G.R. No.

110315 January 16, 1998

RENATO CUDIA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON. CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner assails the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 1993 dismissing his petition and finding that he had not been
placed in double jeopardy by the filing of a second information against him, although a first information charging the same offense
had been previously dismissed, over petitioner's vigorous opposition.

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez, Mabalacat, 2 Pampanga, by members of the then 174th
PC Company, allegedly for possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, where he
was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter conducted by an investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the
City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 11542, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control one
(1) .38 Cal. Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number with six (6) live ammunitions, which he carried outside of his residence
without having the necessary authority and permit to carry the same.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 3 (Emphasis petitioner's.)

The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City (hereafter the Angeles City RTC). Upon his arraignment
on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the
parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City.
Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the judges of the Angeles City RTC as to who would handle cases involving
crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to criminal cases
involving crimes committed outside of the city. Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.

On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging petitioner with the same
crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was likewise raffled to
Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 11542 to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw
the Information, stating "that thru inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the Information
in this case, it appearing that the apprehension of the accused in connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm and
ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta. Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga" 4
and that the Provincial Prosecutor had filed its own information against the accused, as a result of which two separate informations
for the same offense had been filed against petitioner. The latter filed his opposition to the motion, but the trial court nonetheless,
granted said motion to dismiss in its order dated April 3, 1990.

On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the ground that his continued prosecution for the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition — for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which
had been dismissed despite his opposition — would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the ground that the petition could not have been convicted under
the first information as the same was defective. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.
Petitioner points out the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF ANGELES CITY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY
TO FILE THE FIRST INFORMATION.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRST JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH BECAUSE THE FIRST INFORMATION
FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED WAS NOT VALID.

We shall discuss the assigned errors jointly as they are closely related.

Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense . . ." Pursuant to this provision, Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides in part that "(w)hen an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, . . . "

In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. 5

In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the existence of the following:

(a) Court of competent jurisdiction

(b) Valid complaint or information

(c) Arraignment

(d) Valid plea

(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. 6

It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he pleaded "not guilty" therein, and that the same
was dismissed without his express consent, nay, over his opposition even. We may thus limit the discussion to determining whether
the first two requisites have been met.

As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for jurisdiction to try the case is essential to
place an accused in jeopardy. The Court of Appeals and the Solicitor General agreed that Branch 60, which originally had cognizance
of Criminal Case No. 11542, had no jurisdiction over the case. In the words of the Solicitor General:

The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City was not the proper venue for
hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction (Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA
699). In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the
offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77). Although both
Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses committed in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Petitioner was arraigned before Branch 60, not Branch 56. 7

It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before it must be resolved on the basis of the
law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, and Section 4 of Executive Order
No. 864 of the President of the Philippines, dated January 17, 1983, the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Region One to
Twelve are hereby defined as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

PAMPANGA

xxx xxx xxx

1. Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City — comprising ANGELES CITY and the municipalities of Mabalacat,
Magalang, and Porac as well as part of Clark Field U.S. Airbase.

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned. Consequently, notwithstanding the internal
arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in lawbooks
in the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any trial court.

With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file
the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction.
Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:

Sec. 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances
within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused.
In the conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses
summoned by subpoena for the purpose.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses committed
within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be
filed by another. 8 It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court
does not acquire jurisdiction. 9

Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing the information in question is
deemed a waiver thereof. 10 As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's plea to an information before he filed a
motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear
implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, 11 questions relating to want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other
requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be
cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent. 12

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint
or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been
sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information,
the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a
defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. 13

Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the investigating panel and the same should
not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all too familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or
inadvertence of its officials and employees. 14 To rule otherwise could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection
to the community, and give rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.
Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should have been the remedy sought by
the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals 15 has ruled that even if amendment is proper,
pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an information
may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.

In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the
first information meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength thereof.

As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure to
comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 24958 is
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 202122 January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEOANRDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the January 19, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 03794, which affirmed in toto the conviction for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness meted out by Branch 113, Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 04-1556-CFM and 04-1557-CFM.2

On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape. The Informations for the three charges read
as follows:

I. For the two counts of Rape:

Criminal Case No. 04-15 5 6-CFM

That on or about and sometime in the month of February, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the common law spouse of the minor victim’s
mother, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual
assault upon the person of [AAA3], a minor 13 years of age, by then and there mashing her breast and inserting his finger inside her
vagina against her will.4

Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM

That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the stepfather of [AAA], a minor 13 years of age,
through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said minor
against her will.5

II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:

Criminal Case No. 04-1558-CFM

That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, being the common law spouse of minor victim’s mother by means of
force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of
Rape against the person of minor, [AAA], a13 years old minor by then and there crawling towards her direction where she was
sleeping, putting off her skirt, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produce[d] the crime of rape for the
reason other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is the timely arrival of minor victim’s mother who confronted the accused,
and which acts of child abuse debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of said minor complainant as a
human being.6

On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him.7 After the completion of the
pre-trial conference on September 16, 2004,8 trial on the merits ensued.

The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse took place on three (3) different dates,
particularly [in December 2003], February 2004, and March 27, 2004.
AAA’s parents separated when she was [only eight years old9]. At the time of the commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA
was living with her mother and with herein accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother,
together with three (3) of their children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.

The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAA’s mother was not in the house and was with her
relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation, [Pareja], while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja],
who was already naked, begun to undress AAA. [Pareja] then started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise
inserted his penis into AAA’s anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of
their house.

Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003] incident for fear that [Pareja] might kill her.
[Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would expose the incident to anyone.

AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than once. According to AAA, in February 2004 [the
February 2004 incident], she had again been molested by [Pareja]. Under the same circumstances as the [December 2003 incident],
with her mother not around while she and her half-siblings were asleep, [Pareja] again laid on top of her and started to suck her
breasts. But this time, [Pareja] caressed [her] and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.

With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAA’s mother who saw [Pareja] in the act of
lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAA’s mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay
officers to report the said incident. AAA then narrated to the barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x
many times x x x.

Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital for a
medical and genital examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional Medico-Legal Report Number 2004-03-0091. Her
medico-legal report stated the following conclusion:

Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5-7 o’clock area, Type of hymen: Crescentic

xxxx

Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.

After the results of the medico-legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAA’s mother then filed a complaint for rape
before the Pasay City Police Station.

To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against him as his defense. He denied raping
[AAA] but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his live-in partner and that they all stay in the same house.

Contrary to AAA’s allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible that the alleged incidents happened. To justify
the same, [Pareja] described the layout of their house and argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual abuses could have
happened.

According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by ten (10) meters, and was so small that they
all have to sit to be able to fit inside the house. Further, the vicinity where their house is located was thickly populated with houses
constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to sleep beside her siblings.

All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly still go about with his plan without
AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.

Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled against him by AAA. He contended that AAA filed
these charges against him only as an act of revenge because AAA was mad at [him] for being the reason behind her parents’
separation.10

Ruling of the RTC

On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him of the crimes of rape and acts
of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents, respectively. The dispositive portion of the Decision11 reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from the charge of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 04-
1558, for want of evidence.

In Crim. Case No. 04-1556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of Lasciviousness and he is meted out the penalty of
imprisonment, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision [correccional] as maximum.

In Crim. Case No. 04-1557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape, and he is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.

