political
scientists regarding an understanding of what effect far right parties have had on politics of the
mainstream parties specifically regarding the migration question.
Historically, in Germany and France the agendas and positions of the mainstream parties
toward migration and refugee policies have mixed relationships with the far right parties. Given
the fact that some of the possible ways of responding to populist far right parties is to exclude
them, defuse their message, to some extent adopt their rhetoric and policies, or engage more with
voters at a local level, it is important to understand to what extent the political establishments of
two states in particular use one of these counter methods today and in what way it shapes their
mainstream positions. 56
Politics of Immigration: the Mainstream and the Far Right
The mainstream right apparently puts immigration issues in electoral competition, because
its anti-immigrant stance corresponds to the views of the average voter. In this context, it allows
mainstream right parties to put immigration, nationalism, and xenophobia on their political
agendas in order to compete with the mainstream left. 57 The situation changes when radical right
parties are present in the electoral arena. However, in contrast to the left, mainstream right
parties can still play the immigration card. According to Bale, the mainstream and far right
parties are in fact better off than the left. They often form a coalition together. Sometimes the
mainstream right finds itself in a difficult situation between political moderation and balancing
of interests of the center and center-right, and the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the far right. 58
56
Robin Wilson, Paul Hainsworth, «Far-Right Parties and discourse in Europe: A challenge for our times,» The
European Network against Racism, March, 2002, p. 19.
57
Tim Bale, “"Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarising Party
Systems." West European Politics 26, no. 3 (2003): 67.
58
Ibid., 70.
23
The mainstream left parties find themselves in a more complicated situation. These parties
have to deal with the mixed preferences of its electorate. On the one hand, part of their electorate
is voters with high income, education, and liberal socio-cultural values. On the other hand,
another part of the electorate is working-class voters who usually feel threatened in terms of
economic benefits, which decrease with the growing numbers of immigrants. 59 In this context,
taking into account variety in electorate preferences and immigration growing more relevant on
the public agenda, in the face of rising support of the far right, Socialists and Social Democrats
find themselves in a difficult situation. The left should find what kind of voters it will rely on,
particularly when immigration become a burdensome issue on the agenda. Some theories argue
that if the right emphasizes immigration issues critically, the mainstream left will shape a
position which is close to the average vote, then it will converge with the right. 60 Based on the
theories of electoral competition, the left will prefer to rely on its own issues instead of focusing
on immigration. 61
Given the main features of the far right party's agenda on immigration, the mainstream
parties often give more preference to immigration in their political agendas and shape their
positions towards the far right, especially when there is a growing support for these anti-
immigrant parties. Some authors argue that mainstream left parties could win if they give more
relevance to the socio-cultural dimension and lean towards the right. 62 For example, previous
researches show that the mainstream left employed this strategy by using the anti-immigrant
59
Green-Pederson, Christopher and Jesper Krogstrup, “ Immigration as a Political Issue in Denmark and
Sweden,” European Journal of Political Research 47, no. 5 (August 2008): 47;
Sofia Perez y Jose Fernandez Albertos, “Immigration and Left Party Government in Europe,” Paper prepared for the
APSA Annual Meeting, Toronto, September, 2009.
60
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
61
Ian Budge and Denis Farlie, “Party competition: Selective Emphasis or Direct Confrontation? An Alternative
View with Data,” in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, Western European Party Systems, London: Sage.
62
Van der Brug, Wouter and J. Van Spanje, «Immigration, Europe and the «New» Cultural cleavage,» European
Journal of Political Research, (2009): 48.
24
rhetoric of the far right parties in order to steal voters from the right. 63 The mainstream Left also
has an option to take an “adversarial strategy” and defend pro-immigrant positions and, thus, to
prevent the loss of its electorate. 64 However, it will hardly have a long lasting effect. Instead it
will bring costs for the mainstream left.
Alonso and Claro da Fonseca show in their research that the overall anti-immigrant or pro-
immigrant trends of the left and right parties with or without presence of the far right might take
place differently across Europe. For example, in 1986 in Germany the anti-immigrant turn of the
mainstream left and right happened after the electoral success of Die Republikaner in the
Bavarian state elections, in some other countries without electorally relevant far right parties, the
mainstream left experienced an anti-immigrant turn. According to the scholars’ argument, the
anti-immigrant turn of the mainstream parties can be interpreted in three ways: convergence with
the main competitor, congruence and divergence or polarization. In short, if a country has a
relevant far right party with an increasingly welfare chauvinist agenda, the mainstream left party
in this country is likely to become more vocal and more critical about immigration. In such
countries as Germany and Austria, Socialist and Christian Democrats show a congruent
development, which means that the polarization of mainstream party positions on the
immigration scale may facilitate the emergence of the far right. 65
Germany
In the recent local elections, although Merkel’s center-right CDU party suffered vote-share
losses in three states, it remained the largest party in Saxony-Anhait. Meanwhile, a far right wing
party AfD has made stunning gains in three regional elections.
63
David Art, "Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria." Party Politics 13, no. 3 (May
2007): 340.
64
Bonnie Meguid, Party competition between unequals, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
65
Sonia Alonso and Saro Claro da Fonseca, “Immigration, left and right,” Party Politics 18, no. 6 (May, 2011): 880.
25
Compared to France, the radical right parties have developed differently in the German
political establishment. There are several dynamics that have prevented the radical right from
becoming a sustained electoral force. First, the mainstream parties have preempted the far right’s
main issues of German unification and immigration. Second, the political culture of postwar
Germany makes it difficult for voters to support any party that has connections to neo-Nazism.
Third, the far right parties have followed ineffective strategies and suffered from organizational
weakness. 66
The German political establishment is characterized by its stability and decentralized
character. Germany contains sixteen federal regions, or Lander. The upper house, or Bundesrat,
represents the concerns of the Lander. Its members are appointed by each Land government. The
number of members of the lower house, the Bundestag, is at least twice the number of electoral
districts in the country. Each voter casts a ‘first vote’ for a particular candidate, and a ‘second
vote’ for a party. Half the members are elected through proportional representation, the other half
are elected in single member districts. Because a party must either receive five percent of the
national vote or a seat in at least three electoral districts to be gain a seat in the Bundestag, small
parties face a difficult barrier. 67 Regarding far right parties, generally speaking they have played
a role only at the subnational level and have frequently competed with each other. Indeed, new
parties that succeed in regional elections do not necessarily repeat their results at the national
level. Thus, many far right parties hardly manage to arrange electoral campaigns in all states.
Due to Germany’s history of the ‘Third Reich,’ all parties on the political far right are
automatically stigmatized as heirs of Nazism. This has consequences for their media image and
66
Roger Karapin, "Far-Right Parties and the Construction of Immigration Issues in Germany." In Shadows over
Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe (Palgrave MaCmillan, 2002), 187.
67
Martin Schain, Aritide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay, Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the
Extreme Right in Western Europe, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 329.
26
coverage. They in turn respond to this stigma by provocation through using offensive language
that originates form National Socialism. Thus strong state control and development of anti-
fascist organizations also help to prevent far right parties from being represented in the
parliament. 68
Finally, ineffective structure and organizational weakness impose limits on far right
parties’ attempts to gain seats in the Bundestag. As long as a party has a charismatic and strong
leader, who is able to prevent the party from having internal tensions, a party has a chance to
exist. Once, the leader disappears, a party will probably start collapsing. Older parties such as the
National Front in France, manage to adapt to the loss of their leader and to a find a replacement.
Overall, what might promote success of far right parties in other countries prevents them from
being treated equally in Germany’s political discourse. In other words, until now, in Germany
right-wing radicalism has been absorbed by other parties.
Predecessors to Modern Far Right Parties
To understand the radical right in contemporary Germany and its possible influence on
policy of the mainstream party, first it is important to analyze the development of far right parties
such as National Democratic Party (NPD), Republikaner (REP), and German People’s Union
(DVU) through time. David Art highlights that one of the causes of failure of this party was the
tension between its middle-aged leadership and youths. The interests of the NPD party elite were
often at odds with those of the new recruits. The second explanation is that of state control. In
contrast to France, the German state has a right to ban radical extremist parties and
organizations, and bar civil servants from joining them. Plus the state actively tries to convert
members of far right parties and organizations. Overall, there is a clear distinction between
68
Nicole Berbuir, Marcel Lewandowsky, and Jasmin Siri, "The AfD and Its Sympathisers: Finally a Right-Wing
Populist Movement in Germany?" German Politics 24, no. 2 (January 2015): 160.
27
extremist groups and mainstream politics in Germany. The third dynamic is the presence of
strong antifascist groups against the NDP and other radical right groups. The broader social
reaction of German politics and society has dramatically restricted these parties’ recruitment
base. 69 By describing the development of NPD, Art points out that in the post-war era, the
German state adopted a carrot (integration) and stick (repression) approach that succeeded in
exacerbating internal conflicts within far right parties. Moreover, economic growth in Germany
led to dramatic increases in the standard of living, which limited the number of voters of far right
parties as well.
At the time of German reunification, the rise of the far right Republikaner (REP) party was
one of the most important political moments. Like other radical right parties elsewhere during
the 1980s, the REP developed into an anti-immigrant and welfare chauvinist party. However,
from the beginning, the party started overcoming long lasting internal chaos, including the battle
between extremists and moderate members. As in case of NPD’s failure the state also played an
important role in raising the costs of membership in radical right organizations. In 1972, the
West German government of Willy Brandt passed the Decree Against Radicals, which forbade
people with radical views to hold positions in the German civil service. 70 Some members of
REP left the party for the sake of their careers.
After the collapse of REP, the German far right has been dominated by two parties: the
German People’s Union (DVU) and a renewed NPD. However, DVU has gradually lost the
support of its voters, which eventually led to its internal breakdown and defeat. The renewed
NPD in turn adopted a new anticapitalist rhetoric with its focus on socioeconomic problems. By
shaping a core ideology, the party moderated extremist rhetoric and got a more respectable
69 David Art, Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe (New York:

