G.R. No.
L-14722 May 25, 1960 Sometime in 1952, Maria Florentino, with the consent of her husband Jose Villanueva, sold all
IGNACIO MESINA, plaintiff-appellant, vs EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL.,
defendants.EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Mesina claimed to be the owner of a parcel of land located in San Antonio, Nueva,
Ecija. He has been in possession of the subject land openly, publicly and peacefully since 1914.
The said lot was subject of registration proceedings. Surprisingly, the defendant Pineda without
knowledge of the Plaintiff was able to procure a homestead patent in the same court were the
registration of property was pending of the same land by the plaintiff, despite of the fact that
defendant had not complied with the requirements of CA 141. That the said title was procured
by defendants through frauds, deception and misrepresentation since they knew that the lot
belong to the plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff sought to annulled and cancelled the patent issued to
defendant and prayed that this registration case pending in the same court be given due course.
ISSUE: WON the homestead patent given to defendant Pineda be declared null and void
.RULING: In view of the fact that plaintiff was able to proved his open, continuous, exclusive
possession of the disputed land for more than thirty years or since 1914 and that lot is at present
subject of registration proceeding. Plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot by grant of the
state, it follows that the same had ceased to part of the public and had become private property
and therefore beyond the control of the Director of Land. The homestead patent issued to
defendant therefore is null and void and for having it issued through fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
G.R. No. L-14634 January 28, 1961
ARTURO NIETO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.BARTOLOME QUINES and MIGUEL P. PIO,
defendants-appellees.
Justiniano P. Cortez for plaintiff-appellant.
Miguel P. Pio for defendants-appellees.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
Sometime in 1917, Bartolome Quines filed with the Bureau of Lands a homestead application
covering a tract of land situated in the municipality of Abulug, province of Cagayan. Upon the
approval of his application in the following year, he began clearing and cultivating the land.
In the years 1923 to 1925, cadastral surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands in the
municipality of Abulug, during which the tract of land applied for as a homestead by Bartolome
Quines was designated as Lot No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. After the surveys were
completed, cadastral proceedings were initiated in 1927 by the Director of Lands in the Court
of First Instance of Cagayan. Relying upon the assurances made by the employees of the
Bureau of Lands that they would take care of his homestead in the cadastral proceedings,
Bartolome Quines did not file any answer therein. However, one Maria Florentino filed an
answer claiming several lots including Lot No. 3044. After hearing, the cadastral court, on
August 16, 1930, rendered its decision wherein Maria Florentino was awarded the lots claimed
by her. Lot No. 3044 was included in the award, apparently because neither the Director of
Lands nor any of his representatives appeared during the hearing to inform the court that it was
under homestead application. On August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final decree of
registration and the original certificate of title to Maria Florentino, a homestead patent covering
Lot No. 3044 was granted to Bartolome Quines, and pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds
of Cagayan, on September 15, 1930, issued Original Certificate of Title No. 623 in his name.
Six months thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register of Deeds issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the lots awarded to her
by the cadastral court including Lot No. 3044.
the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 to Arturo Nieto, who subsequently
secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1402 in his name on January 21, 1953.
On other hand, Bartolome Quines executed a deed of sale on December 23, 1953 transferring
Lot No. 3044 as covered by Original Certificate of Title issued in his name to Atty. Miguel P.
Pio. Discovering that the land he purchased was covered by another title in the name of Arturo
Nieto, Atty. Pio, on January 8, 1954, filed an action against the latter in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan for quieting of title. The lower court, however, upon defendant's motion,
dismissed the action on the ground that the plaintiff had not yet acquired a legal title that could
affect third persons, the sale not having approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the deed not being registered in the office of the Register of Deeds.
Prior to the dismissal of the action to quiet title above mentioned, or on January 16, 1954, Arturo
Nieto, the defendant therein, filed a complaint against Bartolome Quines in, the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan. The complaint alleging, among other things, that the homestead patent
and Original Certificate of Title No. 623 were obtained through fraud and misrepresentations,
prayed that the patent and title be cancelled and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1402
issued in plaintiff's name be declared as the true and valid title over the lot in dispute. It was
likewise alleged that defendant Quines was not in possession of Lot No. 3044, but of certain
portions of other lots belonging to plaintiff, and should, therefore, be ordered to vacate the
same. Defendant Bartolome Quines, through his counsel Atty. Miguel P. Pio, answered the
complaint denying its material allegations.
During the pendency of the action, the sale of Lot No. 3044 to Miguel P. Pio was approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and was later registered in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Cagayan who issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1994 in the name of
Miguel P. Pio. Accordingly, Miguel P. Pio filed a motion for his inclusion as party defendant. His
motion having been granted, defendant Miguel P. Pio answered the complaint denying the
material allegations thereof and interposing a counterclaim for damages.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in defendants' favor dismissing the complaint,
ordering the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 1402 insofar as they cover Lot No. 3044, and sentencing the plaintiff to pay the
defendants P6,000 representing the owner's share in the harvest from the years 1954 to 1957.
His two motions for reconsideration having been denied, plaintiff Arturo Nieto appealed directly
to this Court.
The appeal is without merit.
As established during the trial and found by the trial court, Bartolome Quines had been in the
continuous and peaceful possession of Lot No. 3044 from the time his homestead application
was approved in 1918 up to 1953 when he was forcibly ejected therefrom by Arturo Nieto. As
a homestead applicant, he religiously complied with all the requirements of the Public Land Act
and, on August 29, 1930, a homestead patent was issued in his favor. Considering the
requirement that the final proof must be presented within 5 years from the approval of the
homestead application (sec. 14, Public Land Act), it is safe to assume that Bartolome Quines
submitted his final proof way back yet in 1923 and that the Director of Lands approved the
same not long thereafter or before the land became the subject of the cadastral proceedings in
1927. Unfortunately, there was some delay in the ministerial act of issuing the patent and the
same was actually issued only after the cadastral court had adjudicated the land to Maria
Florentino. Nevertheless, having complied with all the terms and conditions which would entitle
him to a patent, Bartolome Quines, even without a patent actually issued, has unquestionably
acquired a vested right on the land and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof.
(Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). Under these circumstances and applying by analogy the
principles governing sales of immovable property to two different persons by the same vendor,
Bartolome Quines' title must prevail over that of Maria Florentino not only because he had
always been in possession of the land but also because he obtained title to the land prior to
that of Maria Florentino.
Having arrived at the above conclusions, we deem it idle to consider the other points raised in
this appeal.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. With costs
against appellant.
Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Paredes JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
Concepcion and Barrera, JJ., reserve their votes.
G.R. No. L-28918 September 29, 1970
PACIENCIA BENIGA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
RUFINA BUGAS, defendant-appellant.
Paulino A. Conol for plaintiffs-appellants.
