1. Republic vs. Cagandahan thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.

She further
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676 alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years
Petitioner, and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has
Present: small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well
TINGA, as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed
VELASCO, JR., and that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from
BRION, JJ.
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Promulgated:
Respondent.
September 12, 2008 The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for
three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony
of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained
12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male
which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex
Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in organs female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that
Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones,
Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to male. and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondents
condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because
The facts are as follows. respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and
the gender change would be advantageous to her.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a

Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January
33 of Siniloan, Laguna. 12, 2005 which reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and
was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up,
she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons
satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed
[for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very
clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It
was medically proven that petitioners body produces male
hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings
 are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the
person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a
male. correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or
gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
Rules of Court.
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
a) By changing the name from Jennifer
Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the
local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or
b) By changing the gender from female to correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
MALE.
respondents petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, registrar.[5] The OSG further contends respondents petition is fatally defective
voters registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province
records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such
corrected data.
filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The
SO ORDERED.[3] OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth
certificate and respondents claimed medical condition known as CAH does not
make her a male.[7]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking
a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil
Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for
The issues raised by petitioner are: Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003
CONSIDERING THAT: and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
I. proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex
RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; or gender is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and respondent substantially complied
AND,
with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.[11]
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA
DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4] Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name
shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the
province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name
shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name
changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set
forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident
of the province where the petition is filed for at least
three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's
name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in
form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the
purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three
(3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem
best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30)
days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the
last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the
hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the
proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the
Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on
the date fixed in the order that such order has been published
as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the
court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for
changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name
be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered
in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar
of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is
situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil
register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file
a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction;
(m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition,
the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to
be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having
or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the
proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
 preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because
respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule
108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party
in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be
had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition should also implead
as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may
claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.[14] Respondent,
however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that
courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing
to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought
before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is
a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article
412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters
can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need
for a judicial order.In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies
only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and
408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent,
with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn
who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris
with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing
more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female
reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child
grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the
voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to
18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21]
that involve intersex anatomy.
During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply
to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The
term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the
state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes,
genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither
exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different
cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to
conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern
medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous
external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble
either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a disorder which is almost always recommended
to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order
to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not
be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle
ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are
neither truly male nor truly female.[25] The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female,
but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then
there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we
determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen).As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the
phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as
being male.Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not
taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent
could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he
did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in
order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent
to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female,
as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To
him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus,
to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence
to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms
as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of
being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of

nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In
other words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We
cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus
help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to
be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that
will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from
Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision

dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
 2. People v. Aquino
[G.R. No. 128887. January 20, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGARDO
AQUINO y PUMAWAN @ "EDDIE AQUINO," accused-appellant. ULANDU
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellant Edgardo Aquino y Pumawan (hereafter EDGARDO) prays
for the reversal of his conviction for murder decreed by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City, in its decision[1] of 30 January 1997 in
Criminal Case No.56-96.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in the Appellee's Brief; thus:
On January 19, 1996, Roselyn Lampera, daughter of Valerio
and Esmeralda Lampera was in their house, together with her
mother, younger brother Daniel and younger sister (tsn, July
31, 1996, p. 3). Their house is like a small cubicle without any
partitions, elevated from the ground by about 2 1/2 feet (Ibid.,
pp. 3-4).
In the morning of that fateful day, Roselyn's mother,
Esmeralda, was in their house taking care of Roselyn's
younger sister who was sick at the time (Ibid., p. 3). Her
younger brother, on the other hand, was playing on the ground
near their house (Ibid., p. 4). Appellant Edgardo Aquino (who
was their neighbor) arrived, looking for their father. Both
Roselyn and her mother informed Edgardo that Valerio,
Roselyn's father, was in Olongapo (Ibid., p. 5).
Unsatisfied with their answer, Edgardo (who was near the
door at the time) peeped in their house and when he did not
see Valerio, pulled out his knife. Initially, he tried to stab
Roselyn's younger brother. When Roselyn and her mother
saw this, they rushed towards the younger boy in an attempt
to protect him (Ibid.). When Edgardo saw their reaction,
Edgardo stepped inside their house, eager to vent his ire on
Roselyn, intending to stab her. Roselyn's mother pulled her
aside, shouting. Edgardo went for her mother who tried
valiantly to evade his thrust as she was then carrying
Roselyn's sick younger sister. Roselyn saw Edgardo
repeatedly stab her mother in the latter's stomach and chest
areas.... Out of fear, Roselyn managed to destroy their nipa
wall and jumped out of their house. Despite her shouts for
help, no help came (Ibid., pp. 6-7).Juris sc
At about the same time also, Benjamin Costimiano,
a purok leader, was in his house when he heard some kind of
shouting or commotion. Being a purok leader, he went to the
place of incident and saw the victim (tsn, August 15, 1996, p.
15). He heard the people there say that the culprit was
Edgardo Aquino (Ibid.). He went after Edgardo and was able
to catch up with him in the house of one Francisco Franco.
Benjamin asked Edgardo (who was still armed with a knife at
that time) to put down the knife and the latter gave him the
knife (Ibid., pp. 16-17). Benjamin described the knife used as
a double-bladed one, and when it was handed to him, the
handle still had some blood on it (Ibid., p. 19).