The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment, in case of
insolvency.12

The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more weight to the prosecution’s evidence as
against Pareja’s baseless denial and imputation of ill motive. However, due to the failure of the prosecution to present AAA’s mother
to testify about what she had witnessed in March 2004, the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the crime of Attempted Rape in the March
2004 incident for lack of evidence. The RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis of AAA’s testimony for being hearsay evidence as
she had no personal knowledge of what happened on March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that time.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed13 to the Court of Appeals, which on January 19, 2012, affirmed in toto the
judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 04-1556 and 04-1557, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and, consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed
Decisions rendered by Branch 113 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region in Pasay City on January 16, 2009
in Criminal Cases Nos. 04-1556 to 04-1557 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14

Issues

Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court15 and posited before us the following errors as he did before the Court of Appeals:

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS
NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED SOLELY ON THE PROSECUTION WITNESS’ TESTIMONY.16

In his Supplemental Brief17 Pareja added the following argument:

The private complainant’s actuations after the incident negate the possibility that she was raped.18

Pareja’s main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony of AAA in convicting him for rape and acts of
lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is attacking the credibility of AAA for being inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if
nothing happened after the alleged sexual abuse.

Ruling of this Court

This Court finds no reason to reverse Pareja’s conviction.

Core Issue: Credibility of AAA

Pareja claims that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was riddled with inconsistencies.19

We find such argument untenable.

When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain guidelines that have overtime been
established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez,20 we enumerated them as follows:

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in
directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine
the truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing
court is generally bound by the lower court’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the
outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. (Citations omitted.)

The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court
judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied
appellate courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon
this Court."21 While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to overturn the identical
conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility.

Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally expected.22 As this Court stated in People v.
Saludo23:

Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an offense is not analogous to a person’s
achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds
and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget.
Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying
experience she had undergone. (Citation omitted.)

Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a
standard in testing the credibility of a witness.24 The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential matters
that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident
is not even a matter pertaining to AAA’s ordeal.25 The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes important
only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of
conviction. In other words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of
the complainant’s narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime."26 Moreover, the date of the commission
of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.27

In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v. Ladrillo,28 implying that our rulings therein are applicable to his
case. However, the factual circumstances in Ladrillo are prominently missing in Pareja’s case. In particular, the main factor for
Ladrillo’s acquittal in that case was because his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him was violated when the Information against him only stated that the crime was committed "on or about the year 1992." We said:

The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the Rules Court which requires that the time
of the commission of the offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as the information or complaint will permit. More
importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The Information is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accused-appellant of the date on
which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed.
The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve (12) months of 1992 but includes the years prior and
subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which accused-appellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the
failure of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to prove
during the trial the date of the commission of the offense as alleged in the Information, deprived accused-appellant of his right to
intelligently prepare for his defense and convincingly refute the charges against him. At most, accused-appellant could only establish
his place of residence in the year indicated in the Information and not for the particular time he supposedly committed the rape.

xxxx

Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that accused-appellant raped complainant in 1992
manifestly shows that the date of the commission of the offense as alleged was based merely on speculation and conjecture, and a
conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed on the date and place indicated in the Information.29 (Citation omitted.)

In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents were not specified, the period of time Pareja had
to account for was fairly short, unlike "on or about the year 1992." Moreover, Ladrillo was able to prove that he had only moved in
the house where the rape supposedly happened, in 1993, therefore negating the allegation that he raped the victim in that house in
1992.30

While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim in Ladrillo contributed to his eventual acquittal, this
Court said that they alone were not enough to reverse Ladrillo’s conviction, viz:

Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness’ testimony that militates heavily against its being accorded the
full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court’s
judgment of conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in relation to the testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and
fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment.31 (Emphasis supplied.)

It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the crime charged against him to exculpate him from
liability. He also had an alibi, which, together with the other evidence, produced reasonable doubt that he committed the crime as
charged. In contrast, Pareja merely denied the accusations against him and even imputed ill motive on AAA.

As regards Pareja’s concern about AAA’s lone testimony being the basis of his conviction, this Court has held:

Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears
to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule
requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case.32 (Citations omitted.)

Improbability of sexual abuse

in their small house and in the
presence of AAA’s sleeping siblings

Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA, considering that their house was so small that they had to
sleep beside each other, that in fact, when the alleged incidents happened, AAA was sleeping beside her younger siblings, who
would have noticed if anything unusual was happening.33

This Court is not convinced. Pareja’s living conditions could have prevented him from acting out on his beastly desires, but they did
not. This Court has observed that many of the rape cases appealed to us were not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no
respecter of time or place,34 and rape defies constraints of time and space. In People v. Sangil, Sr.,35 we expounded on such
occurrence in this wise:

In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples with big families living in small quarters,
copulation does not seem to be a problem despite the presence of other persons around them. Considering the cramped space and
meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the
attention of family members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with them around even
when asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the
sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep more soundly than grown-ups and are not
easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in appellant’s contention that there can be no
rape in a room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly
declared that "lust is no respecter of time and place," and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places. (Citations
omitted.)

Demeanor of AAA
as a rape victim

Pareja asseverates that AAA’s demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was raped. He said that "the ordinary Filipina [would
have summoned] every ounce of her strength and courage to thwart any attempt to besmirch her honor and blemish her purity."
Pareja pointed out that they lived in a thickly populated area such that any commotion inside their house would have been easily
heard by the neighbors, thus, giving AAA the perfect opportunity to seek their help.36 Moreover, Pareja said, AAA’s delay in
reporting the incidents to her mother or the authorities negates the possibility that he indeed committed the crimes. AAA’s belated
confession, he claimed, "cannot be dismissed as trivial as it puts into serious doubt her credibility."37

A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting the blame on the victim for failing to
manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court has recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a
person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape. Even
lack of resistance will not imply that the victim has consented to the sexual act, especially when that person was intimidated into
submission by the accused. In cases where the rape is committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law
spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence.38 In this case, AAA’s lack of resistance was brought about by her
fear that Pareja would make good on his threat to kill her if she ever spoke of the incident.

AAA’s conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is also not enough to discredit her. Victims of
a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in accordance with society’s expectations. It is unreasonable
to demand a standard rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to act as
usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover,
it is wrong to say that there is a standard reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope
with different circumstances.39

Likewise, AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper authorities is insignificant and does not affect the
veracity of her charges. It should be remembered that Pareja threatened to kill her if she told anyone of the incidents. In People v.
Ogarte,40 we explained why a rape victim’s deferral in reporting the crime does not equate to falsification of the accusation, to wit:

The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or to report the matter to the
authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually molested and that her charges against the accused
are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of
rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their
shame to the world or risk the offenders’ making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims. (Citation omitted.)

Medical examination
not indispensable

Pareja avers that the Medico-Legal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma upon examination
of AAA’s hymen, "cannot be given any significance, as it failed to indicate how and when the said signs of physical trauma were
inflicted." Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that AAA’s hymen sustained trauma cannot be utilized as evidence against him as
the alleged sexual abuse that occurred in December, was not by penetration of the vagina.41

This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim. In
People v. Colorado,42 we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. x x x.

Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at the time she was examined is of no
consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination actually bolsters AAA’s claim of being raped by Pareja on more than one
occasion, and not just by anal penetration. However, as the prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and prove the
incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.

In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:

This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering
that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and
thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the
wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years,
one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.
(Citations omitted.)

Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM:

The December 2003 Incident

In Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was charged and convicted of the crime of rape by sexual
assault. The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, revolutionized the concept of rape with the
recognition of sexual violence on "sex-related" orifices other than a woman’s organ is included in the crime of rape; and the crime’s
expansion to cover gender-free rape. "The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons
and the introduction of rape by ‘sexual assault’ as differentiated from the traditional ‘rape through carnal knowledge’ or ‘rape
through sexual intercourse.’"44 Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article 335, the provision on rape in the Revised Penal Code and
incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present;

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.

Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:

1. Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as "organ rape" or "penile rape."45 The central
element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.46

2. Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called "instrument or object rape," or "gender-free rape."47 It
must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.48

In People v. Abulon,49 this Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as follows:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be a man or a woman;

(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended party may be a man or a woman;

(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the second is committed by inserting the
penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and

(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.

Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual assault is "by any person who, under any of
the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person."

AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis into her anus. While she may not have been
certain about the details of the February 2004 incident, she was positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus,
clearly establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other words, her testimony on this account was, as the Court of
Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable.50

However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape through carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be
found guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during trial. This is due to the material differences and substantial
distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa.
Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge,
would be to violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.51

Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the variance doctrine embodied in Section
4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,52 to wit:

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.

Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under
any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prisión correccional.

The elements of the above crime are as follows:

(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and

(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.53 (Citation omitted.)
Clearly, the above-mentioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident, and were sufficiently established during trial.
Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts
of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.54

Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity to remind the State, the People of the Philippines, as represented by the
public prosecutor, to exert more diligence in crafting the Information, which contains the charge against an accused. The primary
duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is to see that justice is done55 – to the State, that its penal laws are not broken and order
maintained; to the victim, that his or her rights are vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly punished for his crime. A faulty
and defective Information, such as that in Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM, does not render full justice to the State, the offended
party, and even the offender. Thus, the public prosecutor should always see to it that the Information is accurate and appropriate.

Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM:

The February 2004 Incident

It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the prosecution against Pareja, especially AAA’s
testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found AAA’s declaration on the rape in the December 2003 incident credible enough to result in a
conviction, albeit this Court had to modify it as explained above. However, it did not find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond
reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied by the prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a second count of rape against Pareja. In
Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM, or the February 2004 incident, the RTC considered AAA’s confusion as to whether or not she was
actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually resolved the matter in Pareja’s favor.

This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated that aside from sucking her breasts, Pareja also
inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not able to give a clear and convincing account of such insertion during her
testimony. Despite being repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what followed after her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to
testify, in open court, that Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later on, she added that Pareja inserted his penis
in her vagina during that incident. Thus, because of the material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in
the February 2004 incident. Nonetheless, Pareja’s acts of placing himself on top of AAA and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime
of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed above, is included in the crime of rape.

Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked both her breasts in the February 2004 incident.
Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the courts a quo of the crime of acts of lasciviousness.

Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive

Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him, coupled with the attribution of ill motive against AAA. He claims
that AAA filed these cases against him because she was angry that he caused her parents’ separation. Pareja added that these cases
were initiated by AAA’s father, as revenge against him.57

Such contention is untenable. "AAA’s credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such imputation of ill motives.1âwphi1 It is
highly unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives or grudge."58 Furthermore, motives such
as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim.59
In People v. Manuel,60 we held:

Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private parts and subject
herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her
being. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.

Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness

The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is prisión correccional in its full range. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,61 the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty next
lower in degree,62 i.e., arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and 1 day to 6 months.63 The maximum of the indeterminate
penalty shall come from the proper penalty64 that could be imposed under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of Lasciviousness,65
which, in this case, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, is the medium period of prisión correccional, ranging from 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.66

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as follows: P20,000.00 as civil indemnity;67
P30,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,68 for each count of acts of lasciviousness. All amounts shall
bear legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03794 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. We find accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and
penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to two (2) indeterminate prison terms of 6
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the
victim, AAA, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of
acts of lasciviousness, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 201620 March 6, 2013

RAMONCITA O. SENADOR, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CYNTHIA JAIME, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the May 17, 2011 Decision 1 and March 30, 2012
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 00952.

In an Information dated August 5, 2002, petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador) was charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 32 in Dumaguete City with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, 3 viz:

That on or about the 10th day of September 2000 in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, having obtained and received from one Cynthia Jaime various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount
of P705,685.00 for the purpose of selling the same on consignment basis with express obligation to account for and remit the entire
proceeds of the sale if sold or to return the same if unsold within an agreed period of time and despite repeated demands therefor,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to remit proceeds of the sale of said items or to return any of the items
that may have been unsold to said Cynthia Jaime but instead has willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the same to his/her own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Cynthia Jaime in the aforementioned
amount of P705,685.00.4 (Emphasis supplied.)

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution’s evidence sought to prove the following facts: Rita Jaime (Rita) and her daughter-in-law, Cynthia Jaime (Cynthia),
were engaged in a jewelry business. Sometime in the first week of September 2000, Senador went to see Rita at her house in
Guadalupe Heights, Cebu City, expressing her interest to see the pieces of jewelry that the latter was selling. On September 10,
2000, Rita’s daughter-in-law and business partner, Cynthia, delivered to Senador several pieces of jewelry worth seven hundred five
thousand six hundred eighty five pesos (PhP 705,685).5

In the covering Trust Receipt Agreement signed by Cynthia and Senador, the latter undertook to sell the jewelry thus delivered on
commission basis and, thereafter, to remit the proceeds of the sale, or return the unsold items to Cynthia within fifteen (15) days
from the delivery.6 However, as events turned out, Senador failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale or return the unsold jewelry
within the given period.7

Thus, in a letter dated October 4, 2001, Rita demanded from Senador the return of the unsold jewelry or the remittance of the
proceeds from the sale of jewelry entrusted to her. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting Rita to file the instant criminal
complaint against Senador.8

During the preliminary investigation, Senador tendered to Rita Keppel Bank Check No. 0003603 dated March 31, 2001 for the
amount of PhP 705,685,9 as settlement of her obligations. Nonetheless, the check was later dishonored as it was drawn against a
closed account.10

Senador refused to testify and so failed to refute any of the foregoing evidence of the prosecution, and instead, she relied on the
defense that the facts alleged in the Information and the facts proven and established during the trial differ. In particular, Senador
asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is not the same person who made the demand and filed
the complaint. According to Senador, the private complainant in the Information went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas,
during trial, the private complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia Jaime was never presented as witness. Hence,
citing People v. Uba, et al.11 (Uba) and United States v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog (Lahoylahoy), 12 Senador would insist on her
acquittal on the postulate that her constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against her has been violated.
Despite her argument, the trial court, by Decision dated June 30, 2008, found Senador guilty as charged and sentenced as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds RAMONCITA SENADOR guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA under Par. 1 (b), Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional
as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the private complainants, RITA JA[I]ME and
CYNTHIA JAIME, the following: 1) Actual Damages in the amount of P695,685.00 with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the
Information until fully paid; 2) Exemplary Damages in the amount of P100,000.00; and 3) the amount of P50,000 as Attorney’s fees.

