ANTIPORADA v GARCHITORENA Sandiganbayan ignored the Motion to Quash since the accused have continually refused
to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court.
Municipal Mayor Antiporda and others were charged with the crime of kidnapping one
Elmer Ramos. It was filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. The Information
reads as follows:
“That on September 1, 1995, in Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Eliterio Rubiaco, Caesar
Talla, Vicente Gascon and Licerio Antiporda, Jr…did then and there… kidnap
Elmer Ramos from his residence in Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his
will with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle…“
Sandiganbayan ordered the prosecution to submit an amendment to the Information:
[Sandiganbayan] expressed anxiety as to the Court's jurisdiction over the case
considering that it was not clear whether or not the subject matter of the
accusation was office related.
For this purpose, Prosecutor Agcaoili is given 30 days to submit the amendment
embodying whatever changes necessary in order for the Information to
effectively describe the offense herein charged...
The prosecution filed an Amended Information:
“That on September 10, 1997, at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Licerio Antiporda, Jr., being the
Municipal Mayor of Buguey, Cagayan in the exercise of his official duties as
such and taking advantage of his position, ordered, confederated and conspired
with Juan Gallardo, Barangay Captain of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan (now
deceased) and accused Eliterio Rubiaco, barangay councilman of San Lorenzo,
Buguey, Cagayan, Vicente Gascon and Caesar Talla… kidnap and abduct the
victim Elmer Ramos… and detain him illegally at the residence of Antiporda for
more than five (5) days.”
Accused then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation of the case
be conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto denied the Omnibus Motion.
The accused filed a Motion for New Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance
and/or Recall Warrant of Arrest Issued which was also denied "on the ground that there
was nothing in the Amended Information that was added… so that the accused could
not claim a right to be heard separately in an investigation in the Amended Information.
Also, the Court ruled that "since none of the accused have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Court, the accused are not in a position to be heard on this matter at
this time"
The accused filed a Motion to Quash the Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged.
A MR was filed wherein it was alleged that the filing of the Motion to Quash and the
appearance of their counsel during the scheduled hearing amounted to their voluntary
appearance and invested the court with jurisdiction over their persons.
Sandiganbayan denied the MR.
Petitioners: Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction since the original information did not
allege that one of the petitioners, took advantage of his position as mayor. Court lacking
jurisdiction cannot order the amendment of the information.
Court: They cannot question the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan
because they insist that said court acquired jurisdiction over their motion to quash.
WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged?
NO. The original Information did not mention that the offense committed by the
accused is office-related.
Sec. 4, par (a) of P.D. 1606, as amended by P.D. 1861: (Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction)
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office…
Criminal Jurisdiction Requisites:
1. the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of
(SUBJECT MATTER)
2. the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction (VENUE
OR TERRITORY)
3. the person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for
trial (PERSON OF THE ACCUSED)
4. forcibly by warrant of arrest
5. or upon his voluntary submission to the court.
BUT, the petitioners are estopped for in the MR filed with the Sandiganbayan, it was they
who "challenged the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case and clearly stated in their MR
that the said crime is work connected.
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus vested
with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.
Can the amended information be allowed without conducting anew a
preliminary investigation for the graver offense charged therein?
Reinvestigation is not necessary anymore. It is proper only if the accused's substantial
rights would be impaired. The amendments merely describe the public positions and
where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped.
A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits and but determines only whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty. The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already
and we see no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be
conducted.
Under the Rules, criminal actions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.’
That the firearms were confiscated from him by the La Carlota policemen within the
territorial boundaries of that municipality would not sustain the motion for quashal of
the complaint in this case nor affect the merits thereof. It is not altogether improbable
that the offense of unlawful possession of firearms could have been committed in La
Castellana, as stated in the complaint, and also in La Carlota, as manifested by the
appellant.
For, being malum prohibitum the crime is consummated by the very fact of its
performance; by the firearms being possessed or held by the accused without proper
authorization therefor. The place where the said firearms were finally confiscated and
taken away from the accused is immaterial; it could not have added anything to the
nature of the unlawful act completed and consummated earlier.

COLMENARES v VILLAR Thus, for purposes of the proceeding instituted in the La Castellana municipal court, it is
sufficient that, according to the prosecution, the accused was in possession of the
Petitioner Colmenares was charged for illegal possession of firearms. He thereafter filed unlicensed firearms while he was in La Castellana. To determine the correct venue, the
a motion to quash the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It was claimed that vital point is the allegation of the situs of the offense charged in the complaint or
venue was improperly laid, because the firearms mentioned in the complaint were taken information, and that is satisfied in this case.
from the possession of the accused in the municipality of La Carlota, Negros Occidental,
by the La Carlota policemen, and not in La Castellana where the complaint was filed. The
motion was denied. Hence, the accused went to the CFI of Negros Occidental in a
petition for certiorari, raising the same issue of improper venue. And as prayed for in the
petition, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by said court, restraining the
Municipal Judge of La Castellana from proceeding with the trial.