Lorenzo P. de Guzman and Pacito G. Mutia and Marcial G. Mendiola for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., Acting C.J.:
Joint appeal (Record on Appeal was approved on 23 March 1968) directly taken to the Supreme
Court by both the plaintiffs and the defendant from an amended decision of the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental, in its Civil Case No. 2598, declaring the former as the owners
and ordering the latter to deliver the possession of a portion of parcel of land but "without (the
latter) having to account for the fruits and the produce of the same until actually delivered and
to pay the costs of the proceedings."1
The findings of fact in the said decision were, based upon a stipulation of facts and upon
evidence adduced on controverted matters not covered by the stipulation. Said findings are as
follows:
The land in controversy is —
Bounded on the North by Salimpono River, SOUTH by Magsirawang Brook, EAST by V. Baol
and R. Mabascog, WEST by D. Malon, A. Beniga and M. Luzing, containing an area of 2.1680
hectares under Tax Declaration No. 71458 in the name of the late Antonio Mabascog, and
assessed at P1,680.00 —
and constitutes a portion of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Magsirawag (Guintomoyan),
Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, designated as Lot 2031, Pls-646 under Free Patent No. 232966,
containing an area of 47,429 square meters.
Free Patent No. 232966 was issued on 3 May 1963. The patentee, Antonio Mabascog, died on
5 September 1966. Before his death, however, he donated inter vivos, on 22 September 1965,
the controverted portion of the parcel of land to the descendant Rufina Bugas, who, thenceforth,
took possession of the property.2 At the time of the donation, both donor and donee did not
know about the issuance of the patent.
The deceased Antonio Mabascog was a widower at the time of the donation.3 He died without
a descendant or ascendant, leaving as his heirs the herein plaintiffs Paciencia Beniga Anselmo
Burlat, Dionisia Malon, Buenaventura Vale, Agapito Vale, Alfonso Vale, Matea Vale and Manuel
Vale, who are the children of the four deceased sisters of Antonio Mabascog.
Upon the foregoing facts, the court a quo held that the donation was null and void, being in
violation of the 5 year prohibitory period against alienation of lands acquired under free patent,
pursuant to Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 as amended by Commonwealth Act 496
(sic, but obviously referring to CA No. 456) and, therefore, the donation transferred no right to
defendant Rufina Bugas, but held her possession and enjoyment of the property in litigation as
made in good faith and, therefore, not accountable for the fruits that she had gathered
therefrom.
Appellant-defendant's theory is that the 5-year prohibitory period should begin to run from the
date of inscription of the patent in the Registry Book, which was on 13 January 1966, in cases
where the contracting parties had no prior knowledge of the issuance of the patent at the time
they executed their contract; and pursuant to this theory, she avers that the donation of 22
September 1965 does not fall within the prohibited period, hence, the donation is not invalid.
Obviously, the defendant-appellant's thesis is untenable. It proceeds on the unstated
assumption that alienations by patentees to persons or entities not excepted by law are
invalidated only if made within the five-year period from and after the issuance of the patent.
This is incorrect, for Section 118 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 456) recites as follows:
SEC. 118. Except in favor of the Government or an of its branches, units, or institutions,
or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of
the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patentor
grant nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five
years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal
grounds.
It is clear from the language of the law that the alienation of lands acquired by homestead or
free patent grants is forbidden "from the date of approval of the application" up to and including
the fifth year "from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant." Otherwise, the
provision makes no sense, for the prohibition starting from the date of approval of the
application would have no terminal date. Since the 1965 donation in favor of defendant-
appellant was clearly within the period of prohibited alienation, whether the same be deemed
to end five years counted from the issuance of the patent or grant, or five years counted from
its registration or recording with the Register of Deeds, said donation is plainly void.
Anyway, it has been repeatedly held that the period is not computed from the date of registration
with the Register of Deeds or from the date of the certificate of title.4
Section 118 does exempt patentees and their purported transferees who had no knowledge of
the issuance of the patent from the prohibition against alienation; for the law does not say that
the five years are to be counted "from knowledge or notice of issuance of the patent or grant.
The date of the issuance of the patent is documented and is a matter of government and official
record. As such, it is more reliable and precise than mere knowledge, with its inherent frailties.
Indeed, the policy of the law, which is to give the patentee a place where to live with his family
that he may become a happy citizen and a useful member of our society,5 would be defeated
were ignorance of the issuance of a patent a ground for the non-application of the prohibition.
Equity, as ground for the validation of the donation, may not be invoked, for the prohibition
under the aforesaid Section 118 is mandatory,6 and the "general principles of equity will not be
applied to frustrate the purpose of the laws or to thwart public policy."7
As asserted by defendant-appellant donee, the donation of the land in violation of Section 118
shall cause the reversion of the property to the State, as provided for in Section 124 of the law.
However, such reversion, which could be of the entire land covered by the patent,8 is "a matter
between the State and the Grantee ... or his heirs"9 but does not preclude the heirs from suing
to have the alienation declared invalid, 10 for their right to the possession of the land is superior
to that of the transferee in the void
alienation. 11
On the part of the plaintiffs-appellants, they counter-assign as error, the lower court's not
ordering the defendant to pay damages, at least from receipt of judicial summons. It is true that
possession in good faith ceases upon the possessor's becoming aware of the flaw of his title
and from there on, the possessor should be held accountable for the fruits of the land. 12
However, in the instant case, the lower court made no findings as to the amount of the produce,
hence it becomes necessary to remand the case to the court of origin for the determination of
the value of the fruits accrued from and after summons, and of the deductions corresponding
to the costs of production.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision, in so far as it decrees the nullity of
the donation in favor of appellant Rufina Bugas, is hereby affirmed. The case is remanded to
the court of origin for determination of the net indemnity due from respondent Bugas to the
plaintiffs-appellants Beniga, et al. Without costs. So ordered.
MANOTOK vs. BARQUE[1] (G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605; August 24, 2010; VILLARAMA,
JR., J.)
FACTS:
· Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd.,
La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto
Order of the Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar Land.)
o The subject parcel “Lot No. 823” is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in QC.
· On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government
pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. The certificate of title in the name of the government was OCT
No. 614. The Estate was placed under the administration of the Director of Lands.
· Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire gutted portions
of the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of the
Register of Deeds.
· In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT
No. 372302 covering Lot No. 823 with an area of 342,945 square meters à GRANTED à TCT
No. RT-22481 (372302) was issued in 1991.
· In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In
support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owner’s duplicate of the
TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property.
o MANOTOKs opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.
· Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land belonging to Lot No.
823, TCT No. 210177 actually involves 2 parcels with an aggregate area of 342,945 square
meters, while TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) pertains only to a 1 parcel of land, with a similar
area of 342,945 square meters.
· 1997 – Barques’ petition was DENIED. à Lot. No. 823 already registered in the name of
the Manotoks. --> Barques MR was denied à They appealed to the LRA à LRA Reversed.
o LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent. Hence, it ordered the
Barque title to be reconstituted. BUT cancellation must 1st be sought in a court of competent
jurisdiction of the 1991 Manotok TCT.
· The LRA denied the Manotoks’ MR and the Barques’ prayer for immediate reconstitution.
Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the CA.
§ In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the dismissal of the
cases claiming ownership of the subject property.
· 2002 and 2003 à 2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of QC to cancel
the Reconstituted Manotok Title and to reconstitute the Barques’ “valid, genuine and existing”
TCT No. 210177.
o Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were ordered consolidated
on August 2, 2004.