Senador questioned the RTC Decision before the CA. However, on May 17, 2011, the appellate court rendered a Decision upholding
the finding of the RTC that the prosecution satisfactorily established the guilt of Senador beyond reasonable doubt. The CA opined
that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the following undisputed facts, to wit: (1) Senador received the
pieces of jewelry in trust under the obligation or duty to return them; (2) Senador misappropriated or converted the pieces of
jewelry to her benefit but to the prejudice of business partners, Rita and Cynthia; and (3) Senador failed to return the pieces of
jewelry despite demand made by Rita.

Further, the CA––finding that Uba13 is not applicable since Senador is charged with estafa, a crime against property and not oral
defamation, as in Uba––ruled:

WHEREFORE, the June 30, 2008 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Dumaguete City, in Criminal Case No. 16010,
finding accused appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Senador filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated March 30, 2012. Hence, the present petition of
Senador.

The sole issue involved in the instant case is whether or not an error in the designation in the Information of the offended party
violates, as petitioner argues, the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal.

The petition is without merit.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the
prosecution does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal, 14 more so if the variance relates to the designation of the offended
party, a mere formal defect, which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused. 15

As correctly held by the appellate court, Senador’s reliance on Uba is misplaced. In Uba, the appellant was charged with oral
defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the identity of the person against whom the defamatory words were directed is a
material element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the person injured is material. On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was
charged with estafa, a crime against property that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper designation of the name
of the offended party. Rather, what is absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act charged in the
information.16 Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the
Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information, not its dismissal:

SEC. 12. Name of the offended party.—The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person against whom
or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If
there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.

(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.

(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or
ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against property, the materiality of the erroneous designation of the offended
party would depend on whether or not the subject matter of the offense was sufficiently described and identified.

Lahoylahoy cited by Senador supports the doctrine that if the subject matter of the offense is generic or one which is not described
with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous designation of the offended party is material
and would result in the violation of the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her. Such error, Lahoylahoy teaches, would result in the acquittal of the accused, viz:

The second sentence of section 7 of General Orders No. 58 declares that when an offense shall have been described with sufficient
certainty to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial. We are of the opinion that
this provision can have no application to a case where the name of the person injured is matter of essential description as in the
case at bar; and at any rate, supposing the allegation of ownership to be eliminated, the robbery charged in this case would not be
sufficiently identified. A complaint stating, as does the one now before us, that the defendants "took and appropriated to
themselves with intent of gain and against the will of the owner thereof the sum of P100" could scarcely be sustained in any
jurisdiction as a sufficient description either of the act of robbery or of the subject of the robbery. There is a saying to the effect that
money has no earmarks; and generally speaking the only way money, which has been the subject of a robbery, can be described or
identified in a complaint is by connecting it with the individual who was robbed as its owner or possessor. And clearly, when the
offense has been so identified in the complaint, the proof must correspond upon this point with the allegation, or there can be no
conviction.17 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Lahoylahoy, the subject matter of the offense was money in the total sum of PhP 100. Since money is generic and has no
earmarks that could properly identify it, the only way that it (money) could be described and identified in a complaint is by
connecting it to the offended party or the individual who was robbed as its owner or possessor. Thus, the identity of the offended
party is material and necessary for the proper identification of the offense charged. Corollary, the erroneous designation of the
offended party would also be material, as the subject matter of the offense could no longer be described with such particularity as
to properly identify the offense charged.

The holdings in United States v. Kepner, 18 Sayson v. People,19 and Ricarze v. Court of Appeals20 support the doctrine that if the
subject matter of the offense is specific or one described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then an
erroneous designation of the offended party is not material and would not result in the violation of the accused’s constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such error would not result in the acquittal of the accused.

In the 1902 case of Kepner, this Court ruled that the erroneous designation of the person injured by a criminal act is not material for
the prosecution of the offense because the subject matter of the offense, a warrant, was sufficiently identified with such
particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged. We held, thus:

The allegation of the complaint that the unlawful misappropriation of the proceeds of the warrant was to the prejudice of Aun Tan
may be disregarded by virtue of section 7 of General Orders, No. 58, which declares that when an offense shall have been described
in the complaint with sufficient certainty to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed
immaterial. In any event the defect, if defect it was, was one of form which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the
defendant on the merits, and can not, therefore, under the provisions of section 10 of the same order, affect the present
proceeding.21 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Sayson, this Court upheld the conviction of Sayson for attempted estafa, even if there was an erroneous allegation as to the
person injured because the subject matter of the offense, a check, is specific and sufficiently identified. We held, thus:

In U.S. v. Kepner x x x, this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient
certainty as to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere
formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which
had a factual backdrop similar to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation of the
proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the effect that the
unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which suffered a
loss, was held to be immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the complaint
with such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against
property under the Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the accused, that it
was established during the trial that the offended party was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America
as alleged in the information." 22 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Ricarze, We reiterated the doctrine espousing an erroneous designation of the person injured is not material because the subject
matter of the offense, a check, was sufficiently identified with such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense
charged.23

Interpreting the previously discussed cases, We conclude that in offenses against property, if the subject matter of the offense is
generic and not identifiable, such as the money unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of the offended
party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and
identifiable, such as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the designation of the offended
party is immaterial.

In the present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any other generic property. Instead, the
information specified the subject of the offense as "various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of P705,685.00." The charge
was thereafter sufficiently fleshed out and proved by the Trust Receipt Agreement 24 signed by Senador and presented during trial,
which enumerates these "various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of PhP 705,685," viz:

Quality Description

1 #1878 1 set rositas w/brills 14 kt. 8.5 grams

1 #2126 1 set w/brills 14 kt. 8.3 grams

1 #1416 1 set tri-color rositas w/brills 14 kt. 4.1 grams

1 #319 1 set creolla w/brills 14 kt. 13.8 grams

1 #1301 1 set creolla 2 colors w/brills 20.8 grams

1 #393 1 set tepero & marquise 14kt. 14 grams

1 #2155 1 yg. Bracelet w brills ruby and blue sapphire 14 kt. 28 grams

1 #1875 1 set yg. w/ choker 14 kt. (oval) 14.6 grams

1 #2141 1 yg. w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 8.8 grams

1 #206 1 set double sampaloc creolla 14 kt. 14.2 grams

1 # 146 1 set princess cut brills 13.6 grams

1 # 2067 1 pc. brill w/ pearl & brill 14 kt. 2.0 grams

 1 #2066 1 pc. earrings w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 4.5 grams

1 #1306 1 set creolla w/ brills 14 kt. 12.6 grams

1 #1851 1 pc. lady’s ring w/ brills 14 kt. 7.8 grams

1 # 1515 1 set w/ brills 14 kt. 11.8 grams

1 #1881 1 pc yg. ring w/princess cut 14 kt. 4.1 grams

Thus, it is the doctrine elucidated in Kepner, Sayson, and Ricarze that is applicable to the present case, not the ruling in Uba or
Lahoylahoy. The error in the designation of the offended party in the information is immaterial and did not violate Senador’s
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.

Lest it be overlooked, Senador offered to pay obligations through Keppel Check No. 0003603, which was dishonored because it was
drawn against an already closed account. The offer indicates her receipt of the pieces of jewelry thus described and an implied
admission that she misappropriated the jewelries themselves or the proceeds of the sale. Rule 130, Section 27 states:

In criminal cases. except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised. an offer of
compromise by the accused may he received in evidence as implied admission of guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)

Taken together, the C A did not err in affirming petitioner's conviction for the crime of estafa.1âwphi1

In light of current jurisprudence,25 the Court, however, finds the award of exemplary damages excessive.1âwphi1 Art. 2229 of the
Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Nevertheless,
"exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions."26 On this basis, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 100,000 is
reduced to PhP 30,000.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 17, 2011 and Resolution dated March 30, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in C A-G.R. CJ.C No.
00952, finding Ramoncita Senador guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA under par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages he reduced to PhP 30,000.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 175602 February 13, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. On January 20,
2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count,
and ordered them to pay to the heirs of each victim P93,000.00 _as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00
as moral damages.

