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Part VIII
ARTICLE VIII - THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Sec. 1: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

A. What is judicial power?

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of judges to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

G.R. No. 92649, FEBRUARY 14, 1991

SPOUSES LEONOR BADUA & ROSA BADUA VS CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION, CORDILLERA PEOPLE’S LIBERATION
ARMY, MANUE TAO-IL, AMOGAO-EN KISSIP, DALALO ILLIQUES, JUANITO GAYYED, PEDRO CAANTO, VICENTE DAYEM & DAVID
QUEMA
FACTS: The main issue tackled in this case is whether a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a VALID AND
EXECUTORY DECISION in a land dispute.
David Quema filed a complaint before the Tribal Court of Maeng in Abra alleging that the parcels of land being occupied
and cultivated by the spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua belonged to him. On the one hand, Quema claims that he mortgaged the said
disputed lands to a certain Dra. Erotida Valera and was able to redeem said parcels of land after 22 years. On the other hand, the
Baduas claim that they bought the land from Valera, but they were not able to present a deed of sale since it is in the possession of
Vice-Governor Benesa. The Tribal Court of Maeng decided that Quema was the rightful owner and that the spouses Badua are
ordered to vacate the said disputed lands.
On June 30, 1989, they received a “warning order” coming from the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) of the
Cordillera Boding Administration (CBA). As per “court order” of the Maeng Tribal Court, they are ordered to pay back the expenses
incurred for the case by Quema and that the spouses should not attempt to bring the case to another Court otherwise, the CPLA will
be forced to settle the matter.
This led the Baduas to file a petition “for Special and Extraordinary Reliefs” alleging that the decision
rendered by the Cordillera Bodong Administration through the Tribal Court of Maeng is null and void.

ISSUE:
1. The Baduas were denied due process or formal hearing.
2. The CBA has no judicial power nor jurisdiction over the Baduas nor over David Quema as neither of them members of the Maeng
Tribe.
The respondents raised the following in answer:
1. The Supreme Court does not have a jurisdiction over the tribal courts because they are not part of the judicial system.
2. The Maeng Tribe as a cultural minority of Abra is a part of the CBA or Administration whose military arm is the CPLA and that the
tribal court is composed of prominent and respected residents in the locality who, as a group decide and settle all kinds of land
disputes more speedily than the regular courts, without the intervention of lawyers.
3. Proceedings and decisions rendered by the tribal court are respected and obeyed by the parties, the municipal and barangay
officials and the people in the locality.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the decision rendered by the Maeng Tribal Court is annulled for lack of jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court said that the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an
indigenous cultural community. Such tribal courts are NOT part of the Philippine Judicial System which consists of the Supreme
Court and the lower courts which have been established by law pursuant to Sect. 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. They DO NOT
possess the judicial power unlike the pangkats or conciliation panels created under P.D. 1508 in the barangays as advisory and
conciliatory bodies whose principal objectives is to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle,
and compromise.
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Take note also that the CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION never came into existence ergo as a logical consequence, the
indigenous and special courts of the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region, and the Cordillera People’s Liberation
Army as a regional police force or regional command of the AFP DO NOT LEGALLY EXIST. Since the CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS
REGION do not legally exist, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted as a special or indigenous court rendering it as an ordinary
tribal court as mentioned above.

Distinguish political question from justiciable question.

Political Question
It is a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their:
1. Sovereign authority
2. Or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
(Tañada v. Cuenco)
Political questions are neatly associated with the WISDOM, NOT THE LEGALITY of a particular measure. (Sanidad v. COMELEC)

Justiciable Question
Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-
political.
The SC explained this further in Sanidad v. Comelec thus:

“What is is the heels of the court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the constitution
but the constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of the constituent assembly.

Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is, therefore, a downright justiciable
question. Should the contrary be formed, the activation of the President would normally be a brutum fulmen. If the constitution
provides how it will be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that consti, can declare whether the procedure followed or the
authority assumed was valid or not.

[G.R. No. L-36142] March 31, 1973

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE AND THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS:
The Plebiscite Case
A Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132,
approved on August 24, 1970.
While the Convention was in session, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law,
Sept 21, 1972
On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution. The next day, the President issued Presidential
Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and
the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until
further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the
calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the
question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged
exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973,
there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents
thereof."
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the
Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the
plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice."
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Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain,
for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite
would be held were known or announced officially.
Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973,
and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a
plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor.
"In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. 
L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that said
case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973."
The next day, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent
motion" and "manifestation," "not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973."
While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, Proclamation No. 1102 was issued and which
had just been signed by the President.
Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102:
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102
ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION”
...
"WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for
at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly
members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary;
….
"WHEREAS,.... the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New
Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
"WHEREAS,... (14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution,
as against.. (743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite
to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million...(14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that
the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;
"WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens
Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution,...
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the power vested...
_________________________________

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National
Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the
provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by
Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens
and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the
decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New
Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed
Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
-----------
The Issues/Resolution/Ratio:
-----------
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question?
Inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there
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has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but,
in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been
complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond
the ambit of judicial inquiry."

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly conformably to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions?
On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six
(6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in
accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.
The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications
mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in such
Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. .
The proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void
Viva voce voting (voice vote) for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the
term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but
natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major
characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the
advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of
the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions
of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein followed is such that there is no
reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscite. This is another patent
violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as
amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s
Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.

3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people?
Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to
the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But there
is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation
No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the
Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines.
The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have
been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila.

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of
the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations
other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court.
Petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not
been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the
people or majority thereof;

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

Court hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with
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the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are
hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered
in force and effect.

De La Llana, et al. vs Alba, et al. G.R. No. L-57883 (1982)

FACTS: Citing a dire need for judicial reorganization, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An act reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds therefor and for Other Purposes” was passed by the legislature. Judge Gualberto De La LLana’s incumbency as a
judge in Olongapo will be terminated by this law. He questioned the constitutionality of the law because Congress has no power to
remove judges of the judiciary, citing Art 8 Sec. 11: “The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 or become incapacitated to discharge duties of their office. The Supreme Court
en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon”.

ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. Blg. 129 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes, B.P. Blg. 129 is constitutional. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the com
petence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la
Costa that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from
the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions."
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure
to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect,
no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member
of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be
accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this
Court does not render advisory opinions. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power, rather
what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except
to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in
the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE
NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. (DEFINE POL QUESTION ONLY, NOT AMENDMENT)
Petitioners question the authority of the President in issuing several PDs proposing amendments to the New Constitution and
calling for a national referendum-plebiscite for the said amendments.
Sept 2, 1976:
Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a nat’l referendum on Oct 16 for the citizen’s assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve:
the issues of martial law · the period of its existence
· the interim assembly · the length of the period
· its replacement · for the exercise by the Pres of his present powers.
· the power of such replacement

20 days after (Sept 22):

Marcos issued (related) PD 1031 (amending 991 by declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass
of votes in “barangays” (Citizen assemblies) for the nat’l referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16.
PD 1031 repealed, Sec 4, of PD 991.

PD 1033
Issued by Marcos, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the ref-pleb on Oct 16.
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In its “whereas” clause, People reveal their desire to abolish and replace interim Nat’l Assembly through a consti amendment to have
a new interim leg. Body, to be submitted to the people (directly) in the ref-pleb of Oct 16.

Sept 27: PABLO and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Comelec
from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos.
991 and 1033, as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to:
· supervise · conduct the Referendum--Plebiscite scheduled on October 16,
· control 197
· hold

Pablo and Pablito Sanidad’s contention: They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum--
Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

Contention of Solicitor General: That the court cannot take cognizance, since the question is political in nature, beyond judicial
cognizance of SC.
That Sanidads have no standing to sue
And at this state of transition period (from ML): only Marcos has the authority to exercise constituent power. For normalization, ref-
plebiscite is a step.

ISSUE: WON the issue is a political question.

HELD: That the amending process, both as to proposal and ratification raises a justiciable question. “ The SolGen would consider the
question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of judicial review. We disagree. The Amending process both as to
proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is specifically true in cases where the power of the President to initiate the
amending process by a proposal of amendment, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.”
That the validity of the manner of proposing amendments and question were justiciable and not political questions.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy
refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is confronting the SC is
not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority
to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
This petition is DISMISSED. The President, who was also the legislature, can propose amendments to the Constitution and he
was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.
Thereupon, however, the Court proceeded to uphold the President’s power.
*(1) The amending process, both as to proposal and ratification, raises a justiciable question.(2) In a crisis government, the President
shall have the power to assume the constituent power to propose amendments lodged in the Legislative body.

[G.R. No. L-66088. January 25, 1984.]

ALEX G. ALMARIO, ISAGANI M. JUNGCO, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., DORINTINO FLORESTA, FIDELA Y. VARGAS, ET AL., Petitioners,
v. HON. MANUEL ALBA and THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
FACTS: As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve
or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa.
The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered by simple YES or NO answers.

Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 and 4, which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and
113, to the people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the doctrine
laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC (41 SCRA 707). The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for
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more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and effect of the
proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.

The questions to be presented to the electorate at the plebiscite are:

QUESTION NO. 3
Do you vote for the approval of amendments to the Constitution as proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in Resolution Numbered 105
which, in substance, provide that grant shall be an additional mode for the acquisition of lands belonging to the public domain and
that the agrarian reform program may include the grant or distribution of alienable lands of the public domain to qualified tenants,
farmers and other landless citizens.
QUESTION NO. 4
Do you vote for the approval of an amendment to the Constitution as proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in its Resolution Numbered
113, adding the following paragraph to Section 12 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
"SUCH PROGRAM MAY INCLUDE THE GRANT OR DISTRIBUTION OF ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN TO
QUALIFIED TENANTS, FARMERS AND OTHER LANDLESS CITIZENS IN AREAS WHICH THE PRESIDENT MAY BY OR PURSUANT TO LAW
RESERVE FROM TIME TO TIME, NOT EXCEEDING THE LIMITATIONS FIXED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
SECTION.
"THE STATE SHALL MOREOVER UNDERTAKE AN URBAN LAND REFORM AND SOCIAL HOUSING PROGRAM TO PROVIDE DESERVING
LANDLESS, HOMELESS OR INADEQUATELY SHELTERED LOW INCOME RESIDENT CITIZENS REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO ACQUIRE
LAND AND DECENT HOUSING CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE IV OF THIS CONSTITUTION.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.

HELD: The present provisions of the Constitution are adequate to support any program of the government for the grant of public lands
to qualified and deserving citizens or for the implementation of urban land reform. Homesteads and free patents are "grants." We
likewise see no constitutional infirmity to a law passed by the Batasang Pambansa, under the present Constitution, that would grant
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain not more than twenty four (24) hectares to any qualified tenant, farmer, and
other landless citizen in areas reserved by the President, acting pursuant to such law. Nor is it correct to say that after the agrarian
land reform program now being implemented and the agitation for a similar program in urban areas, the meaning of "urban land
reform" is not yet understood. Questions No. 3 and No. 4, if ratified with an affirmative vote, will serve at most a symbolic purpose.
That much the Solicitor General conceded when he stated that the amendments under Question No. 3 serve to confirm existing
practice pursuant to long standing legislation. Any interpretation of "grant" will, therefore, carry the weight of applicable precedents
which surround the associated words "homestead" and "purchase" in the same clause of the Constitution. Similarly, any legislation
laying down the rules on urban land reform will have to survive the constitutional tests of due process, equal protection, police power,
reasonable compensation, etc., now applied to agrarian land reform.
More important, however, is that the necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power
of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban land reform" are unwise or improvident or
whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The questions are presented
for their determination. Assuming that a member or some members of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of
disposing of public land or an urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote "NO" in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their
aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes. The
issue is whether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to
make out a case that the average voter does not know the meaning of "grant" of public land or of "urban land reform.”
As argued by the Solicitor-General: "‘Agrarian reform program", for example, has been in the ‘consciousness of the Filipino
people’, to borrow a phrase from the petitioners, since 1972 with the passage of P.D. No. 27 (Oct. 21, 1972), emancipating our tenants
and transferring to them ownership of the land they toil, without mentioning the fact that even prior to this, there were several laws
enacted attempting at land reform, notably Rep. Act No. 3844 (1964), ordaining the agricultural Land Reform Code and instituting land
reforms in the country. More importantly and more to the point, ‘grant’ or ‘land grant or distribution’ are subject matters that have
been in the ‘consciousness’ of the Filipino people since Commonwealth days, with the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
amending and compiling the previously scattered laws relative to the conservation and disposition of lands of the public domain.
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The respondents assure us that publication in all provinces and cities, except a few where there are no local newspapers, has
been affected and that Barangays all over the country have been enjoined to hold community gatherings for this purpose. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and various civic organizations have taken a strong stand for or against the last two proposed
questions. Television and radio programs regularly broadcast the amendments. The petitioners have failed to explain why, inspite of
all the above, there is still fair and proper submission.
"Upon the third issue, associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and
therefore beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court. Associate Justices Teehankee, and Muñoz Palma hold that prescinding
from the President’s lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc
The average voter who goes to the polling place and reads Question No. 3 will know whether or not he or she is in favor of
distributing alienable public lands through "grants" in addition to leases, homesteads and purchases. Upon reading Question No. 4,
the voter will know whether or not he or she is in favor of an urban land reform program. The existing provisions of the Constitution
more than sufficient basis for legislation to achieve the objectives of the proposed amendments.

LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners, vs. MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO
CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and
disbursing officer,respondents.
FACTS: After the 1955 national elections, 23 members of the Nacionalista Party occupied the Senate. The lone opposition senator was
Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal, on the other hand, was a senatorial candidate of the Liberal
Party who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to
choose its members.
*SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority
party and 3 senators from the minority party.

The Nacionalista Party chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. And because there is only one minority senator (Tañada as member of the Citizen’s Party) the other two SET
members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the Nacionalista Party upon the nomination of Senator Primicias. As a
result, the Senate chose Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal making the
SET composed of 5 Senators from the Majority Party (NP).

Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. He alleges that the nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the
Committee on Rules for the Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ETare reserved for minority senators duly
nominated by the minority party representatives.
Macapagal, for his part, assailed that it would also be a violation of his right to an impartial tria , as respondents are about to decide
on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate. He argued that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista
Party, will not have any chance in his election contest.

Respondents Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of NP) contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the
appointment of ET members, since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate and it is vested on the senate alone. They further
contend that it is a political question and thus the court has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Cuenco argued that the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave
it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether the Court has Jurisdiction over the Issue.

HELD: Yes. It is not a political question but rather a justiciable question hence the Court has Jurisdiction over the issue.

The case at bar is not an action against the Senate compelling them to allow petitioners to exercise duties as members of ET.
The ET is part of neither House, even if the Senate elects its members. The issue is not the power of the Senate to elect or nominate,
but the validity of the manner by which power was exercised (constitutionality). The Court is concerned with the existence and extent
of said discretionary powers.

The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada
was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question.
 9

*The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from the
majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even
though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally
sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the
Constitution.
*The election of respondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio.

C. Cases on Judicial Power in General

2) TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. (Minor, Represented by his Mother, Mrs. Angelita C. Santiago) petitioner-appellant, vs. MISS
JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO, LUNA
SARMAGO, AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR MARCELO respondents-appellees.
FACTS: Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City.
· "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" (composed of the respondents-appellees) was constituted for the purpose
of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class.
· The committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina as first honor, Patricia Liñgat as second honor and Teodoro C.
Santiago, Jr. as third honor.
· Three days before the school’s graduation, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his
father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students".
· Respondents argue that the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65,
certiorari is a remedy against judicial function.

ISSUE: Whether judicial function is exercised in this case.

RULING: A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of something
in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist, (test to determine whether a tribunal or board
exercises judicial functions):
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary

Judicial power defined:

· as the authority to determine the rights of persons or property by arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at
the instance of a party thereto;
· the authority exercised by that department of government which is charged with the declaration of what the law is and its
construction so far as it is written law;
· the authority or power vested in the judges or in the courts;
· the authority vested in some court, officer, or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the
propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication;
· the power belonging to or emanating from a judge as such;
· the power conferred upon a public officer, involving the exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of questions
of right in specific cases affecting the interest of persons or property, as distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry out
the mandates of judicial power or the law;
 10

· the power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them, or some matter incidental thereto, and of which
they have jurisdiction;
· the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment; the power which adjudicates upon and protects the rights and
interests of individual citizens, and to that end construes and applies the law.
"Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the power to hear and determine but
not everyone who may hear and determine has judicial power.
The term "judicial power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or
action between the parties.

