Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SECOND DIVISION
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in
[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
question.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings
submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]
DECISION
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant
ROMERO, J.: have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of
and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the
ignorance of the law. wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a
joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The
Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
separated from his first wife. acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar
Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27,
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of
1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by
someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both "A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
Domagtoy," which is still pending. where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.[1] With Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)
Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one
law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory
requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of
marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be
subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law. jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he marriage.
remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error
on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful,
is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore
Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41."
the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus: solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality
of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.) the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary
and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article
29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
statement to that effect." proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should
be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.[6] It is not
having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system
outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by
held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment,
the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and
void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the
Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary
authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is
advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION (2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father
with defendant is null and void ab initio;
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers
NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA death.[1]
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null
DECISION and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.: initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this
Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death? This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3,
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.[4]
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is
of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article
of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a 58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
Article 47 of the Family Code. that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic "autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
life which shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the
deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
dead;
before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the
in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The Civil Code
source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to provides:
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit registrar thereof. x x x."
stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
each other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation,
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons
and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the
legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
a marriage license. x x x."
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus,
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the
any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
monogamy.
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary,
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
wife". Scs daad
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
absence of such element. sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
declare their fathers marriage void after his death? jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot be applied ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either
for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or
spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A into a second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily,
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
FIRST DIVISION For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001] dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the
attention of the Court to two separate affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao,
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those
Pangasinan, respondent. affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were
married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their
RESOLUTION respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses
anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both
bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint We find merit in the complaint.
against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan.
For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or
ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
stated that both contracting parties were separated. requisites must concur:
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was for at least five years before the marriage;
legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and
wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be
have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged
present at the time of marriage;
with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for
being designed merely to harass him. 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together
for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
other]; and
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
act would be dealt with more severely. ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.[6]
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note
filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative. that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the
fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that
both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. [7] In
fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married
he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent
Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as
the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn
to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows
spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each
other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the
case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano
and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for
seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for
at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no
one has special application to judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is
highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.[9] And
when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon
respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175581
Petitioner, are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended
- versus -
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759,
JOSE A. DAYOT, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
Respondent.
x------------------x The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of
Petitioner, G.R. No. 179474
a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November
Present: 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
Acting Chairperson,
- versus - TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of
VELASCO,** and Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He
REYES, JJ.
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that
JOSE A. DAYOT, Promulgated:
Respondent. he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent
March 28, 2008 to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he
came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks
later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall,
upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper
DECISION approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the
package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had
learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses
he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any
that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the
attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could
latter feigned ignorance. have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were
at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was
made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard
validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her
brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took
man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had him, more or less, three months to discover that the pieces of paper
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. [5] In her pre- that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does
not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be taken in
trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter for a ride by [Felisa.]
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was
1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and
liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. [6] The marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose],
Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to
be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that
meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was
emolument.[7] because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse
because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he
would have written instead the name of his sister.
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint. It
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under
disposed:
oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to
the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29,
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the
evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he
the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on
consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court
DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9] if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her
brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more
belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]
the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or
intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had
after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time
prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly
discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February,
annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after
1991 within which to file an action for annulment of
the discovery of the fraud. Thus: marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the
complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent
was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he
could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage
the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the
to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was
alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action
to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.[12] solemnized under Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court
the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband
of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to
and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage,
be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In
this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]
solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that
on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect
marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the
to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article
parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud
56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the
was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck
marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The
down Joses appeal in the following manner:
prescription was established only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was the parties marriage.
employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for
the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of
the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on
time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
executed by him and Felisa was false. husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should
which reads: be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose
A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
City.[19] character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage
between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court initio because of the absence of a marriage license.[21]
III to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24] wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and
wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It
misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of
also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a
the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain
primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment
following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12
of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been
May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993
filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity
issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that
of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses
company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties,
of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
order. marriage.[32]
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter
November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages
governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote
marriage as a contract: places, (2) consular marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
marriages.[34]
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article
76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
character. (Emphasis ours.) years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either found no legal impediment to the marriage.
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a
license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the
state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]
[30]
fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. This is in stark contrast to
[31]
the old Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed
marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under
without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they
have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes
husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
[37]
marry each other. One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person
falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the
lack of a marriage license. ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
We answer in the affirmative.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The
the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely
statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly [38] but reasonably five months before the celebration of their marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted
construed.[39] They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.[40] Where sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court
a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to
former or add to the latter by implication.[41] For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is live in her house.[45]
a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of
majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the
least five years. minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a
need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for
binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the
at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative
body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not
places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of
apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of
five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported
by the record or based on substantial evidence.[48]
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of
law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage,
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose
and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and
and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond
Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the
question.
stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization
of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the
be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which
statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the
was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite
essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant
for a valid marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just
merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.[53] To
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa
permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth
marriage license.
in our laws.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a
the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special
to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity
to the case, to be in fact married.[50] The present case does not involve an apparent
of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas
marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence,
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a
mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at
all.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose
based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their
cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be criminal liability, if any. No costs.
