G.R. No.
95582 October 7, 1991 Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y
MALECDAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO
CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL
CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by
Inocencia Cudiamat, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint 1 for damages against petitioners
for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on
March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Among others, it was alleged that
on said date, while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus
belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due
regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its
passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the
nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of
the victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations
before banging said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.
On the other hand, petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to
observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the transportation
company and the supervision of the employees, even as they add that they are not
absolute insurers of the safety of the public at large. Further, it was alleged that it was the
victim's own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the subject incident, hence
they prayed for the dismissal of the complaint plus an award of damages in their favor by
way of a counterclaim.
On July 29, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision, effectively in favor of petitioners,
with this decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby pronounced that Pedrito
Cudiamat was negligent, which negligence was the proximate cause of his
death. Nonetheless, defendants in equity, are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of
Pedrito Cudiamat the sum of P10,000.00 which approximates the amount
defendants initially offered said heirs for the amicable settlement of the case. No
costs.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied therewith, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in a
decision 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 19504 promulgated on August 14, 1990, set aside the
decision of the lower court, and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents:
1. The sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos by way of indemnity for death of
the victim Pedrito Cudiamat;
2. The sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) by way of moral damages;
3. The sum of Two Hundred Eighty Eight Thousand (P288,000.00) Pesos as actual
and compensatory damages;
4. The costs of this suit. 4
dated October 4, 1990, 5 hence this petition with the central issue herein being whether
respondent court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and in finding petitioners
negligent and liable for the damages claimed.
It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals as a rule are
final and may not be reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this is subject to settled
exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to
those of the trial court, in which case a reexamination of the facts and evidence may be
undertaken. 6
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeal have discordant positions as to
who between the petitioners an the victim is guilty of negligence. Perforce, we have had
to conduct an evaluation of the evidence in this case for the prope calibration of their
conflicting factual findings and legal conclusions.
The lower court, in declaring that the victim was negligent, made the following findings:
This Court is satisfied that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent in trying to board a
moving vehicle, especially with one of his hands holding an umbrella. And,
without having given the driver or the conductor any indication that he wishes to
board the bus. But defendants can also be found wanting of the necessary
diligence. In this connection, it is safe to assume that when the deceased
Cudiamat attempted to board defendants' bus, the vehicle's door was open
instead of being closed. This should be so, for it is hard to believe that one would
even attempt to board a vehicle (i)n motion if the door of said vehicle is closed.
Here lies the defendant's lack of diligence. Under such circumstances, equity
demands that there must be something given to the heirs of the victim to
assuage their feelings. This, also considering that initially, defendant common
carrier had made overtures to amicably settle the case. It did offer a certain
monetary consideration to the victim's heirs. 7
However, respondent court, in arriving at a different opinion, declares that:
From the testimony of appellees' own witness in the person of Vitaliano Safarita, it
is evident that the subject bus was at full stop when the victim Pedrito Cudiamat
boarded the same as it was precisely on this instance where a certain Miss Abenoja
alighted from the bus. Moreover, contrary to the assertion of the appellees, the
victim did indicate his intention to board the bus as can be seen from the testimony
of the said witness when he declared that Pedrito Cudiamat was no longer walking
and made a sign to board the bus when the latter was still at a distance from him.
It was at the instance when Pedrito Cudiamat was closing his umbrella at the
platform of the bus when the latter made a sudden jerk movement (as) the driver
commenced to accelerate the bus.
Evidently, the incident took place due to the gross negligence of the appellee-
driver in prematurely stepping on the accelerator and in not waiting for the
passenger to first secure his seat especially so when we take into account that the
platform of the bus was at the time slippery and wet because of a drizzle. The
defendants-appellees utterly failed to observe their duty and obligation as
 common carrier to the end that they should observe extra-ordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them according to the circumstances of each case (Article 1733, New Civil
Code). 8
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no reason to disturb the above
holding of the Court of Appeals. Its aforesaid findings are supported by the testimony of
petitioners' own witnesses. One of them, Virginia Abalos, testified on cross-examination as
follows:
Q It is not a fact Madam witness, that at bunkhouse 54, that is before the place of
the incident, there is a crossing?