70
Ibid., 202.
28
image among the electorate. So the combination of social legitimacy and violence has worked.
In contrast to DVU, the NPD has networks in many eastern German towns. The Zeit, German
newspaper wrote, “ right-wing extremism in the east is not a phenomenon of marginal groups. It
is not a sub-culture, but rather dominates the youth scene in many small cities and towns. Racism
and anti-Semitism are in fashion.” 71 In general, the collapse of East Germany and with it the
destruction of values and authorities posed a particular challenge for the people in East Germany,
above all for youths searching for identity. 72 Many Germans, especially those who lived in
former Eastern Germany, did not profit from the opportunities of the unified Germany. Most of
them are uneducated and unemployable people, who feel insecure about their future and at the
same time are suffering significant economic losses. 73 An analysis of the last Bundestag election
in 2013, in which the NPD obtained 1.5 % of the vote cast, shows that the far right has gained its
highest support in the areas with low numbers of foreigners. Among the party’s voters were
primarily young men with 10 percent of men in the 18-24 age group and 8 percent of men with
age of 25-34. The data show that the far right rank-and-file were primarily people with relatively
difficult or uncertain living and working conditions. 74 From the regional perspective, the 2013
elections show that the far right is most successful in rural, structurally weak areas of eastern
Germany, which are characterized by a rapid depopulation and high unemployment. The NPD
has won relatively few votes in areas where the population is growing. According to Dierk
Borstel, the far right structures are more firmly rooted in rural areas and small towns. Many
pieces of research show that the development of the far right mostly happens at the local level in
71
David Art, Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe (New York:
72
Britta Schellenberg, "Germany," In Right-Wing Extremism in Europe (Berlin: Fried Rich Ebert Stiftung, 2013):
59.
73
Ibid., 60.
74
Ibid., 60.
29
places with relatively few immigrants, many older people, and an abundance of young men who
have been left without any future prospects. 75
The Alternative for Germany (AfD)
Recent elections in 2016 have shown unprecedented results of far right-wing party success.
The anti-refugee party, Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD), has gained a dramatic number of
votes at regional elections last March, entering state parliament for the first time in three regions.
Although the party exists only three years and not a long time ago it was on the verge of
collapse, this time in Saxony-Anhalt, the party had gained 24.4 percent, according to initial exit
polls, thus becoming the second-biggest party behind the CDU. In Baden-Wurttemberg it won 15
percent and 12.5 percent in Rhineland-Palatinate.
The AfD was founded in 2013 by a group of economists and journalists calling for the
abolition of the euro. After the resignation last year of its founder, Bernd Lucke, the party has
focused on campaigning against the government’s refugee policy, calling for the reintroduction
of border checks. 76 Since the time the party was established, there is an ongoing debate about its
ideological character. From the beginning of its appearance in the German political discourse,
the party originally linked their skepticism towards the Euro. In the elections 2013, its leader
Bernd Lucke in all his public appearances focused on the party’s anti-establishment and anti-
Euro position. 77 At the same time, there are some aspects, which distinguish the AfD from other
actors such as the National Front in France.
75
Britta Schellenberg, "Germany," In Right-Wing Extremism in Europe (Berlin: Fried Rich Ebert Stiftung, 2013),
60.
76
Philip Oltermann, “German Elections: Setbacks for Merkel’s CDU as Anti-Refugee AfD Makes Big Gains,” The
Guardian, March 17, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/13/anti-refugee-party-makes-big-gains-in-
german-state-elections.
77
30
According to the research held by Nicole Berbuir, Marcel Lewandowsky and Jasmin Siri,
the 2013 elections have shown that the AfD party platform does not refer to migration in a
strictly negative way, it promotes migration of those people who are fit for work but opposes
‘migration into our (German) welfare systems.’ 78 They conclude that while right-wing extremist
parties directly rely on the arguments of National Socialism, the AfD, similar to other more
moderate right-wing populists in Europe, refers to the supposed incompatibility of different
cultures. Overall, according to debates in political science, the AfD is neither just another right-
wing populist party nor a liberal bourgeois party free from populist and nationalist ideas. 79
Authors describe this party, as a ‘projection screen’ for different concerns and as a ‘functional
equivalent’ for right-wing parties. Moreover, they point out that the AfD is full of tensions
within the organization with potential voters who place themselves in the political center and
with the party’s adopted positions that have a right rhetoric. In sum, according to the research,
the AfD is not a right-wing populist party in itself but may be a right-wing populist movement in
the making. 80
In the recent elections, the AfD fiercely opposed Chancellor Angela Merkel’s welcome for
refugees. As it was mentioned earlier, the party results showed its new strength. In all three states
Baden-Wurrtemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony-Anhault, the showing by the new party
illustrated the decline of the traditional parties. Voter patterns analyzed by pollsters showed the
AfD drew support from people who traditionally do not vote and from disappointed Christian
Democrats, but also from supporters of the Social Democrats and the far-left party. 81 In Saxony-
78
79
Ibid., 173.
80
Ibid., 173.
81
Alison Smale, “Setback for Angela Merkel as Far Right Makes Gains in Germany,” Europe (The New York
Times), March 15, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/14/world/europe/germany-elections.html?_r=0.
31
Anhault, people who did not previously vote were the main source of the new party’s support.
Indeed, this region is characterized by relatively high unemployment and decreasing population.
As many analysts say, the problem is not that the elections are a victory or a defeat of Merkel’s
party, but that the results in the three states reveal the country’s polarization, where the CDU and
the SPD are weaker while the support for other parties is growing. However, given this changing
dynamic in German political discourse, it is necessary to admit that despite the relatively poor
results of Chancellor Merkel’s party, two leaders of other parties who supported her refugee
policy had retained their seats. The Green party with its leader, who passionately defended
Merkel’s open-borders stance, gained an unprecedented 30.5 percent in Baden-Wurttemberg. In
neighboring Rhineland-Palatinate, the Social Democrat won as well.
The Pegida Movement
Between late October 2014 and mid-January 2015, political debate in Germany was
captured by the rapid emergence of a new political movement, the far right group PEGIDA. On
January 12, 2015, PEGIDA drew 25,000 people in an anti-immigrant protest in Dresden,
becoming one of the biggest manifestations in the history of its movement. 82 The protesters
include citizens concerned about religious fanaticism, but also those who stand for racist
ideologies. More important is that these rallies have sparked a debate in Germany and beyond
about cultural identity and migration. This time the movement became more radical than ever
before. In October 2015, thousands of PEGIDA demonstrators participated in the rallies in
82
32
Dresden with the main slogans “deport, deport” against refuges, “we are the people,” and
“Merkel must go.” 83
Based on the recent social science research, the typical PEGIDA supporter “belongs to the
middle class, is well-educated, employed, has a slightly above average after-tax income in the
context of Saxony, is 48 years old, male, not a member of a religious denomination, not closely
linked to a political party and is from Dresden and Saxony.” 84 In short, a significant part of
PEGIDA supporters are more located on the right not on the far right. It is important to point out
that despite the established knowledge that the supporters of right and far right parties are mostly
unemployed and poorly educated, PEGIDA supporters had above –average education and a
stronger than average desire to participate in elections. Moreover, a large number of PEGIDA
supporters have voted AfD and the far right NPD in the previous election. Another study shows
that a majority of supporters of PEGIDA are described themselves as moderate rightists, while
the rest belongs to the far right. The latter group comes from the young less economically
established generation. However, there is a growing frustration or lack of confidence in political
institutions and the mainstream politics noticeably among the German middle-class, who are
dissatisfied with Merkel’s policy and who might adopt a position that is more aligned with that
the lower social classes position, because of the fear that the downward social mobility might
also hit them in the future. 85
In terms of political program, PEGIDA’s program consists of a list of demands: defense of
the ‘Christian-Jewish culture of the Occident’ and a controlled migration policy, followed by the
83
Maik Baumgärtner, Maximilian Popp, “The German lynchmob: Islmophobe movement returns with a
vengeance.” De Speigel Magazine, October 24, 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/deep-concern-
over-return-of-anti-muslim-pegida-protests-a-1057645.html.
84
Jörg Michael Dostal, "The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to
Stay?" The Political Quarterly 86, no. 4, (2015): 527.
85
Ibid., 527.
33
expulsion of all rejected asylum seekers from Germany and others. Although the party has harsh
rhetoric against Muslim immigrants, it is noticeable that direct criticism of Islam has been
avoided. Instead, the rise of ‘parallel societies’ is criticized as offensive to German laws and civil
liberties. 86 However, today there is a tendency to make the following issues heard in a more
radical way. For example, the movement has found more precise targets: the refugee issue and
Chancellor Merkel. Officials at the state chapter of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency note
that there is a “massive verbal escalation” against Muslim immigrants in German society. 87
Despite the fact that the PEGIDA movement has recently gained historically
unprecedented support, it has to admit that such growing far right populism is unlikely to spread
all over Germany. The overall right-wing share of the electorate is probably higher in the eastern
part of Germany, particularly in Saxony than in any other German state. This movement
remained a Dresden and Saxony-based phenomenon, with some grains of support elsewhere, but
without a German-wide support base. 88 Moreover, after recent rallies, the level of participation
declined nearly as quickly as it had grown beforehand. Such rapid decline is likely to suggest
that PEGIDA had over-expanded, suffered from internal tensions and might disappear as quickly
as it had come into existence. 89 PEGIDA ultimately failed to approach the German public at
large. Citizens took note of PEGIDA and then moved on. Moreover, there is also no data that
PEGIDA mobilized previously passive population to participate in political process for the first
time. 90 However, the PEGIDA movement has shown that political stability in Germany should
86
Stay?" The Political Quarterly 86, no. 4, (2015), 530.
87
Maik Baumgärtner, Maximilian Popp, “The German Lynchmob: Islamophobe Movement Returns with a
Vengeance,” SPIEGEL ONLINE, October 14, 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/deep-concern-
over-return-of-anti-muslim-pegida-protests-a-1057645.html.
88
Stay?" The Political Quarterly 86, no. 4, (2015): 524.
89
Ibid., 524.
90
Ibid.,526.
34
not be taken for granted. The recent events have demonstrated that there is a loss of confidence
in the political system among Germans in certain parts of the country.
German U-turns as a sign of far right popularity?
Since Angela Merkel announced to take one million refugees, concerns among the
Germans continued to take place. However, analysis of the development of far right parties and
their role in shaping the positions of mainstream parties over time confirms the fact that it is very
unlikely to see them as a legitimate opposition party in the Bundestag in the nearest future. At
the time of refugee flow in 1992 and a euro crisis in 2008, some predicted it could shape the
German political system, but it did not and it is doubtful that it will happen today.
Yet in the beginning of the crisis, after having been attacked by the critics of the CSU
leader Horst Seehofer and other members of her own party, Angela Merkel’s popularity rating
dropped down. Soon after, she agreed to produce a paper which firstly focused on the influx
management, combating the causes of migration and reducing the number of refugees and
secondly, on secure integration. Next she announced that Germany would reapply the Dublin
rules in regard to asylum for Syrian refugees. 91 So far, Merkel has refused to set limits on the
influx. Instead, Germany concluded a deal with Turkey to stem the flow. In exchange for
European concessions, such as a visa-free travel for Turks and about 6.7 billion dollars in aid,
Turkey would enforce border control and take back any illegal migrants crossing from its shores
to Greece. 92 In this context, Merkel to some extent relieved the domestic pressure since the crisis
started. But such turns in policy were unlikely to happen because of increasing support of far
91
The Dublin Regulation establishes the Member State responsible for the examination of the asylum application.
The criteria for establishing responsibility run, in hierarchical order, from family considerations, to recent possession
of visa or residence permit in a Member State, to whether the applicant has entered EU irregularly, or regularly.
See European Commission, “The Dublin Regulation,” (European Parliament, Council of the European Union,
2013).
92
35
right parties among the Germans. Taking into account the fact that at the institutional level, the
situation is not so stable, the Christian Democrats are mostly at risk to break up with their
Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, still none of the mainstream parties want to
have any deal with populists; Merkel’s Christian Democrats refused to even acknowledge the
existence of the AfD. 93
Not long ago the Chancellor had also refined her approach toward refugees in the context
of integration. Recent “integration law” is designed to reassure Germans about the integration of
Muslim asylum-seekers into society. 94 Under the legislation, refugees are obliged to take
German lessons and attend “orientation courses” in order to learn about local values and
customs. In this context, if the draft becomes law, permanent residency for refugees will be
granted only after five years, but only if they can prove elementary knowledge of the German
language, if they have a job which covers “the largest part of their keep,” and if they take
orientation courses. 95
Generally speaking, Merkel is likely to be forced to take a series of measures, aimed at
tightening Germany’s rules for refugees. As SPD chief Sigmar Gabriel put it, “For the first time,
Germany is proactively addressing those who come to us, instead of just watching what they are
doing. This is the great difference to the German immigration history of the last decades.” 96 This
strategy can be explained as a congruent way of the mainstream party to stop the government’s
slide in the polls and get credit from the public for the shift in refugee policy. At the same time,
93
Mattew Karnitschnig, "Identity Politics Keep Feeding Europe’s Far-right," The Politico. June 2, 2016,
http://www.politico.eu/article/identity-politics-keeps-feeding-europes-far-right-jerome-boateng-immigration-
refugees-afd-austria-norbert-hofer-populism/.
94
Janosch Delcker, "Angela Merkel to Refugees: Integration Is a Must," The Politico. May 25, 2016,
http://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-to-refugees-integration-is-a-must-germany/.
95
Mattew Karnitschnig, “Identity Politics Keep Feeding Europe’s Far-Right,” The Politico, June 2, 2016,
96
36
Merkel is unlikely to continue to adopt the policies of the right wing, because as it was
mentioned earlier, the success of the far right still has a local phenomenon. Plus, cooperation
with the far right will most probably backfire. There is already a criticism sparked over Merkel’s
party initiative, undermining the effectiveness of these measures. As one of migration experts
Schammann said, “Migration policy is largely about symbolism. It’s about catering to the wish
of the voter. Measures like the orientation courses are also intended to make sure that the
population feels reassured, and that the gap between public opinion and actual policies is not
getting too wide.” 97
France
The lack of a consensus culture in political life leads us to analyze France’s cautiousness
towards the refugee crisis through looking at what role the far right wing party plays in the
French political establishment today. The government cannot find support for a more open
refugee policy from the right wing. Various statements from different members of the
Government including the Prime Minster’s controversial rhetoric put on display the
disagreements taking place in the French establishment. Moreover, the rise of the far right