[54]
stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. There is a law on
SO ORDERED.
the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of
the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity
of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.[55]
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is
claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses
subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven
years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-
year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]
SECOND DIVISION
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 160172
69166,[2] declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the
Petitioner,
petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until
Present: properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
QUISUMBING, J.,
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
TINGA, and married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
VELASCO, JR., JJ. Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October
1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to
Respondent.
push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated
Promulgated: 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least
February 13, 2008 five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
DECISION On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De
Castro. Since the childs birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her
TINGA, J.: income as a government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.[3] In her complaint, respondent to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state
alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that
responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation
[4]
child. and reward him of his being irresponsible.[6] Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the
affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that
he is the legitimate father of the child.
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage
is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was
merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null
that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the
also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties,
seen nor acknowledged the child. as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter
that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
[5]
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, the trial court ruled that the marriage proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the
between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage
marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent.[7] The dispositive
thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, portion of the decision reads:
arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of
mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16
is not, and could not have been, his own child.
October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital
Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the
legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage
marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the
is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court in a
appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.[8]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot
Appeals.[9] Hence this petition. be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with
out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was
respondent because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the
uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover,
marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they
she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly
executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being
objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation. [15]
that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit
should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper
[10]
license. Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the appearance of a for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in
prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not the action for support. Citing the case of Nial v. Bayadog,[16] it states that courts may pass
an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from
petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented
marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner
support. Citing several authorities,[11] petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a
subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it
of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be concludes the trial court correctly held that themarriage between petitioner and respon
presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for dent is not valid.[17] In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that
the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.[12] Finally, petitioner claims that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.[18]
in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction
paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his
to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action
legitimate child.
for support and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.[13]
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void
In her Comment, [14]
respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory marriage may be collaterally attacked.[19] Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
husband and wife for the last five years on or before March
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the A Yes, sir.[25]
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if
the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a
judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
only for purpose of remarriage.[20]
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
[21]
Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario, the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.[26] In the
for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no
a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to
[22]
a marriage an absolute nullity. obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall therefore entitled to support.
render the marriage voidable.[23] In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
same evidence as legitimate children.[27] Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of
living together for more than five years.[24] However, respondent herself in effect
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[28]
ATTY. CARPIO:
The Certificate of Live Birth[29] of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16
petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, October 2000is hereby REINSTATED.
admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
SO ORDERED.
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who
was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro
Manila;[30]
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is
supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by
respondents own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he
conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were
sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At
times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual
dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their
marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that
he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures
taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. B, B-1, to B-3, C, C-1 and
C-2, D, D-1 and D-2, E, E-1 and E-2, F, F-1 and F-2, G, G-1 and G-2 and H,
H-1 to H-3). In one of the pictures (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2), defendant is
seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger and in another
picture (Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2) respondent is seen in the act of kissing the
petitioner.[31]
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of
Republic of the Philippines requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
SUPREME COURT ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he
Manila did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that
THIRD DIVISION he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013 a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be
found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on
July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another
vs.
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
certification reads as follows:
DECISION
11 July 2003
VELASCO, JR., J.:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage
Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11,
License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-
MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City,
and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision. No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and
MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or
Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. intents it may serve.7
Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I,
Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in
Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria. 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. his counsel.8
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case. Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to
in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at
2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the
testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11,
2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated
Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not
issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she
person.11 is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993;
(b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty.
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola. Sanchez.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage
barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of
Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A
Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for them
testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they
the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered
with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29
and copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that
Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this
Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan,
testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites,
the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at
and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing the time were Chinese.31
officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
The Ruling of the RTC
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-
in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license
her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City
was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and
Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take
Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
place, a male person went to their house with the application for marriage
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no
license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the
marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact
marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License
solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of
No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage
the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from
was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid
Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at
marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE
CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows: PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL
DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
respondent declaring as follows:
III
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled; THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY
LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner COURT BELOW.35
and the respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation
by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that
Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil said certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was
registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila. married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37
SO ORDERED.34 It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage
contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as
husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied
against him for bigamy.38
the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
II xxxx
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND (3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42 the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the
marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a
The Ruling of this Court valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this
case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the
The petition is meritorious. couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that
there was a valid marriage license.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order
No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read
as follows: Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the
office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In
the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted
by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
contain no such record or entry.
not less than two witnesses of legal age.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the
was issued and such other relevant data.44 presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the
probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a
marriage license. location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the
license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom
machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
document. delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was
secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus,
have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and
could not be given probative value. submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening
her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is
worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the
lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño
be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
to apply. secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can
be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was
a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was
official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to
proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the
the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that
alleged marriage license. his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may,
the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of
and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA: a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite,
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of
parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No.
appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993
members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the is hereby REINSTATED.
restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is
Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract. No costs.
xxxx SO ORDERED.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee Associate Justice
more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said
Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy
(Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or
subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not
ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his
freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. 51 Again, this
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1
SECOND DIVISION Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003
The decree provides in part:
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,
vs. [T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding through Judge van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral
Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents. proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
QUISUMBING, J.: The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil
Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion
allegedly committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial The parental custody for the children
court, in matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order 1 dated September
30, 1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987
Makati Regional Trial Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of
nullity of marriage, and (b) the order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for is granted to the father.
reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing
Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issues relating to the property
The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9
settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married
the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg,
or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan,
petitioner and private respondent.
Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on
November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion
to dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of
that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children
marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997,
and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its
order7 dated May 28, 1997.