3) Radiowealth v Agregado (1950)

Facts:
● The SC purchased a Webster Teletalk Model 206A and 6 Webster Telephone speakers (intercom apparatus) from
Radiowealth, Inc. with a total amount of P585.00
● The SC clerk certified that the purchase and installation of the apparatus (on the 2nd and 3rd floor of the Malacanang which
housed the SC) were of urgent character and necessary to public service.
● As Chairman of Property Requisition Committee (Exec Dept), Casimiro Dacanay disapproved the purchase and installation
because it is contrary to EO 302 (administrative regulations covering the procedure to be followed in making regular and
emergency purchase of supplies, materials, furniture and equipment for the government) and a policy they adopted for the
discontinuance of open market purchases
● The auditor of the SC refused to countersign the warrant for the payments, so Radiowealth took the matter up with Auditor
General Manuel Agregado, requesting that the payments be approved.
● Agregado likewise disapproved and referred the papers to the Chief Justice, commenting that the purchase of emergency
supplies, materials, furniture and equipment for the use of the government is governed by the Revised Admin Code and
various orders of the Executive Dept. The purchase was said to be made because of their need for an emergency, but there
was no evidence to show that the requirements of the law and/or regulations aforecited had been complied with.
● Radiowealth filed a petition, praying:
1. That the Property Requisition Committee be declared dissolved, and its powers be left to be performed by the Auditor
General alone
2. That the respondent Auditor General be ordered to countersign the treasury warrant

ISSUE: Is the purchase of the apparatus a matter that the Executive Dept should have a say on? Can the Judicial Dept make
purchases without the prior approval of the Executive Dept?

HELD: Yes. The judiciary has the power to maintain its existence; they have power to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity,
and to insure effectiveness in the administration of justice. The purchase of the necessary equipment would contribute to a more
effective judiciary.
The Court ruled: “Contrary to the Auditor General's theory, the prerogatives of this court which the Constitution secures
against interference includes not only the powers to adjudicate causes but all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice. So, we believe, it is within its power free from encroachment by the Executive to acquire books and other
office equipment reasonably needed to the convenient transaction of its business. Without the power to provide itself with
appropriate instruments for the performance of its duties, the express powers with which the Constitution endows it would
become useless. The court could not maintain its independence and dignity as the Constitution intends if the Executive personally or
through subordinate officials could determine for the court what it should or use in the discharge of its functions, and when and how
it should obtain them.”
The Chief Executive has no more authority to encroach on the Supreme Court in the choice of the instruments needed to
carry on its functions than the court has to dictate to the executive what, when and how to get his.
The Revised Administrative Code regulates the purchase of government supplies and directs that such purchase should be
effected through the Bureau of Supply. BUT the provisions speak of departments, bureaus, and offices. They do not speak of the
legislature or the Supreme Court, the word "departments" in these sections to mean the several divisions among which are
 11

distributed the functions and duties devolving upon the Chief Executive. The Supreme Court is neither a department, a bureau nor
an office within the meaning of the provisions.
The Auditor General may not question the court's expenditures except when they are, in the words of the organic law,
"irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant." Outside of these exceptions his duty to approve the payments is mandatory.
The cost of the equipment and labor has been certified to be the lowest obtainable on the market, and there is
appropriation from which the items may lawfully be paid for.

4) Noblejas vs. Teenhankee

Petitioner: Antonio H. Noblejas, as Commissioner of Land Registration
Respondents: Claudio Teenhankee, as Secretary of Justice, and Rafael M. Salas, as Executive Secretary
FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Noblejas is the duly appointed Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by RA 1151. The
same act also provides that the Commissioner is “entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance”, granting him a salary the same with a district judge— P 19,000.

On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice required the Commissioner to explain in writing in not later than two (2)
days as to why there is no disciplinary action to be taken against the petitioner for “approving or recommending approval of
subdivision, consolidation, and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by original
titles.” Noblejas then answered that as stated in RA 1151, he enjoys the same ranks and privileges as of a district judge, which means
that he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as them.

On March 17, 1968, the petitioner received a communication of suspension with the grounds of gross negligence and
conduct prejudicial to public interest. He then filed the next day a petition claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion. In
response, the respondents admitted the facts but denied that the Commissioner is entitled with the same privileges in terms of
investigation as of a district judge— who can only be investigated by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court.

HELD: No. The said grant of privileges is unconstitutional, for it violates the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers. Such
grant would give the Supreme Court the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and would reduce
the protanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials. It would also be implied that the right of the Commissioner to be
investigated only by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended and removed upon its recommendation, would also grant the same
right to those executive officials whom the Legislature has indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.

5.) LUALHATI L. LINA, petitioner, vs. The Honorable AMANTE P. PURISIMA in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, and ESTEBAN CABANOS, respondents.
FACTS: Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeper at Philippines Veterans Bank. Petitioner, Lina, files for mandamus to compel Cabanos
(President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was removed from office by Cabanos who acted in
grave abuse of discretion and authority forcibly excluded petitioner from the position without valid cause, nor basis in law, it also
states that the removal of petitioner was 'upon recommendation of Branch Manager, Julio Tamondong. It now appears from the
annexes of the amended petition that petitioner was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to Letters of Instruction No. 14 and No. 19-A,
for being notoriously undesirable. This being the case, petitioner had a right to appeal from her dismissal, and the venue of the
appeal is the Office of the President. She did appeal. But the appeal was denied. Since her removal is pursuant to a Letter of
Instruction issued by the President pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the
courts to review, much less modify or reverse, whether by means of the writ of certiorari and/or mandamus, or any other court
process. This is one of the express hesitations upon the power of Courts imposed by General Order No.3 issued by the President on
September 22, 1972. Said general order provides:
I do hereby further order that the Judiciary shall continue to function in accordance with its present organization and personnel, and
shall try and decide in accordance with existing laws all criminal and civil cases, except the following cases:
1. Those involving the validity, legality, or constitutionality of any decree, order or act issued, promulgated or performed by me or by
my duly designated representative pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated Sept. 21, 1972.
 12

2. Those involving the validity, legality or constitutionality of any rules, orders or acts issued, promulgated or performed by public
servants pursuant to decrees, orders, rules and regulations issued and promulgated by me or by my duly designated representative
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated Sept. 21, 1972.
Foregoing considered, the amended petition is dismissed
ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President pursuant to Proclamation 1081, and the
validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to review, much less modify, or reverse. (This is one of the express
limitations upon the power of the Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.)

HELD: In any case elevated to this Court for the correction of any supposed procedural error of any lower court, it should be found
that indeed there has been a mistake, and it further appears that all the facts needed for a complete determination of the whole
controversy are already before the Court undisputed or uncontroverted by the parties, the Supreme Court may at its option,
whenever it feels the best interests of justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding the case
to the court of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the Supreme Court may already resolve the pertinent determinative issues
and render the final judgment on the merits.

Garcia v. Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106 (1971)

FACTS:
1. Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one
of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch.
2. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that
his Court Room cannot be properly established due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up and
running.

3. When Macaraig realized that it would be some time before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended
leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended
leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law).

4. The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to assist the Secretary, without being
extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.

5. Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of
his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that Macaraig has
received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact
that a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department of the executive in charge of prosecution of cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge.

HELD: No. Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute
incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and
rid himself of the stigma of being ‘a judge without a sala’, but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from
discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure,
of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative
authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other
offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the
principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded
by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.

The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only
by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more
paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to
the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should
place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and
 13

prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.

Sec. 2: The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.

Sec. 3: The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the
amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

Sec. 4: The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the
Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and
other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of
such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle
of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en
banc
.
League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC
th
FACTS: During the 11 Congress, 57 bills were filed before the House of Representatives seeking for the conversion of municipalities
into component cities. However, only 33 bills were acted upon. During the 12 th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No.
9009, which took effect on June 30, 2001. It amends section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement from Php20 million to Php100 million. The amendment was done to restrain the rush of the municipalities to convert
into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence. After which, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the
income requirement in RA 9009. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving the Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, following the advice of Senator Pimentel, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed their individual cityhood bills
through their respective sponsors. The bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the annual
income requirement in RA 9009. It was then approved by the House of Representatives on December 22, 2006.

ISSUE: WON the cityhood laws converting the 16 municipalities into cities constitutional.

HELD: Yes, it is constitutional. The SC Ruling:

“We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending
during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No.
9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do
no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective
wisdom of Congress.”

November 18, 2008 Decision: The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. “The Cityhood Laws
violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government
units... The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria
prescribed by law, are material in determining the ‘just share’ of the Local Government Units in national taxes.”

December 21, 2009 Decision: The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared it as constitutional. It said
that based on Congress, deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale
 14

of the miimum income requirement of Php100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any
retroactive effect insofar as the Cityhood Bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as
a political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favourable treatment accorded the sixteen
municipalities by the Cityhood Laws rests on substantial distinction. The Court stressed that respondent Local Government Units
were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after
what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. “Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given
a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the
criteria set forth under the Local Government Code of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009.

1)VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA

FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion assailing the constitutionality of Section 14 of the People’s Court Act (Commonwealth Act No. 682).
What is the commonwealth act?
Title: an act creating a people’s court and an office of special prosecutors for the prosecution and trial of crimes against national
security committed during the second world war, and for other purposes.
What it aims to do: The Commonwealth Act aims to create a People’s Court that will try and decide all cases of crimes against national
security (ex. treason and espionage) committed between Dec. 8, 1941 and Sept. 2, 1945.
Who will comprise the People’s Court: The People’s Court will be comprised of a Presiding Judge and fourteen Associate Judges, who
shall be appointed by the President, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. They will be chosen among the pool of
District Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance, Cadastral Judges, Judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, the
Securities and Exchange Commissioner, and the Public Service Commissioner.
Methods in Judging: The People’s Court shall, as a body, sit en banc, but it may sit in five divisions of three Judges each. The sessions
will be held in the City Manila unless public interest justifies otherwise. Final decisions and orders of the People’s Court will be reviewed
by the Supreme Court who shall sit en banc and decide the case promptly without filing placing it upon the regular calendar.
Until when is it valid: It will cease to exist once the President certifies that all cases filed have been tried and disposed.
The Section in question:
Section 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission[1] or under
the government called Philippine Republic[2] may not sit and vote in any case brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in
which the accused is a person who held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof.
If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges in Rule 126, section 1 of the
Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence or temporary disability the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a
quorum or to render judgment in any case is not present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-
at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof, as may be
necessary to sit temporarily as Justices of said Court, in order to form a quorum or until a judgment in said case is reached.
A Re-statement:
This section basically aims to disqualify Justices of the Supreme Court who were members of the PEC or the Second Philippine Republic
from reviewing the cases coming from the People’s Court. Please note that the Commonwealth Act mandates the Supreme Court En
banc (emphasis here) to review the cases.
In case that a Justice or Justices are disqualified on the account that they were members of the aforementioned groups this section
provides that the President may designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges to be
temporary members of the Supreme Court to complete the quorum. (well this is at least my interpretation.)
IMPLICATION OF SECTION 14: Only four of the Justices that time were not adversely affected by this disqualification. Hence, if Section
14 is applied, majority of those who will review cases from the People’s Court would be “Temporary Justices.”

ISSUES: The Supreme Court decided to approach this question from these angles:
(a) Whether or not the Congress had power to as to the preexisting grounds of disqualification of a Justice of the Supreme Court,
that provided for in said Section 14.
HELD: No because it violates the doctrine on separation of power. Section 14 of the Commonwealth Act, which provides for the
disqualification of a Justice on the grounds mentioned above, challenges the supposedly “uninterrupted continuity” in the tenure of
Justices in exercising his powers and fulfilling his duty. According to the Supreme Court, a Justice must be left unhampered to
exercise all the powers and fulfill all the responsibilities of said office in all cases properly coming before his Court under the
constitution, again without prejudice to proper cases of disqualification under Rule 126.
Since Section 14 interrupts some of the powers of the displaced Justices, it is unconstitutional. This is premised on the belief that a
disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power if that judge is the one
designated by the constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of
his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself.
 15

Also, if Section 14 is promulgated, it can enable the Congress in specific situations to order that Judge X shall not decide the
controversy between Y and Z or that Justice M shall not sit in the appeal of P.S. and so on ad infinitum, and thus decisively influence
the decision, for or against one party litigant. Such legislative power might thus be wielded to interfere with the functions of the
judiciary, depriving Philippine citizens of their right of impartial awards from judges selected without any reference to the parties or
interest to be affected. Unnecessary to prove or impute sinister motives behind the statutory disqualification.
Let it not be argued that the Court is the same, only the membership being different. Because Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the
Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein
mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of
the Court — as in this case — are replaced by judges of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And
the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court.
(b) Whether or not a person may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court who has not been duly appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments pursuant to the constitution, even only as a "designee" (***designees are those
who will act as Temporay Justices as appointed by the President) ;
HELD: No. The Constitution mandates that the members of the Supreme Court should be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission of Appointments. The “designees” do not need to be confirmed by the Commission of Elections
Furthermore, the designees need not be at least forty years of age, nor have more than ten years or more been a judge of a court of
record or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines (as required by section 6 of Article VIII of the Constitution), because under
said section he need only have practiced law for a period of not less than five years or have held during a like period within the
Philippines an office requiring a lawyer's diploma. It is evident here that there is a huge gap in the qualifications. Since they are
acting as Temporary Justices they should as well be qualified to be a Supreme Court Justice since they will be acting as such albeit
temporarily.
There is no also provision in the constitution that allows the temporary constitution of the Supreme Court. In principle, what really
matters is not the length or shortness of the constitutional composition of the Court, but maintaining the permanence and the
inalterability of Court which is enshrined in the Constitution.
(c) Whether or not by the method of "designation" created by the afore cited section 14 a Judge of First Instance, Judge at large
of First Instance, or Cadastral Judge, designated by the President under the same section can constitutionally "sit temporarily as
Justice" of the Supreme Court by virtue thereof.

HELD: No. The framers of the Constitution intended the Supreme Court to function through its members as defined in Section 4 and
5 of Article VII of the Constitution and for this members to be appointed pursuant to Section 6 of the same Article. Since the
designees have not been appointed and confirmed pursuant to said sections 5 and 6, they cannot sit as Temporary Judges.
Even if the action or participation of a judge designated under section 14 of the People's Court Act in a collaboration case of the class
therein defined, there is no escaping the fact that he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the Supreme Court, as
the appellate tribunal in such a case, and if allowed to do so, his vote would count as much as that of any regular Justice of the
Court. There can be no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required by section 4 of Article VIII of the Constitution to
compose the Supreme Court — indeed, a "temporary member" thereof would be a misnomer, implying a position not contemplated
by the constitution. Section
For the foregoing consideration, it is declared and ordered: (a) that section 14 of the People's Court Act is unconstitutional in the
respects specified in the body of this resolution; and (b) that this case be dealt with henceforward in pursuance of and in
harmony with this resolution. So ordered.

2.) VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS: It appears the Seamen entered into separate contracts of employment with the VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES,
engaging them to work on board M/T' Jannu for a period of twelve (12) months.
The master of the vessel complainant Rogelio H. Bisula, received a cablegram from the Company advising him of the
possibility that the vessel might be directed to call at ITF-controlled ports said at the same time informing him of the procedure to be
followed in the computation of the special or additional compensation of crew members while in said ports. (ITF is the acronym for
the International Transport Workers Federation, a militant international labor organization with affiliates in different ports of the
world, which reputedly can tie down a vessel in a port by preventing its loading or unloading, This is a sanction resorted to by ITF to
enforce the payment of its wages rates for seafarers the so-called ITF rates, if the wages of the crew members of a vessel who have
affiliated with it are below its prescribed rates). After 2 months, the company sent another cablegram to Bisulan telling them that
the membership fee of 28 crew were already been paid.
Rogelio Bisula, in representation of the other seamen (officers and crew members) , sent cablegram informing the Company
that the officers and crew members not contented with their present salaries 'based on the volume of works, type of ship with
hazardous cargo and registered in a worldwide trade.That the officers and crew (were) not interested in ITF membership if not
 16

actually paid with ITF rate and that their demand is only 50% increase based on present basic salary (They compare the Company's
salary rates 'especially in tankers with other shipping agencies in Manila).
In reply, the Company proposed a 25% increase in the basic pay of the complainant crew members. The proposal was
accepted by the Seamen with certain conditions which were accepted by the Company. Subsequently, the Company sought
authority from the NSB to cancel the contracts of employment of the Seamen, claiming that its principals had terminated their
manning agreement because of the actuations of the Seamen which the NSB granted. When the vessel arrived in Japan the seamen
where repatriated to Manila.
The seamen appealed the decision of the NSB to the National Labor Relations Commision (NLRC). The NLRC reversed the
decision of the NSB on the ground that the termination of the contract was without valid cause. Also, the NLRC required the Vir-Jen
Shipping Inc. to pay the wages and other monetary benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of the employment contract.
NB: Technically there are two court division 1 st ruled that termination of seamen is illegal (I assume the 1 st Division is the
NLRC di kasi nakalagay) and the 2nd division which set aside the decision of NLRC and sustains the NSB’s decision (it is here also
the seamen file motion for reconsideration twice).