National Front party seems to paralyze any attempt to have a peaceful consensus on refugee
issues. In the last regional elections on December 2015, the National Front candidates came first
in six out of 13 regions and in 46 out of 96 departments in the first round. The party improved its
results almost everywhere in the second round, including regions where it had no chance of
winning a majority. 98
97
98
Angelique Chrisafis, “'Anything but le Pen': French turn to tactical voting to stop far-right,” The Guardian,
December 11, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/11/le-pen-french-tactical-voting-to-fight-rise-of-
far-right.
37
Origins of the National Front
In contrast to far right parties and movements in Germany, the success of the National
Front (FN) in France cannot be simply explained in the context of history but more likely as a
continuity of personal influence, networks, new discourse of the party, and a generally worsening
political, economic, and security environments in the country today.
The FN was founded in the early 1970s with its head Jean-Marie Le Pen in the context of
the Algerian issue, one of the core ideas of the party, which was later developed into anti-
immigrant, xenophobic, and nationalist slogans. Even though the party had a strong internal
structure with the qualified and educated partisans of Algerie Francaise as its members, it would
not guarantee enough success for the future. However, a favorable political environment helped
the FN to gain real success in recruiting new members. It was Mitterrand who introduced
proportional representation in the 1986 legislative elections, which led to an influx of a new type
of activist into the FN, the opportunist. In short, before the party became more extremist in its
slogans and before Marine Le Pen took the leadership, Jean-Marie Le Pen managed to play with
the permissive political environment in France in the 80’s for the party’s benefits. Particularly,
Le Pen attracted the new type of activists, including notables and members of the New Right,
who could move the FN farther away from its extremist roots and make it more appealing to a
much wider group of voters. However, the FN could not avoid factionalism inside the party and
lost a wide support in the regional elections in 2004. With the appearance of Marine Le Pen as a
leader of the party, the FN did not acquire power at the national level until immigration issues,
an increasing unemployment rate, and the refugee crisis, in Europe became one the main
concerns of the Europeans, particularly of the French. However, it is important to point out that
38
the German case differs significantly from the French one resulting from the organizational
weakness of far right parties, their lack of a strong and charismatic leader. 99 Moreover, France
has offered a richer environment for the institutionalization of right-wing extremism. 100
Although neither in France, nor in Germany was a ban applied of these parties, their rise
provoked a state backlash that in German case was stronger than in French one. For example, in
former West Germany, freedom of speech was restricted in 1949 including the use of Nazi
symbols and racist speech. During the 90’s, several smaller Nazi parties were banned by the
federal minister of the interior. These measures implicitly affected other radical right parties that
they might have the same fate if they violate the rules of the game. Moreover, in contrast to
France, all parties interpreted the new radical right as a threat rather than an opportunity in the
electoral game and tried to marginalize them from the beginning.
Going back to the electoral success of the FN, it is important to mention the summer of
1997 when the party had become the third party in France in terms of its electoral support.
Although the party did not have political representation at the national level, the FN managed to
form a loyal core of voters over the years, which was different than in Germany. According to
the data, drawn by Martin A. Schain in his research, the loyalty rate among FN voters exceed in
1997. 101 Plus, another factor of electoral stability was the percentage of voters supporting the
political platform of the party who feel close to the party, a measure of partisan identity. In
Germany, far right parties’ voters are volatile protest voters, who disagree with the established
99
Michael Mikenberg, "The New Radical Right in the Political Process: Interaction Effects in France and
Germany," In Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe,
Palgrave MaCmillan, (2002): 256.
100
French presidential, legislative and departmental elections are conducted using proportional representation lists.
If no party gets 50 percent of the vote in the first round, a second round takes place. Any party that took more than
10 percent in the first round may enter second round. Any party that got at least five percent of the vote in the first
round can choose to build a coalition with another party.
101
Martin A. Schain, “The National Front and the French Party System,” French Politics and Society 17, no.1
(Winter 1999): 7.
39
parties more than they accept far right rhetoric. The core electorate for example in 1997 had
shown that the FN support was expanded and not concentrated only in cities and towns, while
German far right parties gained support only locally. Thus, expansion has served to reemphasize
the core anti-immigrant, racist, and authoritarian values of the FN party. Moreover, in 1997 the
FN did much better than other parties of the right by building networks at the local level. One of
the main distinctions from the German far right, by sustaining networks the FN has managed to
dominate space, within which it has been able to stabilize and then get additional support. 102
The 2007 presidential elections have shown that the FN’s impact on politics grew as its
ideas became increasingly agenda fitting. Nicolas Sarkosy’s agenda may have led to a fall in the
number of voters for the FN, yet it ultimately proved an ideological victory of the far right
populism in the French political environment. Sarkozy owed much to the FN’s success and
strategy and, in return, the FN owed him much for popularizing and spreading its ideas to the
French mainstream. 103 For example, such themes as a debate on French national identity,
expulsion of Roma families, the banning of the veil in public places and wrestling with Marine
Le Pen for the nativist heritage of Jeanne d’Arc were seen as attractive to far right actual or
potential voters. However, in contrast to Germany, where the center right may profit from
moving to the right, in France such strategy just makes the argument of the far right legitimate.
In this context, part of the FN’s program and the rhetoric have become widely accepted as part of
the political establishment, clearing from the stigma associated with Le Pen’s party. 104 While
Nicolas Sarkozy became president in 2012, the FN dramatically modernized its image. Although
102 Martin A. Schain, “The National Front and the French Party System,” French Politics and Society 17, no.1
(Winter 1999): 8.
103
Aurelien Mondon, The Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right in France and Australia: A Populist Hegemony?
(Ashgate, 2013).
104
Aurelien Mondon, “The Front National in the Twenty-First Century: From Pariah to Republican Democratic
Contender?,” Modern & Contemporary France 22, no. 3 (January 17, 2014).
40
the party, with its new president Marine Le Pen, did not change its cornerstone ideology, the new
discourse helped to get a more respectable image and support. 105 Overall, Marine Le Pen
benefited from three factors: firstly, she got the party with an already established framework and
electorate base. Secondly, in his presidency, Sarkozy mainstreamed the FN’s ideas, which helped
the party in many aspects. Finally, Marine Le Pen got a new image for the party and distanced
itself from her father’s racist claims. In the 2012 elections, the FN reached twelve percent of the
vote in all but one demographic, which was a breakthrough compared to her father’s results.
Most recently in the 2015 regional elections, although the FN party did not win the second
round of the recent regional elections, its rise under the leadership of Marine Le Pen has attracted
more attention of the French political elite nowadays than ever before. Especially after recent
terror attacks and the ongoing refugee crisis, the FN appears in a very strong position. Arthur
Goldhammer highlights the global financial crisis of 2008 and the replacement of party founder
Jean-Marie le Pen by his daughter Marine, who was elected leader in 2011, as two explanations
for the National Front’s rise. 106 In the first place, the French economy has shown its poor
indicators in many areas, especially after the euro and financial crises. Secondly, the new face of
the party with its more moderate rhetoric has become much more appealing to native French
voters. However, these two explanations of the National Front’s rise are insufficient, especially
during the current refugee crisis. Undoubtedly, Marine Le Pen has had a significant impact on
the party, but one of the important changes was to reclaim key concepts in French politics and
reshape them to fit core ideas of the FN. For example, such themes as laïcité (secularism), anti-
immigration, and Islamophobia have allowed the FN to claim a role as defender of the most
105
Aurelien Mondon, “The irresistible rise of the Front National- Populism and the mainstreaming of the extreme
right” in Report edited by the PRIO Cyprus Centre PRIO (2016): 38.
106
Arthur Coldhammer, «Explaining the Rise of the Front national, Political Rhetoric or Cultural Insecurity?»
French Politics, Culture and Society 33, no.2, (Summer 2015).
41
cherished, republican values in France. But before the refugee crisis, as it was already mentioned
such events as 9/11 and hijab ban laws helped the party to get legitimacy of its ethno-exclusivist
ideology. The shift in discourse and the redefinition of republican principles in French politics
has allowed the FN to counterbalance the strategy of mainstream parties. Cecile Alduy and
Stephane Wahnich point out that Marine Le Pen has turned a new focus to the current
dependency on the European market and republican values, including “liberty,” “equality,” and
“laïcité” to attack Islam without naming it. 107 With this new terminology in discourse the FN
has managed to fill the gap in French politics whereas powerless mainstream parties do not have
anything meaningful to offer to increasingly frustrated voters, especially during the refugee crisis
today.
The National Front and the Refugee Crisis
In contrast to Germany, where far right parties are still playing a marginal role, the political
situation in France is different. The immigration question in France is a very politicized issue,
which has become one of the most discussed problems in the current political debates,
particularly with the growing numbers of refugees coming to Europe. In contrast to Angela
Merkel’s standing among members of her party, François Hollande, since he came to power, has
gotten poor support from the public, including his party members. The decision of the French
state to take only a very limited amount of refugees and further Hollande’s policy can be partly
explained by growing support of the FN. The rise of the FN in the country even at the
subnational level might differently influence the French political establishment than the far right
might do in Germany. Given the fact that France has recently gone through a series of terror
attacks and that its economic indicators are worse than ever before, François Hollande’s tactic in
107
Cited in Arthur Coldhammer, «Explaining the Rise of the Front national, Political Rhetoric or Cultural
Insecurity?» French Politics, Culture and Society 33, no.2, (Summer 2015):137.
42
the following crisis has shown his interests’ convergence with those of the National Front in
order to make his stand stronger against the growing support for Marine Le Pen. This is
especially reflected in Hollande’s proposal to strip French nationality from citizens who are
found guilty of terrorist offenses. Marine Le Pen in turn, happily took credit when the new
reforms were announced, saying it was a direct result of her party’s record numbers in recent
polls. 108 She wrote in Twitter, “Removal of nationality: the first effect of the 6.8 million votes
for the FN in regional elections.” Moreover, in the aftermath of November’s attacks in Paris,
Hollande declared that France is at “war.” The measure of “state of emergency” gave the
government the authority to search houses without a warrant. The use of such vocal rhetoric is
aimed to rehabilitate Hollande’s flailing presidency, to reassure public opinion, and to veil the
inadequacies of French security. 109
Although Hollande’s proposals were withdrawn, the current situation taking place in the
French establishment illustrates the following dynamics. First and foremost, Hollande was driven
to adopt such measures usually associated with the right wing rhetoric, to defend himself from
attacks from the political far right. Indeed, this denaturalization measure has received an 85
percent approval rating among the French public. 110 It is interesting to note that Hollande’s
proposal towards citizenship had been already advocated by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2011 but quickly
dismissed by the center-left Socialists, whose secretary-general at the time was Hollande himself,
and by the Socialist mayor of Evry, Manuel Valls. However, today both politicians have actively
promoted this decision, dismissing the fact that it goes against not only the principles of their
108
Arthur Coldhammer, «Explaining the Rise of the Front national, Political Rhetoric or Cultural Insecurity?»
French Politics, Culture and Society 33, no.2, (Summer 2015): 137.
109
Sudhir Hazareesingh, “Marine le Pen Trumps’ Hollande,” The Politico, October 12, 2015,
http://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-trumps-hollande/.
110
"France's State of Fear and Swing to the Right," Stratfor, January 15, 2016,
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/frances-state-fear-and-swing-right.
43
party but also the principles they have themselves proclaimed. Secondly, there has been a
growing criticism inside and outside the French establishment. In the new version of
denaturalization, not only offenders with dual citizenship status could be prosecuted but also
French citizens who have just one nationality. This kind of shift would represent a sharp change
in French approach to citizenship, bringing back the memories of the denaturalization of Jews in
Vichy France during the Second World War. Patrick Weil said France would become “the first
democracy in the world” to cherish in its constitution the principle of unequal treatment of dual
nationals. He added, “it introduces the idea of a different penalty for the same act, just because of
the random chance of their birth.” 111 Finally, according to the recent polls, Hollande’s popularity
has dropped three points from the last IFOP poll (Institut français d’opinion publique), 112 which
placed him at 17 percent in September. 113 Therefore, on the one hand Hollande tries to imitate
his right-wing opposition implementing symbolic measures which are un-Socialist and go
against civil liberties; on the other hand, he tries to tackle the problem of controlling a leftist
political party, which has recently become more split than ever before.
As the 2017 presidential elections get closer it seems likely that Marine Le Pen will reach
the second round and make a new breakthrough in terms of the vote. Moreover, the environment,
in which the FN will compete, especially after recent terror attacks in Paris and failing
presidency of François Hollande, could not be more ideal. On the left, the FN will compete with
the most unpopular president in the whole history of the Fifth Republic. On the center right, les
111
"Hollande under Fire over ‘right-wing’ Call to Strip Citizenship from Terror Convicts | The National," The
National, December 30, 2015. http://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/hollande-under-fire-over-right-wing-call-to-
strip-citizenship-from-terror-convicts.
112
International polling and market research firm
113
Madeline Grant, "French Far-Right Leader Le Pen Twice as Popular as President Hollande, Says Poll,"
Newsweek, November 04, 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/far-right-leader-marine-le-pen-twice-popular-france-
current-president-hollande-282090.
44
Republicans might not overcome their internal divisions. In these circumstances, the FN will get
more legitimacy and continue to be a major player in French politics in 2017. 114
Overall, the success of the French right party and its influence on the changing positions of
François Hollande is the result of many factors including ongoing political and economic
stagnation, a new image of FN, and decreasing support of the mainstream policy among the
voters. France cannot compete anymore with Germany and its economic strength. Indeed, fears
that the refugee influx will ultimately force the country to also take in more Syrians might
continue to spark public anti-immigrant resentment and lead to the further rise of the FN. By
showing a latent form of converging interests with the FN, François Hollande will probably have
the potential to stop the National Front’s rise. However, it is also politically feasible that this
time the FN might successfully capitalize on the concerns with refugees and the general growing
of public grievances, even though it was unable to secure victory in the 2015 regional elections.
Far right: balance the leaders’ position in shaping states’ policies?