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed
by the petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an
case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen
order8 dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for
D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied
Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the
the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
fact that said decree of divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of
July 14, 1999, through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:
Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing
On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting her order dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated
aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property July 14, 1999; and
relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent
portion of said order provides: 2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she
assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.
1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and
considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is
included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd completely inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16,
situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse though Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had
obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the
considering further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the
dissolution of the property relations of the spouses, and the support and
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the
custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside
ground relied upon is not indubitable.
with respect to these matterswhich may be ventilated in this Court.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was
Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or
denied by respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12
claim, denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.
Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order
the part of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:
dated July 14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of
respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant
case is not allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13
Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides:
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial
Reconsideration had recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court
by her ex-husband in Hamburg, Germany.14
may set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such
terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to
conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly.
Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had already been awarded to
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.23Before our courts can
it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
severable without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
(Emphasis supplied.) judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule
39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a Procedure), to wit:
case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of
July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
that the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become
executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such upon the title to the thing;
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
do so when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality. subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse law or fact.
of discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact
that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in
Hamburg, Germany. order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam,
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. the contrary.24
Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity
Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons. of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what
was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she
has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental commented on the proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services
custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had
endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment
mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that
Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner. when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably
dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the
trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This
is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s
welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody. 28
On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded
the bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning
property relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent
herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that:
"[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property
nor have they incurred any debts during their marriage." 29 Herein petitioner did not
contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the
allegations and the proof.30Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings
that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert
jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding
the custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private
respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the
matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on
September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We
hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as
to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children,
namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be
remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal
PANGANIBAN, J.: assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.[9]
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his
first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
The Case obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit
nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably
disposed as follows: broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. that it stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.[3] parties.[16] After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.[17]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
The Facts
Ruling of the Trial Court
Issues
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1 The Petition is partly meritorious.
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby First Issue:
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner. Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
2
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a
decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the
voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these
elements.
3
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
case. celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements
4 of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case. cannot grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed
5 marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our consistent with their respective national laws.[27]
courts.[19] A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written
insufficient. act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Divorce as a Question of Fact Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must publication or (2) a copy thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the
first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
Code. These articles read as follows:
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which
shall specify the following: The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not
xxxxxxxxx sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
annulled; submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only
to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
xxxxxxxxx City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners
qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
applicant shall be required to admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate Australian citizenship in 1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized
the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x. adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens Burden of Proving Australian Law
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons. petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that
document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may
sound discretion. allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.[47]
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil
cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint 1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the
bigamy.[48]
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.[42] Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on
the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage
was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity
was void ab initio. to remarry.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the license.[50]
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal
bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent. capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City,
during which no reconciliation is effected.[46] Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino)
and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d)
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information
statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and
remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [55] (2) for
respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree
Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate
of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio
since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he
was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence,
we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing
in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground
of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and
the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of
declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines DECISION
Supreme Court
BRION, J.:
Manila
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
THIRD DIVISION
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari[2] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due
to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
BRION,
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but
BERSAMIN,
was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
- versus - *
ABAD, and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce
on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006.[5]
Promulgated: Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
August 11, 2010 Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on
GENERAL,
his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an
Respondents. -- - official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6] enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by
the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[11]
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition
and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial
THE PETITION
and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends
Article 26 of the Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to be able to remarry under that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the
Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads: RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the
petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
38.
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
THE COURTS RULING
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
The alien spouse can claim no right
under the second paragraph of Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
Article 26 of the Family Code as
incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v.
the substantive right it establishes
is in favor of the Filipino spouse Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void[15] and To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one
on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
Filipino citizens.[18] served.[22]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
under the Freedom Constitution, [19]
enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent
Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows: is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38. foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose
or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In
bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
foreign judgments. This Section states:
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect
of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.[26]
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon
the title of the thing; and
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only
the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision. person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
The foreign divorce decree is In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
presumptive evidence of a right evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
that clothes the party with legal fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for
the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
[27]
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive
[28]
its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. This means that evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken
evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment,
judgment on the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[33]
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of
the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of
recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as
the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of
discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive
a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept
in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper Considerations beyond the
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to include
certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording to
a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point,
be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
had been done.
(i) naturalization; and
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. [35] preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the
civil registry: (2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the
civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of
name and naturalization register.
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
(d) annulments of marriages; the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
(e) divorces; decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
(f) legitimations; recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
(g) adoptions;
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring
[36]
court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] both of which required a final order from a registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect. of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC
can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the
may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
cancellation of entries in the civil registry. and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be
the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of
changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412
this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be SO ORDERED.
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition
must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;[38] that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be ARTURO D. BRION
[39]
made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be Associate Justice
[40]
published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional
THIRD DIVISION Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000] consistent with this Decision.
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
"SO ORDERED."
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.: The Facts
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her "They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang
Motion for Reconsideration. Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus: eventually became sweethearts.
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent "After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is Corporation when she was still single.
dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to
Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In "After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she
petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent. always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her,
as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat
Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also
inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
he chastised them.Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave
their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military
service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed "Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified,
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation. sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must
be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring
a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set
their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by
even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and evidence and explained in the decision.
their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert
Records, 153). evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove
that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly
incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at
her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that
the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he
he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity
got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them
was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological
with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that
would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong. obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the
marriage and [was] incurable."[4]
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described
their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100). Hence, this Petition.[5]
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the
marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family following issues:
and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a are to be 'protected' by the state.
Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
xxxxxxxxx
respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Petition."[7]
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
The Court's Ruling
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
incapacity.
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration'
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations at such moment, or prior thereto.
of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
refused to submit himself to such tests.
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows: prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the of marriage.
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby psychologically incapacitated.
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support,
be given great respect by our courts. and even left the family home.
xxxxxxxxx Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon Code.
1095."[10]
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
(a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination not faithfully observed them.
of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's psychological incapacity. No costs.
Republic of the Philippines Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
SUPREME COURT Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract.
Manila (Exh. "A")
SECOND DIVISION After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South
Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997 of their married life.
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
vs. newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents. intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
TORRES, JR., J.:
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City.
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey
But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his
over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has
nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in
been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the
living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not:
the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.
motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20,
1989.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by
the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and
still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
established: medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment
was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he
never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical
did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out
appearance of a normal man. whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size
of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband. lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife. defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2
on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage
He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila
intervention of medical technology or science. Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before
the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and SO ORDERED.
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
Hence, the instant petition.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be
forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband,
I
the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
II
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and
with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a
absent. testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
III separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner,
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated
both. upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and
the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
IV
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When
lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual
them. contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing
the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based
respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there
on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is
was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties,
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should
record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife
retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on
after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
proved.3
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage'
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On August 30, 1999, Reynaldo filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
Damages before the RTC, Toledo City, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799 claiming that his
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 which affirmed the Judgment[2] of
marriage with Nilda did not cure Nilda's flirtatiousness and sexual promiscuity, and that her behavior
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 dated January 2, 2002,
indicates her lack of understanding and appreciation of the meaning of marriage, rendering the same
declaring the nullity of the marriage of Reynaldo and Nilda Navales on the ground of psychological
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.[8]
incapacity.
Reynaldo testified in support of his petition and presented telephone directories showing
The facts are as follows:
that Nilda used her maiden name Bacon instead of Navales.[9] Reynaldo also
1988, before the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of San
presented Josefino Ramos, who testified that he was with Reynaldo when Reynaldo first met Nilda at
Fernando, Cebu, as null and void.[18]
the bar called Appetizer, and that he (Ramos) himself was attracted to Nilda since she was sexy,
beautiful, and jolly to talk with.[10] Reynaldo also presented Violeta Abales, his cousin, who testified
The RTC held that:
that she was a vendor at the YMCA where Nilda worked and was known by her maiden name; that
x x x From the testimonies and evidences x x x adduced, it was clearly established
she knows Nilda is sexy and wears tight fitting clothes; that her companions are mostly males and she
that the defendant had no full understanding of [the] effects of marriage and had
flirts with them; and that there was one time that Reynaldo fetched Nilda at YMCA but Nilda went no appreciation of [the] consequences of marriage as shown by her x x x act of
with another man, which angered Reynaldo.[11] concealing her marital status by using her maiden name Nilda T. Bacon,
augmenting her pretense of being still single through the telephone directories;
Finally, Reynaldo presented Leticia Vatanagul, a Clinical Psychologist and Social Worker who drafted a by her refusal to accompany with [sic] her husband despite of the latter's
Psychological Assessment of Marriage dated March 28, 2001.[12] In said insistence, but rather opted to ride other man's jeep, whose name her husband
did not even know; by her act of allowing a man other than her husband to touch
Assessment, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a her legs even in her husband's presence; by allowing another man to kiss her
social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality disorder, among others, which even in the full view of her husband; by preferring to loss [sic] her husband rather
than losing her job as aerobic instructress and on top of all, by refusing to bear a
illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nildas psychological incapacity to perform her marital child fathered by her husband because it will destroy her figure, is a clear
role as wife to Reynaldo.[13] indication of the herein defendant's psychological incapacity.[19]
Nilda, for her part, claims that Reynaldo knew that she had a child before she met him, yet Reynaldo Nilda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied on April 10, 2002.[20]
continued courting her; thus, their eventual marriage.[14] She claims that it was actually Reynaldo who
was linked with several women, who went home very late, kept his earnings for himself, and The CA dismissed Nildas appeal, ruling that the RTC correctly held that Nilda concealed her marital
subjected her to physical harm whenever she called his attention to his vices. She worked at the YMCA status, as shown by the telephone listings in which Nilda used her maiden name; that nymphomania,
to cope with the needs of life, and she taught only female students. Reynaldo abandoned her for the condition which the expert said Nilda was afflicted with, was a ground for psychological incapacity;
other women, the latest of whom was Liberty Lim whom she charged, together with Reynaldo, and that the RTC correctly gave weight to the four pieces of testimonial evidence presented by
with concubinage.[15] Nilda presented a certification from the YMCA dated October 17, 2001 stating Reynaldo vis-a-vis the lone testimony of Nilda.[21]
that she was an aerobics instructress for a program that was exclusively for ladies,[16] as well as a
Nilda now comes before the Court alleging that:
statement of accounts from PLDT showing that she used her married name, NildaB. Navales.[17] I
The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated to comply [with] her marital
On January 2, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision disposing as follows: obligations as a wife.