Dr[]. Nancy Valdez, Medico-legal Officer III of the San
Marcelino District Hospital, testified that she was the one who
conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. She noted
four (4) stab wounds at the xiphoid processes/chest area, two
(2) of which were fatal as they penetrated the thoracic cavity,
causing lacerations on the anterior portion of the superior lobe
of the left lung (tsn, August 29, 1996, pp. 8-10).
Valerio Lampera, Esmeralda's husband, declared that the untimely death of
Esmeralda caused him pain and compelled the family to incur expenses in the
amount of P2,500.[2] Daniel Isaac, Esmeralda's 8-year-old son, was likewise
psychologically and emotionally affected by the unexpected demise of his
mother.[3] He cried on the witness stand when asked of the whereabouts of his
mother. Misj uris
EDGARDO had another story to tell. According to him, Esmeralda's husband
was his business partner in the sale of fish. In the evening of 19 January 1996,
he went to the house of the Lamperas to get his capital for the business. He
saw Roselyn standing by the stairs of the house and asked her about the
whereabouts of her father Valerio. When she informed him that Valerio was
not there, he left for the store of Francisco Franco. On his way to the store, he
heard shouts coming from the Lampera's house, which he mistook to be just
another ordinary fight. He proceeded to Franco's store. Then Benjamin
Costimiano, a purok leader, arrived at the store, carrying with him a knife
which, according to him, was recovered from inside Esmeralda's house.
Benjamin invited EDGARDO to go with him to the Police Department of Subic,
Zambales. Upon arrival thereat Costimiano ordered the detention of
EDGARDO allegedly because the latter was a suspect in the killing of
Esmeralda. EDGARDO was detained for two months but was not investigated
by the police. He could not remember having been brought to the office of the
Provincial Prosecutor and having given a statement thereat. He insisted that
he did not kill Esmeralda and that the knife presented by the prosecution was
not taken from him. Besides, he had no reason to kill the wife of his business
partner.[4]
The trial court gave credence to the version of the prosecution. It thus found
EDGARDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.7659. It held that the
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, since the
deceased was carrying a sick child when suddenly attacked. It appreciated in
his favor the mitigating circumstance of intoxication based on the testimony of
EDGARDO that he drank liquor on that fateful day while fishing at sea, which
was corroborated by Roselyn's testimony that EDGARDO had red eyes. This
circumstance was, however, offset by the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling. Since there was no other modifying circumstance established, the
trial court sentenced EDGARDO to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased the amounts of P50,000 as
indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; P30,000 as exemplary damages; and
P2,500 as actual damages.
EDGARDO seasonably appealed to us. In his Appellant's Brief, he contends
that the trial court erred in (a) considering treachery when the same was
inexistent and (b) convicting him of murder qualified by treachery; and that it
also overlooked material facts of substance which if considered would be
sufficient to acquit him of the crime charged. Jj lex
EDGARDO argues that no treachery was proved. First, the victim was already
forewarned of the danger that would befall her, since EDGARDO initially
pointed a knife at her young son, then tried to stab her daughter but missed.
Besides, the attack was frontal and expected. Treachery did not automatically
attach just because the victim was a woman and was holding a child. Second,
one of the requisites of treachery, namely that "the means of execution was
deliberately and consciously adopted," was absent because the stabbing
spree was made at the spur of the moment when EDGARDO was enraged
with passion and obfuscation or was under the influence of a sudden attack of
"temporary insanity." Third, to appreciate treachery, the accused must be
shown to have made some preparations to kill the victim. EDGARDO was in
the victim's house with a legitimate purpose, i:e., to collect his share of the
proceeds of the sale of the night's catch of fish in the amount of P640; there
was no murder in his heart at the precise moment.
Further, EDGARDO claims that from his warrantless arrest to the custodial
interrogation, he was denied his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have an effective counsel.
In the Appellee's Brief, the OSG recommends that the judgment appealed from
be affirmed in toto. It agrees with the trial court that there was treachery in view
of the sudden and unexpected attack upon the unarmed victim, who had not
committed the slightest provocation and who was totally unaware of
EDGARDO's murderous designs. Neither the victim nor her children
anticipated the attack. EDGARDO did not give any warning that he was about
to start a stabbing spree. The victim, then carrying a sick child, never had the
chance to defend herself or to retaliate. All that she managed to do was to try
to evade EDGARDO's knife blows.
Anent the third assigned error, the OSG argues that "temporary insanity" is not
recognized in this jurisdiction and that mere abnormality of the mental faculties
will not exclude imputability.[5] In any case, EDGARDO had the burden of
proving his alleged "temporary insanity," as it is a basic principle in our rules
on evidence that he who alleges a fact must prove the truth thereof. However,
he did not raise this argument below, and it is only now that he belatedly raises
it. New miso
In light of the positive identification by a credible eyewitness of EDGARDO as
the perpetrator of the crime, his self-serving denial is worthless. There is no
shred of doubt as to his culpability for the death of Esmeralda.