Comparing the rise of far right parties in Germany and France and the extent to which they
have shaped the positions of leaders, it would be right to say that the risk of further rising support
for the FN and its influence on mainstream politics is relatively higher than of the far right
parties in Germany. The political culture of postwar Germany makes it difficult for voters to
support any party that has connections to neo-Nazism. Plus, the far right parties have followed
ineffective strategies and organizational weakness. In France, where the economic situation is
getting unpredictable and the rating of Hollande’s popularity continues to be incredibly low, the
FN has managed to secure a firmer position through the personal influence of its leader,
networks, new discourse and permissive political environment in the country.
114
Aurelien Mondon, “The irresistible rise of the Front National- Populism and the mainstreaming of the extreme
right” in Report edited by the PRIO Cyprus Centre PRIO (2016): 40.
45
Nevertheless, what we see today is how both leaders, Angela Merkel and François
Hollande, are trying to normalize their approaches to refugee resettlement domestically. By
normalization, I mean that both leaders have tried to counterbalance the rise of criticism
domestically by taking such decisions as an attempt to toughen naturalization law in the case of
France and introducing of temporary border controls and a suspension of the Schengen
agreement in the case of Germany. While Angela Merkel to some extent relieved domestic
pressure as a consequence of increasingly framing the migrant question in international terms, 115
François Hollande does not have enough credence among his voters and party members to use
the same instrument of policy balancing in his favor. In previous crises, Merkel’s reputations for
caution, and her preference to delay as to avoid big decisions made Germany as a reluctant
leader, a ‘geo-economic’ power. Thus, the domestic and international expectations on the
Chancellor have grown. In contrast to France, Angela Merkel has both institutional and political
power. Although the current domestic political situation in Germany is to some extent a
constraining factor for the Chancellor, international frame of the crisis through balancing
domestic politics with foreign policy gives her more room for maneuvering than for Hollande.
Therefore, the reasons of shifting positions of two courtiers have different origins. In the case of
Germany, Angela Merkel is more worried about the long-term consequences of the migration
crisis. Firstly, through the balancing, she is trying to avoid a change in German policies against a
difficult historical background. Secondly, and more importantly, by toughening the measures,
building fences and only being driven by its own interests, Germany will undermine its position
in the EU. And then the EU will tackle not only migration crisis but also a German question.
Meanwhile, François Hollande is more concerned with the shorter-term consequences of the
115
The support of CDU was increasing after three months of decline, 19 August 2015: 43 percent, 17 November
2015: 36 percent and 22 December 2015: 39 percent, Spiegel Online, 2015-16.
46
migration crisis particularly of continuous rise of the FN, loss of credence among his voters and
party members and of others. Thus, the French President has mostly shifted his decisions in order
to counterbalance the far right rhetoric and get back the support from his voters.
CHAPTER III: New Identity?
This chapter will explain why understanding the significance of cultural and national
identities is vital for decision-making of the leader but not the sole factor. Specifically, this
section will explore the German and French national identities as well as cultural identity of
migrants.
Since the 1980s social science explored how meanings, expectations, and conflicts are
associated with the different groups of people, how individuals represent themselves using one
element or another that describes their identity, how these elements can be categorized, and how
different identities can be negotiated when they are a part of one country. In this context, this
section shows how national identity in countries that receive immigrants has developed over
time, how identities of newcomers and of the receiving country have been transformed or
remained unchanged; and finally, how conflict of national identities with the cultural identity of
newcomers is not a totalizing aspect of a country’s taking of a position in the refugee crisis.
On the subject of identity, a majority of scholars depict the arrival in the receiving country
as a “total” event because it requires the complete reconstruction of individual identity.
Moreover, leaving their country of origin, migrants lose their social status, family, and social
networks. In the receiving country, they find themselves lost and excluded. During the
integration process in the receiving country migrants still remain strangers. Overall, migrants live
between idealization and disillusionment both in the receiving country and in the country of
origin. In reality, they belong neither here nor there.
47
While migrants are searching for a new identity, the receiving country is also facing
pressures from within and without. Both countries, Germany and France, feel apprehensive about
their national identity and culture. They are both struggling to defuse the potentially explosive
mix of nationalism and fear of the Muslim “stranger,” while defining citizenship for their
marginalized immigrants. In this context, the appearance of a new national identity might be one
of the potential factors of the decision-making of two countries on current refugee resettlement.
Germany
Leading the Grand Coalition as of 2005, Angela Merkel, the first woman Chancellor has
shifted exclusive images of Germaness towards a new identity paradigm, as a multicultural
country, which should learn to coexist with difference and destroy any belief in national
exceptionalism. She introduced a bold strategy for integrating minorities of migrant descent at
home. Her pro-active approach reflects her scientific background as a physicist, combined with a
special gender-sensitivity to social inclusiveness and pragmatic-Protestant commitment to human
rights. Today, answering to the question “who are Germans,” it would be right to recall Richard
Schroder’s response, “We are Germans?, Nothing special but something particular.” 116
German Ethno-Cultural Identity and its Turkish Muslims
As the depth of the challenge of taking more than a million refugees this year has become
apparent, the discussion in the German political establishment has shifted from the short-term
concerns to identity, the subject that makes Germans worried. Long before the refugee crisis
began, in 2010, Muslims has already constituted five percent of the German population.
Although a relatively small share of the general population, Muslims have become a target of
hostility. One study showed that the level of hostility toward Muslims in Germany was among
116
Cited in Joyce Marie Mushaben, "Rethinking Citizenship and Identity: ‘What It Means to Be German’ since the
Fall of the Wall." German Politics 19, no. 1 (March 2010): 86.
48
the highest in Europe. 117 In 2010, Thilo Sarrazin, a board member of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
published a book where he argued that Muslim immigrants drag down the country’s average skill
level and it will continue to decline. The author went further by defending the idea of racial
superiority and claiming that intelligence is not nurtured, but inherited. There are genetic
differences between the IQs of Muslims and those of ethnic Germans. According to the author,
Germany is under threat of becoming a less intelligent society because Muslims have a higher
fertility rate than ethnic Germans. At that time public opinion showed that one-third of ethnic
Germans agreed with Sarrazin’s argument. 118
The migration question has sparked open and lively debates on national identity for the last
couple of years. Taking into account the fact that in post-war era, German nationalism was often
a source of shame, not pride, the factor of a growing number of Muslim immigrants in the
country have urged German society to rethink its identity in order to reconstruct the essence of
being German. After Merkel’s decision to be a main saver of refugee lives in the crisis of 2015,
German public opinion showed uncertainty in this regard. In the beginning of the crisis, a solid
majority of Germans expressed optimism about the country’s deal with the refugee crisis. Now
polls show Germans are increasingly skeptical. 119 A slight majority says they are scared. About
one third say they are concerned the large number of foreigners will threaten Germany’s societal
and cultural values. Today the discussion of German identity largely takes place inside
Germany’s political mainstream. While large parts of the population offer strong support and
help, a substantial percentage of Germans protest against further immigration.
117
Liav Orgard, The Cultural Defense of Nations: A Liberal Theory of Majority Rights (Oxford University Press,
2016): 99.
118
Cited in Liav Orgard, The Cultural Defense of Nations: A Liberal Theory of Majority Rights (Oxford University
Press, 2016): 99.
119
Matthew Karnitschnig, "Identity Politics Keep Feeding Europe’s Far-right," The Politico, June 2, 2016.
49
Generally speaking Germany is a bit of paradox. The constitution offers asylum to
refugees, but no explicit immigration law whatsoever is in place. Moreover, not a long time ago
Germany has admitted the fact that it is a country of immigration. While traditionally a
xenophobic culture, around five million foreigners currently live in the country. Given the
country’s history as a relatively young nation, Germans have always been less sure than the
French of what defines them as a people and a nation. At the same time racist attitudes by
portraying the refugees and immigrants as ‘invaders’ and ‘others’ have taken place long before
the unification of Germany. It is important to go back to nationality law and look at the historical
and contemporary developments through the perspective of national identity formation.
There are different conceptions of how nationality law affects the idea of a nation as a
whole. Many scholars concluded that German nationality laws were a form of ‘institutional
racism’ because of their ethno-cultural foundations and exclusion of non-Germans. 120 However,
it would be better to say that on the official level, since 2000, Germany’s naturalization policy
has become easier, while concerning the emotional sentiments of belonging, things have very
much remained the same.
There was no German nation state and no German citizenship until 1875. The current basis
of nationality can be traced to the 1913 Nationality Law, which defined the German nation as a
common culture with the basic principle of jus sanguinis, meaning that a person could become a
German citizen only if a person had German ancestry. The German nation was considered as a
natural community, within which “nationhood [was] an ethno cultural, not a political fact.” 121
However, the symbolic and explicit description of German society as an immigration country led
the new government to initiate the liberalization of immigration and citizenship laws and
120
Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe (London: SAGE Publications, 2003), 93.
121
Ibid., 94.
50
reformulation of state policies towards questions of integration and cultural and ethnic
diversity. 122 In the 1990s, Germany moved towards a civic model with a combination of jus soli
and jus sanguinis. Since January 2000, every child born in Germany to a foreign parent with a
residency permit is German. However, at the age of twenty-three, he will have to choose between
the nationality of his parents and German nationality. 123 Patrick Weil argues that such reforms
have created confusion between nationality law and the concept of the German nation. He
explains that Germany, like France, having become a country of immigration, eventually left its
racial concept of the nation, and adopted measures allowing the integration of children of non-
German immigrants into its nationality. By comparing French nationality law and the German
one, he concludes that the conception of the nation and nationality law have developed
independently. While the basis of German citizenship law was partially changed, the idea of
“Germanness” founded on the idea of blood and soil remains supported by a large part of the
population. In contrast, Rogers Brubaker makes a constant difference between French and
German conceptions of nationhood, leading to divergent citizenship policies. As he puts it, “If
the French understanding of nationhood has been state-centered and assimilationist, the German
understanding has been volk-centered and differentialist.” 124
In the 1980s, when East Germany and West Germany were reunited, national identity was
reborn: one nation, one Germany. In reality, there were two completely different parts of one
country. To avoid this antagonism, the search for a national connecter through differentiating the
122
Gotz Nordbrunch, Migration, Islam and National Identity, Report, Center for Mellomoststudier, (September
2011), 8.
123
Patrick Weil and Catherine Porter, How to Be French: Nationality in the Making since 1789.
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2008),190.
124
Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1992, p.1.
51
‘other’ was the good way to start identity-building process. 125 This might explain the rise in
German nationalism, which ended up with the killings of several Muslim immigrants.
Today, although with a radical shift from jus sanguins to jus soli, Germany stands as one
of the most liberal states in Europe with regards to citizenship. Recent studies highlighted the
growing importance attributed to cultural conformity as a central component for citizenship.
Being German is still linked to specific phenotypes. The country with the general self-perception
of a highly homogenous, ethnically based nation and the non-definable lead culture Leitkultur
still makes people who have lived older than 50 years or were born there to migrant parents feel
126
not unconditionally accepted and belonging as normal members of society. The prejudice
over immigrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, and cultural distance between German
cultural distance and Muslim immigrants have continuously taken place in German society.
Moreover, since the late 1990s, and since the events of 9/11, the public’s perception of
immigration was increasingly linked to the question of religion. Even though according to the
constitution, the state has the ‘positive neutrality’ towards religion, it was obliged to integrate
practicing Muslims into society. In this context, the growing importance of religion in public and
political discourse is notable. 127
In Germany more than 90 percent of the Muslims are of Turkish nationality, and 99.9
percent of the Turkish nationals are Muslims. 128 Even though Turkey has a secular constitution,
the nation profoundly identifies with its Muslim origins. As one association leader said: “Our
body is Turkish and our soul is Muslim,” highlighting the importance of Islam. In Germany, the
125
Naika Foroutan, Identity and (Muslim) Integration in Germany, Report, Humboldt University. Migration Policy
Institute, (2013): 10.
126
Ibid., 9.
127
2011), 9.
128
Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002) 95.
52
difference is explained not only as cultural but also as structural. After the mid-1990s Turkish
Muslims became associated with their Muslim identity rather than their Turkish identity, a shift
that correlated with their increasing adoption of German citizenship. Individuals with a different
nationality or religion live as a separate group. In some arguments, such segregated communities
are considered as undermining existing social stability; in others, parallel structures would not
only cause mutual alienation, but also lead to a replacement of the existing order. Regardless of
their German citizenships, Muslims and Islam are identified a threat to society. 129 Not only
numerous studies have addressed the religious aspects of immigration but also the political
establishment has defined questions related to religious practices as a new field of state policy.
However, unlike France, there is no legacy of colonialism to harden or unduly politicize the
stance of Muslims toward the German state.
As has been previously mentioned, Germany is full of paradoxes, especially in the question
of the recognition of Turkish minorities. It is true that the German ethnic concept of national
identity relatively challenges the process of Muslim immigrants’ integration, but according to
Riva Kastoryano’s argument, in contrast to France, the Turkish immigrants’ power of negotiation
in the question of recognition draws most of its strength from their economic integration. In
France the economic contribution of immigrant groups is not easily measured by statistics. Once
an immigrant becomes a French citizen, he or she will be classified as French. Compared to
France, “The hard core of German identity is the economy,” stated Barbara John, leader of the
Auslanderbeauftrage of Berlin in 1993. 130 Business owned by the foreign born have become an
important component of the German economy over the past fifteen years. The Board of Trade
129
Cited in Gotz Nordbrunch, Migration, Islam and National Identity, Report, Center for Mellomoststudier,
(September 2011), 10.
130
Cited in Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2002), 160.
53
noted that self-employment rates among Muslim immigrants in the country has constantly risen