II
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in Psychological incapacity, if ever existing, of the wife is NOT PERMAMENT or
the above-entitled case declaring defendant Nilda B. Navales as psychologically INCURABLE and was NEVER EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF
incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations with plaintiff Reynaldo MARRIAGE.
V. Navales and further declaring their marriage contracted on December 29,
III
passed upon, and factual findings of the courts a quo are binding on this Court; that only questions of
The petitioner is not a nymphomaniac.
law may be raised before this Court; that the RTC, in reaching its decision, complied with the
IV
requirements of Molina; that the Solicitor General was represented by the City Prosecutor of Toledo
The effort of herein petitioner into the case shows that she is consciously and nobly
preserving and continue to believe that marriage is inviolable rather [sic]. City; and that Reynaldo discharged the burden of proof to show the nullity of his marriage to Nilda.
V
The guidelines of Molina case in the application of Article 36 of the New Family Code Reynaldo further averred that he testified on his behalf; presented corroborating witnesses,
has not been strictly complied with.[22] one of whom is an expert clinical psychologist, as well as documentary evidence in support of his cause
of action; that Molina did not require that the psychologist examine the person to be declared
Nilda claims that she did not fail in her duty to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; that she never psychologically incapacitated; that Nilda did not rebut the psychologist's findings and did not present
had any illicit relationship with any man; that no case for inchastity was initiated by Reynaldo against her own expert to disprove the findings of Vatanagul; that Nilda's psychological incapacity, caused by
her, and that it was actually Reynaldo who had a pending case for concubinage.[23] She questions the nymphomania, was duly proven to have been existing prior to and at the time of her marriage to
lower courts finding that she is a nymphomaniac, since she was never interviewed by the expert Reynaldo and to have become manifest during her marriage, based on the testimonies of Reynaldo
witness to verify the truth of Reynaldo's allegations. There is also not a single evidence to show that and his witnesses; and that such incapacity was proven to be incurable, as shown by the report
[24]
she had sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband while they were still living together. of Vatanagul.[28]
Nilda also avers that the guidelines in Republic of the Phillippines. v. Molina[25] were not complied Nilda filed a Reply, and both parties filed their respective memoranda reiterating their arguments.[29]
with. The RTC resolved the doubt on her motive for using her maiden name in the telephone directory
in favor of the dissolution of the marriage instead of its preservation. The expert opinion was given Simply stated, the issue posed before the Court is whether the marriage between Reynaldo
weight, even though it was baseless to establish that petitioner had psychological incapacity to comply and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nilda's psychological incapacity.
with her marital obligations as a wife; and that, assuming that such incapacity existed, it was already
existing at the time of the marriage; and that such incapacity was incurable and grave enough to bring The answer, contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, is in the negative.
[26]
about the disability of the wife to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Preliminarily, let it be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the
Reynaldo, for his part, argues that while the petition is captioned as one under Rule 45, it is actually a family as the basic autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family.[30] The
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, since it impleads the CA as respondent and alleges that the CA Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or parties.[31] The Family Code under Article 48[32] therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting
[27]
excess of jurisdiction. Reynaldo also claims that the issues raised by Nilda necessarily require a attorney or fiscal assigned, in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to
review of the factual findings of the lower courts, which matters have already been decided and appear on behalf of the State in order to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Indeed, only the active participation of issues of the case; run contrary to the admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain relevant facts
the Public Prosecutor or the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that the interest of the which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declarations of nullity of facts.[41] Such is the case at bar.
marriage by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.[33] Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36[42] of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
While the guidelines in Molina requiring the OSG to issue a certification on whether or not it is marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
agreeing or objecting to the petition for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-11-10- and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain
SC or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly
of Voidable Marriages,[34] still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and active participation of the any doubt that the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
[35]
State through the fiscal or the prosecuting attorney. to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[43]
In this case, contrary to the assertion of the RTC that the OSG actively participated in the case through
the Office of the City Prosecutor, records show that the State's participation consists only of the Report In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[44] the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
dated November 29, 1999 by Assistant City Prosecutor Gabriel L. Trocio, Jr. stating that no collusion (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.[45] In Republic of the Philippines v.
exists between the parties;[36] the OSG's Opposition to the petition for declaration of nullity of Molina,[46] the Court further set forth guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
marriage dated June 2, 2000;[37] and the cross-examination conducted by Prosecutor Trocio on the Family Code, thus:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
Reynaldo[38] and his witness Abales.[39] There were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG; and no controverting evidence presented by them before the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. x x x
judgment was rendered. Considering the interest sought to be protected by the aforestated rules, the
Court finds the State's participation in this case to be wanting.[40] 2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
But even on the merits, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo, contrary Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
to its appreciation by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to sustain a finding that Nilda is psychologically psychological --- not physical, although its manifestation and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
incapacitated. that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known that obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this Court. Such assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
principle however is not absolute, such as when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to establish that Nilda was a flirt
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and before the marriage, which flirtatiousness recurred when she started working as an aerobics
clinical psychologists.
instructress. The instances alleged by Reynaldo, i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to ride
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the home with another man instead of him, that he saw Nilda being kissed by another man while
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the in a car, and that Nilda allowed other men to touch her body, if true, would understandably
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts by themselves are insufficient to establish a
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically 36 of the Family Code.