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Court en banc should give due course to the motion for reconsideration inspite of its having been
denied twice by the Court's Second Division?;
2. Whether or not the termination of the seamen is illegal.

HELD: 1. YES ; 2. YES

1. The case was referred to and accepted by the Court en banc because of the movants' contention that the decision in this case by
the Second Division deviated from Wallem Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor (L-50734-37, February 20, 1981), a First Division
case with the same facts and issues. We are constrained to answer the initial question in the affirmative.
A fundamental postulate of Philippine Constitutional Law is the fact, that there is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts are required to take their bearings. (Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948; Barrera v. Barrera, 34
SCRA 98; Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226). The majority of the Court's work is now performed by its two Divisions, but the
Court remains one court, single, unitary, complete, and supreme. Flowing from this nature of the Supreme Court is the fact that,
while ' individual Justices may dissent or partially concur with one another, when the Court states what the law is, it speaks with only
one voice. And that voice being authoritative should be a clear as possible.
Any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, whether en banc or in Division, may be modified or reversed only
by the Court en banc. (Section 2(3), Article X, Constitution.) In the rare instances when one Division disagrees in its views with the
other Division, or the necessary votes on an issue cannot be had in a Division, the case is brought to the Court en banc to reconcile
any seeming conflict, to reverse or modify an earlier decision, and to declare the Court's doctrine. This is what has happened in this
case.
The decision sought to be reconsidered appears to be a deviation from the Court's decision, speaking through the First
Division, in Wallem Shipping, Inc. v. Hon. Minister of Labor (102 SCRA 835). Faced with two seemingly conflicting resolutions of
basically the same issue by its two Divisions, the Court. therefore, resolved to transfer the case to the Court en banc. Parenthetically,
the petitioner's comment on the third motion for reconsideration states that the resolution of the motion might be the needed
vehicle to make the ruling in the Wallem case clearer and more in time with the underlying principles of the Labor Code. We agree
with the petitioner.
After an exhaustive, painstaking, and perspicacious consideration of the motions for reconsideration and the comments,
replies, and other pleadings related thereto, the Court en banc is constrained to grant the motions. To grant the motion is to keep
faith with the constitutional mandate to afford protection to labor and to assure the rights of workers to self-organization and to just
and humane conditions of work. We sustain the decision of the respondent National labor Relations Commission.
2. The termination of the contract of the seamen was illegal. A manning contract involves the interests not only of the
signatories thereto, such as the local Filipino recruiting agent, the foreign owner of vessel and the Filipino seamen in general as well
as the country itself. Conformably to the power vested in the NSB, the law requires that all manning contracts shall be approved by
said agency. The stringent rules governing Filipino seamen abroad foreign ships are dictated by national interest.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration of SEAMEN are hereby GRANTED. The petition of VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND
MARINE SERVICES, INC is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
 17

Maniago vs. CA, 253 SCRA

FACTS: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas
Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in Loakan, Baguio City.
- On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent
Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City.
- As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical
injuries was filed on March 2, 1990 against petitioner’s driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch III,
- A month later, on April 19, 1990, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself
- Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case
against his driver
- But the trial court, in its order dated August 30, 1991, denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code,
the action could proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in
the criminal case.
- Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals, maintaining that the civil action could not
proceed independently of the criminal case because no reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made in the criminal
case.
- On January 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition on the authority of Garcia v. Florido,1 and Abellana v.
2
Marave, which it held allowed a civil action for damages to be filed independently of the criminal action even though no reservation
to file the same has been made

ISSUE: The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for
damages against petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.

HELD: No, private respondent cannot bring an action for damages against the petitioner if there is an absence of reservation, as the
court concluded, that the right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, 1
I. Rule 111, 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.- When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused
Rule 111, 1 clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil
liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those
which arise from the offense charged, as originally provided in Rule 111 before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In
other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes or
from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal
action.
II. On the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, except only
(1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived;
(2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or
 18

(3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the
institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a
finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately
must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same party.
In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found
insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action is
reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no
pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused.
In such case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not result in the employee
being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against
double recovery for the same act or omission. As held in Barredo v. Garcia the injured party must choose which of the available
causes of action for damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate civil action he will be deemed to have elected
to recover damages from the bus driver on the basis of the crime. In this case case his cause of action against the employer will be
limited to the recovery of the latter’s subsidiary (bus driver) liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

Sec. 5: The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments
and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not
exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

Power of Judicial Review: the power of the Courts to test the validity of the Executive and Legislative acts in light of their conformity
with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments, but merely an expression of
the superiority of the Constitution.
Requisites:
1. Actual case or controversy: a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial determination
2. Legal standing: Constitutional question must be raised by the proper party. The party being the one who has sustained or is in
imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the acts complained of.
3. Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
4. Determination of the constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a final determination of the case.

[G.R. No. 149848. November 25, 2004]

 19

ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M. DIMALOTANG - in their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II,
respectively, of the first Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur vs. Respondents SIMEON A. DATUMANONG –
DPWH SEC EMILIA T. BONCODIN – DBM SEC
FACTS: Republic Act No. 8999 (R.A. 8999) - An Act Establishing An Engineering District in the First District of the Province of Lanao del
Sur and Appropriating Funds
DPWH Department Order No. 119 - Creation of Marawi SubDistrict Engineering Office
History
Art. X Sec. 1 and 15 – constitutional mandate that created ARMM and CAR
R.A. 6734 – An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; was enacted pursuant to the said
constitutional mandate
- calls for the holding of a plebiscite in several provinces; only 4 voted for the creation of ARMM. They eventually became
the ARMM. (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi)
EO 246 - Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other purposes
- ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990. Nine (9) years later, DPWH Sec Gregorio Vigilar issued DO 119 creating the
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office. Jurisdiction covers Marawi City and the province of Lanao Del Sur. (Note: Marawi is a City of
Lanao Del Sur)
- Two (2) years later Pres. Estrada approved and signed into law RA 8999 creating the First Engineering District of Lanao Del Sur and
appropriating funds therefor.
- Congress later passed Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054), entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended. RA 9054 then lapsed. On March 2001 Basilan and Marawi City voted to join
ARMM.
- On July 2001, the Disomangcop and Dimalotang addressed a petition to Datumanong

ISSUE: Are RA 8999 and DO 119 unconstitutional/inoperative?

HELD: Yes. It violates the regional autonomy under the constitution thru RA 6074 – Province of Lanao Del Sur minus Marawi City. RA
8999 ventures to re-establish National Governments jurisdiction over infrastructures in Lanao del Sur. RA 9054 superceded / repeals
the RA 8999. The former advances the regional autonomy. As to the Department Order, it has tasked the Marawi SubDistrict
Engineering Office with functions that have already been devolved to the DPWHARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
2. Prohibit the DPWH Sec from implementing RA 8999 and DO 119, and the release of funds for projects intended for Lanao del Sur
and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub District. To compel the DBM Sec from releasing budgets for the mentioned case
“There is no similar basis for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent DBM Secretary to release funds appropriated
for public works projects in Marawi City and Lanao del Sur to the DPWH ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur and to
compel respondent DPWH Secretary to allow the DPWHARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur to implement all public
works projects within its jurisdictional area. Petition seeking for writ of mandamus against respondents is denied.”

1-A. ADELPHA FERNANDEZ, et.al. vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR, et al.
FACTS: Petitioners seek certiorari and prohibition to prohibit and restrain the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
("DOLE") and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA") from enforcing and implementing
Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 dated 20 November 1991 entitled "Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and
Procedures for the Deployment of Performing Artists."
Item No. 1 of the assailed DOLE Circular provides as follows:
1.No Filipino entertainer shall be deployed outside the Philippines except for legitimate performing artists consisting of musicians,
singers and members of dance troupes. In all cases, the performing artists must have a track record of legitimate and reputable
performance in the Philippines for at least one year. In no case shall the performing artists be below 23 years old.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt performing artists from coverage hereof.
It was promulgated in response to the growing number of documented reports and complaints about the exploitative working
conditions, harassment, forcible detention, physical injuries, rape and even death suffered by female performing artists and
 20

entertainers abroad. Because a comprehensive prohibition of such deployment would obviously adversely affect the economy,
especially thethe entertainment industry, the First National Tripartite Conference for the Protection of Overseas Entertainers, was
convened to evaluate a Government proposal for a complete interdiction of overseas deployment of Philippine entertainers and
performing artists. During this Conference, some of the problems facing Filipino entertainers (in particular, women entertainers)
abroad were discussed openly: vulnerability to operations of organized crime syndicate abroad; subjection to white slavery; harsh and
substandard working conditions; vulnerability to sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies, and so forth. At the end of
the Conference, it was resolved that Government should adopt a policy of selective (rather than comprehensive) prohibition of
deployment abroad of Philippine entertainers, to avoid the adverse effects which complete prohibition would impose on the country's
manpower export program. The labor representative recommended that the minimum age for performing artists seeking overseas
deployment be raised from eighteen (18) years to twenty-three (23) years.
Petitioners allege themselves to be "qualified performing artists, mostly singers and dancers," of ages 18-22 years. They challenge
the constitutional validity of Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91:
(1) that it is violative of the equal of the protection clause and the due process clause of the Constitution, and the state policy on
protection of labor because it is arbitrary, oppressive and discriminatory against performing artists of ages eighteen18-22 who
would otherwise be qualified for overseas employment; and
(2) that it was promulgated by public respondent DOLE Secretary and POEA Administrator without or in excess of their jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion.
The firmly settled rule is that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements
of judicial inquiry are met:
(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy;
(2) the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the resolution thereof;
(3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and
(4) that the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable for the final determination of the controversy.
Solicitor General: the Petition at bar does not present a justiciable controversy for having been filed prematurely. Petitioners had not
previously applied with the Secretary of Labor for exemption from the coverage of the Circular in line with the afore-quoted provision.
Said provision connotes that the prohibition is not at all permanent or absolute. It admits of exception. Obviously, the petition must
fail for prematurity.

ISSUE: Whether the petition present a justiciable controversy.

HELD: No. it does not present a justiciable controversy. Mere apprehension that the Secretary might under the law arbitrarily deny
their applications for exemption are considered mere stipulations and does not constitute a justiciable controversy. Reasons:
1) Item No. 1 DOLE Circ. does not establish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition of deployment abroad of entertainers
below 23 years of age. It provides that:
"the Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt from performing artists from coverage hereof."
The discretionary authority here asserted by the DOLE Secretary does not purport to be unlimited and arbitrary in nature. To the
contrary, fairly explicit and precisely drawn grounds for exempting particular performing artists from the coverage of Item No. 1 are
set out in a set of "Administrative Guidelines Implementing Department Circular No. 01-91."
2) Petitioners have failed to allege or have refrained from alleging, that they had previously applied to public respondent officials for
exemption from the minimum age restriction imposed by Item No. 1. Nor that respondent officials have arbitrarily denied their
applications for exemption from the minimum age requirement or from any other requirement establishment by Item No. 1. Neither
have petitioners alleged that public respondents have continually threatened to deny all and sundry applications for exemption, so as
to create a reasonable expectation that their applications would be immediately and arbitrarily denied, should they in fact file them.
Two (2) important presumptions are here applicable.
1) Administrative orders and regulations are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality.
2) Official duty has been or will be regularly performed.
An action like this is brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual and positive relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially true where the issues
"reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues
unless avoidance becomes evasion.
 21

To engage in judicial review, under the facts and circumstances here obtained, in advance of official efforts to apply the
provisions of the challenged circular, upon the supposition that petitioners' legal rights in the premises might be denied by public
respondent officials, is too close to rendering an advisory opinion in a hypothetical case — an undertaking clearly beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court.
Petitioners have failed to show the first requisite of a judicial inquiry- the existence of actual case or controversy. This failure
renders unnecessary consideration of the other requisites of constitutional litigation.

Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines

G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention is constitutional; a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government
and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, when applicable: To all "international transportations of persons by aircraft for hire."
Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket.
When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals "within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and
liabilities of the airline and its passenger.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction: Place of Destination vis-a-vis Agreed Stopping Place: The contract is a single
undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in th is
expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and
one place of destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

FACTS:
 Augusto Benedicto Santos III is a minor and a resident of the Philippines.
 Private respondent Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and
licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines.
 The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A. In December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked
in at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his departure to Manila.
 Despite a previous confirmation and reconfirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight for Tokyo to
Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.
 On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is in accordance with the constitution so as to deprive the Philippine
Courts jurisdiction over the case

HELD: Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.

Constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention

The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred
in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President
Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became
applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201,
declaring our formal adherence thereto. "to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled
in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof."

The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and
effect of law in this country.

Does the Warsaw Convention apply in this case?

By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international transportation of persons performed by aircraft for hire.

International transportation is defined in paragraph (2) of Article 1 as follows:

 22

(2) For the purposes of this convention, the expression "international transportation" shall mean any transportation in which,
according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in
the transportation or a transshipment, are situated [either] within the territories of two High Contracting Parties . . .

Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers is the
ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals "within
the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights
and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.

Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being from the United States to the Philippines and back to the
United States, it is subject to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the four places
where an action for damages may be brought.

Does Article 28(1) refer to Jurisdiction or Venue?

...where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international
sense must be established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular
court must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction is
determined will the issue of venue be taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is
submitted.
Was the case properly filed in the Philippines, since the plaintiff’s destination was Manila?

The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or,
specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner's ticket shows that his ultimate
destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates
that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an
agreed stopping place and not the destination.

Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and an "agreed stopping place." It is the "destination" and not an
"agreed stopping place" that controls for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under the Convention.

The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The
use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has
one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a
"place of destination."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

ANGARA v ELECTORAL COMMISSION, et al, 63 Phil 139

FACTS:
- October 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed member-elect of National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas
- December 3, the NA in session assembled; they passed Resolution No. 8 confirming its elected members and no protest
had thus far been filed
- December 8, respondents and rivals Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor for said position filed a Motion
of Protest before the Electoral Commission
- December 9, despite the resolution from NA, the Electoral Commission issued a resolution fixing December 9 as the
last day of filing election protests
- Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss because by virtue of NA resolution, Ynsua can no longer protest; Ynsua said EC
resolution prevails and that EC is not subject to prohibition from SC

ISSUE:
- Whether EC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed against
Angara despite the resolution of National Assembly
- Whether SC has jurisdiction over the EC and that it can take cognizance on the matter

HELD:
- The EC acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted by the Constitution to
decide in "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"
 23

- Yes. The SC as the final arbiter can take cognizance in cases of conflict between government agencies. The SC decided
that the Electoral Commission has jurisdiction to hear and determine the contest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua et al against the petitioner Jose A. Angara.

2) January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS: The petition is based on the premise that Patricio Dumlao a former governor of Nueva Vizcaya who filed his certificate of
candidacy in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980 is not allowed to run for re-election as stated in the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Big. 52
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in
existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)
The suit was enjoined by Igot and Salapatan (tax payer’s suit) on the ground that the other provisions of BP52 regarding the
term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from
running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office.
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52
Sec. 4: Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in
any partisan political activity therein:
provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing
of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima
fascie evidence of such fact.

ISSUE: Whether their petitions have cause of action. (Qualified for judicial review): The petitioners contend that it is in violation of
equal protection and due process under the Constitution.