over the past twenty years, proving they are increasing productivity in establishing new jobs with
new employees. Considering the Turkish population, alone- the largest single Muslim immigrant
group, one can observe an increase in self-employment rates of more than 200 percent since
1991. 131 In this sense, every individual who participates in public life dominated by economic
competition can be considered as a citizen. 132 This very specific concept of citizenship makes
economics serve politics, unlike in France, where politics prevails over economics. 133 In this
context, the term “constitutional patriotism” (“Verfassungspatriotismus”) proposed an alternative
basis that could provide common forum for immigrants and native citizens. 134 The term draws
attention to the procedure through which values and norms might be negotiated. For example, an
image of economic success helped to change the image of the Turks. They are not perceived just
as foreign workers, but are also considered citizens who participate in building civil society.
However, as it was mentioned earlier, given Germany’s history as a country ethnically centered,
in 1998 the term “Leitkultur” or “lead culture,” which had a culturalist narrative of national
identity, was originally coined by Bassam Tibi and explicitly adopted by prominent
politicians. 135
Regarding the current development of German national identity, although Germany is
known as a nation which is still undergoing the formation process, the German state strongly
identifies as ‘Christian-Occidental,’ where Islam has no place. 136 Uncertainty over the
131
Cited in Naika Foroutan, Identity and (Muslim) Integration in Germany, Report, Humboldt University. Migration
Policy Institute, (2013): 8.
132
University Press, 2002), 160.
133
Ibid., 160.
134
2011), 10.
135
Ibid., 11.
136 Christian Joppke, Veil: Mirror of Identity (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 62.
54
coexistence of Muslim religious identity and German Christian-Occidental identity has appeared
in the public discourse in particular after the unification of Germany and has continued to take
place nowadays. The formation of German identity and its relation to Muslim religious identity
has shown the rise of skepticism among Germans toward Muslims in general. The problem is
that many of the million who are expected to come to Germany are Muslims. In this context,
there is a question of how Germany will manage to incorporate Muslim religious identity and
save its own national identity.
France
A series of terror attacks in France for the last couple of years have acted to illuminate
France’s struggle with itself. The Charlie Hebdo shootings, the 2015 November Paris attacks,
and the recent terror attack in Nice, all took place against a background of profound anxieties
afflicting France today, particularly of uncertainty over the meaning of Frenchness. Generally
speaking, France’s last three presidents, have been incapable of articulating a new identity for
their country. And such moments of violence and conflict have amplified an existing sense of
collective crisis about the state of France, its national identity and specifically the impact of
cultural and religious identities of the country’s ten millions Muslims on its core republican
values.
French Republicanism
A majority of ethnically French people may seek to keep out migrants, in the current case
refugees, who are seen as a challenge to the ‘liberal culture’ (liberal values and institutions);
‘national culture’ (language, national symbols, common destiny); or ‘popular culture’ (dress
code, folklore, social norms). In 2011, Nicolas Sarkozy, the former French President, claimed,
“If you come to France, you accept to melt into a single community, which is the national
55
community, and if you do not want to accept that, you cannot be welcome in France.” In
Sarkozy’s view, France has “been too busy with the identity of those who arrived and not enough
with the identity of the country that accepted them.” Sarkozy’s Chief of Staff and the Minister of
the Interior, Claude Guent, made an even more astonishing observation. There are no equal
civilizations, but those, which believe in Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité are superior. 137 Those,
which do not accept these ideas, are inferior civilizations.
Europe’s cultural challenge, specifically the French one, is obviously not a myth. The
Muslim question in France is interwoven with a broader debate over French identity. Due to
various reasons, which are discussed in this paper as well, “there is an angst over identity in
Europe,” argues Vincent Geisser, “There is a feeling that Europe is becoming smaller and less
important. Europe is like an old lady, who whenever she hears a noise thinks it is a burglary.” In
this perspective, Islam is “a box in which everyone expresses their fears.” In regards to the
French case, the national debate over the essence of French identity gives a rare chance to get a
sense of the French’s perceptions of themselves and their expectation of the process of becoming
French. The research drawn in Liav Orgad’s recent book shows that “it is impossible to provide a
single definition of what constitutes the French national identity.” 138 The author identifies well
three main features. The first tenet is French history and culture, the second one is the French
language, and the last one is loyalty to French values, which is a basis of French identity.
The questions “Who is a Frenchman?” and “What are the qualities one should possess to
become French?” are complicated. In February 2009, President Sarkozy launched a nationwide
discussion over the meaning of being French. 139 Sarkozy’s question, “what is French?” sparked a
137
Liberty, Equality, and Brotherhood
138
2016): 93.
139
Ibid., 92.
56
lot of discussions in the media and in French society. The results have shown that when nations
start to examine what holds a people together, they often conclude that there are more sources of
division than unity. 140 As Patrick Weil argues, becoming French is a dynamic concept that
changes frequently. “Since Revolution, France has changed its nationality laws more often
significantly than any other democratic nation has.” 141 Discussions on French identity have
slowly turned to the debate over compatibility between Islamic and French values. In contrast to
Germany, where multiculturalism has prevailed, the idea of French integration has been to
assimilate foreigners ‘into Frenchmen.’ 142 However, such a model did not have a desirable
outcome. Although Muslim immigrants with French citizenship might be assimilated, culturally
some of them have not associated themselves with French values. Instead, they are living in
French suburbs (banlieu), where they are constantly exposed to marginalization and even
radicalization.
One of the main issues, which distinguishes French culture from other European countries,
is the principle of laïcité (principle of secularism). France is a secular country where church is
separated from the state. The fact that most of the immigrants in France are Muslims, who are
considered themselves as adherents of Islam, has created a lot of controversy over Muslim
immigrants’ integration into French secular society and over meaning of French identity.
The headscarf ban laws of 2004 and 2010 have strengthened Islamic activism and
facilitated Muslims to situate religious identity at the center of their political interests. Among
the French public, such a ban on religious symbols was widely endorsed. Presenting the bill,
140
2016), 92.
141
Cited in Patrick Weil and Catherine Porter, How to Be French: Nationality in the Making since 1789.
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 92.
142
57
Jean-François Cope, the political leader of the Union for a Popular Movement, called the ban “a
law of liberation.” 143 Eric Raoult, the rapporteur of the commission that recommended banning
the burqua, went even further by saying “we went to fight Islamic fundamentalism…the burqa is
a manifestation of that fundamentalism.” 144 French scholar Olivier Roy claims that Muslims
challenge French identity, not necessarily because of Islam, but since Muslims tend to display
religious symbols in the public sphere: “We have nothing against immigrants, but we want
secular Muslims…The problem is not Islam but religion.” 145 The scholar names one of the main
French values, laïcité, as anti-religious ideology, which does not give flexibility towards
religious Muslim immigrants. In France today the state has constructed the identity, which makes
a believer disappeared as a citizen. Instead it focuses on cultural, normative and ethnical
homogenization. And headscarf ban is the one of many issues where French universal ideology
has collided with religious and cultural identity of majority of immigrants. Long before refugee
crisis of 2015, Islam has already called into question the very identity of the country, mainly
laïcité, the sacred French concept. Thus, the state has decided to adopt, as Olivier Roy put it, a
policy of “militant laïcité.” 146 However, it has led to a greater split in French society over the
identity meaning.
From the identity perspective, the French reaction to refugees has shown that important
national interests might be under threat. As we can see that French national identity has been
undermined since the number of Muslim migrants went above ten percent of the population.
Since that time there is a revival of national identity debates. While a new population with a
143
2016): 94.
144
Ibid., 94.
145
Olivier Roy, «Islam in the West or Western Islam? The disconnect of Religion and Culture,» The Hedgehos
Review (Spring/Summer 2006): 127.
146
Ibid., 127.
58
different culture has arrived, France tried to formulate their identity in order to strengthen its
solidarity and unity. As it was previously mentioned, the French assimilationist model failed
because it ignored the religious dimension of immigrants’ identities, or even presupposed that
this dimension would disappear during the process of integration. 147 The idea of granting to
immigrants “nothing as a community (nation), everything as individual citizens” has resulted in
the rise of different forms of Islamic religious revivals among integrated immigrants. Although
in France the right of nationality is granted to anyone who expresses the wish to live there,
naturalization has become an indispensable part of French citizenship. Since the French people
are those who have French nationality according to the French Constitution, a French identity
has become more linked to the notion of citizenship than to cultural, historical, or ethnic ties.
However, most of those immigrants who have gotten French citizenship, do not want to abandon
their culture and religion, which in many aspects is contradictory to French republican values.
This creates a paradox in the French model of integration. The pursuit of nationwide equality has
led to an aggressive suppression of diversity, which in turn has caused marginalization and
enormous ghettoization of Muslim immigrants in the country, which historically had an open
border policy for immigrants from its ex-colonies. 148 Olivier Roy has observed that the
assimilationist model dismisses the disconnection between religion and cultures, which has
recently taken place. Thus it has resulted in a surge of religious identities at a time when
secularization is seen as a prerequisite for democracy and modernity. 149 In fact, Islam is seen as a
mirror in which Europe, particularly France, is looking at its own identity, but it does not offer a
147
148
Cadet Andrea Walton, “Migration sans Assimilation: Muslim Immigration in France,” New Horizons Online
(April 2007): 6.
149
59
new culture or new values. Laïcité remains one of the main principles of republican French
identity on the one hand, and on the other hand, one of those essentially contested concepts that
are politically useful precisely because it has no agreed-upon definition. This paper does not
have the purpose to analyze the possible factors of current identity anxiety but it is important to
mention that the confusion over the meaning of laïcité creates frustration in understanding what
the Frenchman has to be. As John Bowen put it, there has never been agreement on the role of
religion should play in public life. Some in France hold laïcité to guarantee freedom of public
religious practice, while others think that it prevents such practice. However, there is no
historical actor called laïcité. 150 Meanwhile, the French state has actively intensified debates
about what laïcité should be and how Muslims has to act not in a light of a firm legal and cultural
French identity, but at the same time in a light of a blurring sense of certitude about what France
was, is, and will be. In reacting to Islam as a political religious power, which seeks to transform
Western European society and which threatens all the achievements of Enlightenment, French
public opinion tends to construct an enemy in face of Muslim immigrants. After the appearance
of such inadequate phenomena as radical Islam, as Jean Pierre Denis, director of the weekly
Christian publication La vie (Life), put it, French society has been divided into those who are
ashamed of their Christian past and those, who see immigrants as ‘aliens’ who threaten the
stability of non-Christian society. His argument that France does not have to build those walls,
which were demolished in Europe, might have been a good framework for further development
of dialogue between Muslim minorities and the native French. However, Holland’s strategy in
the recent refugee crisis has taken another direction. He has insisted on the republican principles
and the accommodation of Islam. Indeed French Islam has not become a significant counterforce
150
John Bowen, Why the French Don't like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton: Princeton
60
against radical Islam. Starting from 2012, France has been attacked by a series of terrorist
invasions. It is important to highlight that the combination of identity uncertainty and a bad
image of Islam creates frustration in the society in regard to incoming refugees. So far the French
establishment has returned to the notion of clash of civilizations, defining de-Christianization of
Europe as one of the causes of the rise of radical Islam. 151
Identity as an absolute explanation?
On the one hand, in contrast to Germany, the French identity dilemma is most acute
because of its strongly universalist republican convictions. The French rejection of pluralism in
the name of national integration and an ideal of value-monism are two factors, which have not
given a chance for Muslim immigrants to be recognized and heard. Put differently, it has
questioned the true meaning of identity on both sides, Muslim incomers and ethnic French
citizens. As most of the Syrian refugees are Muslims, it might add fuel to the fire and completely
reshape French national identity or further aggravate the integration crisis. On the other hand,
paradoxically, according to the polls mentioned earlier, the significantly most widespread anti-
Muslim attitudes were found in Germany and Hungary. 152 Moreover, Germany has a worse
perception of adherents of non-Christian religions than publics in France. 153 It would be bold
enough to say that in one of these countries the identity question has played a decisive role in
shaping the country’s position in the refugee crisis. However, there is still an issue for both states
today to define what kinds of values are essential for their countries’ secular model of society
and what kinds are negotiable.
151
Vladimir Chernyaga, “Bendy Paths of Secularism,” Russia in Global Affairs 3, May 5, 2016,
http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Izvilistye-puti-sekulyarizma-18139.
152
Andreas Zick, Hövermann and Beate Küpper, Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European Report,
(Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Forum Berlin, 2011).
153
Cited in Andreas Zick, Hövermann and Beate Küpper, Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European
Report, (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Forum Berlin, 2011).
61
The French case has shown that its secularism and non-negotiable republican principles
have left the country with no power to tackle the development of Islamism. For France one of the
important problems to solve is a question of separation of church and state in a new perspective,
whether it is a question of the religious right’s clerical hold over the political power, or an
ideological chauvinism that hides behind the reason and the Enlightenment and Reason. In
Germany the demonization of Islam and Islamism has only deepened the level of distrust
between the Muslim communities and German nationals. Overall, if we use a clash of national
identities with the cultural identities of newcomers as the only explanation to the countries’
refugee policy today then we are left with the questions which identity cannot answer. The
discussion above shows that both countries have an issue of cultural identity of newcomers,
which does not fit the concept and principles of the nation of receiving countries. However, it
would be mistaken to say that the clash of identities takes place in a way that shapes the refugee
policy of the countries in the current crisis. Although German and French immigration and
refugee policies, citizenship laws, naturalization and models of integration have been more or
less different, integration of Muslim migrants failed in both countries. In this context, if the
identity problem were more in place than other factors, both countries would react otherwise.
CHAPTER IV: Role of Personality
“Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but