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily marital obligations.[48] Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x. will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition or illness.[49] Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or contemplated by said rule.[50]
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda was not all that bad; in fact, it went well in the first
essential to marriage.
year of their marriage. As in other cases, an admission of a good and harmonious relationship during
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 the early part of the marriage weakens the assertion of psychological defect existing at the time of the
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
celebration of the marriage which deprived the party of the ability to assume the essential duties of
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.[51]
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of In determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article 36, the same must be read in
the decision.
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from, Articles 35,[52] 37,[53] 38[54] and 41[55]of the
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of Family Code that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void abinitio; or Article
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.[47] 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable; or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation.[56] These various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.[57] Indeed, Article 36 should not be equated with legal separation, in which defined nymphomia as a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor behavior as shown
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, by her sexual relationship with various men other than her husband.[65]
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment
and the like.[58] The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the
circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not even a single proof that
Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which Nilda used her maiden name Bacon to prove she was ever involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagulclaims,
that Nilda represented herself as single. As noted by the CA, however, the telephone listings during her testimony, that in coming out with the report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo but
presented by Reynaldo were for the years 1993 to 1995,[59] after Reynaldo admittedly also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and sister, respectively, a
left Nilda on June 18, 1992. Apart from Reynaldo and Abalales's testimony, therefore, Reynaldo has certain Marvin and a certain Susan.[66] Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these
no proof that Nilda represented herself as single while they were still living together. The Court cannot persons, which information were supplied by whom, and how they came upon their
agree with the RTC, therefore, that said telephone listings show that Nilda represented herself to be respective informations. Indeed, the conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack
single, which in turn manifests her lack of understanding of the consequences of marriage. sufficient factual bases. As the report lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause
of Nilda'spsychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening
Reynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul to bolster his claim that Nilda is disabling factor or an adverse integral element in Nilda's character that effectively incapacitated her
psychologically incapacitated. While it is true that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for from accepting, and thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that her
its understanding of the human personality,[60] and that there is no requirement that the defendant psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage.[67] Hence, the Court cannot give
spouse be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before the nullity of marriage based on weight to said assessment.
psychological incapacity may be declared,[61] still, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained,[62] and said incapacity The standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.[63] very strict, but that is only proper in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.[68]
The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to
establish Nilda's psychological incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a Reynaldo also claims that Nilda does not want to get pregnant which allegation was upheld by the
nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a borderline personality, has strong sexual trial court. A review of the records shows, however, that apart from the testimony of Reynaldo, no
urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a very weak conscience other proof was presented to support such claim. Mere allegation and nothing more is insufficient to
or superego, emotionally immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several support such proposition. As petitioner before the trial court, it devolves upon Reynaldo to discharge
occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms, the burden of establishing the grounds that would justify the nullification of the marriage.[69]
deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggresive, irresponsible and vain.[64] She further
While Reynaldo and Nilda's marriage failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the
remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.[70] And this Court,
even as the highest one, can only apply the letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it may
be.[71]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 and the Decision dated January 2, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. T-
799, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May
Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the
marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
The Facts
A Yes, Your Honor. The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their
professions?
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
A Yes, Your Honor. explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms
The Court has no more questions. may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist
is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's and clinical psychologists.
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be nation.
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the
petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of guidelines.
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
text of the decision.
SO ORDERED.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres,
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Jr., JJ., concur.
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
THIRD DIVISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner, Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
Present: incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in our
jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that
current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept
Chairperson,
was formulatedfree in form and devoid of any definition.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
NACHURA, and For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Respondent,
Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
PERALTA, JJ.
G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution[2]denying
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.
Promulgated:
Oppositor.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena
Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their
college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter
already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January
1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.[3]
DECISION
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed
and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they
around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At telephoned to ask for him.[9]
first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however,
made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing
their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.[4] In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence
that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate
lives. They then parted ways.[10]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house
accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In
April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before
and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his
telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was
with Rowena at her uncles place.[5] docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the
was then 25 years old, and she, 20.[6] The two then continued to stay at her uncles place Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was
where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out collusion between the parties.[12] In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the
unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its
leave Rowena.[7] At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.[13]
suggested that they should stay at their parents home and live with them. Edward relayed
this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they
could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it
told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.[8] could not determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended
trial on the merits.[14]
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties
psychologically incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions: In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and
this became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After a
month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having
problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY: also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their
lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that
they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she
and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is
college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the
unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going
GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped
psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of
Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was
incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City. compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but
could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should
go back and seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of
deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the
whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few
virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she
generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he
remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he
his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home
and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then and
on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent
said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and
as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message. scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he
would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent
brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,]
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents
father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,]
collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the
boyfriend prior to that with petitioner. Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after TESTS ADMINISTERED:
arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner
arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner
was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many Revised Beta Examination
guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going
home, they will commission their military friends to harm his Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he
Draw A Person Test
should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]ۥand
relatives[ ]ۥhouses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament
and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military Sachs Sentence Completion Test
escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a MMPI
marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,]
petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they are still
studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only
live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away
from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally
already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows
they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.