HELD: It is unacceptable for judicial resolution. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan
Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in
his. The respectively contest completely different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual
capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit
standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review
(1) the existence of an appropriate case
(2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question
(3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity
(4) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity

SC: Although the third requisite is satisfied , the petitioners have not been able to satisfy the other 3 to qualify for judicial review.
a)Actual Controversy - Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's
disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC.
b)Proper Party - Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for
Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor
disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been called to have been adversely affected
by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional
c) Unavoidability of constitutional question - , the present is not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners
Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality
is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.
 24

ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Facts: On January 19, 1960, Republic Act No. 3001 was passed granting petitioner (Allied Broadcasting Center) the permit or
franchise to construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in the Philippines. Due to the passage of the said act, ABC
was able to established and operate ten (10) radio stations. Through said broadcasting stations, petitioner was able to provide
adequate public service which enabled the government to reach the population on important public issues, and assist the
government in programs relating to public information and education. On November 11, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 576-A
entitled "Decree Regulating The Ownership And Operation Of Radio And Television Stations And For Other Purposes" was issued.
One of the law’s provisions is that a broadcasting station should only own one radio station per municipality or city. This made ABC
lose 7 of its radio stations. ABC then filed directly with the Supreme Court a petition to declare the said law as invalid. It alleged that
the law is arbitrary.

ISSUE: Whether Presidential Decree No. 576-A is constitutional.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that ABC’s petition is actually a petition of declaratory relief which is not among the petitions
within the original jurisdiction of the SC. It must be brought to the before the Regional Trial Court and not before the Supreme
Court. Thus, the present petition is dismissed on this score. However, the SC discussed the merit of the case. The SC ruled that there
is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to be nullified. Though ABC did lose 7 of its original 10 radio stations
pursuant to the said law, there is nothing in the case which indicated that ABC complied under protest. ABC is therefore deemed to
have merely complied with the law and ABC is now estopped from denying such compliance.
There is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to be annulled. Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an
application for a license to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized number and that the same is being
denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Moreover, the petitioner does not also allege
that it had been penalized or is being penalized for a violation under said Decree. There is, likewise, no allegation that any of the
petitioner's stations had been confiscated or shut down pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the constitutional
challenge is not being raised in the context of a specific case or controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted his rights, instead
what the petitioner seeks is the nullification of Presidential Decree No. 576-A and the reinstatement of its rights under Republic Act
No. 3001.
Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is “the right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants. The function of the courts is to determine controversies between litigants and not to give advisory opinions. The
power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide case or controversy which involves the statute sought
to be reviewed.

Functions of Judicial Review:

Legitimizing Function: Upholds the validity of the law that results from a mere dismissal of a case challenging the validity of the law
Checking Function: Invalidate law of executive act that is contrary to the Constitution
Symbolic or educational function: Educates the bench and bar as to the controlling principles and concepts on matters of grave
pubic importance for the guidance of and restraint upon the future.

Salonga v Pano 134 SCRA 438

FACTS: A rash of bombings was occurred in Manila during August – October of 1980. On September 6, 1980, Victor Burns Lovely, Jr.,
a Philippine-born American citizen, almost killed himself and injured his brother, Romeo, as a result of a small bomb in his room. The
police found in his possession several pictures. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were appeared in the group pictures together
with other guests in a birthday party. Due to the injuries suffered by Lovely, he was brought to the AFP Medical Hospital and was
placed under the custody of Col. Roman P. Madella. Shortly, Lovely and his brothers Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with
subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property.
On October 19, 1980, after the president delivered his speech for the International Conference of the American Society of
Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, a small bomb exploded. Arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs)
were issued against persons who were implicated by Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. Lovely offered himself to be a
"state witness" and in his letter to the President, he stated that he will reveal everything he knows about the bombings.
 25

On October 21, 1980, the military went to the Manila Medical Center and arrested Salonga who was currently confined. The
arresting officer showed him an ASSO but it did not specify the charge against him.
On November 2, 1980, Salonga was transferred from his hospital room to an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati.
Subsequently on November 27, he was released for humanitarian reasons and was placed under house arrest, still without the benefit
of any investigation or charges.
On December 10, 1980, Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a Notice of Preliminary Investigation" in People v. Benigno
Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that "the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has
been set at 2:30 o'clock p.m. on December 12, 1980" Petitioner contends that he has not received any copy of the charges until January
17, 1981.
On or around March 26, 1981, the counsel for petitioner was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen.
Prospero Olivas, dated March 12, 1981, charging the petitioner, along with 39 other accused with the violation of R.A. 1700 (Revised
Anti – Subversion Act).
On October 15, 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him.

Contention of Petitioner: No prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against
him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law
exists in the Philippines today.

ISSUE: Whether there is prima facie evidence established by the prosecution to justify the information charged.

HELD: The petition was dismissed, the issue being moot and academic.
The Court ruled that the prosecution failed to establish prima facie case against the Salonga. However, they could no longer grant the
petition of Salonga because the prosecution decided to exclude him as one of the accused in the information charged. Notwithstanding
that the issue is moot and academic, the Court still ruled that the contention of Salonga that there was no prima facie evidence
established was correct. The only evidence relied upon was based on the testimony of Victor Lovely Lovely. He stated that the house
of Sen. Salonga was used as meeting place (contact point) and Salonga had been meeting with several subversive personnel based in
the U.S.A as evidenced by the photo from a birthday party which was in the possession of Lovely. Lovely’s testimonies are inconsistent
and insufficient, and should not have been relied upon.
No trial should commence if there is no prima facie evidence or there is no probable cause to form a sufficient belief that as to the
guilt of the accused.

Prima facie evidence: Evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to
establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction.

JAVIER v COMELEC 144 SCRA 194

FACTS: Evelio Javier and Arturo Pacificador were running in Antique as candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. Pacificador was a candidate of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).
On the eve of the elections, there was terrorism, as demonstrated by the killings, of followers of Javier. Because of this, other voters
gave their support the candidate of the ruling part, Pacificador. The incident was allegedly committed by Pacificador’s men.
Javier went to the COMELEC to question the canvassing of the election returns. On May 18, 1984, the 2nd Division of COMELEC
directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation until further
orders. On June 7, 1984, the same division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice
to the outcome of the case before the Commission.
On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been
made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made.
Javier contested the irregularities that took place upon the proclamation of Pacificador. He pointed out that one of the
Commissioner who ruled the case, Commissioner Jaime Opinion, was a former law partner of Javier who refused to inhibit himself. He
also contested that the case involving a member of the Batasang Pambasa must be attended by COMELEC en banc, and not by division.
 26

While the case is still in its pendency, Javier was gunned down on February 1986. Thus, the Solicitor General moved the petition mood
and academic.

ISSUE: WON due process was present in the proclamation of Pacificador

HELD: No. There was no due process.

The relationship of the judge, Opinion, with one of the parties may influence the decision towards to the favor the said party.
Where this is probable or even only posssible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable
imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear
to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without
such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Section 5.

Moot and academic cases shall still be resolved in the following cases:
1. There is grave violation of the Constitution

Province of Batangas vs Romulo

FACTS: In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to
enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-
003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the
LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other
requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos
contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each
corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization
Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and
the LGC of 1991.

HELD: Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion
of the IRA – they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local governments“. Consistent
with the principle of local autonomy, theConstitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision,
which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Limdistinguishes supervision from control: control lays down
the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it
himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to
modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or
“just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the “just share” shall beautomatically
released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act to receive the “just share” – it shall
be released to them “without need of further action“. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules
 27

& regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this
constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the
current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the
same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate lawand not through appropriations laws or GAAs.
Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to
a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit – any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an
“inappropriate provision“. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law.
To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials
should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon
which these provisions are based.

2. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involve

Lacson v. Perez (2001)

FACTS: May 1, 2001: There was an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones, and other
deadly weapons, attempting to break into the Malacañang. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo thereafter issued Proclamation No.
38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. There
were warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion.

There are 4 petitions in this case which assail that the declaration of a state of rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless arrests had no
basis both in fact and in law. The petitioners were not actually arrested, they only had a fear of such that is why they filed the
petitions.

May 6, 2001: Subsequently, PGMA ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila. Accordingly, all the
petitions are rendered moot and academic. The petitioners (Panfilo Lacson, Michael Ray Aquino, and Cesar Mancao), claim that the
proclamation of a state of rebellion is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests; however, the Secretary of Justice
denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the rebellion.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners still be arrested after such lifting of the declaration of state of rebellion?

HELD: Take into consideration the fact that the petitions are already moot and academic. However, the SC still resolved this case. Yes,
they can still be arrested. They can be arrested with the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in
connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang. It is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police
authorities to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means
that preliminary investigators will henceforth be conducted.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
rebellion if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a
state of rebellion.
**Note: The Supreme Court pondered on the factual basis of the President exercising her “calling out power”, making on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. This justifies the idea of “the paramount public interest involved” which is supposed to be discussed with this case.

Romeo Acop Vs Teofisto Guingona

G.R. No. 134855
 28

Facts: On May 18, 1995, 11 suspected members of the criminal group known as the Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City in an alleged shootout with the Anti-Bank Robbery Intelligence Task Group of the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) of the PNP and who was one of the officers
assigned to conduct an investigation on the incident, made a public disclosure of his findings that there was no shootout and the 11
suspected members of the gang were summarily executed. This was attested by SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, also a member of the CIC.
The senate conducted hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding the subject incident and SPO2 delos Reyes and
SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate hearings.
On June 2, 1995, former Senator Raul Roco, who was then the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human
Rights, recommended that SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted to the government’s Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Program. Accordingly, they were admitted into the said Program.
Herein petitioners, in their capacity as taxpayers, but who are among the PNP officers implicated in the alleged rubout,
contend that under Sec. 3(d) for R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officers, like SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz, are disqualified
from being admitted into the witness protection program even though they may be testifying against other law enforcement
officers. Petitioners pray that the decision of the RTC be reversed and set aside and instead –
a) An injunction be issued enjoining the Department of Justice from continuing to provide the benefits accruing under the Witness
Protection Program to respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz;
b) Order the immediate discharge of respondent SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from WPP and for the latter to be ordered to
cease and desist from accepting benefits of the WPP; and
c) Order respondent officers to return whatever monetary benefits they have received from the government as a consequence of
their wrongful and illegal admission into the WPP.

Issue: W/N the petition for judicial review should prosper.

Held: In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that the petition lacks merit and that the same has been
rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under the Program was already
terminated on December 3, 1997 and August 23, 1998, respectively, as evidenced by the letter of the Director of the Program
addressed to OSG, dated February 10, 1999.
In their comment, private respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz agree with OSG.
Indeed, prayers a) and b) above had been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2
dela Cruz from the coverage of the Program.
However, we find it necessary to resolve the merits of the principal issue raised for a proper disposition of prayer c) for future
guidance of both bench and bar as to the applications of Sec. 3(d) and 4 of R.A. No. 6981. As we have ruled in Alunan III vs. Mirasol,
276 SCRA 501 (1997), and Viola vs Alunan III 277 SCRA 409 (1997), “courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it
is capable of repetition, yet evading review.”

Judicial Review
 29

G.R. No. 67752 April 10, 1989

NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, ELIZALDE D. DIAZ, JULIO LOGARTA, JR., ENRIQUE ANGELES, ALFREDO DE
LEON AND GEORGE SIBAL, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE ROBERTO V. ONGPIN, in his capacity as Minister of Trade and Industry
and Chairman of the Board of Investments, and the HONORABLE GREGORIO G. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Treasurer of the
Philippines, respondents.
FACTS: President Ferdinand Marcos lifted Martial Law on January 16, 1981. Prior to this and after this time, he issued several
presidential decrees and issuances pursuant to his legislative power under the 1935 Constitution and the transitory provisions of the
1973 Constitution. Among those he enacted are:
1.) PD 1789 – Omnibus Investment Code, which amended RA 5186 and 6135, dated Jan. 15, 2016
2.) 1981 Investment Priorities Plan and EO 676, which implements the plan dated April 10, 1981
3.) PD 1892 - Allowed an increase in foreign equity participation in preferred areas of investment effective for one (1) year
dated December 4, 1983
The Petitioners, NEPA, identified themselves as citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers and businessmen who claim to be adversely
affected by the enforcement and continued implementation of the said decrees:
1.) They aver that PD 1789 is an abuse of the legislative power of the President. It is their position that decree-making
powers are limited to those relative to the suppression and prevention of the invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent
danger thereof. (This was issued before the President lifted Martial Law.)
2.) They claim that the 1981 Investment Priorities Plan and EO 676 offends Article XIV Sec 8 & 9 of the 1973 Constitution,
which deals with National Economy and Patrimony whose exploration, development and exploitation are reserved to the
citizens of the Philippines. (This was issued after the Martial Law was lifted.)
3.) They argue that PD 1982 is violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution and is repugnant
to the nationalistic and conserving spirit of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General, representing the public respondents maintains that the petitioners have no personality to sue absent any actual
controversy on the enforcement of the above laws. These laws were issued pursuant to Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution
and are valid and not unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Do the petitioners have personality to sue?

DECISION: No. The Petitioners do not have a locus standi in seeking judicial redress by declaring the above laws unconstitutional.
Petitioners advance an abstract, hypothetical issue which is in effect a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court. There must
be a Bona fide suit. Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. It is legitimate only in the last resort,
and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants.
The following requisites of a judicial inquiry of a constitutional question must be present: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2)
an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. Petitioners
merely complied with the third requisite, that of raising the issue of constitutionality at the earliest instance in their pleadings.
The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugned the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Not even one of the petitioners has
been adversely affected by the application of those laws. No actual conflict has been alleged wherein the petitioner could validly and
possibly say that the increase in foreign equity participation in non-pioneer areas of investment from the period of December 2,
1983 to December 4,1984 had any direct bearing on them, such as considerable rise in unemployment, real increase in foreign
investment, unfair competition with Philippine nationals, exploitation of the country’s natural resources by foreign investors under
the decrees. The laws are also not appropriation measures which may constitute misappropriation of public funds. In this case,
the petitioners may have locus standi as taxpayers.

b. On personality to sue: must have a right that is directly prejudiced or will be prejudiced and the positive action would grant relief.

ALAN PAGUIA vs OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL.

FACTS: On March 2006, Former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide was nominated by PGMA to become a permanent representative to the
United Nations. Petitioner Alan F. Paguia questioned the validity of such nomination, as he contends that such nomination was
violative of Section 23 of the Republic Act No. 7157 or the Philippine Foreign Services Act of 1991. Under that said provision of the
law, the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the DFA is at 65 years old. Davide, at the time of the nomination,
was already 70 years of age. Thus, according to petitioner, he is disqualified to be a permanent representative of the DFA. He theorizes
that the the mandatory retirement age rule is applicable to all DFA employees, whether career or non-career, as the position in the
case at bar.
 30

Defendants, in response to Paguia, question his legal standing or locus standi to bring this suit on two grounds. They first
contend that since Paguia is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, then he cannot properly file this case. Second, that neither
his citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davide’s appointment because such nomination
does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds and would therefore not affect him.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner has locus standi (legal standing/legal personality) to file the case?

HELD: Yes, petitioner did not have legal personality to file the suit because:
1. Petitioner’s citizenship does not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. Three factors are relevant in the determination to
allow third party suits so [the court] can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised:
1.) the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy;
2.) a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition and;
3.) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.
None of petitioner’s allegations comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation
of a statutory provision on the retirement of government personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission
that a "clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition" is absent.
2. The same conclusion holds true for petitioner’s invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers’ contributions to the state’s coffers
entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal. However, the salaries
and benefits respondent Davide received were fixed by law under the Annual General Appropriations Act, negating petitioner’s
claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds."
3.. Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." Preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments
on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within
the proscribed conduct (Take note: the definition of the practice of law as enunciated in Cayetano v. Monsod, just in case you want
to read it - Tepman).

Executive Secretary et al. Vs Southwing Heavy Industries 482 SCRA 673

The instant consolidated petitions seek to annul and set aside the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72,
in Civil Case No. 20-0-04 and Civil Case No. 22-0-04, both dated May 24, 2004; and the February 14, 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83284, which declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) unconstitutional.

FACTS: On December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued EO 156,
entitled PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES. E.O 156 prohibits the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special
Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions
(Among those listed, include: A vehicle that is owned and for the personal use of a returning resident or immigrant and covered by
an authority to import issued under the No-dollar Importation Program. Such vehicles cannot be resold for at least three (3) years; A
vehicle for the use of an official of the Diplomatic Corps and authorized to be imported by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trucks
excluding pickup trucks, Buses, Special purpose vehicles: fire trucks, ambulances, funeral hearse/coaches, etc)

Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. (SOUTHWING), Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corporation (MACRO VENTURES), and Motor
Vehicle Importers Association of Subic Bay Freeport, Inc. (ASSOCIATION) all engaged in the business of, among others, importing
and/or trading used motor vehicles
filed separate actions for declaratory relief. They sought for the E.O. be declared unconstitutional.