A The way going to the mines but it is not being pass(ed) by the bus.
Q And the incident happened before bunkhouse 56, is that not correct?
A It happened between 54 and 53 bunkhouses. 9
The bus conductor, Martin Anglog, also declared:
Q When you arrived at Lepanto on March 25, 1985, will you please inform this
Honorable Court if there was anv unusual incident that occurred?
A When we delivered a baggage at Marivic because a person alighted there
between Bunkhouse 53 and 54.
Q What happened when you delivered this passenger at this particular place in
Lepanto?
A When we reached the place, a passenger alighted and I signalled my driver.
When we stopped we went out because I saw an umbrella about a split second
and I signalled again the driver, so the driver stopped and we went down and we
saw Pedrito Cudiamat asking for help because he was lying down.
Q How far away was this certain person, Pedrito Cudiamat, when you saw him
lying down — from the bus how far was he?
A It is about two to three meters.
Q On what direction of the bus was he found about three meters from the bus, was
it at the front or at the back?
A At the back, sir. 10 (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing testimonies show that the place of the accident and the place where one
of the passengers alighted were both between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the finding
of the Court of Appeals that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same is
correct. They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus
when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the
vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence on where he was thereafter found in relation
to the bus when it stopped. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the
deceased was guilty of negligence.
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that
the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his
intention to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion
there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board.
A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence,
it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no
act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was
attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a
breach of such duty. 11
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train,
streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to
afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries
suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their
conveyances while they are doing so. 12
Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same
cannot be considered negligent under the circumstances. As clearly explained in the
testimony of the aforestated witness for petitioners, Virginia Abalos, th bus had "just started"
and "was still in slow motion" at the point where the victim had boarded and was on its
platform. 13
It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or
streetcar which is moving slowly. 14 An ordinarily prudent person would have made the
attempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact
that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common
experience both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of
such an ordinary practice.
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already
considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a
contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers
owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting
therefrom. 15
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound
to observe extraordina diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the
according to all the circumstances of each case. 16 A common carrier is bound to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. 17
It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the
court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in
order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of
carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his
destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away
attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule
that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove
that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the
Civil Code. 18
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the
gravely injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and
incontrovertible proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even be
stigmatized as callous indifference. The evidence shows that after the accident the bus
could have forthwith turned at Bunk 56 and thence to the hospital, but its driver instead
opted to first proceed to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger to alight and to deliver a refrigerator,
despite the serious condition of the victim. The vacuous reason given by petitioners that it
was the wife of the deceased who caused the delay was tersely and correctly confuted
by respondent court:
... The pretension of the appellees that the delay was due to the fact that they
had to wait for about twenty minutes for Inocencia Cudiamat to get dressed
deserves scant consideration. It is rather scandalous and deplorable for a wife
whose husband is at the verge of dying to have the luxury of dressing herself up
for about twenty minutes before attending to help her distressed and helpless
husband. 19
Further, it cannot be said that the main intention of petitioner Lardizabal in going to Bunk
70 was to inform the victim's family of the mishap, since it was not said bus driver nor the
conductor but the companion of the victim who informed his family thereof. 20 In fact, it
was only after the refrigerator was unloaded that one of the passengers thought of
sending somebody to the house of the victim, as shown by the testimony of Virginia
Abalos again, to wit:
Q Why, what happened to your refrigerator at that particular time?
A I asked them to bring it down because that is the nearest place to our house
and when I went down and asked somebody to bring down the refrigerator, I
also asked somebody to call the family of Mr. Cudiamat.
COURT:
Q Why did you ask somebody to call the family of Mr. Cudiamat?
A Because Mr. Cudiamat met an accident, so I ask somebody to call for the
family of Mr. Cudiamat.
Q But nobody ask(ed) you to call for the family of Mr. Cudiamat?