[that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own
family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he
chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still
the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still
and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to support founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded
her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore, as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner in social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too
that they should live separate lives. akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to
commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as
aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously
undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was attached and spend a solemn time alone.
caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their young
age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom,
while she was still egocentrically involved with herself. ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of
the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat
exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen
to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision[19] in CA-
petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich
family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner
knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did
realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her
not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided
way out of the relationship.
by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of
REMARKS:
the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[21] needed for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. [22] The CA
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of
himself and marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to,
should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by as the case may be, the petition.[23] The CA later denied petitioners motion for
petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.[24]
have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware
of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening
their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other
hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review
insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required
It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable
presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[25]
since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties
display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for
them to take.[15]
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage
void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both
parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision[16] declaring the marriage
for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is
of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically
bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.[17] The Republic,
had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.[27]
represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.[18]
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,[28] that the annulment As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that
petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law.
that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court
likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The of Appeals:[33]
purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina[29] were not
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code
satisfied.[30] Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.[31] Family Code.
I.
During its early meetings, the Family Law
Committee had thought of including a chapter on
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by
development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact,
some members of the Committee were in favor of a
no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de facto.
Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a
proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and
the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the continuous years of separation between the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void separation, and (b) whenever a married person
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in
another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later,
even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to
discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
that such an action would not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the
Subsequently, however, when the Civil
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages
Code Revision Committee and Family Law
on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the
Committee started holding joint meetings on the
State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code,
prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
they agreed and formulated the definition of
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
marriage as
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void
marriages as found in the present Civil Code and
those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
a special contract of declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds
permanent partnership between a similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now
man and a woman entered into in working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a
accordance with law for the New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
establishment of conjugal and provisions on void marriages with the proposals of
family life. It is an inviolable social Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
institution whose nature, additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration
consequences, and incidents are of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property
(7) those marriages
relations during the marriage
contracted by any party who, at
within the limits provided by law.
the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand
With the above definition, and considering the essential nature of marriage or
the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the was psychologically or mentally
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, incapacitated to discharge the
indissoluble social institution upon which the family essential marital obligations, even
and society are founded, and also realizing the strong if such lack or incapacity is made
opposition that any provision on absolute divorce manifest after the celebration.
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the
Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great
majority of our people belong, the two Committees
as well as the following implementing provisions:
in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for
judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought
Art. 32. The absolute constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
nullity of a marriage may be and psychosexual anomaly.[34]
invoked or pleaded only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring
the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of
Article 34. In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that 1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree. as contract;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Thus, mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from each
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of
essential to marriage. protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable
base of the nation.
has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its
like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity
Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have
individuals.[51] become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the
other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the
latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by
Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the
intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.[52] The Court should rather be this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v.
Reyes,[55] there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases.
basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony,
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. were presented to these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the
wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
II.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in
this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment,
We now examine the instant case. but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made
in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met
in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that
personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp
disorder.[56]
and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are
now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive psychological incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
parties.[57]
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to
each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right
to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia,
the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal personal responses consistently fall short of
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but reasonable expectations.
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the
strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for xxxx
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
The psychological grounds are the best
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she
has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements traditional categories often fits very easily into the
necessary to the mature marital relationship: psychological category.
The courts consider the following elements As new as the psychological grounds are,
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties'
openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity
of marriage, etc. to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack of due competence).
An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions competence is that at the time the marriage was
that might lead to the failure of a marriage: entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family
almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry
out marital responsibilities as promised at the time
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment the marriage was entered into.[58]
precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of presenting Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows
expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and
to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v.
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic
Marcos[60] asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically of a persons recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply
ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence must
individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often
and the psychological disorder itself. recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood
and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have
more than one personality disorder at a time.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
The common factor among individuals who have personality
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived
by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal,
finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other
refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their
problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not
and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who
unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or
are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced
determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
prerogative to present their own expert witnesses. Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health
viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality disorders. These
include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain
wave activity.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain
consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with stages of development led to certain personality types. Thus, some
personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and
phallic character types.Demanding and dependent behavior Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders.
(dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or
fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and eccentric habits and traits.
emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal
stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness
and an inability to engage in intimate relationships. However, later Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality
researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly
fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality emotional, erratic and dramatic.
patterns.
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court,
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness;
and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties
psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a
society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for
the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal
behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume
spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity
is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard,
and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control
others. advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where
to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty
doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also
may befit some individuals who are prominent in business or politics approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
may be hidden prior to a public scandal. followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has
no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being
afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential
marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others,
her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame
others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society.[68] Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering;
she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and
void.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July
14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which
Supreme Court
reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Manila Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.[2] The reversed RTC decision nullified
Jocelyns marriage with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
SECOND DIVISION
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were
residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, G.R. No. 164493
Petitioner, Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn
and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter,
Present:
Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - ABAD, and Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos
parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd
PEREZ, JJ.
jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand,
refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and
Promulgated: violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a
BRION, J.:
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion
the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist
relationship, she alleged in her complaint: testified at the trial.
xxxx
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition,
including the alleged incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July examination, she remained firm on these declarations but significantly declared that
1987, their relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which
caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the Angelito had not treated her violently before they were married.
plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every
time they had a troublesome encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent
defendant to work or his indolence and his excessive drinking which before you got married?
makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff
causing their separation in fact in July 1987; A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will
the time of their marriage and became very apparent as time went and you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?
proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;
xxxx
A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of
marital relation to the respondent (sic).