We do not, however, agree with the trial court that treachery attended the
commission of the crime. For treachery to qualify the killing to murder, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution
that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.[6]
In this case, the victim, Esmeralda, was forewarned of the impending attack
on her, since it was preceded by EDGARDO's attempts to attack her son and
daughter. It cannot be said that she was in no position to defend herself; for,
in fact, she succeeded in repelling appellant's aggression against her children.
When EDGARDO turned to her, she "tried to evade the thrust" causing her 6-
year-old child whom she was carrying to be thrown away.[7] Furthermore, there
is no sufficient evidence that the appellant deliberately and consciously
adopted the means of execution employed by him. What is apparent is that the
killing was done impulsively or on the spur of the moment.
Anent EDGARDO's claim of the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation, the same is bereft of merit because his acts did not result from an
impulse arising from lawful sentiments but from a spirit of lawlessness.[8]
Neither are we persuaded by EDGARDO's plea of "temporary insanity." As the
OSG aptly stated, "temporary insanity" is not recognized in this jurisdiction.
Insanity, under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, connotes that the
accused must have been deprived completely of reason and freedom of the
will at the time of the commission of the crime,[9] or that he must have acted
without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of the accused' mental
faculties does not exclude imputability.[10] Moreover, EDGARDO was unable
to substantiate his claim. The law presumes every man to be sane. If the
accused interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of
establishing such fact rests upon him.[11] Insanity must be proved by clear and
positive evidence.[12] Finally, EDGARDO did not raise this argument below, but
only now, obviously as a delayed afterthought. Acct mis
We disagree with the trial court in appreciating in appellant's favor the
mitigating circumstance of intoxication. EDGARDO declared that he drank
liquor on the day of the incident in question,[13] and the trial court held that his
intoxication was corroborated by Roselyn's testimony that EDGARDO's eyes
were "red" when she saw him. For intoxication to be mitigating, the following
conditions must be present: (1) the same is not habitual or is not subsequent
to the plan of the commission of a felony; otherwise, it is aggravating if it is
habitual and intentional; and (2) the consumption of alcoholic drinks was in
such quantity as to blur the accused's reason and deprive him of a certain
degree of control.[14] In this case, EDGARDO was unable to prove both
requisites.
Nevertheless, we appreciate in EDGARDO's favor the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender. Immediately after the incident, when purok leader
Benjamin Costimiano followed him in the house of Francisco Franco,
EDGARDO voluntarily gave the knife to Franco and went with the latter to the
Police Headquarters where he was forthwith detained. The information against
him was filed much later.
The trial court correctly considered the existence of the generic aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, since the crime was committed inside the house of
the victim, who had not given any provocation.[15]
We do not find merit in EDGARDO's claim that he was arrested without a
warrant, was subjected to custodial interrogation without the assistance of a
counsel, and was denied his right to remain silent and to have an effective
counsel. In the first place, there is no clear evidence that he was arrested. On
the contrary, he voluntarily turned over his knife to purok leader Costimiano
and went with the latter to the Police Department, for which reason we even
appreciate in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Second, the records do not disclose that a custodial interrogation of
EDGARDO was made, although a preliminary investigation was conducted by
Prosecutor Floresta.[16]
Accordingly, since the killing was not attended by treachery or any other
qualifying circumstance, EDGARDO should be held guilty of homicide only,
which is punishable by reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code. The generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling having been
offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and there being
no other modifying circumstance, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
EDGARDO should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as minimum. Mis act
The awards of P50,000 as moral damages and P2,500 as actual damages for
burial expenses incurred by the family of the victim are proper, as they were
duly proved.[17] So is the award of exemplary damages, the crime having been
committed with one aggravating circumstance.[18]
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 75 of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City in Criminal Case No. 56-96 is MODIFIED. As modified,
accused-appellant EDGARDO AQUINO y PUMAWAN is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum. The awards of P50,000 as indemnity,
P50,000 as moral damages, P30,000 as exemplary damages, and P2,500 as
actual damages stand.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED .
 3. Antonio v. Reyes
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has
unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception
between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the
depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the
modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability
to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The
Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie
Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we
reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years
old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting,
they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and
through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish,
Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a
child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the
Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and
still subsists up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner
claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her,
her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to
wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her
family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to
rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr.
Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a
degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with
Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her
family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same
vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village
Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but
petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that
no such occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under
those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold
and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the
one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one
of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez
were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not
known in or connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered
her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a
sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a
famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended
up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling
up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take
her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left
her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr.
Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondent’s persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship
that should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that
respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was
having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital
obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that
there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and
invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was
afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she
surmised such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from
head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been
teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer
of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson
for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal
Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she
was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold
office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in
her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the
writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political
clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed
with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred
that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking
for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s
whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost
ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior
to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly
hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence
presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her
part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a
psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr.
Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33 together
with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological
Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism,
psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might
point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and
interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only
one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can
fake the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that
respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state
of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent
and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court
thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of
the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the
ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the
pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan
Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by
a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic
tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While
conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated
the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively
establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the
credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a
settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor
or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of
Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner.
Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to
establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the
operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of
facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These
standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v.
Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of
Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at
bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to
squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only
one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the
remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the
Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the
petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of
nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a
decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The
concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel
in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as
a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons
"who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting
marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same
class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among
others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the
Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound
mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under
the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s incurable
insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage
contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the
Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of
the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage
void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under
Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound
mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent,
just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential
requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a
specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of
the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that
psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the
spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was
nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code
that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as
phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically
incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage,
which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code
x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage
only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were
psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations,
because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These
concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of
Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand
the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them,
was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then
Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to
establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has
recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity
deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading
"psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has
been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code
committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application,
by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision
committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In
regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity,
as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics.
Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by
evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current
trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under
the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has
developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework
that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the
clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation,
and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36.
There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of
this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then
in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation
of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the
Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of
psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member
admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled
by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be
disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has
expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that
the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation
of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law,
its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation
occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on
psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial
decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on
lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide
utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind,
have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which
respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the
constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection
to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains
the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever
socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put
into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family.
This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding
legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well
as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for
declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect
marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage,
not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only
constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn
serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the
State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons
who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand
or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the
judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has
consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological–not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
 against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included
in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective
in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on
evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General
issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the
petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance
of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this
case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the
petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the
hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on
this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary
trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of
these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently
lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The
question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally,
the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior,
and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel
Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing
career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology
who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to
psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court
acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance
of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public
matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family
Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the
parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory
complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and
abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories,
and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational
attainment, and family background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to
medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology.
Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2)
major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can
say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards.
There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over
again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated
lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the
respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her
marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another.
The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also
something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based
on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate
are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their
feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie,
what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned.
Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent
in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing
the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third
witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the
petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and
ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page
six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr.
witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which
means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is
having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is
pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we
also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is
abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the
husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently
believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the
psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of
petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she
continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on
the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as
well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v.
Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We
deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for
their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common
conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their
own acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since
the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there
is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court
explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that
propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state
of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world
of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and
significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying
to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the
psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and
pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She
fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before
she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found
out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is
immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of
cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise
supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the
record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as
false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly,
they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction,
or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were
emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic
nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of
respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality
would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly
tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to
perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly
banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential
marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals
as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which
states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances
constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations
made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46.
The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to,
and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with
her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in
particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it
is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit
to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the
Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed
decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30
March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such
decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from
contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when
elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct
appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law
that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the
testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made
the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were
markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her
matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other
words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-
concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and
reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially
binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case
however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of
the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only
by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper
import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold
sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the
veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated
respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such
conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial
trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant
recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that
respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to
such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he
returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s
aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate
stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the
conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that
respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s
psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it
would have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized
respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether
the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity
on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court
rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well
before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that
the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article
36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995,
began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code
committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did
refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that
psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule
on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to
incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial
court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s
psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in
an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity
at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial
court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite
arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate
review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts SO ORDERED.
of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in
enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily
cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no
categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was
no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question
was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep
reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried
before Molinaor Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where
presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not
have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those
cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually
incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of
Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to
reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present
evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than
ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently
convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has
been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled
by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently
convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the
degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly
ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the
marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that
respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as
exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment
to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons
and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than
the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10

August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL
and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
 4. People v. Genosa
[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC
GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for
acquittal on a novel theory -- the battered woman syndrome (BWS), which
allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not
entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression --
no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the
time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant
constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her
psychological resistance and self-control. This psychological paralysis she
suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor
under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating
circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal
night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight
months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid
emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to
vindicate her life and her unborn childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising
from BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she
may now apply for and be released from custody on parole, because she has
already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during
the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998
Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in
Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds
the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic
aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby
sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity
and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as
moral damages.[2]
The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang,
Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate
husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had
provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
Cadaveric spasm.
Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes
protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the
mouth.
Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of
the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture
 of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration
of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial
hemorrhage.
Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding
of the epidermis.
Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.
which caused his death.[4]
With the assistance of her counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not guilty during
her arraignment on March 3, 1997.[6] In due course, she was tried for and
convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions
version of the facts in this wise:
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in
Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at
Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Bens younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with
them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban
Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their
two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after
receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading
home. Arturo would pass Bens house before reaching his. When they arrived
at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to
look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it,
waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo
did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the
Genosas rented house, he heard her say I wont hesitate to kill you to which
Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That was the last time Arturo
saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas rented house
appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and
neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig
because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise
asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who
unfortunately had no money to buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a
bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her
two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her
children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters
behind the Genosas rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode
the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that
appellant did not want to talk to him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the
foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban
went there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from
the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed
the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through
the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked
it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell
was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on
the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the
back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to
the mother of Ben about his sons misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada
Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then
assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the
foul smell at the Genosas rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1
Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and
went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his
side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only
had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of
an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning
against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long
with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a
stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench,
had to be taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem
examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A
municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases,
Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body
was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded
the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant.