The RTC declared that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the
Constitution with Congress. The trial court further held that the proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic Act No. 7227 (RA
7227) or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport.

Petitioners are now before this Court contending that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is valid and applicable to the entire country,
including the Freeeport. They assail Procedural and Substantive Issues.
 31

Procedural issues: W the respondents lack locus standi to question the validity of EO 156
Petitioners argue that respondents will not be affected by the importation ban considering that their certificate of registration and
tax exemption do not authorize them to engage in the importation and/or trading of used cars.
HELD: The established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a
direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied in the instant case. The broad subject of the prohibited importation is
all types of used motor vehicles. Respondents would definitely suffer a direct injury from the implementation of EO 156 because
their certificate of registration and tax exemption authorize them to trade and/or import new and used motor vehicles and spare
parts, except used cars. Other types of motor vehicles imported and/or traded by respondents and not falling within the category of
used cars would thus be subjected to the ban to the prejudice of their business. Undoubtedly, respondents have the legal standing
to assail the validity of EO 156.
At any rate, even assuming the procedural flaws raised by petitioners truly exist, the Court is not precluded from brushing
aside these technicalities and taking cognizance of the action filed by respondents considering its importance to the public and in
keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution.

Substantive issues: (1) whether there is statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; and
(2) if the answer is in the affirmative, whether the application of Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, reasonable and within the scope
provided by law.
(1) Yes
The main thrust of the petition is that EO 156 is constitutional because it was issued pursuant to EO 226, the Omnibus Investment
Code of the Philippines and that its application should be extended to the Freeport because the guarantee of RA 7227 on the free
flow of goods into the said zone is merely an exemption from customs duties and taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not
an open floodgate for all kinds of goods and materials without restriction.
(2) Partly
Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals,
and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may
also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the
barangay.[16] Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated
by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law
and implement legislative policy. To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following
requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
EO 156 actually satisfied the first requisite of a valid administrative order. It has both constitutional and statutory bases.
Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.
Anent the second requisite, EO 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to implement or execute primary legislative
enactments intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified product not previously
subject to such prohibition. Considering the settled principle that in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, acts of the other
branches of the government are presumed to be valid, and there being no objection from the respondents as to the procedure in
the promulgation of EO 156, the presumption is that said executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations
imposed by law.
To determine whether EO 156 has complied with the third and fourth requisites of a valid administrative issuance, to wit,
that it was issued within the scope of authority given by the legislature and that it is reasonable, an examination of the nature of a
Freeport under RA 7227 and the primordial purpose of the importation ban under the questioned EO is necessary.
RA 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military
reservations and their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of Special Economic and Freeport Zone, or the Subic
Bay Freeport, in order to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general.
In issuing EO 156, particularly the prohibition on importation under Article 2, Section 3.1, the President envisioned to
 32

rationalize the importation of used motor vehicles and to enhance the capabilities of the Philippine motor manufacturing firms to be
globally competitive producers of completely build-up units and their parts and components for the local and export markets. The
President issued the questioned EO to prevent further erosion of the already depressed market base of the local motor vehicle
industry and to curtail the harmful effects of the increase in the importation of used motor vehicles.
The importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a valid administrative order. To be valid, an administrative issuance
must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling
statute and other existing laws, for such is the sole function of the legislature which the other branches of the government cannot
usurp.
In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor
vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the
importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory. The proscription in the
importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of
the prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when the application of an administrative issuance modifies existing
laws or exceeds the intended scope, as in the instant case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for
being unreasonable.
The importation ban in this case should be declared void for its too sweeping and unnecessary application to the Freeport
which has no bearing on the objective of the prohibition. If the aim of the EO is to prevent the entry of used motor vehicles from the
Freeport to the customs territory, the solution is not to forbid entry of these vehicles into the Freeport, but to intensify
governmental campaign and measures to thwart illegal ingress of used motor vehicles into the customs territory. It must be
mentioned that on June 19, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97-A, Further Clarifying The Tax And Duty-
Free Privilege Within The Subic Special Economic And Free Port Zone.
In sum, the Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void insofar as it is made applicable to the presently secured
fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Pursuant to the separability clause of EO 156, Section 3.1
is declared valid insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the Philippine territory outside the presently secured fenced-in
former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the Philippine territory
via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine
territory, but they cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.
Article 2 Section 3.1 of E.O. 156 is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently
fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area and VOID with respect to its application to the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base
area.
 33

PASCUAL VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS

G.R. No. L – 10405, December 29, 1960
On August 31, 1954, Winceslao Pascual filed a petition to declare RA 920 null and void. RA 920, An Act Appropriating Funds
for Public Works approved on June 20, 1953 and contained in such act is the item of Php 85, 000 for the “construction, repair,
extension and improvement” of Pasig feeder road terminals. Pascual contends that the feeder roads were “nothing but projected
and planned subdivision (Antonio Subdivision) roads, not yet constructed and that projected feeders do not connect any
government property or any important premises to the highway. It was further contended that the parcel of land where the roads
will be constructed are owned by Jose Zulueta, who at that time of the passage and approval of RA 920 was a Senator. Take note
that Zulueta offered to donate it to the municipality and that the municipality accepted it.

ISSUE: Pascual contends that the donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting Members of the Congress from
being directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the government and that he projected feeder roads in question
to be constructed with public funds will greatly enhance or increase the value of the subdivision of Zulueta.
Zulueta contends that Pascual had “no legal capacity to sue” and that the petition did not state a cause of action. He further
contends that it should not be the governor who will represent the province of Rizal in such matter, instead it should be the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal in consonance with Sec 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code.

HELD: It is well stated that the validity of a statute maybe contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its
enforcement. In American jurisprudence, it also follows that not only persons individually affected but also taxpayers, have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditures of public moneys.
In this case, it was ruled that the validity of the statute depends on the powers of Congress at the time the statute was
passed or approved, not upon events occurring or acts performed subsequently. Referring to the 85, 000 php appropriation for the
projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether the said roads were public or private property
when the bill, which later on became RA 920, was passed by Congress or when the bill was approved by the President and the
disbursement of the said sum became effective. In the case, the Supreme Court ruled that since Zulueta owned the land where the
projected feeder roads will be constructed, the appropriation of 85, 000 was sought for private purpose and hence should be
declared null and void.

Sanidad vs COMELEC
FACTS: On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin
COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991
and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that the president has no power to propose amendments to the new
constitution, as such, the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis.

ISSUE:
1. Is the case at bar justiciable?
2. Does the president have authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed sufficient and proper submission?

HELD: The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable question since it is not the
wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to perform such act is in question. The president has the authority to
propose amendments as the governmental powers are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time for
deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short especially since the questions are issues of the day
and the people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law.

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
 34

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, seeking to enjoin
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 for being
unconstitutional.

FACTS: Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and he has been receiving
retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among
others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class
legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
BP 52, sec. 4, par 1
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have different issues.
The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of
the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public
office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office.
As for Igot and Salapantan, they assail the validity of BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 2
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State […] shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the
offices covered by this Act […] provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the filed petition is actual case or controversy filed for judicial review.
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

HELD: It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies
The Supreme Court pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for the latter should have never been merged. Dumlao's issue is
different from Igot and Salapantan.
They have different issues. Further, this case(Dumlao) does not meet all requisites to be eligible for judicial review, namely:
(1) the existence of an appropriate case;
(2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The Supreme Court held that the petitioners fell short of the necessity that the case bean actual controversy.
Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of BP52 nor is any party seeking for his disqualification. The question he
poses is in the abstract and a hypothetical issue.
Whether or not petitioners are the proper party to submit the petition, the Supreme Court held in the case of Igot and Salapatan,
neither of them has been called to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as
unconstitutional.
What they have is only generated grievance as contrasted to a direct injury creating a substantial interest in the case. Without
a litigate interest, they cannot claim any locus standi. However, due to the impelling public interest involved and the proximity of the
elections, the strict procedure for judicial relaxed. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 4 of BP 51 was not discriminatory and contrary
to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. The equal protection clause of the constitution does not forbid
all legal classification. It only proscribes arbitrary and unreasonable classification. Furthermore, it should be emphasized the purpose
of such classification was to allow emergence of younger blood in local governments.
 35

Regarding the accreditation of COMELEC in pursuance to BP 52, it was held that charges for committing any act of disloyalty
to the state should not be a basis to disqualify a candidate. An accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Therefore, the Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the 1st paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP52 while the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP 52 as null and void for being
violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to the accused.

NEPA vs Ongpin
FACTS: After the lifting of martial law in 1981, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1789 and some other PDs.
The said PD was issued in order to suspend for one year the requirement that in order for companies to validly operate in the
country it must be composed of at least 60% Filipino. NEPA (National Economic Protectionism Association), an association of local
businessmen, assailed the said PD averring that as taxpayers and Filipinos they will be greatly adversed by such PD. They sought to
enjoin Roberto Ongpin, then the Minister (Secretary) of Trade and Industry, from enforcing the said law. The Sol-Gen commented
that NEPA et al have no personality and standing to sue in the absence of an actual controversy concerning the enforcement of the
PD in question – that they were not actually adversely affected by said PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites for judicial review are met.

HELD: No. NEPA et al question the constitutionality of Secs 1 and 3 of PD 1892 in relation to PD 1789, the 1981 Investment Priorities
Plan and EO 676, as being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the 1973 Constitution as well as Secs 8 & 9 of
Article 14 thereof, and seek to prohibit Ongpin from implementing said laws. Yet, not even one of the petitioners has been adversely
affected by the application of those provisions. No actual conflict has been alleged wherein NEPA could validly and possibly say that
the increase in foreign equity participation in non-pioneer areas of investment from the period of Dec 2, 1983 to Dec 4, 1984 had
any direct bearing on them, such as considerable rise in unemployment, real increase in foreign investment, unfair competition with
Philippine nationals, exploitation of the country’s natural resources by foreign investors under the decrees. NEPA et al advance an
abstract, hypothetical issue which is in effect a petition for an advisory opinion from the SC. The power of courts to declare a law
unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient.
There must be a bona fide suit. Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to
pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a
legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants.

Kilosbayan vs Morato
FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery
equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of
the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the
facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to
declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It
is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987
Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different
from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of
Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal
standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled
rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since
the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense
be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An
issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action
 36

between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in
a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of
the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, JOHN H. OSMEÑA and RODOLFO G. BIAZON
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary
of the DOTC, and EDSA LRT CORPORATION, LTD.
This is a petition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to prohibit respondents from further implementing and enforcing the
“Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA” dated April 22, 1992 and the
“Supplemental Agreement to the 22 April 1992 Revised and Restated Agreement To Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit
System for EDSA” dated May 6, 1993.
1989: DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA, from Pasay, Quezon, Mandaluyong and Makati will be known
as EDSA Light Rail Transit III (EDSA LRT III),
March 3, 1990: A letter of intent was sent by the Eli Levin Enterprises, Inc., represented by Elijahu Levin to DOTC Secretary Oscar
Orbos, proposing to construct the EDSA LRT III on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis.
March 15: Secretary Orbos invited Levin to send a technical team to discuss the project with DOTC.
July 9 ( Pres. Cory signed: BOT Law): Republic Act No. 6957 entitled “An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and
Maintenance of Referred to as the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law, it took effect on October 9, 1990. The schemes are as follows
(1) Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) (2)Build-Transfer (BT).
January 22, 1991 and March 14, 1991: In accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6957 and to set the EDSA LRT III project underway,
DOTC, on, issued Department Orders Nos. 91-494 and 91-496 (Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Technical
Committee)
· issued guidelines for the prequalification of contractors for the financing and implementation of the project
· The notice, advertising the prequalification of bidders, was published in three newspapers of general circulation once a week for
three consecutive weeks starting February 21, 1991.
· deadline set for submission: March 21, 1991, later extended to April 1, 1991.
· Five groups responded to the invitation:
1. ABB Trazione of Italy,
2. Hopewell Holdings Ltd. of Hongkong
3. Mansteel International of Mandaue, Cebu
4. Mitsui & Co., Ltd. of Japan
5. EDSA LRT Consortium
On the last day for submission the prequalification criteria proposed by the Technical Committee were adopted by the PBAC. The
criteria totaling 100 percent, are (a) Legal aspects — 10 percent; (b) Management/Organizational capability — 30 percent; and (c)
Financial capability — 30 percent; and (d) Technical capability — 30 percent (Rollo, p. 122).
April 3, 1991: The Committee (BOT Law) approved the same.
After evaluating the prequalification, the PBAC issued a Resolution on May 9, 1991 declaring that out of five only the EDSA LRT
Consortium “met the requirements (21 points per criteria, except for Legal Aspects, and obtaining an over-all passing mark of at
least 82 points.
Secretary Orbos was appointed Executive Secretary then replaced by Secretary Pete Nicomedes Prado: to award of the EDSA LRT III
project to the sole complying bidder, the EDSA LRT Consortium
July 1991: Executive Secretary Orbos, issued a directive to proceed with the negotiations
July 16: The EDSA LRT Consortium submitted its bid proposal to DOTC.:
 37

DOTC and respondent EDSA LRT Corporation entered into an “Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for
EDSA” under the terms of the BOT Law. Secretary Prado requested presidential approval of the contract.
March 13, 1992: Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon (replaced Executive Secretary Orbos) informed Secretary Prado that the President
could not grant the requested approval because (1) that DOTC failed to conduct actual public bidding in compliance with Section 5 of
the BOT Law; (2) that the law authorized public bidding as the only mode to award BOT projects, and the prequalification proceedings
was not the public bidding contemplated under the law; (3) that Item 14 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the BOT Law
which authorized negotiated award of contract in addition to public bidding was of doubtful legality; and (4) that congressional
approval of the list of priority projects under the BOT or BT Scheme provided in the law had not yet been granted at the time the
contract was awarded. Executive Secretary Drilon, the DOTC and private respondents re-negotiated the agreement.
April 22, 1992: the parties entered into a “Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer
Light Rail Transit System for EDSA inasmuch as “the parties [are] cognizant of the fact that DOTC has full authority to sign the
Agreement without need of approval by the President pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 380 and that certain events
[had] supervened since November 7, 1991 which necessitate[d] the revision of the Agreement”
On May 6, 1992, DOTC, represented by Secretary Jesus Garcia vice Secretary Prado, and private respondent
entered into a “Supplemental Agreement to the 22 April 1992 Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light
Rail Transit System for EDSA” so as to “clarify their respective rights and responsibilities” and to submit [the] Supplemental Agreement
to the President, of the Philippines for his approval
Secretary Garcia submitted the two Agreements to President Fidel V. Ramos for his consideration and approval (Memorandum to
Secretary Garcia on May 6, 1993, approved the said Agreements)
Agreements:
1. the EDSA LRT III will use light rail vehicles from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics
2. will have a maximum carrying capacity of 450,000 passengers a day, or 150 million a year to be achieved-through 54 such vehicles
operating simultaneously.
3. will run at grade, or street level, on the mid-section of EDSA for a distance of 17.8 kilometers from F.B. Harrison, Pasay City to
North Avenue, Quezon City.
4. The system will have its own power facility
5. It will also have thirteen (13) passenger stations and one depot in 16-hectare government property at North Avenue
6. Private respondents shall undertake and finance the entire project required for a complete operational light rail transit system
7. Target completion date is 1,080 days or approximately three years from the implementation date of the contract inclusive of
mobilization, site works, initial and final testing of the system
8. Upon full or partial completion and viability thereof, private respondent shall deliver the use and possession of the completed
portion to DOTC which shall operate the same
9. DOTC shall pay private respondent rentals on a monthly basis through an Irrevocable Letter of Credit.
10. The rentals shall be determined by an independent and internationally accredited inspection firm to be appointed by the parties.
11. As agreed upon, private respondent’s capital shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall
come from the earnings of the EDSA LRT III. After 25 years and DOTC shall have completed payment of the rentals, ownership of
the project shall be transferred to the latter for a consideration of only U.S. $1.00
 38

May 5, 1994: R.A. No. 7718, an “Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 6957, Entitled “An Act Authorizing the Financing,
Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and for Other Purposes” was signed into
law by the President. (published in two newspapers of general circulation on May 12, 1994, and took effect 15 days thereafter or on
May 28, 1994.
R.A. No. 7718: The law expressly recognizes BLT scheme and allows direct negotiation of BLT contracts

PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: The agreement, as amended by the Supplemental Agreement, in so far as it grants EDSA LRT
CORPORTATION, LTD., a foreign corporation, the ownership of EDSA LRT III, a public utility, violates the constitution, and hence, is
unconstitutional.
They contend that the EDSA LRT III is a public utility, and the ownership and operation thereof is limited by the Constitution to Filipino
citizens and domestic corporations, not foreign corporations like private respondent.