Court:
Court:
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown
by the respondent (sic). love to the petitioner?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Court:
Q. What are the vices?
xxxx
[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above][6]
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from
the start of her married life with the respondent, she already suffered
from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and that The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the
she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who
husband to sustain the latters niece (sic) and because they were living testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting that
with her husbands family, she was obliged to do the household chores there is psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to
an indication that she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that she comply with the essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and
served as a servant in his (sic) husbands family. clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed
for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold
incapacity of the respondent is a speculation and conjecture and that the respondent was psychologically incapable of entering into the
without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due
the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the to an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand
respondent, although they are now separated, and a grim and sad testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As
reminder of her husband who made here a slave and a punching bag observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to
during the short span of her marriage with him. The law on annulment provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical
should be liberally construed in favor of an innocent suffering abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of
petitioner otherwise said law will be an instrument to protect persons a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically
with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein identified. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was
respondent.[8] suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the
marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical
investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal
at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was
THE CA RULING due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or
the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of
rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a
ruling that: permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to
engage in productive work and more stable relationships with
another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the
defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the
guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of
Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court There is no doubt that for the short period that they were
adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the fact of under the same roof, the married life of the petitioner with the
psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this
clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the reason be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our
evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family
resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity
the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses
not found to be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in the of parties to separate and divorce.
absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose
mental and psychological capacity was in question.
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these
criteria. The RTC, being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of
THE PETITION
psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of lower court magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes psychological
the CA ruling based on the following arguments: incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on generalities without
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that actually exists
totally disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage only in name.
null and void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns
be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that the finding of the Trial Court
as to the existence or non-existence of petitioners psychological marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the
Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial
courts factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private THE COURTS RULING
respondents witnesses vis--vis petitioners defenses are clearly and
manifestly erroneous;
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological
law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with
incapacity; this omission was intentional to give the courts a wider
discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by statutory Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would make a
person unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows: The Law, Molina and Te
1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties which are
to be mutually given and accepted;
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely
introduced an abstract concept psychological incapacity that disables compliance with
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential the contractual obligations of marriage without any concrete definition or, at the very
obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic nature.
least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept
of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological incapacity must be
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
psychologists.
discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
meaning and significance to the marriage.[10] illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases
we now find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the
finality of the factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns main
anchor in her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that,
on the contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the
facts and the evidence of the present case.
-SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its
December 13, 2004 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its
BENJAMIN G. TING, G.R. No. 166562
assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision[3] of the Regional
Petitioner, Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and
Present:
respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[4]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
CARPIO MORALES,*
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting
NACHURA, and (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.[5] They fell in
PERALTA, JJ. love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already
pregnant with their first child.
Promulgated:
NACHURA, J.:
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial
James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles support to their family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money
Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, for their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on
born on June 16, 1991.[12] drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby. [17] He
rarely stayed home[18] and even neglected his obligation to his children.[19]
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner
and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.[20] He would
before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based gamble two or three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from
on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological loan sharks whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wifes own
incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only jewelry to finance his gambling.[21] There was also an instance when the spouses had to
became manifest thereafter. [13] sell their family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just
to be able to pay off his gambling debts.[22] Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in
1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments.[23]
aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.[14] But after
In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the
they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about
following manifestations:
midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would
confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him.
There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family
house.[15]Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was affected to
relationship and his profession;
the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass
the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his 2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular
services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to drinking;
her husband about the latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found
the same.[16]
it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited
from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a
money to pay the same; and psychiatrist.[31] Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates evaluation of
Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamins
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and
deposition because the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a
refusal to give regular financial support to his family.[24]
hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oate
concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse
of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.[32]
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He
maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is
an active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a
reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by
psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry
circumstances.[25] As for his alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin
[33]
in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness. Dr. Obra
claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees
evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript of stenographic
from Velez Hospitalwhen he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.[26] In his
notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his
psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras) interview
means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending
with Benjamins brothers.[34] Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that there
his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.[27] He also pointed out that it was he who
is nothing wrong with petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship
often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her
with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.[35]
friends twice a week.[28]
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision[36] declaring the
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and gambling
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr.
habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny
Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and
to the spouses children from 1987 to 1992.[29] Wasawas stated that she personally
found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.[30]
marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive
gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person
with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing
even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
respondent filed a petition for certiorari[43] with this Court. In a Resolution[44] dated
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmens
hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and motion for reconsideration.[45] On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous
defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code.
ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision [46] reversing its first
xxx
ruling and sustaining the trial courts decision.[47]
xxxx
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision[38] reversing the trial courts ruling. It faulted the trial courts finding, stating that
no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically For our resolution are the following issues:
incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only
on theories and not on established fact,[39] contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos
v. Court of Appeals[40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[41] I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it
refused to follow the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases;
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine. each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
We have not. by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the
verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to
have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [61] The
where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed
it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage
Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric
experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[62]
conference.[60]
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present at
the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his
expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing
alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove
accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of such defects to be incurable.
marriage.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence
in determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly,
however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened
III. On petitioners psychological incapacity. respondents allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided
diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners
behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder,[63] while Dr. Obra maintained
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality. Moreover, there appears to be
respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of
duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
Associate Justice
the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview with
Benjamins brothers.[64] Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.
SO ORDERED.