She concluded that the cause of Bens death was cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of
the occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on
November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet
might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao,
appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte
but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the
Genosas house. Ecel went home despite appellants request for her to sleep
in their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging
her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children
who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction,
Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the
television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to
appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got
hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and
screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because
she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home,
Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom
towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her You might as well be
killed so nobody would nag me. Appellant testified that she was aware that
there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he
got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, smashed the
arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant
then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the
blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting
him. She supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben.
He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.[7] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983.
Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City,
obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was
working, at the time of her husbands death, as a Secretary to the Port
Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl
Pierre and Marie Bianca.
2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were
neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree
cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was
persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness
developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together
with Bens brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic
and Ben lived happily. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would
quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember
when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic
quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict
injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a
kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with
blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently having
asked for Bens forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early
morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Bens aid again and saw
blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and
Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens
forgiveness.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben
and Marivic married in 1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.
She said as the marriage went along, Marivic became already very
demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivics two
sons, there were three (3) misunderstandings. The first was when Marivic
stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second incident was
on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead using a
sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the
ear and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995
when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw
that Bens hand was plastered as the bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical
intervention.
5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995
After we collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO. They
stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they went to Uniloks and drank
beer allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque
and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while
talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait for the runner and
the usher of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao
numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can
place my bet. On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the
Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one
Fredo who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas testimony on
the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying I will
never hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent.
Basobas thought they were joking.
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa
residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits
every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben before when he
was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa that he should leave her and that
Ben would always take her back after she would leave him so many times.
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time
that they had been quarreling. He said Ben even had a wound on the right
forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.
6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to
her and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her,
sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her
parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and
would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would
seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These
doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports.
Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk,
at least three times a week.
7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic,
testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas,
testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and
Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw
the spouses grappling with each other. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He
did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was
the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe
Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of
November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is located
beside the Genosa house and saw the spouses grappling with each other then
Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic
Genosa. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter
the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go
fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note
that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they
were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from
theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14
years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that
Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time,
he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would
be pacified if somebody would come. He testified that while Ben was alive he
used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he
will say, Teody because that was what he used to call me, mokimas ta, which
means lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben would
box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a
wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was
stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured
too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic,
testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house
and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several
taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied
Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house
because she might be battered by her husband. When they got to the Genosa
house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that her husband was
already there and was drunk. Miss Arano knew he was drunk because of his
staggering walking and I can also detect his face. Marivic entered the house
and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same
night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was
not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would
be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when
she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben
arrived because the couple were very noisy in the sala and I had heard
something was broken like a vase. She said Marivic ran into her room and they
locked the door. When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and a knife and
showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us. She said that
Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said
that when she left Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still
quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-
employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient many times
and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that
from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of
physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-
Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the
qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic
on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits 2 and 2-B.
The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the
consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries
reported was marked as Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not
say whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said
it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up
of the patient, whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas
resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to
his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the
Genosa couple who were experiencing family troubles. He told Marivic to
return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed that
they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each
other.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it
was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened
that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would
deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal
Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and
the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband
at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would
reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive
towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend,
Lulu x x x Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that
he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing
their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next
day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented
herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias
Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just
wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San
Pablo, Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away;
that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to smash him once;
that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours
after she was whirled by Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged her towards the
drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.
9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an
investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence.
This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense
witnesses during the trial.
10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of
Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such
was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of
cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic
pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986.
She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got
there, she saw some police officer and neighbor around. She saw Ben
Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to
the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the
skeletal area of the head which she described as a fracture. And that based
on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify
as to what caused his death.
Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa
charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill, with
treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a
hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.
12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17,
22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997,
22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial
date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc
City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating
circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review
and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivics trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P.
Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a
precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellants Briefs he had prepared for
Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.
The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted
the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20
January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita
G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein
she submitted her Brief without counsels to the Court.
This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by
the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death;
allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband;
and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony
of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel
Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined
that the description of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem
findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead
pipe.
17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly
granted Marivics URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case to the
trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion
on the battered woman syndrome plea, within ninety (90) days from notice,
and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together
with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any,
submitted.
18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified
before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had
interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews
were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20)
years with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle
University as a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology
Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology
at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Josephs College; and was the
counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in
Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical
[Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was
the past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a
member of the American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of
the International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member
of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial
Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological
profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with
the Davide Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has
written a book entitled Energy Global Psychology (together with Drs. Allan Tan
and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an
expert on battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-
demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic
violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten
(10) years and discovered that there are lots of variables that cause all of this
marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.
Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of incidents of
psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse
and also sexual abuse.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually has a very
low opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing
characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when
the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they
were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be
physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them. Dra. Dayan said that
usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from broken
homes.
Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also has a very
low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it
comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very
angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times
they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become
violent. The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which
over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they
see often how their parents abused each other so there is a lot of modeling of
aggression in the family.
Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman
does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked
the violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change,
the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of
the children.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave
the house, or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back
triggering physical violence on both of them. She said that in a normal marital
relationship, abuses also happen, but these are not consistent, not chronic,
are not happening day in [and] day out. In an abnormal marital relationship,
the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and even would cause
hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she
administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman
because inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times
there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees
herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still
has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even
consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the
time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxxxxxxxx
19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since
passed away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of
the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry
Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years.
Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the Veterans
Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and
neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years.
Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of
Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the University of
Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of Military
Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society;
and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the
Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 1978 which was presented
twice in international congresses. He also authored The Mental Health of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000, which was likewise published
internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of
Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline),
on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in
1985-86.
Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the
mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord
enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate
degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo
had already encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified
in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family
disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In
those days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result
of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the
Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal
abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that
the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder depends on the vulnerability of the victim. Dr. Pajarillo said that if the
victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the
disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of
the victim is stronger, it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-
traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.
In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the
anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism. It is produced by overwhelming
brutality, trauma.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the beating
or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that
time. She thinks of nothing but the suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her
emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to
become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her self-
world is damaged.
Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individuals
illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents.
As to the batterer, he normally internalizes what is around him within the
environment. And it becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he
is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong faade but in it
there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the
precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing
of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just
come up in her mind or in his mind.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to
defend themselves, and primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any
weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x
because that abound in the household. He said a victim resorts to weapons
when she has reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other
recourse left on her but to act decisively.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview
he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the
psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his
diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxxxxxxxx
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the
time she killed her husband Marivicc mental condition was that she was re-
experiencing the trauma. He said that we are trying to explain scientifically that
the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come
in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-
experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind. At the time he interviewed
Marivic she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is
mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.
xxxxxxxxx
20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or
the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable
Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated.[9]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave
credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased
while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic
aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly
defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed
him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this
Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying
that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination
of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative,
a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts
testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part
appellants Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman
syndrome plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court
the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional
evidence, if any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the
examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad
Dayan[10] and Alfredo Pajarillo,[11]supposedly experts on domestic violence.
Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then
presented to and admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to
this Court to form part of the records of the case.[12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this
Courts consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision
without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa
were legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with
a pipe.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced
from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a
gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding
that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of
Marivic Genosa.
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila and
her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to
save the life of her unborn child.
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional
elements in determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in
this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of
parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death.[13]
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether
appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether
treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if
not collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by
this Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused
his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of the
case.[14]
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion,
reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or
modify the trial courts disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly
dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously hasty
decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense. We
note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the
testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the
basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his
evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing
the testimony and the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even
this Court, may not agree with the trial judges conclusions, we cannot
peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to reflect on
the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an
obviously hasty manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court
on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were
held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the
conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and
resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken against him, much less
used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which
he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in
substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.[15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa
and appellant had been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their
marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,[16] this Court held:
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim.
In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between
the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a
marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be
considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother
of appellants deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married
to Marivic.[17]The defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover,
during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of
her marriage to Ben.[18]Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is
conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing that
(1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission
was in fact made.[19] Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the
marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made by
appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made
through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause
of Bens death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal
consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution,
[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and
the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back
of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not
immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the victims death.
Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive
of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that
Ben was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us
for automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of battered
woman syndrome, for which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory
of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be
discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing
jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to
the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past behavior,
did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony
from appellants children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all
criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and
evidence are necessary to present.[20] As the former further points out, neither
the trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her
children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not
requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight
of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are
indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any
reversible error as to the trial courts appreciation of these circumstances has
little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes
self-defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits
killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying
circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.[21] Well-settled is the rule that
in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third
person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.[22]
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered
woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has
been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the
least, incomplete self-defense.[23] By appreciating evidence that a victim or
defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their
understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been
cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time.[24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order
to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship
with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time,
and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-
esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role;
emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept
responsibility for the batterers actions; and false hopes that the relationship
will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the
so-called cycle of violence,[27] which has three phases: (1) the tension-building
phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least,
nonviolent) phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be
verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman
usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior;
or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows
herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she
wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This
wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her placatory and passive
behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first
place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate
him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens.
Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and
despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon
withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable,
the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some
unpredictable point, the violence spirals out of control and leads to an acute
battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this
incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no
control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as
unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it.
The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that
resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the
terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her
apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the
batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her
past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents
are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or
intervenors are likely to get hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering
incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound
relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior
towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to
make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her
again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself
that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the
better; and that this good, gentle and caring man is the real person whom she
loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the
emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels
responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his
reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially
if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek
professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of
remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented
psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered
womans psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally
dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her
forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of tension, violence and
forgiveness, each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be
separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning
without the other.[31]
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense
presented several witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending
experience as follows:
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year
he was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your
husband was abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this
abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and
sometimes he pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat
me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate
each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced
and after that I go to him and he said sorry.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and
abusive behavior by your husband, were you able to see a
doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra.
Cerillo.
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Of course my husband.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
[Court] /to the witness
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury
inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage, from that time
on, how frequent was the occurrence?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a
week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just
quarrel me. [32]
Referring to his Out-Patient Chart[33] on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos
Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic
battery in this manner:
Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are
found in the chart of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates
for the record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R)
lower eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr.
Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital
area, pain and contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr.
Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma.
Attending physician: Dr. Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending
physician: Dr. Canora; and
 6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused
Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora. sometime in the month of November, 1995 when this incident
happened?
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were
the attending physician, is that correct? A As per record, yes.
A Yes, sir. Q What was the date?
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused? A It was on November 6, 1995.
A Yes, sir. Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who A Yes, sir.
attended the patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle
left axilla? Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court,
was the patient pregnant?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with
something rough substance if force is applied. A Yes, sir.

Q What is meant by furuncle axilla? Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy
was she?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation
of left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When A Yes, sir.
your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain. Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor? examination about her pregnancy or for some other findings?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which
xxxxxxxxx complicates her pregnancy.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
Q What did she tell you?
A One day.
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of
these injuries. And she told me that it was done to her by her Q Where?
husband.
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir. xxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxx Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said
that you were able to examine her personally on November 6,
1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
What is this all about?
 A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to
hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the same
period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-
three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the
patient had hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our
treatment. She does not response when the medication was
given to her, because tension headache is more or less stress
related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is
emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the
patient is the family history in line of giving the root cause of
what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to
the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases
in hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the
medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the
blood pressure of the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was
180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is
dangerous level of blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus. [34]
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the
Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling
several times; and that on some occasions Marivic would run to him with
bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.[35]
Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been asked
by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben
would come home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep
over, she was awakened about ten oclock at night, because the couple were
very noisy and I heard something was broken like a vase. Then Marivic came
running into Ecels room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window
grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help --
this time to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa
home, where they found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her,
Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness,
Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to
leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least
three other witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling.[37] Marivic relates in
detail the following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of
him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15,
1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working
then after office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to
Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son,
where was his father, then my second child said, he was not
home yet. I was worried because that was payday, I was
anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my
eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my
children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at
Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to
sleep with me at that time because I had fears that he was again
drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so I
requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because
she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with
you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not
allow her because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you?
What else did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel
him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you
know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for
him. I was just worried he might be overly drunk and he would
beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if
any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I
want to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps
he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his
provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him, why did
you switch off the light when the children were there. At that
time I was also attending to my children who were doing their
assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his
challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the
antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they
were scared and he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben
was carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I
fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was
going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their
reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with
me for packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the
bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged
you? How did he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he
kept on shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there
will be nobody to nag me.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the
drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the
key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3
inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I
smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long,
and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I
smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the
feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
 Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please
describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. [38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an
expert witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person.
She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen
hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latters ordeal to the
court a quo as follows:
Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife?
Could you in laymans term describe to this Court what her life
was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years,
that she was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of
instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and
to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she
was the one who was practically the bread earner of the family.
The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with
barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in
cockfight and going home very angry and which will trigger a lot
of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting
from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused
her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was
carrying was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at
the same time very depressed because she was also aware,
almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was
happening day in and day out. [39]
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited,
but wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as
shown below:
Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999,
where you talked to her about three hours, what was the most
relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The
most important information were escalating abuses that she
had experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you
already knew of the facts of the case or at least you have
substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can
consider them as substantial.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her
husband they were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her
husband that were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are
also battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed
in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her and
battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in
that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about
being battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on
saying this matter. I think that is the first time that we have this
in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
 A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind
happened, it was really a self-defense. I also believe that there
had been provocation and I also believe that she became a
disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because
of all the battering that happened and so she became an
abnormal person who had lost shes not during the time and that
is why it happened because of all the physical battering,
emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that she had
experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely
battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality
test, what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory. The purpose of that test is to find out about the lying
prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or
is she someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality
test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a
person that I can trust. That the data that Im gathering from her
are the truth.[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo,
testified on his Psychiatric Report,[42] which was based on his interview and
examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the first three
years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was
fine, normal and happy -- until Ben started to be attracted to other girls and
was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same
time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed
toward his family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: At first, it was
verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically
abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive
every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate
whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They
had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than eight years, she
was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband
whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain.
Further quoting from the Report, [s]he also sought the advice and help of close
relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was
happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more frequent
and more severe. x x x.[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the
Courts mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused
woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind,
we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who
is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian
court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of
battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary.
How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The
average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this
kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How
could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization?
We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-
respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is
the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called battered wife
syndrome.[44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should
not be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the
mind of a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may
not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been
through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute
common myths and misconceptions about battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research
on domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and
the United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a
battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The
psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the
battered woman immobilizes the latters ability to act decisively in her own
interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of
escape.[46] In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that the abuse often
escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger
of dying then.[47]
 Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the battered
woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating
and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen,
they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who
precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically,
verbally and even sexually abusive to them.[48]
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman
does not readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt
arising from the latters belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an
obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and
that she is the only hope for her spouse to change.[49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He
had previously testified in suits involving violent family relations, having
evaluated probably ten to twenty thousand violent family disputes within the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result
of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the
Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty
(40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the
woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.[50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could result in
posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxietism.[51] After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons
may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their
situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the
development of coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victims
ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma.
Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will
have a predictable positive effect.[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University
of Pennsylvania, found that even if a person has control over a situation, but
believes that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation
with coping responses rather than trying to escape. He said that it was the
cognitive aspect -- the individuals thoughts -- that proved all-important. He
referred to this phenomenon as learned helplessness. [T]he truth or facts of a
situation turn out to be less important than the individuals set of beliefs or
perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women dont attempt to leave
the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is
possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that
nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances.[54]
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow
responsible for the violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is
capable of killing her, and that there is no escape.[55] Battered women feel
unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the
relationship.[56] Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not
only because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because
she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more.[57]
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific
evidence establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had
suffered from her spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the
battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that
would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample
evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of
BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No
doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how
the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly
described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in
adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single
incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she
failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had
gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior
to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively minor
abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from
developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third
phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to
her mothers or fathers house;[58] that Ben would seek her out, ask for her
forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would
return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and
her spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform?
And that she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being?
Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and
trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to
separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual
experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the
essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for
the defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically
and scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved
or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her
by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each others testimonies, which
were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual
cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences and
thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they
concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying
circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the
records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the
battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the
Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in
itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence
must still be considered in the context of self-defense.[59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that
crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the
time of the offense[60] -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her
batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts
to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the
Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-
defense:[62]
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.[63] It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger
thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.[64] In the present case, however,
according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him.
She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape
to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack
and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed
had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual
threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens
bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability
that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the
imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where
the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual
physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic
battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to
await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount
to sentencing her to murder by installment.[65] Still, impending danger (based
on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the
defendants use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or
communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.[66] Considering
such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be
appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not
warrant self-defense.[67] In the absence of such aggression, there can be no
self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim.[68] Thus,
Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other
modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to
evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal
liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it
wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the
parties.[69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra.
Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000,
opined as follows:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering
Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative]
provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-
control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of
impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced
at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which
can only be ended by an act of violence on her part. [70]
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that
the effect of repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious
maltreatment as well as the severity and the prolonged administration of the
battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.[71] Expounding thereon, he said:
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering.
Second, the severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged
administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the
battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of
the victim and another one is the public and social support
available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she
will go to that disorder....
xxxxxxxxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in
terms of severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr.
Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of
the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that
precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are
suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face,
strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and
boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is
heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is pregnant,
she is very susceptible because the woman will not only protect
herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is
heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you
classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or
[a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called
delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and
the individual will manifest now a severe emotional instability,
higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably
in most [acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the
individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious
maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months.
The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six
(6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book
specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical
one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is
abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get
neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of
post[t]raumatic stress disorder. [72]
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness
clarified further:
Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman
syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.[73]
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon
appellant resulted in cumulative provocation which broke down her
psychological resistance and natural self-control, psychological paralysis, and
difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations
were analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her
will power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There
was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent.
Pursuant to paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating
factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance
of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present
when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason.[77] To appreciate this circumstance, the
following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.[78]
 Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful
aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to
kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept
a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the
time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.[79] His abusive
and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic
and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming
her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her
emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood
pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and
her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet
drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot
him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was
no considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her
normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillos testimony[80] that with neurotic
anxiety -- a psychological effect on a victim of overwhelming brutality [or]
trauma -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although
she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control re-experiencing
the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered. She thinks
of nothing but the suffering. Such reliving which is beyond the control of a
person under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic
experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering
her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological
paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set
of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and
the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That
is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological
paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her
will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent
aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred
when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as
an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such
perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons
by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to
oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.[81] In
order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be
proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere
inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of
evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be
proved as conclusively as the killing itself.[83]
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court
imposed the penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying
circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been
found lying in bed with an open, depressed, circular fracture located at the
back of his head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked,
however, the prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Only the following
testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death:
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged
you? How did he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he
kept on shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there
will be nobody to nag me
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
 Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the
drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the
key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3
inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I
smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long,
and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I
smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the
feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please
describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and
I smashed him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what
happened before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I
was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I was
frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him,
the witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or
the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with
him, I took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also
because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun
and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery.
There is no showing of the victims position relative to appellants at the time of
the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is
preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted
by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the
specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any
defense that might be put up by the party attacked.[86] There is no showing,
though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of
successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any
retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought
of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she
decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that
she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she
committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the
doubt in her favor.[87]
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the
commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree,
pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5[88]of the same Code.[89] The penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two
mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty
by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have
attended the commission of the offense.[90] Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next
lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range
of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and
proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6)
years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its
medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that
appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and
be released from detention on parole.[91]
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman
syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the
given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the
theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner
in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence
applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case,
it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in
order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality
of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And
definitely, the solicitor general and appellants counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda,
have helped it in such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can
only work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot
make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only
Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense
arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main
points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and
her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing,
the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual
-- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present
case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide
is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances
and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her
penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty
hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASEher from custody upon due determination that she is
eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.