ISSUE:
Can respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation own EDSA LRT III; a public utility?

HELD: YES. What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power
plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by themselves
constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public.
Private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles and collect fees from the riding public. It will have no dealings with the public
and the public will have no right to demand any services from it.
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own
said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities
used to serve the public. The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof
who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.
While private respondent is the owner of the facilities necessary to operate the EDSA LRT III, it admits that it is not enfranchised to
operate a public utility as per requirement of Section 11 of Article XII of the Constitution. In view of this incapacity, private respondent
and DOTC agreed that on completion date, private respondent will immediately deliver possession of the LRT system by of lease for
25 years, during which period DOTC shall operate the same as a common carrier and private respondent shall provide technical
maintenance and repair services to DOTC.
Since DOTC shall operate the EDSA LRT III, it shall assume all the obligations and liabilities of a common carrier.
For this purpose, DOTC shall indemnify and hold harmless private respondent from any losses, damages, injuries or death which may
be claimed in the operation or implementation of the system, except losses, damages, injury or death due to defects in the EDSA LRT
III on account of the defective condition of equipment or facilities or the defective maintenance of such equipment facilities.
BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELEOPMENT CORPORATION VS. HON. CRISPN C. LARON Judge of Court of the Court of First
Instance (RTC), Branch 44, Dagupan City, P and M AGRO-DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and REGINO RAVANZO, JR.
FACTS: March 3, 1978- The city of Dagupan (City) awarded a lease contract in favour of P and M Agro-Development Corporation (P
and M) over a city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area with and approximate are of 3,692 square meters.
· May 25, 1982- The City filed an action to rescind the lease contract with P and M for the latter’s failure to comply with the
conditions of the contract.
· January 16, 1985- the case was decided in favour of the City on the basis of a “joint Manifestation” of both parties.
· September 26, 1985- upon motion of the City, a writ of execution was issued ordering the immediate delivery of the
possession of the premises of the movant city
 39

· November 5, 1985- P and M filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. However, it was only on August
17,1987 when the incident was resolved by the court which set aside the decision previously rendered on the ground that the joint
manifestation on which it was based is not in the nature of a compromise agreement.
· April 20, 1987-during the pendency of the resolution on the motion for reconsideration filed by P and M, Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Dagupan adopted a resolution "Authorizing the City Mayor, Honorable Liberate Ll. Reyna, Sr., to Enter Into
a Contract of Lease with Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation”
Regino Ravanzo then filed a case questioning the validity of the lease contract between the City and the Bugnay
Construction. He filed the suit in the guise of being a taxpayer in the City and as he was the counsel for P & M in the earlier case.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is the real party in interest

HELD: No. The essence of a taxpayer's right to institute such an action hinges on the existence of that requisite pecuniary or
monetary interest and only when the act complained of directly involves an illegal disbursement of public funds raised by taxation
will the taxpayer's suit be allowed.
In this cases was no disbursement of public funds involved. The contract of lease entered into by Bugnay Construction with the City
expressly state that the former will FINANCE, establish, construct, develop, manage, operate, maintain, control and supervise a
commercial center and a modern public market building, paying a monthly rental of eight pesos (P8.00) per square meter, for a
period of twenty (20) years.
*If the contract is for local consumption only, and that the petitioner is not directly injured by the said contract which does not
involve the disbursement of public funds, the petitioner has no personality to sue.
d. three views on the effects of declaration of unconstitutionality of a law

Ynot vs IAC, March 20, 1987

FACTS: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the
petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the
case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the
decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

ISSUE: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

HELD: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do
not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner
and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case,
the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a supersedes bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner
without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

Norton v Shelby County/ Sheppard v Barren

There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute.
1. Orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed.
It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are
bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted
to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.
 40

2. Modern view (less stringent). Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal
the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just
as if such statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law, but the decision affects the
parties only and there is no judgment against the statute. The opinion or reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the
determination of other similar cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke,
or annul the statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound.

The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code, providing that "when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

De Agbayani v PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (April 29, 1971)

FACTS: July 19, 1939––De Agbayani obtained a loan (P450) from PNB, which was to mature on July 19, 1944. The loan was secured
by a real estate mortgage (on a land in Pangasinan).
July 12, 1959––PNB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan, seeking to
recover the unpaid amount.
August 10, 1959––De Agbayani filed a suit to counter PNB's claim. Her main allegation was: 15 years had already lapsed since the
maturity of the loan, so the foreclosure of the land mortgaged to PNB should no longer be enforceable, because the prescriptive
period had lapsed. As of November 27, 1959, the balance due (unpaid) on said loan was P1,294.
~History~
September 1, 1939, World War II broke out. It ended on September 2, 1945.
March 10, 1945––EO 32 was issued by President Osmeña, temporarily suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other
monetary obligations payable by war sufferers.
July 26, 1948––RA 342, the debt moratorium legislation, was enacted which extended the suspension of debt payments for a period
of 8 years (until 1956) in order to give the prewar debtors an "opportunity to rehabilitate themselves". At the time of the enactment,
there was a factual justification for the moratorium. Having just been freed from Japanese forces in 1945, businesses were at a
standstill and the economy laid prostrate.
1953––However, the Court explicitly held in a case (Rutter v Esteban) that RA 342 was unconstitutional, declaring it "unreasonable
and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without
effect". The right to non-impairment of contractual obligations (creditors' claims) must prevail over the assertion of community
power to remedy an existing evil (suspension of debt payment because war sufferers needed rehabilitation after the war).
Going back to De Agbayani's suit, PNB contends that if the period where RA 342 was operative were to be deducted from/not
included in the computation of the prescription period, the right of PNB to foreclose the mortgage should still subsist. The lapsed
period would not be 15 years, but only 7 years.
The lower court did not find PNB's contention persuasive and decided in favor of De Agbayani.

ISSUE: Did the lower court err in granting De Agbayani's suit and dismissing PNB's contention?

HELD: Yes. "In arriving at such a conclusion, the lower court manifested a tenacious adherence to the inflexible view that an
unconstitutional act is not a law, creating no rights and imposing no duties, and thus as inoperative as if it had never been. It was
oblivious to the force of the principle adopted by this Court that while a statute's repugnancy to the fundamental law deprives it of
its character as a juridical norm, its having been operative prior to its being nullified is a fact that is not devoid of legal
consequences."
Under the orthodox view, an act or law declared as unconstitutional cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties, nor
can it justify any official act taken under it. The Civil Code says that "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution."
Understandably and logically so, because the Constitution is supreme and paramount, and any law contrary to it cannot
survive. HOWEVER, the orthodox view may not be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit that prior to the declaration of nullity, such
challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with.
 41

"The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official."

Principle: “the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached.”
Ruling: The SC reversed the lower court's decision and ruled in favor of PNB.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Julio Herida

FACTS: From May 10, 1943, defendant Julio Herida issued a promissory note in favor of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd,for the amount of P
750.00 payable on May 10,1994; on June 8, 1943, defendant issued again another promissory note for the same amount payable on
June 8, 1994; on June 10, 1943, defendant issued again another promissory for the amount of P 280.00 payable on June 10, 1944.
All the promissory notes bear interest at the rate of 6% per year compounded quarterly.
To secure their full payment, the defendant executed two real state mortgages affecting six parcels of land registered in
Negros Occidental. The contract further provides that upon failure of the mortgagor to comply with the terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract, defendant will pay 10% of the total indebtedness but not less than P200.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay
the costs.
On September 22, 1954, the plaintiff (Republic of the Philippines) addressed a letter to the defendant demanding the
payment of his amount due. Despite the said demand, defendant failed and refused to pay the above-mentioned amount.
The plaintiff then raised the argument that due to a Transfer Agreement, dated June 15, 1957, the loans secured by said
mortgages is now administered by the Board of Liquidators, a government agency under the Office of the President, created under
EO 372. This implies that the defendant is now responsible to pay the said amount to the Republic of the Philippines.
In response, the defendant contended that such right of the Republic of the Philippines to bring the present action against
the defendant has already prescribed and that the moratorium laws, such as EO 25 and EO 32 are not applicable to the loans at bar.
On the other hand, appellee explains that the said moratorium laws were declared unconstitutional only on May 18, 1953,
the ten-year period within which to bring the action on May 19,1953 which will therefore prescribe on May 19, 1963. The complaint
in the case was filed on November 27, 1961. Consequently, the ten year period has not yet prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether the said laws are applicable to the loans at bar

HELD: YES. The ten-year period within which to institute the action began the day after the moratorium laws were declared
unconstitutional. Appellee’s cause will therefore prescribe only on May 19, 1963. The complaint in this case was filed in November
1961, which is within the 10-year period and, therefore, the action has not yet prescribed.

Republic v CFI
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land owned by the private respondents for
the widening and concreting of the Nabua-Bato-Agos Section, Philippine-Japan Highway Loan (PJHL) road. While the right of the
Republic is not now disputed, the private respondents, however, demand that the just compensation for the property should be
based on fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which fixes payment on the basis of the
assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner, whichever is lower.
>The Regional, Trial Court ruled for the private respondents.
> When elevated to it, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
>Hence, the instant petition by the Republic.
In Export Processing Zone Authority ("EPZA") vs. Dulay, etc. et al., 1 this Court held the determination of just compensation in
eminent domain to be a judicial function and it thereby declared Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including
Presidential Decree No. 1533, to the contrary extent, as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of judicial
prerogatives. The ruling, now conceded by the Republic was reiterated in subsequent cases. 2

ISSUES:
 42

1.) EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PD 1533 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID; UP TO WHEN RETROACTIVELY; EFFECT
ON A PENDING APPEALED CASE WHERE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PD 1533 NOT ASSAILED BEFORE COURT A QUO.
2.) WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN EPZA VS. HON. DULAY, ETC., ET AL. (G.R. NO. 59603,
APRIL 29, 1987) DECLARING PD 1533 UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID, BE APPLIED IN THIS CASE.

HELD: No error in the appealed decision. The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional as
being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed. Here, of course, we refer to the law
itself being per se repugnant to the Constitution. It is not always the case, however, that a law is constitutionally faulty per se. Thus,
it may well be valid in its general import. but invalid in its application to certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise valid
law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates
contractually vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive application may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of
contracts.
A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void
act occurring prior to such a declaration. Thus, in our decisions on the moratorium laws, 6 we have been constrained to recognize
the interim effects of said laws prior to their declaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise been unable to simply
ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play. So also, even as a practical matter, a situation that may aptly be described as fait
accompli may no longer be open for further inquiry, let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity of a governing
statute.
The instant controversy, however, is too far distant away from any of the above exceptional cases. To this day, the
controversy between the petitioner and the private respondents on the issue of just compensation is still unresolved, partly
attributable to the instant petition that has prevented the finality of the decision appealed from. The fact of the matter is that the
expropriation cases, involved in this instance, were still pending appeal when the EPZA ruling was rendered and forthwith invoked
by said parties.

e. Transfer of venue in criminal cases

PEOPLE vs. GUTIERREZ
FACTS:
1. In the morning of May 22, 1970, a group of armed persons set fire to various inhabited houses in barrio Ora Centro, Bantay,
Ilocos Sur.
2. On the afternoon of the same day, several residential houses were likewise burned in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality
and province, which resulted to the destruction of various houses and resulted in the death of an old woman.
3. Two informations were filed in the Court of First Instance (one for arson with homicide and the other for arson), charging the
17 private respondents, together with 82 other unidentified persons,
“confederating, conspiring, constabulating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously burn or caused to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied.”
4. Two of the accused furnished bail and voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
5. The Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District to hold a special in Ilocos Sur.
6. Three days after, the Secretary of Justice further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing respondent Judge to transfer the
criminal cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.
7. The prosecution moved the respondent Judge for a transfer of said cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the above-mentioned
administrative Orders and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses for reason of
security and personal safety.
8. The accused opposed such transfer and the respondent Judge declined the transfer sought on the ground that said Administrative
Order only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for more expeditious
disposal of the cases; and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to
subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Sec. 4 of RA No. 5179 the same should have been done right
at the very inception of these cases.
 43

RA 5179 created the Criminal Circuit Courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the CFI, and to accelerate the disposition of
criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, but nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to
the circuit courts.
1. In view of the lower court’s denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to the
SC for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to set aside the order of denial of transfer
and to compel the CFI to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Secondary Judicial District.
2. Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the Administrative Order merely
authorized the court below, but did not require or command it.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court committed abuse of discretion in denying to transfer cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.

HELD: YES. Respondent Judge, in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of
his discretion and violated neither the law nor the EOs mentioned. HOWEVER, in refusing to consider Department AO No. 226 of the
Secretary of Justice as mandatory, respondent Judge failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases should
be transferred to the Criminal Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of
the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court where they felt their lives would be endangered.
This refusal by the witnesses to testify due to security and safety manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place
of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and
the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.
The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the SC, and such inferior courts as may be established by law, and such
judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The
courts “can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an
effective institution of government”.
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of
equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice,
so demands.

SUMMARY
1. That RA No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer
thereto specified and individual cases;
2. That the SC, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses
inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another
CFI within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons
to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial
and lead to a miscarriage of justice.
3. That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of th.e said criminal cases
of the CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice

People vs. Mayor Pablo Sola, et al 103 SCRA 393

FACTS: On September 15, 1980, acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of
seven persons believed to be in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental. On September 16, 1980, armed with the above warrant, elements of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place
of Sola. Diggings made in a cane field yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos,
Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the
PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola,
Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names. After
due preliminary examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause
against the accused. It, thus, issued an order for their arrest. However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused
Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been released from detention.
 44

In a parallel development, the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the
Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least
two of the accused are officials with power and have influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most
of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the
witnesses.

ISSUES:
1. WON the plea for a change of venue for trial is justified.
2. WON the cancellation of bail bonds are justified.

HELD:
1. Change of venue has become moot and academic with the transfer of the case to Bacolod City. However, the case proceeds with
this discussion: To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what
they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established.
The witnesses in the case are fearful of their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during
any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives.

2. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. Whether
WON the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course
of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil
action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order
of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground. Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also.
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. This norm which is
of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove
that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal judge before
bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character.

People vs Pilotin, 65 SCRA 433

FACTS: Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer to the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively,
to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
wherein he, as sole defendant, is charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.

Contention of Crisologo: His life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because
there are many political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity.

HELD: The Constitution expressly empowers the Court to “order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice”.
What is involved in the case at bar is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of Crisologo. It would be absurd to
compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperiled. Dispositive The municipal court of Vigan is directed to
transfer the record of Crisologo’s Criminal Case to the city court of Quezon City where it should be redocketed and raffled to any
Judge. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and security measures should be adopted in bringing Crisologo
to Crame on the occasion of the hearing.

F. Rule Making Power; note the limitation

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS VS. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been
bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the
court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the
 45

subject matter of this proceeding.

FACTS: The accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace
informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. Then his
counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in
the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence,"
and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the justice of the Peace court of Masantol committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the
accused his motion to return the record.

HELD: NO, Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason of that
waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not
act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for the purpose
set out therein.
Evidence is the mode and manner of proving competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the
fact in dispute in judicial proceedings. It is fundamentally a procedural law. The Supreme Court that section 11 of rule 108 does not
curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. Said section defines the bounds of the defendant his right in
the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue
a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth.
But we made it clear that the "defendant cannot, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in
his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention to
the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary
hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of
fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the
due process clause to a fair trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and denied even any
discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his
witnesses to testify a new. Petition is dismissed.

Nunez vs SandiganBayan
FACTS: Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the
Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial document
committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. The information were filed respectively on
February 21 and March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on
constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. A week later respondent Court denied such motion. There was a motion for
reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition It is the claim of petitioner
that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the due process, equal protection,
and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Is Presidential Decree No. 1486 violative of the due process, equal protection and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution,
thus declaring it unconstitutional?

HELD: No, The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree cannot be adjudged. Those adversely
affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed,
far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in term of burden or charges, those that fall within
a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.
 46

An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of
evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission to
regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.” Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition
fails to sustain the claim of petitioner.
This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and,
generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be
heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.” This Court holds
that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606.
Petition dismissed. No costs.