A No sir. 21
With respect to the award of damages, an oversight was, however, committed by
respondent Court of Appeals in computing the actual damages based on the gross
income of the victim. The rule is that the amount recoverable by the heirs of a victim of a
tort is not the loss of the entire earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings
which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross
earnings, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary
in the creation of such earnings or income and minus living and other incidental
expenses. 22
We are of the opinion that the deductible living and other expense of the deceased
may fairly and reasonably be fixed at P500.00 a month or P6,000.00 a year. In
adjudicating the actual or compensatory damages, respondent court found that the
deceased was 48 years old, in good health with a remaining productive life expectancy
of 12 years, and then earning P24,000.00 a year. Using the gross annual income as the
basis, and multiplying the same by 12 years, it accordingly awarded P288,000. Applying
the aforestated rule on computation based on the net earnings, said award must be, as
it hereby is, rectified and reduced to P216,000.00. However, in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, the death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00. 23
WHEREFORE, subject to the above modifications, the challenged judgment and
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. SO
ORDERED.
Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. V. CA (1991), G.R. No. 95582, October 7, 1991
Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (Transportation)
Laws Applicable: Art. 1733, Art. 1755
FACTS:
 May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to
Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. (Dangwa). The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53
and 54 when Pedro alighted
 Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated
forward. Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicle
 Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations
before bringing Pedro to Lepanto Hospital where he expired
 Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa for the death of
Pedro Cudiamat
 Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence required in
the operation of the co. and the supervision of the employees even as they are not
absolute insurers of the public at large
 RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence was the
cause of his death but still ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
 CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages, actual and
compensatory damages and cost of the suit
ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore
HELD: YES. CA affirmed. A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer
to bus riders (EVEN when moving as long as it is still slow in motion)
 Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the effect of increasing peril to
a passenger while he is attempting to board the same
 Premature acceleration of the bus in this case = breach of duty
 Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already considered a passenger
and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation
 Duty extends to boarding and alighting
 GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the
passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due
regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the
passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier
 EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Art.
1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code
 Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious condition =
patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence
 Hospital was in Bunk 56. 1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later
called the family of Pedrito on his own will) to alight and deliver a refrigerator
 In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings
G.R. No. 92288 February 9, 1993
BRITISH AIRWAYS, INC., petitioner,vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Twelfth Division, and FIRST INTERNATIONAL TRADING AND
GENERAL SERVICES, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the decision dated
November 15, 1989 of the Court of Appeals1 affirming the decision of the trial court2 in
ordering petitioner British Airways, Inc. to pay private respondent First International
Trading and General Services actual damages, moral damages, corrective or exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and the costs as well as the Resolution dated February 15,
19903 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the appealed decision.
It appears on record that on February 15, 1981, private respondent First International
Trading and General Services Co., a duly licensed domestic recruitment and placement
agency, received a telex message from its principal ROLACO Engineering and
Contracting Services in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to recruit Filipino contract workers in behalf
of said principal.4
During the early part of March 1981, said principal paid to the Jeddah branch of
petitioner British Airways, Inc. airfare tickets for 93 contract workers with specific
instruction to transport said workers to Jeddah on or before March 30, 1981.
As soon as petitioner received a prepaid ticket advice from its Jeddah branch to
transport the 93 workers, private respondent was immediately informed by petitioner that
its principal had forwarded 93 prepaid tickets. Thereafter, private respondent instructed
its travel agent, ADB Travel and Tours. Inc., to book the 93 workers with petitioner but the
latter failed to fly said workers, thereby compelling private respondent to borrow money
in the amount of P304,416.00 in order to purchase airline tickets from the other airlines as
evidenced by the cash vouchers (Exhibits "B", "C" and "C-1 to C-7") for the 93 workers it
had recruited who must leave immediately since the visas of said workers are valid only
for 45 days and the Bureau of Employment Services mandates that contract workers must
be sent to the job site within a period of 30 days.