· December 12, 2005, SC First Division à affirmed both decisions of the CA. à Manotoks
filed MR à Denied in April 2006 Resolution.
o Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with their MR
attached. à Denied in June 2006 Resolution. Eventually entry of judgment was made in the
Book of Entries of Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the meantime, the Barques filed multiple
motions with the First Division for execution of the judgment, while the Manotoks filed an Urgent
Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral
arguments). à Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006.
· On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to
intervene, to which was attached their petition in intervention. They alleged that their
predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Manahan, was issued Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot
No. 823 and attached the findings of the NBI that the documents of the Manotoks were not as
old as they were purported to be. Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB
recommended to the Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok Title should be reverted to
the state.
o Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.
· 2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1st division decision and entry of judgment
recalled and the CA’s Amended Decisions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed
and set aside. The En Banc remanded the case to the CA.
o The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of WON the Manotoks
can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad
Estate, which was a Friar Land. PURPOSE: to decide WON the title of the Maotoks should be
annulled.
· CA’s findings à None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of Lot 823 from
the government in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as the
“Friar Lands Act”. Notably lacking in the deed of conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as required by Section 18 of the said law. Upon
close scrutiny, the factual allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the
purchase of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the claimants revealed badges of fraud
and irregularity.
BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:
Manotoks à Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919. They have since
occupied the land, built their houses and buildings on it. The subject land is now known as
Manotok Compound.
Barques à Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta who had a
TCT in his name.
Manahans à The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently bought by his wife.
They had a caretaker on the property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they just
declared the property for taxation to protect their rights.
ISSUE: Who has the better right over Lot No. 823? NO ONE! It belongs to the National
Government.
RATIO:
· From the proceedings in the CA, it was established that while records of the DENR-LMB
indicate the original claimant/applicant of Lot 823 as a certain Valentin Manahan, only the
Manotoks were able to produce a sale certificate in the name of their predecessors-in-interest,
certified by the LMB Records Management Division. In addition, the Manotoks submitted
photocopies of original documents entitled Assignment of Sale Certificate dated 1919, 1920
and 1923.
· Sale Certificate No. 1054 was not signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the
Secretary of the Interior. The Certificates of Assignment of Sale contained only the signature
of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks belatedly secured from the National Archives a certified
copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7, 1932, which likewise lacks the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed only by the
Director of Lands.
Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
· It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale of friar lands
shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce).
· In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the original Deed
of Conveyance No. 29204, sourced from the National Archives, shows on the second page a
poorly imprinted typewritten name over the words “Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources”, which name is illegible, and above it an even more poorly imprinted impression of
what may be a stamp of the Secretary’s approval.
· The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of the RD’s
task in issuing the TCT in the Manotok name. The Manotoks contend that “we can assume that
the Manotok deed of conveyance was in fact approved by the Department Secretary because
the register of deeds did issue TCT No. 22813 in the name of the buyer Severino Manotok.”
FURTHER, the Manotoks assert that even if we were to ignore the presumption of validity in
the performance of official duty, Department Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on October
27, 2005 by then DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor, supplies the omission of approval by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in deeds of conveyances over friar lands.
o NO! These arguments fail.
· Citing Alonso v. Cebu Country Club which applied the rule in the Solid State and Liao
Casesà the absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale
certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale null and void ab initio. Necessarily,
there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment.
o SC in the MR of the Alonso case underscored that the approval is a MADATORY
requirement. Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred
from certain acts since the law is explicit in its mandate. Petitioners have not offered any cogent
reason that would justify a deviation from this rule.
· DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks and the Manahans,
states that some Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field offices of the LMB do not bear the
Secretary’s signature despite full payment for the Friar Land. They are deemed signed or
otherwise ratified by this Memo provided that the applicant really paid the purchase price and
complied with all the requirements under the Friar Lands Act.
o The CA opined that the Manotoks cannot benefit from the above department issuance
because it makes reference only to those deeds of conveyance on file with the records of the
DENR field offices. The Manotoks’ copy of the alleged Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 issued
in 1932, was sourced from the National Archives.
· Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the Government ceases
reservation of its title once the buyer had fully paid the price. (They were claiming that they fully
paid!) Their basis is SECTION 15[2] of the Friar Lands Act.
· Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention however, the new
rule Pugeda v. Trias, à “the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-
called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the
resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in
full.
· Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate of sale that
vests title and ownership to the purchaser of friar land. Such certificate of sale must, of course,
be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as evident from Sections
11[3], 12[4] and the 2nd paragraph of Section 15[5], in relation to Section 18.
CONCLUSIONS
· Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid
certificate of sale issued to them by the Government because their Certificate lacks the
signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
· The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real property
taxes and construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks
miserably failed to prove the existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of Severino
Mantotok after the latter had paid in full the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any
explanation as to why the only copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of
documents leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. As to the certification
issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it simply described the copy presented as
“DILAPIDATED” without stating if the original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually existed in their
records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of registered owner.
o As we stressed in Alonso: Prescription can never lie against the Government.

· RE: MANAHANS àNo copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can be found in the
records of either the DENR-NCR, LMB or National Archives. Although the OSG submitted a
certified copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 allegedly executed by Valentin
Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is no competent evidence to show that the
claimant Valentin Manahan or his successors-in-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared
the land for tax purposes, or paid the taxes due thereon.
· Even assuming arguendo the existence and validity of the alleged Sale Certificate No.
511 and Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 presented by the Manahans, the CA correctly
observed that the claim had become stale after the lapse of 86 years from the date of its alleged
issuance. Citing Liao v. CA “the certificates of sale x x x became stale after 10 years from its
issuance” and hence cannot be the source documents for issuance of title more than 70 years
later.”
)DEL PRADO vs COURT OF APPEALS GR 148225
Facts: A lot No. 1109 was adjudicated in favor of spouses Caballero thru a Deed of Sale. They
sold to petitioner said lot on the basis of Tax Declaration covering the said property. In the Deed
of Sale, it is stated that the parcel of land sold to Carmen Del Prado only covers 4,000 square
meters while the total area of the said lot is 14,000 square meters.
Issue: Whether or Not the sale of the land was for lump sum or not .
Held: The court reiterated the rulings in Esguerra v. Trinidad; In sales involving real estate, the
parties may choose between two types of pricing agreement: Unit price contract, where in the
purchase price is determined by way of reference to stated rate per area. Lump sum, contract
which states a full purchase price for an immovable, the area of which may be declared based
on the estimate or where both the area and boundaries are stated. In the instant case the sale
of the land was for lump sum because the parties agreed to purchase the land at P 40,000 for
pre-determined area of 4,000 square meters, more or less, with boundaries stated therein. In a
contract of sale of land in a mass, the specific boundaries stated in the contract prevails over
any other statement with respect to the area contained within its boundaries
[G.R. No. 71835. April 30, 1991.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
MUTALIB SUSUKAN, NORORA BASA, HAJAL INDAL, BERJIN AMILABAS, DAYANG
DAYANGIN, NORIA ABDUL AND KALUYA YOSUP, Respondents.
Prudencio N. Cichon for Private Respondent.