his judgment; and he betrayes instead of serving you if he
sacrifices it to your opinion.” Edmond Burke, 1774
This chapter will focus on decision-making as the result of individual ‘human agency;’ that
is, that ultimately, it is individuals who make decisions, not states, which Jensen describes as a
62
‘legal abstraction.’ 154 Specifically the regulation of this crisis is significantly impacted by
personality. Jensen identifies a number of situations in which personality is more likely to affect
decision-making. He distinguishes the following conditions: the leader must be interested in
foreign affairs, the situation must be non-routine, and the information regarding the situation
must be ambiguous. The scholar argues that crisis situations are more prone to the effects of
personality. Therefore, decisions are based on personal perceptions of the situation rather than on
rational calculations. 155 Rosati adds that the structure of individual cognition is based on
background, past experiences, belief systems, and others. 156
There are a variety of ways in which personality can affect decision-making. Different
political scientists make different distinctions, although the most common distinction is the
categorization of the leaders as either aggressive or conciliatory leaders. 157 Others include
pragmatists or crusades, and ideologues and opportunists. 158
According to Herman, an aggressive leader can be characterized by a high need for power,
a tendency toward suspiciousness, high levels of paranoia, while conciliatory leaders are
distinguished by displaying a desire to affiliation, friendly relations with others and an ability to
explore different policy options. 159 Overall examination and analysis of individual psychological
variables can be extremely important in understanding decision-making of the leaders. The
154
Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy (London: Prentice-Hall, 1982), 13.
155
Ibid., 13.
156
Jerel Rosati, "A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy," In Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and
Change in Its Second Generation, (N.J. : Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 1995).
157
Margaret Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political
Leaders," International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (March 1980).
158
Margaret Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany, and Timothy M. Shaw, "Who Leads Matters: The Effects
of Powerful Individuals," Int Studies Review International Studies Review 3, no. 2 (Summer 2001).
159
Margaret Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political
Leaders," International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (March 1980).
63
extent to which personality influences policymaking depends significantly on the individual, his
decision style, and many other factors, which are out of scope of this section.
Angela Merkel’s pragmatism
In Angela Merkel’s office, there is only one picture: a silver-framed portrait of Sophie von
Anhalt-Zerbst, later known as Catherine the Great. As ruler of Russia, Catherine pursued policies
very much in the spirit of Enlightenment, but she was also vigorously imperialist. She loved to
play with power, converted to the Orthodox Faith, took a Russian first name, made use of men
and ruled for thirty-four years. 160 Although the Chancellor tends to dismiss any interpretations,
such personal moments still might help to guess who is this politician who has become a global
figure in the years since 2010.
Since Angela Merkel became a politician, she was called the Iron Chancellor, woman of
the year 2015, the most powerful woman in the world, a reluctant mediator and an incremental
pragmatist. But this time she became “Mother Merkel” by resettling many Syrian refugees in the
country. The word in German, Mutti (Mommy), is even cozier, summoning the sense of being
cared for that accumulated over Merkel’s 10 years in office. 161
Taking into account other EU member states’ responses to refugee distribution, Angela
Merkel’s approach to the crisis is remarkable. On August 31th, Mrs. Merkel announced that
today’s refugee influx would have graver consequences for the future of the EU than the euro
crisis. “If Europe fails on the question of refugees, it won’t be the Europe we wished for.”
Although the political tone in the country has turned against the Chancellor, Angela Merkel has
taken a brave stand by suspending European asylum rules and allowing tens of thousands of
160
Stefan Kornelius, Angela Merkel: The Authorized Biography, (Kindle Version, 2014), 169.
161
Ibid., 120.
64
refugees to enter Germany. 162 Meanwhile, in a survey by German public television, 51 percent of
Germans say that they fear the refugee influx, 13 points more than in September. Approval of
Mrs. Merkel dropped by 9 points to her lowest level since 2011. In two other polls Mrs. Merkel
moved from Germany’s most popular politician to fourth. 163 The harshest criticism of Mrs.
Merkel comes from her own conservative party- the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which
she leads, and the Christian Social Union (CSU), which exists only in Bavaria and usually
supports her. Horst Seefhofer, the CSU’s leader and premier of Bavaria, called Mrs. Merkel’s
decision “a mistake that will keep us occupied for a long time.” 164 He added: “We are now in a
state of mind without rules, without system and without order because of Mrs. Merkel’s
decision.” 165
It is clear that Mrs. Merkel is under pressure as never before. However, the previous crisis
made Merkel strong. It is a commonly held opinion that years of crisis are good for chancellors.
Undoubtedly, it is true that Angela Merkel would not have become the unchallenged leading
figure in Europe if this serious of a crisis had not put a burden on European and German
politics. 166 “European policy is domestic policy,” Merkel always says, but she treats it like
classic foreign policy, as the prerogative of the country’s leader. She said so shortly before she
was first elected Chancellor: “Foreign policy is my thing.” 167
This time the refugee crisis has brought out a new style of leadership in her. If, since the
beginning of the euro crisis, she has been accused of following public opinion rather than
guiding it, now she has decided to fight for an issue by demonstrating her firm personal stand
162
«Merkel at her limit,» The Economist, October 10, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21672296-
after-historic-embrace-refugees-german-public-opinion-turning-merkel-her-limit.
163
Ibid.
164
Ibid.
165
Kate Connolly, «Merkel under pressure,» The Guardian, October 30, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/30/merkel-pressure-refugees-germany-talks-government-divided-crisis.
166
Stefan Kornelius, Angela Merkel: The Authorized Biography, (Kindle Version, 2015), 1250.
167
Ibid., 1087.
65
combined with her moral duty toward refugees. She had saved for so long and carefully
protected her power that she is now likely to spend her political capital. 168
As Stefan Kornelius, author of Angela Merkel: Authorized Biography put it, “Angela
Merkel shows a lot of understanding for people who flee from war and despair. There is no
moral questioning of her motives.” She said “if we start having to apologize for showing a
friendly face in emergencies then this is not my country.” 169 Until then, Merkel had always been
flexible, but she is not flexible when she is under pressure. 170 The Chancellor showed herself as a
cautious, sober decision-maker, when she has no choice but to make bold decisions and stick to
them.
In order to understand such compassion in Merkel’s status to refugee policy, it is important
to be aware of her background and life experiences. As Jennifer A. Yoder notes in her article that
Merkel’s case as an easterner, a Protestant, and a physicist shapes her policy in many aspects.
Human rights are of particular importance to a woman who grew up under communism. During
the summit in Brussels at the end of October, 2015, Merkel turned to Hungarian Prime Minister
Victor Orban, who built a fence around his country, and said: “I lived behind a fence for too long
for me to now wish for those times to return.” 171 The refugee crisis has made clear the fact that
Merkel has found courage to justify her politics with her own biography. As Hackle concludes:
“Merkel is a liberal, she deeply believes in western values of freedom, human rights, democracy.
From personal experience in the former East Germany, she knows the difference between
168
Markus Feldenkirchen, Rene Pfister, “What is driving Angela Merkel?,” Speigel Online, January 25, 2016,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/why-has-angela-merkel-staked-her-legacy-on-the-refugees-a-
1073705.html.
169
“Germany’s Merkel Under Increasing Pressure to Reduce Refugee Numbers: Ally,” February 1, 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-germany-merkel-idUSKCN0VA3HU.
170
1073705.html.
171
Ibid.
66
freedom and dictatorship.” 172 As a young girl in school, Angela Merkel’s mature perspective had
already shown the combination of tolerance and open-mindedness: “ I first noticed that others
had difficulties with disabled (sic.) when my classmates reacted with fear whenever they come to
visit me it was always just normal for me. As a child, your abilities grow but only slowly beyond
the abilities of disabled adults.” 173
One of the closest friends of Merkel, Klaus von Dohnanyi, the Social Democrat and former
Hamburg mayor, said that Merkel grew up with the understanding that, if a stranger is standing
in the rain before your door, you let him in and help, and when you let them in, you do not
grimace. Christians do not do that.” 174 Such qualities might fit to her sincere moral duty to help
refugees. Indeed, taking into account the “ugly” past of Germany in the Second World War,
Angela Merkel may now be showing that the exercise of power in today’s world is less based on
military might than on moral humanitarian actions.
Moreover, observes agree that Merkel’s scientific training can also be expected to shape
her style of policy making. Merkel’s decision-making method is characterized by pragmatism
and her ability to recognize the circumstances available to her. 175 Therefore, there are two factors
explaining Germany’s pragmatic leadership in the current refugee question. First, if Angela
Merkel did not take the leading role in solving the problem of refugee distribution, the whole
idea of the EU would be questioned, which might lead to the early transformation of the Union.
As Paul Claudel, a French dramatist and diplomat, put it, “ Germany is not there (in Europe) to
172
Jennifer A Yoder, "An Intersectional Approach to Angela Merkel's Foreign Policy," German Politics 3, no. 20
(2011): 360-75.
173
Jean E Krasno, Personality, Political Leadership, and Decision Making: A Global Perspective (Praeger
Publishers, 2015), 225.
174
1073705.html.
175 Jean E Krasno, Personality, Political Leadership, and Decision Making: A Global Perspective (Praeger
67
divide nations but to let all the different nations around it feel that they cannot live without one
another.” 176 His main idea was that Germans should not be a dominant power in Europe but they
should explain to their neighbors that only by being together would they have a common united
future. Secondly, being awarded the Charlemagne Prize for EU Leadership for “her decisive
leadership and outstanding contribution to the new momentum within the European Union” in
2008, Angela Merkel has felt a moral duty to put humanitarian issues at the core of her decision-
making. Merkel is clearly sensitive to the notion of “human security” and in that framework to
questions of race, ethnic identity, development, and the denial of human rights. As one principle
of the evangelical parsonage says, one should not value oneself more than other people, no
matter where they come from. In other words, her focus on human dignity has prevailed in her
approach to the current refugee resettlement. 177
Hollande’s “descente aux enfers”
Never in the history of the Fifth Republic, beginning in the 60s, has the president in office
had such a low approval rating. 178 This can be explained by the general atmosphere of
unprecedented chaos currently taking place in France. As John Gaffrey put it, the Hollande
presidency is an acute illustration of the dysfunction of the presidency and political institutions in
the Fifth Republic. 179 In fact, challenges posed by economic failure, immigration, radical Islam
and the absence of bold decisions on the part of the ruling party and its leader to address these
issues has resulted in an increasingly fragmented party system on the one hand, and growing
anxiety or indifference among French voters, on the other hand.
176 Walter Laqueur and Leon Sloss, European Security in the 1990s: Deterrence and Defense after the INF Treaty,
(New York: Plenum Press, 1990).
177
178
Helene Fouquet, "Hollande's Popularity Plumbs Record Low in French Opinion Poll," Bloomberg, March 3,
2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-03/hollande-s-popularity-plumbs-record-low-in-french-
opinion-poll.
179
John Gaffrey, France in the Hollande Presidency: The Unhappy Republic (Kindle Version, 2015), 216.
68
Taking into account the fact that the important advent of the Fifth Republic and
functioning of the institutions made the presidency the central actor in the republic, the personal
role of François Hollande in the decision to take on refugee resettlement needs to be analyzed.
The Hollande Era
The first sign that something was going wrong in the country was demonstrated by the
results of the European elections in May 2014. During those elections, both the main French
political parties were being undermined to the extent that their poor rhetoric and ambivalent
discourse on many issues simply encouraged the populist vote. The success of the National Front
in these elections was a clear illustration of the collapse of François Hollande’s legitimacy.
In 2012, Hollande came to power, generally speaking, from relative obscurity. And this
historical irony, as John Gaffrey put it, would not be without consequence. Such a stroke of luck
as a person whose name was not previously familiar to the French, as if by chance, being elected
to the office of the president, would haunt his presidency. 180
After the hectic and incoherent policy style of the preceding administration, the French
welcomed the return to a more measured pace in governing, which was distinguished by greater
reflection and caution. However, the ‘normality’ of Hollande’s presidency has led to a crisis of
his own making; both the Right’s fire and the Left’s anxiety has put the president in a
deadlocked situation where he seems wary of what policy to proceed with. He added ‘normality’
to his way of being, a mode of making politics, but it was abandoned, just after the first year of
his presidency and not replaced by anything truly effective and decisive.
On the part of public support, growing disillusionment, particularly among lower-class