Sometime in the first week of June, 1981, private respondent was again informed by the
petitioner that it had received a prepaid ticket advice from its Jeddah branch for the
transportation of 27 contract workers. Immediatety, private respondent instructed its
travel agent to book the 27 contract workers with the petitioner but the latter was only
able to book and confirm 16 seats on its June 9, 1981 flight. However, on the date of the
scheduled flight only 9 workers were able to board said flight while the remaining 7
workers were rebooked to June 30, 1981 which bookings were again cancelled by the
petitioner without any prior notice to either private respondent or the workers. Thereafter,
the 7 workers were rebooked to the July 4,1981 flight of petitioner with 6 more workers
booked for said flight. Unfortunately, the confirmed bookings of the 13 workers were
again cancelled and rebooked to July 7, 1981.
On July 6, 1981, private respondent paid the travel tax of the said workers as required by
the petitioner but when the receipt of the tax payments was submitted, the latter
informed private respondent that it can only confirm the seats of the 12 workers on its July
7, 1981 flight. However, the confirmed seats of said workers were again cancelled without
any prior notice either to the private respondent or said workers. The 12 workers were
finally able to leave for Jeddah after private respondent had bought tickets from the
other airlines.
As a result of these incidents, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner demanding
compensation for the damages it had incurred by the latter's repeated failure to
transport its contract workers despite confirmed bookings and payment of the
corresponding travel taxes.
On July 23, 1981, the counsel of private respondent sent another letter to the petitioner
demanding the latter to pay the amount of P350,000.00 representing damages and
unrealized profit or income which was denied by the petitioner.
On August 8, 1981, private respondent received a telex message from its principal
cancelling the hiring of the remaining recruited workers due to the delay in transporting
the workers to Jeddah.5
On January 27, 1982, private respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 82-4653.
On the other hand, petitioner, alleged in its Answer with counterclaims that it received a
telex message from Jeddah on March 20, 1981 advising that the principal of private
respondent had prepaid the airfares of 100 persons to transport private respondent's
contract workers from Manila to Jeddah on or before March 30, 1981. However, due to
the unavailability of space and limited time, petitioner had to return to its sponsor in
Jeddah the prepaid ticket advice consequently not even one of the alleged 93 contract
workers were booked in any of its flights.
On June 5, 1981, petitioner received another prepaid ticket advice to transport 16
contract workers of private respondent to Jeddah but the travel agent of the private
respondent booked only 10 contract workers for petitioner's June 9, 1981 flight. However,
only 9 contract workers boarded the scheduled flight with 1 passenger not showing up as
evidenced by the Philippine Airlines' passenger manifest for Flight BA-020 (Exhibit "7", "7-A",
"7-B" and "7-C").6
Thereafter, private respondent's travel agent booked seats for 5 contract workers on
petitioner's July 4, 1981 flight but said travel agent cancelled the booking of 2 passengers
while the other 3 passengers did not show up on said flight.
Sometime in July 1981, the travel agent of the private respondent booked 7 more
contract workers in addition to the previous 5 contract workers who were not able to
board the July 4, 1981 flight with the petitioner's July 7, 1981 flight which was accepted by
petitioner subject to reconfirmation.
However on July 6, 1981, petitioner's computer system broke down which resulted to
petitioner's failure to get a reconfirmation from Saudi Arabia Airlines causing the
automatic cancellation of the bookings of private respondent's 12 contract workers. In
the morning of July 7, 1981, the computer system of the petitioner was reinstalled and
immediately petitioner tried to reinstate the bookings of the 12 workers with either Gulf Air
or Saudi Arabia Airlines but both airlines replied that no seat was available on that date
and had to place the 12 workers on the wait list. Said information was duly relayed to the
private respondent and the 12 workers before the scheduled flight.
After due trial on or on August 27, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court renders judgment:
 1. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the sum of
P308,016.00;
2. Ordering defendant to pay moral damages to the plaintiff in the amount of
P20,000.00;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff P10,000.00 by way of corrective or
exemplary damages;
4. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff 30% of its total claim for and as
attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs.7
On March 13, 1986, petitioner appealed said decision to respondent appellate court
after the trial court denied its Motion for Reconsideration on February 28, 1986.
On November 15, 1989, respondent appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs
against the appellant.8
On December 9, 1989, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also
denied.
Hence, this petition.