Jose E. Fernandez for Mutalib Susukan.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; RECONSTITUTION OF CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE; AUTHORITY OF FISCAL TO ACT IN BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT. — The act of
provincial fiscal in signing the compromise agreement was in accordance with his duty to
appear for and protect the interests of the government in court in petitions for reconstitution, as
expressly provided by LRC Circular No. 35, dated 13 June 1983.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INACTION OF FISCAL SHOWS ABSENCE OF INTEREST OF
GOVERNMENT. — The absence of any opposition on the part of the government to the petition
for reconstitution despite having been duly served copies of the petition and its annexes through
the Registrar of Deeds, Director of Lands, Solicitor General and the Provincial Fiscal shows
that the government has no contrary evidence with which to contest and frustrate the petition.
Thereafter, when judgment was rendered based on the compromise agreement without
awaiting the report and recommendation of the Land Registration Administration and the
verification of the Registrar of Deeds concerned, its failure to file a motion to set aside the
judgment of the court after due notice likewise proves that no interest of the government was
prejudiced by such judgment.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; BASES OF RECONSTITUTION, PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. — Susukan
presented the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title. However, upon an objection raised by
the oppositors on the basis of the absence of the name of one of the registered owners, said
oppositors presented two other documents, namely the certificate from the Bureau of Lands
and a copy of the decision of the lower court to prove not only the ownership of the third
registered owner but of all the registered owners. These documents readily fall under Section
3 (f) of Republic Act No. 26. We therefore affirm the findings of both the lower and appellate
courts and rule that these documents are sufficient and proper bases for reconstituting the
burned or destroyed original certificate of title.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT HAS NO DISCRETION TO DENY RECONSTITUTION IF ALL
BASIC REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN COMPLIED. — If the court after hearing finds that the
evidence presented is sufficient and proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost (or
destroyed) certificate of title and that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property, and
said certificate was in force at the time it was lost (or destroyed), the duty of the court is to issue
the order of reconstitution. This duty is mandatory. The law does not give the court discretion
to deny the reconstitution if all the basic requirements have been complied with. (Director of
Lands v. Gan Tan, 89 Phil. 184)
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated August 13, 1986 which affirmed in
toto the order of the Regional Trial Court of Sulu, Branch IV, Jolo, Sulu granting the petition for
reconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title in the name of Maharajah Sacandal, Moro
Indulang and Mora Dayang Sitti Fatima and ordering the Register of Deeds of Sulu to
reconstitute and issue the certificate of title in the name of the aforementioned registered
owners.
The antecedent facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On December 23, 1982 Mutalib Susukan filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Sulu a petition for reconstitution of the destroyed Transfer Certificate of Title No.
566 of the Registrar of Deeds of Sulu, covering Lot No. 133-B with an area of 1,614,074 square
meters.
The petition alleges that Moro Indulang, grandfather of Susukan, and Maharajah Sacandal are
the registered owners of Lot No. 133-B. Susukan along with his father and other relatives as
well as the heirs of Sacandal possess and occupy the said lot. On February 8, 1974, the original
copy of the certificate of title in the custody of the Registrar of Deeds of Sulu was lost and
destroyed by fire but the owner’s duplicate copy remained in the possession of Susukan.
It also alleges that the certificate of title is free from any lien or encumbrances; neither was
there a deed of instrument affecting said lot and that no co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessee’s
duplicate copy of the title was ever issued.
By an order dated January 13, 1983, the petition was set for initial hearing and pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 26, the aforementioned order was published in the Official
Gazette and likewise posted in the required places.
On February 4, 1983, the Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the
provincial fiscal to represent the same. The notice of appearance specifically requested the
provincial fiscal to appear in the case, to wit:chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
"The Provincial Fiscal of Sulu has been authorized to appear in this case and therefore should
also be furnished notices of hearings, orders, resolutions, decisions and other processes.
However, as the Solicitor General retains supervision and control of the representation in this
case and has to approve withdrawal of the case, non-appeal, or other actions which appear to
compromise the interests of the Government, only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions
served on him will bind the party represented." (Rollo, p. 19)
On July 22, 1983 Norora Basa, Hajal Indal, Barjin Amilabas, Dayang Dayang In, Noria Abdul
and Kaluya Yosup filed an opposition to the petition for reconstitution alleging that they are the
heirs of Moro Dayang Sitti Fatima, the third registered owner of the subject lot.
The oppositors further allege that the owner s duplicate copy in the possession of Susukan is
not the real or genuine copy of the certificate of title because the same was copied from a
tampered one which erased the name of Mora Dayang Sitti Fatima as one of the registered
owners.
In order to prove that the late Mora Dayang Sitti Fatima was one of the registered owners of
the said lot, the oppositors presented the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) a certification from the Bureau of Lands dated June 8, 1983 (Annex A) to the effect
that Lot 133-B with an area of more or less 164. 7853 is a decreed property registered in the
names of Maharajah Sacandal, Moro Indulang and Mora Dayang Sitti Fatima;
(2) a decision in Civil Case No. 457 for recovery of possession concerning said Lot 133-
B, dated June 21, 1963, showing that Maharajah Sacandal, Moro Indulang and Mora Dayang
Sitti Fatima were the registered owners and which also decided once and for all the respective
shares of each and everyone of their heirs." (Rollo, p. 48)
Furthermore, the oppositors prayed that the reconstitution be held in abeyance until the
authentic copy of the decree covering said lot is secured from the land registration office in
Manila to be the basis of reconstitution.
After a pre-trial conference between Susukan and the oppositors, both parties agreed to enter
into a compromise agreement so long as the name of Mora Dayang Sitti Fatima be included as
one of the registered owners of the said lot. The provincial fiscal interposing no objection agreed
to sign the compromise agreement dated August 29, 1983.
On September 12, 1983, the lower court rendered judgment granting the petition for
reconstitution, the dispositive portion is hereunder quoted as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"CONSIDERING the same to be in accordance with law and evidence, the compromise
agreement is hereby ordered approved and judgment is rendered in accordance therewith,
granting the petition for reconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title in the names of
Maharajah Sacandal, Moro Indulang and Mora Dayang Sitti Fatima, stating their status and
personal circumstances as herein shown. The Register of Deeds of Sulu is hereby ordered to
reconstitute and issue the Certificate of Title in the name of the three registered owners based
upon the documents to be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of this court and upon showing the
certificate of payment of all real property taxes from 1974 up to the current year.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 28-29)
From said judgment, the government through the Solicitor General interposed an appeal before
the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals).
On August 13, 1985, the appellate court rendered a decision affirming in toto the findings of the
lower court.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raised two (2) assignment of errors, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) Whether or not the act of the Provincial Fiscal of Sulu in signing the compromise
agreement dated August 29, 1983, without first securing the approval of the Solicitor General,
is binding upon the petition (sic);
"(2) Whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the decision dated August 13,
1985 of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the decision dated September
12, 1983 of the trial court granting the petition for reconstitution of T.C.T. No. 566 of the Registry
of Deeds of Sulu. (Rollo, p. 18)
Petitioner contends that the act of the provincial fiscal in signing the compromise agreement
which was the sole basis of the judgment of the lower court in granting the petition for
reconstitution is not binding because it violated the authority vested on the fiscal expressly
provided for in the notice of appearance filed by the Solicitor General which specifically states
that the latter has to approve actions which appear to compromise the interests of the
Government.