voters, confirmed the arrogant image of a government of “caviar-eating elites” which distanced
180
69
itself from public concerns and proved its inability to implement effective reforms. 181 The
presidential relationship with the public began to collapse into not simply disapproval but also a
kind of growing indifference, as if he was almost not a president. 182
In regards to Hollande’s approach to governing, he has been portrayed through his
perceived inaction. Some explain that he is not doing enough in terms of economic reforms.
Another interpretation is that the mission was impossible from the beginning. Taking into
account the fact that unpopularity has been the usual fate for Presidents since the 1980s and the
general economic and European political context of austerity has prevailed, all this left Hollande
with very little room to actually implement his campaign’s promises. Nevertheless, Hollande
was elected as a policymaker from a hard-left electorate but he has ended up embracing many of
the same policies that were undertaken by his predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy, whether in domestic
or foreign policy, particularly regarding Europe and Germany.
Before he became president, Hollande was characterized as an apparatchik, or even as “the
captain of a pedal boat.” 183 But after his speech in 2012 at Le Bourget, he denounced the
Merkozy pact, fiscal policy of Nicolas Sarkozy, and thus demonstrated apparent boldness and
decisiveness, shredding an image of “vacillating compromiser,” at least for the time of
elections. 184 Thus Hollande’s election in May 2012 made people hope that France would follow
the path of anti-austerity policy. However, after he took office, Hollande implemented extremely
unpopular policies, which characterized him as a leader who tried to look as a humble and
sanguine figure with whom the average French voter could identify. But that turned out to be a
181
Gabriel Goodlife, "France: The Hollande Presidency," In Europe Today: A Twenty-first Century Introduction,
17-51. 5th ed. (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 38.
182
183
Arthur Goldgammer, "The Old Continent Creaks." Democracy Journal, no. 37 (Summer 2015).
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/37/the-old-continent-creaks/.
184
Ibid.
70
weakness of his governance, especially at the time of economic failure, an ineffective welfare
system and poor social policy. Once he was compared to a hapless plumber attempting to
forestall a tsunami. 185 He seemed like a character struggling with a “permanent gale” injured by
a strong wind and rain. 186 Throughout his presidency, his speeches simply became declarations
of intent: what he or the state were going to do rather than what they are doing or had done. 187 At
one point his approval rating reached thirteen percent. 188
Moreover, from Mitterrand, Hollande learned a lesson that to some extent also ruined his
reputation among the French: promises could be made and later broken with impunity. Once he
was elected, Hollande felt free to step away from the course. In this context, Hollande contrasts
with Angela Merkel who, whatever one may think of her policies, seems to be a firm,
determinant politician who takes control over instability and manages not to lose credence
among her party’s voters.
As a leader, Hollande also had the reputation of being a trimmer, one who was constantly
seeking face-saving compromises between the party’s more left-wing and its social-liberal right
rhetoric. As one of his advisers said: “He may be the first French president whose policies are
basically opposed by a majority of his own party.” 189 For example, in April, Martine Aubry, the
Socialist mayor of Lille, and Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the Franco-German Green leader, signed a
letter, which criticized Hollande’s “market-friendly” reforms, his refugee policies and his
support for a Constitutional amendment that would give authority to take away the French
185
186
187
188
Ibid., 38.
189
Pierre Briancon, "François Hollande’s Season in Hell," The Politico, April 3, 2016,
http://www.politico.eu/article/francois-hollande-season-in-hell-crisis-approval-president-france-criticism/.
71
passport from those who are convicted perpetrators of terror attacks. 190 Laurent Bouvet, an
author of “Cultural Insecurity,” cited earlier, said, “For the first time two different strands of the
Left came together against a sitting Socialist leader.” 191 Given the fact that one of the conditions
of Fifth republic leadership is the relationship between the President and Prime Minister, these
relations became dysfunctional, particularly in the Hollande presidency. For example, Manuel
Valls’ statements, French Prime Minister, added ambiguity to the understanding of the main
course of the party in the question of refugee policy. During his visit to Germany on February
13, Valls had severely denounced Merkel’s refugee policy and opposed any system of refugee
quota, apparently contradicting Hollande’s position on this matter. As for political unity, the
French justice minister, one of the most outspoken voices in the government, resigned and soon
after published a book Murmures a la Jeunesse (Whispers to the Young) denouncing Hollande’s
proposal to strip the citizenship of French-born dual nationals convicted of terrorism. 192 Overall,
instead of mitigating the internal disagreements within his own party and reaching a consensus
on refugee policy, Hollande has seemed to focus on foreign policy to show that he is doing his
job. From the beginning the problem was not just the economic problems or social unrest, there
was a general sense that not only the President does not know what to do in terms of domestic
policy, there was no sense of ‘direction’ at all. 193
190
Pierre Briancon, "François Hollande’s Season in Hell," The Politico, April 3, 2016,
http://www.politico.eu/article/francois-hollande-season-in-hell-crisis-approval-president-france-criticism/.
191
Ibid.
192
Aurelien Breeden, "French Justice Minister Quits Over Plan to Strip Citizenship From Terrorists," The New York
Times, January 27, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/28/world/europe/france-christiane-taubira-justice-
minister-resigns.html.
193 John Gaffrey, France in the Hollande Presidency: The Unhappy Republic, French Politics (Kindle Version,
2015), 2254.
72
German dominance?
Generally speaking, Germany has always played a key role in European integration. A
main feature of post-war German European policy has been, as Paterson calls it, “a leadership
avoidance reflex.” 194 Given the history of the country, it was evident that an exposed leadership
of Germany was seen unacceptable for other EU members. Thus, the tandem with France was
often interpreted as Thomas Paterson calls it, “cooperative hegemony.” 195 But after the euro
crisis Germany has been pushed somewhat reluctantly center stage to become Europe’s reluctant
hegemon. In the euro crisis, the Сhancellor has shown her brutality and coolness by
implementing the austere measures toward Greece. However, in the current crisis she has shown
her unprecedented understanding and compassion. Krasno in his book notes that Angela Merkel
has the dichotomous pattern within her personality, which has eventually shaped a chancellor’s
leadership and decision-making. Angela Merkel describes herself, “I am multifaceted
…yesterday I was mousey, today I am brutal and heartless.” 196
Meanwhile, François Hollande even in his speeches on the refugee crisis has avoided to
engage in a global narrative. Instead he has focused on the exterior problems, without
mentioning France as a country, which would be one among the others who would share the
burden. He has seemed to stay away from proposing any action, which would mean a more
active role for France, whereas Merkel has assured to act in alliance with France. It might be
simply explained by the fact that the current domestic political situation in France is a definite
constraining factor for the President. Some of the key figures from his party have openly
194 William E Paterson, "The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Centre Stage in the European Union*," JCMS:
Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 1 (August 2011): 72.
195
Ibid., 74.
196
73
criticized his presidency, including refugee policy, by stressing that French society has already
been in crisis for a long time. Moreover, economic, security and identity concerns make the
public feel exhausted amid the migrations flows. With the unprecedented low rating of the
president’s popularity, the FN has become serious contender for power in the country. Therefore,
taking into account all these factors plus Hollande’s incapacity to normalize domestic concerns
in all levels of French society, he could not afford to take the same amount of refuges as
Germany on the one hand, and could not refuse to take any on the other hand. Hollande was put
in a situation when he had been occupied with internal chaos within the country and he also
understood France’s duty to the EU as well as to Germany.
Conclusion
The idea that the crisis will bring the European continent together no longer seems true.
The only way the EU might work is if it has a strong center. In this context, each member state
needs to give up a part of their domestic sovereignty. Yet, today this crisis has had the opposite
effect, pushing the union toward a break-up as member states vigorously keep their sovereignty,
specifically in the migration question. What we see today are the collapse of an existing order
and the evolution of a new one. While the many different issues are currently at stake, the goal of
this research was to analyze the reasons of different positions that the EU member states adopted.
To make the argument valid, the research was focused on causal domestic factors such as party
politics particularly the rise of the far right, the role of national identity and how it plays into
politics, as well as the role of leaders in decision-making toward refugee distribution and further
regulation. By exploring the possible causal factors affecting the changing positions of two
dominant EU member states, Germany and France, the research concludes that in tackling the
crisis Angela Merkel has relied on her individual policy preferences, which mostly came from
74
her personal beliefs, whereas François Hollande has acted in the context of his weak domestic
position and growing populist backlash in the face of the National Front.
Germany, however, a nation which is still undergoing the formation process, strongly
identifies as ‘Christian-Occidental,’ where Islam has no place. As a country where five percent
of the population is Muslim immigrants, Germany has an even a worse perception of adherents
of non-Christian religions than does the French public. Taking into account that the country has
an issue of religious identity of newcomers, which does not fit into the concept of Germnaness,
the decision to take a million refugees looks at least unprecedented. This time Germany clearly
showed that it could no longer simply isolate itself. Although Angela Merkel is to face domestic
opposition, including attacks with the critics of the members of her own party and rise in support
of far right parties, the Chancellor has made it clear that she is against any fundamental change
of her course in refugee policy. Through her approach in policymaking, Merkel accepted the
shorter-term consequences in face of domestic opposition and chose to tackle the international
crisis in order to avoid longer-term effects. Before the terror attacks in Munich, she had managed
to relieve the domestic pressure through taking such measures as toughening ‘integration law’
and making a deal with Turkey. Overall, compared to France, the backlash does not yet threaten
Merkel’s hold on power. While the National Front has become serious contender for power in
France, far right parties remain marginal in Germany. Moreover, criticism in the coalition of
Merkel’s party will be unlikely to prevail. Mr. Seehofer is popular, but remains an ambiguous
figure. Mr. Shauble is also unlikely to be the next chancellor. Nevertheless, if it has only been
about tactics, Merkel would have abandoned her approach long ago, when the right-wing
populist party AfD began rising in the polls and her own popularity figures began dropping.
Therefore, there must be a different, more personal motivation for her reluctance to change
75
course. She no longer wants to be the woman without a face. As mentioned earlier, having grown
up under the East German communist regime, Merkel has known the feeling of being surrounded
by walls. Besides she has felt responsible for the unity of the EU, she has also felt a moral duty
to put humanitarian issues at the core of her decision-making.
France, with its immigration roots dating back to colonialism, decided to host fewer
refugees and delegate ‘the reins of power’ to Germany in this crisis. The country with around ten
percent of Muslim immigrants has faced an unprecedented number of domestic ‘crises’:
economic stagnation, security threats, an identity issue, growing distrust and even rejection
among the public of the political establishment, and finally, dysfunction of the presidency and
political institutions. All together this has shown an atmosphere of uncontrolled chaos taking
place within the society. As Margaret Thatcher once said, “This is not the time to go wobbly.”
François Hollande though has chosen that kind of tactic in addressing problems. While François
Hollande has lost credence not only among his voters but also among his own party members,
the National Front has managed to get a firmer position through the personal influence of its
leader, networks, new discourse and a generally worsening political environment. The French
President has also tried to balance his refugee policy in order to defend himself from attacks of
the National Front. However, he does not have the same institutional and political power as
Angela Merkel to get back the credence of the public. Taking into account personal failure as a
President and growing anxiety within the country, François Hollande could not afford to share
the burden equally with Germany on the one hand, and could not afford to refuse to take any on
the other hand.
Overall, this thesis demonstrates that the positions of the states have changed throughout
the crisis due to many factors. At first view, Germany and France seemed to work consolidated
76
in tackling the problem of refugees. However, as the crisis went on, each Member State was
immersed in addressing domestic challenges. Obviously, the number of causal factors, which
shape the position of one state, will probably not be the same for another state. The analysis
therefore only serves as a two-country case study, which does not allow for much generalization.
77
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Europe's refugee crisis: A comparative analysis of Germany and France