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR ( Zaldevar), vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be
and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution

FACTS: Petitioner Zaldivar, Governor of Antique is accused of having violated the Anti-graft and corrupt practices act as preliminarily
investigated by Gonzalez
- The petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
was no longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption
against public officials and employees. Therefore, the informations filed with respect to the case are null and void
- On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus of the informations filed by Gonzales in
the Sandiganbayan alleging him of the said case
- On 11 September 1987, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST
from hearing and trying Criminal Cases insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned
- On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt against Gonzalez, for investigating and
filing information before the Sandiganbayan about the petitioner’s case, and for issuing contemptuous statements to the media in
relation with the proceedings of the case published in the Philippine Daily Globe saying;
“What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential persons get favorable actions
from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course”.

ISSUES: 1. WON Gonzalez is subject to contempt

2. WON the SC has the power and right to discipline the members of the Bar

HELD:
1. The Court is compelled to hold that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this
Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect
for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world of
subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14)
incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this
Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes
the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.
 47

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this
Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice
which are accepted by the general community
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an
officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders
from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
2. Yes, The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers.
The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the
Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and
responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or
impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary
action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power. :)

In Re Atty Marcial Edillon, 84 SCRA 554

FACTS: Re IBP membership dues delinquency… Lawyers are therefore subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purpose of the bar.
RA 6397 – gives authority to the Supreme Court to adopt rules of court to effect the IBP under such conditions as it shall see fit.
When Respondent Edillon entered the legal profession he has to conform to such regulation. If he did not want to submit himself to
such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns – becoming a
lawyer.
Objections of Edillon
1. Compelling him to become a member of the IBP violates his right of freedom to or/and not to associate.
IBP does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when
passed the Bar Examinations. The national organization integrates unorganized and incohesive group of lawyers. The only compulsion
is the payment of annual dues. The fees are cost of improving the profession. It is also deemed as a police power of the State.
2. Payment of membership fee is void.
There are no prohibitions in the constitution regarding the matter.
3. Enforcement of penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process.
This is still resolved by the principle of police power of the State. Imposing of fess is a regulatory measure. Practice of law is not a
property right but merely a privilege, and as such, a lwayer must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
Disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers are recognized as inherent judicial functions and not responsibilities.

HELD: Provisions of Rules of Court 139-A of the IBP and of the By-Laws of the IB are constitutional and legal. Edillon disbarred.
ROC 139-A, Sec. 9 – Membership Dues
Every member of the IBP shall pay such annual dues as to board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court.
ROC 139-A, Sec. 10 – Effect of non-payment of dues
Subject to the provisions of Sec 12 of this rule, default in the payment of annual dues for t6 months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default ins such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys

Sec. 6: The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. HERMINIGILDO L. ANDAL

 48

FACTS: Herminigildo L. Andal holds the position of Security Guard II in the Sandiganbayan. On 24 January 2000, he filed an
application to take the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT) and was admitted to take the
examination. The examination results showed that respondent passed the examination with a rating of 81.03%.
On 25 January 2000, Arlene S. Vito (Vito), claiming to have been authorized by Andal to secure the results of the examination,
presented a handwritten authorization allegedly signed by Andal. Upon verification and comparison of the pictures attached to the
Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of respondent which Vito presented, there appeared a dissimilarity in the facial features.
Bella A. Mitra, then Officer-in-Charge of the Examination, Placement and Services Division (EPSD) of the Civil Service Commission-
National Capital Region (CSC-NCR), issued a Memorandum on the alleged impersonation of respondent and the matter was referred
to the Legal Affairs Division to conduct a fact-finding investigation. On 29 November 2000, the CSC-NCR formally charged Andal with
dishonesty.
A formal investigation of the case was scheduled on 4 June 2001, 21 November 2001, 5 February 2002, and 10 July 2002.
Notices were sent to respondents last known address as indicated in his Application Form but respondent failed to appear on the
scheduled hearings. Respondent was deemed to have waived his right to appear at the formal investigation and the case proceeded
ex parte.

On 5 August 2005, the CSC-NCR rendered judgment finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of
dismissal from the service.

Andal moved for a reconsideration of the CSC judgment but the motion was denied. He elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on
a petition for review, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in favor of Andal.
The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has disciplinary jurisdiction to try and decide administrative cases against court
personnel.

HELD: In taking cognizance of the administrative case for dishonesty against respondent, the CSC invoked Section 28, Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which provides that the CSC shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its
officials and employees and over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies or irregularities. The CSC further contends
that administrative cases of dishonesty in connection with duties and responsibilities under Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of the Revised Administrative Code are different from cases of dishonesty in connection with cheating incidents in Civil
Service examinations administered by the CSC. In the latter case, the CSC assumes jurisdiction as an integral part of its duty,
authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, citing the case of Civil Service Commission v.
Albao.
The CSC argues that one of the powers of the CSC is the administration of the civil service examinations. The CSC made a
careful study and comparison of the facial features of the person appearing on the photographs attached to the Application Form and
the Personal Data Sheet (PDS), and the photograph attached to the Picture Seat Plan. Resemblance of the pictures purporting to be
respondents was clearly wanting. The signatures appearing on the face of the documents also revealed discrepancies in the structure,
strokes, form and general appearance.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and accordingly, deny the present petition.
The Court recognizes the CSCs administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. Section 3, Article IX-B of the Constitution declares the
CSC as the central personnel agency of the Government, thus:

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career
service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy
in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It
shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
Section 12, Title 1 (A), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292) likewise enumerates the powers and functions of the CSC, one of
which is its quasi-judicial function under paragraph 11, which states:
Section 12. Powers and Functions The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it
And, Section 47, Title 1 (A), Book V of EO 292 provides for the CSCs disciplinary jurisdiction, as follows:
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly
 49

with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and
decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the
investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the
penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The CSCs authority and power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases are not in dispute. The question is whether the
CSCs disciplinary jurisdiction extends to court personnel in view of Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Albao case cited by the CSC is not in point as Albao was not a court employee but a contractual employee of the Office
of the Vice President. The Albao case merely affirmed the authority of the CSC to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly
connected with the civil service examinations.
One case in point is Bartolata v. Julaton[8] wherein a letter-complaint was sent to the CSC Regional Office in Davao City
denouncing the acts of Felicia Julaton (Julaton), Clerk of Court, and Juanita Tapic (Tapic), Court Interpreter II, both of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Davao City, Branch 3. The CSC Regional Office in Davao City discovered that a certain Julaton submitted her
application to take the Civil Service Professional Examination in 1989 but the picture on the application form and on the Picture Seat
Plan did not resemble the picture appearing on the appointment of Julaton. The signature of Julaton affixed to the examination
documents did not match the signature on her PDS. The case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator which
recommended that Julaton and Tapic be held liable as charged. This Court dismissed Julaton from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits while Tapic, who had resigned, was fined P25,000 and his retirement benefits were ordered forfeited.
Likewise, in Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana,[9] the CSC formally charged Zenaida Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana), Court Stenographer
I of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Quezon-Licab, Nueva Ecija with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for misrepresenting that she took and passed the CSPE-CAT when in truth and in fact, someone else took
the examinations for her. The CSC found that the picture and signature in Sta. Anas PDS were different from those appearing in her
application form and in the Picture Seat Plan. Upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, this Court found
Sta. Ana guilty of dishonesty and dismissed her from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits.
In the Julaton and Sta. Ana cases, the CSC recognized the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over court personnel.
This is consonant with Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof, thus:
Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels administrative compliance with
all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers. This we have ruled in Maceda v. Vasquez[10] and have reiterated in the case of Ampong v. Civil Service
Commission.[11] In Ampong, we also emphasized that in case of violation of the Civil Service Law by a court personnel, the standard
procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme
Court.
The CSC contends that respondent is now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the CSC-NCR and was accorded due process, citing the Ampong case.
We disagree.
In Ampong, petitioner in that case admitted her guilt. She voluntarily went to the CSC regional office, admitted to the charges
leveled against her and waived her right to the assistance of counsel. She was given ample opportunity to present her side and adduce
evidence in her defense before the CSC. She filed her answer to the charges against her and even moved for a reconsideration of the
adverse ruling of the CSC. In short, Ampong did not question the authority of the CSC and, in fact, actively participated in the
proceedings before it.
In the present case, while respondent may have filed his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty after having been directed
to do so, he denied having taken the civil service examination and did not even appear at the formal investigation conducted by the
CSC-NCR.[12] He appealed to the CSC after the adverse decision of the CSC-NCR was rendered but raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
over his person. He argued that as an employee in the Judiciary, the jurisdiction to hear disciplinary action against him vests with the
Sandiganbayan or the Supreme Court.[13] It cannot therefore be said that he was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC.
This notwithstanding, we reiterate that we will not and cannot tolerate dishonesty for the judiciary expects the highest
standard of integrity from all its employees. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden or responsibility. The Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 22 September 2008 and the Resolution dated 2 December 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100452. Accordingly, we DENY the instant petition. Nonetheless, we ORDER the Civil Service Commission to
refer the case of respondent Herminigildo L. Andal to the Office of the Court Administrator, for the filing of the appropriate
administrative case against him.

Judge Maceda vs Ombudsman Vasquez

FACTS: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all
 50

civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or
before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10
criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of
service for 17 months.

ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of
supervision over all inferior courts

HELD: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can
oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court
employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

De Guzman vs People 119 SCRA 337

FACTS: Petitioner De Guzman work as Traveling collector. He collected the total amount of P 204,349.32 from various agencies but
remitted to the General Teller, Cash Division Department of Finance, only P 127, 797.95, thus resulting in a shortage of P76,521.37.
Petitioner contends that his accountability was not proven considering that the audit examination was conducted in his absence and
after he signed the Report of Examination in blank presented to him by Auditing Examiner Maximo Pielago, thus making the
procedure irregular. Auditing Examiner Pielago candidly admitted that he made the accused sign the Report of Examination in blank
even before any examination could be conducted because upon his first demand to the Petitioner for the production of his cash and
cash items the latter told him that he had nothing to account for anyone since he ceased making collection. Pielago proceeded with
the audit examination of Petitioner’s accountability from the official records. He was found guilty for Malversation of public funds.
Petitioner contends that his accountability was not established as the Report of Examination was denominated by Pielago as
“preliminary”.

ISSUE: Can the Petitioner be held guilty of malversation based on a “preliminary” audit report?

HELD: Yes. In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession public funds, that he could
not account for them and did not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same. An accountable public officer may be
convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in
his account which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. In the case at bar, True, the report of the audit aforesaid was
denominated as “preliminary”. But, this does not imply that the same may not be taken as basis for the date of said audit. If there
was anything tentative about the finding made, it was only because collections of the accused under official receipts known to be
still in his possessions and the stubs of which had not yet been submitted, were not yet accounted for. Hence, the only meaning that
the term “preliminary” had in the premises was that the amount of shortage could still be increased if all receipts are eventually
found and taken into account. But, on the basis of the records available to the auditor, the amount of shortage established could not
but be considered final.

Sec. 7: (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or
more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
 51

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he
is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Sec. 8: (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions
and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

Chavez vs Judicial and Bar Council, August 16, 2013

FACTS: The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of allowing
more than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional Respondent contends that the phrase “ a
representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two houses are
permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective
powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only
with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE: W/N the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives to be unconstitutional as provided
in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

HELD: The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed as to having
only one representative that would come from either house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat
of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative. The motion was denied.

Sec. 9: The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.

Sec. 10: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed
by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.

Sec. 17, Art. XVIII: Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand
pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.

Nitafan vs Commissioner, 152 SCRA 284

FACTS: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes
from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or
diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their
 52

continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned
in and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to representations
that the Court shall direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus,
on June 4, 1987, it was reaffirmed by the Court en banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HELD: No. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the
salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
The ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the
Constitution", in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental
law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article
VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should
share the burden of general income taxation equitably. Therefore, the petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

PERFECTO (Justice of the Supreme Court) VS MEER (Collector of Internal Revenue)

FACTS: Justice Gregorio Perfecto was ordered by the CIR to pay income tax upon his salary as a member of the SC for 1946. Perfecto
paid the income tax in protest and instituted an action for the refund of the amount he paid asserting that the assessment was
illegal for violating the constitutional provision on non-diminution of the salaries of Judges.
The CFI ruled in the favour of Justice Perfecto but the CIR appealed the decision. During the pendency of the appeal, Justice Perfecto
died but the SC went on to decide the case.

ISSUE: Is the imposition of income tax upon the salaries of justices and judges (members of the judiciary) considered a diminution?

DECISION: Yes. The taxation of the salaries of the members of the judiciary is considered diminution thereof. The Supreme Court
premised their decision on American Jurisprudence where there have been three instances where the US Congress attempted to tax
the salaries of members of the Judiciary.
1. In 1862, a law was passed, taxing salaries of “civil officers of the United States”, which was construed to include salaries of
judges. The Chief Justice wrote an official communication to the Secretary of Treasury opposing such interpretation as it
would diminish the salaries of judges in the name of tax at the pleasure of the legislature. The collection of tax was
discontinued.
2. In 1919, the legislature of US passed a law providing income tax for “the compensation of judges of the SC and the inferior
courts of the US”. The case of Evans vs. Gore came about in connection to this law and was decided by the SC saying that
“the primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges but to attract good and
competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgement which is essential to the
maintenance of the guarantees, limitations and pervading principles of the constitution…”
3. In 1939, another law was passed taxing the “gross income” of the judges. According to the US Congress, this is not a
diminution of the salaries of the judges but a guarantee that no one shall enjoy immunity from incidence of taxation to
which everyone else within the defined classes of income is subjected. This would affect judges appointed after the law has
been passed. This gave rise to the O’Malley decision where the US Supreme Court resolved that the issue of taxability of
judges salaries as a question of policy, which must be stated in a Congressional enactment.
 53

The CIR asserts that taxation will not imperil the independence of the Judiciary. However, the SC demonstrated that taxation may be
used to retaliate against the Judiciary when the Executive or Legislative is displeased with the Judiciary. This will result to judges
toeing the line to earn the pleasure of the legislative or yielding to pressure by the two other departments when they have a
pending case before the judge.
The CIR also asserts that the judiciary should act in the same way as the President who has subjected his salary to the Income Tax
Law by virtue of an Executive Order. The SC ruled that the Judiciary is not seated similarly as the President, in the matter of
compensation and power and the need for security. ***Unlike the Judiciary, the President needs political security and power.

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs .SATURNINO DAVID

FACTS: The Congress passed a law, Republic Act No. 590. Section 13 of the said law states:
“SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by
the Constitution or by law.”
Petitioners herein are Justices of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court respectively. They assail the constitutionality of
Section 13 of RA No. 590 because they contend that it is inconsistent with Section 9, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which provides
that :
“SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior,
until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall
receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.”
The imposition of taxes is, according to petitioners, in violation of the constitution since in effect there is a diminution of their salaries
when taxes are imposed upon them. However, the legislative argue that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a diminution of
salary as discerned in Sec. 9, Art. VIII of the 1935 Constitution.

ISSUE: Is Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional?

HELD: Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 is unconstitutional. Indeed, the Legislative Department may create, modify, amend, or repeal
laws as that is their prerogative under the constitution. However, when congress passed RA 590, they treated taxes not as a sort of
diminution of the salaries of the members of the judiciary as discerned in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution. By doing so, they
gave their own interpretation of the Constitution, and in effect encroached on the power of the judiciary.
According to the Supreme Court, Section 9, Article VIII pertains to any diminution on the salaries of the members of the judiciary.
Imposing taxes on their salaries would take an effect of diminution of their salaries. Hence, it is unconstitutional.

Sec. 11: The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reached the
age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power
to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Judge Ruben c. Ayson vs The RTC Judges of Baguio City

HELD: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas
Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City Loakan, Baguio City.roper to its plant site
one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of
the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against
petitioner's driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by
private respondent Boado against petitioner himself. The complaint was assigned to Branch IV of the same court.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against
his driver. But the trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed
independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case.
 54

Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals, maintaining that the civil action could not proceed
independently of the criminal case because no reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed his petition which it held allowed a civil action for damages to be filed independently of the criminal
action even though no reservation to file the same has been made.

ISSUE: The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for
damages against petitioner under Art. 2176, 2180, 2177 of the Civil Code:

HELD: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas
Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City Loakan, Baguio City.roper to its plant site
one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of
the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against
petitioner's driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by
private respondent Boado against petitioner himself. The complaint was assigned to Branch IV of the same court.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against
his driver. But the trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed
independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case.
Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals, maintaining that the civil action could not proceed
independently of the criminal case because no reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed his petition which it held allowed a civil action for damages to be filed independently of the criminal
action even though no reservation to file the same has been made.