However, the respondents maintain that the authority granted to the provincial fiscal in the
notice of appearance was not violated by the same because there was no interest of the
government that was prejudiced by the mere act of the fiscal in signing the compromise
agreement.
Furthermore, the petitioner alleges that the decision of the lower court was not supported by
substantial evidence, to wit:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
(1) "The alleged owner’s duplicate copy of T.C.T No. 566, attached to the petition for
reconstitution filed with the trial court, is not a reliable evidence." (Rollo, p. 21)
(2) "The records of this case show that there was no evidence whatsoever presented by any of
the parties to prove that the original of T.C.T No. 566 was validly issued and still existing as of
February 8, 1974 when it was allegedly destroyed." (Ibid)
(3) "But even assuming that the two (2) documents were adduced in evidence, still they are
not sufficient basis for the reconstitution of T.C.T No. 566." (Rollo, p. 23)
On the other hand, the respondents claim that there is substantial evidence in support of the
decision of the trial court. They submitted a certificate from the Bureau of Lands and a copy of
the decision of the lower court proving the ownership of the three registered owners. They
contend that these documents together with the compromise agreement are considered
sufficient bases for the judgment granting reconstitution.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
In order to forestall, if not eliminate entirely, anomalous or irregular reconstitution of lost or
destroyed land certificates of title and, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, subsections (b)
and (d) and Section 110 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Land Registration Commission
(now Land Registration Administration) adopted LRC Circular No. 35, dated 13 June 1983.
(Noblejas and Noblejas, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1986 Edition, p. 211)
The power or authority of the provincial fiscal by himself and not merely in representation of the
Solicitor General, to appear for and protect the interests of the government in reconstitution
cases is expressly provided for in the aforementioned circular, the pertinent portions of which
are hereunder quoted as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Certificates of title lost or destroyed for any cause shall be judicially reconstituted in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 26, and its implementing rules and
regulations, Circulars, memoranda and Administrative Orders relative to judicial reconstitution
of lost or destroyed certificates of title insofar as not inconsistent with this circular.
2. All petitions for reconstitution shall be directly filed in duplicate with the clerk of court
of the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the property is situated serving copies
thereof and its annexes to the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. The Registrar of Deeds concerned
b. The Director of Lands
c. The Solicitor General
d. The corresponding Provincial or City Fiscal.
7. Notices of hearings shall also be given to the Registrar of Deeds of the place where
the property is located, the Administrator of the NALTDRA (now Land Registration
Administration) and the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city where the land is located
who shall appear for and protect the interests of the government in court on the basis of the
report and recommendations of the Administrator of the NALTDRA (now LRA) and the Registrar
of Deeds concerned which are required to be submitted to the Court.
16. Should an order or judgment granting reconstitution be issued by the Court without
awaiting the report and the recommendations of this administration as well as the verification
of the Registrar of Deeds concerned, or while the examination, verification and preparation of
the report and recommendation are still pending in the said office due to the failure of the clerk
of court or the petitioner to comply with all the necessary requirements as called for herein, and
it appears that there is a valid ground to oppose the reconstitution, a motion to set aside the
order/judgment shall be filed by the Administrator of the NALTDRA (now LRA) and or the
Registrar of Deeds thru the Solicitor General or the provincial or city fiscal
concerned.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
We therefore rule that the act of provincial fiscal in signing the compromise agreement was in
accordance with his duty to appear for and protect the interests of the government in court in
petitions for reconstitution (Ibid, pp. 211-215).
Besides, the absence of any opposition on the part of the government to the petition for
reconstitution despite having been duly served copies of the petition and its annexes through
the Registrar of Deeds, Director of Lands, Solicitor General and the Provincial Fiscal shows
that the government has no contrary evidence with which to contest and frustrate the petition.
Thereafter, when judgment was rendered based on the compromise agreement without
awaiting the report and recommendation of the Land Registration Administration and the
verification of the Registrar of Deeds concerned, its failure to file a motion to set aside the
judgment of the court after due notice likewise proves that no interest of the government was
prejudiced by such judgment.
Anent the allegation that there was no sufficient evidence to grant the petition for reconstitution,
We find that such allegation has no leg to stand on.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26 provides for the sources or bases for reconstitution of
certificates of title, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner’s mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or
by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the Registry of Deeds, containing
the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had
been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was
issued;
(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the property, the description of
which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated
copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; andchanrobles.com :
virtual law library
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis
for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title."cralaw virtua1aw library
As mentioned earlier, Susukan presented the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title.
However, upon an objection raised by the oppositors on the basis of the absence of the name
of one of the registered owners, said oppositors presented two other documents, namely the
certificate from the Bureau of Lands and a copy of the decision of the lower court to prove not
only the ownership of the third registered owner but of all the registered owners. These
documents readily fall under Section 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 26. We therefore affirm the
findings of both the lower and appellate courts and rule that these documents are sufficient and
proper bases for reconstituting the burned or destroyed original certificate of title.
Hence, if the court after hearing finds that the evidence presented is sufficient and proper to
warrant the reconstitution of the lost (or destroyed) certificate of title and that the petitioner is
the registered owner of the property, and said certificate was in force at the time it was lost (or
destroyed), the duty of the court is to issue the order of reconstitution. This duty is mandatory.
The law does not give the court discretion to deny the reconstitution if all the basic requirements
have been complied with. (Director of Lands v. Gan Tan, 89 Phil. 184)
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the appellate court committed no error in
affirming in toto the decision of the lower court granting the petition for reconstitution.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 139518. March 6, 2001]
EVANGELINE L. PUZON, petitioner, vs. STA. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT, Inc.,
respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Are notices to owners of adjoining lots and actual occupants of the subject property mandatory
and jurisdictional in petitions for judicial reconstitution of destroyed original certificates of title,
when the source for such reconstitution is the extant owners duplicate transfer certificate of
title? More specifically, is the failure to send those notices fatal to a trial courts final and
executory decision granting the reconstitution? In other words, may the decision be annulled
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction? The short answer to all of these questions is No.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the April 30, 1999 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), as well as its July 21, 1999
Resolution[2] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive part of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated February 11, 1994 in LRC Case No.
Q-6436 (93) of RTC, Br. 80, Quezon City is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. TCT Nos.
RT-78673 (240131) and RT-78672 (213611) reconstituted in the name of private respondent
Evangeline L. Puzon are declared cancelled and null and void for being in violation [of] Republic
Act No. 26, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 7-96 and Land Registration Authority
circulars.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
On June 11, 1988, a fire in the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City destroyed, among
others, the original copies of petitioners Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 240131 and
213611 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, covering two lots with areas of 109,038
and 66,836 square meters respectively, both located in the District of Capitol, Quezon City.
In October 1993, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
80, a Petition for the judicial reconstitution of the two destroyed titles. The Petition, docketed as
LRC Rec. No. Q-6436 (93), was based on the owners duplicate copies of the TCTs, which were
in petitioners possession.
The October 26, 1993 RTC Order, which served as the notice for the hearing of the Petition for
reconstitution, was published in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette. Thirty days
before the date of hearing, the Order was also posted at the entrance of the Quezon City Hall
Building and on the bulletin board of the trial court. Together with a copy of the Petition, it was
served on the Office of the Solicitor General, the Register of Deeds for Quezon City, the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), the Land Management Bureau, and the Office of the City
Prosecutor for Quezon City.