Thesis · September 2016

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded ﬁle.

Thesis prepared for

Approved: Professor Vivien Schmidt

August 22, 2016

including European, German and French political statements.

leadership, national identity, Alterative for Germany, National Front, Muslims.

The European refugee crisis

Beginning in 2011, an unprecedented number of people began migrating in response to the

numerous recent polls. 3

unique in Europe, and difficult to follow for any other countries.

their inefficiency in taking consolidated measures particularly in regard to equal distribution of

responded and how their response can be explained.

political processes in the changing of positions (decision-making) of Germany and France on

be the result of individual political leadership.

mainstream politics differ in both countries.

paper develops Wendt’s understanding on international politics by emphasizing that international

Waltz, consisting of three levels of analysis: international-level explanations, which look to a

individual-level explanations, which look to the personal or psychological characteristics of

domestic and individual-level explanations.

internationally, it is important to note that all sophisticated IR theories consequently ended up

making to the same degree as constructivists.

ideological beliefs may also be important.

Specifically he distinguishes three type of liberalism: ideational, commercial, and

Overall, as Andrew Moravcsik highlights, liberal theory remains a comprehensive

alternative to realism and institutionalism, as well as to constructivism. Firstly, neither realism

Constructivism, although not yet formulated as a theory, shares some societal-level

normative and ideational forces with liberalism. 16 However, in contrast to liberalism,

Many interests “depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived

thus the choices that are made among them. 22

environment, and behavior are changing factors of a state’s decision-making.

acceptance of German participation in military interventions, which goes against a constructivist

independent source of a state’s decision-making. Overall, research on the influence of public

foreign policy decision-making. 29

connected.” 30 The role of personality in state decision-making is the result of cognitive

processes, background, personal characteristics, motives, and beliefs. 31 It was social

“operational codes” of political leaders. He argued that an individual’s beliefs are

interdependent, consistent, hierarchically organized, and resistant to change. The cornerstones of

leader decision-making. He concludes that an individual’s cognitive predispositions or mindsets

or the need to make tradeoffs between values. 37

touched upon in the present research.

of causal factors of state decision-making in international relations, present research will be

based on multidimensional investigations by analyzing in what way domestic factors as well as

CHAPTER ONE. Refugee and immigration policy

Cambridge University Press, 2008), 13.

residency as well as social and welfare benefits. 39

Macmillan Press, 1999), 86.

even for genuine refugees.

an unprecedented decision to resettle a million refugees in Germany in 2016.

structure of the authorities was reorganized. 51

nation’s historical commitment to helping refugees.

CHAPTER TWO. Rise of Far Right Parties

mainstream parties specifically regarding the migration question.

Politics of Immigration: the Mainstream and the Far Right

will bring costs for the mainstream left.

immigration scale may facilitate the emergence of the far right. 65

party AfD has made stunning gains in three regional elections.

The German political establishment is characterized by its stability and decentralized

right-wing radicalism has been absorbed by other parties.

Predecessors to Modern Far Right Parties

REP left the party for the sake of their careers.

Cambridge University Press, 2011), 192.