The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification that each of the accused pay to the heirs of
each victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus costs of suit.

The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which
the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated. 1

On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of
homicide, instead of three counts of murder, and meting on him for each count of homicide the indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum,2 to wit:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of
10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late
Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a selfexplanatory letter 3 dated March 12, 2012, where he pleaded for the
application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the ground that the judgment would be beneficial to him as
an accused. The letter reads as follows:

HON. MIDAS MARQUEZ

Court Administrator
Office of the Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Manila

SUBJECT: Re. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of Rules of Court, Request for.

Your honor,

The undersigned most respectfully requesting through your Honorable office, assistance on the subject mentioned above.

I, Edwin and Eduardo, both surnamed Valdez were both charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Quezon City for the
entitled Crime of Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-90718 to Q-0090720, which convicted us to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua for each of the three (3) offense.
Then after the decision of the RTC Branch 86, the same was appealed to the Court of Appeals with CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00876 and
again on July 18, 2006 the Honorable Court of appeals Ninth Division issued a Decision AFFIRMED the questioned Decision with
MODIFICATION.

Only my Co-principal Accused EDUARDO V. VALDEZ enterposed appealed (sic) the Affirmatory Decision of the Honorable Court of
Appeals to the Highest Tribunal with G.R. Nos. 175602. On my part, I decided to withdraw my appeal, because I believe that there is
no more hope for me, but I was wrong when I read the Decision of the First Division of the Supreme Court, dated January 18, 2012
signed by the Chief Justice Honorable Renato C. Corona and finally I found hope.

And now I come to your Honorable Office through this letter to seek help and assistance that the Decision of the Supreme Court to
my Brother Eduardo V. Valdez may also benefitted (sic) the undersigned through Section 11 (a) , Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

"(a) An Appeal taken by the one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the Appellate Court is favorable and applicable to the latter: x x x"

Favorable Humanitarian consideration on this matter.

Thank you very much and more power, God Bless.

Respectfully yours

EDWIN V. VALDEZ

Through a comment filed on September 25, 2012, 4 the Solicitor General interposed no opposition to the plea for the reduction of
Edwin’s sentences for being in full accord with the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence.

We grant the plea for reduction of Edwin’s sentences.

The final judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 downgraded the crimes committed by Eduardo from three counts of murder to
three counts of homicide, and consequently prescribed lighter penalties in the form of indeterminate sentences. As a result,
Eduardo would serve only an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum, under which he can qualify for parole in due course by virtue of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, instead of suffering the
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

The Court rationalized the result as follows:

x x x The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts and circumstances showing that he
and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai alai betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the
teller of the betting booth then busily attending to bettors inside the booth; that because the accused were calling to Rubio to
come out of the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened Moises; Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that
immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises, causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2
Valdez continued firing at the fallen Moises; that Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot
Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito
twice in the back; and that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three victims were apparently fired from short
distances.

The testimonial accounts of the State’s witnesses entirely jibed with the physical evidence. Specifically, the medico-legal evidence
showed that Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the head; that two gunshot wounds entered Joselito’s back and the right side of his
neck; and that Moises suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four gunshot wounds in the chest. Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the
NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the gunshot wounds
were inflicted at close range. Given that physical evidence was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all
witnesses put together, the congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical evidence rendered the findings
adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit the felony. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or
inferred from their acts. Herein, both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between the accused from the mode and manner in
which they perpetrated the killings. We are satisfied that their deduction was warranted.

Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and
Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their
unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from their going together to the betting station on
board a single motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and
immediately followed by Edwin’s shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other. It was also significant that they fled
together on board the same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common purpose.

To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part
performed by his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts. Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2
Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and proved through their acts that were indicative of their common purpose and
community of interest.

And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides, instead of three murders, on
account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery.

Treachery is the employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to
directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime
committed. Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and
dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the state to specifically aver the factual
circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the
interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself.

It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law,
but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. In People v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated:

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of
the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The
acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated
in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x assault, attack and employ personal violence upon" the victims "by then
and there shooting them with a gun, hitting [them]" on various parts of their bodies "which were the direct and immediate cause
of their deaths" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It
should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show
how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim
might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that
could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term,
standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances
constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.

x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge
against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. This requirement accords with the presumption of innocence in his
favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged
with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he
must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, x x x.

xxxx

x x x. There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its medium period (ie., 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken
from prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of homicide.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence
of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the
late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)

On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes committed (and the
resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The
downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of
the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the two accused to have acted in
concert in their deadly assault against the victims, warranting their equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.

We grant Edwin’s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly provides:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

xxxx

In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals6 that the benefits of this provision extended to all the
accused, regardless of whether they appealed or not, to wit:

As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the event of Guingguing’s acquittal, petitioner should likewise
be acquitted, based on Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which states:

SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of
the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to petitioner inasmuch as he appealed from his
conviction, and the provision states that a favorable judgment shall be applicable only to those who did not appeal.

A literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal," as espoused by private respondent, will not give justice to the purpose of the
provision.
It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did
not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the
Court applied the foregoing provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a coaccused, so long as the
judgment was favorable to him.

In People v. Artellero, the Court extended the acquittal of Rodriguez’s co-accused to him despite the withdrawal of his appeal,
applying the Rule 122, Section 11(a), and considering that the evidence against both are inextricably linked, to wit:

Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-established rule is that an appeal in a criminal
proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. The records show that
Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that
"an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellant court is favorable and applicable to the latter." As we have elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both
appellant and Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellant’s acquittal, which is favorable and applicable to Rodriguez, should
benefit the latter.

In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused Arondain guilty only of homicide.1âwphi1 Such verdict was applied to his co-accused,
Jose Precioso, who was previously found guilty by the trial court of robbery with homicide, despite the fact that Precioso appealed
but failed to file an appellant’s brief. The Court also modified Precioso’s civil liability although the additional monetary award
imposed on Arondain was not extended to Precioso since it was not favorable to him and he did not pursue the appeal before the
Court.

In People v. De Lara, Eduardo Villas, together with several coaccused, were found by the trial court guilty of forcible abduction.
During pendency of the review before the Court, Villas withdrew his appeal, hence his conviction became final and executory.
Thereafter, the Court found Villas’ co-accused guilty only of grave coercion. Applying Rule 122, Section 11(a), the Court also found
Villas guilty of the lesser offense of grave coercion since it is beneficial to him.

In People v. Escaño, the Court granted a motion filed by accused Julian Deen Escaño, praying that the Court’s Decision dated January
28, 2000, acquitting his co-accused Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez in Criminal Case No. 95-936 for violation of Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, be applied to him. Escaño originally filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court but later
withdrew the same.