It is the contention of petitioner that private respondent has no cause of action against it
there being no perfected contract of carriage existing between them as no ticket was
ever issued to private respondent's contract workers and, therefore, the obligation of the
petitioner to transport said contract workers did not arise. Furthermore, private
respondent's failure to attach any ticket in the complaint further proved that it was never
a party to the alleged transaction.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
Private respondent had a valid cause of action for damages against petitioner. A cause
of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other.9 Petitioner's repeated failures to transport private respondent's workers in its flight
despite confirmed booking of said workers clearly constitutes breach of contract and
bad faith on its part. In resolving petitioner's theory that private respondent has no cause
of action in the instant case, the appellate court correctly held that:
In dealing with the contract of common carriage of passengers for purpose of
accuracy, there are two (2) aspects of the same, namely: (a) the contract "to carry
(at some future time)," which contract is consensual and is necessarily perfected by
mere consent (See Article 1356, Civil Code of the Philippines), and (b) the contract
"of carriage" or "of common carriage" itself which should be considered as a real
contract for not until the carrier is actually used can the carrier be said to have
already assumed the obligation of a carrier. (Paras, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. V, p.
429, Eleventh Ed.)
In the instant case, the contract "to carry" is the one involved which is consensual
and is perfected by the mere consent of the parties.
There is no dispute as to the appellee's consent to the said contract "to carry" its
contract workers from Manila to Jeddah. The appellant's consent thereto, on the
other hand, was manifested by its acceptance of the PTA or prepaid ticket advice
that ROLACO Engineering has prepaid the airfares of the appellee's contract workers
advising the appellant that it must transport the contract workers on or before the
end of March, 1981 and the other batch in June, 1981.
Even if a PTA is merely an advice from the sponsors that an airline is authorized to
issue a ticket and thus no ticket was yet issued, the fact remains that the passage
had already been paid for by the principal of the appellee, and the appellant had
accepted such payment. The existence of this payment was never objected to nor
questioned by the appellant in the lower court. Thus, the cause or consideration
which is the fare paid for the passengers exists in this case.
The third essential requisite of a contract is an object certain. In this contract "to
carry", such an object is the transport of the passengers from the place of departure
to the place of destination as stated in the telex.
Accordingly, there could be no more pretensions as to the existence of an oral
contract of carriage imposing reciprocal obligations on both parties.
In the case of appellee, it has fully complied with the obligation, namely, the
payment of the fare and its willingness for its contract workers to leave for their place
of destination.
On the other hand, the facts clearly show that appellant was remiss in its obligation
to transport the contract workers on their flight despite confirmation and bookings
made by appellee's travelling agent.
xxx xxx xxx
Besides, appellant knew very well that time was of the essence as the prepaid ticket
advice had specified the period of compliance therewith, and with emphasis that it
could only be used if the passengers fly on BA. Under the circumstances, the
appellant should have refused acceptance of the PTA from appellee's principal or to
at least inform appellee that it could not accommodate the contract workers.
xxx xxx xxx
While there is no dispute that ROLACO Engineering advanced the payment for the
airfares of the appellee's contract workers who were recruited for ROLACO
Engineering and the said contract workers were the intended passengers in the
aircraft of the appellant, the said contract "to carry" also involved the appellee for as
recruiter he had to see to it that the contract workers should be transported to
ROLACO Engineering in Jeddah thru the appellant's transportation. For that matter,
the involvement of the appellee in the said contract "to carry" was well
demonstrated when
the appellant upon receiving the PTA immediately advised the appellee thereof. 10
Petitioner also contends that the appellate court erred in awarding actual damages in
the amount of P308,016.00 to private respondent since all expenses had already been
subsequently reimbursed by the latter's principal.
In awarding actual damages to private respondent, the appellate court held that the
amount of P308,016.00 representing actual damages refers to private respondent's
second cause of action involving the expenses incurred by the latter which were not
reimbursed by ROLACO Engineering. However, in the Complaint 11 filed by private
respondent, it was alleged that private respondent suffered actual damages in the
amount of P308,016.00 representing the money it borrowed from friends and financiers
which is P304,416.00 for the 93 airline tickets and P3,600.00 for the travel tax of the 12
workers. It is clear therefore that the actual damages private respondent seeks to
recover are the airline tickets and travel taxes it spent for its workers which were already
reimbursed by its principal and not for any other expenses it had incurred in the process
of recruiting said contract workers. Inasmuch as all expenses including the processing
fees incurred by private respondent had already been paid for by the latter's principal on
a staggered basis as admitted in open court by its managing director, Mrs. Bienvenida
Brusellas. 12 We do not find anymore justification in the appellate court's decision in
granting actual damages to private respondent.
Thus, while it may be true that private respondent was compelled to borrow money for
the airfare tickets of its contract workers when petitioner failed to transport said workers,
the reimbursements made by its principal to private respondent failed to support the
latter's claim that it suffered actual damages as a result of petitioner's failure to transport
said workers. It is undisputed that private respondent had consistently admitted that its
principal had reimbursed all its expenses.
Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that:
Except as provided by law or by stipulations, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Furthermore, actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly
proved, and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must
depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on evidence of the actual
amount thereof. 13
However, private respondent is entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages
for the injury suffered as a result of petitioner's failure to transport the former's workers
because of the latter's patent bad faith in the performance of its obligation. As correctly
pointed out by the appellate court:
As evidence had proved, there was complete failure on the part of the appellant
to transport the 93 contract workers of the appellee on or before March 30, 1981
despite receipt of the payment for their airfares, and acceptance of the same by
the appellant, with specific instructions from the appellee's principal to transport
the contract workers on or before March 30, 1981. No previous notice was ever
registered by the appellant that it could not comply with the same. And then
followed the detestable act of appellant in unilaterally cancelling, booking and
rebooking unreasonably the flight of appellee's contract workers in June to July,
1981 without prior notice. And all of these actuations of the appellant indeed
constitute malice and evident bad faith which had caused damage and
besmirched the reputation and business image of the appellee. 14
As to the alleged damages suffered by the petitioner as stated in its counterclaims, the
record shows that no claim for said damages was ever made by the petitioner
immediately after their alleged occurrence therefore said counterclaims were mere
afterthoughts when private respondent filed the present case.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
award of actual damages be deleted from said decision.
SO ORDERED.
British Airways, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 12th Division, First International Trading and
General Services, G.R. No. 92288 February 9, 1993, Nocon, J.
FACTS:
 First International Trading and General Services Co. – duly licensed domestic recruitment
and placement agency; it received a telex message from its principal ROLACO
Engineering and Contracting Services in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to recruit Filipino contract
workers in behalf of said principal
 ROLACO paid to the Jeddah branch of petitioner British Airways, Inc. airfare tickets for
93 contract workers with specific instruction to transport said workers to Jeddah on or
before March 30, 1981
 March 1981: First International was informed by British Airways that ROLACO had
forwarded 93 prepaid tickets; First International instructed its travel agent, ADB Travel and
Tours. Inc., to book the 93 workers with petitioner but the latter failed to fly said workers,
thereby compelling private respondent to borrow money in the amount of P304,416.00
in order to purchase airline tickets from the other airlines for the 93 workers it had recruited
who must leave immediately since the visas of said workers are valid only for 45 days and
the Bureau of Employment Services mandates that contract workers must be sent to the
job site within a period of 30 days
 June 1981: First International was again informed by British Airways that it had received a
prepaid ticket advice from its Jeddah branch for the transportation of 27 contract
workers; First International instructed its travel agent to book the 27 contract workers with
the petitioner but the latter was only able to book and confirm 16 seats on its June 9,
1981 flight; on the date of the scheduled flight only 9 workers were able to board said
flight while the remaining 7 workers were rebooked to June 30, 1981 which bookings were
again cancelled by the petitioner without any prior notice to either private respondent
or the workers; thereafter, the 7 workers were rebooked to the July 4,1981 flight of
petitioner with 6 more workers booked for said flight; but the confirmed bookings of the
13 workers were again cancelled and rebooked to July 7, 1981