During the trial which commenced on January 17, 1994, no opposition was registered. A
representative from the Office of the Solicitor General, however, appeared and cross-examined
petitioner, who was the sole witness. After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February
11, 1994. The court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City is ordered to reconstitute the original copies of TCT Nos. 213611 and 240131 from
and on the basis of the owners duplicate copies thereof in possession of petitioner Evangeline
L. Puzon, after payment of the prescribed legal fees.[3]
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued to herein petitioner TCT Nos. RT-
78673 (240131) and RT-78672 (213611). These TCTs were for the lots covered by the
destroyed certificates, whose numbers are indicated in the parentheses.
After discovering in 1996 that Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., herein respondent, was
occupying a portion of the land covered by TCT No. RT-78673 (240131), petitioner filed against
it and Garsons Co. Inc. a Complaint for Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages and Prayer for
the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Injunction.
On March 25, 1998, while the accion reinvindicatoria was still pending before the RTC of
Quezon City (Branch 104), respondent filed before the CA a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment, seeking to annul and set aside the earlier Decision of the RTC of Quezon City
(Branch 80) in the reconstitution case.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Annulling the Decision of the RTC (Branch 80), the CA held that petitioner had failed to comply
with the requirements of Section 13, Republic Act No. 26. Citing Republic v. Marasigan,[4] it
ruled that notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land were mandatory and
jurisdictional in an action for the judicial reconstitution of a certificate of title. It also opined that
the RTC Decision had been rendered without requiring a clearance from the LRA. Finally, it
referred to earlier findings of the land registration commissioner that petitioners TCT No. RT-
78672 (213611) was fake.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals grossly erred in applying the provisions of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 26, which is applicable only in relation to Section 12 of R.A. No. 26. Notices to adjoining
owners and actual occupants of the land are not mandatory and jurisdictional in reconstitution
of titles based on the owners duplicate copy.
2. The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that clearance from the land registration
authority is a jurisdictional requirement.
3. The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that petitioners TCT No. RT-87672 (213611)
covering lot 119 is fake and spurious.[6]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Notice Requirement
Respondent and the CA contend that notices to owners of adjoining lots are mandatory in the
judicial reconstitution of a title. They cite as authority Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26,[7]
which we reproduce hereunder:
SEC. 13. The Court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be
published at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette,
and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building
of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or
otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is
known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other
things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered
owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the
adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the
property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file
their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the
publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.
The clear language of the law militates against the interpretation of respondent and the
appellate court. The first sentence of Section 13 provides that the requirements therein pertain
only to petitions for reconstitution filed under the preceding section, Section 12, which in turn
governs those petitions based on specified sources. We quote Section 12 below:
SEC. 12. Petition for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f),
3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by
the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition
shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owners duplicate of the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owners, mortgagees or lessees
duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed;
(c) the location area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the
buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names
and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the name and addresses
of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining
properties and of all persons who may have interest in the property; and (g) a statement that
no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or,
if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents,
or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support to the petition for
reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this
Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the
property duly approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration, or with a certified copy of
the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
In other words, the requirements under Sections 12 and 13 do not apply to all petitions for
judicial reconstitution, but only to those based on any of the sources specified in Section 12;
that is, sources enumerated in Section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this
Act.
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 26 provide as follows:
SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a
legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant
to which the original certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which
is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of
said document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a
legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds, containing the
description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been
registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property the description of which
is given in said documents, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of
said document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other documents which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. (italics supplied)
In the present case, the source of the Petition for the reconstitution of title was petitioners
duplicate copies of the two TCTs mentioned in Section 3(a). Clearly, the Petition is governed,
not by Sections 12 and 13, but by Section 10 of RA 26. We quote said Section 10 in full:
SEC. 10. Nothing hereinabove provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest
from filing the petition mentioned in Section Five of this Act directly with the proper Court of
First Instance, based on sources enumerated in Section 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of
this Act: Provided, however, That the Court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing
and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in Section Nine[8] hereof: And
provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be
subject to the encumbrance referred to in Section Seven of this Act.
Nothing in this provision requires that notices be sent to owners of adjoining lots. Verily, that
requirement is found in Section 13, which does not apply to petitions based on an existing
owners duplicate TCT.
Put differently, Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 require that 30 days before the date of hearing, (1)
a notice be published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette at the expense of the
petitioner, and (2) such notice be posted at the main entrances of the provincial building and of
the municipal hall where the property is located. The notice shall state the following: (1) the
number of the certificate of title, (2) the name of the registered owner, (3) the names of the
interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, (4) the location of the
property, and (5) the date on which all persons having an interest in the property, must appear
and file such claims as they may have.
For petitions based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and
3(f), Section 13 adds another requirement: that the notice be mailed to occupants, owners of
adjoining lots, and all other persons who may have an interest in the property. To repeat,
mailing the notice is not required for a petition based on Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b) and 4(a),
as in the present case.
In this light, the cases cited by respondent -- particularly Republic v. Marasigan,[9] Manila
Railroad Co. vs. Moya[10] and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals[11]-- are not applicable,
because they all involve judicial reconstitution under Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26.
There is no question that in such actions, notices to adjoining owners and to the actual
occupants of the land are mandatory and jurisdictional. But in petitions for reconstitution falling
under Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 where, as in the present case, the source is the owners
duplicate copy, notices to adjoining owners and to actual occupants of the land are not required.
When the law is clear, the mandate of the courts is simply to apply it, not to interpret or to
speculate on it.
In sum, RA 26 separates petitions for reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title into
two main groups with two different requirements and procedures. Sources enumerated in
Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and 4(a) of RA 26 are lumped under one group (Group A); and
sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f) are placed
together under another group (Group B). For Group A, the requirements for judicial
reconstitution are set forth in Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of RA 26; while for Group B,
the requirements are in Sections 12 and 13 of the same law.
In the present case, the source of the reconstitution of petitioners TCT is the extant owners
copy, which falls under Section 3(a). It follows that the applicable provision of law is Section 10
in relation to Section 9 of RA 26, not Sections 12 and 13. When the reconstitution is based on
an extant owners duplicate TCT, the main concern is the authenticity and genuineness of the
Certificate, which could best be determined or contested by the government agencies or offices
concerned, principally the Office of the Solicitor General. The adjoining owners or actual
occupants of the property covered by the TCT are hardly in a position to determine the
genuineness of the Certificate. Giving them notice and inviting them to participate in the
reconstitution proceeding is not only illogical, but constitutes a useless effort to clog the dockets
of courts.
Let it also be remembered that the TCT holder in this case had no fault at all in the destruction
of the original Certificate in the office of the Register of Deeds. Hence, she should not be
burdened with meaningless formalities in the prosecution of her property rights, including the
reconstitution of her original TCT. Moreover, the interests of creditors, whose liens may have
been registered in the original Certificate on file with the Register of Deeds but not annotated
in the owners copy, are addressed by the publication requirement. However, even in this
instance, the notification of adjoining owners is hardly necessary.