In the foregoing cases, all the accused appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction
became final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused. The
Court notes that the Decision dated September 30, 2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated, "'the verdict of guilt with respect to Lim [herein
petitioner] had already become final and executory." In any event, the Court cannot see why a different treatment should be given
to petitioner, given that the judgment is favorable to him and considering further that the Court's finding in its Decision dated
September 30, 2005 specifically stated that "the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed
by this Court to have been done with actual malice."7

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on January
18, 2012 finding P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty of three counts of homicide, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay to the
respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, the late Moises Sayson, Jr., and the late Joselito Sayson the amounts ofP50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages for each count.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176349 July 10, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ORLANDO UBIÑA y AGGALUT, Appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00012, which affirmed with modification the August 6,
2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 in Criminal Case No. 895-T, finding appellant Orlando Ubiña y
Aggalut guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

On December 18, 2000, appellant was charged with rape in an Information 3 that reads:

The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Officer-In-Charge hereby accuses Orlando A. Ubiña of the crime of Rape,
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, and Section 2, of Republic Act
8353, committed as follows:

That on or about October 16, 2000, in the Municipality of Sto. Nino, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, [Or]Lando A. Ubiña, uncle of the offended party AAA, thus, have moral ascendancy over the
aforesaid complainant, with lewd design and by the use of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the offended party, AAA, a minor 15 years of age against her will.

Contrary to law.4

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 5

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

The series of events that led to the charge of rape started in the morning of October 9, 2000 when the appellant went to the Tabang
Elementary School in Tabang, Sto. Niño, Cagayan (where AAA was a student) to inform her that her grandfather ("lolo") was in a
hospital and needed her there. AAA went with the appellant but was told while at Tuguegarao that her lolo was in a different
hospital. The appellant then brought her to Allacapan, Cagayan "in a house where the accused stayed when they were still young."

In a room at that house, the appellant removed AAA’s pants and thereafter inserted his penis into her vagina while AAA was lying
down. AAA resisted when she was made to lie down and cried as the appellant removed her pants. The appellant sexually abused
[her] five (5) times in the seven (7) days they stayed in Allacapan.

From Allacapan, the appellant brought AAA in the afternoon of October 16, 2000 to her grandfather’s house located in a rice field in
Campo, Sto. Niño, Cagayan. He molested [her] twice at that location that same afternoon. Again, AAA cried as the appellant
removed her shorts and panty.

After three (3) days, AAA’s grandfather brought her home to San Manuel. With the appellant’s warning not to tell anyone what
transpired between them, AAA did not mention a word regarding the incident to either her grandfather at Sto. Niño, or to [her]
father upon her arrival at home at San Manuel. It was only on the following day that she told her father about her ordeal. AAA’s
father reported the matter to the police the next day.

After initial police investigation, AAA was brought to the Cagayan Valley Medical Center where Dr. Jeliza Alcantara medically
examined her. The examination disclosed several hymenal lacerations in her genitalia, indicating that she was no longer a virgin. The
Medical Findings state:

"Abdomen – flat, soft, normo active bowel sounds, non-tender

GUT – Normal External Genitalia, admits 2 fingers with ease (+) multiple complete and incomplete old healed hymenal lacerations

xxx

The appellant denied that he raped AAA but admitted that his father-in-law instructed him on October 9, 2000 to bring AAA home
from school because he (the father-in-law who is also AAA’s grandfather) was sick. [She] was summoned because no one else was
available to look after him. After bringing [her] home, he went to his farm to pick up his wife. The appellant denied that he brought
AAA to Allacapan, Cagayan; he had no reason to go there since he didn’t know anybody from that place. He further claimed that on
October 16, 2000, he was at Maguiling, Piat, Cagayan to have his buffalo carabao vaccinated; he went home by 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of that same day.

The appellant claimed that he could not think of any reason why AAA would accuse him of rape, and surmised that [her] father could
be angry at, or at the very least envious of, him. He narrated that AAA’s father did not receive any dowry from his father-in-law while
he and his wife were given a carabao.6

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds that the guilt of the accused Orlando A. Ubiña for the crime of Rape,
defined and penalized under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code has been established beyond reasonable doubt and hereby
sentences the said accused Orlando A. Ubiña to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) years of Reclusion Perpetua. He is further
sentenced to indemnify the private complainant AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.7

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 895-T, finding the appellant
guilty of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION with respect to penalty and the awarded damages. The appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the complainant P50,000.00 as moral damages and, as awarded by
the trial court, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.8

The appellate court disregarded the aggravating circumstance of craft and the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship of the parties in the imposition of penalty because it noted that they were not alleged in the information. It however
modified the penalty of 30 years’ imprisonment imposed by the trial court and instead imposed the single and indivisible penalty of
reclusion perpetua. It also awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Appellant denies raping AAA. He alleges that after he fetched AAA from school on October 9, 2000, he went to the farm to fetch his
wife; that on October 16, 2000, he had his carabao vaccinated at Maguiling, Piat, Cagayan; that AAA’s father fabricated the
accusation against him out of jealousy because their father-in-law gave him and his wife a carabao as dowry, while the former and
his wife were not given any; that the testimony of AAA was inconsistent and incredible – AAA cannot recall the place where the
alleged first sexual abuse happened; and AAA’s father, unlike other parents of rape victims, did not immediately report the alleged
rape incidents to the police, nor did he confront him about what he allegedly did to his daughter. Finally, appellant invokes his right
to be presumed innocent considering that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The appeal is bereft of merit.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the
intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.9
When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Also, in a long line of cases, we have held that if the
testimony of the rape victim is accurate and credible, a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victim's testimony
because no decent and sensible woman will publicly admit being a rape victim and thus run the risk of public contempt unless she is,
in fact, a rape victim.10

In the instant case, both the trial and appellate courts found AAA’s testimony to be clear, convincing, and credible. In fact, records
show that AAA properly identified her rapist and realistically depicted her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant:

Q Do you know the accused in this case?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you know him?

A My mother and his wife are sisters.

xxxx

Q Do you recall where were you at around 10:00 O’clock in the morning of October 9, 2000?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you?

A At Tabang Elementary School, sir.

Q At that particular date and time, do you still recall if somebody came to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who was that person?

A Lando Ubiña, sir.

Q Who is this Lando Ubiña, is he the same accused Lando Ubiña in this case?

A Yes, the same person sir.

Q If he will be shown to you, will you be able to recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q If he is now in the court room, will you please point at him?

A There, sir (Witness pointed to a person who was asked his name and he answer [sic] that he is Lando Ubiña). 11

xxxx

FISCAL:

Q Did you reach the hospital?

A No, sir.

Q Where did you go then?

A In Allacapan.
xxxx

Q While in Allacapan, do you recall if something happened to you?

xxxx

A He removed my short pants.

xxxx

COURT:

Q What did you do when Orlando Ubiña removed your pants?

A None, sir.

Q You did not object or refuse?

A I cried, sir.

FISCAL:

Q After the accused removed your shortpants, what happened next or what did he do next?

A He inserted his penis into my vagina.

xxxx

Q Did you resist when he made you lie down?

A Yes, sir.12

xxxx

Q On October 16, 2000, do you remember if there was anything unusual that happened to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you tell what happened to you on October 16, 2000 at barrio Campo, Sto. Niño, Cagayan?

A He again removed my shorts and panty and sexually abused me again.

Q What did you do when the accused removed your shorts and panty?

A I cried again.

Q How many times on October 16, 2000 did the accused sexually abuse you?