 First International paid the travel tax of the said workers as required by British Airways but
when the receipt of the tax payments was submitted, the latter informed First
International that it can only confirm the seats of the 12 workers on its July 7, 1981 flight;
but the confirmed seats of said workers were again cancelled without any prior notice
either to First International or said workers; the 12 workers were finally able to leave for
Jeddah after First International had bought tickets from the other airlines
 July 1981: First International sent a letter to petitioner demanding compensation for the
damages in the amount of P350,000.00 it had incurred by the latter’s repeated failure to
transport its contract workers despite confirmed bookings and payment of the
corresponding travel taxes
 British Airways’ narration:
 it received a telex message from Jeddah advising that ROLACO had prepaid the airfares
of 100 persons to transport First International’s contract workers from Manila to Jeddah
on or before March 30, 1981; however, due to the unavailability of space and limited
time, it had to return to its sponsor in Jeddah the prepaid ticket advice consequently not
even one of the alleged 93 contract workers were booked in any of its flights
 June 1981: British Airways received another prepaid ticket advice to transport 16
contract workers of First International to Jeddah but the travel agent of First International
booked only 10 contract workers for British Airways’ June 9, 1981 flight; however, only 9
contract workers boarded the scheduled flight with 1 passenger not showing up as
evidenced by the Philippine Airlines’ passenger manifest
 First International’s travel agent booked seats for 5 contract workers on British Airways’
July 4, 1981 flight but said travel agent cancelled the booking of 2 passengers while the
other 3 passengers did not show up on said flight
 July 1981: the travel agent of First International booked 7 more contract workers in
addition to the previous 5 contract workers who were not able to board the July 4, 1981
flight with British Airways’ July 7, 1981 flight which was accepted by British Airways subject
to reconfirmation
 July 1981: British Airways’ computer system broke down which resulted to its failure to get
a reconfirmation from Saudi Arabia Airlines causing the automatic cancellation of the
bookings of First International’s 12 contract workers; the computer system of the
petitioner was reinstalled the next day and immediately British Airways tried to reinstate
the bookings of the 12 workers with either Gulf Air or Saudi Arabia Airlines but both airlines
replied that no seat was available on that date and had to place the 12 workers on the
wait list; said information was duly relayed to the First International and the 12 workers
before the scheduled flight
ISSUE: WON British Airways is liable HELD: Yes. Its repeated failures to transport First
International’s workers in its flight despite confirmed booking of said workers clearly
constitutes breach of contract and bad faith on its part.
 two aspects of contract of common carriage of passengers:
 a. contract to carry at some future time –consensual and is necessarily perfected by
mere consent
 b. contract of carriage or of common carriage itself –real contract for not until the carrier
is actually used can the carrier be said to have already assumed the obligation of a
carrier
 contract to carry was involved in the case; its elements are consent, consideration and
object certain
 CONSENT: British Airways consent to the contract was manifested by its acceptance of
the PTA or prepaid ticket advice that ROLACO has prepaid the airfares of the First
International’s contract workers advising the appellant that it must transport the contract
workers on or before the end of March, 1981 and the other batch in June, 1981
 CONSIDERATION: the fare paid for the passengers by the principal of First International
 OBJECT CERTAIN: the transport of the passengers from the place of departure to the
place of destination
 First International has fully complied with the obligation, namely, the payment of the fare
and its willingness for its contract workers to leave for their place of destination.
 On the other hand, British Airways was remiss in its obligation to transport the contract
workers on their flight despite confirmation and bookings made by First International’s
travelling agent. British Airways should have refused acceptance of the PTA from by First
International’s principal or to at least inform by First International that it could not
accommodate the contract workers.
G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003]
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD,
Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60720, entitled Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo
Roman, et. al., which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability
and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on
account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing
payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks,
Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist
fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who,
between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the
exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad,
along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo
Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the
death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-
claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that
it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of
presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that
Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its
decision; it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs the following:
a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
d) Costs of suit.
The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of
merit.
The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed.[1]
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court
promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death
of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable
thusly:
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants
from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman
and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby
directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.[2]
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet
boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim
entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and
getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court
stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said
that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the
evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been
hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The
appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish
the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10
October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate
court; viz:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS
OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN
IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA.[3]
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the
factual findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping
conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not
overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused the
latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or
prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate courts conclusion on the existence of
an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because
Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a
contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the
LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and
protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held
LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary
diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost
diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.[4] The Civil Code, governing the liability of a
common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
a due regard for all the circumstances.
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.[5] Such duty of a
common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course
of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought
to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.[6] The statutory provisions render a common
carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts
of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission.[7] In case of such death or injury, a carrier
is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and [8] by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of
its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure.[9] In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the
carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court,
have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,[10] an exception
from the general rule that negligence must be proved.[11]
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake
the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the
contract of carriage.
 Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort
under the provisions of Article 2176 [12] and related provisions, in conjunction with Article
2180,[13] of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or
fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then
be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The
liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a
showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the
one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 2194[14] of the Civil Code can well apply.[15]In fine, a liability for tort may
arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. [16] Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the
parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the
rules on tort to apply.[17]
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late
Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
that there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that
the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x. This finding of the
appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records of
the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the
contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the
latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[18] It is an established rule that nominal
damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.[19]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b)
petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs. SO ORDERED.
LRTA V. Navidad (2003), G.R. No. 145804, 02/06/2003
Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (transportation)
Laws Cited: Art. 1755,Art. 1756,Art. 1759,Art. 1763
FACTS:
 October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m. : Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor) entered the EDSA LRT
station after purchasing a “token”.
 While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the guard Junelito
Escartin approached him.
 Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight
 Nicanor fell on the tracks and killed instantaneously upon being hit by a moving train
operated by Rodolfo Roman
 December 8, 1994: The widow of Nicanor, along with her children, filed a complaint
for damages against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org. Inc. and Prudent
(agency of security guards) for the death of her husband.
 LRTA and Roman filed a counter-claim against Nicanor and a cross-claim against
Escartin and Prudent
 Prudent: denied liability – averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection
and surpervision of its security guards
 LRTA and Roman: presented evidence
 Prudent and Escartin: demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that
Escartin was negligent in his assigned task
 RTC: In favour of widow and against Prudent and Escartin, complaint against LRT and
Roman were dismissed for lack of merit
 CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held LRTA and Roman liable
ISSUE: W/N LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract of carriage
HELD: NO. Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal damages is DELETED (CANNOT co-
exist w/ compensatory damages) (b) Roman is absolved.
 Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty off exercising
utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers
 Civil Code: Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances
 Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
 Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or wilful acts of the former’s employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers
 This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
 Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father
of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
 Carriers presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier
or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is
due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure
 Where it hires its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task, the common carrier is NOT relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage
 GR: Prudent can be liable only for tort under Art. 2176 and related provisions in
conjunction with Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (Tort may arise even under a contract,
where tort [quasi-delict liability] is that which breaches the contract)
 EX: if employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee,
employer can be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the
employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
 EX to the EX: Upon showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee
 Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent and the death of Nicanor for the
reason that the negligence of Escartin was NOT proven
 NO showing that Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also
be absolved from liability
 Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is NOT itself a juridical relation bet. Nicanor and
Roman
 Roman can be liable only for his own fault or negligence
LRTA V. Navidad (2003), G.R. No. 145804, 02/06/2003
FACTS:
On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on
the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached Navidad and a misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact
moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
A complaint for damages was then filed against Escartin, Roman, the LRTA, the Metro
Transit Organization Inc. and Prudent for the death of Navidad. The RTC then held that
Prudent and Escartin were liable and it ordered them to pay jointly and severally the
damages for the death of Navidad.
On appeal, the CA exonerated Prudent and Escartin from any liability for the death of
Navidad and held that LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable. It ruled that the
contract of carriage had already existed when Navidad entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding
token therefor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRTA and Roman are liable for the death of Navidad.
RULING:
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common
carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the
trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage. Thus, in this case, the foundation of LRTA’s liability is
the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach
of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the
common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a
carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or
an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the
contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the
latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.