Finally, the parties must not lose sight of the nature of judicial reconstitution proceedings, which
denote a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its
original form and condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document is to have
the same reproduced, after proper proceedings in the same form they were when the loss or
destruction occurred.[12] We emphasize that these actions do not pass upon the ownership of
the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Possession of a lost certificate of title is not
necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself,
does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property.[13]
Second Issue
Pertinent Circulars
Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that an LRC clearance is a
jurisdictional requirement. We agree. None of the circulars mentioned in Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 7-96 (Circular 7-96) requires any clearance from the Land
Registration Authority for the judicial reconstitution of certificates of title under Section 10 of RA
26. NALTDRA Circular No. 91 (Circular 91), which is mentioned in Circular 7-96 and has the
word clearance in its heading, deals with the subject of original land registration cases, not
reconstitution of titles. Thus, Circular 91 is not applicable to this case.
Even LRC Circular No. 35, which is also mentioned in Circular 7-96, does not require any
clearance. Rather, it requires the Chief of the Clerks of Court Division to make a report, and
likewise the Register of Deeds to write a report of his or her findings after verifying the status
of the title, which is the subject of the reconstitution. Both reports are to be submitted to the
reconstitution court on or before the date of the initial hearing.[14] It is not mandatory, however,
for the reconstitution court to wait for such reports indefinitely. If none is forthcoming on or
before the date of the initial hearing, it may validly issue an order or judgment granting
reconstitution. This is implied from the provisions of Section 16 of the same Circular, which
states:
16. Should an order or judgment granting reconstitution be issued by the Court without awaiting
the report and the recommendations of this Commission as well as the verification of the
Register of Deeds concerned, or while the examination, verification and preparation of the
report and recommendation are still pending in the said Offices due to the failure of the Clerk
of Court or the petitioner to comply with all the necessary requirements as called for herein,
and it appears that there is a valid ground to oppose the reconstitution, a motion to set aside
the order/judgment granting reconstitution or to stay the period of finality of said order/judgment
shall be filed by the Land Registration Commissioner and/or the Register of Deeds thru the
Solicitor General or the provincial or city fiscal concerned.
In the present case, therefore, neither was the Petition for reconstitution affected nor was the
RTC divested of its jurisdiction by the fact that the trial court rendered the judgment ordering
the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title without awaiting the report and
recommendations of the land registration commissioner and the register of deeds of Quezon
City.
Also, LRC Circular No. 35 requires that notices of hearings be given to the register of deeds of
the place where the property is located, the land registration commissioner and the provincial
or city fiscal.[15] But nowhere does it require that such notices be sent also to owners of
adjoining properties and actual occupants of the land. Thus, in the present case, the fact that
none were sent to the owners of adjoining lots or to the alleged actual occupants of the subject
property did not negate the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Third Issue
The Character of Petitioners TCT
Lastly, petitioner questions the finding of the Court of Appeals that her TCT No. RT-87672
(213611) is fake.
Again, we find merit in her submission. We stress that the Petition filed by respondent before
the CA was for the annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Such recourse
is limited to the grounds provided by law, and cannot be used to reopen the entire
controversy.[16] The CA was not being called upon to determine the character of petitioners
TCT. Evidently, its ruling with respect thereto was merely an obiter dictum that did not, and
indeed could not, rule on such matter. It had no authority to do so.
Verily, the only issue before the CA was the jurisdiction of the RTC, not the correctness of the
latters Decision which had become final and unappealable. In debunking the genuineness of
petitioners TCT, it was going beyond the ambit of the case before it: the alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC to render the questioned judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167748 November 8, 2005
HEIRS OF RAFAEL MAGPILY, Petitioner, vs.
HERMINIGILDO1 DE JESUS and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the January 7, 2005 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 69601, setting aside the December 10, 2001 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Laguna, Branch 91, in Civil Case No. SC-3874, which affirmed with modification the
Decision4 of the Municipal Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, ordering private respondent
Herminigildo de Jesus to vacate the land of the late Rafael Magpily. Likewise questioned is the
April 18, 2005 Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The complaint6 for ejectment filed by Rafael Magpily reveals that he was the owner of a 10,000
square meter land planted with fruit bearing trees and tenanted by Nazaria Tope. Sometime in
July 1978, upon the request of the latter, Magpily allowed Nazaria’s nephew, herein private
respondent to construct a house of light materials on a portion of the land and to gratuitously
occupy the same. The agreement was embodied in a "Salaysay"7 duly signed by the parties.
Their relationship, however, turned sour when private respondent interfered with the gathering
of coconuts and other fruits in the lot. Magpily requested private respondent to vacate the
premises but the latter refused, prompting him to file the instant ejectment suit.
In his answer,8 private respondent contended that he is a bonafide agricultural tenant of
Magpily for 15 years. He alleged that his grandparents, succeeded by his aunt, Nazaria, were
the former tenants of Magpily. When Nazaria died in 1979, he performed all the duties of a
tenant by cultivating the land and sharing in its produce. Private respondent claimed that the
instant case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because it
involves a tenancy dispute under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
On May 4, 1999, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered decision in favor of Magpily ordering
private respondent to vacate the land and to pay reasonable rental for the use of the premises,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. It held that the evidence presented by private
respondent failed to prove a tenancy relationship. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
WHEREFORE, finding plaintiff[’s] cause of action to be sufficiently establish[ed,] being
supported by evidence on records, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, by ordering the defendant and all persons claiming rights under him to
vacate the property in question and to remove his house from the aforesaid property, and
ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the following:
1. the sum of P300.00 as reasonable value of the use of the portion of the lot occupied by
defendant’s house from May 1994 until such time as defendant shall have actually vacated the
premises in question;
2. the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the sum of P1,000.00 as litigation expenses;
and,
3. to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
In the meantime, Magpily died on December 18, 1999.10
Private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which on December 10, 2001,
affirmed the challenged decision but deleted the monetary obligations adjudged against private
respondent for lack of basis. The decretal portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, finding no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the First Level Court, the
assailed decision is hereby affirmed except the award for the use of the land and attorney’s
fees as well as litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a petition with the Court of Appeals which reversed the
decision of the RTC holding that an implied landlord-agricultural tenant relationship was
established between Magpily and private respondent when the former allowed the latter to
cultivate, harvest and share in the produce of his land after the death of the former tenant. It
thus declared that the case involves an agrarian dispute, hence, the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter.12
Petitioner heirs of Magpily filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
The issue to be resolved is whether there existed an agricultural tenancy relationship between
Magpily and private respondent that would divest regular courts of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
The Court rules in the negative.
In Sumawang v. De Guzman,13 we held that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter
is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.
Jurisdiction over the nature of the action cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up
in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end
of the litigation. The MTC does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple
expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties. But it is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the
allegations of tenancy. If after hearing, tenancy had, in fact been shown to be the real issue,
the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Section 1, Rule II of the 2003 Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. – The Adjudicator shall have primary
and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate the following cases:
1.1 The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the
management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands covered by Republic Act (RA) No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), and other related
agrarian laws;
1.4 Those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants and/or leaseholders;
1.13 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of
the DAR. (Emphasis added)
An agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law) as
follows:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between
the parties. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove the
tenancy relations such that all its indispensable elements must be established, to wit: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent
by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation;
and (6) there is sharing of the harvests. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy
relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de
facto tenant.14
In ruling that there arose an implied agricultural tenancy relationship between private
respondent and Magpily, the Court of Appeals erroneously relied on the following evidence,15
to wit:
(1) Sworn statement of Gregorio Ambrosio,16 a tenant of the lot fronting Magpily’s land;
(2) Sworn statement of Nestor C. Marinay,17 the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) Chairman of Barangay Labuin, Sta. Cruz, Laguna;
(3) Receipts;18
(4) The July 9, 1989 letter of Magpily to private respondent directing the latter to allow the
bearer to cut down trees in the land;19 and
(5) Order of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) fixing the leasehold rental.20
Tenants are defined as persons who – in themselves and with the aid available from within their
immediate farm households – cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the
latter’s consent; for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the
share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce
or money or both under the leasehold tenancy system.21
In the present case, the sworn statements of Gregorio Ambrosio and Nestor C. Marinay merely
attested to the fact that private respondent became a worker in the coconut plantation of
Magpily after the death of the former tenant of the land. Nowhere in the said statements was it
mentioned why and how private respondent became an agricultural tenant. Nothing was said
about the intent of Magpily to institute private respondent as his tenant nor of the landowner’s
purpose to embark on agricultural production. Neither did said declarations attest to the
existence of a sharing agreement between the parties. Indeed, said statements only tended to
prove that private respondent is a worker or an overseer of the land and nothing more. The
same is true to Magpily’s letter directing private respondent to allow the bearer of the letter to
cut down trees in his land. It does not prove that private respondent is an agricultural tenant,
but only a caretaker of the land. In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,22 it was held that the fact alone of working on another’s landholding does not raise a
presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. There must be substantial evidence on
record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing.
In the same vein, the receipts presented by private respondent does not prove sharing in the
agricultural production. Some receipts show that private respondent sold coconuts to several
persons. The others do not reflect if the coconuts sold were that of Magpily’s, or if the unlabeled
computations reflected therein truly pertain to the sale of the agricultural products of the land
owner. Moreover, even assuming that Magpily during his lifetime benefited from the produce of
the land, this fact alone is not enough to establish tenancy. In Rivera v. Santiago,23 we stressed
that it is not unusual for a landowner to receive the produce of the land from a caretaker who
sows thereon. The fact of receipt, without an agreed system of sharing, does not ipso facto
create a tenancy.
Likewise, the order issued by the MARO fixing the lease rental of private respondent does not
prove a tenancy status. As noted by the MTC, the order submitted to the court was not
authenticated by the DAR. Moreover, the settled rule is that certifications issued by municipal
agrarian reform officers are not binding on the courts. In a given locality, the certifications or
findings of the secretary of agrarian reform (or of an authorized representative) concerning the
presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties are merely
preliminary or provisional; hence, such certifications do not bind the judiciary.24
Furthermore, the questioned order appears to have been issued ex parte and without prior
investigation as it does not bear the conformity of the landowner and the approval of the PARO
as required by Administrative Order No. 4, Series of 1989, or the rules and procedures
governing agricultural leasehold and the determination of lease rental for tenanted
lands.25 Hence, it cannot support a finding of tenancy relationship.
In sum, private respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was an agricultural
tenant26 of Magpily and that the instant case involves an agrarian dispute cognizable by the
DARAB. The MTC thus lawfully took cognizance of the present controversy which involves the
gratuitous occupation of another’s property which became unlawful by virtue of the owner’s
withdrawal of consent or tolerance to such occupation.
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when
the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. A person who
occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing
which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy.27
Considering that private respondent’s occupation of petitioner’s land is now unlawful in view of
Magpily’s demand to vacate the premises, ejectment of private respondent therefrom is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 7, 2005 Decision and the April 18, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69601, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The December 10, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laguna, Branch 91, in Civil
Case No. SC-3874 which ordered private respondent Herminigildo de Jesus to vacate the
property is REINSTATED.
No costs.
WELFREDO CENEZE vs. FELICIANA RAMOS G.R. No. 172287 January 15, 2010 Nachura,
J.:
Facts: Petitioner Welfredo Ceneze filed an action for declaration as bona fide tenant-lessee of
two parcels of agricultural land owned by respondent Feliciana Ramos located in Lelemaan,
Manaoag, Pangasinan. Petitioner alleged that in 1981, Julian Ceneze Sr., petitioner’s father,
transferred his tenurial rights over the landholding to him with the consent and approval of
respondent and that, since then, petitioner had been in actual and peaceful possession of the
landholding until April 12, 1991, when respondent forcibly entered and cultivated the land for
the purpose of dispossessing the petitioner of his right as tenant.
Respondent denied that a tenancy relationship existed between her and petitioner, asserting
that she had never instituted petitioner as a tenant in any of her landholdings. She averred that
petitioner had never been in possession of the landholding, but admitted that it was Julian, Sr.
who was the tenant of the landholding. After Julian Sr., his wife and his son Julian Jr. migrated
to the U.S.A. she reported on April 8, 1991, to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
of Manaoag, Pangasinan, the abandonment of the landholding by Julian, Sr., his wife and his
son, Julian, Jr.
On December 19, 1997, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of petitioner for
it find the petitioner a bona fide tenant-lessee of the landholding. The Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) affirmed the decision.
Respondent elevated the case to the CA through a petition for review. On December 29, 2005,
the CA resolved the petition in favor of respondent landowner and dismissed petitioner’s
complaint. Likewise, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence,
this petition for review was filed.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner had tenancy relationship with respondent.

Held: The petition is not meritorious.

In resolving this petition, the Court is guided by the principle that tenancy is not purely a factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land; it is also a legal
relationship. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove the
presence of all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose
is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvest.
The absence of one element does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, its cultivator or
planter, a de jure tenant.

The certification or findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (or of an authorized

representative) concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties are merely preliminary or provisional in character; hence, such certification
does not bind the judiciary.

From our own assessment of the evidence at hand, we find that petitioner failed to establish
the existence of a tenancy relationship between him and respondent. To prove a tenancy
relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is substantial evidence, or such relevant
evidence as a From our own assessment of the evidence at hand, we find that petitioner failed
to establish the existence of a tenancy relationship between him and respondent. To prove a
tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is substantial evidence, or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The Certification of the BARC Chairman and the affidavits of Julian, Sr. and of the tenants of
the adjacent landholdings certainly do not suffice. By themselves, they do not show that the
elements of consent of the landowner and of sharing of harvests are present.

In any case, the fact alone of working on a landholding does not give rise to a presumption of
the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence requires more than a mere scintilla
of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be established; there must be concrete
evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing. To prove sharing of
harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented, because self-serving statements
are inadequate. In this case, petitioner failed to present a receipt for respondent’s share in the
harvest, or any other solid evidence proving that there was a sharing of harvest.

To recap, petitioner is not a de jure tenant entitled to security of tenure. There being no tenancy
relationship between the parties, the DARAB did not have jurisdiction over the case. We,
therefore, sustain the ruling of the CA, dismissing petitioner’s complaint.