ATTY. LIGAS:

Objection, the information allege [sic] only one sexual intercourse.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

A Two times, sir.

Q How do you know that the penis of the accused entered into your vagina at barrio Campo, Sto. Niño, Cagayan?
A I felt the entering of his penis into my vagina.

Q How long did he sexually abuse you at Campo?

A For a long period, sir.13

It is well-settled that the evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility is a matter best left to the trial court, because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. Findings of the trial court on such
matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.14 No such facts or circumstances exist in the case at bar.

We find that the prosecution satisfactorily proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA through
force, threats and intimidation. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size,
and strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each other. 15 Appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt; as such, he
is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim. 16 It is a settled rule that in rape committed by a close
kin, moral ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.17

The alleged inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony, i.e., her inability to remember the house where she was raped and her father’s
alleged unnatural reaction upon knowing that his daughter was raped, are inconsequential matters that do not bear upon the
elements of the crime. What is decisive in a prosecution for rape is whether the commission of the crime has been sufficiently
proven. For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness, to serve as basis for acquittal, must refer to the significant
facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused for the crime charged. As the inconsistencies alleged by appellant had nothing to
do with the elements of the crime of rape, they cannot be used as grounds for his acquittal. 18

We have said before that the workings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently and there is no standard form of
behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.19 AAA could not be expected to remember all the details surrounding her
harrowing experience with appellant. The emotional trauma she suffered may tend to make her forget a circumstantial matter such
as the house where she was raped. On the same note, AAA’s father cannot be expected to immediately demand justice for his
daughter. His initial shock could have prevented him from doing anything at all. Be that as it may, the inaction of AAA’s father on the
day he knew his daughter was raped does not negate the crime of appellant.1awphil

The proposition of appellant that the father of AAA instigated the filing of the criminal charges against him is a feeble attempt to
exonerate himself. Besides, no mother or father would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the
embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter’s psyche and mar her life if
the charge is not true.20 Moreover, we held in People v. Viajedor,21 that family resentment, revenge or feud have never swayed the
Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a complainant for rape, especially a minor who remained steadfast in her
testimony, throughout the direct and cross-examinations, that she was sexually abused.

Compared with the factual backdrop painted by prosecution witnesses, appellant’s version of what transpired only generates
disbelief. Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which can not be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of credible witnesses. 22 To be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability;23 whereas for alibi to prosper, it must be proven that during the commission of the crime, the accused
was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis.24 In the instant case, it was not shown
that it was physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Moreover, nobody
corroborated his alibi.

In People v. Esperanza,25 we explained that:

The twin circumstances of minority and relationship under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are
in the nature of qualifying circumstances because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty. As special
qualifying circumstances they must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information; xxx If the offender is merely a
relation - not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or common law spouse of the mother of the victim – the specific
relationship must be alleged in the information, i.e., that he is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as the case may be] within the
third civil degree." 26
The information in the instant case only mentioned appellant as AAA’s uncle, without specifically stating that he is a relative within
the third civil degree, either by affinity or consanguinity. Even granting that during trial it was proved that the relationship was
within the third civil degree either of consanguinity or affinity, still such proof cannot be appreciated because appellant would
thereby be denied of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Appellant cannot be charged
with committing the crime of rape in its simple form and then be tried and convicted of rape in its qualified form. 27 Thus, the Court
of Appeals correctly disregarded the qualifying circumstance of relationship.

However, the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the minority of AAA because such was properly alleged in the Information and
was proven during trial by the presentation of a certification of AAA’s record of birth duly issued by the office of the municipal civil
registrar of Sto. Niño, Cagayan.28 Conformably with the Esperanza case,29 when either one of the twin special qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the information and proved by the
evidence may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. As such, complainant’s minority may be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. However, it may not serve to raise the penalty in the instant case because in simple rape, the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua which is single and indivisible.

Anent the award of damages, the appellate court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages in addition to civil indemnity
because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 30 Moral damages are
separate and distinct from civil indemnity;31 however both are automatically granted once the fact of rape has been established. 32 In
People v. Catubig,33 we held that the presence of an aggravating circumstance, such as complainant’s minority in the instant case,
entitles her to an award of exemplary damages. The amount of P25,000.00 is deemed appropriate under the circumstances. 34

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding Orlando A. Ubiña guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim AAA, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity ex delicto, and another Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that appellant is further ordered to pay the victim Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013

RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the
proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the
independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.

The Case

On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the writ of
certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No. 71252 entitled People v. Han. Winlove M Dumayas, Presiding Judge, Branch 59,
Regional Trial Court, Makati City and Rafael Consing, Jr., and set aside the assailed order issued on November 26, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, in Makati City deferring the arraignment of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-120 entitled
People v. Rafael Consing, Jr. upon his motion on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question in the civil cases pending
between him and the complainant in the trial courts in Pasig City and Makati City.

Antecedents

Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various loans totaling
P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land
(property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite registered
under the name of de la Cruz.2 In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase
one-half of the property for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to

Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount
of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of
Unicapital.3

Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was really TCT No. 114708
in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz.
TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious. 4

On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had been paid to and
received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands. 5

On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief,
thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of the P41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had
acted as a mere agent of his mother.

On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document against Consing and
de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office. 6

On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of money and
damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (Makati civil case). 7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information for estafa
through falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00-120), which was assigned to Branch 60
(Makati criminal case).8

On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a
prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion
for deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November 19,
2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion.9

On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the Prosecution’s motion for reconsideration. 10

The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No.
71252).

On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252,11 dismissing the petition for certiorari and upholding
the RTC’s questioned orders, explaining:

Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal cases?

We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private respondent may be held liable in the
questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent Consing in both the Cavite and Makati criminal
cases.

The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite criminal case show that: (1) the
parties are identical; (2) the transactions in controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) involved are identical;
(4) the questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in question are identical; and (6) the issue of private
respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions is identical in all the proceedings.

As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig civil case identical to or intimately related to the criminal cases in
Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to the parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed of Sale/ Mortgage involved in the
questioned transactions.

The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent in the Makati case, in view of CA-G.R. SP
No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a party thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory power to take judicial notice of an official act
of another judicial authority. It was also a better legal tack to prevent multiplicity of action, to which our legal system abhors.

Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 may be validly invoked to suspend private respondent’s
arraignment in the Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an offshoot, merely, in the
Cavite criminal case.12

In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for damages against Consing (Civil Case No. 99-95381)
in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil case).13

On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against Consing and De la Cruz in
the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite criminal case). Consing filed a
motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila
civil cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the RTC handling the Cavite criminal case denied Consing’s motion. Later on, it also denied
his motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin his
arraignment and trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and later promulgated its decision on
May 31, 2001, granting Consing’ petition for certiorari and setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently
enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying for the reversal of the May 31, 2001
decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the Court granted the petition for review in G.R. No. 148193, and reversed and set aside the
May 31, 2001 decision of the CA,14 viz:

In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case (the
Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent
(Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for
Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount
paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction
involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable
for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive
Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document.

Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question will not be determinative of
the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages,
it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public document. Stated
differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily
absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other
evidence.

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for
executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another party without consent of the previous mortgagee.
Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of management contract, one of the causes of action of which
consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a
prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied
the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and
ruled that:

… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action based on the fraudulent
misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that
his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and encumbrances" will not determine the criminal
liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . .
(i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime
charged in the information in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both
the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides: "In
cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (j) That, therefore,
the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to in the instant petition was not made with "grave abuse of discretion."