Ocampo vs Secretary of Justice

FACTS: In 1948, the Judiciary Act was passed. The law has been subjected to several amendments, including RA 1186 which took effect
in June 30 1954, without the President’s approval. It includes Section 3 which provides for the abolishment of “the existing positions
of Judges-at-large and Cadastral Judges”.
Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief/ mandamus to declare Sec. 3 of RA 1186 void and asked the court to declare that their
offices and positions still exist.

ISSUE: WON Section 3 of RA 1186 is unconstitutional

HELD: It was dismissed by the Supreme Court for insufficiency of votes needed to invalidate a challenged provision. Only 7 out of 11
viewed the statute as unconstitutional. (NB: To hold a statute unconstitutional, majority (8) of the SC sitting en banc must vote against
it)
In the abolition of courts, the principle used is relative to the abolition of civil service positions. Abolition of office is valid
when done in good faith and not for political reasons. In such situation, properly and logically speaking there is no removal from office
because removal implies that the office exists after the ouster. (In this case, the office ceased to exist since there is abolishment)

De La Llana vs Alba, 112 SCRA 294

FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget,
the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates
that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of
their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of
the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution.

RULING: What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services. What is
important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.
 55

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle
that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would
thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise.

Sec. 12: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Garcia vs Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106

FACTS: Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being
one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was
not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established due to
problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that it would be some
time before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the
Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave
benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced
Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy
attending to the needs of his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation
of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that Macaraig
has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was
the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department of the executive oi charge of prosecution of cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge.

HELD: No. Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute
incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and
rid himself of the stigma of being ‘a judge without a sala’, but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from
discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing,
to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising
administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working
with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously
observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution
be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited
only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more
paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to
the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should
place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and
prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.

Manila Electric vs Pasay Transportation, 57 Phil 60

FACTS: Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed a petition requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig Bridge of the petitioner
and the compensation to be paid to them by such transportation companies citing Sec 11 of Act No. 1446.
 56

Sec 11 of Act No. 1446 provides: Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation,
now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation
for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of
whom shall be final."
Upon filing the petition, Manila Electric Company was ordered to serve copies to the transportations companies (Pasay
Transportation Company and ) and to the Attorney-General, who disclaimed any interest in the proceedings, and a petition by a
number of public operators opposing Manila Electric Company’s petition.
Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioner's Court [1908], 158 Ala., 263. It
was there held that an Act of a state legislature authorizing the commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate and fix the rate
of toll to be charged by the owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the courts.
ISSUE: WON the members of the SC may be constituted a board of arbitrators and fix the terms and compensation asked by the
petitioner
HELD: No. Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government
constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.
In the case at bar, the members of the Supreme Court is facing the dilemma whether sitting as a board of arbitrators,
exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi
judicial functions.
It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the
guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as
strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The
Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any
duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. According to the CJ Taney, the power conferred to
the SC is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized to exercise any other.

Lopez vs Roxas, 17 SCRA 756

FACTS: Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the election.
Roxas appealed his loss before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law
that:
“There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines.”
In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the
PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution.
Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly
appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.

HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function to the Supreme Court. Such is within its power,
the Constitution allowed Congress to determine which body should decide controversies relating to the election of the President or
the Vice President. RA 1793 did not create another court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution, “the Judicial power shall be
vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be established by law”
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the judicial branch of the government, not
merely some specified or limited judicial power, but “the” judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or
“all” of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to “judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives,
which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said authority
 57

requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof;
and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on
appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that “Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts”, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the court’s jurisdiction and such can
be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid
because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial.

In Re: Judge Rodolfo Manzano

FACTS: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the
member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his
membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch
XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.

ISSUE: What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned?

HELD: The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency performing
Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any
Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
“Administrative functions” as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Government’s executive machinery and its performance of governmental
acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to
make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.

In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence “we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or
City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A
member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely
deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or
detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or
rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.

Sec. 13: The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in
consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed
by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member
who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements
shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.

Sec. 14: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor.
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Air France vs CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155

FACTS: Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket from Manila - Rome. During the stopover at
Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat because there was a "white man" who had better
right to the seat.
As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently, whether or not he was entitled to the
damages awarded.

HELD: Yes to both. To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is desirable.
Quoting the court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it
never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be
at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or
not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not."
Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy
for Air France to present its manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition but defendant did neither. There is also no
evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man.
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a 1st class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will.
He forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to tourist class just to give way to another
passenger whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal is conduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuse from such employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter
an action for damages against the carrier.
Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary damages that
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
*Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior
purpose
VDA De Espiritu vs. CFI, 47 SCRA 354

Buscayno vs Enrile, 102 SCRA7

FACTS: Bernabe Buscayno was arrested in Barrio Sto. Rosario, Mexico, Pampanga, as ranking leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP), the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the New People's Army (NPA), and was accused in two criminal
cases: (1) violation of R.A. No. 1700 or Anti-Subversion Act and (2) murder. These are both pending with respondent Military
Commission No. 2. He is likewise an accused in the MV Karagatan case for rebellion before Military Commission No. 1. Prior to his
arrest, his trial before respondent Military Commission had started; it continued thereafter after he was duly arraigned.
Buscayno avers that a judgment of respondent Military Commission would be violative of Article X, Section 9 of the 1973
Constitution, now Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.
**Bernabe Buscayno, also called Kumander Dante, is the founder of the New People’s Army, the military wing of the Communist
Party of the Philippines. He was a political detainee during Martial Law, and was freed during the Aquino Administration.

ISSUE: Can Military Tribunals try individuals who are not members of the Armed Forces? (This has been the decisive issue posed in
this habeas corpus and prohibition proceeding.)

HELD: The petition was dismissed. (This has already been answered in Aquino Jr. v. Military Commision. Military Courts may try
civilians during Martial Law.) This Court once again sustained the power of the President to create military commissions or courts
martial to try not only members of the armed forces but also civilian offenders.
In matters regarding Article X, Section 9, copied directly from the full text: This provision requires that a decision of a court of
record "shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based." The proceeding in a military commission
terminates with a guilty or not guilty verdict. Hence this objection. It can be said of course that a military commission is not a court
 59

of record within the meaning of this Articles on the judiciary. Moreover, the procedure followed, including the form the judgment
takes, was given the seal of approval in the above Aquino decision citing the applicable section of the Article on Transitory
Provisions. That would remove any taint of unconstitutionality. It may be stated further that the record of the proceedings are
available to the reviewing authorities. Hence any imputation of arbitrariness sought to be avoided by the above provision would not
be warranted.
In other words: This is not violative of Article X, Section 9 because the procedures as provided by the Constitution are followed. The
court cited the decision of Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission, and that is enough to say that the court “clearly and distinctly stated
the facts and the law on which it is based” to render a decision. If you continuously read the case, the decisions of the Supreme
Court seemingly being in favor of the military dictatorship, well, that is not the case. The Constitution remained supreme, with the
fundamental principle of civilian supremacy upheld. The Supreme Court also based the decision on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as well as the Covenant on Civil and Political rights.

Mangca vs COMELEC, 112 SCRA 273

FACTS: In a petition for a pre-proclamation controversy, petitioner, who lost in the election, assigned as error of the COMELEC, the
following.
No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based. and Sec. 26, Rule XV of COMELEC Resolution No. 1450 dated February 26, 1980, which reads: In deciding
contests, the Commission shall follow the procedure prescribed for the Supreme Court in Secs. 8 and 9, Art. X of the Constitution of
the Philippines.
It appears on record that the COMELEC did not consider petitioner's evidence, particularly the Memorandum Report of
Atty. Mamasapunod Aguam, Regional Election Director for Region XII, to the effect that there was failure of election in Sultan
Gumander.

ISSUE: WON there grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC.

HELD: Petitioner's contention that the March 31, 1981, resolution is null and void for being violative of Sec. 9, Art. X of the
Constitution and Sec 26, Rule XV of COMELEC Resolution No. 1450 is untenable. Firstly, both cited provisions are inapplicable to the
case at bar since the constitutional requirement applies only to courts of justice which the COMELEC is not (Lucman vs. Dimaporo, L-
31558, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 387) while COMELEC Resolution No. 1450, per Sec. I thereof, applies only to "election contests" and
"quo warranto proceedings" which the pre- proclamation cases are not

Valladolid vs Inciong, 121 SCRA 205

NAPOLCOM vs Lood, 127 SCRA 757
FACTS: Respondent Judge Lood tried a case involving the respondent police officer Simplicio Ibea. Some time during the tenure of
Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo, Ibea was dismissed from police service pursuant to a decision of the Police Commission finding him
guilty of serious irregularity in the performance of duty on the complaint of one Jose Lee, Jr.
Ibea filed a complaint with respondent court seeking his reinstatement. He was sustained by respondent court which
rendered its decision declaring the decision of the Police Commission as null and void and ordered the town mayor to "reinstate the
plaintiff to his former position as patrolman in the Police Department of San Juan, Rizal with back salaries and remunerations
pertaining to said position from the date of his suspension to the time of his reinstatement to the service." Respondent court ruled
that the decision of petitioner commission was based on incomplete records as there was no transcript of the testimonies of
witnesses or minutes of the proceedings before the Board of Investigators and that the commission's conclusion was without factual
basis and was in violation of administrative due process. Furthermore, the respondent ruled that Ibea’s eligibility has become moot
and academic due to Ibea’s acquisition of civil service eligibility.

ISSUE: Whether the decision rendered by Judge Lood was correct and should be sustained?

HELD: The Judge erred in deciding the case on those merits. On the issue of the lack of records and stenographic notes during the
hearing of the NPC Board of Investigators, Supreme Court said that Rep. Act 4864, which established such board, does not provide
that they shall also be a board of records and as such, they are not required to hire stenographers or clerks to do such a job. The
 60

proceeding provided for is merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the principle that "administrative rules of
procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses.”
As to the issue on the decision being without factual basis, the Supreme Court also said that since there have been
testimonial evidences presented, such were sufficient to be factual basis for the decision of the Commission on the case.
Lastly, as to Ibea’s eligibility, Supreme Court ruled that his appointment was only temporary in nature for lack of civil service
eligibility at the time, the same was terminated after dismissal by commission. Respondent court erred in holding that the
allegations on the temporary status of the appointment of private respondent Simplicio C. Ibea for lack of civil service eligibility had
been rendered moot and academic upon the latter's subsequent acquisition of a civil service eligibility. Under the Civil Service Law
then in force, the fact that private respondent subsequently became a civil service eligible did not ipso facto render permanent the
nature of his temporary appointment as to make the question moot and academic. In fine, since respondent Ibea was merely a
temporary appointee, he was subject to removal at any time without the necessity of following the procedure set up by Republic Act
No. 4864, for removal of police officers, and regardless of the complaint filed against him. After his services were terminated by
former Mayor Sto. Domingo, his reinstatement was no longer legally feasible in the face of incumbent Mayor Estrada's refusal to do
so, considering that he held merely a temporary appointment. prLL
For "well-settled in this jurisdiction is the principle that when an appointment is temporary, the same is terminable at the
pleasure of the appointing power, and no cause is required to be shown for such termination."

Nunal vs CA, 169 SCRA 230

***For resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Minute Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 dismissing the
Petition for certiorari "for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the public respondent had committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding, among others, that the compromise agreement of the parties is not enforceable against the Municipality of
Isabela, the latter not having been impleaded as an indispensable party in the case.

FACTS: Nunal was the Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan. The Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, abolished the subject
position pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code.
On 17 September 1985, petitioner filed his claim for separation pay in the amount of P54,092.50 according to a
Compromise Agreement entered into by him and the Municipal Mayor. The Provincial Auditor opined that the claim was legal and
proper but payment thereof was made subject to availability of funds and the ruling of the Regional Office of the Commission on
Audit.
The Regional Director of the Commission on Audit reversed the Provincial Auditor of Basilan and denied petitioner's claim
for separation pay. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA). COA Central Office
denied petitioner's claim for separation pay and also disallowed the other payments made to petitioner.
Thus, this recourse by petitioner alleging grave abuse of discretion by COA, which Petition the Court had previously
dismissed.

The petitioner now contends that the previous resolution of the Supreme Court was not in accordance with Section 14, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the decision does not clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which it is based

HELD: No. Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Court shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor. "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision" within the meaning of the Constitutional
requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or
Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course to a
Petition for Certiorari. Further, the assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies
with the Constitutional provision.
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Mangelen vs CA, 215 SCRA 230

Bedruz vs Office of the Ombudsman
FACTS: The omission of the trial court to state the factual and legal bases of its decision is not violative of the constitutional
requirement if the same can be inferred from the discussion of the decision. Petitioners Tagaytay City Engineer Samson B. Bedruz
and City Administrator Emma C. Luna were held administratively liable for violation of the Constitution, the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in
manifesting arrogance, bias, abuse and crystal personal interest in connection with the issuance of a permit to fence a lot. Resolving
in the affirmative, the Deputy Ombudsman fined them in an amount equivalent to One (1) Month Salary. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals committed grave error and mistake in denying the petition for certiorari.

HELD: A review of the records of the case shows that the following factual findings of the Ombudsman, upon which its decision of
May 8, 1999 was based, and which were cited by the appellate court in arriving at its assailed decision, are supported by the
evidence on record. Clearly, the appellate court did not err in finding that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
As for Bedruz and Luna’s complaint that the Ombudsman did not express in a clear manner the law on which its decision was based,
thereby violating Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that ―[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, the same fails. Political Law A trial court‘s
omission to specify the offense committed, or the specific provision of law violated, ―is not in derogation of the constitutional
requirement that every decision must clearly and distinctly state the factual and legal bases for the conclusions reached by the trial
court as long as the legal basis can be inferred from the discussion in the decision. From the Ombudsman’s decision, it can be
gathered that Bedruz and Luna violated Sections 19 of R.A. No. 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) in relation to Section 4,
paragraphs A(b) & (c) of R.A. No. 6713, as amended (THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES), requiring public officials and employees to ―perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill, ―act with justness and sincerity and ―not to discriminate against anyone, especially the poor
and the underprivileged.

German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA 329

FACTS: Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land situated in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing
petitioner German Management Services to develop their property. They have already acquired the proper permits to do so but
they discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20 other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmer’s
Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the last twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits and they
already have their crops all over the property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land.
Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their crops and property. The respondents
filed in CFI because they were deprived of their property without due process of law by trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their
crops and property situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision
in CA but were denied thus this appeal

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner?

RULING: YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at
the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry
regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not
in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, only
actual possession. It is undisputed that private respondents were in possession of the property and not the petitioners nor the
spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a valid claim over ownership this does not in any way justify their act of ―forcible
entry.‖ It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
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possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor priority in time,
he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self help, which the petitioners were using to justify their actions, are not
applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case
at bar (in fact they are the ones who are threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article 536 basically tells us
that the owner or a person who has a better right over the land must resort to judicial means to recover the property from another
person who possesses the land.
When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. As clearly
stated in Article 536- ―In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of
the competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

Sec. 15: (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months
from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate
courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum
required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge
shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The
certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been
incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further
delay.

Corpus vs CA, 98 SCRA 424

Malacora vs CA, 227 SCRA 435

Marcelino vs Cruz, 121 SCRA 51

FACTS: Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the prosecution finished presenting evidence
against Marcelino and rested its case. On the same date, the attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for time within
which to submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge, Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave them 30 days or until September 4,
1975. Only Marcelino submitted a memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his decision, his decision bears the same date of
November 28, 1975. The promulgation of the decisions was scheduled in January 1976. Marcelino is now contending that the court
can no longer promulgate judgment because by January 1976, the 3-month period (90 day period) within which lower courts must
decide on cases had already lapsed, thus, the lower court lost its jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period.

HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date of last day of filing of the memoranda by the
respective parties). From that day, the 3-month period begins to run so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the case.
Judge Cruz made a rendition of his decision on November 28, 1975. The date of rendition is the date of filing of the decision with the
clerk of court. Hence, Judge Cruz was able to rule on the case within the 3-month period because November 28, 1975 was merely
the 85th day from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could not serve as the reckoning date
because the same necessarily comes at a later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “upon the effectivity of this constitution, the maximum period
within which case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court,
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12 months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts. In practice, the Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this
provision. The provision is mandatory, its merely directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such
provision as mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless, the SC warned lower court judges to resolve
cases within the prescribed period and not take this liberal construction as an excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.

De Roma vs CA, 152 SCRA 205

Sec. 16: The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President
and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.