Therein respondents Municipal Judge and Chief of Police of La Castellana contended that
although the alleged unlicensed firearms were taken from the custody of the accused by
La Carlota policemen such unlawful act of carrying unlicensed firearms started from La
Castellana; that the La Carlota policemen intercepted the accused and took the firearms
from him only because they were earlier requested, by telephone, by the policemen of
La Castellana.

The court ordered the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.

Whether or not the municipal court of La Castellana has no jurisdiction to take

cognizance of the case for illegal possession of such arms.

There is no merit in the appeal.

It must be remembered that the jurisdiction of the court over a case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information. Here, the complaint filed with the municipal
court of La Castellana recited that the accused, Francisco Colmenares, was found in
possession of two unlicensed firearms in the municipality of La Castellana. That
allegation makes the filing of the case in the La Castellana municipal court proper.
 LACSON v EXECUTIVE SEC
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized
crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank
Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were
petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal
Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not
a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman
Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said
panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board
modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder
against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the
Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner
was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said
law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the
“principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said
requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved
amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from
the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7
which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which
trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due
process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions
seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire
jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
RIGHTS NOT VIOLATED.
Petitioner and intervenors’ contention that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their
right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence
and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every
classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the
law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary
when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only,
and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in
this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public
officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any
court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly
directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
NOT EX POST FACTO LAW.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides
retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that
define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot
be challenged as unconstitutional.
Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng
was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to
the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial
Court’s jurisdiction.
RTC HAS JURISDICTION.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate
relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended
information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by
the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties
as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said
accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as
will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused
PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the
Sandiganbayan.
 SOLLER v SANDIGANBAYAN
A complaint was filed against the petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with the
Office of the Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of
the fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by (a) altering his wound (b) concealing his brain; (c)
falsely stating in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had
only one; and d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening around
his wound when in truth there was.
Petitioners spouses Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry Macabael,
and claimed, among others that Jerry Macabael was brought to their private medical
clinic because it was there where he was rushed by his companions after the shooting,
that petitioner Prudente Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely requested by his wife
Preciosa Soller, who was the Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy
considering that the procedure involved sawing which required male strength, and that
Mrs. Macabaels consent was obtained before the autopsy. The two (2) police officers
denied having planted three (3) shells at the place where the shooting took place.
The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an Information for Obstruction
of Justice (Violation of P.D. 1829), and two (2) Informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case
NO. For an offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offense must
have been committed by the officials enunciated in paragraph (a) in relation to their
office, i.e. it should be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and should
have been perpetrated while the offender was in the performance of his official
functions. Moreover, these requisites must all be alleged in the information.
The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the
provisions of the law should be inquired into. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court
must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be
presumed or implied. For this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action.
Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were intimately
connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused Mayor Soller, the
offenses charged in the subject criminal cases fall within the exclusive original function of
the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged orders are SET ASIDE and
declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
PEOPLE v BENIPAYO
In the first libel case filed against him, Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman COMELEC,
delivered a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the
Philippines" held at UP Diliman which was subsequently published in the Manila Bulletin.
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when
he stated in his speech that “Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of
signing a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have been bought for
350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isn’t even a requirement for voting. But reason
intervened and no contract was signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us
into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the government that it offends
common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.”, filed,
through its authorized representative, an AffidavitComplaint for libel. The case was
dismissed based on lack of jurisdiction since the offense was committed in relation to his
office, hence vesting the jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. 155573 Respondent as COMELEC Chair was a guest of the talk show "Point
Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon and televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The
television show’s episode that day was entitled "COMELEC Wars.", where Respondent
against discussed that Photokina’s funds are being used to campaign against him.
Another information for libel was instituted against Respondent but also dismissed by
the RTC rationating that being an impeachable officer, the jurisdiction must be with the
Sandiganbayan.
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the crime of libel filed against Benipayo.
YES. The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof. Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No.
4363, is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations in
providing that the criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations
as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court
of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense.
RA 7691 also did not divest the RTC of jurisdiction over libel cases because although it
was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the RTCs by expanding the jurisdiction
of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it
does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. Laws
vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and should
prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court
of First Instance) which is a general law. A later enactment like RA 7691 does not
automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of
construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter
must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a
special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the
MTC.
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without
qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is
committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the
respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former
COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above
disquisition, gross error.
UY v SANDIGANBAYAN
In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 105965-70. August 9, 1999], petitioner Uy, who was
Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval
Staff for Comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification of official
documents and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner filed a motion to quash, arguing that
the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the offense.
The court ruled that :
1. It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try
petitioner since he was a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell
squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850,
“Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated National Police
and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines”
2. As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the
“rank” requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive
jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts , as amended by R.A. No. 8249,
which states that “In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.”
Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to
prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
No. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and
to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts as well. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public
officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause
"any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees
during their tenure of office.
The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and
prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The prosecution
of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important
functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed
the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the
people in ensuring accountability in public office.
Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of the Ombudsman then
(to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto
will show that, at its inception, the Office of the Ombudsman was already vested with
the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan
and even the regular courts.

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file
the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The
Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.

In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial
motion for reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor
filed, which was denied.

The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated
February 22, 2000.
 COCOFED v REPUBLIC
Congress enacted, in 1971, Republic Act No. (RA) 6260, otherwise known as the Coconut
Investment Act, creating the Coconut Investment Corporation (CIC) for the declared
national policy of accelerating the development of the coconut industry through the
provision of adequate medium-and long-term financing for capital investment in the
industry. To finance the CIC, RA 6260 also created the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF)
that was to be funded with collections from a levy on the sale of copra. A portion of the
funds would be placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of
coconut producers with the largest membership as recognized by the Philippine Coconut
Administration, "for the maintenance and operation of its principal office which shall be
responsible for continuing liaison with the different sectors of the industries, the
government and its own mass base."
WON the series of acts and omissions of respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan
in Civil Case No. 0033 culminating in the Order of 15 June 1990 are without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The instant petition is DISMISSEDfor being moot and academic. The Sandiganbayan
grievously erred and clearly abused its judicial discretion when it repeatedly and
continuously denied COCOFED, et al. the opportunity to present their evidence to
disprove the baseless allegations of the Ill-Gotten Wealth Cases that the sequestered
assets constitute ill-gotten wealth of Cojuangco and of former President Marcos, an error
that undeniably and illegally deprived COCOFED, et al of their constitutional right to be
heard.
The Court to be sure agrees with the thesis that, under present state of things, the PCGG
and the Office of the Solicitor General have no power, by themselves, to convert the
sequestered shares of stock. That portion, however, about the reference to the
separation of powers being gratuitous does not commend itself for concurrence. As may
be noted, the reference to the separation of powersconcept was made in the context
that the ownership of the subject sequestered shares is the subject of a case before this
Court; hence, the need of the Court’s approval for the desired conversion is effected.
TRENAS v. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory.
Elizabeth Luciaja gave P150,000.00 to Atty. Hector Treñas to assist in the titling of a
house and lot located in Iloilo City. Treñas prepared and issued a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage. He also gave Elizabeth three Revenue Official Receipts
amounting to P120,000. However, when Elizabeth consulted with the BIR, she was
informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the
receipts were fake and that he used the money for his other transactions. Elizabeth
demanded the return of the money. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against
Hector.
An Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the RTC Makati City
which rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa. Petitioner
appealed with the CA which also rendered a Decision affirming that of the RTC.
Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it
show that ₱ 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Also, the
evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner was without any indication of the
place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage
prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City. Petitioner claims that the
only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City,
especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct
proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that
things happened according to the ordinary course of nature.
Whether RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the controversy.
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action
but is an essential element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. In this case, the prosecution failed to show
that the offense of estafa was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati
City. Also, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any
allegation as to where the offense was committed.
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by
the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in
Makati City. There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution
that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed.
There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, The RTC of that
city has no jurisdiction over the case.
The case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and
recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
DISPOSITION: There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati,
The RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.
 HERNAN v SANDIGANBAYAN 6. Reopening must be before finality of judgment. In this case, it took three years
after the entry of the judgment before a motion to reopen the case was filed.
Ophelia Hernan was convicted by the RTC of the crime of malversation. Hernan’s first The judgment has long become final and executory.
counsel filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which had no appellate jurisdiction
over the case. The CA took cognizance of the appeal and affirmed the conviction but later But when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of an amendatory law
set aside its decision for lack of jurisdiction. imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court can direct
reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so
Hernan procured a new counsel who appealed to the Sandiganbayan. The SB affirmed much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.
the conviction so the second counsel filed a motion for reconsideration blaming the first
counsel in failing to elicit facts that would have acquitted Hernan of the charge. The SB
denied the MR in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010 which became final and executory
on June 26, 2013.

On July 26, 2013, Hernan again changed to a third counsel who filed a motion to reopen
the case and stay the execution of the judgment because the second counsel allegedly
failed to receive 2010 SB Resolution. Hernan’s second counsel was appointed to the PAO
and thus changed office address. However, the SB was not notified of the change of
address. Hernan’s counsel invoked the ruling in People v. Chavez wherein the Court held
that entry of judgment without receipt of the Resolution was premature. But the SB still
denied the motion to reopen on December 4, 2013 finding the motion to be a prohibited
second MR.

On January 9, 2014, Hernan’s third counsel filed a “Petition for Reconsideration with
Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of Prayer for Stay of Execution of
Judgment”. On February 2, 2015, the SB denied the petition finding the petition a third
MR which was likewise prohibited.

Hernan’s counsel then filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari against the final resolution of
the SB on May 14, 2015. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion in the denial of the
Sandiganbayan of her motion to reopen of the case since evidence, not produced before
the trial court, would warrant reversal of the conviction.

Did the Sandiganbayan gravely abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
reopen the case? Is reopening of the case the proper remedy after a judgment
has already become final and executory?

No. The SB did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions to reopen
the case.

The requisites of reopening the case are:

1. the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;

2. the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion;
3. the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
4. the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
5. the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated
within thirty days from the issuance of the order.