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent
and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not
operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.15

Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the CA, citing the ruling
in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that the Pasig and Manila civil cases did not present a prejudicial question that justified the
suspension of the proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, and claiming that under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig and
Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question that would cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case.

In his opposition to the State’s motion for reconsideration, Consing contended that the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 was not binding
because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus Builders, which was different from Unicapital, the complainant in the Makati criminal case.
He added that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did not yet become final and executory, and could still be reversed at any time, and
thus should not control as a precedent to be relied upon; and that he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for his mother, and
should not be held personally liable under a contract that had involved property belonging to his mother as his principal.

On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself. It relied upon the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, and held thusly:

CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The transactions in controversy, the documents involved; the issue of the
respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions are all identical in all the proceedings; and it deals with the same parties
with the exception of private complainant Unicapital.

However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. (G.R. No.
148193, January 16, 2003) held that "Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and attachment on account of alleged fraud committed
by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar." In view of
the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, We are thus amending Our May 20, 2003 decision.

WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 26, 2001 and March 18, 2002
issued by the respondent Judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the
hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-120 with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.16

Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the CA denied the motion through the second assailed resolution of December 11,
2003.18

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issue

Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 was not controlling in relation to C.A.-G.R. No. 71252, which
involved Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the complainant in Criminal Case No. 00-120. He posits that in arriving at its amended
decision, the CA did not consider the pendency of the Makati civil case (Civil Case No. 99-1418), which raised a prejudicial question,
considering that the resolution of such civil action would include the issue of whether he had falsified a certificate of title or had
willfully defrauded Unicapital, the resolution of either of which would determine his guilt or innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.

In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Unicapital brought the Makati civil case as an independent
civil action intended to exact civil liability separately from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner fully authorized under Section 1(a)
and Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.20 It argues that the CA correctly took cognizance of the ruling in G.R. No. 148193,
holding in its challenged amended decision that the Makati civil case, just like the Manila civil case, was an independent civil action
instituted by virtue of Article 33 of the Civil Code; that the Makati civil case did not raise a prejudicial question that justified the
suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120; and that as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig civil case did not also raise any
prejudicial question, because the sole issue thereat was whether Consing, as the mere agent of his mother, had any obligation or
liability toward Unicapital.

In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that he filed and Unicapital’s Makati civil case were not intended to delay the
resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to pre-empt such resolution; and that such civil cases could be validly considered
determinative of whether a prejudicial question existed to warrant the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120.

Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the
proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling

The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.

Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect that the proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because the Makati civil case was an independent civil action, while the Pasig
civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the
similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital.

A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was predicated on fraud. This was apparent from
the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive,
or malevolent manner in offering as security and later object of sale, a property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a
spurious title."22 As such, the action was one that could proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of
the Civil Code, which states as follows:

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case.23 This
was precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

xxxx

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent
and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not
operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar. 24

Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with Unicapital, for,
although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions Plus
Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud,
and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the
resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed.

As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consing’s being a mere agent of his mother who should not be criminally liable
for having so acted due to the property involved having belonged to his mother as principal has also been settled in G.R. No. 148193,
to wit:

In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case (the
Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent
(Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for
Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount
paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction
involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable
for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive
Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document.25 (Words in parentheses supplied; bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009

ANITA CHENG, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Order dated January 2, 2006 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy.

The antecedents are as follows—

Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy
(Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William Sy) for issuing to her Philippine
Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were
dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.

Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).

On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the
crime. The Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy.3 On the other
hand, the Order in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 contained a statement, "Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is
purely ‘civil,’ not criminal in nature."4

Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order5 dated February 7, 2005 on account of
the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order also did not make any pronouncement as to
the civil liability of accused respondents.1avvphi1

On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a complaint 6 for collection of a sum of
money with damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks
previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.

In the assailed Order7 dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg.
22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 8 which the court denied in its Order9 dated June 5, 2006. Hence, this petition, raising
the sole legal issue –

Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules
and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case where the nature of
the order dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the respondents was [based] on the failure of the prosecution to identify
both the accused (respondents herein)?10

Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only prospective application. She further
contends that that her case falls within the following exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to the criminal action
is deemed instituted with the latter—

(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is necessary for the resolution of the civil aspect of the case;
(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the
criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspect of the case;

(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused amounting to a reservation of the right to
have the civil liability litigated in a separate action;

(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist;

(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu and not ex-delicto pursuant to Article 3111 of the Civil Code; and

(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under Article 29 12 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.

The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the petitioner has not made any waiver,
express reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the corresponding civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00
and damages prior to the criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases. 13

This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the
estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability was impliedly instituted and remained pending before the
respective trial courts. This is consonant with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada 14 that the possible single civil liability arising from
the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the
prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously available to the complaining party, without traversing the prohibition against
forum shopping.15 Prior to the judgment in either the estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be
deemed to have elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of the
other.16

The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt—where
in Criminal Case No. 98-969952 there was no pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the accused and in Criminal Case No. 98-
969953 where the trial court declared that the liability of the accused was only civil in nature—produced the legal effect of a
reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the civil action impliedly instituted with the estafa cases, following
Article 29 of the Civil Code.17

However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on account of the dismissal of the estafa cases on reasonable
doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have also elected that such civil action be prosecuted together with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light
of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.

With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity of the accused, the question that arises is whether such
dismissal would have the same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put differently, may petitioner’s action to recover
respondents’ civil liability be also allowed to prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?

Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states –

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –

xxx

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees
based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22
complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he
is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws.18

Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to
recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In
fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the
criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of
the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil
liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of
this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable. 19

Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not cast in stone, are for the speedy, efficient, and
orderly dispensation of justice and should therefore be adhered to in order to attain this objective.20

However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be left without a remedy to recover from
respondents the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice even the petitioner’s Notice of Claim involving the
same amount filed in Special Proceedings No. 98-88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie
Sy), which case was reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the petition for an unreasonable length of time. 21 Expectedly,
respondents would raise the same defense that petitioner had already elected to litigate the civil action to recover the amount of
the checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.

It is in this light that we find petitioner’s contention that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22
proceedings critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her cause when he
failed to have her establish the identities of the accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed
impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.

Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner’s recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would have been
to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil
action may proceed requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the
reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability of respondents. However, due
to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule.

It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. 22 But this rule admits of exceptions – (1)
where the counsel’s mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) where the counsel
is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client’s deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. 23 Tested against
these guidelines, we hold that petitioner’s lot falls within the exceptions.

It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing laws and rules and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to
discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the Bar. 24 Further, lawyers in the government service are
expected to be more conscientious in the performance of their duties as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only
members of the Bar but are also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.25 Apparently, the public prosecutor
neglected to equip himself with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure such that he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining remedy
available to petitioner to be able to recover the money she loaned to respondents, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases on
demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was denied her day in court to prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay their loan.

Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court’s observation when it dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98-
969953 that if there was any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability
of petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now
conveniently evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied against petitioner.

There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages
to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s
expense. One condition for invoking this principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.26

Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal interpretation and application of the rules which will give
the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication
of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities. 27 For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the complement of
the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to
adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so,28 we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby
ordered REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED