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Manoj Gupta
Indian Ocean Region
Maritime Regimes for Regional Cooperation
Foreword by Hasjim Djalal and Jon Van Dyke
123
Manoj Gupta
University of New South Wales
At the Australian Defence Force Academy
2600 Australian Capital Territory
Canberra
Australia
manoj.gupta@unswalumni.com
ISSN 1866-6507 e-ISSN 1866-6515

ISBN 978-1-4419-5988-1 e-ISBN 978-1-4419-5989-8
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-5989-8
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Foreword
It is a privilege to introduce the reader to this book, as I believe that it will make
a significant contribution to, given the difficulties in the knowledge of the Indian
Ocean, developing cooperation in the Indian Ocean region.
There have been numerous failed efforts at regional cooperation in different fora
in the Indian Ocean. As a result of the land-based orientation of the people in the
region, the importance for countries to develop the power to govern the sea has
largely been ignored. The maritime approach taken by Manoj Gupta to the Indian
Ocean as a region in international relations offers a timely and critical assessment
of the potential for regional cooperation and ocean governance.
The political leadership in the region can no longer ignore the need for cooper-
ation in maritime affairs in the Indian Ocean. This book enriches the literature on
Indian Ocean issues as it argues convincingly that the security of nations, economic
well-being of the people and health of the Indian Ocean cannot be divested from
one another. All are fundamentally dependant on the ability of the countries in the
region to individually and collectively exert the power to govern the sea.
This book on the Indian Ocean is long overdue. Its immediate value resides in
providing the reader with a piercing insight into marine scientific research and port
state control—the two most critical regimes for the security of nations, well-being
of people and health of the oceans. I say this after some five decades of experience
in maritime affairs at national, regional and international levels and having been the
President of the International Sea Bed Authority.
The reader is provided with a clear understanding of the importance of actor
and structure interplay to develop effective cooperative relations, just as the roles of
intellectual groups, power-based groups and interest-based groups in the implemen-
tation of maritime regimes is important. The book thus offers a potentially creative
tool for assessing the effectiveness of maritime regimes and international regimes
in general. The statistical data painstakingly collated is suggestive of greater intra-
Indian Ocean trade, and in this context, the book emphasises the importance of
developing shipping in the Indian Ocean.
Manoj Gupta’s work in maritime policy brings a lively and rigorous presence
to complex subjects. His work is about three intertwining concepts—regime the-
ory, regional cooperation and ocean governance—and he addresses their integration
with a clear and thorough understanding of the literature. This book, with refreshing
v
vi Foreword
originality and creativity, provides a new ocean-focussed perspective to regional

cooperation in international relations.
I see some significance in being given the opportunity to introduce the reader to
this book. I sense Manoj Gupta’s vision for an Indian Ocean future. Having been
fully involved in somewhat difficult and tenacious negotiations for nearly a decade
at the third United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea and its implementation
thereafter, I share his optimism for regional cooperation toward ocean governance
in the Indian Ocean region.
I am confident that government officials, nongovernmental organisations and
the plurality of scholars in international relations, foreign policy, area studies and
regionalism will find this book useful and a an invaluable resource to further regional
cooperation and ocean governance in the Indian Ocean region. Manoj Gupta has set
the tone; now it is up to the wider Indian Ocean community to come together and
create a “one ocean” policy for the Indian Ocean.
This book is original in many ways and makes a significant contribution to gain-
ing a deeper knowledge about the Indian Ocean. The book is well researched and
documented and offers a very creative approach in explaining regimes to ocean gov-
ernance and regional cooperation in international relations. This book is particularly
eloquent and helpful in developing an understanding of maritime regimes in the
Indian Ocean, and it offers a refreshing and original approach to overcoming the
difficulties of developing Indian Ocean cooperation.
Professor Dr. Hasjim Djalal
Professor Dr. Hasjim Djalal was the ambassador at-large for the Law of the Sea and
Maritime Affairs. He has also served as the president of the International Seabed
Authority (ISBA) and currently serves as chairman of its Finance Committee. He
also has been the ambassador/deputy permanent representative of Indonesia to the
United Nations, ambassador to Canada and Germany.
He is a member of Indonesian Maritime Council, senior advisor to the Indonesian
Minister for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and to Indonesian Naval Chief of Staff
and has been involved in development of maritime cooperation in the Indian and
Pacific Oceans. He has written extensively on the Law of the Sea and Regional
issues.
This book presents a thoughtful and careful analysis of regional Indian Ocean
issues, based on extensive and difficult research. It helps readers understand not only
what has been accomplished in the region, but also what remains to be done. The
author provides a road map for the countries of this region to follow and challenges
them to work together more effectively in the future.
Professor Jon Van Dyke

Preface
The Indian Ocean is arguably the world’s least understood region in international
relations. Furthermore, the oceanic realm has been ignored for too long by Indian
Ocean countries. The implementation of international maritime regimes could pro-
vide the waterway for regional cooperation and strengthen ocean governance in the
Indian Ocean region.
This book is unique. Few contemporary works offer a close look at Indian Ocean
maritime affairs. Even fewer works combine three distinct concepts—regimes,
regions and ocean governance—in examining prospects for regional cooperation.
This book is possibly the first systematic and interdisciplinary attempt at drawing
together leading theories of regionalism, integrated management of maritime affairs
and regime effectiveness, and in so doing transcending the fields of international
maritime law, political science, international relations and international regimes.
This book seeks to make a modest contribution to the study of the Indian Ocean
region, offering a comprehensive exposition of maritime regimes for regional coop-
eration. The aim is to try narrowing the gap in our understanding about the strategic
importance of the Indian Ocean as a region in contemporary world geopolitics
and international relations. This places the study in the genre of area studies that
emphasise regions, regional orders and regional cooperation.
A rubric model of regime effectiveness constructed from a synthesis of regime
theory and structuration theory is used to test effectiveness of two fundamentally
important maritime regimes for the Indian Ocean region. The model avoids both
overemphasising the role of structure and underestimating the power of actors in
regime building. The creative approach has potential for further development and
its application in measuring effectiveness of other international regimes.
The regime for marine scientific research and the maritime safety regime of port
state control were investigated for cooperation in areas of common interests to assess
the prospects for broader regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean region. The case
studies show that the groundwork for regional cooperation in the maritime realm has
been laid by Indian Ocean countries. At present, though, for these maritime regimes
to be effective, the Indian Ocean must be considered as “one-ocean, one-region,”
for which there is insufficient political leadership amongst rim countries.
Researching the regimes for the Indian Ocean region has not been without
its challenges. The Indian Ocean as a region occupies little scholarly attention.
vii
viii Preface
The state of information is dismal and publicly available government data of most
countries is scant. Travelling to rim countries was constrained by resources and the
inability to initiate contact with government agencies.
The analysis and interpretation has relied on collating firsthand data from annual
reports and international agencies. The ideas have developed over nearly a decade of
policy work in maritime affairs. The study has benefited immensely from the inter-
action with numerous subject experts at different forums and individual meetings in
Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brussels. The discussion in Brussels
was particularly useful in conceptualising the model for measuring regime effective-
ness and learning more about global governance, regionalism and the inter-regional
dimension.
This unique exercise attempts to overcome the cynicism associated with looking
at the Indian Ocean as a region to argue that international maritime regimes could
potentially build regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean for a new geopolitical
region to emerge in the geostrategic maritime realm. In a sense the book develops
its own distinctive perspective on maritime regimes for ocean governance in the
Indian Ocean region—a new regional order.
Canberra, Australia Manoj Gupta

Acknowledgements
Arguably, this book is my own work, but the effort would not have been possible
without the contributions of numerous individuals who have coalesced around its
creation.
When I left the Indian Navy in 2005, only to embark upon this research, I left
behind a highly professional and fine service in search of an identity at sea. I
would like to acknowledge four senior officers, Madhvendra Singh, Raman Puri,
Satish Nambiar and Ashok Sawhney, who greatly contributed to my learning and
advancement in maritime policy work.
The transition to research was made easy and much more exciting by a new
team in a new country. Sam Bateman showed me the path to making this research a
reality. Anthony Bergin introduced me to the research and Canberra. Clive Schofield
offered deep insights into Law of the Sea issues. Carlyle A. Thayer put in long
hours providing valuable input and translating the research into its present form,
encouraging me to publish.
During the course of this research, the numerous people I interacted with helped
sharpen my thinking on the Indian Ocean and other matters of regions, regime the-
ory and maritime affairs. My particular thanks to Professor Dr Hasjim Djalal and
Rear Adm (Retd) Robert Mangindaan for the fieldwork in Indonesia. I am indebted
to Professor Vinod K. Aggarwal for his vital input on the framework for measuring
regime effectiveness that changed the model from a static to a dynamic one and for
a coding method to be adopted for the qualitative analysis.
Thanks are owed to a number of organisations, Indian Ocean Research Group,
Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Rajaratnam School of International Relations at
Singapore, Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia, HMAS
Creswell and Seapower Centre in Australia, for hosting me in the course of this
research, which that allowed wide ranging discussions across a spectrum of pro-
fessionals. I am grateful to the GARNET network of excellence and the European
Commission for supporting my participation at the Fourth Ph.D. School workshop
in Belgium.
The University of New South Wales played a pivotal role by providing
a research scholarship. In the Australian Defence Force Academy a scholar
could not have asked for a better home. My sincere thanks to the Australian
Government Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and
ix
x Acknowledgements
Local Government for their support and flexible work arrangements. I would never
have entered research, and thus never have written this book, without the teach-
ings at the Defence Services Staff College in India and the Southampton Solent
University in the United Kingdom, formerly known as Southampton Institute.
I am deeply indebted to the team at Springer led by Jon Gurstelle for their
patience and wisdom in bringing this book to life. The final read is mine. I am
sure the reader will find errors in this book. My apologies in advance, with more
than one hundred and forty thousand words, I do not know where the errors are.
Finally, I thank my family as this transition into research was eased by their love,
support and endless patience. For my wife Neelima, my son Mihir and my daughter
Tanya, “thanks” can never suffice. I especially wish to thank Mihir for his tireless
efforts in assisting me with pulling the statistical data and references together. Tanya
assisted me immensely with the proof read. My in-laws, Shashi and Chaman, for
their quiet encouragement and blessings. My parents, Kumud and Chandra Mohan,
for inspiring me to follow my dreams and without whom none of this would ever
have been possible. This book is dedicated to them.
And to God, who made all things possible.
Contents
Part I Introduction: Power of the Oceans Across Regions

1 Researching the Indian Ocean Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Indian Ocean Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Maritime Regime Building for Regional Cooperation . . . . . . 4
1.3 Importance of the Indian Ocean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Regional Cooperation for Ocean Governance . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.5 Centrality of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.6 Factors and Approach to Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.7 Contribution of the Book to IR and IO Studies . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.8 Structure of Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.9 A Note on Sources and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.9.1 Case Study on IOGOOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.9.2 Case Study on IOMOU for PSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Part II Ocean Governance, Regional Cooperation

and Regime Theory
2 The New Regime for Ocean Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1 Emergence of the New Legal Regime for the Oceans . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Regime Change in the Oceans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Importance of Oceans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Changing Maritime Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 Regime for Ocean Governance “History in the Making” . . . . . 25
2.6 Defining Ocean Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.7 Pressures of Ocean Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.8 Indicators of Ocean Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.9 Objectives and Principles of Ocean Governance . . . . . . . . . 30
2.10 Initiatives for Ocean Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.11 Strategy for Ocean Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.12 Regulation and Control at Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.13 Attributes of the Power to Govern the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
xi
xii Contents
2.14 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 Indian Ocean Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1 Indian Ocean Region as a Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Regions and Regional Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 New Concept of Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 Indian Ocean RSCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6 Regions and the Indian Ocean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.7 Understanding the Geostrategic Maritime Realm . . . . . . . . . 55
3.7.1 Indian Ocean Nomenclature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.7.2 Indian Ocean Political Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.8 Indian Ocean Regional Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.9 Indian Ocean Regionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.10 Indian Ocean Region Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.11 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4 Regime Theory and Application of Structuration Theory . . . . . . 69
4.1 Regime Effectiveness an Agenda for Research . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Structurational Approach to Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3 Regimes Do Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.4 Conceptual Clarification of Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.5 Regime Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.6 Attributes and Classification of Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.7 Norm for Ocean Governance and Maritime Regimes . . . . . . . 75
4.8 Driving Social Forces of Regime Formation . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.9 Process of Regime Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.10 Actor–Structure Interplay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.11 Actors and Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.12 Structure in Regime Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.13 Elements of Structuration Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.14 Application of Structuration Theory to Regime Theory . . . . . . 86
4.15 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5 Methodological Considerations for Case Study Analysis . . . . . . 95
5.1 Integrating the Literature on Ocean Governance, Regions
and Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2 Maritime Regime Analysis in the Indian Ocean Region . . . . . 97
5.3 Meaning of Regime Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.4 Objects of Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.5 Importance of Time and Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.6 Level of Collaboration as a Measure of Effectiveness . . . . . . . 100
5.7 Behavioural Change and Institutional Effectiveness . . . . . . . 101
Contents xiii
5.8 Broader Consequences of Regime Effectiveness Across Space . . 101

5.8.1 Analytic Construct of Broader Consequences
Across Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.9 Variables for Measurement of Regime Effectiveness . . . . . . . 103
5.10 Constructing the Measurement Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.11 Rubric for Measuring Regime Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.12 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Part III Indian Ocean Rim Power to Govern the Sea

6 Regime for Marine Scientific Research in the Indian Ocean
Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.1 Importance of Marine Scientific Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.2 Maritime Zones and Marine Scientific Research . . . . . . . . . 130
6.3 International Legal Regime for Marine Scientific Research . . . . 132
6.3.1 Marine Scientific Research and Economic Interests . . . 133
6.3.2 Marine Scientific Research and Military Interests . . . . 134
6.4 International Cooperation in Marine Scientific Research . . . . . 135
6.5 Process of Regime Formation: Global Ocean Observing
System (GOOS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.6 Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System
(IOGOOS) Regional Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.7 Actor Behaviour and Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.7.1 Knowledge-Based Actors and Intellectual Leadership . . 140
6.7.2 Interest-Based Actors and Entrepreneurial Leadership . 141
6.7.3 Power-Based Actors and Structural Leadership . . . . . 141
6.8 Structure Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.8.1 Signification—Communication and Level of Concern . . 142
6.8.2 Legitimisation—Contractual Environment . . . . . . . . 143
6.8.3 Domination—National Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.9 Broader Consequences Across Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.9.1 State Learning at the Unit Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.9.2 Regional Cooperation at the Subsystem Level . . . . . . 146
6.9.3 International Cooperation at the System Level . . . . . . 148
6.10 Stages of Regime Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.10.1 Agenda Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.10.2 Institutional Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.10.3 Operationalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.11 IOGOOS Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.11.1 Indian Ocean Panel (IOP) and the Indian Ocean
Observing System (IndOOS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.11.2 Coastal Module of IOGOOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.11.3 Data and Information Management . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.12 Analysis of Regime Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
xiv Contents
6.12.1 Stages of Regime Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

6.12.2 Actor Behaviour and Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.12.3 Structure Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.12.4 Broader Consequences Across Space . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.12.5 Level of Collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.12.6 Effectiveness of the Regime for Marine Scientific
Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.13 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7 Intra-Indian Ocean Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
7.1 Indian Ocean Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
7.2 Intra-Indian Ocean Trade Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.3 Country-Specific Intra-Indian Ocean Trade Performance . . . . . 186
7.3.1 Intra-Indian Ocean Trade and World Exports . . . . . . 186
7.3.2 Intra-Indian Ocean Trade and Developing Countries . . 187
7.3.3 Intra-Indian Ocean Trade and Industrialised Countries . 188
7.4 IOR Regional Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
7.5 Top-Performing IOR Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.5.1 Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
7.5.2 Singapore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
7.5.3 Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
7.5.4 Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
7.5.5 Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
7.5.6 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
7.5.7 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
7.5.8 United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
7.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
8 Shipping and Port State Control in the Indian Ocean . . . . . . . . 203
8.1 Shipping a Globalised Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
8.2 International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Framework . . . . . 205
8.3 World Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
8.4 IOR Shipping Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
8.5 Indian Ocean Port State Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
8.6 Actor Behaviour and Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
8.6.1 Power-Based Actors and Structural Leadership . . . . . 216
8.6.2 Knowledge-Based Actors and Intellectual Leadership . . 219
8.6.3 Interest-Based Actors and Entrepreneurial Leadership . 225
8.7 Structure Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
8.7.1 Signification—Communication and Level of Concern . . 232
8.7.2 Legitimisation—Contractual Environment . . . . . . . . 233
8.7.3 Domination—National Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
8.8 Broader Consequences Across Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
8.8.1 State Learning at the Unit Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Contents xv
8.8.2 Regional Cooperation at the Subsystem Level . . . . . . 238

8.8.3 International Cooperation at the System Level . . . . . . 239
8.9 Stages of Regime Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
8.9.1 Agenda Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
8.9.2 Institutional Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
8.9.3 Operationalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
8.10 Analysis of Regime Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
8.10.1 Stages of Regime Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
8.10.2 Actor Behaviour and Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
8.10.3 Structure Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
8.10.4 Broader Consequences Across Space . . . . . . . . . . 252
8.10.5 Level of Collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
8.10.6 Effectiveness of the Regime for Port State Control . . . 255
8.11 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
Part IV Conclusion: Power of the Sea from Coast to Coast

9 Prospects for Regional Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region . . 265
9.1 Open Maritime Space or a Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
9.2 International Regimes and Ocean Governance . . . . . . . . . . 266
9.3 Effectiveness of Maritime Regimes in the Indian Ocean Region . 268
9.4 Challenge to Building Good Order at Sea and Prospects
for Regional Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
9.5 Indian Ocean as a Regional Framework in International
Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Appendix A: List of Persons Contacted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Interviews/formal/informal discussions in Australia . . . . . . . . . . 275
Interviews/Formal/Informal Discussions in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . 275
Other Interviews/Formal/Informal Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
Appendix B: Coding and Classification of IOGOOS Annual Reports . . 277
Use of Wef QDA Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
Actor Behaviour/Leadership (ACBEL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
Power-Based/Structured (POBAS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
Interest-Based/Entrepreneurial (INBAE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
Knowledge-Based/Intellectual (KNBAI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Structure Over Time (STROT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Signification/Level of Concern (SIGLOC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
Legitimisation/Contractual Environment (LEGCOE) . . . . . . . . . . 291
Domination/Capacity of Governments (DOMCOG) . . . . . . . . . . 292
Broader Consequences Across Space (BREAS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
State Learning/Unit Level (SLUL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
xvi Contents
Regional Cooperation/Subsystem level (RCSSL) . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

International Cooperation/System Level (ICSL) . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Stages of Regime Formation (STAREGFOR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Agenda Formation (AGFOR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Institutional Choice (INCHO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
Operationalisation (OPSTA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Process of Regime Formation (PROREGFOR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
Imposition (IMPOS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
Negotiation (NEGOT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
Self-Generation (SELFG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
Appendix C: Intra-Indian Ocean Trade (in USD Millions) 2001
to 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
Appendix D: Intra-Indian Ocean Exports by Value (in USD
Millions) by Country 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
Appendix E: Intra-Indian Ocean Exports by Value (in USD
Appendix F: Intra-Indian Ocean Exports by Value (in USD
Appendix G: Intra-Indian Ocean Exports by Value (in USD
Appendix H: Intra-Indian Ocean Exports by Value (in USD
Appendix I: Intra-Indian Ocean Exports by Value (in USD
Appendix J: Intra-Indian Ocean Exports by Value (in USD
Appendix K: Indian Ocean Shipping Fleets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Appendix L: Indian Ocean Countries Port State Control
Inspection Data 2001 to 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Appendix M: Indian Ocean Port State Control Inspection Data
for Classification Societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
List of Figures
2.1 Possible boundary limits for ocean governance . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2.2 Activity in the coastal and open ocean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Ocean governance concept to practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4 Cyclic process in the “use of the sea” and “use of power” at sea . . . 41
3.1 Map of the Indian Ocean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.1 From norms to rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 Ocean governance norm and attributes of maritime regimes . . . . . 75
4.3 Regime formation multivariate model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4 Giddens stratification model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.5 Dimensions of the duality of structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.6 Giddens “duality of structure” in regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.1 Process of measuring regime effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.2 Measure of behavioural change and institutional
effectiveness variable sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.3 Measure of level of collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.4 Regime effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.1 GOOS international institutional structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.2 IOC regional committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.3 GOOS regional alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.4 Integrated Indian Ocean Observing System (IndOOS) . . . . . . . . 157
6.5 Regional committee for Central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO)
member states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.6 Measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness . . . . 170
6.8 Marine scientific research regime effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
7.1 Intra-IOR exports by region in US dollar (millions) 2001–2007 . . . 185
7.2 Australia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007 . . . . . . . . . . 193
7.3 Singapore’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007 . . . . . . . . . 194
7.4 Malaysia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007 . . . . . . . . . . 195
7.5 Indonesia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007 . . . . . . . . . . 196
7.6 Thailand’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007 . . . . . . . . . . 197
7.7 India’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
7.8 Saudi Arabia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007 . . . . . . . . 200
xvii
xviii List of Figures
7.9 The United Arab Emirates intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007 . . 201
8.1 Principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of registration . . 209
8.2 Tonnage of principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean
country of registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
8.3 Number of ships of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner 211
8.4 Gross tonnage of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner . 213
8.5 Overview of the port state control regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
8.6 Effect of PSC inspection—serious and less-serious casualty . . . . . 224
8.7 Working of International Chamber of Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
8.8 Organisational structure of IOMOU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
8.9 Measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness . . . . 251
8.11 Port state control regime effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
List of Tables
2.1 Indian Ocean states membership in interest groups . . . . . . . . . 25

2.2 Porter’s 5 Ps and strategy for ocean governance . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 Time line of key events in the maritime realm . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1 Relative influence of different levels on Indian Ocean RSCs . . . . 54
3.2 List of Indian Ocean countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1 Definitions of regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 Schools of thought in international regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.1 Components of regime effectiveness and variables for
measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2 Typology of effective and ineffective regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.3 Level 4 measurement of actor–structure interplay . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4 Rubric for measuring regime effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.5 Measurement of level 4 regime collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.6 Level of collaboration ordinal scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.7 Recoded scores of variable sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.1 Conduct of marine scientific research in the maritime zones . . . . 130
6.2 Indian Ocean countries IOC membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.3 GOOS and IODE marine scientific research programmes . . . . . . 151
6.4 Indian Ocean countries remote sensing capability . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.5 IOGOOS Data and information management timeline . . . . . . . . 164
6.6 Numerical score of variable sets and level of collaboration . . . . . 166
6.7 Level of collaboration marine scientific research in the
Indian Ocean region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.8 Marine scientific research regime effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . 173
7.1 Indian Ocean rim countries total exports in US dollar
(millions) 2001–2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.2 Intra-IOR exports by region in US dollar (millions)
2001–2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
7.3 Intra-IOR exports as a percentage share of total exports
2001–2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
7.4 Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a percentage of world
exports in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
xix
xx List of Tables
7.5 Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a percentage of exports

to developing countries in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
7.6 Value of intra-Ocean trade as a percentage of exports to
industrialised countries in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
7.7 Value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of world
exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
7.8 Value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of exports to
developing countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.9 Value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of exports to
industrialised countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.10 IOR country exports by value (> USD 10,000 million) to
IOR country of destination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
7.11 Intra-IOR exports by value (> USD 10,000 millions) to IOR
country of destination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
8.1 Principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of
registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
8.2 Tonnage of principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean
country of registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
8.3 Number of ships of principal merchant fleets by nationality
of owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
8.4 Gross tonnage of principal merchant fleets by nationality of
owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
8.5 Port state control regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
8.6 Flag state performance of Indian Ocean PSC countries . . . . . . . 217
8.7 Three-Year average detention percentage of Indian Ocean
PSC countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
8.8 Black–Grey–White List performance of Indian Ocean PSC
countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
8.9 Indian Ocean intellectual leadership in port state control . . . . . . 220
8.10 Keyword search in identified maritime journals . . . . . . . . . . . 221
8.11 IACS classed cargo-carrying ships from IOR countries on
record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
8.12 Black–Grey–White List IOMOU performance of
classification societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
8.13 Flag state performance as of June 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
8.14 Tokyo MoU port state inspection contribution from IOR
countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
8.15 IOMOU port state inspection contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
8.16 Indian Ocean port state inspection contribution . . . . . . . . . . . 237
8.17 IOMOU status of port state control relevant IMO instruments . . . 242
8.18 Inspection contributions by IOMOU member states . . . . . . . . . 244
8.19 Inspection effort of IOMOU member states . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
8.20 Numerical score of variable sets and level of collaboration . . . . . 248
8.21 Level of collaboration port state control in the Indian Ocean
Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
8.22 Port state control regime effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Glossary
AAMP Asian Australian Monsoon Panel

ABS American Bureau of Shipping
ADCP Acoustic Doppler Current Profiling
AMSA Australian Maritime Safety Authority
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APN Asia-Pacific Network for Global Change Research
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
BIMCO Baltic and International Maritime Council
BV Bureau Veritas
CCS China Classification Society
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CLIVAR Climate Variability and Predictability
COLREG Collision Regulations
COM Council of Ministers
COOP Coastal Ocean Observations Panel
CORDIO Coastal Oceans Research and Development in the Indian Ocean
CS Continental Shelf
CSC International Convention for Safe Containers
CSO Committee of Senior Officials
CZ Contiguous Zone
DIM Data and Information Management
DIOZP Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
DNA Designated National Agency
DNV Det Norske Veritas
DWT Dead Weight Tonnage
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EU European Union
EURO-GOOS Euro-Global Ocean Observing System
FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation
FoC Flags of Convenience
xxi
xxii Glossary
FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangement

FSI Flag State Implementation
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GCOS Global Climate Observing System
GCRMN Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDS Geographically Disadvantaged States
GL Germanischer Lloyd
GLOSS Global Sea Level Observing System
GOOS Global Ocean Observing System
GOOS-Africa Global Ocean Observing System for Africa
GRAs GOOS Regional Alliances
GRC GOOS Regional Council
GSC GOOS Steering Committee
GSO GOOS support office
GSSC GOOS Scientific Steering Committee
GT Gross Tonnage
HOTO Health of the Ocean
IACS International Association of Classification Societies
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAM Integrated Coastal Area Management
ICES International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICM Integrated Coastal Management
ICS International Chamber of Shipping
ICSU International Council for Science
ICZM Integrated Coastal Zone Management
IGO Inter-Governmental Organisation
I-GOOS Intergovernmental Committee for GOOS
IHO International Hydrographic Organisation
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMCAM Integrated Marine and Coastal Area Management
INCIOS Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services
IndOOS Indian Ocean Observing System
INTERCARGO International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners
INTERTANKO International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
IOC International Oceanographic Commission
IOCINDIO IOC regional committee for the Central Indian Ocean
IOCIS Indian Ocean Computerised Information System
IOCWIO IOC regional committee for the Western Indian Ocean
IOD Indian Ocean Dipole
IODE International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange
IOGOOS Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System
IOMAC Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation
IOMOU Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding
Glossary xxiii
IOP Indian Ocean Panel

IOR Indian Ocean Rim
IORAG Indian Ocean Academic Group
IOR-ARC Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IORBF Indian Ocean Business Forum
IOTWS Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System
IR International Relations
IRS Indian Register of Shipping
ISF International Shipping Federation
ISPS International Ship and Port Facility
ITCP Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme
ITF International Transport Federation
IUCN International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources
IW Internal Waters
JCOMM Joint WMO-IOC technical Commission for Oceanography and
Marine Meteorology
JCR Journal Citation Reports
J-GOOS Joint Scientific and Technical Committee for Global Ocean
Observing System
KR Korean Register of Shipping
LLS Land Locked States
LMR Living Marine Resources
LOSC Law of the Sea Convention
LR Lloyd’s Register
MARPOL Prevention of Pollution from Ships
MIM Marine Information Management
MLC Maritime Labour Convention
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MSC Maritime Safety Committee
MSR Marine Scientific Research
NGOs Nongovernmental Organisations
NK Nippon Kaiji Kyokai
NODC National Oceanographic Data Centre
OCIMF Oil Companies International Marine Forum
ODIN Oceanographic Data and Information Network
ODIN-CINDIO Ocean Data and Information Network for the Central Indian
Ocean Region
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OOPC Ocean Observations Panel for Climate
OOSDP Ocean Observing System Development Panel
OSF Ocean State Forecast
P&I Protection and Indemnity
PEBLDS Pan-European Biological and Landscape Diversity Strategy
PFZ Potential Fishing Zone
xxiv Glossary
PICO Panel for Integrated Coastal Observations

PI-GOOS Pacific Islands Global Ocean Observing System
POGO Partnership for Observation of the Global Oceans
PSC Port State Control
PSCO Port State Control Officer
QDA Qualitative Data Analysis
RINA Registro Italiano Navale
ROOFS-Africa Regional Ocean Observing and Forecasting System for Africa
RS Russian Maritime Register of Shipping
RSC Regional Security Complex
RSCT Regional Security Complex Theory
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCC South African Development Coordination Conference
SCOR Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research
SEACAMP South-East Asia Centre for Atmospheric and Marine Prediction
SEA-GOOS South East Asia Global Ocean Observing System
SIA Strategic Impact Assessment
SIDS Small Island Developing States
SIRE Ship Inspection Report
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea
SSC Strategy Sub-Committee
SST Sea Surface Temperature
STCW Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers
STCW-F Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Fishing Vessel Personnel
TC/OPC Technical Committee for Ocean Processes and Climate
TS Territorial Sea
UAE United Arab Emirates
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDOALOS United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USCG United States Coast Guard
WAGOOS Western Australia GOOS
WCED World Commission on Environment and Development
WCRP World Climate Research Programme
WESTPAC IOC regional sub-commission for the Western Pacific
WGTI Working Group on Trade and Investment
WIOMAP Western Indian Ocean Marine Applications Programme
WIOMSA Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association
WMO World Meteorological Organisation
XBT Expendable Bathythermograph
Part I
Introduction: Power of the Oceans Across
Regions
Source: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation Intergovernmental

Oceanographic Organisation Tsunami Information, Regional Coordination of Tsunami Warning
System, http://ioc-tsunami.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=36
Chapter 1
Researching the Indian Ocean Region
This chapter sets the stage for a concerted detailed analysis of agreements between
countries on maritime issues for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean. The main
emphasis of research lies in efforts to assess the behavioural change and institutional
effectiveness of individual maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean as a region.
1.1 Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean as a region is arguably one of the least understood areas in the
world.1 It is only in the last few decades that scholarship has begun to appreciate the
important historical role that the Indian Ocean has played in integrating trade across
the ocean from the East Coast of Africa and the Arab world to Southeast Asia and
beyond to Japan and Korea long before the arrival of Europeans.2
The geography of the Indian Ocean may be described simply as the medium
connecting the continents of Africa, Asia and Australia. What is not easily realised
is that the region with one third of the world population becomes the world’s largest
market for buying consumer goods. The region has enormous resources: It contains
two thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves, one third of the world’s natural gas,
90% of the world’s diamonds, 60% of the world’s uranium and 40% of the world’s
gold, making it potentially the single largest area of exploitable wealth in the world.3
Its waterways account for transportation of the highest tonnage of goods globally-
one-half the world’s crude oil container shipment and one third of the bulk cargo.4
The Cold War divided the Indian Ocean Region in countless ways, fermenting
border wars, suspicions and tensions with a widespread emphasis on sovereignty.
Even after the Cold War ended, it took 6 years for some countries in the region
to unite in 1997 and establish the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional
Cooperation (IOR-ARC).5
The IOR-ARC focus is to promote greater economic interaction and human
resource development across the region. Unfortunately, the organisation does not
seem to have delivered, prompting one of the principal participants at that time to
write about the “sad history of the good ship IOR-ARC”.6
M. Gupta, Indian Ocean Region, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, 3
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-5989-8_1, C Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010
4 1 Researching the Indian Ocean Region
1.2 Maritime Regime Building for Regional Cooperation

In global ocean politics, the process of ocean governance as a way for better man-
aging the oceans is becoming a priority across stakeholders and sectors. In the
governance of oceans, economic development, environmental protection and mar-
itime, safety and security are now considered to be interdependent and indivisible.
There are also questions on the legal status of oceans from one of “freedoms of the
seas” to that of “control and regulation”.7 Consequently, Indian Ocean Rim states
must adapt to the emerging maritime environment to coordinate, collaborate and
cooperate in matters of ocean governance not just at the national level but also at the
regional level.8
In a world, which has become interdependent, virtually every country is engaged
in cross-border region building. Cooperation in marine issues that are of common
interest to all Indian Ocean states is seen as a “building block” for wider maritime
security of the Indian Ocean Region.9 Mark Valencia is the first to have explored
in great detail the concept of maritime regime building for Northeast Asia. The
focus was on marine issues of pollution and environment protection and fisheries in
identifying the role maritime regimes can play in regional confidence building.10
In this book on the study of Indian Ocean maritime affairs, all three concepts—
regimes, regions and ocean governance—are central to regime effectiveness and
regional cooperation. Normally, in international relations there is the system level
of analysis then the regional, nation-state and decision-making levels with a focus on
land regions rather than ocean regions. By introducing maritime regime analysis, our
research introduces a new dimension in the way we look at regions in international
relations.11
1.3 Importance of the Indian Ocean
The literature review in Chapter 3 reveals a limited body of pre-1991 work on

the Indian Ocean as a region. Post-1991, international relations (IR) and geopo-
litical sub-disciplines broadly characterise the pattern of relationships in the Indian
Ocean into four sub-regions—Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, South Asia and
East Asia/Asia Pacific. The simultaneous works in 2003 by Buzan and Weaver12
and Cohen13 reflect a marked similarity in the delimitation of regions. Both works
exclude the existence or emergence of an Indian Ocean Region in international
relations and world geopolitics.
Michael Pearson best sums up the existing scholarship: “The Indian Ocean has
been known and ignored, dismissed and described”.14 In other words, the Indian
Ocean as a region in international relations is a neglected area. What then makes an
analysis of the Indian Ocean as a region relevant? It is Pearson’s astute observation:
“The Indian Ocean is embedded in a truly global economy. . . it is now impossible to
write a history of the Indian Ocean. All Indian Ocean history is now a history in the
ocean. . .”15 that provides a compelling insight into the relevance of the otherwise
neglected ocean proper, in geopolitics and international relations.
1.4 Regional Cooperation for Ocean Governance 5
The expansion of land activities into the 200 nautical mile (nm) Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and potentially beyond the 200 nm limit in the context of
outer continental shelf claims, as well as the prospect of seabed exploitation through
the International Seabed Authority by nation-states, including those that are land-
locked, could potentially abuse the oceans. Pearson concludes forebodingly, that
“at present people ignore the sea: soon they may destroy it. The Indian Ocean can-
not expect to be spared from this catastrophic event”.16 Robert Kaplan points out
that “politics is still at the mercy of geography” as the Indian Ocean assumes cen-
tre stage for the challenges of the twenty-first century.17 The research in our book
draws inspiration from policy ideas that consider Milo Kearney’s notion that “the
Indian Ocean Region continues to form, as always, the hub of the wheel” in world
history.18
1.4 Regional Cooperation for Ocean Governance
This section draws on the work of Elisabeth Borgese19 that shows how the new
ocean regime has achieved many firsts in international law, thereby creating the
framework by which implementation of international maritime regimes could poten-
tially further cooperation in the Indian Ocean as a region. Borgese argues that the
new ocean regime enshrined in the 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea actually
fosters the concept of regional cooperation, which in number of instances it makes
mandatory.
For Borgese, the new ocean regime (discussed in detail in Chapter 2) includes
a comprehensive, binding, enforceable international environmental law framework.
It provides for the development of marine resources, human resources, and marine
scientific research and technology. It advances peace and security by reserving all
seas outside the territorial waters and the seabed exclusively for peaceful purposes
including the conduct of marine scientific research.
In the most creative and original way, the new ocean regime combines develop-
ment, environment and peace-enhancing aspects into the concept of the common
heritage of humankind—a new relationship among people and between people and
nature. It favours a universally acceptable international institutional framework for
exploration and the development of human resources and technology. Further, the
new ocean regime is the most important peaceful redistribution and reorganisation
of ocean space ever attained in history. It is a system of management through a
combination and interaction of national, regional and international institutions. It
recognises that “the problems of ocean space are closely interlinked and need to
be considered as whole”. Finally, it provides for a comprehensive and flexible yet
binding system for peaceful settlement of disputes.
Borgese further suggests that comprehensive security and common heritage
are complementary, because common heritage, like comprehensive security, has a
developmental, environmental and peace-enhancing dimension. Under such con-
ditions, there is a need for institutional innovation at the national, regional and
global levels. More specifically, Borgese calls for the creation of a regional seas
institutional framework to implement comprehensive security, and with its environ-
mental, developmental and disarmament dimensions declaring the regional seas as
a zone of peace. She foresees the oceans as “our great laboratory for the making
of a new world order, foreshadowed in the process of implementing, interpreting,
and progressively developing the new law of the sea and the principle of the com-
mon heritage of humankind as the basis of a system of common and comprehensive
security”.
Writing on the prospects of ocean governance as a catalyst for regional coop-
eration, Sam Bateman takes the view that there is a need for the following:
Inter-sectoral orientation in national ocean governance policy; regional cooperation
among not just governments of states but local and epistemic communities; com-
mon understanding of the principles of the Law of the Sea; innovative solutions to
resolve problems of competing sovereignty claims; enhancing comprehensive secu-
rity through cooperation among navies and coast guards; and promoting maritime
confidence and security-building measures.20
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye make an important and distinctive contribution
in bringing together regime theory, regional cooperation and ocean governance that
examines power and interdependence in international relations theory.21 In advanc-
ing the most elaborate theory of international regimes, Keohane argues that in terms
of contractualist or functional theory regimes can act as catalysts for cooperation.22
1.5 Centrality of the Book
Case studies that form the empirical backbone of this book depart from regime
analysis literature by measuring precisely this very aspect. Our book measures
the potential for regional cooperation from implementation of international mar-
itime regimes in furtherance of ocean governance, something that has never been
attempted for the Indian Ocean Region.
The focus of the research is to determine and critically assess the effectiveness of
selected international maritime regimes for the Indian Ocean Region. The research
focus raises three issues: What are international regimes? What are the issue areas
in ocean governance to which international regime theory can apply? What is a
measure of effectiveness? The emphasis is on the regional level of analysis to deter-
mine the prospects for greater regional cooperation. Regional cooperation in the
Indian Ocean in the post-Cold War era has not been extensively studied, and there-
fore we examine this in our book from a maritime perspective and offer an original
contribution.
The theoretical framework of international regimes in the context of ocean gover-
nance frames the objective of this research, which is to test the following hypothesis:
Can international maritime regime building improve prospects for regional cooper-
ation in the Indian Ocean, thus providing for a new geopolitical region to emerge
within the geostrategic maritime realm?
1.6 Factors and Approach to Research 7
Our book tests the effectiveness of two different maritime regimes in the Indian
Ocean Region. First is the regime for marine scientific research, and second is the
maritime safety regime of port state control. These two regimes considered to be the
most important for the Indian Ocean Region are investigated to find any common
interests that hold prospects for regional cooperation.
The effectiveness of the marine scientific research legal regime is vital to the
successful implementation of other international maritime regimes in fisheries,
environment, disaster management and climate change. Each of these regimes is
dependent on marine scientific research for effective policy-making at the national
level. Ill-informed national policies are only likely to impede regional cooperation.
Therefore, an examination of the regime for marine scientific research is essential
as the basis for regional cooperation in the areas of fisheries, environmental and
disaster management, and climate change.
The examination of the maritime safety regime is similarly significant. All coun-
tries in the region are dependent on the sea for trade and the safety of ships is critical
to carrying that trade. The successful implementation of the port state control regime
is key to the effectiveness of international maritime safety standards. If implemented
by all Indian Ocean countries, the port state control regime would increase the
effectiveness of maritime safety and security measures under international law.
The interdisciplinary approach draws on historical analysis, international mar-
itime law, political science, international relations and the literature on regime
theory.
In so doing our research attempts to answer three questions: What challenges
need to be overcome for building good order at sea in the Indian Ocean Region,
the least developed and yet the most strategic of the world’s oceans? What are the
prospects for cooperation among Indian Ocean states for effective implementation
of international maritime regimes? Does the Indian Ocean have value as a regional
framework for future analysis in international relations?
1.6 Factors and Approach to Research
The effectiveness of international maritime regimes in ocean governance for the

future is important. The unresolved issue in the literature is a measure of differ-
ent international maritime regimes for ocean governance as a whole. This can be
attributed to a number of factors.
Foremost is the tension between increasing national control and the demand for
regional cooperation in the oceans. The single factor responsible in coastal states
wanting to extend national jurisdiction over the oceans is the creation of the 200 nm
Exclusive Economic Zone under the new ocean regime.
The second factor is the limited analysis on the effects of international maritime
regimes on regional orders. The focus has been more on the political effects of
international institutions on member states in terms of increasing national concern,
contractual environment and capacity and less on the institutionalised possibilities
of regional cooperation.
The third factor is that ocean governance has not received the attention it
deserves in the discourse on regions, regionalism and regionalisation in interna-
tional relations. The need for increased regional cooperation stems from the fact that
governance of oceans is beyond the individual capacity of states. More so, despite
national overtones the many uses of the ocean retain a transnational character for
governance.
We address these issues in greater detail in Chapter 4 on regime and structuration
theory in our theoretical model for measuring effectiveness of international maritime
regimes.
There are several methods for determining what norms are shared in a commu-
nity. One way is to look for evidence of the norm in codified laws. Another strategy
is to examine patterns of behaviour and to argue that these patterns reveal certain
norms. This process of attaching meaning to observed behaviour, of course, can
be controversial. A third strategy is to examine the discourse in a community by
some form of content analysis, discourse analysis, survey or in-depth interviews.23
Regardless of the method employed, one must guard against over-generalising and
evoking essentialist stereotypes.
A mix of strategies is adopted. The evidence in memorandum of understand-
ings is examined and through content analysis attaches meaning to behaviour. The
methodology for modelling regime effectiveness involves data correlation from
published documents using qualitative content analysis and undertaking statistical
analysis. The procedure, in an effort to understand the nature and effectiveness of
international maritime regimes, involves supplementing conventional contractarian
thinking in “regime theory” with “structuration theory”.24
The focus of contractarian thinking is on the processes through which groups
of actors (participants) endeavour, successfully or unsuccessfully, to arrive at social
contracts establishing the constitutive rules of regimes.25 Structuration theory orig-
inating in the writings of Anthony Giddens presupposes a “de-centering” of the
actor-agent and provides “ontology of potentials” emphasising both actors and
structures.26 Giddens captures this emphasis in his conception of the “duality of
structure” in terms of the following:
Essential recursiveness of social life as constituted in social practices: structure is both

medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into
the constitution of the agent and social practices, and “exists in the generating moments of
this constitution”.27 (my emphasis)
This book will undertake an effectiveness audit of the regimes for marine sci-
entific research and the port state control in the Indian Ocean Region using a
“rubric model of effectiveness” constructed from a synthesis of “regime theory”
and “structuration theory”.
The model avoids both overemphasising the role of structure and underestimating
the power of actors in regime building. Applied to the study of international relations
(IR), the model advances Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger’s theoretical synthesis
of the three schools—knowledge (cognitivism), interests (neoliberalism) and power
(realism).28
1.7 Contribution of the Book to IR and IO Studies 9
For purposes of this investigation, each of the regimes will be analysed using
five broad concepts with each concept examined for three sub-concepts. These
conceptual components include the following: process of regime formation (impo-
sition, negotiation, self-generation); actor behaviour and leadership (knowledge-
based actors and intellectual leadership, interest-based actors and entrepreneurial
leadership, power-based actors and structural leadership); structure over time (sig-
nification, legitimisation, domination); broader consequences across space (state
learning, regional cooperation, international cooperation); and stages of regime for-
mation (agenda formation, institutional choice, operationalisation).29 The approach
taken is to stress the regional level and is not intended to provide a detailed unit-level
analysis of each Indian Ocean state policy.
1.7 Contribution of the Book to IR and IO Studies

The rich body of literature on the history of the Indian Ocean emphasises its signif-
icance in world history. At the same time, however, the Indian Ocean has not been
studied as a region from a geopolitics and international relations viewpoint.
This book addresses the analytical niche of the gap in our understanding about
the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean as a region in contemporary world
geopolitics and international relations. Therefore, our book is placed in the genre of
area studies that emphasise regions, regional orders and regional cooperation.
Even here, the book departs from previous analyses of the Indian Ocean as a
region. First, it brings forward the theory of international regimes to treat maritime
regimes as the instrument for regional cooperation. Second, it integrates regime and
structuration theory in analysing the effectiveness of international regimes. Third, it
undertakes a cross-sectoral, cross-national and cross-regional study of ocean policy.
Fourth, none of the previous studies has examined the regimes for marine scien-
tific research and for port state control in the Indian Ocean, for which both have a
memorandum of understanding among Indian Ocean rim countries.
The central focus is to examine why regional order in the Indian Ocean is so
difficult to achieve and why common maritime interests have not formed the basis
of broader regional cooperation to date.
In this context, the book contributes to literature in four ways. First, it takes a
view of the land from the ocean to present a post-1991 comparative study of the
four sub-regions: Southern Africa and island states east of it, the Middle East, South
Asia and South East Asia including Australia that frame the Indian Ocean Region
in international relations and geopolitics. Second, in the application of ocean gov-
ernance this book advances the understanding of maritime regimes through the lens
of international regime theory. Third, focussed comparative case studies assess the
concept of an Indian Ocean Region in the maritime realm at the system level in
international relations. Fourth, the book adds to the explanatory utility of regime
theory within the context of regionalism in international relations applied to specific
maritime issues in ocean governance.
In so doing, our book breaks new ground as it advances our knowledge across a
number of different areas of social sciences in Indian Ocean studies: regionalism,
international regime theory, maritime regimes and ocean governance policy.
We hope that this book will be of interest to a plurality of scholars includ-
ing Indian Ocean area specialists; ocean governance analysts with an interest in
the effectiveness of different maritime regimes; regime theory specialists that are
interested in the potential development and application of the “rubric model of
effectiveness” in determining the effectiveness of regimes in sectors outside the mar-
itime sector; and foreign policy scholars who study mechanisms to build regional
cooperation in the Indian Ocean. In addition, this publication should have a broader
interest to those in the Indian Ocean policy community that may be seeking practical
ideas on how to apply maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean as a means to improve
regional cooperation.
1.8 Structure of Book
This book is divided into two parts. Part I consists of the following comprehensive
discussions: Ocean governance in Chapter 2, Indian Ocean Region in Chapter 3,
regime and structuration theory in Chapter 4 and methodological considerations for
case study analysis in Chapter 5. Part II undertakes an empirical analysis, opening
with the case study on marine scientific research in Chapter 6, discussion on Indian
Ocean trade in Chapter 7 and a case study on port state control in Chapter 8.
Chapter 2 opens with a discussion on regime change in the ocean before drawing
on literature to define the regime for ocean governance. The chapter then reflects
on the changing maritime dimension and its implications for control and regu-
lation. The chapter examines approaches to ocean governance in the context of
investigating maritime regimes for their effectiveness in the Indian Ocean Region
before identifying the attributes of the power to govern the sea. By so doing, the
literature establishes the plausibility of “oceanic” regional cooperation beyond the
territorialised Indian Ocean shoreline.
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on regions and regional orders with a focus on
Regional Security Complex (RSC) theory put forward by Buzan and Weaver in the
context of Indian Ocean RSCs. The works of prominent historians are outlined to
establish intra-ocean patterns of relationship in conceptualising the Indian Ocean as
a region. The geostrategic maritime realm is then explored to examine the geogra-
phy and political geography of the Indian Ocean before discussing the literature on
Indian Ocean regionalism. The chapter attempts to bridge the study of regions and
regional orders in international relations to define the Indian Ocean Region.
Chapter 4 continues with the conceptual clarification of regimes to develop the
attributes of regimes and their classification. The processes and driving social forces
of regime formation that underpins the multivariate model guiding the empirical
analysis are presented in the two case studies related to marine scientific research
and maritime safety. This leads to a discussion on structuration theory to develop
1.9 A Note on Sources and Methods 11
the “duality of structure” at the heart of the synthesis with regime theory. In Chapter
5, by integrating structuration theory with regime theory, the key components of
actor, structure, time and space used to measure behavioural change and institutional
effectiveness and establish are explored to assess the effectiveness of a regime.
In Chapter 6, a case study examines the regime for marine scientific research,
critical to addressing marine-related problems of coastal communities, environmen-
tal degradation, food security and resource exploitation. Using the “rubric model of
effectiveness,” the chapter analyses implementation of the marine scientific regime
and assesses its effectiveness using the Global Ocean Observing System as a case
study for the Indian Ocean.
Chapter 7 explores the extent of intra-Indian Ocean trade to emphasise the
importance of shipping to countries in the region. Chapter 8 examines the frame-
work for international shipping standards and analyses the shipping fleet of Indian
Ocean countries. Using the “rubric model of effectiveness” this chapter analyses the
implementation of the port state control regime in the Indian Ocean to assess its
effectiveness in furthering quality shipping.
In Chapter 9, a synthesis of the findings of the empirical analysis is used to draw
conclusions about the challenges that need to be overcome for building good order
at sea in the Indian Ocean Region and the prospects for cooperation among Indian
Ocean countries. The chapter concludes with the rationale for why the Indian Ocean
as a regional framework has value in international relations.
1.9 A Note on Sources and Methods
Ideas for the book were first tested with subject experts and informally through inter-
views with officials in the Australian Government, and then with subject experts
and officials in the Indonesian Government, including the Deputy Minister for
Environment. These discussions provided background information only.
Subsequently, our thesis was also tested and improved upon at international con-
ferences and workshops at four different stages of research. At the beginning in
July 2005, ideas were tested at the conference organised by the Maritime Institute
of Malaysia and the Indian Ocean Research Group. Our research on maritime
regional cooperation was further tested in 2006 at the Indo-Defence conference
when attending the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as a
research fellow. The ideas on maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean
Region and regional maritime affairs were further probed in two separate work-
shops, one with a group of Indonesian Navy officers and experts from the Forum for
Defence and Maritime Studies in Indonesia and with industry members through a
nongovernmental organisation.
Our regime theory and its application to regional cooperation were tested in
2007 at a Ph.D. workshop in Brussels on global governance and regionalism. The
initial formulations on the model for measuring effectiveness were refined by dis-
cussion with eminent scholars, including Professors Mario Telo, Université Libre
de Bruxelles, Belgium; Professor Bjorn Hettne from University of Gothenburg,

Sweden; and Professor Vinod K. Aggarwal, University of California, Berkley. In
Brussels, I also had the opportunity to talk to John B. Richardson, Head of the EU
Maritime Policy task force at the European Commission. Finally, in 2008, I had an
opportunity to be a participant at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies
roundtable on Asian security in Singapore. A complete list of persons interviewed,
both formally and informally, can be found in Appendix A.
The case studies are based on published reports on the Memorandum of
Understanding for the Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System (IOGOOS)
and the Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding (IOMOU) for Port State
Control (PSC). E-mail correspondence with the secretariats of the two memoranda
helped clarify those issues that were not clear from a reading of the annual reports.
1.9.1 Case Study on IOGOOS
In the case study on marine scientific research in Chapter 6, there are numerous
acronyms that have been used within a sentence. To maintain flow in readability, the
first use of acronyms has not been expanded. Please see the glossary of acronyms
on page XX.
The marine scientific research case study utilises “Weft QDA,” a freely available
software tool for Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) of the written texts. The software
assists in character-level coding using categories to organise the data: retrieval of
coded text; fast free-text search; and combining coding and searches using Boolean
queries. The use of software with examples has been elucidated in Appendix B along
with the data collated from the IOGOOS I-IV reports.
Since completion of the marine scientific research case study, the IOGOOS-V
report on the meeting, held on November 30–December 3, 2007, was published on
the web late in 2008. This report could not be coded by the software tool; therefore,
the reference to the document is limited. However, a reading of the document shows
no change in the findings.
1.9.2 Case Study on IOMOU for PSC

In the analysis of intra-Indian Ocean trade in Chapter 7, the International Monetary
Fund database on Direction of Trade has been used to establish the extent of Indian
Ocean trade by exports. The focus is on exports rather than the total intra-Indian
Ocean trade. The complete data is listed in the appendices. Of the 36 Indian Ocean
rim countries in the case study, Timor-Leste was not included in the analysis due to
insufficient data, while landlocked Ethiopia was included on the basis that it has a
shipping fleet registered under its flag.
The analysis of shipping fleets utilises Lloyds Register Fairplay on world fleet
statistics to determine the strength of the Indian Ocean shipping fleets made
Notes 13
available from the Australian Government Department of Infrastructure, Transport,

Regional Development and Local Government.
In the case study on port state control in Chapter 8, the IOMOU PSC regime has
been considered for the period 2001–2007, for which annual reports were avail-
able. The reports utilise 3-year averages to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
regimes. Hence, the analysis aggregates data on the 3-year averages for 2001–2003
and 2004–2006 and where needed makes reference to the 2007 data. The annual
report for 2008 was posted on the website in March 2009. Brief references have
been made to the report, and from a reading of the document there is no change in
the findings. The data does suggest improved inspection rate in the region.
The annual 2001–2006 reports of the IOMOU, Tokyo MoU and Paris MoU on
PSC are aggregated to determine the flag state performance of Indian Ocean coun-
tries. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority annual reports are utilised to correct
for data under the IOMOU and Tokyo MoU as Australia provides the same data to
both PSC regimes.
The author corresponded with the secretariats in Paris and Tokyo MoUs on
PSC to understand the formulae for establishing the black–grey–white lists. The
methodology has been applied to the data on IOMOU for PSC.
Notes
1. Take for example the BBC News website at http://news.bbc.co.uk that has the Americas,
Europe, Asia Pacific and then Africa, the Middle East and South Asia as its regional groupings
for reporting world news in international relations.
2. See Gupta (1967), Gupta and Pearson (1999), Abu-Lughod (1989), McPherson (1993),
Chaudhuri (1978, 1985, 1990), Curtin (1984).
3. Sinai (copy held by author).
4. Report by the UNCTAD secretariat, 2004, UNCTAD/RMT/2004.
5. Indian Ocean Rim Association of Regional Cooperation (2004).
6. McPherson (2004).
7. The author has published a series of publications addressing both issues. See Gupta (2007);
Gupta and Djalal (2007), Gupta (2005a, b, 2006).
8. “Sharing and Cooperation Are Now a Necessity, Not Just an Idealistic Vision,”
see Van Dyke, 2008, http://www.hawaii.edu/elp/publications/faculty/JVD/Sharing_Ocean_
Resources.pdf.
9. Bateman and Bergin (1996).
10. Valencia (1996).
11. Thayer, Interview Apr 17 2009.
12. For an authoritative survey of regions in international relations, see Buzan and Weaver (2003).
13. For an authoritative survey of regions in geopolitics, see Cohen (2003).
14. Pearson (2003).
15. Pearson (2003, p. 12).
16. Pearson (2003).
17. Kaplan (2009).
18. Kearney (2004).
19. Borgese (1993, pp. 23–37).
20. Bateman (1994, p. 96).
21. Keohane and Nye (1977).

22. On how regimes make a difference, see Hasenclever et al. (1997, pp. 33–36).
23. Herrmann (2002).
24. Levy et al. (1995, pp. 267–330).
25. Levy, The study of international regimes.
26. Cohen (1989).
27. Giddens (1979, p. 5).
28. Hasenclever et al. (2000, pp. 3–33).
29. See Levy et al. (1995), Giddens (1984).
Part II
Ocean Governance, Regional Cooperation
and Regime Theory
Source: Columbia University, Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures, viewed 18
April 2009, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00maplinks/mughal/orteliusmaps/arrian
1592.jpg
Chapter 2
The New Regime for Ocean Governance
This chapter discusses the framework for ocean governance that emphasises
coordination, cooperation and collaboration at the national, regional and interna-
tional levels. This chapter underscores the importance of regional cooperation and
maritime regimes for ocean governance in the Indian Ocean as a region.
2.1 Emergence of the New Legal Regime for the Oceans
In the twenty-first century, the oceans remain significant to humanity and increas-
ingly require separate consideration in international relations. The dramatic change
over time of ocean usage has, however, altered the highly permissive “freedom of
the high seas” regime to a new form of ocean governance centred on “control and
regulation”. In a world that has become more interdependent, this new regime for
the oceans is embodied in the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) adopted by the
third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 and
entered into force in 1994, possibly the most significant but least recognised legal
instrument of the twentieth century.
The new legal regime for the oceans assumes that the problems of the ocean space
are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole, where all nations will
cooperate in the management of the oceans. LOSC in one stroke evolved into hard
law from soft law.1 It consolidated all past treaties, codified customary law and put
in place new law for new issues.2 It was a global agreement because for the first
time even land-locked states were addressed in maritime affairs.3
Historically, in international relations, nation-states act in pursuit of national
interests and seldom from collective international good. Territoriality reigns
supreme. Looking through the national security lens, it is about what serves the
essentially territorial nation-state best.
Primarily, national interest is to do with gaining political leadership, military
supremacy and/or economic advantage in the international arena. Nation-states in
pursuing their national interests act alone (national identity) in relation to other
countries or in concert (group identity) in relation to other group of countries.
To achieve ascendancy in their relations with one another, nation-states have even
established societal boundaries that separate race, nations and regions.4
18 2 The New Regime for Ocean Governance
In the last two decades, the significant change in perception about the abun-
dance and resilience of the environment introduced a new dimension in the study
and practice of international relations. In stark contrast to any other dimension of
international relations, the environment seeks nation-states to act at the international
level for the collective good of all mankind.
Yet, in the oceans, for example, nation-states have acted more to protect indi-
vidual interests than to protect the marine environment as the common heritage of
mankind.
2.2 Regime Change in the Oceans

This section draws on Keohane and Nye’s work on the international regime change
in the oceans.5 Keohane and Nye use theories other than traditional theories in
international relations. In the current environment, interdependent relationships to
deal with non-military dimensions of security now characterise international rela-
tions alongside the traditional maxim that nation-states interact in pursuit of their
national interests.6 It is worth noting that interdependence does not automatically
spell mutual benefits. Invariably, it will also involve costs and the terms of mutual
dependence need not be evenly balanced.7
The reciprocal effects of interdependence revolves around the question of “who
gets what” even in situations where nation-states recognise that they cannot act
alone.8 Individual nation-state’s power to affect outcomes in interdependent rela-
tionships depends on their own sensitivity and even more on their own vulnerability
in the event of policy change.9 In essence, there is a web of complex interde-
pendence that depends on what gets securitised as the referent object, who is the
securitising actor, and who are the functional actors.10
Contemporary ocean policy is illustrative of the three aspects that characterise
complex interdependence.11 First, multiple channels connect nation-states. Second,
there are multiple issues. These are closely interrelated at multiple levels across a
multiplicity of stakeholders and lack coordination with no clear hierarchy among
issues. Third, nation-states in a region are less inclined to use naval force against
one another and are more willing to use collective naval forces to deal with issues
that affect the interdependent relationship.
Over the past two decades, ocean politics has moved even closer to complex inter-
dependence than when it was first studied by Keohane and Nye in the 1970s. True
to Keohane and Nye’s assessment, the different conditions in international relations
have increased the range of foreign policy choices available to nation-states.
More specifically, multiple channels of contact could provide effective policy
coordination overcoming some inherent pitfalls of nongovernmental influence on
policymakers. On a more general level, policy coordination for the future requires
nation-states to act from “long foresight and a prescribed system” than from seeking
short-term goals. On this last point, if major nation-states are willing to exercise
“multiple leadership” and assume special obligations, then a way could be paved
for regional orders.
2.3 Importance of Oceans 19
A necessary condition for a successful international regime in the oceans is

that the interests of domestic special groups within the major nation-states must
be addressed as also the make-up of power among those nation-states.
2.3 Importance of Oceans

Oceans, regarded as the “last frontier” on earth, shall decisively influence world
geopolitics, globalisation, socio-economic balance and life on earth. From a his-
torical perspective the importance of the oceans has evolved, over the last 500
years.
Today, 82% of all nations border the world’s oceans or seas. Of these, some 40
nations (30%) are islands.12 The world’s oceans have afforded the human populace
freedom to explore and acquire natural resources and wealth distributed over 29% of
the land. With 70.92% of the earth’s surface covered by water, the oceans encompass
not only two thirds of the world surface but could well impact the lives of three
quarters of the world’s population by 2030.13
The ocean of “all” life on earth (oceans as the cornerstones of life) has remained a
vast frontier whose mysterious depths, abundant life and influence on earth have yet
to be fully explored and understood.14 The ocean space represents a unique socio-
cultural entity that offers fresh air, natural light and breath-taking long-range views
of landscapes and seascapes that have provided a distinct culture and way of life for
centuries. Nearly 60% of the world population lives within 60 km of the coast at a
density twice the global average.15
An insight into the traditional expanse of the high seas is useful in understanding
the impact of the new legal regime in the use of ocean space. It is well estab-
lished that the world’s largest expanse of common international spaces—the high
seas—traditionally nearly encompassed the vast majority of the world ocean with
the exception of a narrow coastal band of territorial sea (generally 3 nm). The his-
tory of the law of the sea, however, is a narration of the struggles for and against
the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. J. Verzijl states, “historical research clearly
proves that freedom has no static content a priori, but is subject to continuous, at
times even violent, changes”.16 For example, Spain and Portugal through a series of
papal bulls and the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 went on to divide all of the oceans
in the Southern Hemisphere.17
Until 1958, the high seas were viewed as all parts of the sea not included in the
territorial sea or the internal waters of a state.18 In 1782, the Italian jurist Galiani
suggested for the purposes of neutrality the breadth of territorial waters as a mar-
itime belt coterminous with a “cannon shot”.19 In 1793, during the war between
England and France, U.S. Secretary of State Jefferson equated the range of a can-
non ball to one sea league or 3 nm.20 In the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of
1878, Great Britain formalised measurement as a result of three decisions by Lord
Stowell between 1800 and 1805.21 Ever since, various nations states have submitted
proposals that have varied from 3 to 200 nm.22
LOSC marked a historically important shift in the balance between “control and
regulation” and “freedom of the high seas”. Under Article 86 of LOSC, the high
seas came to be defined as “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state”. The 200 nm EEZ now spatially under
national jurisdiction of the coastal states amounts to nearly 41% of the world’s ocean
space.23
The freedoms making up the “freedom of the high seas,” which by the end
of nineteenth century had come to be established as a fundamental principle
of international law, were now subjected to varying control and regulation.24
Although the fundamental high seas freedoms, especially the crucial naviga-
tional/communications related rights, were retained within EEZs, this was crucial to
the balancing act achieved through LOSC. The new legal regime for the oceans had
established zones of maritime jurisdiction and specified rights and responsibilities
for all states including landlocked states.
The maritime zones that define the oceanic realm cover a geographic area where
both the land and the water interact through the dynamics of natural processes. The
boundary of these maritime zones encloses a space, which extends from the ocean
across the land–water interface to an inland limit. It is difficult defining such an
all-embracing area in terms of physical or administrative boundaries. Figure 2.1 is
illustrative of the possible limits to defining the geographic extent of the maritime
Exclusive
Economic Zone
limit
Continental Shelf
limit SEAWARD BOUNDARY
Contiguous Zone DEFINITION
limit
Territorial Sea
limit
State/local limit
Arbitary distance from
tide mark
MLW
MHW
Extent of salt water

influence
Arbitary distance
from tide mark
State/local limit
effects of an
LANDWARD activity limit
BOUNDARY
DEFINITION Watershed limit
Climatic
influence limit
Fig. 2.1 Possible boundary limits for ocean governance

Source: Developed by M. Gupta
2.3 Importance of Oceans 21
zones. Ideally, the inland limit must encompass all activities that have a direct impact
on the oceans. The concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone has transformed the
status of the coastal waters out to the 200 nm limit, and ideally the seaward limit of
national jurisdiction must extend up to 200 nm.25
The economic use of ocean space can be classified into a number of basic cate-
gories that reflect the fundamental human activities involved (Fig. 2.2). The ocean
space is a region of simultaneous and continually increasing land and sea-based eco-
nomic activity. With each activity competing for the same space, a typical conflict
of interest exists among different economic user groups.26
Conservation Coastal Engineering Resources

1. Heritage sites 1. Sediment cell formation 1. Mineral and Aggregates
2. Biological diversity 2. Accretion 2. Hydrocarbons
3. Wetlands 3. Beach erosion 3. Living resources
4. Critical habitats 4. Man made structures 4. Renewable energy
Economic Use
Education and 1. Gross National Product Transport and
Research Communication
2. Efficiency and
1. Training stakeholder value 1. Shipping
2. Data collection 3. Potential for conflict 2. Ship Design and Building
3. Data analysis between sectors 3. Ship maintenance
4. Data dissemination 4. Need for systems 4. Undersea optic cables
perspective
Waste Disposal Recreation Strategic

1. Industrial 1. Marine leisure 1. Military
2. Domestic 2. Coastal tourism 2. Crime at sea
3. Pollution at sea 3. Water sports 3. Regional co-operation
4. Agricultural run off 4. Underwater recreation 4. International co-operation
Fig. 2.2 Activity in the coastal and open ocean

The range of international agreements dealing with different aspects in the ocean
realm has contributed to international norm-setting for ocean governance, but imple-
mentation at the national and regional levels continues to be a challenge. The
problems include the following: legislation and policy have been sectorally based
and uncoordinated; inappropriate and isolated sectoral planning decisions have often
worked against long-term interests; rigid bureaucratic systems have limited local
creativity and adaptability; local initiatives have lacked adequate resources and sup-
port from higher administrative levels; management has lacked vision and has been
based on a very limited understanding of ocean processes; and scientific research
and data have been isolated from end-users.27
Many of the marine scientific research and maritime safety and maritime security
issues are beyond the capacity of individual states to tackle alone. Growing depen-
dency on ocean use for food security has the potential for conflict among and within
nation-states. In addition, growth in the intensity of ocean use is impinging on the
carrying capacity of the marine environment.
2.4 Changing Maritime Dimensions
In this new “ocean regime” of interdependence the centre of political gravity has
unendingly shifted from land to oceans, but knowledge and understanding of the
oceans is fragmented and specialised. The triad of factors in geopolitics: end of
the Cold War, globalisation and governance standards28 ; security: beyond indi-
vidual states, empowerment of transnational actors, interdependence of security29 ;
development: trade, aid, security30 ; maritime environment: new law of the sea,
growing dependence on oceans, growth in sea denial capabilities31 ; balance: growth,
efficiency, sustainability32 ; and Agenda 21: economic, social and environmental
sustainable development, together provide an understanding of the need to look at
issues from the ocean towards land rather than take a land-centric view of things.
First, from a security perspective the end of the Cold War has brought
non-traditional maritime security challenges—environmental degradation, resource
scarcity, transnational crime, piracy, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and
terrorism—into greater prominence. It also eroded the bipolar model of interna-
tional relations, bringing an increased opportunity to address global problems with
a growing acceptance of a wider concept of peace and security.
Many of the issues are beyond the capacity of individual states to tackle alone,
although tough, independent measures can be taken to reduce these states, vulner-
ability to certain threats. From 1984 to June 2002, 2,678 incidents of piracy and
armed attack were reported to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Two
hundred and seventy-six incidents of migrant smuggling, involving 12,426 migrants,
were reported to IMO from the end of 2000 to 30 April 2002.33
The empowerment of transnational non-state actors necessitates international
cooperation to deny them access to sanctuaries, weaponry, finances and other
resources. Consequently, despite the growth in sea denial capability of a number
of nations there is increasing interdependence for maritime security.
Second, from an economic perspective the breaking down of economic bound-
aries, globalisation and aid for eliminating poverty has had a significant impact on
governance and security. Trade, aid and security are mutually supportive in theory.
Trade leading to growth in economic and social exchange between groups, com-
bined with international standards of governance to preserve peace and balanced by
transfer of payments, should lead to more harmonious and equitable societies.
The reality is that globalisation of weakly governed markets coupled with misuse
of international development assistance and aggressive promotion of unbalanced
trade is straining traditional international and national mechanisms for preserving
peace.
2.4 Changing Maritime Dimensions 23
Third, from a social perspective there is growing dependency on ocean use for
resource and transit of goods by all nations leading to unplanned development and
decline of traditional sectors. Uncontrolled development in the port and tourism or
other sectors destroys the cultural heritage and dilutes the social fabric of the coastal
population.
The carrying capacity of the coastal zone is increasingly being exceeded, thereby
polluting and degrading the natural resources, destroying the landscapes and reduc-
ing the quality of life for the coastal populace.34 Ocean pollution is estimated to
cause some 250 million cases of gastroenteritis and upper respiratory disease every
year, costing societies worldwide about $1.6 billion a year.35 The consumption of
uncooked sewage-contaminated shellfish causes some 2.5 million cases of infec-
tious hepatitis each year, at a cost of approximately $10 billion annually.36 Added
to that the decline of traditional sectors like inland fisheries, struggling to remain
competitive, is leading to unemployment, emigration and social instability. The
capacity to accommodate has steadily eroded and conflicts among competing uses
have become common place.
Fourth, from a technological perspective accelerated growth in science and tech-
nology has led to the discovery of new uses and the potential to exploit them. For
instance, new advances in technology have allowed humankind to go further off-
shore and deeper into the oceans. Life on the seabed, which was once thought of
as existing only in the shallow waters of the continental shelf, has now been found
at depths of more than 4,000 ft.37 At the same time, advances in science and tech-
nology has also added to the vulnerability of the oceans. For example, increasing
trade is making demands for a more efficient cargo transport. The development of
faster and larger ships with zero tolerance for negative environment impacts such as
emissions, discharges of bilge water and tank washings and introduction of harmful
alien species into new environments through ship ballast water is placing enormous
pressure on the marine environment.
Fifth, from a legal perspective the new law of the sea has not only increased
the demand for uses of the oceans but promises to alter radically the traditional
freedom of access enjoyed by maritime powers in the past. Now, more than one
third of the world’s oceans fall within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of
coastal states. The 200 nm EEZ gives coastal states exclusive rights with respect
to natural resources and other economic activities and the right to exercise juris-
diction over marine scientific research and environmental protection. The economic
significance of EEZs is evident from the fact that 90% of the world fish stocks
were within national jurisdictions.38 Further, the high seas, representing nearly
60% of the earth’s surface, are beyond national jurisdiction and the International
Seabed Authority is now vested with the control of high seas seabed and
resources.
Sixth, from an environmental perspective the balance between human life and
the environment, which as assumed international dimensions since the 1970s, has
come to be recognised as the one of the pillars of sustainable development. Growth
in the intensity of ocean use is impinging on the carrying capacity and levels of
sustainable use of the marine environment.
The ocean has served as humanity’s preferred dumping ground. This has involved
the dumping of waste; disposal of industrial, space and military debris; flow of
runoffs laden with toxic pollutants; and the pumping of dirty oil bilges.39 The ocean
is now in a state of crisis and can no longer exist in isolation from activities on
land. Land-based sources are responsible for 80% of the pollution while dump-
ing of wastes and other matter account for 10% of pollutants affecting most of the
productive areas in the marine environment.40
In addition, to the problems of large-scale urbanisation and overuse of pristine
natural habitats are other negative impacts on coastal communities such as climate
change and global warming. Changes in climatic conditions are perceived to be the
reason behind the frequent devastating storms, cyclones and hurricanes as well as
causing erratic hot and cold weather conditions and variations in monsoons.
The United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea
(UN/DOALOS) 2002 report estimates that approximately 27% of coral reefs are
at a high risk of degradation due to direct human impact and the effects of cli-
mate change.41 Scientific studies predict that a further 50–60% of the world’s
coral reefs may be destroyed within the next 30 years unless urgent measures are
taken.42
Another impact of climate change is the rise in sea levels, which threatens the
very survival of some countries, such as some Small Island Developing States
(SIDS) and low-lying coastal states. It is estimated that the average global sea level
has risen 10–25 cm over the past 100 years. Different projections indicate that sea
levels will rise another 15–95 cm by 2100 or at the minimum 18–59 cm.43
Seventh, from a resource perspective, the removal of millions of tons of wildlife
has led to the collapse of dozens of species once thought of as inexhaustible pop-
ulations of ocean life with implications for food security.44 Every year, almost 90
million tons of fish are captured globally, providing by far the largest source of
wild protein for human consumption.45 According to the Food and Agricultural
Organisation (FAO) projections for 2010 world fisheries production is likely to
range between 107 and 144 million tons.46
Finally, from a political perspective, effective forms of ocean governance have
been rendered more complex by the increased number of nation-states and their
differing interpretations of the Law of the Sea. The major maritime powers benefit
from the current arrangements or from the absence of them. This is even more so
when traditional negotiating blocks—such as disarmament, development, trade and
investment—are much less in evidence in the case of the oceans.
Further, the economic ideology of nations is placing heavy reliance on the mar-
ket and role of private enterprise, and therefore some nations are not receptive to
regulatory mechanisms for the oceans. The absence of regulatory mechanisms has
led to the abuse of oceans. Growing awareness of the problems of the oceans has not
yet permeated to individual behaviour. Nations left to their own devices are unable
to dispense answers to questions relating to peace, security, equity and the envi-
ronment. As a consequence, the decision-making imposed by the complexity of the
issue and the realisation that our “Knowledge” to effectively take account of the
multidisciplinary and interdependent issues is still inadequate.
2.5 Regime for Ocean Governance “History in the Making” 25
These changes in maritime dimension point towards increasing interdependence

for addressing maritime issues where traditional international and national mecha-
nisms are strained in implementing maritime regimes. The law of the sea promises
to alter radically the traditional freedom of access, as individual nations are unable
to cope with matters of ocean governance.
2.5 Regime for Ocean Governance “History in the Making”
By the 1970s, just when the world was beginning to fathom the significance of
the ocean for survival of life on earth, the very nature of the ocean, which barely
half a century ago was the “Sea of Eden,” began to dramatically change. It became
evident that there was a need to overcome the plethora of claims by coastal states,
preserve the freedom of navigation, conserve and optimally utilise the resources
at sea, protect and preserve the marine environment and use the sea on a basis of
“equitable apportionment” so as to take into account the interests of mankind as a
whole.47 Table 2.1 summarises membership of the Indian Ocean states in various
special interest groups and their common interests during negotiations on the new
ocean governance regime.
Table 2.1 Indian Ocean states membership in interest groups
Special interest group Indian Ocean member states Common interests of the group
Coastal states Australia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Strong EEZ; counter and

India, Indonesia, Iran, opposed LL/GDS claim for
Kenya, Madagascar, rights to living resources in
Mauritius, Mozambique, the EEZ; and opposed
Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, position of LL/GDS and
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, major powers on the legal
Thailand, United Arab status of the EEZ
Emirates, Yemen
Landlocked states Afghanistan, Bhutan, Resources in the EEZ and
Botswana, Burundi, Lesotho, rights of LL/GDS therein;
Malawi, Nepal, Swaziland, status of the EEZ; definition
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe of continental shelf; revenue
sharing respecting nonliving
resources; and transit rights
for landlocked states.
Geographically Bahrain, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan,
disadvantaged states Kuwait, Qatar, Sudan,
United Arab Emirates
Territorialist states Madagascar, Mozambique Retain rights for a territorial
Somalia, Yemen sea of more than 12 nm
under national legislation.
Proposed 200 nm EEZ
conformed as close as
possible to their territorialist
concept.
Table 2.1 (continued)
Special interest group Indian Ocean member states Common interests of the group
Margineers or broad shelf Australia, India, Madagascar, Exercise continental shelf

states Sri Lanka rights beyond 200 nm; and
opposing revenue sharing
beyond 200 nm.
Straits states Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Oppose transit passage
Yemen (Djibouti, Iran and concept; and seek
Singapore, although strait amendments to
states could not be identified accommodate concerns over
as part of this group) prevention of pollution.
Archipelagic states Indonesia, Mauritius Drawing archipelagic straight
baselines connecting
outermost points of the
outermost islands to create a
sense of political unity.
Equidistance principle Bangladesh, Bhutan, Iraq, Represented splits among
delimitation (EPD) Kenya Madagascar, Pakistan, coastal states, big powers,
Somalia GDS and some Arab states
on the delimitation of the
EEZ and the Continental
shelf
Median Line or EPD Kuwait, United Arab Emirates
Special interest group Other states Common interests of the group

Maritime states France, Germany, Greece, Shipping and navigation
Japan, Liberia, Norway, interests
Panama, United Kingdom,
USA, USSR
Great maritime powers France, Japan, United
Kingdom, USA, USSR
Coordinating group of five France, Germany, Japan,
United Kingdom, USA
Group of 12 Australia, Austria, Canada, Tried to bridge the gap between
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the United States and the
Ireland, New Zealand, the developing countries (Group
Netherlands, Norway, of 77)
Sweden and Switzerland
Source: Compiled by M. Gupta from Edward L. Miles.53

Australia, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yemen
all were members of more than one special interest group
The emergence of ocean governance had several catalysts. In 1967, Arvid Pardo,
President of Malta, coined the phrase “Common Heritage of Mankind” in high-
lighting the inadequacies of the current international law on the oceans. There was
growing recognition in developed nations of coastal degradation due to inappro-
priate development and poor planning. Globally, it had become evident that there
was a need to conserve and optimally utilise the resources, protect and preserve
the marine environment and coordinate activities within the United Nation (UN)
2.6 Defining Ocean Governance 27
system.48 The 1972 UN Stockholm conference on the human environment repre-

sented the first effort by the international community to deal with environmental
problems on a comprehensive basis by creating the United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP).49
The 1982 third UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provided a
comprehensive framework for governance of the oceans. The 200 nm limit EEZ
placed 41% of the oceans under national jurisdiction for conservation of the marine
ecosystem and optimum utilisation of resources.50 This is consistent with the goals
formulated in Garret Hardin’s “The Tragedy of Commons” because UNCLOS has
been able to resolve some important jurisdictional questions by creating forms
of enclosure as recommended by Hardin.51 The 1987 World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED) report “Our Common Future” states “look-
ing into the next century, the commission is convinced that sustainable development
if not survival itself depends upon significant advances in the management of the
oceans”.52 The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development by under-
lying the need for interdependence and integration developed the basis for ocean
governance.
The 1990s saw the emergence of international guidelines on the concepts through
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED) in 1991, World
Bank and International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN) in 1993, World Coast Conference report in 1994 and United Nation
Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1995.
2.6 Defining Ocean Governance
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 identifies ocean governance—sustainable development

and integrated management—as one of the essential components of the global life-
support system.
Cicin-Sain and Knecht summarise sustainable development to mean: economic
development to improve the quality of life of people; environmentally appropriate
development; and equitable development in terms of inter-societal, intergenerational
and international equity.54 Integrated Management combines the land and adjoin-
ing water in a single-unified framework.55 According to Cicin-Sain and Knecht
the variety of terms used internationally such as Integrated Coastal Management
(ICM), Integrated Coastal Area Management (ICAM), Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM) or even Integrated Marine and Coastal Area Management
(IMCAM) all refer to the same concept.
The modern-day ocean space has been segregated into two realms: namely,
coastal ocean subject to a variety national jurisdictional levels and open ocean
subject to international jurisdiction. Moreover, the open ocean has been vertically
subdivided into the water column having the status of “freedom of the high seas”
and the seabed claimed as the common heritage of mankind.
In the management of coastal and open oceans, recent political science literature
has tended to replace the word “management” with that of “governance” to focus on
the ocean as a system that needs to be considered as a whole.56 Keohane and Nye
define governance as “the processes and institutions, both formal and informal that
guide and restrain the collective activities of a group”.57
In this book, ocean governance embodies the call made by Brundtland in Our
Common Future: “We live in an era in the history of nations where there is greater
need than ever for coordinated political action and responsibility”.58
A review of 142 case studies determined that nations have generally followed a
similar process from concept to practice, beginning with an initial awareness stage
and culminating in programme implementation and evaluation.59 However, the ini-
tiatives to manage human activities in this area show weaknesses: jurisdictional gaps
and overlaps, lack of interagency communication and coordination, competition for
scarce management resources, and inter-agency and intergovernmental conflicts.60
The priority should be to create a framework that has the mandate, human and finan-
cial resources and the political will to put into practice the concept of integrated
management.61
There appears to be growing consensus on the outlines of a general model for
ocean governance. Contributions in this regard all stress the dynamic nature of the
ocean realm with an emphasis on integration.62 The EC Demonstration Programme
summarises these works to define ocean governance as a dynamic, continuous
and iterative process designed to promote sustainable development of the maritime
zone. Sustainable development as seen over the long term is based on the inherent
interdependent principle of economic well-being, social justice and environmental
quality.
Based on these works, ocean governance can be said to take into account: spatial
integration or the need to consider the challenges of the ocean space as a whole;
temporal integration or coherence between long-term vision, medium-term targets
and short-term action; stakeholder integration or promoting genuine collaboration
among stakeholders at the national, regional, inter-regional and international levels
so that there is a cooperative approach to problem-solving as the problems are too
complex to be resolved by an one group acting alone; sectoral integration or devel-
oping horizontal linkages across sectors so that there is a coordinated approach to
economic development; and institutional integration or hierarchical linkages so that
there is a convergence in policy, development efforts and governance at national,
regional, inter-regional and international levels.
2.7 Pressures of Ocean Governance
To achieve sustainability in the new millennium, the first step is to bring all users
and uses in the ocean realm under some type of management.63 The management of
the ocean realm is multidisciplinary in nature, balancing economic activity, social
equity, environmental quality and maritime safety and security.
2.8 Indicators of Ocean Governance 29
Among the pressures are expanding economic activities such as renewable

energy, coastal tourism, marine leisure, aquaculture, transportation, communication
and fishing. This has resulted in social instability due to growing coastal population
and loss of traditional employment alongside environmental concerns of increased
pollution and habitat degradation. There are added pressures of disturbances in the
sediment transport mechanisms causing coastal erosion and climate change causing
natural disasters and sea-level rise. These pressures make the ocean realm a dynamic
and complex system for management.64
The issues need to be resolved by concerted action of all stakeholders with
an interest in maritime activities. Over the last two decades a body of work has
emerged on the lessons learned and best practice guidelines. The challenges faced
were similar in developed and developing nations.65
To begin with, the fundamental goals were similar in that they addressed the need
to balance intensifying human activities with the changes that the activities bring in
the quality of the maritime zone.66 Resource degradation, nature destruction and
multiple use conflicts were invariably the precondition for consideration of ocean
governance in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Greece, Australia,
Sweden, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, Philippines and Thailand.67 Management programmes
emphasised integration across scales of time and space, active participation of stake-
holders and an incremental iterative approach to problem-solving. There appeared
widespread inability to implement the strategy as an integrated whole.
2.8 Indicators of Ocean Governance

A case study of 22 nations by Cicin-Sain and Knecht suggests that the difference
between developed and developing nations lies only in the prevailing economy and
the resultant pace of system change.68
Taking the findings of Cicin-Sain and Knecht, and Olsen and Christie among the
cross-section of developed and developing nations into consideration,69 the lessons
learned from the EU Demonstration Programme 1997–1999 serve as good indica-
tors for ocean governance initiatives at the national and regional level. Each of the
indicators builds on the other indicators to repeatedly stress the importance for all
levels to be involved in their own capacity and sphere of competence. A case in
point is that local-level ocean governance activity will not be effective where there
is a policy vacuum at higher national, regional and international levels.70 The EC
programme based on 35 projects suggests that all successful initiatives require seven
components:
1. Taking a wide-ranging perspective. Both human and physical processes link

the land and water components. At the same time, the administrative bound-
aries do not generally coincide with the natural and social system boundaries.
Together, with the geographic scale and extent, the maritime zone represents
a complex zone for governance. Significant interrelated influences necessitate
concurrently considering the hydrological, geomorphological, socio-economic,

administrative, institutional and cultural systems in their entirety.
2. Building on an understanding of specific conditions in the area of interest. The
initiative must be rooted in a thorough understanding of the local circumstances.
Diverse conditions in the physical, social, cultural, economic and institutional
characteristics of the area require adopting a site-specific context. Although a
generic institutional framework can be developed at the regional and national
levels, the characteristics outlined require developing an understanding of the
area in question. This allows an appreciation of the pressures and driving forces
that are influencing the dynamics of the maritime zone.
3. Working with natural processes. Ocean governance initiatives should be based on
an understanding of the natural processes and dynamics of coastal systems. By
working with the processes, maritime activities can become more environmen-
tally sustainable and more economically profitable thereby increasing long-term
options.
4. Ensuring decisions taken today do not foreclose options for the future. Ocean
governance must explicitly acknowledge the uncertainty of future conditions that
may arise from sea-level rise, climate change or coastal erosion and promote
sufficiently flexible management. It is particularly important not to forget future
generations and those who are not physically present in the target maritime zone.
5. Using participatory planning to develop consensus. Participatory planning
may be seen as the involvement and collaboration of the private sector, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens groups and other non-institutional
organisations or individuals interested in or affected by the process of ocean
governance. It works to build the opinions and perspectives of all relevant stake-
holders into the planning process through collaborative involvement reducing
conflict and developing consensus.
6. Ensuring the support and involvement of all administrative bodies. It is essential
to engage local authorities from the start. Ocean governance is not effective if it
is not supported by all levels and by all relevant sectors.
7. Using a combination of instruments. Ocean governance can only succeed using
multiple instruments that include a mix of law and economic instruments, vol-
untary agreements, information provision, technological solutions, research and
education.
2.9 Objectives and Principles of Ocean Governance

A review of recent key initiatives diagnoses the need to facilitate universal logic or
“reason” in the way of decision making by government officials, scientific experts
and by the community.71
Effective governance is really a question of proper institutional design, finding
the right balance between the different vertical levels of control in order to achieve
the collective and sometimes conflicting goals of different programmes.72
2.9 Objectives and Principles of Ocean Governance 31
The first priority should be to create a formalised institutional framework that

has the mandate, the human and financial resources and the political will to put
into practice the concept of ocean governance.73 In the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) initiative “institutional and organisational arrangements
were imperative in carrying out the projects and programmes”.74 Lesson learned
from the Netherlands experience “demonstrates the need for building an organisa-
tional structure for the relevant participants to communicate about problems and
solutions”.75 The challenge lies in “developing practices and institutions that are
consistent with the principles we recognise as right, but whose implementation is
difficult”.76 Limitations in institutional capacities are the main barrier to improved
resource planning and management.77
To summarise the works of Cicin-Sain and Knecht and the EC Demonstration
Programme, the three core objectives of ocean governance are (1) economically
efficient development to improve the quality of life, (2) environmentally sustainable
development that preserves the quality of the environment and (3) socially equitable
development that provides inter-society and intergeneration equity. Using the indi-
cators from the EC Demonstration Programme and the Pan-European Biological and
Landscape Diversity Strategy (PEBLDS),78 the eight core principles can be derived
as the following:
1. Principle of careful decision-making. Decisions as far as possible need to be

made on the basis of the best available information adopting economically,
environmentally and socially sound measures that act as incentives for the
conservation and sustainable use of the maritime zone.
2. Precautionary principle. Ocean governance needs to move from a standard pro-
cedure in which a science arrangement provides advice to a management body
to a system where management options are based on the precautionary princi-
ple. Using Hey’s definition this principle dictates that comprehensive methods of
environmental, social, cultural and economic assessment must be used in decid-
ing on measures to enhance the quality of the maritime zone.79 The principle
stresses the need to simulate further research, particularly, scientific and eco-
nomic research that contributes to a better understanding of the long-term options
available.
3. User pays principle. Part of the costs of measures to prevent, control and reduce
damage to the biological diversity and coastal landscapes and seascapes must be
borne by the user. Prices charged for access to or use of ocean resources should
reflect all short-term and long-term economic, environmental and social costs
associated with the use of those resources.
4. Principle of public participation. It is becoming increasingly, necessary to
develop private–public partnerships to fully accomplish the development goals
within the maritime zone. The users and the public must be involved at the ear-
liest possible stage of an ocean governance strategy. The users have valuable
insights regarding both the management needs and the economic opportuni-
ties that must be addressed. The support of the users for development and
implementation of the ocean governance strategy is seen as crucial to its success.
5. Principle of public access to information. An informed public allows two-way

communications among government agencies, users groups and local com-
munities to ensure the social acceptability that will enhance the successful
implementation and enforcement of ocean governance decisions. There is a
need to make available accurate, timely and documented official information
on proposed ocean governance activities through media coverage and public
fora, meetings and discussions, and information education campaigns in the local
language.
6. Principle of best available technology. Access to and transfer of technology is
essential for attainment of the strategy. Scarcity of water demands that water-
saving technologies be incorporated in all development designs. In addition,
material used for coastal infrastructure should not include contaminants, which
might enter the marine ecosystem.
7. Principle of best environmental practice. Environmental Impact Assessment of
a project needs to be strengthened by Strategic Impact Assessment (SIA) to take
account of the cumulative impacts of a development. This will allow the promul-
gation of non-development zones and protected areas with a view to controlling
the scale of activities in relation to the natural, cultural and physical characteris-
tics of the surrounding area. It will enable the preservation of the local cultural
heritage by relocating development not dependent on the coastal and marine area,
phasing out ongoing harmful activities and reserving potential development sites
for future developments.
8. Principle of ecological integrity. Outstanding natural features as well as impor-
tant flora and fauna habitats should be afforded strict conservation status. The
maintenance and enhancement of natural processes can increase the resilience
of the coastline against coastal erosion and accelerated sea-level rise. Mitigation
of adverse effects of developments that cannot be avoided by restoration of the
habitat is a compensatory mechanism that is to be used as a last resort.
2.10 Initiatives for Ocean Governance
Together with the three core objectives and the eight core principles, 13 core ini-
tiatives are drawn from the 22 nation case study by Cicin-Sain and Knecht and the
lessons learned from the 35 projects of the EC Demonstration Programme. These
are as follows:
• Taking a long-term view. Unfortunately in most nation-states the ocean gover-

nance strategy is in the form of disjointed projects with time frames of 5 years
or a decade at most rather than distinct elements of a coherent, overarching strat-
egy. The ocean governance cycle is a process needing continual updating and
amendments that requires 8–15 years for completion.80
• Adopting a process of adaptive management. Given the geographic scale, the
process of achieving effective ocean governance will have to be an incremental
2.10 Initiatives for Ocean Governance 33
process. Further, ocean governance decisions are often made in the face of impor-
tant unknowns and conflicting opinions regarding the right course of action. This
requires a sustained effort of learning by doing that could extend over decades,
for sustainable development of the maritime zone to become visible. At its most
fundamental level adaptive management means a cyclic process that is based on
a sound governance process rooted in the principles of participatory democracy,
and reliable knowledge that applies the best available science to the issues that
the governance initiative is working to address.81
• Organising around an integrated approach. There is a need to ensure the vertical
and horizontal cooperation and coordination in policy development with those
local individuals and organisations that have a voice in any higher level decisions
that will have a significant impact on them. Given the significant number of per-
ceived conflicts “first, last and always, horizontal and vertical integrated planning
and management are necessary if practitioners are to effectively and efficiently
plan and manage coastal systems”.82
• Promoting participation and a collaborative culture. It is important that the
different and often conflicting sectors are able to collaborate with each other.
Ensuring the involvement of all stakeholders in an ocean governance initiative
is essential. Effective participation can help achieve commitment, ownership and
shared responsibility. Stakeholder ownership of the policies and projects will lead
to commitment to the governance process. Input of local knowledge into the pro-
cess is vital to ensure identification of the real issues and resolution of the issues
by those who are actually affected. Further, better awareness of the project will
lead to greater understanding of the issues, which in turn will lead to governance
that is more effective. Finally, working together can achieve more than working
singularly.
• Establishing coastal forums. This provides a mechanism to empower people to
make decisions essential to achieving the objectives. Public participation is par-
ticularly important to ensure that the ocean governance initiative addresses issues
related to quality of life, cultural and social heritage, and leisure time pursuits.
It also helps ensure implementation of any recommendations or plans that the
governance initiative produces.
• Developing understanding through multidisciplinary training. Most planners and
managers are single discipline specialists while ocean governance requires mul-
tidisciplinary understanding of the activities in the maritime zone. Developing
human capacity at all levels is as important as the need to demonstrate that
effective resource management is possible and sustainable. While a short-term
solution is to undertake capacity-building of existing planners and managers, a
long-term approach is to build multidisciplinary perspective into the education
system.
• Highlighting best practice guidelines. Mahatma Gandhi once said “We must be
the change we wish to see in the world”. For stakeholders to change in how they
relate to the maritime zone there is a need to highlight best practice guidelines
covering every possible area of economic, environmental and social activity. This
encourages the change we wish to see in every possible individual, interest group,
community group, local authority, national authority and regional community and
international body.
• Determining indicators to measure the objectives. The Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defined indicators as “a
parameter, or a value derived from parameters, which points to, provides infor-
mation about, describes the state of a phenomenon/environment/area, with a
significance extending beyond that directly associated with a parameter value”.83
In relation to the economic, environmental and social objectives indicators mea-
sure the extent to which any action is sustainable and consequently, the effect of
any change in that action. It is essential to identify the indicators that objectively
tell the progress towards sustainable development in the maritime zone. Such an
assessment will help to improve the ocean governance process.
• Establishing conflict resolution mechanisms. The economic and ecological inter-
ests of the different stakeholders create conflict between development and
environment in terms of short-term private economic interests and long-term pub-
lic interest of sustainable resource use.84 Effective conflict resolution requires a
conception of public policymaking in which all stakeholders have an opportunity
to negotiate.
• Undertaking Strategic Impact Assessment (SIA). There is a need for a better
understanding of the interactions and interdependencies between the land and
water components. To overcome the procedural, planning, policy and institu-
tional weaknesses of ocean governance will require a formalised systematic and
comprehensive assessment that includes the environmental, social, cultural and
economic impacts of a policy, plan or programme and its alternatives. A policy is
defined as an inspiration and guidance for action, a plan as a set of coordinated
and timed objectives for the implementation of the policy and a programme as a
set of projects in a particular area.85
• Conducting interdisciplinary research. The justifications for interdisciplinary
research lie in the nature of coastal and open ocean systems, which are complex,
interrelated and influenced by humans. The problem faced is that each disci-
pline has its own objectives and scientific language to communicate within the
discipline.86 Yet, interdisciplinary research is essential to evaluate the environ-
ment in its entirety. This is the foundation on which cross-sectoral planning and
management is possible.
• Establishing a Geographic Information System. A need assessment is imper-
ative to organise and integrate data with reference to spatial location. Useful
information not only depends upon raw data but also on its correct analysis
and transformation into something that planners and decision-makers can under-
stand and use. This requires the use of Geographic Information System for data
management and analysis.
• Providing an information technology network. A failure in knowledge diffusion is
one of the key reasons for continuing destruction of coastal landscapes, seascapes
and resources. Many of the problems of the coastal and marine area can be traced
to the fact that the required information or understanding has never reached the
correct audience. The diffusion of information, knowledge and understanding of
2.11 Strategy for Ocean Governance 35
the natural processes can help planners, decision-makers and the general public
to realise the consequences of any particular action, and provide the basis for
developing more sustainable policy and management actions in the coastal and
marine area.
2.11 Strategy for Ocean Governance
Undoubtedly, national prosperity requires sustained economic growth and resource

development to increase productivity and national income. However, alongside
national economic growth, the higher regional level issues: social—intersociety
and intergenerational equity; environmental—resource conservation and protection;
and safety and security—good order at sea also require consideration in ocean
governance. These issues when not addressed accumulate over time and have con-
sequences that do not show up in the shorter time-horizon typical of economic
policymaking. To quote Van Dyke:
The precautionary principles, the polluter-pays principle, the duties to notify, consult, and
cooperate, and the duty to assess the environmental consequences of new initiatives are
not mere idealistic mantras, but are important and practical principles that the world must
embrace if its people are to have enough food to eat.87
Despite the 30-year history ocean management, there are few examples of a suc-
cessful ocean governance practice beyond a local level or problem-specific scale.
The challenge lies in developing the political will to improve the process of plan-
ning for and implementing ocean governance. According to Arild Underdal, to
integrate in ocean governance would mean to unify—to put parts together into a
whole. To qualify as integrated the ocean governance strategy must achieve concept
comprehensiveness, process aggregation and consistent practice.88 The process as
visualised by the author is depicted in Fig. 2.3.
Concept comprehensiveness is measured along four dimensions; namely, time,
space, actors and issues. In time, sustainable development means taking a long-term
view. From a spatial perspective, the concept refers to intergovernmental, inter-
agency, inter-sector, inter-discipline and the land–sea interface. Along the actor
dimension the level ranges from international to site within a given activity sys-
tem. Finally, along the issue dimension the guidelines reflect the interdependency
between an international declaration and a site-specific project.
Process aggregation is reflected in the strategy being evaluated from an overall
perspective. It necessitates weighing interests and setting priorities at each level.
For example, failure to do so at the national level may be attributed as the cause of
failure of the strategy in practice.
Consistent practice can be said to have a vertical and horizontal dimension.
The vertical aspect refers to the accord between the different strategy levels
international–regional–national–local. Along the horizontal dimension for any given
issue, only one level (international, national, regional, local) is being pursued at any
given time by relevant agencies, provided accord across all levels is achieved. In
Fig. 2.3 Ocean governance concept to practice

consistent practice, specific types of implementation measures conform to the more

general guidelines, whereas the techniques and resultant activation conform to the
strategic goal for each vertical level and horizontal dimension.
The ocean governance strategy is integrated to the extent that the concept recog-
nises its consequences as decision premises; the process aggregates them into an
overall evaluation; and in practice penetrates all levels and all agencies involved
in its execution.89 Underdal outlines two generic ways of achieving integration,
direct method or “top–down” approach and indirect method or a “top–down and
bottom–up” approach or co-management approach.90
The direct method seeks to achieve integration by defining national policy goals
derived from global principles that are to be followed by all government agen-
cies involved in the management of the coastal and marine area. However, the
direct method will often have to be supported by the indirect method to find suf-
ficiently precise integrating goals and to secure government agencies’ participation
given the different patterns of participation, interaction and influence.91 The indirect
method involves an intellectual strategy and an institutional strategy.92 The intellec-
tual strategy seeks integration through initiating research, training and socialisation
aimed at developing a more comprehensive and holistic perspective on the part of
decision-makers.
The institutional strategy involves some type of organisational change that facili-
tates moving issues upward from the site to the national level and transferring issues
from a narrow single sector to a broader multiple sector perspective. In fact, the insti-
tutional strategy will encompass the intellectual strategy to be truly representative
of all the stakeholders.
What then do we mean by strategy? Michael Porter’s seminal work pioneers
strategy to be a plan, a ploy, a pattern, a position and a perspective that has been
2.11 Strategy for Ocean Governance 37
described by Henry Mintzberg as the 5 Ps of strategy.93 It can be argued that ocean

governance is a question of strategic management that broadly encompasses the
areas of strategy formulation, implementation and control.94
In essence, ocean governance integrates various functions, is oriented towards
organisation-wide goals, considers a broad range of stakeholders, entails multiple
time horizons and is concerned with both efficiency and effectiveness. An attempt
has been made in relating ocean governance to principles of strategic management
in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Porter’s 5 Ps and strategy for ocean governance
5 Ps Porter’s definition Strategy for ocean governance
Plan Some sort of consciously intended Integrate all relevant policy areas,
course of action—establish sectors and levels of
direction for the organisation administration
Land–water interface
Take a short-term and long-term
view
Ploy A specific manoeuvre to gain An imposed ocean governance
advantage placing the process of strategy works as a ploy for
strategy formation in its most overcoming inertia to change
dynamic setting and tunnel vision in sectoral
organisations
Pattern A notion of convergence in a Taking a wide-ranging view of
stream of actions—achievement interrelated problems
of consistency in organisation Making knowledgeable decisions
behaviour based on data and information
Working with natural forces
Allowing for unforeseen future
developments
Making use of a range of
instruments
Position A match between organisation and Concept comprehensiveness—
the environment—locating the measured along the dimensions
organisation within the of time, space, actors and issue
environment A match between Process aggregation—Evaluating
the internal and external the strategy from an overall
environment—locating the perspective, necessitating
organisation in the external weighing interests and setting
environment priorities at each level of
management
Consistent practice—vertical and
horizontal dimension where
vertical aspect refers to the
accord between the different
strategy levels and only one
strategy for a given issue is
being pursued along the
horizontal dimension
5 Ps Porter’s definition Strategy for ocean governance
Perspective Strategy is a concept, perspective Taking a long-term view

is shared—intention and Adopting a process of adaptive
behaviour in a collective management
context—looks inside the Organising around an integrated
organisation—not just a chosen approach
position but an ingrained way of Promoting participation and a
perceiving the world collaborative culture
Developing understanding through
interdisciplinary training
Source: Compiled by M. Gupta
2.12 Regulation and Control at Sea

Although the international law of the sea has evolved over five centuries, the present
body of rules, agreements, treaties, law and institutions has developed in the last five
decades in a global attempt to provide a system of ocean governance. The increased
focus on the oceans is due to the strategic, political, legal, environmental, economic,
social and technological changes in the maritime realm.
The change in the maritime environment, indicative of increasing coastal state
influence, began to evolve in early twentieth century with the discovery of offshore
oil and a growing realisation of the potential to exploit ocean resources, such as min-
erals and fish. The speed of change accelerated over the past three decades due to a
perceptible shift in mindset from one of “apparent abundance” to “growing scarcity”
of ocean resources and due to the increasing ocean uses from “accommodation” to
“conflict”. These changes in the basic condition of ocean use have been responsible
for raising questions regarding the legal status of oceans from one of “freedom of
the high seas” to that of “control and regulation”.95
This is even more evident after the September 2001 terrorist attack on the World
Trade Center in New York. The perceived threat of maritime terrorism has brought
swift and unprecedented legislation by the international community for the security
of shipping and ports. A number of incidents in the Indian Ocean suggest that the
threat is longer perceived and could become even deadlier.96 The timeline of events
that lays emphasis on “regulation and control” is shown in Table 2.3.
Broadly, fished and navigated for millennia, the “use of the sea” now involves
free passage of trade and access to the ocean wealth, protecting the marine ecosys-
tem from environmental damage and safeguarding the sovereign and territorial
integrity of the bordering nations.
Principle 25 of the Rio Declaration concluded on 13 June 1992 upholds that
security, economic development and environmental protection are interdependent
and indivisible. Thus, ocean governance can be conceived as a trinity of ocean policy
spheres: economic development, environmental protection and maritime security.
And these spheres derive their growing integration from the new ocean regime of
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.
2.12 Regulation and Control at Sea 39
Table 2.3 Time line of key events in the maritime realm
Year Event
1945 President Truman of the United States on 28 September 1945 makes twin
declarations relating to fisheries and continental shelf extending the coastal
jurisdiction to 200 nm in areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the
United States
1958 The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) I is convened
1960 The second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) II is
convened
1967 Arvid Pardo, President of Malta, coins the phrase “Common Heritage of Mankind”
in highlighting the inadequacies of the current international law on the oceans
1968 The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction is established
1972 UN Stockholm conference on the human environment represents the first effort by
the international community to deal with environmental problems on a
comprehensive basis by creating the United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP)
1973 The third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III opens
1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) is adopted by the third United Nations
Conference
1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) report “Our
Common Future”
1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA Convention) adopted by the International Maritime
Organization Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (SUA Protocol) adopted by the
International Maritime Organization
1991 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio. Agreements
reached on Agenda 21 underlying Integrated Management and Sustainable
Development
1993 Commission on Sustainable Development established to oversee implementation of
Agenda 21
1993 World Bank Guidelines
1993 International Union for Conservation of Natural Resources (IUCN) Guidelines
1994 The Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) enters into force
1995 The International Seabed Authority becomes operational
1995 United Nations Environmental Programme Guidelines
1996 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea becomes operational
1997 The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf holds its first session
1998 International Year of the Oceans
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development
2002 IMO adopts the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code
2002 Container Security Initiative launched by the United States of America
2003 Proliferation Security Initiative announced by the United States of America
2004 ISPS code comes into force on 1 July 2004
2005 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention and 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Protocol
Source: Compiled by M. Gupta

The new ocean regime has altered nations’ “use of power” at sea from Alfred
Mahan’s97 purely military concept of “command of the sea” to having the “power to
govern the sea”.98 The focus is now on nations’ “use of power” to safeguard national
and in turn international “use of the sea” within the coastal ocean and beyond on the
open high seas.
This means two things. First, the military concept of sea power and the high seas
regime of “freedom of the seas” has to be balanced with “control and regulation” in
performing good-order tasks. Second, all maritime nations, including great powers
and medium powers, need to individually and/or in concert possess the capacity to
exert the power to govern the sea within the coastal ocean and the maritime com-
mons of the open ocean beyond. The new ocean regime is one of a “shared ocean,
shared future”99 that calls for global ocean governance.
2.13 Attributes of the Power to Govern the Sea
Geoffrey Till describes sea power in the twenty-first century, as the use of both
military and civil maritime capabilities by a nation in the conduct of naval and com-
mercial operations.100 Therefore, sea power depends on a nation’s outlook towards
“use of the sea (ocean)” and the “use of (military) power” at sea.
For the future, it is the individual nation’s power to govern the sea as opposed to
the military concept of sea power that holds the key to sustaining economic growth,
providing protective security and ensuring clean oceans for the benefit of not just its
own people but all mankind. If nations do not develop the power to govern the sea,
they not only undermine their own national interests but also global security, and
nations will be unable to position themselves as partners in global ocean governance.
There are four attributes that a nation must possess to develop its power to govern
the sea. The first attribute is having the political will to be able to act or function at
sea in a manner of governing or control. The second attribute is having to constitute
a law, rule, standard or principle for the nation at sea. This requires articulating a
national maritime vision. The third attribute is being able to constitutionally conduct
the maritime policy, actions and affairs of the nation at sea. To do this, a nation must
build on its financial resources, technological capability and industrial capacity. The
fourth attribute is being in military command of the sea and regulating proceedings
at sea when required by national interests. This requires commitment to developing
military strength for combat and good-order tasks.
The power to govern the sea flows from a nation’s concept of “maritime power”.
Maritime power for the future is defined as the “maritime resource of a nation’s
power” or the nation’s use of the sea.101 In other words the “maritime resource
of a nation’s power” depends on the political outlook; level of international and
regional cooperation; naval power; strength of mercantile marine; level of port
infrastructure, presence of coastal communities; management of living and non-
living resources, ship design, building, repair and maintenance capacity; extent of
coastal shipping and inland waterways; oceanographic science and technological
2.13 Attributes of the Power to Govern the Sea 41
MARITIME MARITIME
RESOURCES CAPABILITIES
MARITIME NATIONAL ECONOMIC FINANCIAL MARITIME

OUTLOOK VISION STRENGTH RESOURCES ENVIRONMENT
MARITIME MARITIME
CHALLENGES STRATEGY
Good order tasks

USE OF MARITIME NEW OCEAN MILITARY MARITIME USE OF
THE SEA POWER REGIME SEA POWER STRENGTH FORCES POWER
Ready for combat
MARITIME MARITIME
INTERESTS OPERATIONS
MARITIME INDUSTRIAL INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL MARITIME

POLICY CAPACITY TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITY DOCTRINE
MARITIME MARITIME
INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY
Copyright: Manoj Gupta
Fig. 2.4 Cyclic process in the “use of the sea” and “use of power” at sea
Source: Gupta (2006)
capacity; and sustainability of marine biodiversity. All these factors governed by

a national legal regime for oceans would arguably constitute a nation’s maritime
power. Figure 2.4 summarises the cyclic process in the “use of the sea” and “use of
power” at sea across six constituents that follow on from the attributes of the power
to govern the sea.
The use of the sea for free passage of trade and also regulated by the EEZ regime
characterises a nation’s right to sustainable development of its ocean wealth: from
oil to gas, diamonds to gravel, metals to fish and nodules to sulphur.
The new ocean regime loop explains that growing maritime interests in the use
of the sea has altered the scope of a nation’s maritime power with new maritime
challenges that are “closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole”102 at
the national, regional and international levels.
The national vision loop envisions maritime resources needed in meeting emerg-
ing maritime challenges. The actual extent of a maritime resource would depend on
the maritime outlook and economic strength of a nation.
The industrial capacity loop visualises the nature of maritime interests that deter-
mine the size of a nation’s maritime industry. What is needed is a robust national
maritime policy that acts as a stimulus for innovative technology in developing the
industrial capacity of the nation.
The use of power in protecting the national and international use of the sea would
depend the political will and foreign policy of a nation to build maritime forces to
secure the maritime domain.
The military strength loop explains that the type of maritime strategy, when act-
ing alone and in concert, would determine maritime force structures for the conduct
of maritime operations.
The financial resources loop envisions adopting a maritime strategy based on
both the military and civil maritime capabilities of a nation. The financial resources
available to build maritime capabilities that shape the operating environment of
maritime forces will depend the economic strength of the nation.
The technological capability loop visualises a maritime doctrine that promotes
innovative technology to sharpen the technological capability needed for the con-
duct of maritime operations. The advancements made by a nation in maritime
technology determine the conduct of maritime operations in support of national
interests and global security.
In determining the power to govern the sea, there has to be recognition
that every maritime nation has rights and responsibilities in conduct of mar-
itime activities occurring within legitimately claimed maritime zones. All nations
require a range of potential responses—diplomatic, operational, political, legal and
nongovernmental—to manage the multiple activities and must at the very least exert
power to govern the sea within their maritime zones by maintaining or having access
to capabilities for surveillance, monitoring and control.
Through improved coordination, cooperation and collaboration at the national,
regional and international levels, nations could better secure national interests within
their delimited maritime zones and achieve greater global security.
The power to govern the sea is clearly more complex than a simple “command of
the sea”. It is no longer concerned with winning the war against a would-be adver-
sary and deterring future aggression. The old image of sea power—war fighting,
deterrence and power projection—increasingly has to adapt to the power to gov-
ern the sea in the execution of good-order tasks that require interdependence and
integration.
The matrix of cause and consequence between economic development, environ-
mental protection and maritime security is, however, a complex one. For example,
economic development driving environmental degradation can result in actual
or possible conflict between and within countries over the resultant scarcity of
resources. Even inequitable distribution of resources and environmental degrada-
tion due to infrastructure development can create a space for sub-state actors to
further their cause by increasing social tensions and political instabilities through
the propagation of conflict.
Decline in fish stocks and the desire to gain access to marine resources, particu-
larly in ocean areas where sovereignty claims overlap or when in doubt, can lead to
conflict. Moreover, growing energy demands and uncertainty over energy supplies
can be motive for controlling the sources of energy, thus leading to conflict.
Interdependence between nation-states is vital to enhancing management of
ocean resources, maritime safety and security, as well as protecting the marine
environment and preparing for disaster management.
The example of maritime safety and security may serve to illustrate the
importance of interdependence between nation-states. The Proliferation Security
Initiative, Container Security Initiative, port state control, Suppression of Unlawful
2.14 Conclusion 43
Acts Convention and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code are
some disparate arrangements that reflect the interdependence in strengthening
the maritime safety and security regime at national, regional and international
levels.
In the implementation of these arrangements, integration of maritime resources
within nation-states is fundamental to the (1) development of an integrated air, sur-
face and subsurface picture; (2) optimising of resources to maintain 24/7 forces and
(3) the speed of execution in the conduct of maritime operations. The US concept
of a “national fleet” commits to a shared purpose and common effort focussed on
tailored operation integration of platforms, infrastructure and personnel.103
Such is the complexity of transnational threats to global security that no individ-
ual nation can do all in protecting its maritime borders. Maintaining security of the
maritime commons is inherent to protecting national maritime borders. It will take
interdependence between international navies and integration of national maritime
forces to build a “1,000-ship navy to secure the seas”.104
A 1,000-ship navy as the cornerstone of a global maritime network is a Pax
Americana vision to increase security of the United States’ maritime domain.
Nevertheless, it is in all nations’ interest to integrate maritime forces internationally
and in a regional context to work interdependently in dealing with global threats to
national and regional maritime safety and security.
Maritime safety as the first step towards broader maritime security is one area of
ocean governance with regional connotations that is considered as vital to the devel-
opment and prosperity of the Indian Ocean Region. The second area of significance
with regional connotations is marine scientific research vital to informing fisheries
management, environmental and disaster management and climate change. We will
examine both of these areas in more detail later in the book.
Haward and Vince make the case on how the scope of ocean law in the develop-
ment of regimes governing oceans has broadened over the last three decades.105 In
their discussion, the authors point out that governance is a matter for government,
market and community where government remains an important actor even if gover-
nance occurs without government.106 According to the authors, the developments of
ecosystem management approaches as opposed to sovereign rights in the treatment
of ocean space remain controversial. This is not to say that regional initiatives are
not important. On the contrary, the authors point to the scale, scope and diversity of
regional management initiatives as a tool for effective ocean governance.
2.14 Conclusion
The modern-day ocean usage has grown manifold. The potential for conflict among
competing uses continues as long as while our knowledge and understanding of
the oceans remains fragmented and specialised. A new form of ocean governance
centred on “control and regulation” assumes that the problems of the ocean space
are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole, where all nations will
cooperate in the management of the oceans.
The management of the ocean realm is multidisciplinary in nature, balancing

economic activity, social equity, environmental quality and maritime safety and
security. Ocean governance conceived as a trinity of economic development, envi-
ronmental protection and maritime security has altered nations’ “use of power” at
sea from purely a military concept of “command of the sea” to having the “power
to govern the sea”.
What is more is that interdependent relationships to deal with issue of ocean gov-
ernance now characterise international relations. Despite a range of international
agreements that have contributed to international norm-setting for ocean gover-
nance, implementation at both national and regional levels remains a challenge.
Many of the marine scientific research and maritime safety and maritime security
issues are beyond the capacity of individual states to tackle alone.
As a result, nations in pursuit of ocean governance can ill afford a pol-
icy vacuum at the regional level between the national and international levels.
The higher regional level issues: social—intersociety and intergenerational equity;
environmental—resource conservation and protection; and safety and security—
good order at sea, all require consideration in ocean governance.
The next chapter considers what constitutes the regional dimension for Indian
Ocean countries in pursuit of ocean governance.
Notes
1. Brown (1994).
2. Brown (1994).
3. Ibid.
4. Agnew et al. (1996, p. 25).
5. Keohane and Nye (1977) Little, Brown.
6. Ibid, p. 8.
7. For benefits and costs, see Ibid, p. 10.
8. For effects of interdependence see Ibid, pp. 8–10.
9. For an explanation on sensitivity and vulnerability, see Ibid, pp. 12–18.
10. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 36).
11. For ocean policy as an example and characteristics of complex interdependence, see
Keohane (1977, pp. 24, 36).
12. Borgese (1998).
13. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “A Sea of
Troubles,” Press Release No 2001-129, viewed on 2 August 2008, http://www.unesco.org/
bpi/eng/unescopress/2001/01-129e.shtml.
14. For “Oceans as the Cornerstones of Life,” see Prager and Earle (2000).
15. Post and Ludin (1996).
16. Verzijl, “International Law in Historical Perspective, Part IV,” cited in Anand (1983, p. 225).
17. Cuyvers (1984).
18. Brown (1994).
19. Anand (1983).
20. Ibid.
21. O’Connell (1982).
22. Vogler (1995).
Notes 45
23. Forbes (1995).

24. Churchill and Lowe (1988).
25. Dronkers and de Vries (1999).
26. Ibid.
27. EU Demonstration Programme on Integrated Management in Coastal Zones 1997–
1999, Lessons from European Commission’s demonstration programme on Integrated
Coastal Zone Management (ICZM), updated on 8 May 2008, viewed on 15 Mar 2009,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/iczm/pdf/vol2.pdf.
28. Thakur and Newman (2000).
29. Kennedy (1987).
30. Halle et al. (2002).
31. Cottrell et al. (1981).
32. Sveiby “Measuring Intangibles and Intellectual Capital—An Emerging First Standard,”
5 August 1998, viewed on 17 February 2009, http://www.sveiby.com/portals/0/articles/
emergingstandard.html.
33. United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UN/DOALOS),
“Oceans: The Source of Life,” United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea,
20th Anniversary 1982–2002, viewed on 15 March 2009, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
convention_agreements/convention_20years/oceanssourceoflife.pdf.
34. Report of the post-International Decade for Ocean Exploration (IDOE) (1979).
35. UN/DOALOS, “Oceans: The Source of Life”.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Prager and Earle (2000, p. 296).
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid, IPCC (2007).
44. Prager and Earle (2000, pp. 276–277).
46. Ibid.
47. Anand (1983).
48. Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998).
50. Comment on draft by Clive Schofield, 31 March 2009.
51. Hardin (1968).
52. World Commission on Environment and Development (1987, p. 264).
53. Miles (1998).
55. Clark (1998).
56. Vallega (1998).
57. Keohane and Nye (2000, p. 12).
58. WCED (1987). The world commission included Indian Ocean region memers from Sudan
(Vice Chair), India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Zimbabwe.
59. Sorensen (1993).
60. Lowry (1993).
61. Olsen et al.(1997).
62. See Kay and Alder (1999), Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998), Clark (1998), Kenchington
(1993), Lowry (1993), Miles (1999), Smith (2000), Thia-Eng et al. (1997).
63. Friedheim (1999).
64. Olsen et al. (1997).

65. Olsen and Christie (2000).
66. Ibid.
70. EU Demonstration Programme, “Lessons from European Commission Demonstration
Programme”.
71. Visser (1999).
72. Imperial (1999).
73. Olsen et al. (1997).
74. Thia-Eng (1993).
75. van Alphen (1995).
76. Friedheim (1999).
77. Noble (2000).
78. Committee for the activities of the council of Europe in the field of Biological and
Landscape Diversity (CO-DBP), “European Code of Conduct for Coastal Zones” 19 April
1999, viewed on 15 March 2009, http://www.coastalguide.org/code/cc.pdf.
79. McIntyre and Mosedale (1997).
80. Olsen et al. (1997).
83. Linster, “OECD Work on Environmental Indicators,” viewed on 18 April 2009, to
http://inece.org/indicators/proceedings/04_oecd.pdf.
84. Visser (1999).
85. Glasson et al. (1999).
86. Dronkers and de Vries (1999).
87. See Van Dyke, “Sharing Ocean Resources—In a Time of Scarcity and Selfishness”.
88. Underdal (1980).
89. Cicin Sain and Knecht (1998).
90. Underdal (1980)
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Mintzberg and Quinn (1996).
94. Miller (1998).
95. Van Dyke makes the case where nations have a duty to protect and preserve the marine
environment embodied in the Law of the Sea Convention. See Van Dyke, “Sharing Ocean
Resources—In a Time of Scarcity and Selfishness”.
96. On USS Cole bombing in 2000 see Ratnesar, Times Magazine CNN, “Sneak Attack,”
15 October 2000, viewed on 16 April 2009, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,
9171,57755-1,00.html; On Limburg tanker blast in 2002 see BBC News, “Yemen says
tanker blast was terrorism,” 16 October 2002, viewed on 16 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/middle_east/2334865.stm; Terrorist enter Mumbai from the sea in 2008, see
Swami, The Hindu online edition, “Pointed intelligence warnings preceded attacks,”
30 November 2008, viewed on 16 April 2009, http://www.hinduonnet.com/2008/
11/30/stories/2008113055981500.htm.
97. Mahan (1890).
98. Gupta (2005).
99. U.S. Department of State (2004).
100. Till (2004).
101. Gupta (2005).
Notes 47
102. UN/DOALOS, Preamble to the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea.
103. United States Navy, “Navy-Coast Guard National Fleet Policy Updated,” Navy
Newsstand, 3 March 2006, viewed on 21 March 2006, http://www.news.navy.mil/search/
display.asp?story_id=22645 and “National Fleet: A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy
Statement,” viewed on 21 March 2006, http://www.navy.mil/palib/cno/2006_national_
fleet_policy.pdf.
104. Morgan and Martoglio (2005).
105. Haward and Vince (2008).
106. Later in Chapter 4 regime theory links the three elements to power-based, interest-based and
knowledge-based actors.
Chapter 3
Indian Ocean Region
This chapter discusses the Indian Ocean as a region drawing on international

relations literature as well as historical and geographic references. The purpose is
to stress the importance of the regional level in international relations to frame the
Indian Ocean as a regional unit of analysis for maritime regimes.
3.1 Indian Ocean Region as a Concept
The Indian Ocean region within world affairs is of utmost strategic importance in
the twenty-first century. As according to Robert Kaplan the Indian Ocean is the
jugular of world energy and commerce.1 In history, K.N. Chaudhuri points out that
Indian Ocean countries have not shared a common destiny, but the ocean had its own
distinct sphere of influence where means of travel, movement of peoples, economic
exchange, climate and historic forces all created elements of cohesion.2
Kenneth McPherson’s contribution in this regard best sums up the body of liter-
ature where he argues that the peoples, culture and economies of the Indian Ocean
region formed a distinctive “world” in which the essential unity of the Indian Ocean
“world” was determined by the long distance maritime trade.3
Europe, the Americas and Asia-Pacific are robust examples of regional group-
ings influencing developments within their own areas, and over time, contributing
to the creation of norms, rules and procedures.4 The scholarly analysis of the
Indian Ocean as a region mainly concentrates on the ancient history of contact,
trade and distant voyages done by the people from its coasts and from distant
lands.5 Moreover, the Indian Ocean region as a priori concept does not take shape
in the study of geopolitics and international relations (IR).6 In Cohen’s geopoliti-
cal structure and theory—analysis of the interaction between geographical settings
and political processes—south Asia when linked with the Middle East forms an
“arc of instability”, sub-Saharan Africa forms a part of the quarter-sphere of
marginality, and south-east Asia and Australia being firmly aligned eastward to the
Asia-Pacific regional groupings.7 According to Buzan and Weaver, the future struc-
ture of international security is to be determined by the interplay of regions and
powers.8
50 3 Indian Ocean Region
Such interplay is evident in the three macro-regions—Americas, Europe and

Asia-Pacific—all have an institutionalised role with the United States as the sole
superpower within/outside the region, and one or more great powers within the
region—Britain/France/Germany—EU, Japan, Russia and China—as an interplay
of mutual dependence and the balance of power.9 A plausible explanation for the
near absence of an Indian Ocean region in IR studies could be that it consists of
only regional powers and there are no great powers within the region. As a result,
there is no interplay of mutual dependence and the balance of power such as that
between the United States as a super power and other regional great powers in the
other regions. US engagement in the Indian Ocean region is limited to instrumental
concerns of oil, nuclear proliferation, and international terrorism while using India
as an ally to balance the rise of China as a super power.10 Peter Lehr concludes
that there is nothing like an Indian Ocean region beyond mere geography, and the
prospects for cooperation are bleak, more so given the perceived absence of a region
at the end of the Cold War.11
Are we then to conclude that the world will witness a move towards a tripolar
structure centred on Americas, Europe and the Asia-Pacific,12 and there will be no
Indian Ocean region at the system level in international relations?
3.2 Regions and Regional Orders
The structure of international relations as Buzan and Weaver point out has changed
from empires to nation-states to regions. This change in world affairs is captured in
the three stages of their study of international relations: the modern era from 1500 to
1945, the Cold War and decolonisation from 1945 to 1989, and the post-Cold War
period since 1990.13
The end of the Cold War transformed the international structure with the emer-
gence of an intermediate strong regional level between the national and global
levels.14 Buzan and Weaver write, “the regional level stands more clearly on its
own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis
for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs” in the post-Cold War
structure of international security.15 “Such is the importance of the regional level
in international relations that the costs of underrating them could be even higher”
than the disasters of the Cold War.16 There has been a renewed focus on the study
of regions, regionalism, and regionalisation in international relations, as scholars
attempt to theorise the present and possible future global power structures for build-
ing security in a new world, which is seen as a combination of superpowers and/or
great powers and/or regional powers.17
Regional orders in contemporary international relations have come to be viewed
as an important strategy for achieving security, peace, development, and welfare.18
Katzenstein, for example argues that a “world of regions”—nation-states grouped
into one or more different regions—could shape the international order in the
twenty-first century.19 This is not to say that debates on subnational levels, substate
nationalism and fourth world nations do not exist.20 Although globalisation and
3.3 New Concept of Security 51
internationalisation of standards of political morality and governance21 fundamen-

tally altered the thinking about regional orders from the “old” to the “new”,22 the
definitions, explanations, and surveys remain contested and fuzzy concepts.23
The concept of “region” is open to manipulation and interpretation in accordance
with the interest of pivotal political players.24 Regional grouping can be deliberately
inclusive and exclusive—keeping welcome states in, and unwelcome ones out—
depending on the terms and scope of regional action.25 Building regional orders is
a continually evolving phenomenon. Regions are “dynamic” in changing their com-
positions, “complex” by varying their aspirations and in “conflict” for determining
capabilities to suit emerging agendas.26 No two regions are analogous. There is no
“ideal” region nor is there a common agenda for all regions.27 However, there is a
fundamental understanding of what is a region.
As the referent object regions, regionalism and regionalisation all identify with
the geographic clustering of nation-states that institutionalises an intermediate or
regional level in the interplay between the national and global levels in the different
sectors.28
3.3 New Concept of Security

Post-Cold War, adding to the interest in regions, international security entered a new
phase that reflects the growing acceptance of a wider conception of peace and secu-
rity, empowerment of transnational non-state actors, increasing interdependence of
security, emergence of new categories of security challenges beyond the capacity of
individual nation-states to tackle alone, and deeper interdependence of the present
global political economy.29
Challenges such as international terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal immigration,
transnational crime, environmental degradation and resource scarcity reflect new
threats to national security as it becomes increasingly inseparable from international
security. The non-military dimension increasingly coexists with the traditional mili-
tary dimension to “security” taking their place alongside the “old” threats of nuclear
warfare and large-scale conventional war. Security in the twenty-first century has
assumed a much broader definition in place of the narrow military concept. A threat
to national security could be defined as anything that challenges people’s health,
economic well-being, social stability and political peace.
Consequently, the old military and state-centred security focus was questioned
and widened in terms of military, political, economic, societal and environmental
sectors.30 As a new framework for analysis, the extended concept of security lays
the foundations for regional security.31
In the face of a wider security agenda at the national level, which has become
inseparable from the international level and the renewed impetus towards regional
orders, in terms of international relations, regional levels are being established as
the interface between the global level of the strong international system and the
micro-level of the sovereign territorial nation-states.
Regional entities are increasingly being viewed by IR scholars as the solution for
nation-states to fill the void created by the lifting of the bipolar super power overlay
from the world. Nation-states concerned with preserving the traditional concepts
of national sovereignty and national autonomy see regional entities as (1) a means
to overcome the risk of being marginalised in the globalised economy, (2) pool
resources in dealing with global security challenges to national interests and (3)
develop the framework for a sustainable future.
3.4 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

This section focuses on the regional security complex theory (RSCT) propagated by
Buzan and Weaver in their seminal work on regions and powers.32
Even as the number of nation-states has grown from 51 in 1945 to 192 today,
the process of geopolitical restructuring in the context of the wider security agenda
has entered an era of interdependence—sovereign entities clustered into regional
security complexes (RSCs), a set of states united by common security problems
constituting a region.33
Buzan and Weaver frame nation-states into eight RSCs—south Asia, east Asia,
Middle East, southern Africa, central Africa, post-Soviet, Europe, South America
and North America; and two proto-complexes—West Africa and Horn of Africa;
that in the post-Cold War are located in five principal regions—Asia, Middle East,
Africa, Americas, and Europe.
RSCT based on a wider security agenda provides a conceptual framework for
comparative studies in regional security to capture the emerging structure of inter-
national security: “regions and powers”. Originally propounded by Buzan, RSCT
can be used to analyse threats that can arise in different spheres or sectors and at
different locations or levels.
RSCT specifies what to look for at four levels of analysis: Determination if the
state is strong or weak domestically; state-to-state relations; the region’s interac-
tion with neighbouring regions and the role of global powers in the region. Taken
together these four levels constitute the security constellation.
RSCT enables a systemic approach to the study of intra-state conditions, inter-
state relations, interregional dynamics, and the interplay between regions and
powers. What RSCT does in international relations is to identify the regional level
as being operative even when it is not the dominant level.
3.5 Indian Ocean RSCs

Regional security complexes (RSCs), characterised by actual patterns of security
practices, are made up by the concerns and aspirations of separate nation-states
within the geographic proximity of one another. Buzan and Weaver define an RSC
as “a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both
3.5 Indian Ocean RSCs 53
are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or

resolved apart from one another”.34
The units are actors such as nation-states, nongovernmental organisations
(NGOs), transnational firms and international bodies.35 It has been argued that the
nation-state is the ideal standard unit of security in the international system.36 Buzan
and Weaver argue that south Asia, Middle East and south-east Asia within East Asia
all remain strongly state-based regions even though some states themselves are not
always strong.
As the starting point of the inquiry, using nation-states as units for defining
an RSC allows easier correlation with the familiar geopolitical definition of a
region. This also determines the kind of relations states and/or others form among
themselves.
RSCs are very specific functionally defined type of regions that are mutually
exclusive. The essential structure of an RSC embodies four variables: boundary,
anarchic structure, polarity, and social construction.
In the Indian Ocean region south Asia is a good example of an RSC that natu-
rally fulfils all four attributes. The boundaries of an RSC may not coincide with the
commonly understood geopolitical boundary of the region. The processes of securi-
tisation in southern Africa and the neighbouring island states are equally interlinked
to form an RSC. Similarly, in the Indian Ocean context south-east Asia and Australia
form the Australasian37 subcomplex within the larger east Asian RSC.
A subcomplex has the same definition as RSCs. It is also possible for an
RSC to contain one or more subcomplexes. The Gulf and the Horn of Africa-
Red Sea area are two subcomplexes within the larger Middle East RSC. The Gulf
Cooperation Council in the Gulf subcomplex is the only Indian Ocean centric
regional organisation in the Middle East RSC.
The four RSCs in the Indian Ocean—south Asia, Southern Africa, Gulf subcom-
plex, and Australasia subcomplex—are all standard RSCs with an anarchic structure
of two or more regional powers and no global-level powers. The polarity in the RSCs
is defined by regional powers—unipolar (South Africa) in southern Africa, bipolar
(India and Pakistan) in south Asia, and multipolar in the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iran,
and Iraq) and Australasia (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand).
The social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity, is one of
conflict formation in southern Africa, south Asia and the Gulf, and that of a security
regime in Australasia.
The standard RSCs of the Indian Ocean stand apart from the centred/great power
RSCs in the rest of the world. North America forms a unipolar superpower (US)
centred RSC. While the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) forms a unipo-
lar great power (Russia) centred RSC. Europe acquires regional actor quality as an
institution (European Union) centred RSC. Finally, east Asia forms a bipolar great
power RSC with China and Japan as the regional poles.
So what distinguishes the standard and centred or great power RSCs? First, the
lowest common denominator of the centred and great power RSCs is the actor
quality of a global-level power versus that of a regional power in standard RSCs.
Second, standard RSCs have a predominant military-political security agenda.
Finally, standard RSCs are open to penetration by superpowers and great powers.
As a consequence, all four levels are in play in the RSCs of the Indian Ocean. The
domestic-level exerts medium influence in three RSCs and is very influential within
the southern Africa RSC. The regional level has significant influence in all the four
RSCs. It takes the top spot in south Asia, shares the top spot with the global level
in the Gulf and Australasia, and takes the number-two spot alongside the global
level in southern Africa. The global level in south Asia exerts the same influence
as the domestic level. The interregional level, in the context of the Indian Ocean
region, is low in southern Africa and the Gulf and of medium influence in south
Asia and Australasia. Table 3.1 shows the relative influence of the different levels in
the international system on the security dynamics of the Indian Ocean RSCs.
Table 3.1 Relative influence of different levels on Indian Ocean RSCs
Levels/RSCs Southern Africa Gulf South Asia Australasia
Domestic High Medium Medium Medium

Regional Medium High High High
Interregional Low Low Medium Medium
Global Medium High Medium High
Source: Adapted from Buzan and Weaver (2003)
What do the centred and great power RSCs portend for the Indian Ocean region?
Centred RSCs can be more stable connecting the regional and global levels, while
great power RSCs, “generate a sustained and substantial level of interregional
security dynamics”.
In the Indian Ocean region as a concept, some internal or external transformation
is evident. There is internal transformation in south Asia that could elevate India to a
global-level great power. India close to achieving unipolarity is pursuing a model of
great power centred RSC. Southern Africa is also showing signs of internal transfor-
mation moving away from conflict formation towards a security regime. Although
South Africa is unlikely to be a global-level player, it is likely to create a unipolar-
centred RSC. External transformation in Australasia merged south-east Asia and
Australia with north east Asia to form the larger East Asian great power RSC. On
the other hand, a centred or great power RSC seems unlikely in the Middle East,
which includes the Horn of Africa-Red Sea area and the Gulf subcomplex of the
Indian Ocean region.
3.6 Regions and the Indian Ocean

A fundamental problem in regional studies research has been the important question
of what constitutes a region. At the same time, in order to limit the scope of scholarly
work it is necessary to establish the boundaries of the region for study even before
the existence can be justified. In so doing, regions cannot be taken for granted and
research must develop concepts that make the common constituents of the defined
region visible.
3.7 Understanding the Geostrategic Maritime Realm 55
In the various interpretations of what constitutes a region Braudel was the first to
conceptualise the notion of oceanic regions to study the problems and consequences
that shaped the destiny of people on the opposite shores of the Mediterranean.38
Few historians have followed suit in conceptualising the Indian Ocean as a region.
Prominent in their exposition are Abu-Lugbhad, Chaudhuri, McPherson, Milo
Kearney and Pearson.39 However, the Indian Ocean region in international rela-
tions remains largely a “mental map” created by scholars in classifying their
research.
The reasons appear to be twofold. First, in comparison to the Atlantic and the
Pacific, there is difficulty in defining the geographic boundaries of the Indian Ocean
region. Second, in the field of area studies the focus has rarely shifted from land-
centric margins to ocean-centred maritime connections that could potentially bind
the littorals on opposite shores of the ocean into a single geopolitical region. Such
reasoning, although true, defies logic, when distant shores of the Indian Ocean have
long been linked through maritime trade, conquests, and migration.
3.7 Understanding the Geostrategic Maritime Realm
The earth’s maritime and continental settings define the geostrategic realms within
which geopolitical regions emerge as power frameworks that should enhance global
stability by strengthening the balance of power system.40
It was not until 1498, when Portuguese sea power changed the face of world
geopolitics into the modern oceanic circle in which all states, including land-
locked states, are now enmeshed.41 Until then, the centres of world civilisation—the
Ottoman Empire, India under the Moguls, China under the Ming dynasty and the
European State System—were roughly at the same level of economic and techno-
logical development and far superior to other scattered societies of Africa, Oceania
and America.42
Ever since, the geostrategic maritime realm comprising primarily of the
Americas, Europe and Asia-Pacific geopolitical regions has dominated the past cen-
tury and a half.43 The nation-states of these geopolitical regions border the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans, not the Indian Ocean.
The most basic divisions of the world into continents and oceans are constructs
based on easily visualised land features of mountains and coastlines. The seven
continents are possibly more of intellectual constructs conveniently identifiable by
prominent land features of the world map.
The ocean world, on the other hand, can be and has been divided in different
ways. For example, historically, it has been said that the Indian Ocean washes onto
the coastline of western Australia. It could well be that the Indian Ocean’s eastern
limit stops short of reaching western Australia just as the southern limit does not
reach the continent of Antarctica. It can also be that the Pacific Ocean’s western limit
stops short of reaching the eastern coast of Australia. Neither construct is practical
for statecraft and is unlikely to be applied in the future.
The same holds true for the determination of limits between the Indian and
Atlantic Oceans south of Africa. Entertaining alternative views of the oceanic
divisions—whole of Australia, part of the Indian or Pacific Oceans—allows us to
see the world afresh, which could reveal patterns of connections otherwise obscured
by our standard world view.
Although discrepancies in the sizes, boundaries and number of oceans remain,
there is remarkable global consensus on the nomenclature of oceanic divisions
within the geostrategic maritime realm, as we will explore further in the next section.
3.7.1 Indian Ocean Nomenclature

This section draws on the work of Martin Lewis on Dividing the Ocean Sea.44
Unlike classifications on land, historic and local names of different bodies of
water have yielded to global conventions. For instance, waters to the west of the
Indonesian archipelago are no longer referred to as the “Indonesian Ocean”.
The current accepted maritime spatial classifications emerged in broad outlines in
the 1800s, but did not fully develop until the twentieth century. The global consensus
in geographic names is strongly indicative of nations tacitly accepting the norm of
international regimes for governance in the geostrategic maritime realm.
On the other hand, epistemic thinking over time does reveal differences on the
number of oceans from one to seven. In medieval times, for example the classical
Mediterranean world predicated a single sea encircling a limited body of land or
held a continental view of two earth-spanning oceans separated by four continental
landmasses. The oceanic model emerged only after Ferdinand Magellan’s voyage in
the early 1500s. In 1570, Abraham Ortelius, accredited as the inventor of the modern
atlas, divided the oceanic world into four oceans by separating the Atlantic into the
northern one as “Mar Del Nort” (North Sea), the southern one as the “Ethiopian
Ocean” the Pacific as the “Mar Del Sur” and identifying the Indian Ocean as the
“Sea of India”.
However, it was to be Phillipe Bauche’s 1758 global model of interconnected
mountain ranges, both terrestrial and submarine, that first inspired the current per-
spective of three distinct basins: Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian. In 1878, Black’s atlas
of the world mapped a five-ocean scheme—Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, Arctic and
Antarctica. It is only when Peter Freuchen in 1957 argued that the North and South
Atlantic and the Pacific exhibited their own individuality that the “seven oceans”
came to figuratively represent the ancient “seven seas” schema and the earth’s
surface was uniformly divided into seven continents and oceans a piece.45
The phrase “seven seas” from time immemorial has represented different bodies
of water and has appealed to those poetically and numerologically inclined. The
“seven seas” were popularised by Rudyard Kipling in 1897 when he published
a book of poetry entitled “The Seven Seas”.46 In India, the Hindi idiom “Saath
Samundar Paar” (across the seven seas) has come to symbolise the Indian diaspora
living across the seven oceans. Kipling never enumerated the seven seas, but in 2000
hydrographers created a system of five oceans or seven divisions, as we now know
them—North Atlantic, South Atlantic, North Pacific, South Pacific, Indian, Arctic
and Southern Oceans.47
One other notable variation in the conceptualisation of the geostrategic maritime
realm has been the synonym use of the terms “Ocean” and “Sea” to describe the
same body of water. The debate amongst geographers on whether or not the Arctic
Ocean should be known as the Arctic Sea shows that the two terms—Ocean and
Sea—remain intertwined. The term “Ocean”, which now has come to represents the
largest seven bodies of water and seas, is generally considered a constituent of the
larger oceans. However, the entire maritime realm is encased in the term “Sea” by
the United Nations Convention on “Law of the Sea” as the internationally accepted
legal regime and also the customary “freedom of the high seas”. What becomes
irrefutable is that the earth’s maritime realm cannot really be divided into pools
of water, and the use of different terms, names, and boundary lines are conceptual
constructs created by political and ideological thinking of its time.
The Indian Ocean has not been insulated from variations in the terminology and
consequential size. By tracing the different names assigned to the modern Indian
Ocean it is clear that geographers were keen to link different bodies of water to the
cultural and political outlooks of neighbouring landmasses.
In 1544, Roman geographer Sebastian Cabot labelled the northern waters as the
“Indian Ocean” and the modern central Indian Ocean was named the “Green Sea”
(Mare Prasodum). Ortelius in 1570 identified the Indian Ocean as a single basin
simply called the “Sea of India”. Continuing with the basin concept, John Senex in
1725 had similar divisions as Cabot but with different names, calling the body of
water north of the equator as the “Indian Sea” and the rest of the basin the “Eastern
Ocean”. There is a striking similarity over time amongst different geographers to
link the waters north of the equator chiefly to India.
There is a brief reference in history to the modern north-western Indian Ocean
as the Red or “Erythraean Sea”. To the Greeks the Erythraean Sea encompassed the
modern-day Red Sea or the “Arabian Gulf” (Sinus Arabicus), Gulf of Aden, Arabian
Sea, and the waters off the Somali coast. Historic explorations are indicative that
states did exert some political and cultural influence across the waters from their
coastline, providing some clarity to the imagination of geographers.
According to some geographers, the “Eastern Indian Ocean” extended from the
Arabian Sea through the Malay Archipelago to include the South China Sea. Abu-
Lughod and Chaudhuri demonstrate that the ocean-arc linking the Swahili coast
to the South China Sea did constitute closely linked trading circuits leading to the
spread of different religions and their associated culture.48
The precise geographic boundaries of the Indian Ocean have remained open
to debate through the twentieth century. The boundaries between the three Ocean
basins—Pacific, Indian and Atlantic—and the southern limits of the three basins
have been revisited from time to time.49 Forbes and Prescot and Schofield provide
an authoritative and comprehensive discussion on the Indian Ocean boundaries as
we know it today.50 The twentieth century Indian Ocean includes the historic waters
of the Persian Gulf, Erythraean Sea (Red Sea), Indian Sea/Arabian Sea and Bay of
Bengal, Mare Barbaricus (Barbarian Sea), Mare Prasodum (Green Sea) and the
Eastern Indian Ocean without the South China Sea.
3.7.2 Indian Ocean Political Geography

The political geography that describes the Indian Ocean region is more complex.
The concept of coastal states and land-locked states established by the United
Nations Law of the Sea identifies 149 coastal (maritime) states and 43 land-locked
(continental) member countries.51 The Indian Ocean region in Christian Bouchard’s
typology52 (Fig. 3.1) accounts for 20.7% of the earth’s total surface.53
Fig. 3.1 Map of the Indian Ocean

Source: Christian Bouchard
The geostrategic maritime realm of the Indian Ocean geopolitical region

describes the position of southern Africa and adjacent island states, Middle East,
south Asia, south-east Asia and Australia. The ocean forms the logical link between
the people of these lands. The Indian Ocean also acts as a communications link
between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Open access through choke points to the
wide, expansive Indian Ocean is of prime geostrategic importance to all nation-
states. In this book, the Indian Ocean, as a geopolitical entity, consists of 36 of the
149 coastal states, 13 of the 43 land-locked countries and 11 other island territories
under the control of the United Kingdom and France (Table 3.2).54
This political geography of the Indian Ocean region, under constant change due
to violent conflict, has now more or less stabilised. The geographic contiguity of an
ocean and documented historic connections notwithstanding, the question remains:
Is it justifiable in continuing to study and analyse the Indian Ocean as a region in
international relations?
Table 3.2 List of Indian Ocean countries
S No Country UN Member S No Country UN Member
Coastal states Land-locked states
1 Australia 01 November 1945 1 Afghanistan 19 November 1946

2 Bahrain 21 September 1971 2 Bhutan 21 September 1971
3 Bangladesh 17 September 1974 3 Botswana 17 October 1966
4 Comoros 12 November 1975 4 Burundi 18 September 1962
5 Djibouti 20 September 1977 5 Ethiopia 13 November 1945
6 Egypt 24 October 1945 6 Lesotho 17 October 1966
7 Eritrea 28 May 1993 7 Malawi 01 December 1964
8 India 30 October 1945 8 Nepal 14 December 1955
9 Indonesia 28 September 1950 9 Rwanda 18 September 1962
10 Iran 24 October 1945 10 Swaziland 24 September 1968
11 Iraq 21 December 1945 11 Uganda 25 October 1962
12 Israel 11 May 1949 12 Zambia 01 December 1964
13 Jordan 14 December 1955 13 Zimbabwe 25 August 1980
14 Kenya 16 December 1963 Other island territories
15 Kuwait 14 May 1963 1 British Indian Ocean Territory
Chagos(UK)
16 Madagascar 20 September 1960 2 La Réunion (FR)
17 Malaysia 17 September 1957 3 Bassas da India (FR)
18 Maldives 21 September 1965 4 Europa Island (FR)
19 Mauritius 07 October 1964 5 Glorioso Islands (FR)
20 Mozambique 16 September 1975 6 Juan de Nova Island (FR)
21 Myanmar 19 April 1948 7 Tromelin Island (FR)
22 Oman 07 October 1971 8 Crozet (FR)
23 Pakistan 30 September 1947 9 Kerguelen (FR)
24 Qatar 21 September 1971 10 Saint-Paul and Amsterdam (FR)
25 Saudi Arabia 24 October 1945 11 Mayotte (FR)
26 Seychelles 21 September 1976
27 Singapore 21 September 1965
28 Somalia 20 September 1960
29 South Africa 07 November 1945
30 Sri Lanka 14 December 1955
31 Sudan 12 November 1956
32 Tanzania 14 December 1961
33 Thailand 16 December 1946
34 Timor-Leste 27 September 2002
35 United Arab 09 December 1971
Emirates
36 Yemen 30 September 1947
Source: Developed by author.

Note: Together Bassas da India, Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova Island and Tromelin
Island form a unique administrative territory, named the Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean.
According to French law 2007–224 of 21 February 2007, the Scattered Islands constitute the
fifth district of French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF). Crozet, Kerguelen, and Saint-Paul
Amsterdam have the same administrative status (one of the five districts of the TAAF).
In ancient times, prior to 1498, the Indian Ocean flourished as a “region” of

trade and had open contact to all.55 At the beginning of the modern era between
1500 and 1945 the great power rivalry embroiled the Indian Ocean into politics
even as it was consolidated into a region of the British Empire.56 After 1945, as the
British withdrew from the Indian Ocean, the political process of the region became
increasingly fragmented into the Westphalian system of nation-states with varying
degrees of instabilities due to conflicts and tensions.57
The Cold War divided the Indian Ocean region in myriad ways that witnessed
civil wars, border wars, suspicions and tensions, insurgencies and terrorism, arms
race and nuclear buildup. It became standard to argue that there were multitudes of
divergence in economic strength, political system, social development, and cultural
and religious traditions.58 And those nation-states in the region were too hostile and
too geographically separated ever to come together as a coherent regional force.
There was widespread emphasis on secrecy and sovereignty. Nation-states believed
that multilateral dialogue would somehow undermine national sovereignty. All this
obstructed the formation of an Indian Ocean regional order.
It is perceived that the superpower rivalry during the Cold War helped support
local balances, preventing the Indian Ocean region from turning into an area of
chaos.59 Post Cold War, the external factors that clouded and vitiated local and
regional tensions and conflicts have largely receded. They have assumed their true
dimension unclouded by the politico—ideological and military factors of the bipolar
struggles. The United States as the sole super power and the other great powers—
Russia, China, Japan, Britain, France and Germany, are more inclined towards
regional solutions to regional problems than direct intervention by an outside power.
The realisation that long-term security in the Indian Ocean region cannot be
guaranteed by the United States or any other single power has placed a sobering
responsibility on regional powers to strengthen mutual relationships.60 The one fac-
tor that had an important bearing on the security environment of the region then and
remains relevant even today is the absence of an Indian Ocean regional order. Post-
Cold War, with the geographic settings unchanged and the political process seeking
a greater role for regional powers, the Indian Ocean as a geopolitical entity is now
more relevant than ever before.61
3.8 Indian Ocean Regional Initiatives
Regional initiatives in the Indian Ocean remain in a state of flux. In an effort

to address strategic and security issues, the 1971 United Nations initiative on
Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (DIOZP), hereinafter referred
to as the DIOZP, continues to languish, despite the Cold War having ended.62
Ironically, opposition to the DIOZP comes from external maritime powers. The
Indian Ocean countries currently have the support of more than two-thirds of the
UN member states, including Russia and China, to progress work on implementa-
tion of the DIOZP, but from the very beginning, they have been thwarted in their
3.9 Indian Ocean Regionalism 61
attempts by the three other permanent members of the UN Security Council—the

United States, the United Kingdom and France.63
A non-military initiative emerged in 1985 from the UN Convention on Law of
Sea to focus on ocean management. The Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation
(IOMAC), initiative started in 1985, focused on cooperation and coordination
amongst Indian Ocean States in tapping the ocean resource potential for economic
benefit and national development.64 The IOMAC initiative has largely remained
embryonic despite efforts to breathe new life through the 1990 Arusha Agreement
in Tanzania.65 An International Forum on the Indian Ocean region in 1995 identi-
fied a number of other intergovernmental, nongovernmental and other Indian Ocean
organisations with mandates for cooperation.66
A second non-military initiative was started in 1997, to foster regional economic
integration and economic cooperation amongst Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) countries.
The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) had four
main components as its pillars for regional cooperation; namely, trade liberali-
sation, trade and investment facilitation, economic and technical cooperation and
trade and investment dialogue. An elaborate institutional mechanism—Council of
Ministers (COM), Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), Indian Ocean Business
Forum (IORBF), Indian Ocean Academic Group (IORAG) and the Working Group
on Trade and Investment (WGTI)—was devised to deliver on the objectives of
regional cooperation with the secretariat situated in Mauritius.67 A decade after its
inception, the IOR-ARC appears to be dying a natural death.68
Of interest is the belief of a group of scholars, internationally and from the Indian
Ocean states, in the concept of an Indian Ocean region. The Indian Ocean Research
Group (IORG) envisions itself as a research umbrella organisation providing social
science policy-oriented research toward realizing “a shared, peaceful, stable and
prosperous future for the Indian Ocean region”.69 Bouchard provides a comprehen-
sive discussion of the various regional associations prevalent in the Indian Ocean
region.70
3.9 Indian Ocean Regionalism

The scant literature in international politics on the Indian Ocean has divided the
nation-states on the three continents in different ways. William dowdy identifies
five core sectors: a Persian Gulf core, a south Asia core, a Red Sea core, a southern
Africa core and an Australasia core within the Indian Ocean region during the Cold
War period.71
In the post-Cold War period, the Indian Ocean Rim have been categorised into
four regional systems: Arabian/Persian Gulf, south Asia, Horn of Africa and south-
east Asia.72 The subdivisions of the Indian Ocean region are similar in Cohen’s
examination of the world system at the beginning of the twenty-first century and
Buzan and Weaver’s examination of the post-Cold War structure of international
security.73 Cohen writes about the Middle East, south Asia, Asia-Pacific Rim and
sub-Saharan Africa that includes southern Africa, west Africa, central Africa, and
the Horn of Africa. Similarly, Buzan and Weaver write about Middle East, south
Asia, east Asia including Australia (on the lines of Cohen’s Asia-Pacific Rim) and
sub-Saharan Africa (same as Cohen).
Vali’s work in 1976 stands apart in the literature on Indian Ocean politics.74 Vali
takes an oceanic approach to write about the African countries and island territories
in southwest Indian Ocean, Horn of Africa and Red Sea, Persian Gulf, India and its
neighbours, south-east Asia including Australia and the residual colonials.
According to Chaturvedi, a new sustainability-based geopolitical orientation is
needed for the Indian Ocean, something that lies outside the neo-imperialist legacy
defining current international maritime relations in the region and moves away
from the traditional geopolitical theorising by the strategic community and military
planners.75
By taking a view of the land from the ocean it is possible to focus on four subre-
gions: southern Africa and the island states east of it, Middle East, south Asia and
Australasia. The subregions differ from other divisions in literature in two ways: the
Middle East includes the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea area and Australasia as a
term defines Australia and south-east Asia as a single subregion.
One of the advantages is that study of the majority of coastal and island states can
be organised around four prominent subregional organisations: Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), Southern African Development Community (SADC), South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), although much broader than Indian Ocean areas of south-east Asia and
Australia.
Together, the four organisations represent 20 of the 31 coastal states and two
of the five island states in the Indian Ocean region. The island states outside the
four organisations are Comoros, Madagascar and Seychelles, and the coastal states
include Iran and Iraq in the Gulf complex, Kenya in southern Africa, and Djibouti,
Egypt, Eritrea, Israel, Jordan, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen in the Horn of Africa-Red
Sea area.
The difficulty is that the Middle East subregion, from an RSCT perspective,
involves a joint discussion of the Horn of Africa-Red Sea proto-complex and the
Gulf subcomplex. The absence of a subregional organisation for the Horn of Africa-
Red Sea proto complex precludes a regional discussion of these eight coastal states
in the area.
The most complex of the four subregions in the Middle East includes the Arab
states of west Asia, north African members of the Arab league, Iran, Turkey and
Israel76 or the Middle East RSC and the Horn of Africa proto-complex.77 The
Middle East subregion consists of two of the three geostrategic choke points in the
Indian Ocean—the Red Sea-Bab el Mandeb strait and the Strait of Hormuz. There
is no regional institution corresponding to a Middle East region to address common
interests and prospects of cooperation.78
It is the Gulf subcomplex formed around the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
that has emerged as one of the most successful organisations in a fragmented Middle
East.79 The nation-states comprising the GCC best represent the geographic setting
of the oil strategic Strait of Hormuz with Oman bordering the Indian Ocean situated
3.9 Indian Ocean Regionalism 63
at the mouth of the strait. Oman as a GCC member is interesting. During the Cold
War, in its fight against Soviet supported guerrillas in Dhofar, Oman received sup-
port from Iran on the other side of the Strait of Hormuz. Now, in the post-Cold War
period, Iran has become a security concern for the GCC.80
South Asia centred on India is the simplest subregion to define in the Indian
Ocean. It stands apart as a geopolitical region independent of the Atlantic and Pacific
trade dependent maritime realm, the Eurasian continental Russian heartland, and the
mixed continental-maritime East Asian realm.81 The South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) established in 1985 continues to focus on areas of
cooperation other than regional security (SAARC charter).
SAARC has made little impact as a regional institution with nation-states
still suspicious of each other and preferring bilateral arrangements to regional
solutions.82 During the Cold War, India, with more than half of the total popula-
tion in the Indian Ocean region, adopted a policy of nonalignment and became the
leader of the Afro-Asian bloc of nation-states seeking a third-way in world affairs.83
The end of the Cold War crushed the nonalignment movement and left Indian
foreign policy groping for direction. India’s 1992 “Look East” policy had its gen-
esis in the end of the Cold War. By 1996, India had become a dialogue partner of
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In the Middle East, India abandoned its anti-
Israeli policy. In 2004, India announced a “Focus Africa Policy”. Unshackled from
its position of nonalignment with a Soviet tilt and fixation with its immediate neigh-
bourhood, India has begun to give greater importance to its relationship with the
U.S. and Europe. Overall, India is being more proactive with its foreign policy for
the security environment of the Indian Ocean region.
Southern Africa (as the core) and the adjacent island nation-states form the third
subregion in the Indian Ocean. The transformation from conflict to cooperation in
the region between the period before and after the Cold War is most apparent in the
restructuring of the regional framework.
In 1980, to lessen economic dependence on South Africa, nation-states in
the region established the South African Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC), which in 1992 transformed itself into the South African Development
Community (SADC) and South Africa joined as a member in 1994.84 The SADC
initiative to formulate a regional security regime with South Africa assuming a
leadership role has been troubled by South Africa’s own internal challenges.85
Australasia comprising nation-states of South East Asia and Australia represents
the final subregion of the Indian Ocean. Although aligned to the Asia-Pacific region,
Australasia is also the most stable of the four subregions within the Indian Ocean.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) founded in 1994 after the Cold War is the prin-
cipal forum for security dialogue that in the Indian Ocean regional context includes
Australia and India as dialogue partners and Pakistan joining in 2004.
The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) of 1971 involving Australia,
Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and the United Kingdom is the only operational
regional defence arrangement of its kind involving coastal states from the Indian
Ocean region. In 1995 Australia signed a defence accord with Indonesia, thereby
establishing defence arrangements with the three principal coastal states bordering
the Strait of Malacca—the busiest strategic waterway of the Indian Ocean. Thus,
Australia geopolitically seen as a unit of the Asia-Pacific rim is strategically crucial
to the Indian Ocean as a region.86
The Indian Ocean region is a geopolitical entity of newly independent nation-
states.87 Bounded by territoriality, all four corners of the Indian Ocean were formed
as regions of conflict and tensions. Post-Cold War only, the Australasia subregion
has had some success toward attaining a durable security architecture. Regional
institutions of the other three subregions had their origins in the 1980s at almost the
same time and have survived to the present.
Security affairs continue to plague these regions. Unlike the GCC, which contin-
ues to exclude Iraq and Iran, SADC emerged from the Cold War transformed into
accepting South Africa as a regional power with a leadership role. SADC unlike
ARF could not deliver as a security regime. Both SADC and ARF formed after the
Cold War differ in approach to regional security. ARF unlike SADC engaged key
nation states as dialogue partners. SAARC continues to remain in the shadow of the
India–Pakistan rivalry.
Regional security was unthinkable during the Cold War period. In the post-Cold
War, era, regional geopolitical unity could give nation-states in the Indian Ocean the
power or the potential to affect outcomes when acting in concert in identified areas
of common interests within the geostrategic maritime realm. In his exposition on the
strategic rivalry in the Indian Ocean, Donald Berlin concludes, “the Indian Ocean,
often characterised in the past as “the neglected ocean” will be so no longer”.88
Dennis Rumley, one of the leading strategic analysts on Indian Ocean geopoli-
tics, conceptualises the significance of regionalism and argues that for “reasons of
identity, security and long-term stability” it is in the interests of “peoples and states”
to construct their own brand of regional cooperation.89
Two prominent reorientations are evident in the post-Cold War era that could
shape the geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean in the future. First, India has
moved away from its traditional position of nonalignment and is building coop-
erative partnerships within the Indian Ocean region and with external powers—the
United States Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China and Japan. And
second, since the mid-1990s by increasing its security linkages with Asia, Australia
has carved for itself a major role in the Indian Ocean region should it choose to fulfil
that role. These and other changes in the subregional organisations have the potential
to foster a new wave of regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean as a region.
3.10 Indian Ocean Region Defined
Allowing for modern-day nomenclature and conventions and for the purposes of
this research, the Indian Ocean is deemed to be bounded by the east coasts of the
African continent and Arabian Peninsula to the west; the south coast of the Asian
continent to the north extending from the Strait of Hormuz to the Singapore Strait;
the south coasts of the Indonesian Archipelagos, and the north and west coast of the
3.11 Conclusion 65
Australian continent in the east; and in the south imaginary lines at sea and not land
borders separate the Indian Ocean from the Atlantic, Pacific and Southern Oceans;
namely, the 20◦ meridian from Cape Agulhas at the southern tip of Africa, the 147◦
meridian from southern most point of Tasmania (Australia) and the 60◦ latitude
to the an irregular line joining the Southern tips of Africa, South African Prince
Edward Islands, French Kerguelen, Australian Heard’s and MacDonald islands, and
Tasmania.90
Simply stated, the Indian Ocean is the smallest of the three oceans in the world
that touche the continental shores of Africa, Asia and Australia and is separated
from the continent of Antarctica by the Southern Ocean.
The modern-day nomenclature that further characterise the waters of the Indian
Ocean include the Mozambique Channel, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Arabian Sea,
Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Laccadive Sea, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea and the
Strait of Malacca. Historic connections apart the waters of the Red Sea–Gulf of
Aden, Persian Gulf–Strait of Hormuz–Gulf of Oman and the Malacca Straits linked
to the expansive Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal are of significant strategic and
economic importance in international relations.
It can be deduced that the political and cultural influence of the Arab Peninsula
was to prevail in the north-western Indian Ocean known as the Arabian Sea, and
India’s influence extended eastwards coming into contact with Chinese influence in
south-east Asia. Clearly, political processes on land have influenced the geographic
settings of the Indian Ocean to the north of the equator. Here, the waters of the
Indian Ocean are named in relation to the historic influence of the proximate land
mass.
Geographers question the extent to which Australia is part of the Indian Ocean
region.91 Historically too, McPherson documents Australia’s marginal contact in the
Indian Ocean.92 In the absences of any meaningful interaction up until the 1800s
across the vast stretches of water from Durban to Perth, geographers possibly relied
on the single basin concept to label the waters south of the equator as the Indian
Ocean.93
The label intensive politically and culturally influential waters north of the equa-
tor together with the southern Indian Ocean waters create a mental map of a single
region referred to as the Indian Ocean region.
3.11 Conclusion
The Indian Ocean region has always existed historically and geographically,
although it is barely recognised as such in modern-day international relations. In an
era of interdependence, the land-centric system of the modern state has for Indian
Ocean states made regional cooperation more complex and difficult. In the oceanic
realm, this has left many Indian Ocean states without the “power to govern the sea”.
In understanding the geostrategic maritime realm, the ocean space can hardly be
divided by imaginary lines at sea and this is true for the Indian Ocean as a body of
water that connects the shores of Africa, Asia and Australia. The geographic setting
remains unchanged, and in history, this oceanic region had flourished as a region of
trade with open contact to all.
The modern-day single basin regional initiatives are in a state of flux. The polit-
ical landscape of this oceanic region has emerged from a period of conflict and
has now more or less stabilised into four different subregional groupings—SADC,
GCC, SAARC and ARF. Some tensions still exist but none in that the oceanic realm
threaten to undermine regional cooperation. The oceanic region of the Indian Ocean
remains intact and open to regional cooperation as an intermediate level between
the national and international levels, should Indian Ocean states choose to benefit
from such cooperation in the implementation of internationally agreed to maritime
regimes.
The next chapter will draw on regime and structuration theory to describe the ele-
ments of a regime that must be considered in assessing the effectiveness of maritime
regimes in the Indian Ocean.
Notes
1. Kaplan (2009).
2. Chaudhuri (1985).
3. McPherson (1993).
4. Fawcett (2004); see also note 1 for emphasis.
5. See e.g. Pearson (2003), Kearney (2004), Bhargava (1990).
6. See Cohen (2003), Buzan and Weaver (2003).
7. Cohen (2003).
8. Buzan and Weaver (2003, p. 460).
9. Ibid, p. 455.
10. Ibid, p. 457.
11. Lehr (2005).
12. Schulz et al. (2001, p. 3).
14. Ibid, pp. 3, 20, Katzenstein (2000, p. 354).
15. Ibid, p. 10, Lake and Morgan (1997).
16. Ibid, p. 41.
17. For two useful surveys see Ibid, Lake and Morgan (1997). For post-Cold War books on
regions, regionalism and regionalization see e.g., Fawcett and Hurrell (1995), Gamble and
Payne (1996), Adler and Barnett (1998), Hettne et al. (1999, 2000a, b), Schulz et al. (2002),
Soderbaum and Shaw (2003).
18. Michael et al. (2001).
19. Katzenstein (2000, p. 354).
20. See Forest (2004), Manuel (1974).
21. See Thakur and Newman (2000), Buzan et al. (1998).
22. See e.g. Breslin and Higgott (2000), Buzan et al. (1998).
23. Fawcett (2004), Fawcett and Hurrell (1995).
24. Bergin (1996).
25. See further Thakur and Newman (2000), Buzan et al. (1998).
26. For varying compositions, capabilities and aspirations see Fawcett (2004, p. 434).
Notes 67
27. Fawcett (2004).

28. For region, see e.g., Hettne and Soderbaum (2000, p. 457). For regionalism see e.g. Hurrell
(1995). For Regionalisation see e.g., Schulz et al. (2001). For regional security complexes
terminology see Buzan and Weaver (2003).
29. See Thakur and Newman (2000), Kennedy (1987), and Schulz et al. (2003).
30. Buzan et al. (1998).
31. Buzan and Weaver (2003, p. xvi).
32. See Ibid, pp. 40–83 and 463–477.
33. See Cohen (2003, p. 29).
35. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 6).
36. Buzan (1991, p. 19).
37. For a discussion on the term Australasia see Rumley (1999, pp. 242–256).
38. Alpers, “The Newest Old World,” Africa Studies Centre, UCLA International Institute,
viewed 23 May 2008, http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=1299.
39. See Chaudhuri (1985), Abu-Lughod (1989), Pearson (2003), McPherson (1993), Kearney
(2004).
40. For settings, realms and regions see Cohen (2003).
41. See Kennedy (1987), Grove (1990).
42. See Kennedy (1987).
43. Cohen (2003, p. 37).
44. Lewis (1999, pp. 188–214).
45. Freuchen and Loth (1957, p. 35).
46. Ibid, p. 33.
47. See the International Hydrographic Organization draft 4th edition of S-23 “Limits of Oceans
and Seas” that remains a working document only.
48. Chaudhuri (1985), Abu-Lughod (1989).
49. The International Hydrographic Organization developed the draft 4th edition of S-23 “Limits
of Oceans and Seas” from 1998 to 2002 that remains a working document only. The document
defines the limits of the Southern Ocean as the parallel of 60◦ S to the north and the coast of
Antarctica, including the Antarctic Peninsula, to the south.
50. Forbes (1995), Prescott and Schofield (2005).
51. United Nations, “List of member states,” viewed 7 Mar 2009, http://www.un.org/members/
list.shtml; Nationmaster Encyclopaedia, “List of Landlocked Countries,” viewed 7 Mar
2009, http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Landlocked-country.
52. Bouchard (2004). Bouchard makes the case to also include the Central Asian countries as
Indian Ocean landlocked countries.
53. Bouchard (2003, pp. 214–233).
54. Based on discussions with Christian Bouchard, Department of Geography, Laurentian
University, Canada in July 2005. The number of Indian Ocean countries and the island
territories under control of the United Kingdom and France differ from Nag (2007)—
this publication does not include Sudan amongst Indian Ocean countries. The 13 land-
locked countries have been identified from the transhipment port of access to the
Indian Ocean indicated by Export 911, “Shipping department,” viewed 7 Mar 2009
http://www.export911.com/e911/ship/landlock.htm; and see Gupta (2005).
55. Chaudhuri (1985), Pearson (2003, p. 123).
56. Vali (1976, pp. 14–16).
57. Ibid, pp. 20–21.
58. Harding (1994, p. 33).
59. Vali (1976, p. 45).
60. Bristow (1996, p. 33).
61. Vali (1976, p. 22).

62. UN General Assembly 56th session, “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean”,
UN Document A/56/29 dated 05 Jul 2001.
63. UN General Assembly 62nd session, Report of the First Committee, “Implementation of the
Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,” UN Document A/62/382 dated 8 Nov
2007.
64. Jayewardene (1994), viewed 29 May 2008, http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu15oe/
uu15oe0n.htm.
65. On Arusha Agreement, see Jayewardene (1994).
66. International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region (1995).
67. Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (2004, pp. 11–16).
68. See statement by Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad, South Africa, at the 7th meet-
ing of the IOR-ARC Council of Ministers, 7 March 2007, viewed 29 May 2008,
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07031511451003.htm.
69. Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG) Vision and Preamble, viewed 18 Apr 2009,
http://www.iorgroup.org/index.php.
70. Bouchard (2004).
71. Dowdy (1985, p. 5).
72. Wriggins et al. (1992, p. 5), for a discussion on sub-regionalism in the Indian Ocean also see
Bouchard (2004).
73. Cohen (2003), Buzan and Weaver (2003).
74. Vali (1976).
75. Chaturvedi (1998, pp. 701–724).
76. Fawcett (2005, p. 2).
78. Fawcett (2005, p. 191).
79. Ibid, p. 185, Fawcett and Hurrell (1995, p. 307).
80. Vali (1976, p. 51), and Fawcett (2005, p. 188).
81. Cohen (2003, p. 4).
83. Vali (1976, p. 50), Cohen (2003, p. 42).
85. Ibid, pp. 236–238, Cohen (2003, p. 389).
86. Cohen (2003, p. 42).
87. Vali (1976, p. 230).
88. Berlin (2002, p. 31).
89. Rumley, (2005, pp. 5–27).
90. Prescott and Schofield (2005, p. 461).
91. Lewis and Wigen (1999, p. 168).
92. McPherson (1993, p. 7).
93. Lewis (1999, p. 204).
Chapter 4
Regime Theory and Application
of Structuration Theory
This chapter reviews the literature on regime theory to inform the analysis on effec-
tiveness of maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean as a regional unit of analysis. The
chapter integrates the different schools of thought on regime theory and applies
structuration theory to emphasise the actor–structure interplay across space and
time.
4.1 Regime Effectiveness an Agenda for Research
When Strange, approximately 25 years ago, commented on the concept of regimes

as a state-centric value-biased imprecise and woolly passing fad, she or anyone else
was far from postulating that regimes matter.1 Within international relations, the
debate has since transcended from regime formation to regime effectiveness and is
now strongly becoming a top research agenda for scholars.2
Mostly, the study of regimes has focussed mainly on international environmen-
tal regimes,3 but the principles are not exclusive to environmentalists. For example,
the Rene Dubos maxim “Think globally, act locally” exhorted by the Brundtland
Commission or the World Commission on Environment and Development has
implications in other ocean regime arenas besides protection of the marine envi-
ronment, such as, shared fisheries resources, conduct of marine scientific research,
safety of shipping, and maritime security. More specifically, the aim of inter-
national regimes is to regulate national actions when dealing with collective
issues.
Empirical observations have shown that the success of international environmen-
tal regimes varies greatly. The question arises can international regimes conceived
globally effectively perform locally in the way they are currently configured?
To answer the question, research emphasis in recent years has shifted to assess-
ing the effectiveness of regimes within the broader study of regime conseq-
uences.
70 4 Regime Theory and Application of Structuration Theory
4.2 Structurational Approach to Regimes

Regimes affect state behaviour by altering the institutional environment and/or
actors’ interests or preferences so that cooperation is more likely.4 It is argued that
the concept of regimes needs to submit itself to a “structurational” approach (dis-
cussed later in Section 4.13) put forward by Anthony Giddens in order to build on
the theory that like actors institutions do matter in the international system.5
A number of authors have applied structuration theory to international relations
for different objectives with telling effect. Alexander Wendt using of structuration
theory makes a notable attempt to theorise about behaviour of states as agents given
the structure constraints in the international system.6 Philip Cerny has applied it to
the process of globalisation.7 Walter Carlsnaes describes structuration theory as a
resolute strategy for overcoming the core of the agency–structure problem in foreign
policy analysis.8 David Dessler seeks to link theory to specific empirical analysis
and builds on Giddens’ work to outline a structural model of international politics.9
Bas Arts focused on the role of non-state actors in regime attempts to enrich regime
analysis with insights from structuration theory.10
This chapter draws inspiration from these notable works in an attempt to use
Giddens’ work in expanding the application of regime theory to analyse the effec-
tiveness of maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean region. Later in the chapter, the
discussion particularly tries to adapt Giddens’ “duality of structure”, the core of
structuration theory, into a cyclical model that opens a four-way actor–structure
interaction in the analysis of regime effectiveness.
4.3 Regimes Do Matter
Where anarchy11 may be the rule in world politics,12 the study of interna-
tional regimes seeking “cooperation under anarchy”13 and “governance with-
out government”14 becomes important for understanding “order” in interna-
tional relations.15 In a range of international issue-areas, mutual interests exist,
whereby, through mutual agreement, self-interested state actors establish interna-
tional regimes for mutual benefits that outweigh the costs of participation or of going
alone.16
In other words, international regimes make expectations of governments con-
sistent with one another, facilitating agreement in an anarchic world of politics by
providing a framework of rules, norms, principles and procedures that govern state
behaviour for international cooperation in areas of common concern.17
Over the last three decades, having weathered a number of challenges, inter-
national regimes can be pictorially described as widely dispersed small islands of
cooperation in the oceanic expanse of anarchy18 that have come to be the main-
stay of peace, development and sustainability in a globalised world. Not without its
criticism,19 there is now consensus amongst scholars that international regimes do
matter in international relations.20
4.5 Regime Definitions 71
4.4 Conceptual Clarification of Regimes

What regimes do is further cooperation to provide international governance.21 From
the various valuable functions served by international regimes,22 Keohane outlines
three key functions in depth.23 Foremost, regimes establish a clear legal framework
that specifies legitimate and illegitimate behaviour. Essentially, a regime alters the
operating environment by stressing on cooperation amongst states and making it
more conducive to achieving such cooperation.
Second, regimes create mutual trust by improving the quality and quantity of
information exchanged between states. In so doing, a regime creates a formal mech-
anism that binds actors by a uniform code of conduct. Over the long run, a successful
regime favourably enhances interaction amongst actors, which in turn encourages
other actors to join.
Finally, even though not cost-free, regimes reduce transaction costs associated
with the negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of agreements. By joining a
regime, there is willingness amongst states to offset transaction costs against the
likely mutual benefits in an issue-area. Thus, by helping make government’s expec-
tations consistent with one another, regimes seek to structure their relationships in
stable and mutually beneficial ways, which in the long term could bring order to an
otherwise anarchic world.24
In sum, international regimes are instruments of institutionalised or regularised
behaviour, which alleviates cooperation between states for a given issue or problem.
4.5 Regime Definitions
At the most basic level, the main challenge concerns the definition of what consti-
tutes a regime. Leading authors such as Keohane, Levy, Young, Zurn and Breitmeier
have made important contributions in attempting to improve upon Krasner’s 1983-
consensus definition of international regimes (Table 4.1). The word “regime” stems
from the Latin words regimen, which means “a rule” and regere, which denotes
“to rule”.25 The Krasnerian consensus definition on regimes is universally accepted
as the foundation of regime-studies, regardless of the debate on the vagueness and
indistinguishable components of the definition. In an effort to better understand the
means and conditions under which state cooperates, a solid working definition of
regimes continues to be sought.26
What is generally acknowledged is that regimes treated as social institutions
are characterised by a specific problem and a problem-solving capacity that relies
on coordination and cooperation amongst actors. The criticism of the definition
points to the difficulty in differentiating the four components—principles, norms,
rules and decision-making procedures—and its vagueness of “around which actors’
expectations converge” in operationalising a regime.27
Keohane simplifies regimes as “institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by
governments that pertain to particular set of issues in international relations”.28
Table 4.1 Definitions of regimes
Author Year Definition
Stephen D. Krasner29 1983 Regimes are implicit or explicit principles,

norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actors’ expectations converge in
a given area of international relations
Robert O. Keohane30 1989 Regimes are institutions with explicit rules,
agreed upon by governments that pertain to
particular set of issues in international relations
Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, 1995 Regimes are social institutions consisting of
and Michael Zurn31 agreed upon principles, norms, rules,
procedures and programs that govern the
interactions of actors in specific issue-areas
Helmut Breitmeier, Oran R. 2006 Regimes are social institutions created to respond
Young, and Michael Zurn32 to the demand for governance relating to
specific issues arising in a social setting that is
anarchical in the sense that it lacks a
centralised public authority or a government in
the ordinary meaning of the term
Source: Developed by author
Levy, Young and Zurn suggest defining international regimes “as social institutions
consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that
govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas”.33
Although vast in range, the definitions seem to vary little in scope. Moreover,
the definitions do not capture the dynamic nature of regimes. Spector and Zartman
convincingly argue regime building as an ongoing negotiation.34 Rather than exam-
ine regimes to determine their effectiveness in terms of compliance, regimes need to
be studied for their own evolution and the effects on the ground. This characterisa-
tion introduces the elements of time and space in any attempt to arrive at a working
definition of a regime.
Implicit in every definition is that regimes define actor behaviour in interna-
tional issues. In effect, a regime institutionalises35 cooperation amongst actors to
better-manage that particular international issue for the collective good of humanity.
Regimes are required where there is an inability on the part of actors to overcome
problems in an issue-area without collective action.36 Under such conditions, the
problems stem from low levels of concern and the lack of individual capacity.37
4.6 Attributes and Classification of Regimes
The first main task is classification of regimes in formulating the methodology to

measure regime consequences and effectiveness. Levy, Young and Zurn make the
point that regime classification is a blank spot in the literature on international
regimes.38 Further complication arises from the difficulty in differentiating between
4.6 Attributes and Classification of Regimes 73
the attributes explicitly used in defining regimes. A good starting point is to draw
distinctions between the different regime attributes and use the variations in the
classification of regimes.
According to Parson, norms are “generalised formulations more or less explicit
of expectations of proper action by differentiated units in relatively specific
situations”.39 Norms are problem-solving devices for dealing with the recurrent
issues of social life: conflict and cooperation.40 Norms are “collective understand-
ings of the proper behaviour of actors”.41
Norms frame international cooperation in three ways (1) norms help to con-
stitute the actors in international cooperation by both identifying who the actors
are and conferring rights and responsibilities upon them; (2) norms make interna-
tional cooperation “rule-governed” in constraining the activities of social actors
where legitimacy within that society is obtained by acting in accordance with
the rules and (3) norms create a meaningful language of communication between
actors in international cooperation based upon established patterns of social
interaction.42
Ian Clark makes a compelling argument that the practice of legitimacy in
international relations and observable actor behaviour in international coopera-
tion is closely linked to the three international norms of legality, morality and
constitutionality.43 The norm of legality elucidates the formal idea of international
legal rules, while the norm of morality alludes to the notion of shared moral val-
ues. The norm of constitutionality lies independent of the norms of legality and
morality in the political realm of conventions, informal understandings and mutual
expectations.44 A good example is constitutional orders, which are characterised by
shared agreement about the principles and rules of order; authoritative limits on the
exercise of power and the entrenchment of these rules in a wider political system.45
Norms most often are in conflict. As Krasner observes, the international environ-
ment has been characterised by competing and often logically contradictory norms,
not some single coherent set of rules.46 Inadvertently, the legitimacy in international
cooperation of an actor’s behaviour is derived from the consensual quality of that
behaviour reached through political accommodation amongst competing pulls of the
three norms of legality, morality and constitutionality.47
What it means is that norms describe the social phenomena of shared under-
standings, arrived at by actors in international cooperation by overcoming conflicts
with self-interest, to prescribe or proscribe actor behaviour with a deontological
content.48 This is not to say that actors do not disregard norms, or the degree of
consensus about them never changes, or even that norms remain constant.49
The theoretical argument is that norms affect behaviour by changing an actor’s
motives and beliefs, that is there understanding of their interests. Norms produce,
therefore, not only a logic that spells out the consequences of what will happen if
they are violated but also the logic of what behaviour is appropriate.50 Norms have
therefore been defined as “a broad class of prescriptive statements—rules, standards,
principles, and so forth—both procedural and substantive” that are “prescriptions for
action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation, a sense that they ought
to be followed”.51
Fig. 4.1 From norms to rules

Source: Braithwaite and
Drahos (2000)
Norms defined in terms of rights and obligations are standards of behaviour.52

Against this backdrop, the methodology assembles the attributes of norms—
principles, rules, standards and guidelines (Fig. 4.1)—into a hierarchical relation-
ship, as set out by Braithwaite and Drahos in their seminal work on “Global Business
Regulation”.53
A principle may apply to more than one action while a rule relates to a particular
action. Ostrom in her ground-breaking work “Governing the Commons”54 argues
that one of the operatives “forbid”, “require” or “permit” must be contained in a
statement to be considered as a rule. In this way, rules prescribe relatively specific
acts. Volger provides the following classification of regime rules:55
• Standards setting rules involves promoting desirable actions and prohibiting

others.
• Distribution rules involve procedures for allocation of shared resources that
specify user rights and obligations.
• Information rules specify sharing of information, reporting and monitoring
arrangements.
• Enforcement/compliance rules adopt a self-regulatory character placing reliance
on governments to enforce compliance within their jurisdiction.
• Knowledge rules are designed to increase the body of consensual knowledge
significant to the operational level in the relevant issue-area.
Principles are at a higher-order level than rules and remain the focus of the
research inquiry. As Braithwaite and Drahos point out, principles stand behind rules
informing their application. Principles are settled agreements on conduct that bring
about mutual orientation between actors in a group. Principles function to secure
objectives and goals, which are important to the actor. Through principles actors
seek changes that are consistent with their general values, goals and desires. Volger
defines principles as “beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude”.56
4.7 Norm for Ocean Governance and Maritime Regimes 75
Standards denote a point of reference in the conduct of actors that can be applied
to measure their performance and act as a benchmark for compliance. Standards,
unlike principles, can have a high degree of specificity. To quote from Braithwaite
and Drahos, “Guidelines are used to suggest a direction for conduct in conditions
of uncertainty. Guidelines do not have the degree of “settledness” that principles
possess and are very often issued as a provisional measure until more is known
about the relevant problem”.
4.7 Norm for Ocean Governance and Maritime Regimes

The methodology treats ocean governance as the overarching norm for research.
The core attributes of norms—principles, standards and guidelines—further frames
the classification of maritime regimes (Fig. 4.2).
Fig. 4.2 Ocean governance norm and attributes of maritime regimes

Principle-based maritime regimes can be classified in a number of ways. The

norm for ocean governance mainly utilises the principle of allocating ocean space
for specific uses. The “common heritage of mankind” principle allocates seabed
resources for shared use defined by the international seabed regime. The nationali-
sation principle of coastal states rights and responsibilities over allocating adjoining
ocean resources led to the creation of the Exclusive Economic Zone regime. The
principle of “freedom of the high seas” maintains the regime character of the high
seas open to all states for navigation, fishing and scientific research besides over-
flight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and constructing artificial islands
and other installations. These freedoms are exercised by all states with due regard
to the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas,
which are reserved for peaceful purposes. Ocean governance across the different
ocean spaces—the Area, Exclusive Economic Zone and the High Seas—is further
guided by principles of cooperation. This has led to the emergence of cooperative
regimes for marine scientific research, protection and preservation of the marine
environment and sustainable fisheries.
Another method is to differentiate in terms of roles amongst participants of a
regime. A good example is the role of flag states and port states in maritime safety
exercised through the regime for port state control. An emerging role-based regime
is the maritime security regime led by the International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) Code and includes other initiatives such as the Container Security
Initiative, Proliferation Security Initiative and the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
convention. According to Levy, Young and Zurn such functionally differentiated
regimes are difficult to create and come into existence only as part of larger insti-
tutional networks, but once created are expected to be more influential in terms of
consequences and display greater robustness.57
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has established a number of
standards-based regimes for international shipping. Amongst the prominent ones are
the International Conventions for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) and Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). Finally, a guidelines-based regime for ocean gov-
ernance includes the regime for the development and transfer of marine technology.
Drawing on the normative power of principles and rules, standards and guidelines
actors use different mechanisms as devices to achieve their goals.58 As such, mech-
anisms are causal chains, which cannot be generalised as laws.59 In the employment
of different mechanisms to achieve goals, states establish regimes, in the knowledge
that it is in their long-term interest to cooperate. The underlying assumption being
that compliance with international commitments is possible, even likely. Therefore,
mechanisms help prevent short-term defection by some states at the expense of other
states.60
The generally accepted notion is that regimes once established would serve the
long-term interests of states. Yet, at the same time, there exists unease over non-
compliance by some states. In a way, for the duration of the regime mechanisms
designed to achieve cooperation amongst states must apply across a defined (geo-
graphic) space and should be extended over time. Using Gidden’s Structuration
theory, the book takes this approach having developed the Indian Ocean space as
a region for analysis in Chapter 3.
4.8 Driving Social Forces of Regime Formation
Contributions on driving social forces essentially cluster around three schools

of thought, (1) interest-based neoliberalism, (2) power-based realism and (3)
knowledge-based cognitivism.61 Scholars point out that the three schools are not
4.8
Table 4.2 Schools of thought in international regimes
Rationalist Sociologist
Attributes Realism Neoliberalism Cognitivism
Meta-theoretical orientation Self-interested goal seeking actors Self-interested goal seeking actors Shared normative and causal social
beliefs
Epistemology Envious states acting to maximise Unenvious states acting to States utility depends on shared
their own utility function maximise their own utility regulative and constitutive social
function knowledge
Ontology Actor priority over norms and rules Actor priority over norms and rules Institutionalised norms and rules
empower actor
Central variable Relative power capabilities Shared common interests Distribution of knowledge
Main actor Atomistic states Atomistic states Social institutions
State behaviour Relative gains seeker Absolute gains maximiser Role player
Driving Social Forces of Regime Formation
Political play Domestic-level politics is almost Domestic-level politics is almost Two-level games—national and
negligible negligible international
Regime-conducive foreign
policy
Veil of uncertainty States concern over lack of reliable States concern over lack of reliable Decision-makers concern about
information about the behaviour information about the behaviour their inability to assess the likely
and intentions of other states and intentions of other states consequences of their own
decisions or nondecisions
Knowledge Assumed knowledge Assumed knowledge Constitutes identities; shapes
preferences and options
Interests International public good Constellation of interests International cooperation
Power Hegemonic state power Distribution of power amongst Epistemic community-backed
states international institutions
77
78
Rationalist Sociologist
Attributes Realism Neoliberalism Cognitivism
Institutionalism Minimum Bounded Maximum

Operating precondition Set of sufficiently clear and Must share common interests; can Minimum of collective
constraining rules and their be attained only through understanding concerning the
reliable enforcement cooperation issues at stake
Operational outcome Sensitivity to rule-based Rule-based cooperation under Rule-based cooperation amongst
4
cooperation amongst states. anarchy states

Collective good supplied by
independent action
Viewing regimes Alternatives to unilateral Problem-solving devices Web of meaning
leadership
Regime resilience Presence of a strong leader Embodied sunk costs Institutionalised cooperation
Regime effects Rationalist approach Sociologist approach
• Reduce mutual uncertainty • Mutual adjustment
• Reduce information costs • Process of policy coordination
• Reduce transaction costs • Shape reputations of members
associated with negotiation, • Strategy of reciprocity
monitoring and enforcement • Sense of obligation in international cooperation
• Enable linkages between
issues
• Continuity in political
relationships or ongoing
negotiation
Source: Deduced by author from Andreas Hasenclever et al. (1996, 1997, 2000)
Regime Theory and Application of Structuration Theory
4.9 Process of Regime Formation 79
mutually exclusive and none offers a complete explanation for regime formation.
To begin with, the neoliberalist view is that sharing of common interests is the
motive for cooperation. Although commonality of interests in a particular interna-
tional issue is necessary, it is not a sufficient condition to get cooperation amongst
actors.
Taking a realist view, consideration of relative power amongst actors encourages
or entices cooperation and characterises effectiveness of the regime. What cogni-
tivists are quick to point out is that perceptions of shared interests and relative power
capabilities are dependent on the causal and social knowledge of the actors.62
Within the mainstream interest-based approach, the widely discussed contrac-
tualist or functional theory by Keohane is considered the most elaborate theory
in the analysis of international regimes, but no one school is a clear winner.63
Regardless of the divergent theoretical considerations, regimes prompt a change in
actor behaviour at the international and national levels.
In their review of international regimes, Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger
compare and contrast the three schools of thought to show how they may com-
plement one another.64 The scholars argue that the variables—interests, power
and knowledge—somehow interact. According to the authors, a synthesis of the
three schools of thought holds considerable promise in studying the effectiveness
of international regimes. The three schools of thought have been crystallised in
Table 4.2. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger in exploring a synthesis of these oth-
erwise comprehensible and plausible theories of international regimes defend three
propositions:
• Neoliberalism and realism not only share a commitment to rationalism as a

meta-theoretical stance, but also may fruitfully work together when it comes to
explaining international regimes, thus offering the prospect of a more unified
rationalist theory of international institutions;
• There is a distinct strand within the cognitivist school (also known as) “weak
cognitivism”, which can serve as an analytically necessary supplement to, and, as
such, can be incorporated into the rationalist account of international regimes and
• “grand synthesis”—that is one that includes the more radical, or “strong”, forms
of cognitvism as well—is not on the cards. Strong cognitivists have ontological
and epistemological commitments that are strictly opposed to those of neoliberals
or realists. In this case, continued intellectual competition is both more likely and
more desirable than ill-fated attempts to merge to mutually exclusive paradigms
of inquiry.65
4.9 Process of Regime Formation

The process involved in identifying the problem for collective response and setting
the agenda could be one of self-generation, negotiation or imposition.66 An imposed
regime, preferred by one or few powerful actors, succeeds in inducing other actors to
accede to the institutional preference of the regime. On the other hand, a negotiated
regime emerges from a conscious process of give and take amongst actors to arrive
at mutually agreeable provisions incorporated into a formal treaty or agreement.
While a self-generating regime forms when there is a convergence in expectations
without any conscious efforts on the part of actors.67
Even after an agenda has been set, regimes do not remain static but continue
to evolve. Under such conditions, the process can be substituted for one another
depending on the varying needs of coordination and problem-solving over time, and
need for adaptability to the shifting constellation of power and interests amongst the
members of the regime.68
4.10 Actor–Structure Interplay

The theoretical core of driving social forces underscores the significance of the mul-
tivariate model69 in regime formation (Fig. 4.3). This model places strong emphasis
on substitution and interaction effects. In the model, actors display leadership and
engage in the process of agenda setting leading to institutional choice towards
operationalisation of the regime in an issue-area.70
Fig. 4.3 Regime formation multivariate model

Source: Adapted from Young and Osherenko (1993a)
Keohane argues that “all efforts at international cooperation take place with
an institutional context of some kind, which may or may not facilitate coopera-
tive endeavours”.71 The right institutional choice can provide governments with
the necessary arrangements to respond collectively to the set agenda.72 Effective
institutions can affect the political process at three key points in the sequence from
4.11 Actors and Leadership 81
agenda setting to operationalisation. They can achieve political and technical con-
sensus about the problem contributing to agendas that are more appropriate to the
specific issue-area. Through the core political process of intergovernmental bargain-
ing, they can contribute to more comprehensive and specific international policies.
Finally, they can contribute to national policy responses.73
Institutions frame the structure by which actors operationalise the regime. Later
in the chapter, the elements of structure are developed using Gidden’s structura-
tion theory. According to Jacobson and Weiss, “operationalisation covers all those
activities required to transform an agreement on paper into a functioning social
practice”.74 Once a regime has been operationalised (1) institutions can inten-
sify the ability to make and keep agreements, thereby enhancing the contractual
environment; (2) promote concern among governments, thereby increasing gov-
ernmental concern and (3) build national and administrative capacity, thereby
increasing national capacity over time.75 Spector and Zartman visualise regimes
as “watercourses flowing through time and space”,76 again something that has been
conceptualised by Giddens in his theory of structuration.
4.11 Actors and Leadership
A number of efforts have each made important contributions from investigation of

the cluster of driving social forces—power, interests and knowledge—in the forma-
tion of regimes. Oran R. Young distinguishes three types of leadership—structural,
entrepreneurial and intellectual—that parallel these driving social forces. The driv-
ing social forces and leadership are applied in a slightly modified form in the
measurement of regime effectiveness. More specifically, not only has a synthesis of
the driving social forces been used to explain actor behaviour in regime formation,
but also leadership is blended into the discussion for treatment of actor behaviour
and leadership as a single component in the methodology.
Knowledge-based actors, not only chiefly construed as epistemic communities77
but also as non-state actors, scientific networks and international nongovernmental
organisations, focus on the role of ideas about international problems and their solu-
tions. Such intellectual leadership is crucial in developing consensual knowledge to
shape the way issues are framed at the agenda formation stage. Knowledge-based
actors energise the occurrence of social learning about the nature of problem and
availability of policy options.
Interest-based actors display entrepreneurial leadership in a search for solutions
to problems requiring collective action. For their part, the focus is on institu-
tional bargaining to produce consensus on the institutional arrangements needed
for regime implementation. The role of interest-based actors becomes important at
the stage of institutional choice in regime formation.
The research takes the accepted view that the dominant power-based actors are
states displaying structural leadership.78 This is not to align with the theory of hege-
monic stability, but it is to say that power does play a role in regime formation.
The research acknowledges that ultimately it is behavioural change in states that is

needed to get commitment for increasing the national capacity, a key element of
institutional effectiveness. According to Young, structural leaders represent states
bringing power in the resource or structural sense to bear on the process of regime
formation. Structural leadership becomes prominent at the operationalisation stage
of regime formation.
4.12 Structure in Regime Analysis
Beginning with the position of “structuration theory” per se, Giddens, one of the
foremost sociological theorists, developed the theory to explain and integrate agent
(actors) and structure (rules and resources), by making time and space the two major
aspects of his theoretical perspective. In Giddens’ words
The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to the theory of structuration, is
neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of social totality,
but social practices ordered across space and time. Human social activities, like some self-
reproducing items in nature, are recursive. That is to say, they are not brought into being
by social actors but continually recreated by them via the very means whereby they express
themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that
make these activities possible.79
A number of inclusive and instructional texts already exist on the theory of struc-
turation. The research treats the call in structuration theory for decentring of the
agent (actors) basic to the analysis of international maritime regimes in the Indian
Ocean region. By doing so, the book ascribes an ontological priority to the study of
social practices (influences of agency and structure) in maritime regimes ordered
across time and space. By “ontology” Gidden means a conceptual investigation
of the nature of human action, social institutions, and the inter-relations between
actions and institutions.80 In simple terms, Giddens explains his ontology as social
practices ordered across space and time.81 Dessler explains a theory’s ontology as a
structured set of entities or things (real world structures) that not only consist of des-
ignated things but also of connections or relations (processes) posited by the theory
and invoked in the theory’s explanations.82
Wendt in championing the agent–structure debate in international relations has
argued that agent and structure are not only both relevant, but also equally influence
social behaviour in the real world. According to Wendt, while structuration theory
by itself cannot substantively contribute to the understanding of international rela-
tions per se, it does provide the meta-theoretical framework for solving agency and
structure problems in existing substantive theories.83 The research uses the “struc-
turational” approach to ground and inform the theoretical and empirical research
into international maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean region and therefore makes
an original contribution to the study of regimes in international relations.
4.13 Elements of Structuration Theory 83
4.13 Elements of Structuration Theory

Structuration theory provides the conceptual framework to analyse the agent–
structure entities in any real world social system but does not provide the type of
agents or structures within that system.84 While agent means actor, agency implies
power and in structuration theory is concerned with the basic aspect of all human
conduct, which is, having the power to act and make a difference or having the
capacity to transform a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. Structure
is regarded as rules and resources recursively implicated in social behaviour across
time and space.
The understanding of the agency–structure relationship is made possible by the
“duality of structure”,85 the core element in Gidden’s structuration theory. The
“duality of structure” is the most promising formulation existing, which is to treat
the “structural properties of social systems as both the medium and outcome of
the practices they recursively organise”.86 In other words, structures not only shape
human conduct or practices, but also the conduct or practices of humans constitute
and transform structures.
According to Giddens, actors are “knowledgeable” people who know what they
are doing and how to do it. Actors show three forms of social behaviour. First, actors
ordinarily show only their knowledge by describing in words what they do and their
reasons for doing it.87 Second, their knowledgeability88 as actors is more than just
what they can say about what they do.89 Finally, the unconscious motivational com-
ponents of social behaviour includes “those forms of cognition or impulsion which
are either wholly repressed from consciousness or appear in consciousness only in
distorted form”.90
There are strong similarities in Giddens’ discursive and practical consciousness
to Krasner’s dimensions of “implicit” and “explicit” rules, principles, norms and
decision-making procedures. The line between the discursive and practical con-
sciousness can easily be altered by the actor’s socialisation and learning experiences.
However, there is a distinct barrier, centred on repression, between what actors do
and their reasons for doing it (discursive) and unconscious social behaviour. The
challenge here in to be able to distinguish between what is said and what gets done;
what is known and what is said about whatever gets done; and what is said or gets
done and what were or are the (unconscious) motives.
Giddens refers to doing or action as the continuous flow of conduct intentionally
or unintentionally, which constitutes the day-to-day activity of any actor. A key fea-
ture is that at any phase in any given sequence of conduct, any given actor could have
acted differently.91 Action as a continuous process of social behaviour is explained
by Giddens using the three components of social behaviour in what he terms as a
stratification model (Fig. 4.4).92
Temporally, the subjective processes sustained by an actor include the following:
purposive or intentional character of everyday human behaviour involving the con-
duct of not just the actor, but also of other actors;93 routinely without fuss “keeping
in touch” with the grounds of what they do, as they do it, such that if asked by
lay actors, they can give reasons for their conduct;94 and the potential for action95
Unacknowledged Reflexive monitoring of action Unintended

conditions of consequences of
action action
Rationalisation of action
Motivation of action
Fig. 4.4 Giddens stratification model

Source: Giddens (1984)
whereby motives supply the overall plans or programmes within which a range of
conduct can then be or is enacted.96 The flow of intentional action in the duree of
day-to-day conduct can have unintended consequences that can feed back to be the
unacknowledged conditions of further action.97
Giddens theorises structure as rules and resources, or sets of transformation
relations, organised as properties of social systems.98 Rules are regarded as tech-
niques or generalisable procedures applied in the enactment and reproduction of
social practices. Rules have two aspects to them: interpretative and normative.
Interpretative rules relate to the constitution of meaning. Normative rules relate to
the sanctioning of modes of social conduct.99 The main characteristics of these rules
are described as intensive versus shallow, tacit versus discursive, informal versus
formalised, and weakly sanctioned versus strongly sanctioned.100
Giddens distinguishes three dimensions of the “duality of structure”, sustaining
of communication, normative regulation and resource allocation and authorisation.
Giddens explains the three dimensions (Fig. 4.5) as the communication of meaning
through interpretative schemes (signification); effective mobilisation of sanctions to
make norms count (legitimation); and exercising power through the mobilisation of
resources (domination).
Fig. 4.5 Dimensions of the duality of structure

Source: Giddens (1984)
These structural dimensions are separable only analytically, as they tend to occur
simultaneously and in an integrated fashion in social practices. Domination depends
upon the mobilisation or allocative101 and authoritative102 resources focussed via
4.13 Elements of Structuration Theory 85
signification and legitimation, which has the transformative capacity for actors to
“make their own geography” and “make their own history”.103 This is critical to the
research consideration of the Indian Ocean as a region.
In the mobilisation of resources, it is important to take into account the two-
way character of power (power as control), whereby the less powerful manage
resources in such a way as to exert control over the more powerful in established
power relationships.104
In expressing the situated character of social practices, Giddens binds the tem-
poral, spatial and structural moments of difference to highlight the conceptual
distinction between systems and structure.105 Systems is the concrete patterning
of interaction across time and space (temporal and spatial moments of difference)
while structure refers to the rules and resources (structural moment of difference)
that enable knowledgeable actors to produce and reproduce practices they recognise
as appropriate.106
Giddens argues that while existing rules and resources make human action pos-
sible, human action is equally constrained by existing structures. Structures are
therefore both enabling and constraining. Giddens reformulated the notion of actor
and structure by emphasising that “Structure has no existence independent of the
knowledge that actors have about what they do in the day-to-day activity. Humans
as actors always know what they are doing on the level of discursive consciousness
under some description . . .. But human knowledgeability is always bounded. The
flow of action continually produces consequences which are unintended by actors,
and these unintended consequences also may form unacknowledged conditions of
action in a feedback fashion”.107
The concept of duality of structure at the core of structuration theory enables
reconceptualising the dualism of actor and structure in that they are considered
inseparable, meeting each other in recurring social practices.
In addition to the dualism of actor and structure, stretching of social systems
across time and space is equally central to the theory of structuration, based on
mechanisms of social and system integration.108 Social integration means system-
ness on the level of face-to-face interaction. System integration refers to connections
with those who are physically absent in time or space.109
In explaining the relationship between social and system integration Giddens
introduces the concepts of locale110 to do with space and presence-availability to
do with time.111 The locale as a physical region in structuration theory carries the
connotation of the structuration of social conduct across space and over time.112
According to Giddens, regionalisation then “should be understood not merely as
localisation in space but as referring to the zoning of time and space in relation to
routinised social practices”.113 Giddens offers four modes of regionalisation: form,
span, duration and character. In Cohen’s words
• Form refers to the boundaries separating one region from another.

• Span refers to the time–space extension of the actions with which it is associated.
For example, in modern times the span of regions may be considerably larger
owing to the revolution in means of transportation and communication.
• Duration refers to the extent to which it is institutionalised in the longue durée.

The duration of regions in modern systems often is shorter than in their traditional
counterparts where clusters of interactions often were regionalised with the same
form, span and character for many hundreds of years.
• Character of a region refers to its time–space ordering within a single region, a
region that itself may comprise one of several zones within a larger system. It
is particularly important to resist the urge to treat regions within regions as if
the boundaries of the larger system circumscribe all of the activities in its more
localised settings.114
The temporal dimension in structuration theory is represented by Giddens as

a “series of episodes”, both at the micro-and macro-level. At the micro-level lies
“routinization” or the “habitual, taken-for-granted character of the vast bulk of
activities of day-to-day social life”. At the macro-level is “world time”, which “con-
cerns watershed events in history that may affect the conditions and outcomes of
seemingly similar episodes”.115
According to Giddens, the fundamental question is to explicate how the “stretch-
ing” of social relations across time and space transcends the limitations of individual
“presence”.116 Amongst the different temporalities, Giddens characterises both the
duree of day-to-day experience and the longue duree of institutions by reversible
time and the life span of an individual by irreversible time.
Giddens explains the duree of day-to-day life as having duration, a flow and not
leading anywhere, indicating that time here is constituted only in repetition. “The
terms “social reproduction,” “recursiveness” and so on indicate the repetitive char-
acter of day-to-day life, the routines of which are formed in terms of the intersection
of the passing (but continually returning) days and seasons”.117
By contrast, the life of an individual is not only finite, but also irreversible, “being
towards death”.118 Even here, there are elements of repetition, given the fact that
we speak of the “life cycle”. However, for Giddens “life cycle” is a concept that
belongs to the succession of generations or the supra-individual duree of the long-
term existence of institutions, the longue duree of institutional time.119
In short, actors are “knowledgeable” people and structure refers to rules and
resources. Structure has no existence independent of the knowledge that actors
have, but knowledgeability of actors is always bounded giving rise to the dual-
ity of structure. The actor–structure interaction occurs across space and over
time.
4.14 Application of Structuration Theory to Regime Theory
As a first step, international regimes may be defined as the “structurational” manner,

method or system of governance across a geographic space and over time, on the
coming into force of an international convention, agreement and/or treaty to deal
with a specific area of common concern.
4.14 Application of Structuration Theory to Regime Theory 87
Fig. 4.6 Giddens “duality of structure” in regimes

In the context of international regimes, the structuralist conception of signi-

fication, legitimation and domination (mobilising of allocative and authoritative
resources) is formed into a cyclic process of institutional orders (Fig. 4.6) com-
pared to the vertical and horizontal explanation provided by Giddens (see Fig. 4.5).
The cyclic process builds on Giddens’ point that these structural dimensions tend to
occur simultaneously and in an integrated fashion.
The three cognate concepts frame the structure over time and across space: for
the beginning of signification (communication) amongst actors leads to legitimation
(sanction) of a framework for action across a defined space, which facilitates the
mobilisation of allocative (economic) and authoritative (political) resources toward
institutionalised cooperation in the implementation of a regime. Moreover, the
cyclic process opens a four-way interaction between signification, legitimation, eco-
nomic domination (allocative power) and political domination (authoritative power).
In the adapted “duality of structure”, the modalities of interpretive scheme in com-
munication by actors and norm in sanctioning action set the rules while the facilities
of allocative power and authoritative power establish the resources committed by
actors. The cyclic process continues over time as rules are altered or modified and
resources are augmented for effectiveness of the regime across a defined space.
Due to “duality of structure”, actors cannot be divorced from structure. Actors
shape structure as much as structures shape actor behaviour. Here, the discussion
returns to the interaction between knowledge, interests and power as the driving
social forces of actor behaviour. It takes us to the heart of the debate between sociol-
ogists and rationalists in regime theory. Social institutions in cognitivism or agency
in structuration theory is equated with transformative capacity. This is because social
institutions or agency depends solely upon the capabilities actors maintain and exer-
cise “to make a difference” in the production of definite outcomes, regardless of
whether or not they intend (or are aware) that these outcomes occur.120
Thus, for Giddens knowledgeability is everything that actors know (believe)
about the circumstances of their action and that of others, drawn upon in the produc-
tion and reproduction of that action, including tacit as well as discursively available
knowledge.
Moreover, Giddens insists that at any phase in any given sequence of conduct
any given actor could have acted otherwise—in a manner somewhat different than
he did.
In integrating schools of international regimes, Giddens’ arguments lend cre-
dence to combining interests and ideas where cognitive variables of knowledge can
causally precede or follow rationalist ones of common interests. Hence, knowledge
can certainly help explain preferences and perceived options to explain outcomes.
Alternatively, knowledge can also intervene between interests and outcomes to
provide salient solutions to negotiating problems, helping parties coordinate their
behaviour in a mutually beneficial way.
Either way, actors are knowledgeable people and so emphasised by Giddens
where mutual knowledge is creating an awareness of the procedures of action, that
is a knowledge of “how to do something” or “how to go on” shared by lay actors and
sociological observers. Thus, by using the structuration concept of bounded human
knowledgeability that produces a continuous flow of intentional and unintentional
consequences, it is possible to integrate the weak cognitivists theories of ideas,
learning and epistemic communities with rationalist interest-based explanations.
Second, aside from the debate between rationalists and sociologists, an intense
dispute over the power variable has been raging within the rationalist school. Going
by the neoliberalist argument, the Indian Ocean region, which has a preponderance
of distributed power amongst states, is ideally suited for implementing international
regimes. Yet, in areas of common concern, the Indian Ocean as a region remains
devoid of a strong international regime. So does that mean that the realist theory of
the need for the presence of a strong power exercising unilateral leadership is central
to having a strong regime? What becomes clear is that either way power plays a role
in explaining state behaviour.
To understand state (actor) behaviour better in seeking relative and/or absolute
gains expounded by realists and neoliberalists requires a prior grasp of Giddens’
innovative approach to generic issues regarding the common denominator of power
at large.
All actors possess the capacity to exert power, once it is understood that the power
to “make a difference” is prior to any regard for the subjectivity of the actor.121 It is
only because of the asymmetrical distribution of resources that actors exhibit some
4.15 Conclusion 89
degree of political inequality. Thus, power in a relational sense is the capability of

actors to secure outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes depends upon the
doing of others.122
The crucial insight provided here by Giddens is the ubiquitous presence of the
“dialectic of control”, which is the two-way character of the distributive aspect of
power in all circumstances of power relations. Giddens stresses on a complemen-
tarity of relations between superordinates and subordinates by taking into account
how the less powerful manage resources in a way as to exert control over the more
powerful in established power relationships. In other words, the dialectic of control
intrinsically refers to the universal presence of imbalanced degrees of autonomy and
dependence that constitute all kinds of power relations.
One can now contextualise rationalist approaches to international regimes by
understanding state motivation or the specific conditions under which absolute gains
dominate relative gains or vice versa. For Giddens, motivation refers to potential
for action whereby motives supply the overall plans or programs within which a
range of conduct is enacted.123 Even in much of our ordinary day-to-day routine and
predictable social life, actors unconsciously have a motivated interest in reproducing
conditions of confidence or trust. It is within this “ontological security”, where the
natural and social worlds are, as they appear to be, actors that are able to canalise
and manage tensions that are more primal.124
Using the present discussion it is now possible to juxtapose the substantive two
propositions of Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger that integrate theories of inter-
national regimes, by using the knowledge, interests and power variables to explain
behaviour. Unilateral or distributed, the “power” to intervene and thereby “make a
difference” in a course of events or state of affairs is the basic aspect of all human
conduct. Giddens introduces the notion of allocative and authoritative resources in
exercising power as an aspect of social practice that refers to how interventions are
exercised to contribute toward transforming or altering an event.125
It is manipulation of resources by which actors influence one another’s behaviour.
Moreover, the mobilisation of resources invariably involves both semantic and nor-
mative aspects of mutual knowledge. Conversely, resources provide the means
by which these semantic and normative rules are actualised.126 Simply stated,
knowledgeable actors (human action driven state or institutional behaviour) open
communications to arrive at shared common interests that shape the legal frame-
work for exercising of power to mobilise allocative and authoritative resources in
the formation, institutional choice and operationalisation of an international regime.
4.15 Conclusion
International regimes align expectations of governments in an issue-area by pro-

viding a framework of rules, norms, principles and procedures for cooperation in
which, just like actors, institutions do matter.
The norm of ocean governance populated by collective issues has witnessed the
emergence of a number of maritime regimes that rely on coordination and coopera-
tion amongst actors. Characterised by a problem-solving capacity the international
maritime regimes seek to institutionalise cooperation amongst actors and better
coordinate national actions in dealing with a specific problem and its consequences
for governance of the oceanic region as a whole.
The application of structuration theory to regime theory shows that actor and
structure cannot be divorced in operationalisation of the regime and stretching the
actor–structure interplay across space and over time is integral to assessing the
effectiveness of the regime.
The next chapter applies these methodological considerations in developing a
rubric model to measure effectiveness of maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean
region.
Notes
1. See Strange (1982, pp. 479–496).
2. See comments by Young (2004).
3. Young (1999, p. 29).
4. See context and functions of international regimes in Keohane (1982, pp. 325–355, 1984),
Spector and Zartman (2003).
5. Giddens (1984).
6. Wendt (1987).
7. Cerny (2000).
8. Carlsnaes (1992).
9. Dessler (1989).
10. Arts (2000).
11. For an excellent discussion on anarchy see Wendt (1992, pp. 391–425).
12. Waltz (1979).
13. Oye (1986).
14. Rosenau and Czempiel (1992).
15. See Keohane (1982, p. 325). For a discussion on anarchy versus order, see Behnke (1995,
p. 187).
16. See especially Keohane (1982, pp. 325–355).
17. See Hasenclever et al. (2000, pp. 3–33).
18. Behnke (1995, p. 187).
19. See Strange (1982). Also see Aggarwal (1985), Kratochwil (1989), and Kratochwil and
Ruggie (1986, pp. 753—775).
20. See Ruggie (1975, pp. 557–583), Keohane (1993, pp. 23–45).
21. Mayer et al. (1993, pp. 392–430).
22. For increasing governmental concern, enhancing contractual environment and for increas-
ing national political and administrative capacity see Levy et al. (1993, pp. 397–406). For
reducing transaction costs and facilitating decentralised rule-making see Keohane (1984),
Aggarwal (1985).
23. Keohane (1984).
24. Keohane (1982, pp. 325–355).
25. Aggarwal (1985).
Notes 91
26. See discussion on the meaning of the term regime in Breitmeier et al. (2006).
27. Levy et al. (1995).
28. Keohane (1989).
29. Krasner (1983, p. 2).
30. Keohane (1989, p. 4).
31. Levy et al. (1995).
32. Breitmeier et al. (2006, p. 3).
33. Levy et al. (1995).
34. See Spector and Zartman (2003).
35. For typology of international institutions, see Keohane (1989, pp. 3–4).
36. Levy et al. (1993, p. 398).
37. Ibid.
38. Levy et al. (1995).
39. Parsons (1961, p. 120).
40. Kratochwil (1989, p. 69).
41. Legro (1997, p. 33).
42. Bellamy (2004).
43. Clark (2005, pp. 207–226).
44. Ibid, p. 220.
45. See Ikenberry (2001).
46. Krasner (1999, p. 52).
47. Clark (2005, p. 226).
48. See Kegley and Raymond (2002), Goertz (1994).
49. See Kegley and Raymond (1994, p. 124), Kegley and Raymond (2002, pp. 192–194).
50. Herrmann (2002, p. 128).
51. Chayes and Chayes (1995, p. 65).
52. Volger (1995, p. 31).
53. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000).
54. Ostrom (1990).
55. Volger (1995, pp. 40–41), Haas (1980, pp. 357–405) sighted in Young (1996, p. 227).
56. Volger (1995, p. 31).
57. Levy et al. (1995).
58. For a discussion on the meaning of mechanisms, see Hovi (2004).
59. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000, p. 15).
60. Raustiala and Slaughter (2002).
61. Hasenclever et al. (1997).
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
66. Young (1983, pp. 93–113).
67. Levy et al. (1995).
68. Spector and Zartman (2003).
69. Young and Osherenko (1993b) cited in Young (1996) and also Young and Osherenko
(1993a).
70. For a discussion on the substitution and interaction effects see Young and Osherenko
(1993a, b).
71. Keohane (1988) cited in Young (ed.) (1996, p. 380).
72. Levy et al. (1993, p. 398).
73. Keohane et al. (1993, p. 8).
74. Jacobson and Weiss (1991) cited in Levy et al. (1995).
75. Levy et al. (1993).

76. Spector and Zartman (2003, p. 18).
77. Network of scientific, technical, legal and policy experts, see Breitmeier et al. (2006,
p. 201).
78. Haas et al. (1993).
79. Giddens (1984, p. 2).
80. Bryant and Jary (1991, p. 201).
81. Giddens (1984, p. 2).
82. Dessler (1989).
83. Wendt (1987).
84. Wendt (1987, p. 355).
85. In Giddens terminology the structural properties of social systems do not exist outside of
action but are chronically implicated in its production and reproduction.
86. Giddens (1984, p. 25).
87. Giddens references such social behaviour as discursive consciousness, a terminology used
to explain what actors are able to say, or to give verbal expression to, about social conditions,
including especially the conditions of their own action; awareness which has a discursive
form.
88. In Giddens terminology everything which actors know (believe) about the circumstances of
their action and that of others, drawn upon in the production and reproduction of that action,
including tacit as well as discursively available knowledge.
89. Giddens references such social behaviour as practical consciousness, a terminology used
to explain what actors know (believe) about social conditions, including especially the
conditions of their own action, but cannot express discursively.
90. Giddens (1984, p. 4).
91. Giddens (1984, p. 9).
92. In Giddens terminology an interpretation of the human agent, stressing three layers of cogni-
tion/motivation: discursive consciousness, practical consciousness and the unconsciousness.
93. Giddens uses the term reflexive monitoring, a terminology that means action is not a string
of discrete acts, involving an aggregate of intentions, but a continuous process.
94. For Giddens this means rationalisation of action.
95. For Giddens it means motivation different from reflexive monitoring and rationalisation of
actions in that much of day-to-day conduct is not directly motivated.
96. Cohen (1989, pp. 49–51).
97. Giddens (1984, p. 8).
98. In Giddens terminology structure exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human
knowledgeability, and instantiated in action; rules and resources recursively implicated in
the production and reproduction of social systems.
99. Giddens (1984, p. 18).
100. Giddens (1984, p. 22).
101. In Giddens terminology allocative resources are material resources involved in the genera-
tion of power, including the natural environment and physical artifacts; allocative resources
derive from human dominion over nature.
102. In Giddens terminology authoritative resources are non-material resources involved in the
generation of power, deriving from the capability of harnessing activities of human beings;
authoritative resources result from the dominion of some actors over others.
103. See Giddens (1984, pp. 33, 377); and Cohen (1989, p. 91).
104. Giddens means “dialectic of control,” a terminology that explains the two-way character of
the distributive aspect of power (power as control).
105. See Giddens (1984, p. 23); and Cohen (1989, p. 87).
106. See Giddens (1984, p. 377); and Cohen (1989, p. 87).
Notes 93
107. Giddens(1984, pp. 26–27).

108. Giddens use the term time-space distanciation to mean the stretching of social systems
across time-space, on the basis of mechanisms of social and system integration. System
integration is the reciprocity between actors or collectiveness across extended time-space,
outside conditions of co-presence.
109. Giddens (1984, p. 28).
110. In Giddens terminology a physical region involved as part of the setting of interaction,
having definite boundaries which help concentrate interaction in one way or another.
111. Giddens (1984, p. 118).
112. Giddens (1984, p. 122).
113. Giddens (1984, p. 119).
114. Cohen (1989, p. 111).
115. Giddens (1984, p. xxix)
116. Giddens (1984, p. 35).
117. Giddens (1984, p. 35).
118. Giddens (1984, p. 35).
119. Giddens (1984, p. 35).
120. Cohen (1989, p. 24).
121. Cohen (1989, p. 24).
122. Cohen (1989, p. 150).
123. Cohen (1989, p. 51).
124. Cohen (1989, pp. 52–54).
125. Cohen (1989, p. 28).
126. Cohen (1989, p. 28).
Chapter 5
Methodological Considerations for Case Study
Analysis
This chapter brings forward the earlier discussion on ocean governance, regions
and regime theory to develop an empirical model of regime effectiveness. The
emphasis is on measuring behavioural change, institutional effectiveness and level
of collaboration across space and over time in analysing regime effectiveness.
5.1 Integrating the Literature on Ocean Governance, Regions

and Regimes
The 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea is the nucleus of the new ocean regime
around which a web of international maritime law for ocean governance has evolved
in the last three decades. A genuine commitment from national governments will be
needed for this new ocean regime to work.1
In 1996, Mark Valencia published a seminal piece and the only work so far
on maritime regime building. His work, centred on multilateral regime building in
North-East Asia, focused on incipient regionalism, particularly on the role of both
maritime issues and regimes in regional confidence-building.2 Five years later, in
deriving lessons learned, Valencia is quick to point out that no maritime regime has
yet been initiated in North-East Asia,3 although the case studies that form the empir-
ical backbone of these lessons all favour the development of international regimes
to promote regional cooperation.
The 200 nm EEZ under the new ocean regime has created boundary conflicts and
conflict of interests in ocean use because as Valencia elucidates there is “insufficient
understanding and consideration (by states bordering the oceans) of the transna-
tional and interdependent character of the ocean environment and resources and
activities that it harbours and supports”.4
The 200 nm EEZ has also created political tension between the traditional notion
of “freedom of the high seas” and the new form of “control and regulation” in pursuit
of national interests in the oceans. Valencia points out that a “major impediment is
the widespread inability to formulate and implement (national) ocean policy as an
integrated whole, balancing the overall interests of the nation and the region in the
short and long term”.5
96 5 Methodological Considerations for Case Study Analysis
This is despite international maritime regimes encouraging increased regional

cooperation among states bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed body of water, a
policy idea inspired by Valencia in arguing for a maritime regime for North-East
Asia.6 The establishing of regional governing bodies is one of the six principles
emphasised by Jon Van Dyke for a comprehensive regime of ocean governance.7
Even the other five principles of ecological vitality; due regard; polluter pays;
common heritage; and shared resources, all stress the need for a coordinated,
cooperative and collaborative perspective of ocean governance.
Valencia sets out the conceptual basis and framework of a system for ocean
governance.8 For a specified marine geographic region, the approach focuses on
getting a defined group of actors to reach agreement on the following: distribu-
tion of power and authority, system of rights and obligations and a body of rules
and regulations that govern individual behaviour of members.9 Such an agreement
would give effect to the institutional character, jurisdictional boundaries and condi-
tions of operation and consequences of operation of the maritime regime.10 Valencia
identifies several key features of an ideal maritime regime:
• Define structure, objectives and functions supported by a significant political

constituency;
• focus on sector-specific issues of concern, identified at the outset, to geographi-
cally fit the natural system;
• concentrate on policy functions maintaining a decentralised decision-making
process;
• avoid distributive issues to focus on mutually beneficial solutions where benefits
of participation outweigh the costs;
• build institutionalised capacity with clear distribution of power and authority
conducive to negotiating rules and/or agreements;
• commit to cooperative marine environment monitoring and scientific research;
• seize “window of opportunity” in crisis situations to enhance speed of regime
formation; and
• maintain strong leadership by one or more members coupled with willingness by
other members to effectively participate would give impetus and direction for the
regime.11
According to Valencia, a level of complexity with regard to maritime regime

building in a nonhomogenous region like Asia-Pacific (as also the Indian Ocean)
is that consensus is prerequisite. Asians generally distrust outside solutions, favour
principle of non-interference and prefer informal structures, placing great emphasis
on personal relationships.12
In looking at the interdependent ocean world, Borgese provides a powerful
interpretation of the Law of the Sea convention, arguing it limits, transforms and
transcends the concept of sovereignty.13 It limits sovereignty by:
• creating a comprehensive dispute settlement system making peaceful settlement

of disputes mandatory;
5.2 Maritime Regime Analysis in the Indian Ocean Region 97
• subjecting “sovereign rights” over resources to duties of conservation and

protection of the environment, and even sharing of resources;
• imposing the duty to cooperate—states shall cooperate—in protecting the marine
environment, resource management, marine scientific research, and transfer and
development of technology; and
• imposing international taxation on resource exploitation in international areas
and the national continental shelf claims beyond 200 nm.14
It transforms sovereignty by disaggregating rights into sovereign rights, exclu-

sive rights, jurisdiction and control and shared jurisdiction, all the time placing
near equal emphasis on states and non-state entities.15 It transcends sovereignty
by setting aside state claims or sovereignty over resources in the area in favour
of mankind as a whole.16 The answer then for effective ocean governance lies in
regional organisations belonging to member states of a region.17
Reflecting on 45 years of cumulative Canadian experience with regional ocean
initiatives, Lennox Hinds contends regional organisations are in a unique posi-
tion to fill the implementation gap between the international and national lev-
els and satisfy both global and national ocean governance and development
needs.18
5.2 Maritime Regime Analysis in the Indian Ocean Region
In the realm of international maritime regimes to fathom the Indian Ocean as “one
ocean” is like sailing on calm seas in fair weather fishing at leisure. To determine
the effectiveness of different maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean as “one region”
is like sinking into the depths of the ocean destined to be laid to rest on the ocean
floor. The sharp contrast in the oceanic experience lies in the differing perceptions
of the sailor and the landlubber.
Defining the geographic area of regime influence is akin to the view of a lookout
from the crow’s nest of a sailing vessel that gives the feeling of one vast ocean. For
landlubbers looking out from the different shorelines of the many sovereign lands,
the ocean beyond gives the sinking feeling of the unknown. Like the landlubber,
what nation-states fail to do is look deep within the oceanic realm to discover a
completely new world in which the goal is one—a sustainable, safe, secure and
clean Indian Ocean.
Nations effortlessly focus on what they can see on the surface—vast geographic
distances, diverse cultures, varied capacities, different interests and dissimilar
laws—to justify individual actions creating suspicions and mistrust, which only
leads to a breakdown of maritime regimes.
The heart of the research on ocean governance in the Indian Ocean Region
lies in efforts to assess the broader consequences of issue-specific maritime
regimes embedded within the much more far-reaching Law of the Sea umbrella-
regime.
With research on the broader consequences of international regimes in gen-

eral still in its infancy, a standard taxonomy for defining and measuring broader
consequences has yet to become available.19
According to Underdal and Young, the suggested strategy for research then is to
devise a methodological model that integrates the works of many scholars, while
the research still exercises individual creativity and develops a personal niche.20
The logic being that a serious research endeavour is only going to add to the exist-
ing stock of knowledge about broader consequences.21 A set of ideas inspired by
Underdal and Young and Miles project22 are used in designing a methodological
model for measuring regime effectiveness.
5.3 Meaning of Regime Effectiveness

The discussion to flow directs attention primarily to the conceptual definition of
regime effectiveness considered a subfield of the study of regime consequences.23
Young and Underdal have each made important contributions in this regard.
Young adopts five approaches in explaining the meaning of effectiveness. First,
the problem-solving approach centres on the degree to which a regime eliminates or
alleviates the problem that prompted the creation of a regime.
Second, the legal approach provides a measure of the degree to which con-
tractual obligations are met, where rules are complied with, policies changed and
programmes initiated.
Third, an economic approach measures efficiency in addition to incorporating
contractual obligations by assessing not only whether a regime generates the right
outcome but also whether it does so at least cost.
Fourth, a normative approach equates effectiveness with the achievement of
values such as fairness or justice, stewardship, participation and so forth.
Finally, a political approach treats regimes as being responsible for changes in
the behaviour of actors, in the interest of actors or in the policies and performance
of institutions in ways that contributes to the positive management of the targeted
problem.24
Underdal cautions against confusing effectiveness with efficiency and for effec-
tiveness to imply fairness.25 Using a common-sense approach, Underdal considers
a regime as effective should it achieve success in performing a certain (set of)
function(s) or solving the problem(s) that motivated its establishment.26
5.4 Objects of Assessment
From a methodological perspective, the design of the conceptual framework using

regime effectiveness as the dependant variable must state precisely the object to
be evaluated, the standard against which the object is to be evaluated and the
measurement operations to be performed in comparing the object to this standard.27
5.5 Importance of Time and Space 99
Underdal uses the three elements to construct two principal alternatives. The first
alternative argues that “regimes matter” by comparing actual performance under the
regime with the hypothetical state of affairs under a no-regime counterfactual. The
second alternative is to compare achievements of the regime against the idea of what
constitutes a “good” or “optimal” solution or some notion of the “best” solution.28
Helm and Sprinz combine the two alternatives into a single formula29 (see below)
or the Oslo-Potsdam solution that conceptualises the effectiveness of a regime in
terms of the extent to which it in fact accomplishes all that can be accomplished.30
Actual regime solution − Non-cooperative outcome

Collective optimum − Non-coopertive outcome
A healthy debate ensued in the Global Environmental Politics journal on the

Oslo-Potsdam solution to measure regime effectiveness.31
Analytically, this book brings into play Underdal’s treatment of output, outcome
and impact as three distinctive objects of assessment.32 In short, output is setting out
the norms, principles and rules constituting the regime; outcome is the behavioural
change in actors as the first product of implementing the regime; and impact is
change in the issue area as result of implementation and adaptation of that regime.33
What this distinction does is to frame the causal chain of events from start to
finish—regime formation (output), regime implementation (outcome) and regime
consequences (impact)—over time and across space.
An important goal in this connection is that effectiveness can be measured at
different points in the causal chain.34 The starting point in time being the political
construct of agenda-setting (output) where an international agreement is signed for
states to then take measures for implementing the agreement.
The political construct of the regime differs from the political processes that are
then set into motion in institutionalisation of the regime.35 This generates its own
consequences in the behaviour of actors (outcome). State actors, for example, may
act unilaterally or collectively through bilateral and multilateral arrangements in
implementation of the regime.36
Finally, long after the regime has been established in an issue area, the effects of
behavioural change on the particular problem (impact) across a defined space can
actually be measured.37
The objective of this discussion was to differentiate between the effects
attributable to establishing the regime itself and those that can be attributed to the
problem-solving efforts or processes in implementation of the regime.
5.5 Importance of Time and Space
It is worth noting as well the importance of time and space in the measure of effec-
tiveness. It is important not to confine the analysis to just measuring the effects from
establishment of the regime but to also analyse the change in behaviour. Underdal
provides good reasons for doing so.38
First, change in human behaviour is a necessary condition for problem-solving,

whatever the ultimate purpose of the regime. In terms of governance, success in
achieving behavioural change is a reasonable notion of effectiveness, even if the
change in behaviour does not bring about an improvement in the situation. For
political scientists, the issue is one of diagnostic error rather than of ineffective
governance.
Second, attempts at determining the impact on complex social and biophysical
systems not only requires substantial expertise in other disciplines outside the social
sciences, but it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the effects caused by the
regime itself and effects caused by other external factors.
Third, influence exerted by a regime differs from actor to actor. Focusing on such
differentials can be interesting in studying regime effects at the micro level as well
as important in aggregating levels of change.
Fourth, by focusing on the immediate behavioural change needed rather than on
the ultimate purpose can allow assessment of regime effects at an early stage, well
before impact on the problem itself can be determined.
Finally, the relationship between effectiveness and level of collaboration mea-
sured in terms of behavioural change is of significant interest. Underdal assumes
that level of collaboration is affected by problem malignancy and problem-
solving capacity but also that it makes a positive, albeit modest, contribution to
effectiveness.39
A measure of the level of collaboration as the intervening variable not only pro-
vides a standard against which the object (regime effectiveness) can be evaluated,
but also allows an assessment of whether greater regional cooperation can lead to
better substantive results in the issue area.
5.6 Level of Collaboration as a Measure of Effectiveness

This leads to conceiving effectiveness in terms of relative improvement caused by
the level of collaboration and at the same time evaluating regime effectiveness
against the concept of a good or optimal solution concerned with satisfying and max-
imising, respectively.40 The notion of relative improvement calls for establishing a
baseline as the point of reference from which improvement can be measured. One
option is using the counterfactual position of a no-regime condition that measures
effectiveness in absolute terms, an elusive notion virtually impossible to measure.
The alternative practical option is to take as the baseline the previous order or rules
of the game and measure change from one order to another in terms of effectiveness
differentials.
The notion of a good or ideal solution refers to the collective optimum or the opti-
mal solution that can be accomplished collectively for the group of members, given
the state of knowledge at the time. This raises the question of what technically and
politically constitutes as the maximum that a particular group of actors can accom-
plish. Under the Pareto frontier, the political optimum is reached when no further
5.8 Broader Consequences of Regime Effectiveness Across Space 101
increase in benefits to one party can be accomplished without one or more members
of the group being worse off.41 In the absence of a reliable method to determine
the distance from the Pareto frontier,42 the research uses level of collaboration, a
political process of behavioural change, to determine the political optimum.
In international relations, there is a complete absence of an Indian Ocean Region.
It is possible then to consider the maxim of regional cooperation as the political
optimum or ideal solution, even though there is no guarantee that such cooperation
will maximise technical benefits in the issue area of the regime for members of the
group.
5.7 Behavioural Change and Institutional Effectiveness
A measure of behavioural change in terms of the level of collaboration can provide

a good indicator of the distance actually accomplished and the distance remaining to
reach the political optimum. Given that technically perfect solutions are politically
not necessarily feasible,43 institutional effectiveness stressed by Keohane, Haas and
Levy and described earlier in Chapter 4 assumes significance. This is supported
by Underdal who takes the view that what is politically feasible depends on the
institutional setting.44
Thus, a considered measure of the three Cs—concern, contractual environment
and capacity—to do with structure over time is a good indicator for the politi-
cal process along the technical optimum. Such an approach moves away from the
narrow analysis of whether the regime solved the problem in the issue area, to a
broader analysis of whether the regime increased concern, contractual environment
and capacity, which would also be reflected in the level of collaboration over time
and across space.
So far, the research methodology has taken Underdal’s simple common-sense
notion of effectiveness, saying that the regime is effective should it successfully per-
form certain (set of) functions or solve the problem that motivated its establishment.
The immediate target is behavioural change (actor) and institutional effectiveness
(structure).
5.8 Broader Consequences of Regime Effectiveness Across Space
Measurements have been integrated into a single intervening variable of the level of
collaboration. Using a level of collaboration not only allows how a regime influences
behaviour, but also allows for assessing impact on the basic problem itself. The
question posed is does greater regional cooperation lead to better substantive results
in the issue area.
The methodology has attempted to sharpen the dependant variables by con-
structing an actor–structure continuum but stopped short of including normative
assessments.45 The discussion makes no pretence of using the assessment of
effectiveness as a tool for broader normative evaluation, such as whether a regime

produces outcomes that are efficient or fair in terms of who deals with what,
how, when and where; determining costs incurred in establishing and operating the
regime; and determining internal distribution of costs and benefits.46
The approach taken is about determining the broader consequences of regime
effectiveness. What this approach cannot provide is simultaneously determining the
effectiveness of regime building as a problem-solving strategy.47 If this is done,
there is a significant risk of bias in favour of findings inflating the importance of
regimes for solving collective problems.48
It is important to stress again that the basic question is whether greater regional
cooperation leads to better substantive results in the issue area; that is, ongoing
governing regional efforts to improve the situation, but it is not necessary that the
problem be solved.
So, before launching into defining and coding the independent variables, a dis-
cussion on broader consequences is in order. Here again, in the discussion on
broader consequences, no attempt has been made to cast a wide net to capture all
the consequences of international maritime regimes—an otherwise impossible task.
The approach taken is to focus attention on behavioural pathways or mecha-
nisms. Mapping behavioural pathways as determinants of broader consequences
across space is essential in understanding the effect institutions have over time.49
5.8.1 Analytic Construct of Broader Consequences Across Space
The analytic construct for this is drawn from the six behavioural pathways,
developed by Young and Levy and put to test in the effectiveness of inter-
national environmental regimes project on causal connections and behavioural
mechanisms.50
Regimes as utility modifiers underscore actors as self-interested utility max-

imisers in that actors alter their behaviour when social practices within
institutional arrangements make it worth their while to do so, and in the costs
and benefits they attach to well-defined options. The essential logic is one
of linkage in which regimes can threaten penalties for non-compliance or
promise rewards for compliance.
Regimes as learning facilitators highlight the institutional processes that give
rise to individual and collective learning. The essential point is that regimes
do play a role in changing information, prevailing discourses and even values.
In the process, they alter the motive forces that give rise to the behaviour of
individuals and collective entities active in the issue area.
Regimes as enhancers of cooperation heighten to alleviate problems of trust
and motivation and allow participants to achieve collective outcomes that lie
closer to the Pareto frontier. The basic point is regimes affect behaviour by
mitigating the collective-action problems.
5.9 Variables for Measurement of Regime Effectiveness 103
Regimes as bestowers of authority emphasise authoritativeness of regime rules

and activities that triggers the behavioural response rather than some calcu-
lation of the anticipated benefits and costs of the different options available
to decision-makers. The basic premise is one of respect for authority.
Regimes as role definers underline the fact that regimes can at times operate
at the constitutive-level shaping identities and therefore interests of actors. In
the process, regimes can influence the way actors behave in the roles assigned
to them.
Regimes as agents of internal realignments accentuate the proposition that
members of regimes and others active in the relevant behavioural complex
need not be treated as unitary actors. The focus here is on internal dynam-
ics of states or other collective entities to explain when and to what extent
regimes are likely to prove effective.
No attempt is made to impose order by isolating a single behavioural pathway

as being adequate in explaining the causal links in the complex institutional pro-
cesses. Rather, by treating behavioural pathways in a comprehensive manner at least
three broader consequences across space are identified in the context of regional
cooperation.51
First, the behavioural pathways of regimes as utility modifiers and regimes as
learning facilitators can provide insights into the level of state learning at the unit
level.
Second, the behavioural pathways of regimes as enhancers of cooperation and
regimes as bestowers of authority can inform the extent of regional cooperation at
the sub-system level.
Finally, the behavioural pathways of regimes as role definers and regimes
as agents of internal realignments can explain the potential for emergence of
international cooperation at the system level.
Taken together, the six behavioural pathways to broader consequences across
space complement the three Cs of structure over time to create a time and space
dimensional behavioural map of institutional effectiveness.52
5.9 Variables for Measurement of Regime Effectiveness

The discussion so far describes behavioural change and institutional effectiveness
as the two main independent variables in the analysis of the core actor–structure
interaction for regime effectiveness. Both these independent variables are a fur-
ther function of two sets of variables each. Behavioural change is a function of the
stages of regime formation and actor behaviour and leadership discussed in Chapter
4. Institutional effectiveness is a function of structure over time dealt through use
of structuration theory discussed in Chapter 4 and the broader consequence across
space. Drawing on the discussion in Chapter 4, these independent variables in the
measurement of regime effectiveness as the dependant variable are summarised in
Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Components of regime effectiveness and variables for measurement
Key components of regime effectiveness as the dependant variable
Processes of regime Self-generation Negotiation Imposition

formation
Independent variable: behavioural change—level of collaboration as the intervening variable
Stages of regime Agenda formation Institutional choice Operationalisation

formation
Actor behaviour and Power-based actors Knowledge-based Interest-based actors
leadership and structural actors and and
leadership intellectual entrepreneurial
leadership leadership
Independent variable: Institutional effectiveness—level of collaboration as the intervening

variable
Structure over time Signification/ Legitimisation/ Domination/

increasing concern improving increasing
contractual capacity of
environment governments
Broader Improved state Greater regional Emergence of
consequences learning cooperation international
across space cooperation
To refresh the discussion in Chapter 4, the process of regime formation can result
in a self-generated regime, negotiated regime or an imposed regime. Even after
regime formation, the regime does not remain static but continues to evolve in which
the one process can be substituted for the other.
The multivariate model in Chapter 4 (see Fig. 4.3) highlights the different
stages of regime formation that include agenda formation, institutional choice and
operationalisation. The discussion evolves into actor behaviour by power-based,
interest-based and knowledge-based actors through structural, entrepreneurial and
intellectual leadership. Taken together, the two variables of stages of regime forma-
tion and actor behaviour and leadership measure behavioural change in determining
the effectiveness of a regime.
The discussion in Chapter 4 on structuration theory highlights the three dimen-
sions of structure over time: signification or increasing concern; legitimisation or
improving the contractual environment; and domination or increasing capacity of
governments in improving the effectiveness of regimes. The broader consequences
across space of improved state learning, greater regional cooperation and emer-
gence of international cooperation combined with the structure over time provide
a measure of institutional effectiveness in determining the overall effectiveness of a
regime.
The combined measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness pro-
vides a measure of the level of collaboration in assessing regime effectiveness. The
process of measurement is illustrated in Fig. 5.1.
5.9 Variables for Measurement of Regime Effectiveness 105
Fig. 5.1 Process of measuring regime effectiveness

5.10 Constructing the Measurement Scale

The research does not attempt to go beyond the ordinal level of measurement (dis-
tinguishing more from less) considered sufficient to understanding what changes, if
any, in the level of collaboration have been brought about by the maritime regime.
A numerical score requires making an unambiguous choice and is more transpar-
ent. Moreover, the freedom of a purely verbal mode of analysis is largely illusory
and the freedom from the constraints of fixed format may come at cost. In mea-
suring single variables, Underdal argues that measurements of behavioural change
and institutional effectiveness call for a judgemental assessment rather than some
form of straightforward observation of simple counting.53 Therefore, each numeri-
cal score is at the same level of measurement as the corresponding verbal description
in the rubric.
The guidelines used for assigning a verbal description to each numerical score of
the rubric are based on the Miles project on confronting theory with evidence and
the coding data used by the International Regime Database (IRD).54
The IRD architecture is built on four pillars—regime formation, regime
attributes, regime consequences and regime dynamics. The data protocol
Table 5.2 Typology of effective and ineffective regimes
Independent variable Effective regime Ineffective regime
Type of problem • Predominantly benign or at • Predominantly malignant

least mixed.
• Good state of knowledge • Poor state of knowledge
Problem-solving capacity High as indicated by: Low as indicated by:

• Decision rules providing for • Decision rules requiring
adoption of rules by majority unanimity or consensus
• An IGO with significant actor • Weak IGO serving the regime
capacity serving the regime
• A well-integrated epistemic • No epistemic community
community present
• Distribution of power in • Distribution of power in
favour of pushers or pushers favour of laggards or
+ intermediaries laggards + bystanders
• Instrumental leadership by • Scant instrumental leadership
one or a few parties or by provided by delegates or
individual delegates or coalitions of delegates
coalitions of delegates
Political context Favourable, as indicated by: Unfavourable, as indicated by:
• Linkages to other, benign • Linkages to other malign
problems problems
• Ulterior motives or selective • No ulterior motives or
incentives for cooperation selective incentives for
cooperation
Source: Miles et al. Environmental regime effectiveness

5.11 Rubric for Measuring Regime Effectiveness 107
specifically interrogates the roles of power, interests and knowledge; the activities of
states, non-state actors and individuals; the stages of agenda formation, negotiation
and operationalisation; outputs, outcomes and impacts; the effectiveness of regimes
in solving specific problems and the broader consequences of regimes.
Table 5.2 summarises the typology for effective and ineffective regimes. The
Miles project based on the scores of the dependant variables categorises regimes
as effective, mixed or ineffective regimes. Mixed performance regimes have either
a combination of positive and negative scores or an intermediate score that lies
between effective and ineffective regimes.
In confronting theory with evidence, the analysis deals with the three
components—regime effectiveness, problem type and problem-solving capacity—
as the core model of the project.
5.11 Rubric for Measuring Regime Effectiveness

In developing the rubric, the focus is directly on the theory-based model of actor–
structure interaction over time and across space. The rubric uses a 5-point ordinal
scale and a corresponding verbal description for measurement of variables. In using
a scale from 1 to 5, what can be inferred is that 1<2<3<4<5. The verbal description
serves as a guideline for assessing each of the variables.
Taking a Level 4 measurement as an example, the rubric describes the actor–
structure interplay from which the level of collaboration can be measured. A Level
4 measurement shows that leadership on the part of actors is reasonably well
established with above-average level of knowledge and prominent participation in
institutional bargaining with most states in the region as members of the regime. In
the formation of the regime, the problem requiring collective response is accurately
identified with the institutional setting regionally operationalised and national mea-
sures evident in every member state of the regime. The structure over time indicates
a high level of concern among stakeholders with a strong regulatory framework for
legitimising the norms and principles of the regime and a high level of political,
legal and administrative capacity among member states of the regime. The broader
consequences across space show an above-average level of learning with decisive
cooperation and quite significant change in the capacity of every member state par-
ticipating at the international level. Table 5.3 summarises the Level 4 measurement
of actor–structure interplay and Table 5.4 illustrates the complete rubric used in the
analysis of the case studies.
In Table 5.5, the scores of each sub-variable are added to provide an average score
for the four sets of independent variables used to measure behavioural change and
institutional effectiveness. The scores of the independent variables are then averaged
to provide a measure of the level of collaboration as the intervening variable. It is
important to note that the numerical scores are dynamic and indicative of the state
of affairs as they exist now, based on the accessible public documentation at the
time.
108
Table 5.3 Level 4 measurement of actor–structure interplay
Variable Sub-variable 1 Sub-variable 2 Sub-variable 3
Stages of regime formation Knowledge-based Interest-based Power-based actors/structural

actors/intellectual leadership actors/entrepreneurial leadership leadership
Intellectual leadership on part of Entrepreneurial leadership by Structural leadership by
knowledge-based actors interest-based actors reasonably power-based actors reasonably
reasonably well established. well established. Prominent well established. Commitment
5
Epistemic community and/or participation of interest-based to issue-specific resources is

non-state actors are quite well actors in institutional bargaining. above average. The more
integrated and play some Responsive interest in present powerful resource states pledge
influential role in regime and future impacts of the substantial allocative and
formation and implementation problem authoritative resources and are
processes. Above-average level joined by most other member
of consensual knowledge base states. Nearly all states from the
region are party to the regime
Stages of regime formation Agenda formation Institutional choice Operationalisation
Problems that require collective The institutional setting is National measures for
response are accurately regionally operationalised in operationalisation of the regime
identified and agenda converted member states and also provides are evident in every member
into measures for collective some low-key political inputs state from the region
action by member states from besides acting as a mediator or
the region go-between
Methodological Considerations for Case Study Analysis
5.11
Variable Sub-variable 1 Sub-variable 2 Sub-variable 3
Structure over time Signification/level of concern Legitimisation/ Domination/national capacity

contractual environment
High level of concern among High level of credible commitment High level of political, legal and
stakeholders. Concerns shared among member states from the administrative national capacity
by every member state from the region. Strong regulatory among member states from the
region framework for legitimising region. Strong regional effort at
international norms and capacity-building
Rubric for Measuring Regime Effectiveness
principles within the region

Broader consequences State learning at the unit level Regional cooperation at the International cooperation at the
across space sub-system level system level
Above-average level of cognitive Decisive cooperation among every Quite significant change in
learning among member states member state from the region on capacity of every member state
from the region about the nature establishing well-defined from the region to effectively
of problem and information activities and resources, needed participate at the international
about the options available for to move from norms to rules level in regime implementation
addressing the problem

109
110
Table 5.4 Rubric for measuring regime effectiveness
1 2 3 4 5
Actor behaviour and Knowledge-based Intellectual Intellectual Intellectual Intellectual Intellectual

leadership actors and leadership on part leadership on part leadership on part leadership on part leadership on part
intellectual of knowledge- of knowledge- of knowledge- of knowledge- of knowledge-
leadership based actors not at based actors based actors based actors based actors well
all established. somewhat reasonably reasonably well established and
Epsitemic established. established. established. energised.
5
community and/or Epistemic Epistemic Epistemic Epistemic

non-state actors community and/or community and/or community and/or community and/or
inactive. Very non-state actors non-state actors non-state actors non-state actors
poor level of active but do play loosely integrated are quite well are well integrated
consensual an influential role. but by no means a integrated and and penetrate deep
knowledge base. Below average coherent actor. play some into national
level of Average level of influential role in governments to
consensual consensual regime formation play an active and
knowledge base. knowledge base. and influential role in
implementation regime formation
processes. Above and
average level of implementation
consensual processes. Very
knowledge base. good level of
consensual
knowledge base.
5.11
1 2 3 4 5
Interest-based actors Entrepreneurial Entrepreneurial Entrepreneurial Entrepreneurial Entrepreneurial

and leadership by leadership by leadership by leadership by leadership by
entrepreneurial interest-based interest-based interest-based interest-based interest-based
leadership actors not at all actors somewhat actors reasonably actors reasonably actors well
established. No established. Some established. Good well established. established and
participation of participation of participation of Prominent energised.
interest-based interest-based interest-based participation of Remarkable
actors in actors in actors in interest-based participation of

institutional institutional institutional actors in interest-based
bargaining. No bargaining. Little bargaining. Keen institutional actors in
interest in present interest in present interest in present bargaining. institutional
and future impacts and future impacts and future impacts Responsive bargaining.
of the problem. of the problem. of the problem. interest in present Notable interest in
and future impacts present and future
of the problem. impacts of the
problem.
111
112
1 2 3 4 5
Power-based actors Structural leadership Structural leadership Structural leadership Structural leadership Structural leadership
and structural by power-based by power-based by power-based by power-based by power-based
leadership actors not at all actors somewhat actors reasonably actors reasonably actors well
established. established. established. well established. established and
Commitment to Commitment to Commitment to Commitment to energised.
5
issue-specific issue-specific issue-specific issue-specific Commitment to

resources is very resources is below resources is resources is above issue-specific
poor, even by the average. The more average. The more average. The more resources is very
more powerful powerful resource powerful resource powerful resource good. All States
resource States. States have not States pledge States pledge from the region
Not all States fully pledged greater allocative substantial are party to the
from the region allocative and and authoritative allocative and regime and pledge
are party to the authoritative resources and are authoritative substantial
regime. resources. Since joined by few resources and are allocative and
inception of the other member joined by most authoritative
regime, more States. A good other member resources.
States from the number of States States. Nearly all
region are party to from the region States from the
the regime. are party to the region are party to
regime. the regime.
5.11
1 2 3 4 5
Stage of regime Agenda formation Problems that Problems that Problems that Problems that Problems that
formation require collective require collective require collective require collective require collective
response are not response are response are response are response are
identified. somewhat accurately accurately accurately
identified. identified and identified and identified and
agreed upon by agenda converted agenda converted
member States into measures for into measures for
from the region. collective action collective action
by member States by all States from
from the region. the region as
participants.
Institutional choice There is no The institutional The institutional The institutional A system level
institutional setting is confined setting has a setting is institution that
setting. to office and secretarial role for regionally generates effective
record keeping building regional operationalised in cooperation
functions for administrative member States amongst all States
member States. capability in and also provides from the region is
member States some low-key operational and
and also provides political inputs also provides
some descriptive besides acting as a political inputs,
or informational mediator or acting as advocate
inputs into the go-between. in promoting own
negotiation ideas and
process. solutions.
113
114
1 2 3 4 5
Operationalisation No national National measures National measures National measures National measures
measures for for operationali- for operationali- for operationali- for operationali-
operationalisation sation of the sation of the sation of the sation of the
5
of the regime are regime are evident regime are evident regime are evident regime are evident
evident. in few member in most member in every member in all States from
States from the States from the State from the the region, now
region. region. region. participants in the
regime.
Structure over time Signification/level of Very low level of Low level of concern Moderate level of High level of Very high level of
concern concern amongst amongst concern amongst concern amongst concern amongst
stakeholders. stakeholders. stakeholders. stakeholders. stakeholders.
Concerns not Concerns shared Concerns shared Concerns shared Concerns shared
shared by States by few member by most member by every member by all States from
from the region. States from the States from the State from the the region, now
region. region. region. particpants in the
regime.
5.11
1 2 3 4 5
Legitimisation/ Very low level of Low level of credible Moderate level of High level of Very high level of
contractual credible commitment credible credible credible
environment commitment amongst member commitment commitment commitment
amongst States States from the amongst member amongst member amongst all States
from the region. region. Weak States from the States from the from the region as
Very weak regulatory region. Neither region. Strong participants. Very
regulatory framework for weak/strong regulatory strong regulatory
framework for legitimising regulatory framework for framework for
legitimising international framework for legitimising legitimising
international norms and legitimising international international
norms and principles within international norms and norms and
principles within the region. norms and principles within principles within
the region. principles within the region. the region.
the region.
Domination/ Very low level of Low level of Moderate level of High level of Very high level of
national capacity political, legal and political, legal and political, legal and political, legal and political, legal and
administrative administrative administrative administrative administrative
national capacity national capacity national capacity national capacity national capacity
amongst States amongst member amongst member amongst member amongst all States
from the region. States from the States from the States from the from the region,
Very weak region. Weak region. Neither region. Strong now participants
regional effort at regional effort at weak/strong regional effort at in the regime.
capacity building. capacity building. regional effort at capacity building. Very strong
capacity building. regional effort at
capacity building.
115
116
1 2 3 4 5
Broader State learning at the Very poor level of Below average level Average level of Above average level Very good level of
consequences unit level cognitive learning of cognitive cognitive learning of cognitive cognitive learning
across space amongst States learning amongst amongst member learning amongst amongst all States
from the region member States States from the member States from the region,
about the nature of from the region region about the from the region now participants
problem and about the nature of nature of problem about the nature of in the regime,
information about problem and and information problem and about the nature of
5
the options information about about the options information about problem and
available for the options available for the options information about
addressing the available for addressing the available for the options
problem. addressing the problem. addressing the available for
problem. problem. addressing the
problem.
Regional Insignificant Critical cooperation Essential Decisive cooperation Conclusive
cooperation at the cooperation amongst few cooperation amongst every cooperation
sub-system level amongst member member States amongst most of member State amongst all States
States from the from the region on the member States from the region on from the region,
region on establishing from the region on establishing now participants
establishing well-defined establishing well-defined in the regime, on
well-defined activities and well-defined activities and establishing
activities and resources, needed activities and resources, needed well-defined
resources, needed to move from resources, needed to move from activities and
to move from norms to rules. to move from norms to rules. resources, needed
norms to rules. norms to rules. to move from
norms to rules.
5.11
1 2 3 4 5
International Hardly any change Somewhat Fairly significant Quite significant Very significant
cooperation at the in capacities of significant change change in change in capacity change in
system level member States in capacities of capacities of most of every member capacities of all
from the region to few member member States State from the States from the
effectively States from the from the region to region to region, now
participate at the region to effectively effectively particpants in the

international level effectively participate at the participate at the regime, to
in regime participate at the international level international level effectively
implementation. international level in regime in regime participate at the
in regime implementation. implementation. international level
implementation. in regime
implementation.

117
118
Table 5.5 Measurement of level 4 regime collaboration
Independent
variable Variable sets Single variable measured Verbal description Score Average score
Behavioural Actor behaviour and Knowledge-based actors and Intellectual leadership on part of 4 4.0
Change leadership (ABL) intellectual leadership (KIL) knowledge-based actors
reasonably well established.
5
Epistemic community and/or

non-state actors are quite well
integrated and play some
influential role in regime
formation and implementation
processes. Above average level
of consensual knowledge base.
Interest-based actors and Entrepreneurial leadership by 4
entrepreneurial leadership (IEL) interest-based actors reasonably
well established. Prominent
participation of interest-based
actors in institutional bargaining.
Responsive interest in present
and future impacts of the
problem.
5.11
Independent
Power-based actors and structural Structural leadership by 4

leadership (PSL) power-based actors reasonably
well established. Commitment
to issue-specific resources is
above average. The more
powerful resource States pledge
substantial allocative and
authoritative resources and are
joined by most other member
States. Nearly all States from the
region are party to the regime.
Stage of regime Agenda formation (AF) Problems that require collective 4 4.0
formation (SRF) response are accurately

identified and agenda converted
into measures for collective
action by member States from
the region.
Institutional choice (IC) The institutional setting is 4
regionally operationalised in
member States and also provides
some low-key political inputs
besides acting as a mediator or
go-between.
Operationalisation (OP) National measures for 4
operationalisation of the regime
are evident in every member
State from the region.
119
120
Independent
Institutional Structure over time (SOT) Signification/level of concern High level of concern amongst 4 4.0
Effectiveness (SLC) stakeholders. Concerns shared
by every member State from the
region.
Legitimisation/contractual High level of credible commitment 4
environment (LCE) amongst member States from
the region. Strong regulatory
framework for legitimising
5
international norms and

principles within the region.
Domination/national capacity High level of political, legal and 4
(DNC) administrative national capacity
amongst member States from
the region. Strong regional effort
at capacity building.
Broader consequences State learning at the unit level (SL) Above average level of cognitive 4 4.0
across space (BCS) learning amongst member States
from the region about the nature
of problem and information
about the options available for
addressing the problem.
Regional cooperation at the Decisive cooperation amongst 4
sub-system level (RC) every member State from the
region on establishing
well-defined activities and
resources, needed to move from
norms to rules.
5.11
Independent
International cooperation at the Quite significant change in 4

system level (IC) capacity of every member State
from the region to effectively

participate at the international
level in regime implementation.
Intervening Level of collaboration (LOC) 4.00
variable
121
Institutional Effectiveness Behavioural Change

Structure Over Time Actor Behaviour and Leadership
Signification/ Knowledge - Based
Level of Concern Intellectual Leadership
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
Domination/ Legitimisation/ Power - based Interest - based

National Capacity Contractual Environment Structural Leadership Entrepreneurial Leadership
Broader Consequences Across Space Stages of Regime Formation

State Learning
at the Unit Level Agenda Formation
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
International Cooperation Regional Cooperation Operationalisation Institutional choice

at the System level at the SubSystem level
Fig. 5.2 Measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness variable sets
Figure 5.2 illustrates the performance of each variable. A uniform score of four
across each of the three sub-variables is perceived as a better outcome for the inde-
pendent variable. At the same time, a lower score for one sub-variable compared
to the scores of the other two sub-variables can indicate an area for improvement.
The scores of each of the two independent variables for behavioural change and
institutional effectiveness are then combined to provide a similar picture (Fig. 5.3).
Figure 5.3 further aggregates the scores of both behavioural change and institu-
tional effectiveness into a single and coherent standard metric of measurement for
the level of collaboration on a sliding scale of 1–5.
Table 5.6 describes the level of collaboration, as the intervening variable, mea-
sured on the five-point ordinal scale. A Level 4 measurement shows substantial
understanding and leadership at the national level and a strong regional structure
with comparitively decisive cooperation among member states of the regime. There
is quite a significant change in the capacity of every member state from the region
to participate effectively at the international level in the regime.
5.11 Rubric for Measuring Regime Effectiveness 123
I E
5
N F 5 B 5
4 S F 4 E 4
3 T E 3 H 3
2 I C C
2 A 2
1 T T V H
1 A 1
U I I
T V O N
I E G
U
O N E
R
N E A
A S L
L S
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Fig. 5.3 Measure of level of collaboration

Table 5.6 Level of collaboration ordinal scale
Scale Level of collaboration
1 No collaborative action
2 Elementary understanding and leadership at the national level and a weak regional
structure with comparatively critical cooperation leads to somewhat significant
change in the capacity of a few of the member states from the region to participate
effectively at the international level
3 Average understanding and leadership at the national level and neither a weak nor a
strong regional structure with comparatively essential cooperation leads to fairly
significant change in the capacity of most member states from the region to
participate effectively at the international level
4 Substantial understanding and leadership at the national level and a strong regional
structure with comparatively decisive cooperation leads to quite significant change in
the capacity of every member state from the region to participate effectively at the
international level
5 World-class understanding and leadership at the national level and a very strong
regional structure with comparatively conclusive cooperation leads to a very
significant change in the capacity of all states from the region to participate
effectively at the international level
Table 5.7 shows the performance for actor behaviour and leadership, stages of
regime formation, structure over time and broader consequences across space using
the averaged scores from Table 5.5. A Level 4 score for each of the variables indi-
cates substantial actor–structure interplay leading to substantial formation of the
regime in the region. The broader consequences across space are that state learn-
ing at the unit level and cooperation at the regional level has been substantial for
member states.
Table 5.7 Recoded scores of variable sets
Fig. 5.4 Regime

effectiveness
5
4
3
2
1
LOC Level of Collaboration

ABL Actor Behaviour and Leadership
SRF Stages of Regime Formation
SOT Structure Over Time
BCS Broader Consequences across Space
Taken together with the level of collaboration score (Table 5.6), the scores of the
two sets of variables each that define behavioural change and institutional effective-
ness illustrate the assessed effectiveness of a regime (Fig. 5.4). Again, a uniform
Notes 125
score of four across each of the five measurements is perceived as a better outcome
for the regime. At the same time, a lower score of one measurement compared to
the scores of other measurements can indicate an area for improvement.
5.12 Conclusion
An international regime (regime theory) defines a manner, method or system (struc-

turation) of governance (ocean governance) across a particular geographic space
(region) and over time (regime effectiveness) in an issue area of common interest.
The regime is effective should it achieve success in performing a certain (set
of) function(s) or solve the problem(s) that motivated its establishment. Measures
of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness are integrated to arrive at a
measure for the level of collaboration as the intervening variable in the measurement
of the broader consequences of the regime across space. The focus is on measuring
ongoing regional governing efforts to improve the situation, and therefore, it is not
necessary for the problem to be solved.
The actor–structure interplay brings to the fore measurement of behavioural
change and institutional effectiveness. The measurement of actor behaviour and
leadership and stages of regime formation variables inform behavioural change.
Similarly, measurement of structure over time and the broader consequences across
space variables inform institutional effectiveness. Taken together, behavioural
change and institutional effectiveness provide a measurement of the level of
collaboration that facilitates an overall assessment of regime effectiveness.
In Part II, the theoretical model for regime effectiveness is empirically tested in
two case studies on marine scientific research (Chapter 7) and ports state control
(Chapter 9).
Notes
1. Joyner (2000, pp. 200–201).
2. Valencia (1996).
3. Valencia (2001).
4. Valencia (2000, p. 236).
5. Valencia (2000, p. 236).
6. Valencia (1996).
7. Van Dyke (1993, pp. 18–19).
8. Valencia (2000, pp. 223–247).
9. Valencia (2000, p. 231).
10. Valencia (1996, p. 31).
11. Ibid, pp. 58–61.
12. Valencia (2000, p. 235).
13. Borgese (1999, p. 985).
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid, p. 986.

17. Hinds (2003, pp. 349–356).
18. Ibid, pp. 355–356.
19. Underdal and Young (2004, pp. 7, 371).
20. Ibid, p. 376.
21. Ibid, p. 371.
22. For Miles project see Ibid, p. 63.
23. Ibid, p. 27.
24. Young (1999).
25. For a explanation on effectiveness, see Underdal and Young (2004, p. 27).
27. Ibid, pp. 4–5.
28. Underdal (2004, p. 35).
29. For a detailed discussion, see Helm and Sprinz (2000).
30. Underdal (2004, p. 35).
31. See Young (2001), Young (2003), Hovi et al. (2003a, b), for more on the Oslo-Potsdam
solution see Sprinz (2005).
32. Underdal (2002, pp. 6–7).
33. Ibid, pp. 5–7.
34. Underdal (2004, p. 34).
35. Ibid, p. 32.
36. Ibid, p. 32.
37. Ibid, p. 35.
38. See discussion by Underdal (2004, pp. 34–35).
39. Underdal (2002, p. 7).
40. Ibid, p. 8.
41. For a detailed explanation on relative improvement, collective optimum and Pareto frontier,
see Underdal (2002, pp. 7–10).
42. Underdal (2002, p. 9).
43. Ibid.
44. Institutional setting encapsulates two notions of institutions—institutions as arenas or the
framework within which politics takes place and institutions as actors that provide indepen-
dent inputs into the problem-solving process or somehow amplify outputs of these processes.
See Underdal (2002).
45. See discussion by Underdal and Young (2004, p. 367).
46. See Ibid, p. 368, Underdal (2002).
47. Miles et al. (2002, p. 473).
48. Ibid, p. 474.
49. Young and Levy (1999, p. 19).
50. Ibid, pp. 22–25.
51. Young and Levy (1999) have made the point not to examine single behavioural pathways but
to take a comprehensive approach.
52. For a discussion on the three Cs and the six behavioural pathways as complementary models,
see Levy et al. (1995).
54. See Brietmeier et al. (2006) and Miles et al. (2002).
Part III
Indian Ocean Rim Power to Govern
the Sea
Source: University of Texas, Perry Castaneda Library map collection, viewed 18 April 2009,
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/indianoceanarea.jpg
Chapter 6
Regime for Marine Scientific Research
in the Indian Ocean Region
This chapter describes the regime for marine scientific research. One of the major
focuses of international cooperation in the field of marine scientific research is the
Global Ocean Observing System. This chapter assesses the effectiveness of the
Global Ocean Observing System in the Indian Ocean region as a case study.
6.1 Importance of Marine Scientific Research
Marine science is “the scientific investigation of the ocean, its biota and its physical
boundaries with the solid earth and the atmosphere”.1 The two main objectives of
all scientific investigation as highlighted by Roger Revelle are to gain greater under-
standing of oceanic phenomena, and solve problems arising from human uses of
the ocean, particularly those arising from the development and utilisation of ocean
resources.2 Besides the conduct of ocean surveying and mapping for peacefully
delimiting maritime boundaries and following from the earlier discussion on the
marine-related problems of society, the conduct of marine scientific research (MSR)
assumes its greatest significance in the need to
• make informed decisions in the area of fisheries management, disaster and

environment management and climate change;
• protect and preserve the marine environment;
• understand distribution and abundance of ocean resources for sustainable and
equitable use and
• explore the ocean depth to provide the missing knowledge for completing the 3D
ecological understanding of the marine environment.3
One would expect a freedom of sorts in the conduct of oceanic research. Contrary
to popular belief, ocean science, once for the curious mind and largely unregu-
lated until the 1950s, for reasons of economic benefit, has quickly moved towards a
controlled and regulated regime in the conduct of all marine research.
Now that a legal regime exists, making the MSR regime work is most basic in
the continuing quest for greater ocean knowledge. Informed decision-making made
130 6 Regime for Marine Scientific Research in the Indian Ocean Region
possible from the knowledge gained is essential in reversing the alarming trends
and making quantifiable progress towards addressing the marine-related problems
of society and in protecting the marine environment for the benefit of present and
future generations.
6.2 Maritime Zones and Marine Scientific Research
The permissible or consensual conduct of marine scientific research (MSR) detailed

in Part XIII of LOSC emerged from the 1958 Geneva Convention on the continental
shelf. As the first of its kind, the MSR legal regime was brought into force in an
attempt to regulate the conduct of nonresource-related oceanographic research by
all states. Developing coastal states that are limited in their capacity to gather ocean
data sought to regulate the conduct of all forms of oceanic research or institute a
system whereby data gathered by all kinds of vessels is shared with the concerned
coastal state.
Although the legal regime gives “all states” the right to conduct marine scientific
research, the conduct of MSR essential to gaining greater understanding of oceanic
phenomena and solving marine-related problems had now become harder to achieve
under LOSC. The new legal regime places significant restrictions on oceanogra-
phers in the study of oceans than when it was considered a freedom up to the limits
of the territorial sea. The MSR legal regime for regulation purposes divides the
ocean-space into two zones. In the national maritime zones, a coastal state exercises
sovereign rights and/or jurisdiction over foreign MSR activities both in the water
column and on the seabed. Part XIII gives exclusive jurisdiction and real but not
absolute control to the coastal state in the conduct of MSR within the EEZ and the
continental shelf.4
The international maritime zone still provides for relative freedom to conduct
MSR on the “high seas” or the water column beyond the EEZ. The MSR regime
also sets the criteria for conduct of similar activities in the area or the seabed and
ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of the continental shelf claimed by
coastal states. Table 6.1 provides the scope of the MSR legal regime in the different
national and international maritime zones.
Table 6.1 Conduct of marine scientific research in the maritime zones
Conduct of marine scientific

Maritime zone research LOSC article
National zone
Internal waters (waters internal Coastal state sovereignty with Article 2, 8
to the baseline) no right to conduct marine
scientific research (unless
specifically authorised by a
coastal state)
6.2 Maritime Zones and Marine Scientific Research 131
Conduct of marine scientific

Maritime zone research LOSC article
Archipelagic waters (waters Right of sea-lane passage but Articles 53, 54 and 40
internal to archipelagic no right to conduct marine mutatis mutandis
baselines) scientific research and
hydrographic survey
activities without prior
authorisation of the
archipelagic state
Territorial sea (up to 12 nm Right of innocent passage but Articles 17, 19, 245
from the baseline) marine scientific research
prohibited without the
express consent of the
coastal state including any
act aimed at collecting
information to the prejudice
of the defence or security of
the coastal state
Contiguous zone (12–24 nm) Right to conduct marine Article 33
scientific research if the
coastal state has not claimed
an exclusive economic zone
Exclusive economic zone Coastal state right to regulate, Articles 56, 246
(12–200 nm) and authorise and conduct
Continental shelf marine scientific research
and in normal circumstances
grant consent to flag states
for conduct marine scientific
research
International zone
High seas (outside 200 nm) Freedom to conduct marine Article 87
scientific research subject to
Part XI (continental shelf)
and Part XIII (MSR regime)
and with “due regard” for the
interests of other states and
“due regard” to the rights of
the other states concerning
activities in the area
The Area Marine scientific research Articles 143, 256
conducted by the authority or
by state parties through the
authority
Source: Compiled by author

6.3 International Legal Regime for Marine Scientific Research

The present day international legal regime of MSR detailed in Part XIII of LOSC
balances the rights and responsibilities of coastal states and research states in the
conduct of research.5 This balancing of rights and responsibilities was at the core of
negotiations that produced the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.6
Even as the regime exhorts international cooperation and imposes obligations on
states to promote oceanographic research, the actual conduct of MSR has been sub-
jected to a consent regime in the EEZ and on the continental shelf. The raison d’être
for the consent regime was the desire of coastal states to safeguard their sovereign
rights over the natural resources within the coastal zone.
In balancing the interests of coastal states and the international scientific commu-
nity, the MSR legal regime emphasises that coastal states shall grant their consent
for MSR projects in “normal circumstances” without unreasonable delay or denial.7
Normal circumstances would constitute project outcomes that remain for peace-
ful purposes aimed at increasing the collective scientific knowledge of the marine
environment for the benefit of all humanity.8
The discretion to withhold consent would-be limited by such circumstances
where MSR projects are likely to interfere with the sovereign rights and jurisdiction
of coastal states within the coastal zone.9 The right to withhold consent could also
apply in circumstances where the project description provided contained inaccurate
information or if the researching state or international organisation has outstanding
obligations to the coastal state from a prior research project.10
Research states and international organisations intending to undertake MSR in
the EEZ or on the continental shelf of a coastal state are required to provide a full
description of the project at least 6 months in advance.11 Research states and inter-
national organisations are further required to comply with specific conditions, such
as, coastal state right to participation; access to all data and samples; and receiving
of all reports, conclusions or results.12
The coastal state has the right to require suspension or cessation of MSR activ-
ities where the research in progress does not comply with the original information
provided under article 248 or fails to meet the specific conditions under article
249 and following notification of suspension or cessation the research state or
international organisation must terminate the research activities.13
To balance interests of the international scientific community, the MSR legal
regime contains an “implied consent” rule applicable to situations when coastal state
consent is not forthcoming within 4 months of the receipt of the communication
of the research project.14 In such circumstances, the research state or international
organisation may proceed with the MSR project 6 months after the date upon which
the information required was provided to the coastal state.15 There are practical
problems in making this regime work, such as, coastal states ignoring the implied
consent rule or delaying consent or cancelling permission at the last moment. There
are also problems of marine scientific research expeditions sharing data.
Just as the right of the coastal state is not absolute in the national zone, the free-
dom to conduct MSR in the high seas or the international zone is no longer an
absolute freedom. All states must conduct marine scientific research on the high
6.3 International Legal Regime for Marine Scientific Research 133
seas exclusively for peaceful purposes using only appropriate scientific methods
and means with due regard to safety of navigation and human life. The research
must be carried out in conformity with regulations for protection and preservation
of the marine environment and in a manner that unjustifiably does not interfere with
other legitimate uses of the sea.16
Similar new restrictive principles of international law apply in the area or the
other international zone known as the common heritage of mankind to “all states” in
the conduct of MSR or other activities.17 The interesting point here is that although
the legal regime prohibits the conduct of MSR in pursuit of resources in the national
zone the regime allows for the conduct of such activity by the International Seabed
Authority when concerned with the area and its resources.18
Significantly, MSR activities cannot constitute the legal basis for any rightful
claim to explore, exploit or own any part of the marine environment or its natural
resources.19 Overall, coastal states enjoy sovereign rights and/or jurisdiction within
the national zones. While in the international zones, the high seas are open to all and
within the area all such rights are exercised by the International Seabed Authority
acting like a state on behalf of and for mankind as a whole.
The MSR regime represents an outcome from the confrontation between states
seeking to regulate the conduct of research, many of them developing coastal states
and states in favour of absolute freedom of research in the world’s oceans or research
states, principally led by the United States.20
The mainstay of this confrontation has been the significant gap in the scientific
and technological capabilities of developing coastal states and research states.21 A
strong supposition of the need to protect their economic and security interests was
the motivation for most coastal states.
6.3.1 Marine Scientific Research and Economic Interests

Marine minerals have been estimated to generate nearly $1 trillion every year.22
These valuable minerals include offshore oil and gas, gold, tin, diamonds, sand and
gravel, which can be found both within and beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion. Offshore oil production accounts for about 30% of total world oil production,
and offshore gas production accounts for about half of world production.23 Huge
deposits of frozen compounds of methane gas (methane hydrates) can be found
at 600–1,500 feet below the ocean floor on continental margins throughout the
world.24 These ocean-floor deposits are potentially an enormous source of energy.
Scientists estimate that they contain twice the amount of organic carbon as all
recoverable and non-recoverable oil, gas and coal deposits on earth.
Oceanic (seabed and water column) data gathered in coastal state thinking could
provide valuable information on the available extent of natural resources. In taking a
closed position, the overriding factor for developing coastal states has been the near
impossible task of distinguishing between activities of scientific vessels engaged in
“pure or applied” research for benefit of “mankind as a whole” and the activities of
commercial exploration vessels.25
Moreover, publishing of certain pure scientific research findings could poten-

tially provide valuable information to commercial entities confirming the presence
or absence of natural resources in a particular region.26 Developing coastal states
lacked the scientific and technological capability for them to determine the eco-
nomic potential of the region and viewed the publishing of such scientific research
findings as detrimental to their economic interests.27
Finally, developing coastal states were guided by the desire to gain access to all
data obtained and receive all results of the scientific research conducted in an effort
to be equally aware of the economic potential of their maritime zones.28
6.3.2 Marine Scientific Research and Military Interests
Oceanic data is equally critical to predicting sonar conditions in the conduct of

covert submarine and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) military operations.
In essence, research vessels operating near a coastal state could provide valuable
intelligence on submarine operations and other military intelligence by monitoring
electronic signals and communications. The research vessels could also be used for
detecting military installations on the seabed or for implanting electronic arrays.29
Between 2004 and 2005, considerable epistemic discussion ensued in the Marine
Policy journal on military and intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ of a
coastal state.30 A number of declarations have been filed by states against the con-
duct of military activities in the EEZ by developing coastal states and vice versa,
research states have filed sharply opposing declarations.
The problem lay in the distinction between military intelligence gathering and
“pure and applied” scientific research compounded by the verity that many sci-
entific research vessels are owned, manned and operated by navies with military
government markings.
Although, UNCLOS did contain provisions on the legal status and immunities of
military vessels, these provisions in any way did not abet in the distinction between
marine scientific research and military intelligence gathering.
A number of incidents have occurred since the capture of the US spy ship Pueblo
in 1968 by North Korea.31 The Cold War tensions, reflected somewhat in the contri-
bution by Desmond Ball, also played a part in the efforts of coastal states to limit the
intelligence gathering ability of ships designed specifically for signal intelligence
collection.32
Intelligence gathering incidents have related to both EEZ freedoms of overflight
and navigation. In 2001, a Chinese F-8 fighter aircraft collided with the US EP-3E
surveillance aircraft flying over China’s EEZ.33 In the same year, India protested
against the activities of a US hydrographic survey vessel USS Bowditch 30 nm from
the Nicobar Islands and a British survey vessel HMS Scott 190 nm from Diu near
Probander on the west coast of India.34
Djalal points out that under article 58 states differ in their interpretation on the
meaning of “freedoms” of navigation and overflight and the precise meaning of
6.4 International Cooperation in Marine Scientific Research 135
“other internationally lawful uses of the sea”.35 Bateman fleshes out the meaning
of hydrographic surveying, military survey and military data gathering to point out
that there is an overlap to some extent in the conduct of these otherwise legitimate
military activities and marine scientific research.36 The definitional and operational
issues remain unresolved and states remain divided on the legitimacy of military
and intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ of another state.37
Under such conditions, Van Dyke argues that the freedom of navigation in the
EEZ no longer exists to the same extent as the high seas.38 Valencia concludes that
the right to engage in military and intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ of
another state remains controversial.39
There is lack of common understanding of key UNCLOS terms particularly
“peaceful uses”, “peaceful purpose”, “freedom of navigation and overflight”, “other
internationally lawful uses of the sea”, “installations and structures”, “residual
rights”, “due regard”, “normal mode”, “hostile intent” and a abuse of rights.40 Then,
there are significant differences and overlap in hydrographic surveying including
military survey and military data gathering and marine scientific research.41 The
issue goes to highlight the contending positions of maritime powers that argue for
high seas freedoms being retained within EEZs and that of creeping jurisdiction by
coastal states seeking to regulate the EEZs.
6.4 International Cooperation in Marine Scientific Research
The lack of national capacity in the conduct of research and the limited capabil-
ity in monitoring and surveillance of illegal activities are the main dampeners to
effectively using scientific knowledge in pursuit of policies and projects for solv-
ing marine-related problems of society and in protecting and preserving the marine
environment.
Promoting international cooperation in MSR therefore takes on a compelling
logic and becomes critical for effectively integrating human activity and ocean uses
in a sustainable manner. Recognising that oceanic phenomena know no political
boundaries, the conduct of MSR for peaceful purposes based on mutual benefit
requires states and international organisations to cooperate in accordance with the
principle of respect for sovereignty and jurisdiction.42
Specifically, cooperative arrangements apply in the conduct of MSR “necessary
to prevent and control damage to the health and safety of persons and the envi-
ronment” within the coastal zone.43 Soons has observed that such arrangements
covers collection of data necessary for predicting earthquakes, tsunamis, hurri-
canes, cyclones, typhoons and monsoons, and monitoring of the environment with
a view to prevent or minimise the harmful effects of natural disasters or otherwise
man-made conditions of polluting the environment.44
The MSR regime requires states to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements
for the creation of favourable conditions and integrating efforts of all scien-
tists involved in the process of data gathering.45 The MSR regime also makes it
mandatory for research states and international organisations to publish and dissem-
inate information and knowledge resulting from the conduct of MSR for actively
promoting the flow of scientific data and information and the transfer of knowledge,
especially to developing states.46
Moreover, the MSR regime requires states to promote strengthening of
autonomous MSR capability for developing states by initiating programmes aimed
at providing education and training of technical and scientific personnel.47 Similar
cooperative arrangements are provided for in the conduct of MSR in the Area.48
In principle, the MSR regime ensures that all states benefit from all research con-
ducted not just in the practical application of research results, but also in furtherance
of marine scientific progress in general.
The International Oceanographic Commission (IOC) is the recognised competent
organisation within the United Nations system for the operationalisation of the MSR
regime and is complemented by the FAO, UNEP, WMO, IMO, IHO and IAEA (see
glossary) in the formulation of ocean-science programmes. UN agencies led ocean
science programmes include cooperation with other agencies, namely, IUCN, ICES
and GCRMN. Marine scientific cooperation programmes are in the three broad areas
of ocean science, fisheries and living resources, and marine pollution. The applica-
tion of the regime for marine scientific research in the Indian Ocean (IO) is analysed
using the cooperative programme for Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS).
The IOGOOS memorandum of understanding is the only agreement between Indian
Ocean countries as a whole in the field of marine scientific research. The theoretical
framework developed for regime analysis is used for determining the effectiveness
of the MSR regime in the Indian Ocean using the GOOS regional alliance as a case
study.
6.5 Process of Regime Formation: Global Ocean Observing

System (GOOS)
The Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS) fructified in 1991 after decade long
deliberations on the need for a world ocean watch to understand and forecast climate
change.49 In less than a month climate change was no longer the sole focus. The
system requirements were broadened to include physical, chemical and biological
coastal ocean monitoring.
GOOS as an enabler of marine scientific research is designed to monitor, under-
stand and predict weather and climate change; describe and forecast the state of
the ocean, including living resources; improve management of marine and coastal
ecosystems and resources; mitigate damage from natural hazards and pollution; and
protect life and property on the coastline and at sea.50 As an operational system,
GOOS is where science (research) informs international and national policy (opera-
tional) on the effects of human activity (users), climate change and natural disasters
in the ocean and coastal zones.
6.5 Process of Regime Formation: Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS) 137
Over 18 long years scientists as actors have grappled with establishing an

institutionalised framework for operationalising and implementing the concept of
GOOS.
In March 1991, the 16th IOC assembly decided to move from ad hoc to per-
manent arrangements by establishing the GOOS support office (GSO) wherein
existing GLOSS activities became the fundamental building blocks of GOOS. In
March 1992, disbanding TC/OPC the IOC, WMO and UNEP jointly sponsored an
Intergovernmental Committee for GOOS (I-GOOS) for providing intergovernmen-
tal coordination in the implementation of GOOS.
When I-GOOS met for the first time in February 1993, the committee formed
J-GOOS as technical and scientific advisory panel to inform scientists in I-GOOS.
In the same year, Health of the Ocean (HOTO) and Living Marine Resources (LMR)
ad hoc panels were also created for advancing the development of specific aspects
of GOOS.
The panels were the first signs of a complex hierarchy being created where
HOTO became a formal advisory panel to J-GOOS, which in turn acted as the advi-
sory panel to I-GOOS with each panel consisting of scientists as members informing
other scientists.
J-GOOS eventually met for the first time in May 1994, jointly sponsored by
IOC, WMO and ICSU not UNEP as the sponsor of I-GOOS. Alongside develop-
ments at the international level for establishing a GOOS structure, OECD widely
promoted GOOS to stimulate development at the regional level. The founding of
EURO-GOOS in 1994 led the way to create a seven other regional alliances by
2003 including the Indian Ocean GOOS.51
In 1994, I-GOOS formed a second “executive” Strategy Sub-Committee (SSC)
for developing a GOOS strategic plan, only to be merged with J-GOOS forming a
new GOOS Steering Committee (GSC) in 1997, this time sponsored by IOC, WMO,
UNEP and ICSU.
The GSC became responsible for all aspects of GOOS planning requiring scien-
tific and technical expertise. By 1998, GSC had finalised the strategic plan published
as a GOOS prospectus. In the interim on the coastal side, the ad hoc LMR panel met
in 1996 with another ad hoc coastal panel started in 1997 and formalised in 1998
both reporting to the GSC.
In the end, the LMR, HOTO and coastal panels were combined into a Coastal
Ocean Observations Panel (COOP) reporting to the GSC, which in turn reported to
I-GOOS. COOP published the design and implementation strategies for the coastal
module of GOOS in 2003 and 2005, respectively.
Soon thereafter COOP was dissolved and the GSC expanded into the GOOS
Scientific Steering Committee (GSSC) charged with added responsibility of coordi-
nating the coastal module.52
On the open ocean side, the IOC, WCRP and SCOR sponsored Ocean Observing
System Development Panel (OOSDP) created in the late 1980s completed its work
in 1995 with the publishing of the “Scientific Design for the common module of
GOOS and GCOS: An Ocean Observing Climate”.
The Ocean Observations Panel for Climate (OOPC) succeeded OOSDP as

the scientific advisory group making recommendations for a sustained global
ocean-observing system. Sponsored by GCOS, GOOS and WCRP, OOPC became
responsible for the global climate component of GOOS and the ocean component
of GCOS.
In 2001, OOPC published a document “Observing the Ocean in the 21st cen-
tury: A strategy for Global Ocean Observations” as guidance in observations of
the open ocean. OOPC advises the Joint WMO-IOC technical Commission for
Oceanography and Marine Meteorology (JCOMM) that is further divided into
observations, services and data-management programmes.53
The GOOS structure in the end developed into two distinct modules, namely,
the open ocean module and the coastal ocean module. Strategy and guidance
for the open ocean module is provided by OOPC and JCOMM undertakes the
implementation of the strategy.
The institutional mechanism to implement the coastal ocean module is differ-
ent. The GSSC provides the strategy and guidance for implementation by GOOS
Regional Alliances (GRAs). Inter-regional governance and identification of com-
mitment is undertaken by I-GOOS, which is advised by the GSSC. A GOOS project
office coordinates the functioning of I-GOOS, GRAs and JCOMM.
In 2007, the I-GOOS committee proposed formation of the GOOS Regional
Council (GRC) to act as a conduit between GRAs and I-GOOS in addressing the
collective needs of GRAs.54 The I-GOOS committee further endorsed formation of
Fig. 6.1 GOOS international institutional structure

Source: Developed by author from GOOS website and recent I-GOOS decisions
6.6 Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System (IOGOOS) Regional Alliance 139
a Panel for Integrated Coastal Observations (PICO) as a technical sub-committee for

providing technical advice to GSSC in the implementation of the coastal module.55
The complex international institutional structure (Fig. 6.1) for implementation of
regional programmes is largely limited to an advisory role. Within the GOOS struc-
ture, there are no apparent linkages between the coastal module and the open ocean
module. What is apparent though is that successful implementation of the coastal
ocean module would depend on the effectiveness of standalone regional alliances.
6.6 Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System (IOGOOS)

Regional Alliance
The Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System (IOGOOS) regional alliance has
been analysed from the annual reports and documentation available on its formation
on the IOGOOS website.
The text of the documentation has been classified by the independent variables of
behavioural change: stages of regime formation; and actor behaviour and leadership,
and institutional effectiveness: structure over time; and broader consequences across
space. The coding and classification of text is provided in Appendix 2.
The analysis that follows is a qualitative assessment interspersed with the what,
when, where and whom of the IOGOOS process and is presented in descriptive style
to tell a very different story from the one told by the annual reports.
As a follow-on from the GOOS process of regime formation, seven countries
(Australia, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa) border-
ing the Indian Ocean met in New Delhi in November 2001 to emphasise cooperation
in the forming of an Indian Ocean regional alliance for promoting GOOS.56
The regional alliance would focus on raising national capacities through the for-
mation of national GOOS coordination committees, promoting mutual assistance
initiatives and providing access to oceanic knowledge in its application for the
benefit of the Indian Ocean Region.
At the first conference in November 2002, 10 of the 16 countries that partici-
pated (Australia, India, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion
(France), Sri Lanka and South Africa) from the region signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU).57
IOGOOS was established as an association of 19 marine operational and research
agencies for planning, coordinating and implementing a regional ocean-observing
system in the Indian Ocean.58 Since then, Tanzania in 2002, Indonesia in 2005 and
Maldives and Thailand in 2007 have joined the IOGOOS marine scientific research
programme.
Through IOGOOS, the IOC and other GOOS sponsors: namely, UNEP, WMO,
ICSU and FAO came one-step closer to operationalising a global ocean-observing
system.59 Envisioned as a network of local, national, regional and global system of
systems the regional alliance could cost-effectively link oceanic programmes thus
enhancing existing knowledge, infrastructure and expertise.60
The network would allow more rapid and systemic acquisition of data for making
timely predictions of environmental changes.61 The idea being to better serve the
needs of marine and coastal user groups in government, private sector, scientific
community, academia, nongovernmental organisations and the coastal community.
Reaffirming IOC, WMO and ICSU support, the UNESCO chairperson, citing
examples of investments made by United States and Europe towards GOOS, empha-
sised the need for similar investments by Indian Ocean countries if the benefits of
the regional alliance were to be fully realised.62
At the Sri Lanka meeting in 2004, the top-down imposed approach to the process
of regime formation was detectable. According to the chair IOGOOS and vice-chair
IOC, what was being envisaged was an internationally acceptable global ocean-
observing system capable of addressing the broad realms of oceanic climate and
coastal issues.63 Regional alliances would allow focussing on issues of regional
concern and interests with the implementation of the ocean-observing system more
or less dependent on national contributions.64
In the GOOS process of regime formation, establishing the Indian Ocean GRA
is one of imposition in accomplishing the international marine scientific research
agenda. The process of negotiation remains in its infancy. Collaborative partnerships
with other regional bodies, such as GOOS Africa and SEA GOOS, have not been
fully negotiated.65
IOGOOS members continue to negotiate use of existing facilities, pilot projects,
operational satellites and pre-operational projects, such as the IOC established
IODE programme for data management.66 IOGOOS members acknowledge the
importance of moving from imposition towards self-generation. Such a move would
empower all members in not only generating and sharing data, but also benefiting
from the use of resultant IOGOOS products and services.67 As a result, members
would ensure long-term sustainability of national and regional ocean-observations
capacity, thereby fully operationalising IOGOOS into a user-oriented ocean-services
system.68
6.7 Actor Behaviour and Leadership
6.7.1 Knowledge-Based Actors and Intellectual Leadership

As a regional alliance between nations of the Indian Ocean, at least three national
organisations (authorities/agencies/institutions) from a single nation could become
independent members of the regional alliance.69 Ironically, inter-agency collabora-
tion within a nation appears difficult to achieve.
India, Australia and South Africa, with more than one established research
agency, preferred independent institutional membership instead of a single national
representative coordinating GOOS effort. Despite the limitation clause of not more
than three institutional members, there were four signatories from South Africa.
In effect, on inception, 10 of the 17 signatory research agencies represented the
Australia–India–South Africa triangle. The other seven research agencies were from
6.7 Actor Behaviour and Leadership 141
Iran, Kenya, La Réunion, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique and Sri Lanka.

The remaining two signatories included the IOC Perth regional office and the
US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).70 Evidently, the
regional ocean-observing agenda was going to be established, institutionalised and
operationalised by knowledge-based actors from these three nations.
Organisationally, the knowledge-based actors were encouraged to take part-
ownership and pursue the task of ocean observation through expert groups and
coordination committees.71 Wider participation from universities and other rele-
vant institutions was sought in assembling a new collective of regional expertise
for ocean observations.72
6.7.2 Interest-Based Actors and Entrepreneurial Leadership
Malone captures the essence of an operational ocean-observing system as an end-

to-end system driven by user groups,73 including government agencies, private
enterprises, scientists, educators, NGOs and the public. An effective system required
the provision of data and data products to be routinely sustained in forms and rates
specified by the users.74
In all the annual meetings, knowledge-based actors have identified the impor-
tance of entrepreneurial leadership by interest-based actors ranging from other
international and regional bodies, coastal zone managers, coastal communities,
industry-based developers and owners of tourism infrastructure, port and marine
authorities, nongovernmental organisations and the international scientific commu-
nity.
Repeated discussions at the 2004 IOGOOS meeting stressed the importance
of getting user inputs, attracting funding from interest-based actors and engag-
ing coastal communities for utilising existing local-level resources to meet project
demands within otherwise constrained budgets.75 In the aftermath of the 2004
Tsunami, the Bali meeting reviewed the IOGOOS strategy. A key consideration
was that the task of a real time 24 × 7 warning system over long-term ocean obser-
vations for climate would-be far in excess of the IOGOOS resource capacity under
current regional arrangements.76 It was thought the IOGOOS could commit to bet-
ter characterisation of other hazards such as sea-level changes arising from climate
change, cyclone events and coral bleaching.77
Undoubtedly for the Indian Ocean with 60% of the world population and com-
prising mostly of developing countries, user-driven operational oceanography that
mobilised governments, scientists and citizens remains the biggest challenge for
IOGOOS regime effectiveness.
6.7.3 Power-Based Actors and Structural Leadership
Structural leadership by power-based actors was seen as fundamental by IOGOOS

members to the successful establishment of an Ocean Observing System in the
Indian Ocean.
From an IOC perspective across nations, government recognition of the impor-

tance and consequential commitment of allocative and authoritative resources would
be crucial for operationalising the regional ocean-observing system.78
When 17 national scientific agencies/institutions from the ten participating coun-
tries signed a MoU, they stopped short of reaching an agreement requiring formal
consideration and signature at the government level.79
Not surprisingly, government support continued to elude the strong scientific
engagement at subsequent meetings.80 At the second IOGOOS annual meeting in
2004, the need to sensitise and get commitment from governments (power-based
actors, decision-makers) was acknowledged as being essential for assuring future
sustainability of the IOGOOS network.81
Moreover, there was further recognition that government departments and insti-
tutes should be engaged from the start of a project if the benefits from monitoring
keystone coastal ecosystems are to become routine government business.82 The
chanting of the mantra seeking government support for IOGOOS projects continued
during the 2005 meeting in Indonesia and the 2006 meeting in Tanzania.
6.8 Structure Over Time
6.8.1 Signification—Communication and Level of Concern
The knowledge-based epistemic community communicated a high-level of con-

cern for the fragility of the living marine environment and its sensitivity to climate
change, natural disasters and human impacts.
Open communication amongst this small epistemic group limited by capacity,
resources and even time for discussions reveals severe shortcomings that must to be
overcome before an ocean-wide data and information system can be set up for the
larger good of all Indian Ocean countries and ocean science as a whole.83
Foremost being the unacceptable disconnect between detection, processing and
prediction of ocean changes for timely, effective and sustainable management of the
marine environment and living resources.84
Then there is the problem of providing data and information over time and across
space for rapid and continuous linking of the changes occurring at the local or
ecosystem scale to the regional and global scales and vice versa.85
All told, engaging in adaptive management and building an integrated data and
information management system visualised as the “life blood” of the IOGOOS
system appeared to have been uppermost on the minds of the epistemic group.86
At close of the first meeting, enthusiasm remained high on the prospects for
regional cooperation to develop an ocean-observation system for the Indian Ocean.
The first step identified was establishing an inventory of regional capability and
capacity.87
Two years hence with a workshop on data and information management
in between not much had changed as the epistemic group reiterated effective
6.8 Structure Over Time 143
management of data as central to the success of an ocean-observing system for the

Indian Ocean.88
Clearly, commitment to IOGOOS from power-based actors remained elusive
as the group discussed a marketing strategy to sensitise and obtain commitment
from their respective governments. The second significant challenge still fac-
ing the group was how to produce national services using other global/regional/
national sources of information to solve varying local problems of individual
nations.89
To “walk the talk” the second meeting repeatedly focussed on different
aspects of expanding communications by setting up a network of committed
researchers/contact persons and institutions in the region, developing an infor-
mative website, holding capacity-building workshops and setting up e-groups for
discussion, information sharing and project development.90
By 2006, again not much changed as the marginally expanded epistemic group
attempted to organise workshops and meetings. The annual meetings show not only
extended communication for gauging member interest in different projects, firming
up projects and establishing links to other projects, but also concern for secur-
ing funding, formalising agreements and affirming commitment for implementing
projects.91
6.8.2 Legitimisation—Contractual Environment
The success of an Indian Ocean observing system legitimised within the frame-
work of GOOS would depend on a workable contractual environment. To start with,
cooperation at the national level by itself posed a considerable challenge. Diverse
national scientific agencies had different objectives and priorities.92
After debating on the nature of contractual environment, the epistemic group
chose to sign a Memorandum of Understanding amongst scientific agencies instead
of an agreement requiring formal consideration and signature by power-based actors
in government.93 A MoU without question is in itself a powerful instrument in
the knowledge that a formal government agreement is not going to be possible.
Unfortunately, the evidence on hand suggests that from the very beginning the
regional alliance has lacked sufficient contractual teeth in getting governments to
commit resources.
IOGOOS members have been unable to secure the allocative and authoritative
resources94 needed for operationalising the ocean-observing system.95 As a result,
significant time was spent at all the meetings in deliberating on different ways for
getting governments to commit resources. It came as no surprise that by the fourth
meeting in 2006, the initial wave of enthusiasm toward Indian Ocean regional coop-
eration had somewhat abated. IOGOOS members were resigned to the limiting
cooperative endeavours amongst select scientific agencies that had the capabil-
ity and capacity to undertake ocean-wide observations within the existing agency
resources.
6.8.3 Domination—National Capacity

Commendably, the epistemic group of Indian Ocean scientists decided to mobilise
their (limited) resources, knowing additional funding to study and monitor coastal
areas and adjacent ocean-space was not exactly a priority with governments in the
region.96
At the inaugural meeting, the main concern appeared to be the development
and maintenance of a minimum scientific capability to collect ocean data neces-
sary for the calibration, validation and enhancement of assimilative and predictive
models.97 The strategy for achieving this centred on building capacity within coun-
tries. Prominent amongst others was education and training for better understanding
of the value and use of in situ and space-based ocean observations.98
Another measure was the building of institutional support structure that allowed
countries to contribute to and benefit from the global observing systems.99 This
would encourage long-term investment in acquiring facilities to receive, process
and interpret data from in situ and space-based sources.100
IOGOOS members also sought to build capacity by the networking of scientific
laboratories using Internet-based and other communication networks for exchange
of data and information.101 Such capacity-building measures would result in real-
ising the desired infrastructural goal of established national and regional platforms
and sensors, and data and modelling centres.102
To implement the capacity-building strategy, the epistemic group sought active
support from the IOC institutional framework comprising both the GOOS project
office and regional office in Perth besides the participation of COOP and OOPC
panels.103 In looking towards the IOC for support instead of national governments
in turning ideas and current enthusiasm into real action, this well-meaning epistemic
group tacitly admitted that their respective governmental commitment of added
allocative and authoritative resources would not be readily forthcoming.
As a result, the already weak scientific and technological base became further
constrained by economic and logistical capacity to undertake ocean observations.104
Lacking a permanent, systematic, routine and long-term ocean-observation system
in the region, individual Indian Ocean countries were just passive spectators in their
ability to monitor the state of the marine environment and predict climate change.105
Given the wide disparity in capacities, IOGOOS members sought a detailed
assessment of available capacities and requirements for establishing an equitable
balance between providing and requesting data and services.106 Moreover, even
after 4 years, capacity to downscale ocean observations to local coastal applications
continued to elude the epistemic group.
In addition, funding issues limited the training of scientists in the use, down-
scaling models and tools.107 Participation of IOGOOS members in global research
programmes also remained restricted by the lack of funding from governments.108
The consensus is to work within existing resources and capacities undertaking small
pilot projects using local-level resources at no extra cost.
According to the annual meeting reports it is clear that the epistemic group could
not secure necessary allocative resources from their own governments as the group
6.9 Broader Consequences Across Space 145
contemplated developing a strategy to attract funding from international sources,

including POGO, APN and the EU as late as its fourth meeting at Tanzania in 2006.
Notwithstanding, and with one hand tied behind its back, the epistemic group
reaffirmed commitment to try and continue building an ocean-wide observing sys-
tem within existing capacities. Mauritius, which was developing a GIS-based marine
and coastal information system for its own coastal waters, reaffirmed commitment
for contributing to the mooring buoys programme.109
India, in the process of modernising the Indian coastal tide gauge network, out-
lined its plans for an observing system in the Indian Ocean.110 Indonesia, the newest
member to launch the Indonesian node of GOOS, while seeking to intensify own
ocean-observation capacity, demonstrated willingness to contribute research ves-
sels and scientists for various research programmes and become a hub for data and
information management.111
For Australia, Indian Ocean remained a top priority with the Australian
Integrated Ocean Observing System developed as a high-level initiative.112
Sri Lanka, interested in upwelling and current systems, expressed willingness to
share data from its tide gauges and provide use of research vessels for deploy-
ing instruments.113 Associate members France and the United States expressed
willingness to support capacity-building initiatives.114
6.9 Broader Consequences Across Space
6.9.1 State Learning at the Unit Level
The Indian Ocean is poorly monitored in comparison to the other major oceans.115
At the unit level, countries lack in capability, and due to insufficient data, an
unacceptable disconnect between processes remains.116
The IOGOOS regional alliance envisaged achieving state learning by estab-
lishing a minimum scientific capability in ocean-observation systems. The group
recognised that state learning would require long-term investments in ocean-
observation scientific capacity and associated training in the provision of services
and products.117
At the unit level, this meant running education programmes for creating aware-
ness amongst the public and decision makers on the benefits of utilising ocean
observations in solving socio-economic problems facing individual nations.118 One
of the major impediments to state learning comes from strategic considerations and
national security interests that hampers sharing of information amongst the nations
on the state of the marine environment.119 It is apparent from the inaugural meet-
ing that state learning followed a vicious cycle that repeated itself over time and
scientists in individual nations were challenged to break this cycle.
To start with, scientists working with minimal national resources generated
information from limited ocean observations. As the sharing of information was
classified as sensitive in nature, scientists could not utilise associated data available
at the regional and global scales. Such data would actually have assisted in produc-
ing more meaningful and accurate products, which in turn would then have attracted
greater investments into building national capability required for enhancing the
ocean-observation system.
Not surprisingly, at the inaugural meeting the epistemic group strongly urged
member states to increase support levels for sustained high-quality data genera-
tion and information management.120 The limited capability weighed repeatedly on
attempts to commission large-scale regional projects. An example citing the benefits
from large-scale collaborative projects was the International Indian Ocean expedi-
tion in the 1960s, which led to the establishment of the Indian National Institute of
Oceanography and is now one of the leading scientific institutions in the IOGOOS
regional alliance.121
At the 2004 Sri Lanka meeting, emphasis continued on the need to empower indi-
vidual nations to generate their own products and services.122 The epistemic group
recognised that sharing of data may be needed to provide some of the services and
sought a marketing strategy for drawing the attention of international and regional
entities to local/national problems.123
The group identified small-scale pilot projects on shoreline changes and coastal
erosion as the way forward in starting up limited services.124 The projects in
themselves required instituting training and capacity-building programmes given
the wide disparity in the state of knowledge amongst the countries in the
region.
Taking a broader IOGOOS perspective, much of the state learning depended
on building capacity in operational oceanography. Other than conducting training
workshops there is little evidence to suggest the existence of a coherent, coordi-
nated and collaborative programme within the regional alliance. There is also little
indication of individual governments committing greater allocative and authori-
tative resources for the regional alliance formed in the Indian Ocean for ocean
observations.
6.9.2 Regional Cooperation at the Subsystem Level
At the subsystem level, relevant regional cooperative programmes identified by

IOGOOS members included the Regional Ocean Observing and Forecasting System
for Africa (ROOFS AFRICA) a GOOS Africa project, South-East Asia GOOS in
collaboration with South-East Asia Centre for Atmospheric and Marine Prediction
(SEACAMP) and the Western Indian Ocean Marine Applications Programme
(WIOMAP).125
Australia maintains a standalone western Australia GOOS (WAGOOS) pro-
gramme. The annual meetings do not suggest the presence of marine science
cooperative programmes in south Asia and Middle East subregions.126
ROOFS Africa has seven countries from the Indian Ocean from the 26 mem-
ber states and is building capacity through training and technology transfer for
developing essential capabilities in delivering user products for management and

protection of the marine and coastal environment.127
SEAGOOS Consists of five Indian Ocean states that are also Pacific states from
the eight member states jointly with SEACAMP, and JCOMM is developing a
collaborative storm surge project for the South China Sea.128
Nine WIOMAP participating countries planned to develop specialised regional
marine application centres that would deliver services in operational meteorology,
marine safety, fisheries, weather forecasting and disaster preparation.129
IOGOOS members agreed that subregional GOOS programmes should work
closely with national meteorological offices and ocean data centres, link their
individual organisation websites and represent each other at meetings of other
subregional alliances.130
At the inaugural meeting, expectations for regional cooperation were high. The
thought that IOGOOS as a regional alliance will stimulate Indian Ocean countries
into investing in the regional partnership was largely based on the belief that the
MoU is one of the strongest instruments of cooperation and collaboration in the
region.131 For the epistemic group, in a region dominated by developing countries
with limited capacity, bringing these countries together in the quest for oceanic
knowledge could benefit the Indian Ocean people as a whole.132
Subsequent meetings repeatedly underscored the significance of IOGOOS as a
vehicle for regional cooperation and synergising oceanographic studies. The sen-
timent stemmed from the knowledge that individual countries had limited marine
scientific research capability for conducting their own oceanographic research
needed in tackling marine resource and environmental problems at the national
level.133
A regional uptake on weather and climate predictions could enhance specific
management decisions in agriculture, water-resource usage and public safety.134 For
example, according to the Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD), there is a high correlation
between sea surface temperature and rainfall in Africa and Indonesia, the western
and eastern extremities of the Indian Ocean.135
Then, the sharing of ecosystem data could increase national capacity for develop-
ing integrated coastal zone management programmes, establishing environmentally
sound marine protected areas and adopting planning measures for the conservation
and restoration of marine habitats.136
The availability of ocean-climate observations for localised predictions, deter-
mination of effects and monitoring of changes in fisheries yield by creating a
regional data hub for products/services could help elevate the generally poor
state of coastal fish stocks. The rationale behind commissioning the prawn fish-
eries project was the regional distribution and dependence on fish stocks and the
need for building sustainable capacity and infrastructure in support of the arti-
sanal and commercial fisheries established across the region.137 The value of
ocean forecasting to fisheries management was again highlighted at IOGOOS V
in December 2007 and the need for the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission to be
made aware of the information that IOGOOS can provide in meeting the objec-
tives of sustainable fisheries.138 Amongst other operational elements requiring a
regional approach, IOGOOS member countries identified the need for educating
fishing fleets in an effort to curb vandalism of mooring arrays deployed for ocean
observations.139
From a UNESCO perspective, through regional and international cooperation
on the most pressing environmental dangers, IOGOOS could achieve the ancil-
lary goal of bringing nations and peoples together by tearing down barriers of
dissention, conflict and fear. By defining the common problems and needs of a
region, the ocean-observation initiative could provide the framework for developing
trust, understanding of diverse views and resolving differences by working towards
a common purpose for the good of all humankind.140
6.9.3 International Cooperation at the System Level
The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) has the mandate to be

the United Nations’ focal point for marine scientific research.141 This intergovern-
mental organisation of UNESCO acts as the forum for recommending, promoting,
planning and coordinating international ocean and coastal area programmes in
research and the dissemination and use of their results.142
By promoting international cooperation and coordination of programmes in
marine observations and research, and the protection of the marine environment
and capacity building, The IOC, brings together the scientific research community
and the governments of member states.143
The IOC’s holistic vision is of “one planet, one ocean” for its 50th anniver-
sary in 2010.144 The IOC is administered by an assembly, executive council and
a secretariat besides a number of subsidiary bodies.145
As of 25 April 2007, there were 136 member states in the Assembly, which meets
once every 2 years.146 In the Indian Ocean Region, Bahrain is the only coastal state
that is not a member and Afghanistan is the only land-locked country to be a member
of the IOC.
The IOC is divided into five electoral groups along continental lines instead of
oceanic divisions for the purposes of election to the Executive Council.147 A panel
of seven IOC officers oversee the functioning of the executive council, which meets
every year. The IOC officers include the elected and past chairperson and five vice-
chairpersons representing each of the five electoral groups.
In addition to the IOC officers, the council can have membership of a maximum
40 states including those of the states represented by the officers.148 Besides the
officers, the council currently comprises 34 member states.149
While the Indian Ocean GOOS is possibly the only ocean-wide GOOS regional
programme, the region, as such, is represented in the council by two electoral groups
(Table 6.2). In the establishment of electoral groupings, the Indian Ocean coun-
tries have been divided into electoral group IV (Asia and Pacific Island States) with
28 member states and electoral group V (Africa and Middle East States) with 45
member states.
Table 6.2 Indian Ocean countries IOC membership
Electoral groups Indian Ocean countries Other member states
Electoral group IV Afghanistan, Australia, China, Cook Islands,

(Asia and Pacific Bangladesh, India, Timor-Leste, Fiji, Japan,
island states) Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, New Zealand,
Maldives, Myanmar, North Korea Papua New
Pakistan, Singapore, Guinea, Philippines,
Sri Lanka and Thailand South Korea, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga and
Vietnam
Electoral group V Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Algeria, Angola, Benin,
(Africa and Middle Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
East states) Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Congo, Cote d’ Ivoire,
Madagascar, Mauritius, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Mozambique, Oman, Qatar, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,
Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania,
Somalia, South Africa, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria,
Sudan, United Arab Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syria,
Emirates, Tanzania and Togo and Tunisia
Yemen
Electoral group I has 24 states from Europe and North Americas; group II has 13
states from European economies in transition; and group III has 26 South America
states. There are 18 members in the Executive Council from the 63 states in these
three electoral groups with only 16 of the 73 member states from the two elec-
toral groups IV and V as members. Amongst these 16 member states, there are 11
Indian Ocean countries in the Executive Council. As of 25 April 2007, for the period
2007–2009, Australia (IOC Officer—vice-chairperson electoral group IV), Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Thailand and Tanzania are members of the Executive Council.150
It is evident that politics of representation overshadows the “one ocean” concept
where the Indian Ocean is abjectly divided into two separate electoral groupings.
This division of the Indian Ocean goes beyond the Executive Council and percolates
into IOC marine scientific research regional programmes.
The IOC has constituted two separate regional committees for the Indian
Ocean. The IOC regional committee for the Central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO)
has members belonging to electoral groupings IV and V from Asia and the Middle
East countries in the region. The IOC regional committee for the Western Indian
Ocean (IOCWIO) has members belonging to electoral grouping V from East Africa
(Fig. 6.2).
In addition, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are not only members
of the Central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO), but are also members of the IOC regional
subcommission for the Western Pacific (WESTPAC). Singapore, which is not a
Fig. 6.2 IOC regional committees (Refer online for color version)
Source: Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission151
member of the regional committee for the Central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO), is
a member of the subcommission for the Western Pacific (WESTPAC).152
The GOOS programme is divided into the global ocean component153 and the
coastal component154 administered regionally. There is not a single Indian Ocean
country as a member of the Ocean Observations Panel for Climate (OOPC) advis-
ing on the global ocean component of GOOS.155 The research effort of some
Indian Ocean countries for the coastal component of GOOS is spread across
GOOS-AFRICA, IO-GOOS, SEA-GOOS and PI-GOOS (Fig. 6.3). Similarly,
the Oceanographic Data and Information Network (ODIN) spans three research
programmes: ODIN-WESTPAC for the Western Pacific, ODIN-CINDIO for the
Central Indian Ocean and ODIN-AFRICA for the east and west coasts of Africa.156
Fig. 6.3 GOOS regional alliances

Source: Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission157
Table 6.3 GOOS and IODE marine scientific research programmes 6.9
Broader Consequences Across Space
151

Further, only 16 of the 36 Indian Ocean coastal states have established National
Oceanographic Data Centres or have a Designated National Agency (DNA) as
part of the International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange (IODE)
programme.158 The data centres and designated national agencies are discussed in
more detail later in the chapter under IOGOOS project on data and information
management. The complex web of subsidiary bodies and Indian Ocean member
states representation in administering GOOS and IODE marine scientific research
programmes is mapped in Table 6.3.
6.10 Stages of Regime Formation
6.10.1 Agenda Formation
The advancement of national and regional marine scientific research formed the
basis for the 17 scientific institutions from the region to unite and mobilise their
resources for the formation of a permanent ocean-observation system in the Indian
Ocean. The other signatories were the IOC regional office in Perth and the US
National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (see earlier discussion).
The epistemic group hoped that wholesome ocean observations would provide
for a fuller development of ocean knowledge and help better understand the nega-
tive effects of natural disasters, climate change and human impact on the marine and
coastal environment.159 Free and open access to ocean knowledge, data and infor-
mation would enable their application to the ocean and climate change problems of
the Indian Ocean.160
The IOGOOS agenda included minimising the disconnect between procedures
and requirements, developing baseline data, producing coastal maps and providing
meaningful forecasts on all relevant time-scales. This would enable detection of
changes in the marine and coastal environment with the least possible lag between
changes and detection.161
Most of the Indian Ocean countries with large percentages of their population liv-
ing near the coast placed emphasis on the urgent need for addressing coastal issues.
Due to their impact on the socio-economics of countries, a number of phenomena
of interest were identified as being feasible for study and as good subjects for pilot
projects.
The prioritised subject areas included coastal erosion, loss of habitat/biodiversity,
nutrient pollution, overfishing and sustainable fisheries, chemical contamination,
invasive/non-native species, aquaculture, coastal flooding, harmful algae blooms
and safety of life at sea.162
The available resource capacity of countries limited the development of
pilot projects to three areas of interest: namely, coastal erosion, loss of habi-
tat/biodiversity and sustainable fisheries.163 The thought was that should pressing
coastal issues be addressed IOGOOS had a good chance of becoming an opera-
tionally successful ocean-observing system.164
6.10 Stages of Regime Formation 153
Participants agreed that tools exist to deliver required products and services
to end users. All that remained was organising resources for implementing the
pilot projects. Key considerations towards building resource capacity in data col-
lection, modelling and applications included creating the awareness necessary
for securing much-needed funding, improving the ability to use satellite data,
strengthening communication links and improving the overall infrastructure in the
region.165 Subsequent meetings were a reiteration of the agenda with a focus on the
development and implementation of the pilot projects.
6.10.2 Institutional Choice
The epistemic group accepted that the creation of a regional observing system
guided by national and regional priorities is the critical building block of a global
ocean-observing system.166
A hierarchical network of local and national subsystems structured as a regional
observing system for the Indian Ocean could feed ocean data into the global network
of similar regional systems.167 Implicit in the structure is that the local level would
benefit from the system of ocean observations only by feeding data into the larger
global network.
The epistemic group categorised the establishing of an integrated data-
management and communication subsystem as the “life-blood” or “lifeline” of the
Indian Ocean regional alliance.168
Arguably, in terms of institutional choice, the “one stop shop” for multiple data
sets from many sources became the highest priority.169 The epistemic group focused
on the IOC established IODE programme for institutional development. The group
agreed that developing an ODIN project administered by IOCINDIO under the
IODE programme would-be a suitable institutional response for implementation of
the IOGOOS agenda.170
Such a programme could complement the already successfully established
ODINAFRICA project. A detailed discussion is provided later in the analysis on
IOGOOS projects. Amongst other steps identified was the establishment of national
GOOS coordination committees for developing national activities in support of the
regional alliance.171
The group also identified the need for networking of universities and govern-
ment agencies for the design and implementation of projects.172 Moreover, a coastal
development committee was formed to serve as the focal point of contact to over-
see, promote and coordinate the implementation of projects.173 In the absence of a
formal agreement between governments, the institutional response was overseen by
the secretariat funded and hosted by India’s INCIOS.174
6.10.3 Operationalisation
An operational ocean-observing system routinely providing data and data products

in forms and rates specified by end users emerged as a new concept for
oceanographers.175
The operationalisation of IOGOOS required an observing system that provided

precise and accurate monitoring of required variables in specified time–space scales.
An integrated data management and communication subsystem would-be needed to
provide captured data of known quality in real-time or delayed mode. A managed
and efficient flow of data and information could then facilitate sustained analysis
and modelling in conformity with user requirements.176
The problems of operationalising the development of user-friendly products lay
predominantly in data acquisition, management and archiving for analysis and
modelling.177 One of the weaknesses lay in the relative separation between data
managers and the wider user community.178
In addition, since the data needs varied significantly from country to country
the diversity of the data required became enormous with very few data-management
centres capable of dealing with both the diversity and volume of data. In addition, in
both the ocean and coastal modules of IOGOOS, local scale data and data products
were lacking.179
Another difficulty came from the inability (because of capacity constraints) to
take advantage of global-level large-scale data products by downscaling for use at
the local level in much-needed climate predictions and other uses.180
Furthermore, the satellite remote sensing community had their own independent
data centres that were largely removed from the needs of the IOGOOS fraternity,
which had insufficient expertise in satellite remote sensing.181 In all of this, a clear-
inghouse mechanism became essential for assembling data and making relevant data
products available to end users.182
The epistemic group acknowledged that pilot projects could help pave the way
for operationalising the ocean-observing system.183 To this end, at the first annual
meeting in 2002, the four core sentiments echoed repeatedly included (1) the need
for securing funds, (2) building technical and infrastructural capacity, (3) estab-
lishing data management and communication links and (4) developing the use of
satellite remote sensing for IOGOOS applications.184 During the second annual
meeting in 2004, the IOGOOS participants agreed on a detailed action plan for the
implementation of pilot projects, analysed later in the chapter.
At the third annual meeting in 2005, the sentiment that progress of IOGOOS
projects had not been as rapid as required appears to have been picked up by the
participants with the chairperson eliciting suggestions to improve the functioning of
IOGOOS.185
A number of suggestions were made on how to improve the effectiveness of
IOGOOS.186 What these suggestions show is that operationalisation of IOGOOS
remained a challenge.
The suggestion of the need for collaboration on regional projects demonstrates
that regional cooperation was not yet as strong as it needed to be.
Calling for IOGOOS activities and progress on pilot projects to be publicised at
the national level implies need for greater state learning and involvement of power-
based and interest-based actors.
Stating the need for developing a user interface implies a continued disconnect
between knowledge-based, interest-based and power-based actors.
6.11 IOGOOS Projects 155
Espousing individual champions for projects to succeed implies need for stronger
leadership.
Emphasis on projects being able to cut across national boundaries and for coun-
tries to be convinced of the project benefits implies need for countries to start
believing in and formally legitimising the IOGOOS agenda for ocean observations.
Reaffirming the need to establish national GOOS coordination committees
implies that countries were far from taking action at the national level to strengthen
institutional development.
Finally, in asking IOGOOS to spend more time on delivering products and useful
information through its website and undertaking capacity building shows the need
for greater commitment of allocative and authoritative resources.
The fourth annual meeting in 2006 went a step further in suggesting that
IOGOOS could coordinate an audit for more targeted activity in the future. The
audit of national programmes could include a range of aspects from coastal moni-
toring, in situ, and remote sensing capability, data products that were available and
modelling, prediction and data-management activities.187
At the end of 4 years, more work was needed at national levels for the regional
alliance to succeed in operationalising a permanent ocean-observing system in the
Indian Ocean.
6.11 IOGOOS Projects
As a regional initiative, IOGOOS mirrors the GOOS’s strategy of developing an

ocean climatic module and a coastal module concerned with the impacts of human
activity. The project outcomes from the first IOGOOS meeting in November 2002
centred on a basin-wide structure to monitor temperature, salinity and currents in
understanding regional climate variability and change; a data-management struc-
ture to disseminate ocean data, analyses and climate predictions to regional users;
and a coastal segment dealing with coastal erosion, conservation of habitats and
biodiversity, and sustainable fisheries.
6.11.1 Indian Ocean Panel (IOP) and the Indian Ocean Observing
System (IndOOS)
The IOC and World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) through GOOS and the
Climate Variability and Predictability (CLIVAR) project joined forces to establish
the Indian Ocean Panel (IOP) as an IOGOOS initiative in February 2004.188 The
panel is designed to develop, coordinate and implement a plan for basin-wide sus-
tained ocean observations in the Indian Ocean. The IOP plan is intended to support
research on the unique climatic phenomena prevalent in the only ocean that is not
open to the northern subtropical regions and has a low-latitude opening in its eastern
boundary.189
The IOP membership currently includes China (1), France (1), Japan (1),
Netherlands (1), the United States (6) and the Indian Ocean countries Australia (2),
India (2) and Indonesia (1).190 South Africa formerly a member acted more as a
representative of the CLIVAR project on Variability in the African Climate System
(VACS) than an Indian Ocean participating country.
The emergence of an integrated observing system could address the diversity of
time and space scales of climate relevant variability. The constitution of the IOP
came from the recognition that implementing basin-wide observations are beyond
the scientific community of any individual nation. To be cost effective, such a large-
scale effort would require coordination of the available resources of every nation
in the region and beyond.191 By August 2005, the IOP had formulated a plan for
an integrated Indian Ocean Observing System (IndOOS) that would make use of
the available types of deployable instrumentation across all relevant time-scales of
variability for providing data on the state of the ocean.192 Although the envisaged
integrated observing system deals only with in-situ observations, the IOP recognised
the need for satellite observations of oceanic surface temperatures. The satellite
observations could complement in-situ observations in resolving climate research
issues and vice versa in-situ observations could help in the calibration of satellite
data.193
By far, the overall success of the plan depended on observed data being dis-
tributed openly in a timely manner and close coordination between the research
and operational oceanography communities.194 Above all, the plan identified inter-
national and inter-agency cooperation and good will as being essential for the
successful implementation of an ocean-observing system in the Indian Ocean.195
The forward plan (Fig. 6.4) for an integrated Indian Ocean Observing System
(IndOOS) is to provide high-quality ocean observations for GOOS ocean appli-
cations and services and support the needs of the international CLIVAR research
project on climate variability.196 CLIVAR is a component of the WCRP that
deals with climate variability and predictability on time-scales from months to
centuries.197 The IOP, a subset of the Asian Australian Monsoon Panel (AAMP)
within the CLIVAR project, would administer IndOOS as an IOGOOS project.198
The implementation of IndOOS envisaged a basin-wide mooring array, 3◦ ×3◦
array of Argo floats, 5 × 5 array of surface drifters, real-time and near real-time
tide gauge network, satellites, biogeochemical observations and an enhanced XBT
network.199
The resources would come from national programmes of member countries. For
the basin-scale mooring array, this involved implementation over 5 years of 40 sur-
face moorings, and five subsurface Doppler current profiler (ADCP) moorings with
an estimated 180 days ship time per year.200 The Argo programme design included
the deployment of 450 floats in the Indian Ocean to 40◦ S with 125 deployments per
year assuming a floating lifetime of 3–4 years. A number of high-priority XBT lines
were identified for implementing a full XBT network.201
For the implementation of the surface drifter array in the northern Indian
Ocean the current number of about 60 drifters would need to be increased to an
Fig. 6.4 Integrated Indian Ocean Observing System (IndOOS) (Refer online for color version)
Source: CLIVAR website last updated 12 December 2007
ASEA, Arabian Sea; BOB, Bay of Bengal, ITF: Indonesian Thorough Flow; WBC, Western
Boundary Current off Africa, EBC, Eastern Boundary Current off Australia
estimated 160 drifters.202 The development of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning
and Mitigation System (IOTWS) provided added impetus for enhancing real-time
and near real-time tide gauges in the Indian Ocean.203
To undertake biogeochemical observations member countries agreed to develop
appropriate instrumentation on all suitable research ships and XBT lines, surface
moorings and Argo floats supported by satellite-based ocean-colour sensors. In
addition, a number of process studies were identified as pilot projects for major
international study of intra-seasonal variation.204
At the second IOGOOS meeting in April 2004, IOP identified its future chal-
lenges as linking of the ocean-observing system to the coastal component of
IOGOOS and downsizing to smaller scales of interests to address the planning and
policy needs of marine information users in the coastal environment.205
At the third IOGOOS meeting in August 2005, the major issues identified
included ship time of 180 days per year, vandalism from fishing boats, scientific
objectives being insufficient to sustain funding, international coordination, system
integration and data management.206
By the fourth IOGOOS meeting in October 2006, IndOOS had made good
progress as per plan in deployment of instrumentation for ocean observations.207
The success of the IndOOS project can be attributed to commitment of national
resources made possible by major oceanic research countries in the Indian Ocean
joining hands and the international marine scientific research community.
In the wider context of the Indian Ocean region, the rim countries were mostly
observed to be visibly inactive and east Africa remained to be linked into the large-
scale oceanography and climate programme. It was thought that this operational
oceanography project needed to become more user-driven in an effort to mobilise
resources from other governments and scientists in the region. The panel was of
the view that this could be achieved by deriving products from the ocean climatic
models to meet the user requirements in dealing with coastal issues.208
6.11.2 Coastal Module of IOGOOS
The coastal module of IOGOOS became a high priority and successful culmination
of pilot projects was vital to the success of IOGOOS. At the inaugural meeting of
IOGOOS in November 2002, the key issues facing the countries in the Indian Ocean
region were coastal erosion from storm surges, cyclones, sea-level rise, coastal con-
struction, sand mining and in some cases land reclamation, coastal pollution and
chemical contamination, and overexploitation of fisheries and illegal fishing.209
In every case, one or all of the three core issues of coastal erosion, coastal pol-
lution and overexploitation of fisheries could be responsible for habitat alteration
and loss of biodiversity and degradation of the coastal ecosystem. Some of the other
country-specific issues identified included coastal flooding in Bangladesh, harmful
algal blooms in Kenya and India, safety of life at sea in Mozambique, aquaculture
in Bangladesh, and coastal desertification in Madagascar.210 An IOGOOS Coastal
Development Committee with an Executive Committee assumed the task of pro-
moting three pilot projects on coastal erosion, habitat/biodiversity and sustainable
fisheries.211
Although the pilot projects were localised in nature, IOGOOS members were
depending on the active support of the regional alliance itself and the IOC umbrella
involving the Perth regional office, Project Office in Paris, COOP and OOPC for
their success.212
The pilot project on coastal erosion seeks to establish a regional network in
quantifying, understanding and predicting coastal shoreline change. The project
envisages a phased approach beginning with an assessment and relying on remote
sensing and community-based monitoring with costs absorbed within existing capa-
bilities of countries in the development of an analytical and modelling capability.213
Once data became available, the project would generate products that could be used
by coastal zone managers, coastal communities, hotel and housing estates, port and
marine authorities and users and the scientific community. An e-group set up for
compiling country-specific information on existing monitoring facilities, coastal
zone management framework and current knowledge of coastal processes did not
generate much response.214
At the second meeting in 2004, the working group agreed as a starting point
to initiate a shoreline change monitoring system in Sri Lanka. In the interim, the
working group agreed to finalise a project proposal for initiation in 2006 having
duration of 5–7 years.215 The third meeting in 2005 informed that continuing efforts
over two and a half years had failed to generate interest in developing a network of
contacts and compiling country-specific information.216 Moreover, the commence-
ment of the shoreline monitoring system in 2005 in Sri Lanka had to be postponed
indefinitely after the tsunami.217 Due to the inability to generate sufficient regional
interest, the annual report suggests that there was no specific planning for project
development undertaken at this meeting.
The pilot project on habitat/biodiversity relied on individual country implemen-
tation plans for undertaking multi-scale monitoring and mapping of coral reefs,
mangroves and seagrass beds as keystone coastal ecosystems for conservation.218
Dependant on remote sensing and community-based monitoring the project would
produce baseline data and maps of the keystone ecosystems. The project would
enhance the overall environmental awareness making predictions of important
changes and recommendations on conservation and restoration strategies using
spectral analysis, statistical comparisons and specific indices of change.219 During
the annual meetings in 2004 and 2005, countries that had expressed an interest in the
project included Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mauritius,
Réunion (France), South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Thailand. The working
group intended building capacity in remote sensing through the Western Indian
Ocean Marine Science Association (WIOMSA), a nongovernmental organisation
and CORDIO.220
At the third annual meeting in 2005, the working group reported that the project
proposal including country plans would-be finalised by 2006 for seeking funds
from international and nation agencies.221 The project over the next 5 years would
undertake training, monitoring, remote sensing and analysis before writing a full
report including management recommendations.222 On completion of the project,
it was thought that the monitoring of keystone ecosystems would-be taken over by
governments and research institutions in the respective countries making this as a
routine part of government business. Engaging relevant government departments
and research institutions from the inception stage therefore became essential to the
success of the project.223
The pilot project on sustainable fisheries was designed to develop a monitor-
ing and management system for the Penaeid Prawn resources in the Indian Ocean,
given the poor state of coastal fish stocks, the high value of prawn resources, and
the regional distribution of prawns. The objective of the project was to make a
determination of the (1) effects of local conditions, (2) study ocean-climate condi-
tions and (3) detect changes in prawn-fishery yield in relation to local and regional
oceanic/climatic events. The project aspired to create links amongst scientists,
coastal managers and coastal communities; establish a central data hub; and build
sustainable capacity and infrastructure.224
A workshop convened in 2003 was attended by Australia, Bangladesh, India,
Kenya and South Africa for identifying the important features of prawn fisheries
in individual countries.225 During the 2004 and 2005 annual meetings, discussions
progressed on the modus operandi for hosting a webpage on the IOGOOS website
(to be completed initially by 2004), which would-be populated with prawn fishery
data from Australia, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, South
Africa, Sri Lanka and Tanzania.226 A webpage including Australia, India and
South Africa was constructed with the intent of being tested on the website of the
Marine and Estuarine Research Centre in Durban.227
Little progress was made over 3 years and by the fourth IOGOOS meeting in
2006, the decision was made to scale down the keystone coastal ecosystem project
to a pilot test involving India and Tanzania, and the other two projects on sus-
tainable fisheries and coastal erosion were virtually shelved due to the lack of
progress.228
6.11.3 Data and Information Management
Ocean observation translated into data and information allows end users to make
knowledgeable decisions in the management of the coastal and marine environment.
Simplistically, a Data and Information Management (DIM) system is fundamental
to the successful implementation of an ocean-observing system in the Indian Ocean
region.229
Realising the importance of an oceanographic DIM system for IOGOOS, the
epistemic group in its first task in 2003 conducted a strategy development workshop.
Three sessional working groups were formed to assess needs, establish status and
determine strategy. Data and information needs were assessed to be in the fields
of marine meteorology, operational oceanography, coastal and marine management,
and marine resources.230
In marine meteorology, ocean observations across weekly, seasonal, annual and
decadal time-scales were designed to generate data and information required for
predicting weather, cyclones, storms, monsoons and climate change. Data and
information in operational oceanography was designed to enable determinations in
optimal ship routing and potential fishing zones; monitor cyclones, storm surges,
oil spills and the ocean state; and assist in guiding search and rescue operations.231
Ocean observations were equated to fulfil data and information needs for coastal and
marine management in areas of marine pollution, water quality, coastal habitats,
fish culture, biodiversity and ecosystem preservation. Ocean parameters required
for generating data and information in marine resource applications were also
identified.232
Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia,
Mauritius, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Thailand reported on the sta-
tus of in-country capacity. The workshop revealed substantial differences in ocean
data and information management capacity between participating countries.233 A
detailed assessment of available capacity and requirement in the region became the
start point for developing capacity-building programmes addressing data assimila-
tion and modelling, satellite oceanography and data products. Whether any such
comprehensive assessment was undertaken is not evident from subsequent meetings
other than a reference to the regional remote sensing capacity (Table 6.4).
Table 6.4 Indian Ocean countries remote sensing capability
Capability in the Indian Ocean Countries
Remote sensing programme in place Australia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia,
Mauritius, Pakistan, Reunion, Singapore, South Africa,
Thailand
Ocean remote sensing capability Australia, India, Indonesia, Reunion, South Africa
Remote sensing training facilities Australia, India, Indonesia, Thailand, South Africa
Source: Compiled by author from IOGOOS reports
In determining a strategy, the workshop acknowledged that the need for solv-
ing local/national problems might require DIM from regional and global sources
in different time–space scales while taking into consideration the different capac-
ity levels of countries.234 The workshop identified some of the constraints as (1)
absence of a clearinghouse mechanism for assembling and making available rel-
evant data; (2) limited remote sensing experience and capacity; (3) shortage of
skills in data management and (4) the need for ocean teacher modules for coastal
projects.235
The success of an IOGOOS DIM system depended on empowering countries
in the region to generate their own services by sensitising decision-makers in gov-
ernment to make firm commitments to assure the sustainability of the system.236
Moreover, workshop participants agreed that there is a strong basis for joining forces
with an IOC-administered programme called International Oceanographic Data and
Information Exchange (IODE). This would allow building on existing facilities to
take advantage of an established network of global and regional IODE projects. The
successful model of IODE regional project ODIN-AFRICA, an Ocean and Data
Information Network (ODIN) under the aegis of IOC regional committees for the
Western Indian Ocean (IOCWIO) and Central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO), became
the basis for expanding the ODIN strategy to the entire region.237
With a view to complement ODIN-AFRICA, an ODIN project ODIN-CINDIO
was established in 2005 for the central Indian Ocean under the aegis of the IOC
regional committee for the central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO).238 This led to the
creation of a complex regional structure under the IODE programme whereby
ODIN-CINDIO, with inputs from ODIN-AFRICA, would-be the medium to build a
DIM system for IOGOOS as part of the GOOS regional alliance network.239 What
this means is that the IOCINDIO secretariat in Iran and IOGOOS secretariat in India
would jointly coordinate the implementation of an oceanographic DIM system for
the entire Indian Ocean region with many of the western Indian Ocean countries
already committed to the ODIN-AFRICA project.
The ODIN-CINDIO project, as the instrument for building IOGOOS DIM
capacity, first requires an understanding of the IODE programme and ODIN
projects. IODE programmes are managed by a nine-member IODE Committee
of which Australia and India are members. The IODE programme requires
countries to establish National Oceanographic Data Centres (NODCs) and/or
Designated National Agencies (DNAs) and nominate national coordinators for data
management.
In the Indian Ocean, 16 countries have established NODCs and/or DNAs. Of
these 16 countries, Malaysia is the only country with DNA status while Tanzania
has a NODC and DNA and India and South Africa each have two NODCs. Data
centres were established by Australia, India and Pakistan in the 1960s; Egypt, South
Africa in the 1970s, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Seychelles and Sri Lanka in the 1990s,
Madagascar, Mauritius and Mozambique in 2000; Comoros and Israel in 2001 and
Tanzania in 2002.240 In addition, Bangladesh and Kuwait have nominated IODE
national coordinators for data management even though the countries have not
established NODCs.241
In terms of the ODIN-CINDIO project capacity, only Australia, India, Iran,
Malaysia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are the six countries that have established NODCs
from the 17 IOCINDIO Indian Ocean member countries.242 Of these, Pakistan
and Malaysia are not members of IOGOOS, although Malaysia has participated in
IOGOOS meetings. Indonesia, Maldives and Thailand are IOGOOS and IOCINDIO
members, but have yet to establish an NODC and nominate a national coordina-
tor for data management. The other countries include Bangladesh, Iraq, Kuwait,
Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE (Fig. 6.5).
Fig. 6.5 Regional committee for Central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO) member states
Source: Regional Committee for the Central Indian Ocean
Effectively, with many of the oceanographic data centres established in the late
1990s, not only is there limited capacity, but there is a mismatch in the membership
structure of IOGOOS and IOCINDIO for the development of an oceanographic DIM
system for the entire region.
Adding to the structural complexity, IODE operates a Marine Information

Management (MIM) programme to help understand and protect the marine envi-
ronment. IOC marine information products such as ocean expert, ocean portal,
ocean teacher and OceanDocs have been pioneered and supported by the MIM
programme.243 Indian Ocean countries that have nominated MIM national coor-
dinators include Australia, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and Sri Lanka.244
ODIN-CINDIO with the objective of providing assistance, training and educa-
tion in the development, operation and maintenance of NODC and MIM remain
largely as national capacity-building projects even as attempts are made for building
IOGOOS capacity.
In contrast, ODIN-AFRICA, also an ODIN project under the IODE pro-
gramme, has implemented three thematic work packages involving a coastal
ocean-observation system, data and information management and product devel-
opment and end user communication and information delivery independently of
GOOS Africa. ODIN-AFRICA has made notable progress across all the work
packages focusing on sea-level data facility, capacity-building through established
NODCs, African library catalogue, marine biodiversity database and an African
marine atlas.245
The envisaged DIM structure involved at the national-level autonomous scientific
institutions with an NODC acting as the focal point. Data and information coordi-
nation at the regional level would-be undertaken by the IOGOOS secretariat with
plans to develop a regional data archive. A DIM working group through an e-group
and discussion forum would identify standards and methods, data exchange for-
mats and regional service/application providers. Mostly external sources of funding
were emphasised with no reference in the actionable items list for members to seek
additional funding from their own governments (Table 6.5).246
The priority areas of the action plan endorsed at the 2004 IOGOOS meeting
essentially included survey completion, e-group formation, establishing a clear-
inghouse mechanism and starting Internet services for IOGOOS members. In all,
seven countries responded to an IOC survey to assess data-management capacity
in the Indian Ocean region.247 IOCINDIO countries Australia, India and Iran and
IOCWIO countries Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar and South Africa responded to
the survey.
At the following IOGOOS meeting in 2005, working groups evaluated the IOP,
remote sensing capacity building and coastal pilot projects. There was no progress
report on the DIM system despite the intent of having back-to-back DIM meetings
with IOGOOS annual meetings.
In 2006, the IOGOOS secretariat reported that the discussion group was now
available online. However, the effectiveness remains to be seen. Moreover, the sec-
retariat failed to receive comments from members on the interface design for making
the e-group and discussion forum available on the IOGOOS website.248 During
the IOGOOS meeting in 2006, further DIM deliberations were limited to building
capacity through a range of training courses and workshops.249
Table 6.5 IOGOOS Data and information management timeline
Objective Actionable item Timeline
Coordination and Strengthen secretariat at INCOIS for 2004

communication coordination
Form an e-group and discussion forum for DIM
and start services on the internet to IOGOOS
members
Conduct national-level surveys, identify national
contact points and set up national coordination
committees
Data standards and Study national data archival policies and explore 2004–2005
policies need for a secure regional archive
Study standard formats, circulate JGOFS
protocols and IODE formats, and incorporate
parameters required for different regional
applications
Training and Identify-higher education programmes, examine 2004–2007
education fellowships with POGO
Introduce experts exchange and visiting scientists
programme
Progress ODIN project proposal for IOGOOS
Provide training in Remote sensing applications
and satellite oceanography
Funding sources Invite potential funding agencies including UN 2004
agencies and other regional bodies
Future trajectory Have back-to-back DIM meetings with IOGOOS 2005–2007
annual meetings
Evaluate pilot projects
Formulate 7-year plan
Source: IOGOOS II report 26–29 April 2004
Besides the Internet services there is little indication of developing other prod-
ucts/services for IOGOOS members. India has started SST, PFZ and OSF services
on its own INCOIS website, but it is not self-evident that these services are available
for IOGOOS members as has been provided for in the DIM work plan.250
6.12 Analysis of Regime Effectiveness
The IOGOOS case study analysed the progress of IOGOOS in descriptive form of
what, when, where and by whom. The story that unfolds is very different from that
contained in the IOGOOS documentation for the period 2001–2007. After 2005,
there is largely more of the same from earlier reports and little new information on
the progress made. Using the rubric for measuring regime effectiveness at Table 5.4,
the variables of actor behaviour and leadership, structure over time, broader conse-
quences across space and stages of regime formation are analysed for effectiveness
of the regime for marine scientific research in the Indian Ocean.
6.12 Analysis of Regime Effectiveness 165
6.12.1 Stages of Regime Formation

There is evidence that problems that require collective response have been accu-
rately identified and agreed upon by member states and issues clearly prioritised.
At the same time, the evidence suggests that the agenda could not be effectively
converted into measures for collective action by member states, giving a numerical
score of 3 on a scale of 1–5 for agenda formation. The institutional choice appears
limited to office and record keeping functions for the secretariat with practically
no role in building regional administrative capability and hardly any input into the
implementation of the agenda, giving a score of 2 on a scale of 1–5 for institutional
choice. A number of problems in operationalisation of the regime, such as lack of
funding, absence of data management and communication links, limited capacity
and inability to develop use of satellite remote sensing for IOGOOS applications
were evident. As a result, the coastal pilot projects were largely shelved. Evidence
of national measures appears limited to a few member states with most lacking in
capacity, giving a score of 2 on a scale of 1–5 for operationalisation. The aver-
age score for stages of regime formation is 2.3 on a scale of 1–5 (Table 6.6 and
Fig. 6.6).
6.12.2 Actor Behaviour and Leadership
The evidence suggests that reasonably established intellectual leadership on part of

knowledge-based actors resulted in the formation of the regional alliance. However,
endeavours to integrated non-state actors, such as, POGO, APN and WIOMSA,
have by no means resulted in any coherent outcome, giving a score of 3 on a
scale of 1–5 for intellectual leadership and knowledge-based actors. Entrepreneurial
leadership by interest-based actors remains a challenge for IOGOOS with little
evidence of user interest in the IOGOOS programme, giving a score of 1 on a
scale of 1–5 for entrepreneurial leadership and interest-based actors. Evidence of
structural leadership by power-based actors suggests that the IOGOOS regional
alliance has not been a priority for governments from the region. Even the more
powerful research states in the region, India and Australia, do not appear to have
pledged sufficient resources for IOGOOS coastal programmes. It must be said
though that the Indian Ocean Panel project in collaboration with the interna-
tional research community where the two countries did commit resources has seen
some results. As for membership, only Tanzania251 and Indonesia in 2005 have
joined the regional alliance since inception. The evidence overall gives a score of
2 on a scale of 1–5 for structural leadership and power-based actors. The aver-
age score for actor behaviour and leadership is 2 on a scale of 1–5 (Table 6.6
and Fig. 6.6).
166
Table 6.6 Numerical score of variable sets and level of collaboration
Independent variable Variable sets Single variable measured Verbal description Score Average score
Behavioural Change Actor behaviour and Knowledge-based actors Intellectual leadership on 3 2.0
6
leadership (ABL) and intellectual part of knowledge-based

leadership (KIL) actors reasonably
established. Epistemic
community and/or
non-state actors loosely
integrated but by no
means a coherent actor.
Average level of
consensual knowledge
base.
Interest-based actors and Entrepreneurial leadership 1
entrepreneurial by interest-based actors
leadership (IEL) not at all established. No
participation of
interest-based actors in
institutional bargaining.
No interest in present and
future impacts of the
problem.
Regime for Marine Scientific Research in the Indian Ocean Region
6.12
Power-based actors and Structural leadership by 2

structural leadership power-based actors
(PSL) somewhat established.
Commitment to
issue-specific resources is
below average. The more
powerful resource States
have not fully pledged
allocative and
Analysis of Regime Effectiveness
authoritative resources.
Since inception of the
regime, more States from
the region are party to the
regime.
Stage of regime formation Agenda formation (AF) Problems that require 3 2.3
(SRF) collective response are
accurately identified and
agreed upon by member
States from the region.
Institutional choice (IC) The institutional setting is 2
confined to office and
record keeping functions
for member States.
operationalisation of the
regime are evident in few
member States from the
region.
167
168
Institutional Effectiveness Structure over time (SOT) Signification/level of High level of concern 4 2.7
concern (SLC) amongst stakeholders.
Concerns shared by every
member State from the
region.
Legitimisation/contractual Moderate level of credible 3
6
environment (LCE) commitment amongst

region. Neither
weak/strong regulatory
framework for
legitimising international
norms and principles
within the region.
Domination/national Very low level of political, 1
capacity (DNC) legal and administrative
national capacity
amongst States from the
region. Very weak
regional effort at capacity
building.
Broader consequences State learning at the unit Average level of cognitive 3 2.3
across space (BCS) level (SL) learning amongst
region about the nature of
problem and information
about the options
available for addressing
the problem.
Regime for Marine Scientific Research in the Indian Ocean Region
6.12
Regional cooperation at the Critical cooperation 2

sub-system level (RC) amongst few member
States from the region on
establishing well-defined
activities and resources,
needed to move from
norms to rules.
International cooperation at Somewhat significant 2
the system level (IC) change in capacities of
few member States from
the region to effectively
participate at the
international level in
regime implementation.
Intervening variable Level of collaboration (LOC) 2.33

169

Signification/ Knowledge-Based
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
Domination/ Legitimisation/ Power-Based Interest-Based

National Capacity Contractual Environment Structural Leadership Entrepreneurial Leadership

State Learning
at the Unit Level Agenda Formation
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
International Cooperation Regional Cooperation Operationalisation Institutional choice

at the System level at the Subsystem level
Fig. 6.6 Measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness

6.12.3 Structure Over Time
The evidence suggests a high level of concern amongst the scientific community
with concerns shared by every member state and agenda clearly identified. However,
the concerns do not appear to have motivated other states in the region, Tanzania and
Indonesia aside, to join the regional alliance giving a score of 4 on a scale of 1–5
for signification—level of concern. The choice of a memorandum over a formal
agreement to legitimise the regional alliance can be viewed as neither a weak or
strong regulatory framework. The contractual environment could be strong should
governments choose to commit resources and weak should they choose not to do
so. Moreover, there appears only a moderate level of credible commitment amongst
scientific institutions of member states with cooperation at the national level seem-
ingly a challenge giving a score of 3 on a scale of 1–5 for legitimisation—contractual
environment. What appears to be clearly missing in action is domination or the com-
mitment of resources by governments resulting in a weak regional effort at capacity
building. The evidence suggests very low level of political, legal and administrative
national capacities amongst most member states in the region giving a score of 1 on
a scale of 1–5 for domination—national capacity. The average score for structure
over time is 2.7 on a scale of 1–5 (Table 6.6 and Fig. 6.6).
6.12.4 Broader Consequences Across Space
The evidence suggests that cognitive learning about the nature of and options
available to address the problem at the state level has been at best average given
the limited resources and constraints in the sharing of information, giving a score
of 3 on a scale of 1–5 for state learning at the unit level. In a region dominated by
developing countries with limited capacity, a strong sentiment for regional coopera-
tion is evident in the implementation of the regime. The IOC international structure
in pursuit of an international research agenda appears to have weighed heavily on
the regional cooperation endeavour with some evidence of critical cooperation, at
best, amongst few member states, giving a score of 2 on a scale of 1–5 for regional
cooperation at the subsystem level. Evidence suggests that international cooperation
at the system level has been complicated by the division of the Indian Ocean into a
number of electoral groups (Table 6.2) and splitting the ocean research across differ-
ent geographic divisions (Figs. 6.2, 6.3). As a result, there is somewhat significant
change in capacities of few member states to effectively participate at the interna-
tional level and no more, borne out by the relative success of the Indian Ocean Panel
vis-à-vis the coastal module, giving a score of 2 on a scale of 1–5 for international
cooperation at the system level. The average score for broader consequences across
space is 2.3 on a scale of 1–5 (Table 6.6 and Fig. 6.6).
6.12.5 Level of Collaboration
Such an analysis of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness gives a good

insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the regime for marine scientific research
in the Indian Ocean region.
In terms of behavioural change knowledge-based actors have shown reasonable
leadership in formulating an agenda for implementation. However, the institu-
tional choice has not been able to generate sufficient participation by interest-based
actors. Moreover, lack of commitment by power-based actors has hampered the
operationalisation of the regime (Fig. 6.7).
In terms of institutional effectiveness a high level of concern has yielded just
about an average level of state learning. The open-ended contractual environment
has not expenenced the desired commitment by governments to regional coop-
eration. As a result, national capacities remain limited with cooperation at the
international level confined to a handful of states from the region (Fig. 6.7).
What becomes evident is that the regime for marine scientific research has cre-
ated the desired atmosphere for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean region.
There is no evidence to suggest that the regime is not working. Neither is there
evidence to suggest that regional cooperation amongst Indian Ocean states is not
sustainable in implementation of the marine scientific research regime through
GOOS.

On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that recognition by governments

of the importance of the regime for marine scientific research as an instrument for
greater regional cooperation (and not just in the national interest) can enhance the
level of collaboration amongst states and strengthen marine scientific research for
the benefit of the Indian Ocean region as a whole. Such recognition by governments
is likely to see commitment of the required allocative and authoritative resources,
generate greater user interest or entrepreneurial leadership and bring about the
institutional changes necessary to effectively operationalise the regime.
The combined effect of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness is to
give a level of collaboration of 2.33, between 2 and 3 on a scale of 1–5. What
this means is that there is elementary to average understanding and leadership
at the national level and a somewhat weak regional structure with comparatively
critical cooperation limited to a few member states in the Indian Ocean region.
In other words, there is enormous potential for regional cooperation in the field
of marine scientific research with the foundation of the regime firmly established
(Table 6.7).
Table 6.7 Level of collaboration marine scientific research in the Indian Ocean region
Level of collaboration : 2.33
2 Elementary understanding and leadership at the national level and a weak regional
structure with comparatively critical cooperation leads to somewhat significant
change in the capacity of a few of the member states from the region to participate
effectively at the international level.
3 Average understanding and leadership at the national level and neither a weak/strong
regional structure with comparatively essential cooperation leads to fairly significant
change in the capacity of most member states from the region to participate
effectively at the international level.

6.12.6 Effectiveness of the Regime for Marine Scientific Research

In assessing the effectiveness of the regime for marine scientific research, it may
be said that elementary actor–structure interplay has resulted in elementary to aver-
age formation of the regime with elementary results for state learning and regional
cooperation in the region (Table 6.8). Taken together with the score for level of col-
laboration, the scores of the two sets of variables that define behavioural change and
institutional effectiveness illustrate the assessed effectiveness of a regime on a scale
of 1–5 where a score of 5 indicates a world-class regime (Fig. 6.8).
Table 6.8 Marine scientific research regime effectiveness

1 2 3 4 5
Actor Perfunctory actor Elementary actor Average actor Substantial actor World-class actor
behaviour behaviour and behaviour and behaviour and behaviour and behaviour and
and leadership leadership leadership leadership leadership
leadership
Stages of Perfunctory Elementary Average regime Substantial World-class
regime regime formation regime formation formation in the regime formation regime formation
formation in the region in the region region in the region in the region
Structure Perfunctory Elementary Average Substantial World-class
over time structure over structure over structure over structure over structure over
time time time time time
Broader Perfunctory Elementary Average Substantial World-class
consequences learning and learning and learning and learning and learning and
across space cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation
Fig. 6.8 Marine scientific

research regime effectiveness
5
4
3
2
1

SOT Structure Over Time
BCS Broader Consequences across Space
6.13 Conclusion
The IOGOOS regional alliance has been one of imposition formed as GOOS
regional Alliance dictated by the structural requirements of the Global Ocean-
Observing System (GOOS). A key positive aspect has been the MoU for coop-
eration, given the deep concerns of Indian Ocean countries about the sharing of
marine scientific research data and information. The imposition of the regime to a
certain degree also enhanced research capacity in the region with countries agree-
ing to pool their limited resources, which is evident from the success of the Indian
Ocean Panel. In an otherwise frosty relationship between India and Australia,252
which only recently has begun to warm, the imposition of the regime got the major
IOP contributing nations to work more closely and combine research efforts.
However, the epistemic group, despite various attempts, has been unable to
advance negotiations in improving the contractual environment for progressing
IOGOOS, and this is reflected in the dismal performance of the coastal module,
the primary reason for the regional alliance. In the process of regime formation, the
IOGOOS regional alliance has not been able to generate sufficient concern, leading
to lack of commitment in resources; it will take quite some time before the regional
alliance can transcend the imposition stage towards self-generation.
The main feature of actor behaviour is that an epistemic group has been able to
sustain a regional alliance for 7 years in the absence of any significant participation
from interest- and power-based actors. Intellectual leadership demonstrated in the
epistemic group’s willingness and capability to cooperate in large-scale regional
action led to the conceptualisation of IOGOOS as a regional alliance. Interest- and
power-based actors, by displaying entrepreneurial and structural leadership, have
yet to forge the missing link between scientists (knowledge-based actors), ocean
and coastal managers (power-based actors) and communities (interest-based actors)
in the conduct of marine scientific research for the benefit of the Indian Ocean region
as a whole.
From the outset, a regional system that linked the global and local scales seemed
to be the best way for providing specific user group information. The underlying
assumption being that a regional system conforming to international standards and
protocols could provide economies of scale, improve cost effectiveness, minimise
redundancy, optimise data and information exchange, and establish reference and
sentinel stations. The attempt by the epistemic group was to provide an ocean-wide
data and information network as the backbone of the IOGOOS structure. In devel-
oping an implementation structure for the ocean-observing system, the fledgling
regional alliance was faced with hard realities of inadequate capacities and vary-
ing priorities amongst Indian Ocean nations and subregions alike. Within existing
national capacities, there is a clear intent of garnering available resources into a
collective combine and building capacities across nations.
The oddity in developing the IOGOOS structure is the decision to mirror the
international GOOS and IODE structure. The regional alliance just as in GOOS
chose developing ocean and coastal modules separately, despite limited resources
and in the knowledge that success of the coastal module will determine the future
Notes 175
of IOGOOS. The challenge has been in bridging the divide between the relatively
successful ocean module and the coastal module for starting coastal projects, which
are central to generating interest in IOGOOS by power- and interest-based actors in
turn building resource capacity in the region. Moreover, the Data and Information
Management system as the core of the IOGOOS structure adopted the IODE estab-
lished ODIN structure. The Indian Ocean split into two projects ODINAFRICA
under the aegis of the IOC regional committee the north and central western Indian
Ocean (IOCINCWIO) and ODINCINDIO under the aegis of the IOC regional
committee for the central Indian Ocean (IOCINDIO). This split occurred after mem-
bership of Indian Ocean countries had already been subdivided by GOOS-AFRICA
(1998), WAGOOS (2000), SEA-GOOS (2001), IOGOOS (2002) and the Indonesian
node of GOOS (2005).
In terms of the broader consequences across space, in despite the political real-
ities of mistrust and suspicion amongst countries, the MoU has sustained for more
than 4 years, proving to be a strong instrument of cooperation and collaboration in
the region. The epistemic group has succeeded in establishing a launching pad for
the regional alliance, and what remains is for governments to make firm commit-
ments of the added allocative and authoritative resources needed for operationalising
IOGOOS. Structural leadership by power-based actors in all likelihood will gal-
vanise inter-based actors in institutionalising the established IOGOOS research
agenda. By linking societal and scientific issues on a regional scale for making use
of otherwise unavailable information in the localised management of the marine
and coastal environment, promoting marine scientific research under the IOGOOS
regional alliance could benefit nearly 1.5 billion people in the Indian Ocean region.
The next chapter analyses trade in the Indian Ocean region followed by an exam-
ination of Indian Ocean shipping fleets in Chapter 8 and then an assessment of the
effectiveness of the port state control regime.
Notes
1. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (1983).
2. Revelle (1985).
3. See Gorina-Ysern (2003), Johnston (1988), Soons (1982).
4. See Miles (1998, p. 90).
5. The convention contains new rules on marine scientific research that strike an equitable
balance between the interests of the research states and the interest of coastal states in whose
economic zones or continental shelves the research is to be carried out—“A constitution for
the oceans” statement by Nordquist (1985).
6. For a comprehensive discussion on the decision process, see Miles (1982) and see overview
of the contents of the LOS convention in McDorman et al. (2005, p.28).
7. LOSC Article 246 (3) (4).
8. LOSC Article 246 (3).
10. LOSC Article 252 (b).
11. LOSC Article 248.

16. LOSC Article 240, 257.
20. North-South Confrontation, see McDorman et al. (2005, p. 20); for US position, see Miles
(1982, p. 77).
21. See discussion in Miles (1982), Soons (1982).
22. UN/DOALOS (1982–2002).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Gorina-Ysern (2003), Soons (1982).
26. Soons (1982).
27. Gorina-Ysern (2003).
28. Soons (1982).
29. Ibid.
30. Valencia and Akimoto (2005).
31. Soons (1982).
32. Ball (2004, pp. 67–82).
33. Van Dyke (2004, pp. 29–39).
34. Ibid.
35. Djalal (2004, pp. 83–87).
36. Bateman (2005, pp. 163–174).
37. Van Dyke (2005, pp. 107–121).
38. Ibid.
39. Valencia (2005, pp. 185–187).
40. Ibid, p. 186.
41. Ibid, p. 186.
44. Soons (1982).
49. Summerhayes, ‘A brief history of the Global Ocean Observing System,’ GOOS
information document 01/02/2006, viewed 8 February 2009, http://www.ioc-goos.org/
index.php?option=com_oe&task=viewDocumentRecord&docID=134.
50. Global Ocean Observing System, ‘What is GOOS,’ viewed 8 February 2009,
http://www.ioc-goos.org/content/view/12/26/.
51. Summerhayes, ‘A brief history of the Global Ocean Observing System.’
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. UNESCO (2007).
55. Ibid.
56. IOGOOS meeting statement, “Indian Ocean Principal’s Meeting—A High-
Level Consultation,” New Delhi, 8–9 November 2001, viewed 24 Jul 2007,
http://www.incois.gov.in/Incois/iogoos/New_Delhi_Statement.htm.
Notes 177
57. First conference statement of the Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing
System (IOGOOS), Mauritius, 4–9 November 2002, viewed 8 Feb 2009,
http://www.incois.gov.in/Incois/iogoos/Conference_Statement.jsp; and List of participants,
viewed 8 Feb 2009, http://www.incois.gov.in/Incois/iogoos/participants.jsp.
58. First conference statement of IOGOOS. Signatories of IOGOOS MOU: Australian Bureau
of Meteorology; Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Research Organisation; Indian
National Centre for Ocean Information Services; National Institute of Ocean Technology,
India; Iranian National Centre For Oceanography, Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research
Institute; University of La Réunion; Mauritius Oceanography Institute; Interim National
Committee for IOGOOS, South Africa; University of Port Elizabeth, South Africa;
University of Natal, South Africa; Institute for Aquatic Biodiversity, South Africa; Curtin
University, Australia; University of Toliara, Madagascar; National Aquatic Resources
Research and Development Agency, Sri Lanka; National Institute for Hydrography and
Navigation (INAHINA), Mozambique; NOAA Office of Global Programs, USA; and IOC
Perth Regional Office.
59. IOGOOS I [13222–13514] Appendix 2.
63. IOGOOS II [4813–5273] Appendix 2.
66. IOGOOS I [94609–94707] Appendix 2 and IOGOOS-IV report 10–12 October 2006.
69. IOGOOS I report 2–9 November 2002.
70. Global Ocean Observing System for the Indian Ocean, “IOGOOS Memorandum of
Understanding,” viewed 20 Apr 2007, http://www.incois.gov.in/Incois/iogoos/Mou1.htm.
71. IOGOOS I [190151–190264] and IOGOOS I [161013–161494] Appendix 2.
75. IOGOOS II report 26–29 April 2004.
76. IOGOOS III report 9–12 August 2005.
77. IOGOOS III report 9–12 August 2005.
80. IOGOOS-III [35094–35204] Appendix 2.
90. IOGOOS II [35747–35901]; IOGOOS II [37366–38068]; IOGOOS II [44325–44842]; and
IOGOOS II [46991–47398] Appendix 2.
91. IOGOOS III report 9–12 August 2005; and IOGOOS IV report 10–12 October 2006.

94. For allocative and authoritative resources see discussion in Chapter 4.
95. See brainstorming discussion and consolidated progress report on coastal working groups
IOGOOS III report 9–12 August 2005 pp. 24, 44–49; and IOGOOS IV report 10–12 Oct
2006 has references to lack of national funding and coordinators of projects being absent
from the meeting with decisions taken to abandon projects.
106. IOGOOS II [24051–24309] and IOGOOS II [23596–23891] Appendix 2.
107. IOGOOS-IV [30128–30783] Appendix 2.
108. IOGOOS-IV [31180–31593] Appendix 2.
109. IOGOOS I [200901–201212] and IOGOOS-III [58439–58755] Appendix 2.
110. IOGOOS II [18984–19288] and IOGOOS-III [55669–56223] Appendix 2.
111. IOGOOS III [56731–56919] Appendix 2.
114. IOGOOS III [53753–54847] and IOGOOS III [60269–60696] Appendix 2.
116. IOGOOS I [22842–22924]; IOGOOS I [31610–31738]; and IOGOOS I [31944–32012]
Appendix 2.
118. IOGOOS I report 2–9 Nov 2002.
124. IOGOOS II [46371–46962] and IOGOOS II [49854–50213] Appendix 2.
125. IOGOOS I report 2–9 Nov 2002, pp. 44–46.
126. Ibid, pp.44–45.
127. Ibid, p. 44.
128. Ibid, p. 45.
129. Ibid, p. 46.
130. Ibid, p. 46.
138. IOGOOS V report 30 November–03 December 2007, pp. 21–22.
Notes 179

141. IOC, “The IOC and Marine Scientific Research,” viewed 19 August 2008,
http://ioc.unesco.org/iocweb/activities/ocean_sciences.
142. IOC Statuts Article 3, Published by UNESCO (2000).
143. IOC Statuts Article 2, UNESCO (2000).
144. IOC One planet, One Ocean, viewed 24 March 2009, http://www.ioc-unesco.org/index.
php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1.
145. IOC governing bodies, viewed 24 March 2009, http://ioc.unesco.org/iocms/contents.
php?id=3.
146. IOC Member States, viewed 19 August 2008, http://www.ioc-unesco.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=4&id=8&Itemid=54.
147. IOC, Twenty-Fourth session of the IOC Assembly, 19–28 June 2007, Electoral Groupings,
grouping of the IOC member states for the purpose of election to the Executive Council,
viewed 24 March 2009, http://ioc3.unesco.org/ioc-24/electoral_groupings.html.
148. IOC governing bodies, viewed 24 March 2009, http://ioc.unesco.org/iocms/contents.php?
id=3.
149. IOC, Twenty-Fourth session of the IOC Assembly, 19–28 June 2007, Results of the
election, IOC-XXIV/NOM/WP 4, viewed 24 March 2009, http://ioc3.unesco.org/ioc-
24/documents/Elec_results%20document.pdf.
150. Ibid.
151. IOC Regional Committees, viewed 24 March 2009, http://www.ioc-unesco.org/index.php?
option=com_weblinks&catid=21&Itemid=82.
152. IOC sub-commission for the Western Pacific, Member states, viewed 24 Mar 2009,
http://www.unescobkk.org/special-programmes/westpac/about-us/member-states.
153. Global Ocean Observing System, Global GOOS viewed 24 March 2009, http://www.ioc-
goos.org/index.php?option=com_livedata&task=global_goos&Itemid=59.
154. Global Ocean Observing System, Coastal GOOS, viewed 24 March 2009, http://www.ioc-
goos.org/content/view/14/28.
155. Ocean Observations Panel for Climate, Panel members, viewed 24 March 2009,
http://ioc3.unesco.org/oopc/about/members.php.
156. International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, Regional Activities, viewed
24 March 2009, http://www.iode.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=
43&Itemid=55.
157. IOC GOOS regional alliances, viewed 24 March 2009, http://www.ioc-unesco.org/index.
php?option=com_weblinks&catid=22&Itemid=84.
158. International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, ‘IODE NODCs
and DNAs,’ viewed 24 March 2009, http://www.iode.org/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=61&Itemid=103.

185. IOGOOS report 9–12 August, 2005, p. 23 and IOGOOS-III [61223–62674] Appendix 2.
187. IOGOOS IV [41293–41611] Appendix 2.
189. For the only ocean not open to the northern subtropical regions and a low-latitude opening on
in its eastern boundary, see World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), “Understanding
the role of the Indian Ocean in the climate system—Implementation plan for sustained
observations,” WCRP Informal Report No. 5/2006, CLIVAR Publication Series No. 100,
p. 9.
190. World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), “CLIVAR/GOOS Indian Ocean
Panel members,” last updated 26 January 2009, viewed 27 Mar 2009,
http://www.clivar.org/organization/indian/indian_members.php.
191. World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), “Understanding the role of the Indian Ocean
in the climate system,” p. 9.
192. IOGOOS III report 9–12 August 2005, p. 18.
194. Ibid.
195. Ibid.
196. World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), “Forward plan for the Integrated
Indian Ocean observing system (IndOOS),” CLIVAR, viewed 27 Mar 2009,
http://www.clivar.org/organization/indian/IndOOS/obs.php.
197. World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), “About CLIVAR,” viewed 27 Mar 2009,
http://www.clivar.org/about/objectives.php.
198. The Indian Ocean Panel (IOP) is to report to CLIVAR Scientific Steering Group (SSG)
through the Asian-Australian Monsoon Panel (AAMP); See ‘Report of the 1st Indian Ocean
Panel & 6th Asian-Australian Monsoon Panel joint meeting,’ 18–24 February 2004, viewed
27 Mar 2009, http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/19363/01/AAMP6report.htm .
199. Meyers and Boscolo (2006).
201. Ibid, p. 37.
202. Ibid, p. 42.
203. Ibid, p. 43.
204. Ibid, pp. 45–46.
207. IOGOOS IV report 10–12 October 2006, p. 8.
Notes 181
208. IOGOOS IV report 10–12 October 2006, pp. 10–11.

209. IOGOOS I report 2–9 November 2002, pp. 18–19.
211. IOGOOS I report 2–9 November 2002, p. 23.
220. IOGOOS II report 26–29 April 2004 and IOGOOS III report 9–12 August 2005, p. 56.
222. IOGOOS III report 9–12 August 2005 Appendix 2, p. 66.
228. IOGOOS IV report 10–12 October 2006, pp. 11–12.
229. IOGOOS (2003).
230. Ibid.
231. Ibid, pp. 11–12.
232. Ibid, pp. 11–13.
233. Ibid, pp. 7–8.
234. Ibid, p. 14.
235. Ibid, pp. 4–5, 14.
236. Ibid, p. 14.
240. International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, “IODE NODCs and DNAs.”
241. International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, “IODE
national coordinator for ocean data management,” viewed 27 March 2009,
http://www.iode.org/index.php?option=com_oe&task=viewGroupRecord&groupID=59&
Itemid=42.
242. France and the United Kingdom are the other two members of IOCINDIO. See IOC
regional committee for the central Indian Ocean, “member states,” viewed 27 March 2009,
http://www.inco.ac.ir/iocindio/memberstate.htm.
243. International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, “Marine
Information Management,” viewed 27 March 2009, http://www.iode.org/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4&Itemid=35.
244. International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, “IODE national
coordinators for marine Information management” viewed 27 March 2009,
http://www.iode.org/index.php?option=com_oe&task=viewGroupRecord&
groupID=60&Itemid=43.
245. Ocean Data and Information Network for Africa (ODIN-Africa), “About ODIN-Africa,”
viewed 27 March 2009, http://www.odinafrica.org.
247. IOGOOS (2003, p. 6).

250. Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS), “Homepage,”
viewed 27 March 2009, http://www.incois.gov.in/Incois/incois1024/index/index.jsp?
res=1024.
251. Personal email communication on 23 August 2008 from Dr. Ing. Alfonse M. Dubi from
University of Dar es Salaam indicating hesitation in initially joining the alliance being
tagged to a membership fee. Personal email communication on 19 January 2009 from Dr.
Srinivas Kumar from IOGOOS secretariat does not confirm the year when Tanzania took
membership. Dr Kumar does provide information that there is an annual membership fee of
$500, which is a token contribution and institutional membership is not discontinued if the
membership fee is not paid.
252. See Rumley (1999, pp. 236, 257), Gopal and Rumley (2004).
Chapter 7
Intra-Indian Ocean Trade
This chapter reviews the dynamics of intra-Indian Ocean trade. The discussion
focuses on the trends and provides an analysis of the exports in intra-Indian Ocean
trade. The focus on exports rather than total intra-Indian Ocean trade provides
a useful backdrop for shipping fleets and port state control in the Indian Ocean
Region.
7.1 Indian Ocean Commerce
The history of trade in the Indian Ocean Region is well established. Historians
such as Chaudhuri and McPherson have each made important contributions show-
ing that even prior to the arrival of Vasco da Gama in 1498 the entire Indian Ocean
Region was enmeshed in high-level trade connected by a far-reaching network of sea
links.1
According to Philip Stienberg, for societies of the Indian Ocean from 500 B.C.
to 1500 A.D., the overall conception of ocean-space was a separating space of great
distance to be crossed as quickly as possible and used extensively for transporting
goods. Under such conditions, the Indian Ocean was immune to assertions of power
by land-based entities. The connections were religious and cultural rather than polit-
ical and there were no attempts to claim or organise the sea as a means of generating
economic wealth. Power where exerted was only to ensure that the Indian Ocean
remained free for all to cross, if one could cope with its hostile nature.2
In this chapter, the International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade statistical
database has been used to establish the modern-day value of merchandise exports
for Indian Ocean rim countries. The trade data in Appendices D–J allows for a
more detailed analysis of exports and imports. However, the assessment has been
limited to exports as it is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a comprehensive
assessment of trade patterns and flows. This chapter has a limited purpose and that
is to provide the backdrop for shipping fleets of Indian Ocean countries, which are
at the core of determining regime effectiveness on port state control in the Indian
Ocean Region, the second case study in Chapter 8.
184 7 Intra-Indian Ocean Trade
7.2 Intra-Indian Ocean Trade Overview

The Indian Ocean Region Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2008 exceeded 15%
of the world GDP.3 In 2001, world merchandise exports from the rim coun-
tries to industrialised countries were marginally higher at US $361,610.41 million
than exports to developing countries at US $337,345.06 million. By 2007, growth
in world merchandise exports from rim countries to developing countries had
increased nearly three times to US $1,015,266.86 million. This trade surpassed the
value of exports to industrialised countries, which otherwise more than doubled to
US $760,527.53 million.4 Between 2001 and 2007, intra-Indian Ocean merchan-
dise exports registered a 2.8 times growth that was marginally higher than world
merchandise exports from the region (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1 Indian Ocean rim countries total exports in US dollar (millions) 2001–2007
Nature
of exports 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Intra-IOR 177595.59 186965.88 231103.31 295108.25 362762.09 439731.36 504614.15

exports
Intra-IOR 163830.16 173219.95 216424.91 275468.90 339917.25 412959.56 473955.49
exports not
including
Australia
Exports to the 729209.97 747240.61 887678.83 1109050.42 1349570.63 1620678.40 1838229.08
World
Exports to 337345.06 357456.94 439551.81 563599.98 699963.34 860096.34 1015266.86
Developing
Countries
Exports to 361610.41 358501.51 415361.74 504631.44 603013.02 709565.54 760527.53
Industrialised
Countries
Source: Derived from IMF Direction of Trade statistical database in Appendix C
As shown in Table 7.2 and Fig. 7.1, the intra-IOR exports from each of the sub-
regions more than doubled with South East Asia accounting for more than half of
the total intra-Indian Ocean Region (IOR) trade.
Notwithstanding the strong South East Asian economic influence on the Indian
Ocean Region, the international community firmly views countries from South East
Asia as economies belonging to the Asia Pacific region under the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping.
In 2007, the Middle East and South Asia regions combined accounted for more
than 37% of the intra-IOR exports. The combined percentage shares of East Africa
and Red Sea countries from the western rim of the Indian Ocean was less than 6%
and marginally lower than the percentage share of Australia’s intra-IOR exports.
Effectively, only the Middle East and South Asian countries are seen as signifi-
cant contributors to the economic value of exports from the Indian Ocean Region.
7.2 Intra-Indian Ocean Trade Overview 185
Table 7.2 Intra-IOR exports by region in US dollar (millions) 2001–2007
Region/ South Middle South East

year East Asia East Asia Australia Red Sea Africa Total
2007 256669.99 132799.86 55190.72 30658.66 16663.65 12631.28 504614.15

2006 251806.48 119987.64 43875.67 26771.79 13776.28 10285.28 466503.15
2005 188763.06 92027.60 37336.51 22844.84 11793.26 9996.82 362762.09
2004 158338.16 69770.50 29059.56 19639.35 10317.03 7983.64 295108.25
2003 127841.90 50532.48 23134.70 14678.40 8546.94 6368.90 231103.31
2002 100072.17 43134.94 17547.75 13745.94 7441.02 5024.07 186965.88
2001 93808.40 44010.04 13438.79 13765.43 7393.70 5179.24 177595.59
Fig. 7.1 Intra-IOR exports by region in US dollar (millions) 2001–2007

Table 7.3 Intra-IOR exports as a percentage share of total exports 2001–2007
Intra IOR exports as a % of 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
World exports 24 25 26 27 27 27 27
Exports to developing countries 53 52 53 52 52 51 50
Exports to industrialised countries 49 52 56 58 60 62 66
not including Australia
World exports 22 23 24 25 25 25 26
Exports to developing countries 49 48 49 49 49 48 47
Exports to industrialised countries 45 48 52 55 56 58 62

During the same period, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports as
a percentage of total world exports increased to 27% from 24% (Table 7.3).
Although the intra-IOR exports as a percentage of exports to developing coun-
tries declined to 50%, from 53% the exports to industrialised countries increased
significantly to 66% from 49%.
The intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports, not including Australia, which is
the only industrialised country in the region, also shows a similar trend. The value
of merchandise exports from intra-Indian Ocean developing countries as a percent-
age of world exports increased to 26% from 22%; exports to developing countries
declined from 47%to 49%; and of exports to industrialised countries increased
significantly to 62% from 47%.
Using the trend lines from 2001 to 2007 with and without including Australia
in the total value of exports from Indian Ocean rim countries, it is argued that
the significance of intra-Indian Ocean trade increased in importance over the past
7 years. The percentage of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports compared to
world exports increased 3–4%, and although intra-Indian Ocean exports to devel-
oping countries declined 2–3%, these exports compared to industrialised countries
increased 17%.
7.3 Country-Specific Intra-Indian Ocean Trade Performance
7.3.1 Intra-Indian Ocean Trade and World Exports
During the last 7 years, there were six countries, Djibouti, Jordan, Maldives,
Myanmar, Somalia and Yemen, from the region with a value of intra-Indian Ocean
merchandise exports between 45 and 97% of world exports (Table 7.4).
Table 7.4 Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a percentage of world exports in 2007
< 10% Between 11 and 35% 45–97%
Decline Unchanged Growth

Bangladesh, Iraq, Egypt, Ethiopia, Australia, India, Indonesia, Djibouti, Jordan,
Israel, Iran, Kenya, Bahrain, Malaysia, Maldives,
Madagascar, Oman Comoros, Mauritius, Myanmar,
Sudan Kuwait, Pakistan, Somalia,
Mozambique, Qatar, Yemen
Saudi Arabia Seychelles,
Singapore,
South Africa,
Sri Lanka,
Tanzania,
Thailand, the
United Arab
Emirates

7.3 Country-Specific Intra-Indian Ocean Trade Performance 187
Intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports for five countries, Bangladesh, Iraq,

Israel, Madagascar and Sudan, showed a declining trend in value remaining
throughout below 10% of world exports.
For the remainder of countries in the region the value of merchandise exports
remained between 11% and 35% of world exports. Of these countries, the value
of merchandise exports declined for Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Kenya and Oman and
was unchanged for Australia, Bahrain, Comoros, Kuwait, Mozambique and Saudi
Arabia.
The value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports vis-à-vis world exports for
Mauritius, Qatar and Seychelles registered at a more than 10% growth followed
by India, Singapore and Sri Lanka with 6–10% growth. The remaining countries,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand and the United
Arab Emirates, all registered a 2–5% growth in value of intra-Indian ocean trade
compared with world exports.5
7.3.2 Intra-Indian Ocean Trade and Developing Countries

In the same period, the value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a percentage of exports
to developing countries declined for most countries in the region. The three most
significant changes from 2001 to 2007 were the percentage changes for Comoros,
Iran and Qatar. In the case of Comoros, the value decreased to 32% from 86% and,
for Iran, the value decreased to 8% from 45% while for Qatar, the value more than
doubled to 87% from 43%.
Besides Qatar, eight other countries (Bahrain, India, Myanmar, Seychelles,
Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka and the United Arab Emirates) registered a 1–8%
increase in the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports as a percentage of
exports to developing countries.6
Table 7.5 summarises the value of intra-ocean trade as a percentage of exports to
developing countries in 2007.
Table 7.5 Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a percentage of exports to developing countries in
2007
5–25% 30–40% 41–50% 51–60% 61–70% 71–85% 86–99%
Iran, Australia, Bangladesh, India, Madagascar, Bahrain, Djibouti,

Iraq, Comoros, Egypt, Indonesia, Seychelles, Jordan, Qatar,
Sudan Israel, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Somalia
Oman, Kenya, Mozambique, the United Mauritius,
South Kuwait, Singapore Arab Myanmar
Africa Pakistan, Emirates,
Saudi Yemen
Arabia,
Tanzania,
Thailand

7.3.3 Intra-Indian Ocean Trade and Industrialised Countries

On the other hand, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports as a per-
centage of exports to industrialised countries increased for most countries in the
region. The percentage increase in value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports
for most countries has been between 15% and 40% of the exports to industrialised
countries.
In seven countries (Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, Myanmar, Oman, Somalia and
Yemen), the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports has remained signifi-
cantly higher than exports to industrialised countries.
For Oman and Bahrain in 2007, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise
exports was 1.6 times and 1.9 times more than the value of exports to industrialised
countries, respectively.
For Djibouti, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports increased
from 3.5 times in 2001 to more than 38 times the value of exports to industrialised
countries in 2007.
For Myanmar, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports increased
from 1.1 times to more than 5.1 times the value of exports to industrialised countries
in 2007.
For Somalia, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports increased from
15 times in 2001 to 59 times the value of exports to industrialised countries in 2007.
While for Jordan, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports declined
somewhat from 3.9 times in 2001 to 1.8 times the value of exports to industrialised
countries in 2007.
Also for Yemen, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports declined
from 6.9 times in 2001 to 3.7 times the value of exports to industrialised countries
in 2007.
Besides these seven countries with significant intra-Indian Ocean merchandise
exports, the value for Maldives increased from 60% in 2001 to 106% the value of
exports to industrialised countries in 2007.
Similarly, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports for Singapore as
percentage of exports to industrialised countries increased from 75% in 2001 to
128% in 2007.
In the past 7 years, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports as a
percentage of exports to industrialised countries for Iran (∼ 30%) and Mozambique
(∼24%) remained constant.
For Madagascar, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports declined
from 29% in 2001 to just 8% of the value of exports to industrialised countries in
2007.
While the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports for Bangladesh
(∼7%) as a percentage of exports to industrialised countries remained insigni-
ficant.
Even for Iraq, the value of intra-Indian Ocean merchandise exports as a percent-
age of exports to industrialised countries has been insignificant and further declined
to 2% in 2007 from 9% in 2001.7
7.4 IOR Regional Exports 189
Table 7.6 Value of intra-Ocean trade as a percentage of exports to industrialised countries in 2007
<20% 20–40% 41–60% 61–80% 81–99% 1–51 times
Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Australia, India, Malaysia, the Bahrain,

Iraq, Israel, Mauritius, Comoros, Indonesia, United Arab Djibouti,
Madagascar Mozambique, Ethiopia, Kenya, Emirates Jordan,
Seychelles, Qatar, Saudi Kuwait, Maldives,
South Africa, Arabia Pakistan, Myanmar,
Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Oman,
Sudan Thailand Singapore,
Somalia,
Yemen
Table 7.6 summarises the value of intra-ocean trade as a percentage of exports to

industrialised countries in 2007.
7.4 IOR Regional Exports
Over the last 7 years, on average with 31% of world exports South East Asia had the
highest value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of world exports (Table 7.7).
The value of IOR regional exports from South Asia as a percentage of world exports
averaged 26% followed by Middle East with 23%, Australia with 22%, Red Sea with
16% and East Africa with 15%.
Table 7.7 Value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of world exports
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 22 21 21 23 22 22 22
South East Asia 28 29 31 32 33 33 34
South Asia 21 25 27 28 29 27 28
Middle East 23 24 22 23 22 24 24
Red Sea 18 16 17 16 16 16 17
East Africa 15 14 15 15 16 16 16
Source: Derived from IMF Direction of Trade statistical database in

Appendix C
South East Asia and South Asia regions have seen a 6–7% growth in value of
exports, while the value of IOR regional exports from Australia, Middle East, Red
Sea and East Africa has remained relatively constant.
During the same period, the value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of
exports to developing countries has remained relatively constant for South East Asia
and South Asia (Table 7.8). On the other hand, the value of exports declined by 5%
for Australia, 6% for Middle East, 7% for East Africa and 10% for the Red Sea
region.
Table 7.8 Value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of exports to developing countries
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 44 43 43 45 41 41 39
South East Asia 55 54 56 56 56 55 54
South Asia 52 57 59 58 57 53 52
Middle East 52 52 48 48 48 48 46
Red Sea 50 47 47 43 41 43 40
East Africa 49 46 47 46 50 45 42
Table 7.9 Value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of exports to industrialised countries
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 45 43 41 48 48 49 51
South East Asia 57 62 72 75 82 83 90
South Asia 36 46 53 57 60 58 64
Middle East 49 52 48 51 50 55 58
Red Sea 31 28 29 29 28 27 31
East Africa 31 28 26 26 28 25 28
As shown in Table 7.9, the value of IOR regional exports as a percentage of

exports to industrialised countries is significantly higher for most regions other than
the Red Sea and East Africa regions.
The value of IOR regional exports from South East Asia as a percentage of
exports to industrialised countries increased steadily, and in 2007, the value was
33% higher than in 2001.
Similarly, the value of IOR regional exports from South Asia as a percentage of
exports to industrialised countries also increased steadily, and in 2007, the value was
28% higher in 2001.
The Middle East registered a 9% growth and Australia registered a 6% growth in
2007 compared with the 2001 value of IOR regional exports.
The value of IOR regional exports for the Red Sea and East Africa regions
has remained constant at about 28–31% of the value of exports to industrialised
countries.
7.5 Top-Performing IOR Countries

In 2007, there were ten IOR countries with 88% of the Intra-IOR exports by value
compared with eight countries in 2001 with 82% of the Intra-IOR exports by value
(Table 7.10).
7.5 Top-Performing IOR Countries 191
Table 7.10 IOR country exports by value (> USD 10,000 million) to IOR country of destination
Source: Derived from IMF Direction of Trade statistical database in Appendixes D–J
The top three ranking countries were Singapore, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia,
respectively, and their position between 2001 and 2007 remained unchanged. India
from the eighth-ranked country in 2001 moved to become the fourth-ranked country
in 2007. The share of Australian intra-IOR exports by value declined in 2007 when
Australia, ranked above the United Arab Emirates and India in 2001, came eighth in
ranking. Kuwait entered the club of countries with intra-IOR export value of more
than US $10,000 million in 2006, followed by Qatar in 2007.
Essentially, Australia and India are the only two countries along with South East
Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia) and Middle East (Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar) responsible for the majority of intra-IOR
exports by value. In 2007, 11 IOR countries of destination accounted for 85% of the
intra-IOR exports by value (Table 7.11).
Table 7.11 Intra-IOR exports by value (> USD 10,000 millions) to IOR country of destination
Source: Derived from IMF Direction of Trade statistical database in Appendixes D–J
In terms of IOR countries of destination, there was greater differentiation in 2001

as the five countries having more than US $10,000 million of exports by value had
only a 63% share of the intra-IOR exports.
Throughout the 7-year period, Singapore and Malaysia remained the top two
ranking countries of destination. Since 2003, Thailand, Indonesia and India have
occupied the top five ranking for countries of destination of intra-IOR exports by
value. From 2005, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and South Africa joined Australia
and the United Arab Emirates as the other countries of destination for intra-IOR
exports by value.
7.5.1 Australia
The share of Australia’s major IOR trading partners in intra-IOR exports increased
from 69% in 2001 to 90% in 2007 (Fig. 7.2).
Australian exports predominantly to South East Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand) declined marginally to 43% in 2007 from 50% in 2001.
While Australia’s trade with India increased to 27% in 2007 from 9% in 2001, the
highest for any IOR country of destination for Australian exports.
On average, Australia has also had about 11% exports by value to Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates. Since 2004, share of Australian exports to South
Africa also increased with about 6–7% of the intra-IOR exports by value.
The share of Australian exports to other countries of destination in the Indian
Ocean Region declined to 10% in 2007 from 31% in 2001.
7.5.2 Singapore
Singapore has maintained a steady pattern of exports to IOR countries. About

92–95% of Singapore’s exports by value are with the major IOR trading partners,
of which the destination for more than 70% of exports has been to countries within
the South East Asian region (Fig. 7.3). In addition, Singapore has had about 9%
exports by value to Australia, 8% to South Asian countries and 3% to the United
Arab Emirates. In all, only 5–8% of intra-IOR exports by value have been to other
IOR countries.
7.5.3 Malaysia
Malaysia’s export destinations too have been largely within the South East Asian
region. Malaysian exports to destination countries in South East Asia declined
marginally to 65% in 2007 from 72% in 2001 (Fig. 7.4). Over time, other regions
experienced incremental increases in exports. In 2007, Australia and India were
the country of destination for 10% of exports by value. The United Arab Emirates
also had the highest percentage of exports by value in 7 years. From 2005, South
Africa emerged as a favoured destination of Malaysian exports within the IOR
region. Exports to other countries of destination in the region declined to just 6% in
2007.
Fig. 7.2 Australia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007

Source: Derived from IMF Direction of Trade statistical database in Appendices D–J
Fig. 7.3 Singapore’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007

7.5.4 Indonesia
The percentage share of Indonesian exports by destination has remained steady over
the last 7 years (Fig. 7.5). The South East Asian countries have maintained on aver-
age a 60% share of the total intra-IOR exports over the last 7 years. The share of
Indonesian exports to Australia declined marginally to 11% in 2007 from 13% in
2001, while India’s share of Indonesian exports increased to 11% from 7% over
Fig. 7.4 Malaysia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007

the same period. Indonesian exports to the Middle East also remained steady at
about 5% annually. Since 2006, South Africa emerged as a favoured destination of
Indonesian exports. Exports to other countries in the region declined to 9% in 2007
from 16% in 2001.
Fig. 7.5 Indonesia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007

7.5.5 Thailand
The nature of Thailand’s intra-IOR exports followed a similar pattern of trading
as the other three South East Asian countries—Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia
(Fig. 7.6). Thailand’s exports to destination countries in South East Asia declined
marginally to 58% in 2007 from 64% in 2001. The percentage share of exports to
Fig. 7.6 Thailand’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007

Australia increased to 14% in 2007 from 9% in 2001 and doubled for India to 6%
from 3% over the same period. The percentage share of exports to the United Arab
Emirates also increased to 8% from 5%. From 2004, South Africa replaced Israel
as the favoured destination of Thailand’s exports. Exports to other countries in the
region declined to 13% in 2007 from 19% in 2001.
7.5.6 India
India’s intra-IOR exports have been fairly well distributed throughout the region. In
2001, major IOR trading partners accounted for 56% share of exports and the rest
of the region received a solid 44% share of India’s exports (Fig. 7.7).
Fig. 7.7 India’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007

The distribution by major IOR trading partners included 23% each to Singapore,
Malaysia and Thailand in South East Asia and to the United Arab Emirates and
Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. Bangladesh was the destination country for 10% of
the exports by value. Since 2002, Indonesia as a major trading partner was the desti-
nation country for about 4–6% of the exports by value. In 2005 and 2006, Malaysia
dropped off in the percentage share of exports by value. Overall, South East Asia’s
share of exports were unchanged over the 7-year period.
The share of exports to the Middle East increased to 38% in 2007 from 23% in
2001. The United Arab Emirates share increased to 28% from 16%, while the share
of exports to Saudi Arabia remained constant at about 5–7%. In 2003, Iran emerged
as a major trading partner with about 4–5% share of exports by value.
India’s exports to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as major trading partners have
remained constant at about 10–14% share of exports by value. Among India’s
other major IOR trading partners were Israel in 2004–2005 and South Africa in
2005–2006. Both countries have had a mixed percentage share of exports by value.
Australia does not appear on the list of India’s major IOR trading partners.
Although India’s share of exports to other countries in the IOR region declined
to 27% in 2007, from 44% in 2001 it remains the highest among the other IOR
countries for intra-IOR exports.
7.5.7 Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia’s major IOR trading partners have remained largely unchanged over
the last 7 years (Fig. 7.8).
The percentage share of exports to South East Asia has been the maximum vary-
ing between 33 and 45%. After 2001, India was overtaken by Pakistan in the South
Asian region as a major IOR trading partner.
Since 2002, Pakistan’s share of Saudi Arabia’s exports has remained constant at
7–8%. The percentage share of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates within the
Middle East region also remained steady at about 15–17% of the percentage share
of exports by value. South Africa’s percentage share of exports declined slightly to
8% in 2007 from 10% in 2001.
Within the Red Sea region, Egypt in 2003 and Jordan in 2004 emerged as Saudi
Arabia’s major IOR trading partners. Interestingly, Australia, again like India, does
not appear on the list of major IOR trading partners of Saudi Arabia. Exports to
other countries in the region declined to 25% in 2007 from 37% in 2001.
7.5.8 United Arab Emirates

Similar to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates’ major IOR trading partners
were largely unchanged. The percentage share of exports to Singapore and Thailand
in South East Asia and to Oman and Iran in the Middle East varied between 23 and
Fig. 7.8 Saudi Arabia’s intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007

30% (Fig. 7.9). The percentage share of exports to India and Pakistan in South Asia
also varied between 17 and 26%. Yemen in 2005 and Australia in 2006 emerged as
major IOR trading partners. Exports to other countries in the region declined to 20%
in 2007 from 31% in 2001.
7.6 Conclusion 201
Fig. 7.9 The United Arab Emirates intra-IOR exports by value 2001–2007
7.6 Conclusion
The exports to developing countries for the 36 countries in the analysis had signif-
icantly surpassed the exports to industrialised countries by 2007 where previously
these exports were higher. This is despite a 17% increase in exports to industri-
alised countries between 2001 and 2007. By 2007, exports to the world had more
than doubled to nearly US $1.9 trillion with intra-Indian Ocean trade accounting for
27% of the export value.
The intra-Indian Ocean trade with and without Australia, the only industri-
alised country in the region, had nearly trebled from 2001. Only Bangladesh, Iraq,
Madagascar and Sudan had less than 10% of value of intra-Indian Ocean exports as
a percentage of world exports. For Djibouti, Jordan, Maldives, Myanmar, Somalia
and Yemen the value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as percentage of world exports
ranged from 45 to 97%.
Another correlation validates the significance of the intra-Indian Ocean trade.
The value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a percentage of exports to developing
countries for all countries other than for Iran, Iraq and Sudan ranged from 30 to
99% with 24 countries in the 41–85% range. As for the value of intra-Indian Ocean
exports as percentage of exports to industrialised countries there were nine countries
whose exports were predominantly to other countries within the region. The value
of intra-Indian Ocean exports for another 14 countries ranged from 41 to 99% of the
exports to industrialised countries. Most of these trades would be moved by ships
from within the region.
The South East Asian countries that otherwise are viewed as part of the Asia-
Pacific region and not the Indian Ocean accounted for more than half of the total
intra-Indian Ocean trade. In all, 10 of the 36 countries—Singapore, Malaysia, Saudi
Arabia, India, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Australia, Kuwait and
Qatar in order of ranking—accounted for 88% of the exports by value in 2007. Of
these countries, Kuwait and Qatar were new entrants in 2006 and 2007, respectively.
From the remaining eight countries only India, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates had more than 20% of their exports by value to other countries in the
Indian Ocean Region. Exports from Australia and South East Asian were limited
to between 5 and 13% of the total exports by these countries. In all cases exports
to other countries declined from a high in 2001, which suggests a consolidation of
trade among the faster developing economies in the region.
The next chapter describes the shipping fleets from the Indian Ocean Region for
a comprehensive analysis of the regime for port state control in the Indian Ocean.
Notes
1. McPherson (1993), Chaudhuri (1985).
2. See discussion on the Indian Ocean: the ocean as distance in Steinberg (2001, pp. 41–52).
3. Calculated for the 35 Indian Ocean rim countries and land-locked Ethiopia (36
countries with shipping fleets) used in the analysis from CIA World Fact Book
2008, viewed on 23 April 2009, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html.
4. Appendix C.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Appendix D.
Chapter 8
Shipping and Port State Control
in the Indian Ocean
This chapter discusses world shipping fleet operations and the structure of shipping
fleets in the Indian Ocean Region. The effectiveness of the regime for port state
control in the Indian Ocean Region is examined by assessing the Indian Ocean
Memorandum of Understanding for port state control as a case study.
8.1 Shipping a Globalised Industry

Shipping is by far the critical joining shackle in the chain anchoring the world
economy. By its inherent mobility, the shipping industry is potentially the most
international and globalised industry that necessitates equity in enforcement of
regulatory standards across the globe.1
World shipping operates in an environment where only some shipping companies
are bad and they are in competition with the many good ones.2 Shipping is the cor-
nerstone of the global transport infrastructure and yet has the lowest public profile
and the least representative public image.3
The complexity of managing a globalised shipping industry has been exacerbated
by the fragmentation in ownership of the world shipping fleet. Broadly, merchant
fleets can be categorised into fleets by registration (nominal ownership) and fleets
by nationality of owner (beneficial ownership).
UNCLOS stipulates that ships must sail under the flag of one state alone specify-
ing duties of the flag state to not only effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control
in administration, technical and social matters but also to take measures to ensure
the safety of the ship at sea.4 A ship must compulsorily assume the nationality of the
flag state with which it has been registered and granted the right to fly its flag. The
flag flown by the ship thereby creates the necessary link between flag state and ship,
but as we shall see later this does not necessarily capture the genuine link between
ship and shipowner.
The intense competition in the shipping industry in the twentieth century led to
the emergence of international or open registers and bareboat charters besides time
honoured closed registers (see discussion below).
204 8 Shipping and Port State Control in the Indian Ocean
The stringent criteria applied by closed registries of ownership by citizens only

and employment of nationals alone as crew led to the creation of international reg-
istries in an effort by traditional maritime nations to retain tonnage and yet maintain
a competitive advantage.
The creation of international registers effectively encouraged a shipowner to
maintain ships registry with the flag state operating a closed register while ben-
efiting from lower operating costs, such as lower taxation and employment of
non-nationals.
This phenomenon of “flagging out” began in the late 1980s with France-
Kerguelen Islands (1987), the Norwegian Ship Register (1987), the Danish
International Ship Register (1988), Portugal-Madeira (1988) and Spain-Canary
Islands (1992). The Lloyds Register Fairplay identifies China (2), New Zealand
(1) and seven European countries—Denmark (3), France (2), the Netherlands (2),
Norway (1), Portugal (1), Spain (1) and the UK (9)—as having 22 international
registries between them.5
Another response to “flagging out” has been the creation of bareboat charter
or dual flags. The underlying principle is the compatibility of the two registries
whereby matters regarding title, mortgage and encumbrances are provided by the
first registry while the charterer under the second registry is responsible for costs
associated with the operations of the vessel, such as crew, provisions, bunkers and
port charges.
The right to fly the flag of the first registry is suspended for the duration
of the bareboat charter. Some examples of countries that allow bareboat char-
ter include Germany, Denmark, Australia, Malta, Liberia and Philippines. Both
international registries and bareboat charters have provided traditional maritime
states with some or all of the flexibility of “Flags of Convenience (FoC)” or open
registries.
Although open registers have been in existence for centuries,6 it was not until
1905 when a legal distinction was first drawn between the nationality of a ship
and the nationality of the shipowners—by the flag flown and registry certifying the
ship’s nationality.7 Since then, open registers became an attractive choice to increase
profitability. European fleets including those of Greece, the UK, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, France, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Romania
and Bulgaria followed American shipowners in the period between the two world
wars to register with Panama and reap the benefits yielded by low registration fees
and taxes together with the freedom to employ cheap labour from the international
market.8
The International Transport Federation (ITF) defines a Flag of Convenience
(FoC) ship as one that flies the flag of a country other than the country of bene-
ficial ownership.9 The 1970 Rochdale Committee Inquiry into shipping set out six
basic characteristics of FoC countries:
• The country of registry allows ownership and/or control of ships by non-citizens;

• access to or transfer from the registry is easy and a ship may usually be registered
at a consul’s office abroad;
8.2 International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Framework 205
• taxes on income from ship operations are not levied locally or are low. Normally,
the only charges include a registration fee and an annual fee based on tonnage
with a guarantee or acceptable understanding regarding freedom from future
taxation;
• the country of registry is usually a small state that has no foreseeable require-
ment for all the tonnage registered, but the small charges on a large tonnage can
significantly affect its national income and balance of payments;
• manning of ships by non-nationals is freely permitted; and
• the country of registry has neither the power nor the administrative machinery for
effectively imposing national or international rules of navigation and has neither
the desire nor the power to control the shipping companies themselves.10
The feature where registration by itself is not considered essential for the exercise
of sovereignty by the state and the features of ownership and/or control by non-
citizens and the manning of ships by non-nationals makes it next to impossible to
establish a “genuine link”11 between the vessel and the state of beneficial ownership
by the flag flown.
Flag states under various international conventions have the prime responsibility
for championing and enforcing standards of professional, safety, environmental and
social performance of ships. Such accountability is unambiguously underpinned by
the UN Convention on Law of the Sea where “every state shall effectively exercise
its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships
flying its flag”.12
In the protection and preservation of the marine environment, states shall ensure
compliance by vessels flying their flag or of their registry with applicable interna-
tional rules and standards and with the laws and regulations where “flag states shall
provide for the effective enforcement of such rules, standards, laws and regulations,
irrespective of where a violation occurs”.13
8.2 International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Framework

The IMO first met in 1959 and for 60 years has had the task of developing and
maintaining a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping, which is captured
by its mission statement “safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans”.14
Towards accomplishing the ideals reflected in this mission statement, the IMO
has developed a body of international conventions governing every aspect of
shipping from maritime safety, prevention of marine pollution, liability and com-
pensation to conventions dealing with facilitation, tonnage measurement, unlawful
acts against shipping and salvage.
The purpose of the organisation is “to provide machinery for cooperation among
Governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to tech-
nical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to
encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards
in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and

control of marine pollution from ships”.15
The IMO spearheads the International Conventions for the Safety of Life
at Sea (SOLAS), Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and on the
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) to
establish environmental, safety, navigation, shipbuilding, watchkeeping and regis-
tration requirements for all ships. The legal framework for quality shipping adopted
by the IMO and implemented through country-specific legislation has been further
strengthened from the labour-related initiatives taken by the International Labour
Organisation (ILO). The ILO through Convention No 147 and the Maritime Labour
Convention (MLC) 2006 has responsibility for establishing guidelines on employ-
ment conditions for seafarers. There are numerous other international conventions
related to international shipping standards concerning vessel construction, design,
equipment, operation and manning requirements, but STCW, SOLAS, MARPOL
and MLC are seen as the four pillars supporting the foundation and structure of the
international regime for quality shipping.
Currently, there are 10 IMO conventions that have yet to enter into force, some
of which have been superseded:
• International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC) 1993 Amendments—42

acceptances required to enter into force. Australia is the only Indian Ocean
Region member state from the nine acceptances to date;
• Torremolinos Protocol of 1993 relating to the Torremolinos International
Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, 1977 (SFV PROT 1993)—entry
into force 12 months after being accepted by 15 contracting states with aggre-
gate number of whose fishing vessels of 24 m in length and over is not less than
14,000. There is not a single Indian Ocean Region member state to date from the
two signatories and 14 contracting states with 3,064 fishing vessels of 24 m in
length and over;
• International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (STCW-F) 1995—entry into
force 12 months after being accepted by 15 contracting states. There is not a
single Indian Ocean Region member state to date from the eight contracting
states and two signatories;
• Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, 1978 (disputes) Amendments—52 acceptances necessary to enter
into force. South Africa is the only Indian Ocean member state from the 20
acceptances to date;
• Protocol of 2002 to amend the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of
Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea, 1974 (PAL PROT 2002)—entry into force
12 months after being accepted by 10 states. There is not a single Indian Ocean
Region member state to date from the four contracting parties and six signatories
subject to acceptance/ratification;
• Operating Agreement on the International Mobile Satellite Organization
(INMARSAT OA) 1994 and 2006 amendments—Two thirds of signatories holding
at least two thirds of total investment shares at time of adoption to enter into force;
8.3 World Shipping 207
• International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in

Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea
(HNS), 1996—entry into force 18 months after the date on which the follow-
ing conditions are fulfilled: at least 12 states, including four states each with not
less than 2 million units of gross tonnage (GT), have expressed their consent to be
bound by it and the Secretary-General received information that states who would
be liable to contribute have received a total quantity of at least 40 million tonnes
of cargo during the preceding calendar year. There is not a single Indian Ocean
member state from the eight signatories subject to ratification and 10 contracting
states;
• International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast
Water and Sediments (BWM), 2004—entry into force 12 months after at least
30 member states with a combined merchant fleet of not less than 35% of the
world GT have accepted. Australia from the five signatories subject to ratifica-
tion and Egypt and Maldives from the 11 contracting states are the only Indian
Ocean member states;
• Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 2005)—90 days following the date on
which 12 member states have accepted. Australia is the only Indian Ocean mem-
ber state from the 10 signatories subject to ratification and the two contracting
states; and
• Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (SUA PROT
2005)—90 days following the date on which three member states have accepted.
However, the protocol may not enter into force before SUA 2005. Australia is the
only Indian Ocean member state from the 10 signatories subject to ratification.16
8.3 World Shipping
Shipping moves 90% of global trade.17 In 2007, seaborne trade, an enabler of, and
supported by, the growth in world economies, recorded an annual growth of 4.8%.18
As of 31 December 2007, the world fleet stood at 97,504 ships of 774.9 million
GT and an average age of 22 years.19 The world cargo-carrying fleet comprised
51,538 ships of 737.3 million GT and average age of 20 years.20
The 20 leading merchant fleets by registration account for 47% of the total num-
ber of ships in the world fleet but 80% by GT. The cargo-carrying fleet of the leading
merchant fleets by registration stands at 56 and 82% by GT.
Singapore and India are the only two Indian Ocean Region countries in the top 20
merchant fleets by registration. Singapore’s fleet is ranked fourth with 2,257 ships
of 36,251,735 million GT and an average age of 15 years. India’s fleet is ranked
19th with 1,417 ships of 9,168,046 million GT and an average age of 18 years.21
The 20 leading merchant fleets by nationality of owner of ships 1,000 GT and
above account for 67% of the total number of ships in the fleet and 81% by GT. The
cargo-carrying fleet of the leading merchant fleets by nationality of owner similarly
stands at 68 and 81% by GT.22
The combined fleets of Singapore, India, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia stand at
5 and 6% by GT among the leading merchant fleets by nationality of owner. The
cargo-carrying fleet of the four Indian Ocean Region countries similarly stands at
4% of the world fleet and 6% by GT.
The market share of ship completions by GT in 2007 by region stands at South
Korea 35%, Japan 31%, China 18%, Europe 12% and rest of the world 4%.23
The Indian Ocean Region merchant fleet by registration stands at 16% of the
world fleet and of 11% by GT with an average age of 24 years versus an average
age of 22 years for the world fleet. The cargo-carrying fleet by registration similarly
stands at 14 and 10% by GT with an average age of 26 years versus an average age
of 20 years for the world fleet.24
8.4 IOR Shipping Fleet

In the last 8 years, there were 10 countries by number of ships from the region
among the principal merchant fleets by country of registration (Table 8.1 and
Fig. 8.1). Between 2001 and 2007, the combined fleets of these countries recorded
a 3% growth as a percentage of the world fleet.
Table 8.1 Principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of registration
Saudi
Year Indonesia Singapore India Malaysia Australia Thailand Iran Egypt Arabia Kuwait
2001 2,528 1,729 1,018 882 622 568 389 364 274 200
2002 2,628 1,768 1,010 915 624 629 380 361 280 201
2003 2,700 1,761 1,028 972 643 671 382 346 285 208
2004 2,826 1,842 1,066 1, 013 652 751 430 341 292 213
2005 3,214 1,977 1,096 1, 052 671 789 453 344 300 222
2006 4,271 2,079 1,181 1, 101 672 789 475 348 304 220
2007 4,469 2,257 1,417 1, 151 692 858 508 344 311 212
Source: Compiled from World Fleet Statistics 2007 in Appendix K
Among the principal merchant fleets from the region, the Indonesian register
had the highest growth of 76% with 1,941 more ships added to the fleet in 2007
than 2001. The registered fleets of other South East Asian countries and India also
recorded a more than 30% growth in the same period.
There were 528 ships added to Singapore’s register, 399 ships to India’s register,
290 ships to Thailand’s register and 269 ships to Malaysia’s register. In the Middle
East sub-region, Iran recorded a 30% growth with 119 ships added to the registered
fleet. The registered fleet of Saudi Arabia added 37 ships; Kuwait added 12 ships
and Egypt’s fleet declined by 20 ships. Australia’s registered fleet increased just
11% with 70 ships added to the register.
The combined GT of the principal merchant fleets from the region as a percentage
of world fleet GT remained static and recorded a marginal increase of 1% between
2001 and 2007 (Table 8.2 and Fig. 8.2).
8.4 IOR Shipping Fleet 209
2008
Indonesia
2007
Singapore
2006 India
Malaysia
2005
Australia
2004 Thailand
Iran
2003 Egypt
Saudi Arabia
2002
Kuwait
2001
2000
Fig. 8.1 Principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of registration
Source: Compiled from World fleet statistics 2007—Appendix K
Comparatively the South East Asian countries and India added significant ton-
nage to their registered fleets with Singapore outperforming the other nations. The
GT of Singapore’s register grew 72% followed by Thailand’s register with 60%,
Indonesia with 57%, India with 37% and Malaysia with 34%. The Middle East
countries all recorded a decline in tonnage except Kuwait with a growth of 6% in
registered GT. Australia’s registered GT too remained static with a 1% growth in 8
years.
The Indian Ocean Region merchant fleet by nationality of owner of ships 1,000
GT and above stands at 11.5% of the world fleet with 11% by GT and an average age
of 22 years, the same as the average age of the world fleet. The cargo-carrying fleet
by nationality of owner similarly stands at 11% with 11% by GT and an average
age of 22 years versus an average age of 21 years for the world fleet.25 There were
12 countries from the region among the principal merchant fleets by nationality of
owner of ships 1,000 GT and above (Table 8.3 and Figure 8.3).
The combined fleet of these countries as a percentage of world fleet remained
static increasing marginally by 1% in the 8-year period between 2001 and 2007.26
The striking aspect is that by nationality of owner for ships of 1,000 GT and
above, only Australia’s fleet declined during the 8-year period from 2001 to 2007.
All other fleets recorded growth. The fleets of the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait
doubled, while the fleets of Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia from the Middle East sub-
region recorded a 10–36% growth in the number of ships by nationality of owner.
The South East Asian countries and India recorded between 22 and 40% growth and
South Africa recorded 26% growth in the number of ships by nationality of owner.
At the same time, the combined GT of the ships from these countries as a percentage
of world GT increased 2% (Table 8.4 and Fig. 8.4).
The South East Asian countries recorded a 56–87% growth in GT of ships by
nationality of owner. India and South Africa recorded a 38% growth in the same
period. Among the Middle East countries, the United Arab Emirates more than
doubled its GT by nationality of owner. Besides Egypt that remained static, Iran,
210
Table 8.2 Tonnage of principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of registration
Year Singapore India Malaysia Iran Indonesia Kuwait Australia Thailand Egypt Saudi Arabia
8
2001 21,022,604 6,688,153 5,207,136 3,943,576 3,613,139 2,291,672 1,887,808 1,771,382 1,350,449 1,132,533
2002 21,148,090 6,142,073 5,394,356 4,128,389 3,723,052 2,255,972 1,861,321 1,879,581 1,274,990 1,472,135
2003 23,240,945 6,960,567 5,745,771 4,851,927 3,840,408 2,324,290 1,905,778 2,268,686 1,151,430 1,363,912
2004 26,282,777 7,517,583 6,056,561 5,324,254 4,072,144 2,377,628 1,971,876 2,889,877 1,143,201 1,678,474
2005 30,989,786 8,065,009 5,758,729 5,270,599 4,330,407 2,315,680 1,794,928 3,025,332 1,128,712 1,028,103
2006 32,173,922 8,381,185 6,389,000 5,207,276 5,287,148 2,156,836 1,852,796 2,882,703 1,141,729 1,021,845
2007 36,251,735 9,168,046 6,974,618 3,576,860 5,669,830 2,426,799 1,911,160 2,846,939 1,113,268 942,204

Shipping and Port State Control in the Indian Ocean
8.4 IOR Shipping Fleet 211
2008
Singapore
2007
India
2006 Malaysia
Iran
2005
Indonesia
2004 Kuwait
Australia
2003 Thailand
Egypt
2002
Saudi Arabia
2001
2000
Fig. 8.2 Tonnage of principal merchant fleets by Indian Ocean country of registration
Source: Compiled from World fleet statistics 2007—Appendix K
Table 8.3 Number of ships of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner
Saudi South
Year Singapore Indonesia India Malaysia Thailand UAE Iran Egypt Arabia Australia Kuwait Africa
2001 714 605 407 312 258 185 163 126 121 87 35 27
2002 1, 284 1, 400 740 535 396 4 286 329 334 438 135 126
2003 758 616 394 335 254 1 156 114 126 88 32 27
2004 715 672 386 327 298 1 172 119 123 85 57 29
2005 764 724 411 325 316 301 179 127 134 80 69 26
2006 794 793 456 357 298 366 184 139 150 85 68 30
2007 869 850 538 393 342 425 179 144 165 85 69 34
Singapore
2008
Indonesia
2007 India
2006 Malaysia
Thailand
2005
UAE
2004 Iran
Egypt
2003
Saudi Arabia
2002
Australia
2001 Kuwait
South Africa
2000
Fig. 8.3 Number of ships of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner

212
Table 8.4 Gross tonnage of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner
Year Singapore India Saudi Arabia Malaysia Iran Indonesia UAE Australia Kuwait Thailand Egypt South Africa
8
2001 11,113,528 7,082,501 5,729,753 5,466,785 3,731,500 3,419,365 2,505,906 2,239,678 2,187,098 1,444,423 1,084,686 154,974
2002 12,147,642 6,496,075 6,206,391 5,650,037 4,173,180 3,671,433 4,181 2,282,537 2,024,959 1,464,755 1,108,230 191,323
2003 14,420,979 7,363,160 6,689,528 7,290,745 5,027,552 3,599,745 3,463 2,214,007 2,010,569 1,450,984 921,448 127,192
2004 12,940,212 7,600,321 6,131,429 7,321,482 5,481,274 4,288,581 3,463 2,227,457 2,891,308 1,935,607 1,031,543 176,400
2005 14,300,265 8,273,962 6,314,713 7,521,941 5,694,064 4,663,221 4,323,046 2,136,764 3,302,733 2,102,819 1,101,760 160,529
2006 15,842,261 8,782,101 6,658,587 6,248,611 5,766,156 4,978,382 5,005,335 2,547,226 3,148,137 1,931,098 1,150,512 163,584
2007 17,742,911 9,736,879 7,228,610 8,877,388 5,900,355 5,331,002 6,453,382 1,783,475 3,402,004 2,694,242 1,096,390 214,667

8.5 Indian Ocean Port State Control 213
Singapore
2008 India
2007 Saudi Arabia

Malaysia
2006
Iran
2005 Indonesia
2004 UAE
Australia
2003
Kuwait
2002 Thailand
2001 Egypt
South Africa
2000
Fig. 8.4 Gross tonnage of principal merchant fleets by nationality of owner

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia all recorded 38–58% growth in GT by nationality of

owner. The GT of Australia’s fleet by nationality of owner declined.
8.5 Indian Ocean Port State Control
The MV Amoco Cadiz incident27 in 1978 provoked the first regional response to
eliminating substandard shipping from European waters. European port states party
to the relevant IMO maritime safety conventions for the first time in 1982 created
a regional grouping in an effort to coordinate regular and systematic control of
ships. A group of 14 European countries initially signed the Paris Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU). Similar groupings in other regions did not emerge for
nearly a decade.
In the process of regime formation, the trigger for eliminating substandard ship-
ping altogether seems to be a 1992 report by the Australian Parliament that noted,
“It is a world of too many ships that are over aged and under maintained chasing too
little freight for too little return.”28 Since then, eight regional memoranda have come
into force with the United States enforcing its own port state control regime. As of
17 January 2008, 113 of the 170 IMO member states/associate members exercise
port state control in the implementation of IMO and ILO conventions (Table 8.5).
In the words of John Hare, the only potentially serious intellectual contribution
from the region port state control involves “the powers and concomitant obliga-
tions vested in, exercised by, and imposed upon a national maritime authority by
international convention or domestic statute or both, to board, inspect and where
appropriate detain a merchant ship flying a flag foreign to that state in order to ensure
compliance by that ship with all applicable international safety at sea instruments
and with any domestic legislative maritime safety requirements”.29 Figure 8.5
provides a simplified overview of the port state control regime for quality shipping.
214
Table 8.5 Port state control regimes
Region Port state control Members Target inspection rate
European Union Paris MoU 1982 Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, 25% annual inspection rate per
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, country
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (20)
Latin America Acuerdo de Vina del Mar MoU Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 15% annual inspection rate per
1992 Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, country within 3 years
Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela (13)
8
Asia Pacific Tokyo MoU 1993 Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Fiji, Hong 75% annual regional inspection rate
Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Republic
of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua
New Guinea, Philippines, Russian
Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Vanuatu,
Vietnam (18 including Australia in
IOMOU and Canada in Paris MoU)
United States of U.S. Coast Guard 1994 Annual targeted flag list
America
Caribbean Caribbean MoU 1996 Antigua & Barbuba, Aruba, Bahamas, 15% annual inspection rate per
Barbados, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Grenada, country within 3 years
Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad and
Tobago, the Netherlands Antilles (12)
Mediterranean Mediterranean MoU 1997 Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 15% annual inspection rate per
Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, country within 3 years
Turkey (11)
8.5
Region Port state control Members Target inspection rate
Indian Ocean Indian Ocean MoU 1998 Australia, Eritrea, India, Iran, Kenya, 10% annual inspection rate per
Maldives, Mauritius, Oman, South Africa, country within 3 years
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Yemen (13
Indian Ocean Port State Control
including Australia in Tokyo MoU Oman

in GCC MoU and South Africa in Abuja
MoU)
West & Central Abuja MoU 1999 Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 15% annual inspection rate per
Africa Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, country within 3 years
Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo (17
including South Africa in IOMOU)
Black Sea Black Sea MoU 2000 Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian 15% annual inspection rate per
Federation, Ukraine, Turkey (6) country within 3 years
Persian Gulf GCC MoU 2004 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 10% annual inspection rate per
United Arab Emirates (6 including Oman country within 3 years
in IOMOU)
Source: Compiled by author from regional PSC websites

215
United Nations
Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea
International
International Maritime Organization Labour
Organization
Guide
National STCW SOLAS MARPOL
ILO147 / MLC
2006
Legislation Regime
Implementation
Ship operator Monitor

Compliance
Nominal Ship
Flag State Classification
Owner Registration
Administration Societies
System Pillars of
Beneficial Port State
Owner Control
• Bahrain, Kuwait, • Australia, Indonesia,

Oman, Qatar, Saudi Malaysia, Singapore
Arabia, United Arab Thailand
Emirates
Financiers
Riyadh Tokyo
Financial MOU MOU
Institutions Port Interface
• Inspection • Australia, Eritrea,
Port State
India, Iran, Kenya,
Control • Verification
P & I clubs Opportunity • Targeting
Maldives, Mauritius,
Oman, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Tanzania, Yemen
IOMOU
Charterer
Freight Ship
Commercial Commercial
Forwarder Requirements Incentives
Vetting
System
Cargo
Owner
Fig. 8.5 Overview of the port state control regime

8.6 Actor Behaviour and Leadership
8.6.1 Power-Based Actors and Structural Leadership

The Indian Ocean (IO) MoU was initially signed by eight of the 22 countries that
participated in the preparatory meeting on developing port state control (PSC) capa-
bilities in the Indian Ocean. By establishing the IOMOU on PSC, the process of PSC
regime formation is one of negotiation among port states in an effort to eliminate
substandard shipping in the region. Now in the 10th year of PSC, the IOMOU com-
prises 13 member states (Australia, Eritrea, India, Iran, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius,
Oman, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania and Yemen) from the 36 Indian
Ocean rim countries with observers from IMO, ILO, Ethiopia, Equasis, Black Sea
MoU, Abuja MoU, Tokyo MoU and the U.S. Coast Guard.
The majority of Gulf countries and all of South East Asian countries in the Indian
Ocean Region are members of the GCC MoU and Tokyo MoU, respectively. Further,
Australia and South Africa at the eastern and western limits of the ocean space are
also members of the Tokyo MoU and Abuja MoU, respectively. Taken together 22
of the 36 Indian Ocean rim countries are members of the regime for regional port
state control.
Table 8.6 gives the flag state performance of Indian Ocean countries under the
Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and IOMOU that are members of either/both the Tokyo
MoU and IOMOU port state control regimes. None of the Eastern and Southern
Africa region countries had more than 30 inspections across three port state control
regimes for the periods 2001–2003 and 2004–2006.
Table 8.6 Flag state performance of Indian Ocean PSC countries
No of Inspections No of Detentions
Countries 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Australia 10 10 6 20 13 11 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eritrea 1 2 1 4 2 1 11 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
India 222 198 162 263 160 155 1,160 18 15 15 14 14 8 84
Indonesia 152 143 237 453 225 206 1,416 50 33 66 132 55 49 385
Iran 148 130 121 159 181 143 882 19 14 15 11 9 3 71
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malaysia 472 373 368 744 339 272 2,568 40 37 27 45 27 22 198
Maldives 10 9 15 12 14 15 75 2 1 3 3 2 2 13
Mauritius 7 5 2 0 2 3 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oman 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Singapore 1,007 1,081 1,019 1,598 1,192 1,289 7,186 38 44 51 69 41 33 276
South Africa 3 3 4 3 1 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sri Lanka 5 13 11 27 30 15 101 0 1 4 7 7 6 25
Sudan 4 6 5 1 0 0 16 1 3 2 1 0 0 7
Tanzania 4 0 4 5 1 3 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Thailand 287 293 250 631 454 464 2379 26 20 19 74 39 40 218
Yemen 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Source: Compiled from Port State Control data—Appendix K

The information is the cumulative total of the data available from the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU, and
IOMOU. Annual reports/databases of other regional MoUs are not available. The USCG PSC does
not constitute a regional port state control regime
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) annual reports are used to correct for
duplication of Australia’s inspection reports in the Tokyo MoU and IO MoU
Personal email communication on 23 February 2008 from Captain A.M. Al-Janahi, Director GCC
MoU indicated that the MoU has just started functioning and so no data is available as yet
Table 8.7 provides the 3-year average detention percentage of the Indian Ocean
countries, which have had 30 or more inspections over at least one 3-year period.
Australian-flagged ships are the top performers with no detentions in the three port
Table 8.7 Three-Year average detention percentage of Indian Ocean PSC countries
2001–2003 2004–2006
Countries Inspections Detentions Detention (%) Inspections Detentions Detention (%)
Australia 26 0 0.00 44 0 0.00

India 582 48 8.25 578 36 6.23
Indonesia 532 149 28.01 884 236 26.70
Iran 399 48 12.03 483 23 4.76
Malaysia 1, 213 104 8.57 1, 355 94 6.94
Maldives 34 6 17.65 41 7 17.07
Singapore 3, 107 133 4.28 4, 079 143 3.51
Sri Lanka 29 5 17.24 72 20 27.78
Thailand 830 65 7.83 1, 549 153 9.88

The PSC countries listed are those with 30 or more inspections over at least one 3-year period.
The Information is the cumulative total of the data available from the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and
IOMOU
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) annual reports are used to correct for
duplication of Australia’s inspection reports in the Tokyo MoU and IOMOU
Table 8.8 Black–Grey–White List performance of Indian Ocean PSC countries
Countries 3-Year period List Inspections Detentions BG Limit GW Limit Excess factor
Australia 2001–2003 <30 reports 26 0 4 −1 0.16

2004–2006 44 0 6 0 0.30
India 2001–2003 582 48 51 30 0.84
2004–2006 578 36 51 30 0.29
Indonesia 2001–2003 532 149 47 27 6.94
2004–2006 884 236 75 49 6.76
Iran 2001–2003 399 48 37 19 1.83
2004–2006 483 23 44 24 −0.09
Malaysia 2001–2003 1, 213 104 100 70 1.10
2004–2006 1, 355 94 111 79 0.47
Maldives 2001–2003 34 6 5 −1 1.46
2004–2006 41 7 6 0 1.55
Singapore 2001–2003 3, 107 133 241 194 −0.69
2004–2006 4, 079 143 313 258 −0.99
Sri Lanka 2001–2003 <30 reports 29 5 5 −1 1.17
2004–2006 72 20 9 1 5.14
Thailand 2001–2003 830 65 71 46 0.77
2004–2006 1, 549 153 125 91 1.56

The PSC countries listed are those with 30 or more inspections over at least one 3-year period
The Information is the cumulative total of the data available from the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and
IOMOU adjusted for Australia’s reports
state control regimes for the 6-year period. Most countries improved their deten-
tion percentage during 2004–2006. The detention percentage of ships flagged in Sri
Lanka was higher for 2004–2006.
In Table 8.8, using the Tokyo MoU formula that requires minimum 30 inspection
reports to determine the Black–Grey–White List performance, only Singapore from
the Tokyo MoU makes it consistently to the White List among Indian Ocean PSC
countries.
India’s flag state performance was unchanged on the Grey List between the two
3-year periods of assessment. Indonesia and the Maldives flag state performance
continued to be on the Black List. Iran’s flag state performance improved from the
Black to White List and so too did Malaysia’s flag state performance improve to the
Grey List from the Black. Thailand’s flag state performance went from the Grey to
Black List whereas Australia and Sri Lanka with less than 30 inspection reports
in 2001–2003 were on the Grey and Black List, respectively, during the period
2004–2006.
8.6.2 Knowledge-Based Actors and Intellectual Leadership
The literature review begins in 1993, soon after the Australian Parliament Report,
Ships of Shame: Inquiry into Ship Safety in 1992, exposed the menace of substan-
dard shipping.30 The report drew further international attention to the importance
of coordinated port state control.31 Using bibliometrics, the “Web of Science”
Journal Citation Reports reveal five journals of relevance on maritime affairs.
An expanded literature search of cited journals and UNSW@ADFA library cross
search/e-journals databases shows three other journals of relevance. Not one of the
eight journals originates in the Indian Ocean Region.
The few localised journals published by a small number of maritime “think
tanks” from Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore enjoy limited
patronage and readership.32 The lack of national annual reports on port state control,
but for Australia and South Africa, further exacerbates the problem of establishing
effectiveness.
The IOMOU database that came online in 2002 and annual reports provide lim-
ited statistics for evaluating individual port state effectiveness. For instance, these
annual reports do not provide the number of individual ship visits and the number
of individual ships inspected needed to establish the inspection rate for a particular
port state.
This rather limited intellectual leadership by knowledge-based actors within the
region creates an unfathomable “abyss” in establishing the extent of implementation
and effectiveness of port state control. Tables 8.9 and 8.10 summarise the results of
the keyword, country/territory and subject category search of the Journal Citation
Reports.
The results of the keywords search were analysed to identify four journals in
the social sciences, one non-technical journal in the science edition and three other
Table 8.9 Indian Ocean intellectual leadership in port state control

∗ means all forms of the word, for example ocean–oceanic; transport-transportation; ship-shipping
editions. A country/territory search showed only five Indian Ocean countries pub-
lish journals in the social sciences and 16 countries publish science editions. Only
three journals from the 193 science editions contained one of the keywords (used to
identify PSC relevant journals internationally) and two from the 26 social science
editions, but none of the editions is relevant to the analysis on port state control. A
search of the subject category reveals a large number of international editions in the
same subject category as that of the identified journals. For example, there are 52
other journals in Environmental Studies, the same subject category as the Marine
Policy journal (Table 8.9).
The Marine Policy and Ocean & Coastal Management editions together returned
145 search results with the phrase “Indian Ocean”, but only 14 articles mention
“Indian Ocean” in the title, abstract or keywords. The two journals returned 52 arti-
cles with the phrase “port state control”, but only 10 of those articles mentioned
the Indian Ocean. Besides the Marine Policy edition, the Journal of Maritime Law
and Commerce returned the maximum number of search results for the majority
of word phrases used. However, in the entire journal the phrase “Indian Ocean”
8.6
Table 8.10 Keyword search in identified maritime journals
r Engine Period Type PS PSC FS CS P&I MSa MSe FOC IO
Marine Policy Science 1993–2008 TAK 8 (2) 7 (2) 7 (2) 3 (0) 5 (0) 6 (0) 6 (2) 3 (0) 6
Direct
FT 65 (8) 42 (5) 102 (18) 31 (4) 91 (9) 59 (9) 18 (5) 35 (4) 65
Ocean and Coastal Science 1993–2008 TAK 1 (0) 0 1 (0) 0 0 0 0 0 8
Management Direct
FT 18 (8) 10(5) 22 (6) 2 (0) 0 17(4) 5 (2) 6 (0) 80
Ocean Development EBSCO 1996–2008 TAK 3 2 1 0 0 0 4 2 4
and International
Law
Actor Behaviour and Leadership
FT 27 16 60 4 1 19 14 19 36
Journal of Maritime ProQuest/ 1993–2008 FT 40 32 40 26 6 43 22 20 12
Law and Heinonline
Commerce
Transportation Science 1993–2008 FT 4 3 3 4 1 3 0 3 1
Research Part E Direct
Maritime Policy and EBSCO 1999–2008 FT 14 11 9 7 1 20 6 13 6
Management
Maritime Economics ProQuest 2003–2008 FT 7 5 7 7 1 9 16 4 1
and Logistics
International Journal Ingenta 1993–2008 TAK 4 3 8 0 0 2 1 1 3
of Marine and Connect
Coastal Law

Figures in parenthesis indicate the number of hits for “Indian Ocean” within the search results containing that particular word. For example, in Marine Policy
only 5 of the 42 full text search results had word phrases “port state control” and “Indian Ocean”
Abbreviations: PS, Port State; PSC, Port State Control; FS, Flag State; CS, Classification Societies; P&I, P&I Insurance; MSa, Maritime Safety; MSe, Maritime
Security; FOC, Flags of Convenience; IO, Indian Ocean
TAK, Title, Abstract, Keyword search; FT, Full Text search
221
returned just 12 search results. The Ocean Development & International Law edi-
tion returned 36 search results with the word phrase “Indian Ocean” and 16 search
results with the word phrase “port state control” (Table 8.10). Most of the litera-
ture has tended to focus on the necessity for port state inspections and how best to
achieve implementation rather than on effectiveness of port state control.
According to a 1993 report on the UK Government position, port state control
had started to address safety issues—ship management, crew standards and state of
ship—but not without limitations placing continued emphasis on flag state control.33
O. Dijxhoorn in focusing on the limitations of port state control—conditional
inspections, avoiding undue delay and sunk administrative costs—places empha-
sis on responsible ownership, effective flag state supervision and properly crewed
ships.34 As an IMO officer, Dijxhoorn defends IMO’s limited enforcement powers
and foresees a new IMO role of greater scrutiny and development of guidelines for
classification societies and other inspection agencies by the IMO subcommittee on
Flag State Implementation.
Philippe Boisson traces the history of classification societies, most founded by
marine insurers to assess risks, and the gradual move from rating to certification
as maritime nations took over regulatory responsibilities from private bodies.35 A
Bureau Veritas team member, Boisson evaluated how classification societies trapped
between certification and evaluation came under criticism from insurers, charters
and bankers, which led to the P&I clubs and charterers establishing their own ship
quality appraisal systems.
Peter Payoyo from the Dalhousie Law School examined the implementation of
international conventions under the 1982 Paris MoU on regional port state control to
argue that European regional cooperation was able to establish baseline data on sub-
standard shipping in the region, mobilise the shipping industry into complying with
international standards and optimise employment of national resources.36 However,
even after 10 years of implementation, this has not eliminated substandard shipping
and the limited success has come at substantial cost to participating countries.37
Payoyo suggests in his findings that introducing similar regional PSC regimes on a
global scale could achieve far greater results in combating substandard shipping and
even optimise cost sharing.38
Professor Wonham, Chair of International Transport, University of Wales,
highlights the progress made at the IMO in extending port state control to opera-
tional requirements under SOLAS and MARPOL conventions.39 The IMO-adopted
Assembly Resolution A.787 (19) on “Procedures for Port State Control” addresses
concerns of unfair targeting of open registries that includes a ten-point list on what
constitutes “clear grounds” to conduct a more detailed investigation than simple
verification of papers. Gerhard Kiehne from German port state control provides a
practitioner’s perspective on the inspection process and the sanctions—rectification
of deficiencies in port/next port of call/within 2 weeks to detention—available to a
PSC officer.40
Ademuni-Odeke, Reader in Law and Director, City Centre for International Law
and Arbitration, London Guildhall University and a consultant on maritime leg-
islation to the IMO, draws on the UK experience to demonstrate that port state
control far from hindering actually helps curb substandard shipping, and by enhanc-
ing maritime safety and pollution prevention strengthens international law.41 K. Li
from the University of Wales statistically shows that even though open regis-
ters exhibit higher-than-average casualty and detention rates, the safety record of
open registers, as the fastest growing fleets, has improved because of port state
control.42
By year end 1999, besides the Paris MoU, regional PSC frameworks existed
for the Asia Pacific, Caribbean, Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, West & Central
Africa regions and the United States, which took unilateral action on port state con-
trol. Canadian academic Ted McDorman, from Faculty of Law at the University
of Victoria, establishes the legal jurisdiction of port state control in international
law where a port state “has extensive authority over vessels voluntarily in port”
that includes access to port being denied or conditions imposed with powers
of detention, arrest and seizure of vessels where national laws are breached.43
Nevertheless, McDorman concludes that effective port state control is contingent
upon cooperation—through regional port state control—and not competition among
ports.44
Joseph Vorbach, from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, asserts that port state
control is driving compliance with international standards and building links with
industry based on transparency, self-regulation and incentive schemes, which can
further improve international shipping safety.45 Alderton and Winchester, from
Cardiff University, and Roberts and Marlow, from Oxford University, focussed
on casualty rates of ships with somewhat contrasting findings.46 Alderton and
Winchester raise the question of whether the profit centric bottom end of the mar-
ket can ever be effectively regulated to force substandard ships off the market for
good.47 Roberts and Marlow establish the need to identify additional risk factors
associated with the design of bulk carriers.48 What both studies firmly establish is
that notwithstanding the arguments over the relevance of the flag state, “flag” does
matter.
Llacer, from University of Cadiz, in analysing open registers, stresses the neces-
sity for a “genuine link” between ship and flag state (register) and the need for
a technically competent and streamlined maritime administration within the flag
state.49 Llacer puts forward that port state control remains as the most efficient
and only method of verifying flag state—open or closed register—compliance with
international standards.50 Laszlo Kovats, from the Maritime Industry Research
Institute at London, makes the case that in a globalised economy traditional
sovereign control of shipping must make way for a unified and universal system
of legal and administrative arrangements.51
There has been a recent interest in the effectiveness of port state control, but
none that specifically examines the IOMOU. Hare provides the first true assessment
on the effectiveness of port state control and a rare find for intellectual leadership
within the Indian Ocean Region on port state control.52 Hare identifies the twin
benefits of regional MoUs—judicial use of limited inspection capacity and/or to be
put on alert—from the sharing of information. Hare uses five national case studies
including Australia and South Africa to show that trading options for substandard
ships have significantly diminished. The caveat is for port jurisdictions to have the
capacity and the will to enforce port state control.
Sabine Knapp completed a doctoral thesis on “The Econometrics of Maritime
Safety: Recommendations to Enhance Safety at Sea” in 2007 and reported some
of the findings in a number of journal articles.53 Knapp and Franses evaluated that
36.5% of the cargo-carrying fleet was without problems, and for 43.2% of the fleet,
inspections were effective in decreasing the probability of casualty by at least 5%
per inspection for very serious casualties.54 Of the remaining 20.3% of the fleet,
6.9% is over targeted and 13.3% is where either inspections or targeting or both
inspections and targeting can be improved.55
Knapp and Franses suggest a global dataset to make targeting more effective.56
In other words, the key to effective port state control would be a global net-
work of regional port state control MoUs. Cariou et al., using Swedish Maritime
Administration data, identify age of vessel at time of inspection, type of ship and
flag/registry of vessel as significant predictors of the number of deficiencies detected
in PSC inspections.57 For Cariou et al. repeated inspections present an effective
way to differentiate the effects of each of the predictors, with more than 63% of
vessels exhibiting a reduction in the total number of deficiencies during subsequent
inspections.58
Knapp and Franses are surprised by the findings (Fig. 8.6) that the strongest effect
of port state control in decreasing the probability of a serious/less-serious casualty is
the Indian Ocean MoU (minus AMSA inspections) followed by the Latin American
MoU and AMSA.59 Knapp and Franses judge the effectiveness of inspections to be
higher because in their casualty statistics determinations the Indian Ocean Region is
one of the high-risk areas with many more substandard ships engaged in local trade
as compared to the European and North American regions.60
Fig. 8.6 Effect of PSC inspection—serious and less-serious casualty

Source: Knapp and Franses (2008, p. 661)
The literature shows that with the exception of the Australian Government
inquiry into ship safety and an academic paper by Hare, knowledge-based actors
from the region show poor intellectual leadership in raising public awareness and
informing policy-makers on the extent of substandard shipping calling at ports in
the Indian Ocean.
8.6.3 Interest-Based Actors and Entrepreneurial Leadership

Since the 1980s, the international regulatory structure has raised shipping stan-
dards in an effort to eliminate substandard shipping. The ship industry response
has been to take collective action. Different interest-based actors (classification
societies, insurers, shipowners and producers) created “exclusive clubs” such that
members could achieve the mandated standards without competition with each
other based on reputation and cost. The access to a particular club remains exclu-
sive to an entrepreneur willing to meet the self-regulated industry standard of that
club.
Such entrepreneurial leadership gave members a competitive edge over low-cost
ship-operators in navigating the regulatory environment. Relying on the reputation
of a club to meet standards mandated by the most stringent flag states, shipowners
reduce the risk of their ship being targeted in ports around the world or having
to be excluded from the international market. With the port state control regime,
flag states have to establish a reputation while industry clubs have a reputation to
protect.
8.6.3.1 Classification Societies

Shipowners hire classification societies to class ships in meeting regulatory stan-
dards, while flag states rely on classification societies for technical support and
compliance verification in the application of the international conventions. Aided
by significant research departments classification societies establish and apply tech-
nical requirements for the design, construction and survey of ships. Classification
societies are required to comply with IMO resolution A.739 (18) for “Recognised
Organisations” in verifying compliance with international conventions and national
statutory regulations.61
The 10 most reputable societies have formed the International Association of
Classification Societies (IACS), which collectively class 94% of all commercial ton-
nage engaged in international trade. The Indian Register of Shipping is currently the
only associate member of IACS.62 In 2000, IACS expelled Polski Rejestr Statkow
from the associate membership after it concluded that the society showed “serious
shortcomings” in its work, and in effect had failed to comply with IACS standards.63
The IACS, by publishing its own classification rules, strives to achieve uni-
form application of the requisite technical standards in a way that allows the club
member to remain individually competitive. Members are free to adopt standards
that are even more stringent. The current members include, American Bureau of
Shipping (ABS); Bureau Veritas (BV); China Classification Society (CCS); Det
Norske Veritas (DNV); Germanischer Lloyd (GL); Korean Register of Shipping
(KR); Lloyd’s Register (LR); Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NK); Registro Italiano Navale
(RINA); Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (RS) and Indian Register of
Shipping (IRS) as associate member.
Each of the IACS members were approached to provide information on shipping
from Indian Ocean countries classed with them in 2007. Only Class NK and Class
Table 8.11 IACS classed cargo-carrying ships from IOR countries on record
Number of ships in 2007
Country Class NK Class GL
Australia 5 15
Bangladesh 17 9
Comoros 0 5
Djibouti 3 0
Egypt 3 34
Eritrea 0 2
Ethiopia 0 2
India 0 9
Indonesia 145 143
Iran 0 46
Israel 0 1
Kuwait 1 0
Malaysia 349 205
Maldives 1 1
Mauritius 0 7
Oman 0 0
Pakistan 0 0
Saudi Arabia 6 5
Singapore 707 629
Somalia 0 0
South Africa 0 1
Thailand 82 25
Source: Class NK and Class GL personal email communications
GL responded with data (Table 8.11).64 There was no response from the other classi-
fication societies except for Class LR, which required a subscription to the sea-web
internet database at a cost beyond the scope of this research. Peter Graaf, Deputy
Head Flag State Affairs from Class GL, makes the point that the “majority of the
figures are of insignificant amount”.65 The available data and the comment from
Peter Graaf seems to suggest that the majority of the ships are classed by non-IACS
classification societies, giving some indication of the nature of flag state affairs in
the region.
From Table 8.12, the 11 IACS member/associate member societies during
2001–2003 classed 93.22% and during 2004–2006 classed 95.24% of all ships
inspected under the IOMOU. The remaining 6.78% of ships inspected in 2001–2003
and 4.76% in 2004–2006, classed by non-IACS members, accounted for 20.86 and
23.16% of all detentions, respectively. In 2001–2003, non-IACS societies had one in
five ships detained compared to one in 18 ships for IACS members. In 2004–2006,
non-IACS societies performed even more poorly with one in three ships detained
compared to one in 16 ships for IACS members. The collective performance of
all class societies also shows a decline in performance from the White List in
2001–2003 to the Black List in 2004–2006.
8.6
Table 8.12 Black–Grey–White List IOMOU performance of classification societies

Actor Behaviour and Leadership
Source: Compiled from IOMOU annual reports in Appendix K

227
Although IACS societies are the better-performing classification societies

remaining on the White List during 2001–2003 and 2004–2006, the performance
of individual IACS members varies considerably as shown in Table 8.12. Class BV
and RINA are on the Black List for 2001–2003 and 2004–2006. During 2001–2006,
Class BV had 221 (2.13%) detentions from 2,309 (7.64%) inspections and Class
RINA had 66 (3.6%) detentions from 532 (1.75%) inspections. The performance of
Class GL, KR and LR analysed to be on the Grey List also remained unchanged.
During 2001–2006, Class GL had 172 (9.45%) detentions from 2485 (8.22%)
inspections; Class KR had 62 (3.40%) detentions from 1118 (3.67%) inspections
and Class LR had 342 (18.78%) detentions from 4,861 (16.10%) inspections. The
performance of Class ABS deteriorated from the White List in 2001–2003 to the
Grey List in 2004–2006. While the performance of Class RS faded from the White
to the Black List. The performance of Class IRS got worse going from Grey to the
Black List. In contrast, Class CCS turned a corner from Grey to the White List. In
all, Class DNV and NK were the only two IACS societies to remain on the White
List throughout.
8.6.3.2 Protection and Indemnity Insurance

Shipowners voluntary subscribe to Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance clubs
to have cover against third-party liabilities arising from the use and operation of
ships. P&I insurance includes a wide range of liabilities, such as personal injury
to crew, stevedores, passengers and others, loss and damage of cargo, pollution,
salvage, collision, towing and wreck removal. The clubs separately provide war risk
insurance and legal expense insurance for freight, demurrage and defence risks. A
group of 13 independent P&I clubs of American, British, Japanese, Scandinavian
and Swedish origin form the international group of P&I clubs (“the Group”). The
Group together underwrite liability cover—protection and indemnity—for 90% of
the world’s ocean-going tonnage.66
Besides coordinating the operation and regulation of the clubs’ claim-sharing
agreement, the Group acts as a forum for sharing of information and developing
common policy and promotes shipowners’ interests within the IMO and shipping
associations besides other international, national and industry organisations.67 The
mantra of P&I clubs is coordination, collaboration and cooperation with shipowners
putting money into a collective fund for managing risk associated with the opera-
tion of a ship. One of the main roles of the Group is management of the pooling
agreement where clubs share all qualifying claims in excess of $7 million.68
The policy of sharing information among the Group makes it difficult for
shipowners to hide bad performance. Club membership is invariably limited to
shipowners with ships deemed to present the least risk. For the shipowners, the
possession of a P&I certificate is reflective of a quality ship, which gives a licence
to trade anywhere in the world. About 5% of ocean-going ships are not covered
for liability.69 The club-like nature of insurance by the mutual non-profit-making
association of shipowners reflects on the entrepreneurial leadership of the shipping
industry.
8.6.3.3 Shipowners
A number of shipowner clubs represent the interests of individual shipping
companies within the IMO and ILO. The International Chamber of Shipping
(ICS)/International Shipping Federation (ISF) are the shipowner’s international
trade association and employer organisations. ICS is concerned with all regulatory,
operational and legal issues. ISF is concerned with labour affairs and training issues
(Fig. 8.7).
Fig. 8.7 Working of IMO

International Chamber of
Shipping National Governments
Source: International shipowners’
Chamber of Shipping (ICS) associations ICS helps
website—How ICS works70 a d vise national
governments shipowners’
on ICS policy associations
and participate advise
in government companies of
ICS Committees international
delegations at
international developments
meetings National Shipowners’
Associations
Shipping Companies
The membership of ICS/ISF combined includes the national shipowners’ asso-

ciations from 39 flag states with Indian Ocean shipowners’ associations from
Australia, India, Kuwait, Pakistan and Singapore (ICS only).71 A key strength of
ICS/ISF is that the membership base comprises national shipowners’ associations.
These national associations not only advise individual shipowners on international
developments, but also inform governments of ICS policy in consultations on fram-
ing national shipping polices. As a result, both ICS and ISF can be quite influential
at the IMO and ILO in representing the shipping industry view.
The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO)
as of January 2008 had 261 members with a combined fleet of more than 2,880
tankers totalling 236 million Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT)72 or 75% of the inde-
pendent tanker fleet.73 Independent tanker shipowners—non-oil companies and
non-state controlled tanker owners—operate 80% of the world tanker fleet.74
Among the 300 associate members are oil companies, state-owned tanker com-
panies, law firms, shipping agents, shipyards, shipbrokers, insurance companies,
marine suppliers, national administrations and port authorities.75
It is mandatory for all INTERTANKO members to have a certified and fully
implemented international ship management system, to be classed by a full mem-
ber of IACS, have insurance by an International Group P&I club or an equivalent
third party and oil pollution liability cover. INTERTANKO best practices include a
commitment towards continuous improvement in achieving goals of zero fatalities,
pollution incidents and detentions. Members must ensure transparency of owner-

ship, allocate sufficient resources to achieve compliance with IMO/ILO rules and
regulations in force, report deficiencies to the classification society for the vessel
and discourage breaches of MARPOL.76
The International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO) rep-
resents the interests of owners, operators and managers of dry cargo shipping.77
The flags most frequently used by INTERCARGO members are Panama (31%),
Liberia (11%), Hong Kong (9%), China (7%) and Greece (6%).78 The members’
charter calls for “quality ships and operation” with vessels classed by an IACS
member society and entered with an International Group P&I club.79 As of 1 July
2008, there were an estimated 6,337 dry bulk vessels over 10,000 DWT trading
internationally.80 In 2007, an estimated 462 bulk carriers and similar vessels were
detained under the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG port state control inspec-
tions and an additional 44 vessels detained in the Indian Ocean.81 Preliminary
evidence suggests that vessels entered with INTERCARGO accounted for 8% of
the detentions reported by Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG.82
The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) is an independent inter-
national shipping association focussed on promoting higher standards to ensure
quality shipping.83 The membership includes more than 900 shipowners, 1,400 bro-
kers and more than 100 P&I clubs across 120 countries.84 The BIMCO members
represent more than 14,000 vessels totalling 525 million DWT or 65% of the total
cargo capacity available worldwide.85 BIMCO applies a vetting process to assess
shipowner vessels based on criteria, such as flag, class, age and PSC detentions.86
The “BIMCO Owner Member Vetting Process” is applied to all applications for
membership and at least once a year for all existing members.87
In 2006, the major clubs—ICS/ISF, INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO and
BIMCO—formed the Roundtable of International Shipping Associations. The mis-
sion of the Roundtable “to work together to serve, represent and advance the
international shipping industry” is suggestive of taking further collective action in
navigating the international regulatory environment.88
The Round Table of International Shipping Associations discourages shipping
companies from registering with poorly performing flag states in an industry
effort to promote satisfactory flag state performance. The Roundtable publishes the
Industry Guidelines on Flag State Performance and a separate performance table.
The Shipping Industry Guidelines sets out the criteria to assist shipping companies
in determining whether a flag state administration takes its responsibilities seri-
ously and even provides information for assessing the performance of flag states.
Table 8.13 summarises 2007 flag state performance by the number of possible neg-
ative indicators for Indian Ocean countries, flags of convenience89 and other flag
states.
8.6.3.4 Cargo Industry

The dry bulk cargo and oil industry organisations have initiated their own inspection
systems in an effort to ensure safe and environmentally responsible delivery of their
Table 8.13 Flag state performance as of June 2007
Total number of possible negative indicators
Flag States <4 > 5 < 10 >11
Indian Ocean Rim India, Singapore Australia, Bahrain, Kenya, Madagascar,

Flag States Bangladesh, Egypt, Thailand
Indonesia, Iran,
Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait, Mauritius
(FOC), Malaysia,
Myanmar (FOC),
Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa,
Sri Lanka (FOC)
Flags of Antigua and Belize, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cambodia,
Convenience1 Barbuda, Panama, St Vincent Georgia, Honduras,
and International Bahamas, and Grenadines, Lebanon, Mongolia,
Registers Barbados, Tonga North Korea, Sao
Bermuda, Cayman Tome and Principe
Islands, Cyprus,
Gibraltar, Hong
Kong, Isle of Man,
Netherlands
Antilles, Malta,
Marshal Islands,
Liberia, Vanuatu
Other Flag States Belgium, Bulgaria, Algeria, Argentina, Albania, Colombia,
China, Denmark, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote
Estonia, Finland, Croatia, Cuba, d’Ivoire, Congo,
France, Germany, Dominica, Ghana, Suriname, Syria
Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Libya,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Morocco,
Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand,
Luxemburg, Nigeria, Papua New
Netherlands, Guinea, Philippines,
Norway, Portugal, Poland, Romania,
South Korea, Russia, Switzerland,
Spain, Sweden, Trinidad & Tobago,
UK, USA Tunisia, Turkey,
Ukraine, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Vietnam
Source: Shipping Industry Flag State Performance Table 2007 and World Fleet Statistics 2007
Flags of Convenience as listed by the International Transport Worker’s Federation
Only those Flag states that have been assessed by the Roundtable of International Shipping
associations
cargo. In minimising the risk of using substandard ships these inspections are in
addition to those performed by classification societies, P&I clubs, flag states or port
state control.
The Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) with 67 members90

launched the Ship Inspection Report (SIRE) Programme in 1993 to measure tanker
quality.91 As a risk assessment tool SIRE uses a questionnaire-based uniform
inspection protocol for tankers and since 2004 now includes barges.92 The web-
based SIRE system operated to the ISO 9001 standard consists of over 30,000
inspection reports for 2007–2008 on more than 8,000 tankers and is available to
port state control authorities and MoUs free of charge.93
A similar online risk management system “RightShip”, born from a 2001 work-
shop conducted in Western Australia, is the largest dry bulk cargo ship-vetting
information system in the world.94 The three parent companies—BHP Billiton, Rio
Tinto and Cargill Ocean transportation from 200695 —created a ship rating system
from one to five stars on ship quality and suitability for a task. The system is based
on a rigorous assessment—almost 50 separate factors covering structural integrity
and quality of crewing and management—for more than 48,000 dry bulk, petroleum,
gas and liner vessels.96
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto are world leaders in the resources industry. Cargill
Ocean transportation carries grains, oilseeds, vegetable oils/proteins and sugar, on
behalf of Cargill Corporation. The business enterprises cannot afford to take risks
involving undue delays and costs while a ship is inspected under the PSC regime,
falls foul with regulators or faces rising insurance costs and casualties; these types
of delays through a possible total loss of cargo carry severe commercial, human and
environmental costs.97 The ship-vetting system uses data from a number of agen-
cies, including regional PSCs, OCIMF SIRE programme, IACS, USCG, AMSA,
the Roundtable of International Shipping Associations, terminals and ports, Lloyd’s
Marine Intelligence Unit and Lloyd’s Register Fairplay.
There were 65,531 vessels rated as of 31 December 2008 with 21,900 ships
vetted representing 1,953,521,069 DWT of which 9,386 vessels were vetted as five-
stars.98 A three/four/five-star rating is an acceptable risk. A two-star rating means
that the user should contact RightShip for further review of the risk profile. A one-
star rating indicates need for a more detailed investigation, including a physical
inspection of the ship and/or an audit of the vessel and its management system.99
Under a new agreement, vessels entered with INTERCARGO would receive bonus
points from March 2008 in the RightShip online ship-vetting information system.100
8.7 Structure Over Time
8.7.1 Signification—Communication and Level of Concern
The lack of an effective knowledge-based epistemic community seems to have

affected open communication and level of concern over substandard shipping within
the Indian Ocean Region. Cooperation and coordination with other regional PSC
regimes appears to be limited to gaining observer status and participation in meet-
ings alone.101 The IOMOU annual reports provide little information on specific
8.7 Structure Over Time 233
outcomes, if any, from these meetings. What runs contrary to the process of cooper-
ation is that there are two regional PSC regimes now in operation within the Indian
Ocean Region and countries in the region are members across four PSC regimes.102
One can only conclude that there has been minimal communication to improve
cooperation among Indian Ocean countries to coordinate PSC inspections.
The annual reports reveal a minimal level of concern among Indian Ocean coun-
tries on improving the effectiveness of PSC in the region taking membership and
rate of inspections as indicators. The PSC regime in the Indian Ocean Region is yet
to develop a ship-targeting factor vital to optimisation of resources and improving
effectiveness of the regime.103
8.7.2 Legitimisation—Contractual Environment
All the regional memoranda recognise the need to increase maritime safety, protect
the marine environment and improve the living and working conditions on board
ships. The member states remain mindful that principal responsibility for the effec-
tive application of internationally agreed standards rests upon flag states’ maritime
administrations.
Nevertheless, port states concede that port state control is indispensable in min-
imising the operation of substandard ships. The uniform application of international
instruments also avoids distorting competition between ports. For these reasons,
member states remain convinced of the necessity for strengthening cooperation and
exchange of information, and instituting an improved and harmonised system of
port state control.104
The member states guided by IMO resolution A.682 (17) on regional
cooperation105 showed preference for an MoU as the implementing instrument
rather than a convention in concluding regional agreements. A memorandum is not
a legally binding document while a convention from a jurisdictional point of view
proves to be a more powerful instrument.
However, a convention usually requires lengthy ratification procedures with simi-
lar problems faced for bringing any amendments. By not imposing legal obligations,
member states acknowledge that individual maritime administration capacities can
differ. Such recognition allows participation by port states to the extent possible.
There is remarkable consistency in the philosophy and language and intent and
structure of each of the memoranda. It is rare for so many regional MoUs to be
contractually similar in nature.
A reading of the different memoranda suggests a convergence of expectations
and tacit acceptance by IMO member states of the importance of regional port state
control to try to eliminate substandard ships internationally.
8.7.3 Domination—National Capacity
With the GCC MoU inspection data unavailable,106 the effectiveness of the port state
control regime is measured using inspection data gathered from the participation
by Indian Ocean Region countries in the Indian Ocean and Tokyo MoUs. The
IOMOU107 and GCC MoU108 have a target inspection rate of 10% annually per
country, which happens to be the lowest among the different regional group-
ings. The Tokyo MoU109 is unique in that it allows for a 75% regional target
inspection rate that caters to the varying capacities of participating countries.
The 3-year average regional inspection percentage (number of individual ships
inspected/number of individual ships visited) for 2001–2003 is 75.18%110 and
for 2004–2006 is 69.51%.111 The drop in regional PSC inspection rate may
be due to the change in 2004 in the method of counting the number of ships
visited.112
From Table 8.14, the 3-year average inspection contribution from Indian Ocean
rim states participating in the Tokyo MoU is 28.95% for 2001–2003 and 23.89% for
2004–2006. The fall in the port state inspection contribution during 2004–2006 is
due to the drop in Indonesian inspection reports.
Table 8.15 provides the breakdown of port state inspection contribution by
IOMOU member states. Effectively, other than for India, Iran and South Africa,
there is little contribution from the other member states. Australia has provided the
same inspection reports to the IOMOU as those that have been performed under the
Tokyo MoU arrangement.
Table 8.16 brings together the Tokyo and Indian Ocean MoU inspection contribu-
tion to determine the relative contribution of Indian Ocean countries considered by
the book. Between 2001 and 2006, Australia, India, Iran and Singapore on aver-
age are the only countries to contribute more than 10% of the total inspections
annually. Australia consistently outperformed the other countries. In 2006, South
Africa performed better than India and Iran with Malaysia significantly improv-
ing its inspection contribution. In 2006, Kenya transmitted inspection reports for
the first time. Indonesia’s inspection contribution during 2001–2003 was better
than 2004–2006 when it dropped to <1%. Sudan remained active until 2004, while
Thailand’s inspection contribution averaged 1.43%. There is little or no participa-
tion (<0.3%) by authorities from Eritrea, Maldives, Mauritius, Oman, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Yemen. What emerges is the vast difference in the capacities of
individual port state countries.
The region seems to be devoid of regional or individual training and capacity-
building efforts.113 In 2002, the IMO conducted two courses on “Training of the
trainers for PSCO” in Eritrea and India and attended separately by participants from
Bangladesh, Eritrea, India, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Myanmar, Oman,
Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.114
Translation of these courses into national training efforts is not apparent from the
annual reports. The annual reports from 2001 to 2007 provide little or no infor-
mation on training activities where the region could indeed benefit from detailing
national training and capacity-building efforts, even if regional capacity-building
initiatives are not forthcoming. Regrettably, in an attempt to clarify and establish
the capacity of governments,115 the secretariat could not provide information on the
number of PSC officers employed by individual states and the number of ship visits
by each member state.
8.7
Structure Over Time
Table 8.14 Tokyo MoU port state inspection contribution from IOR countries
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Countries No % No % No % No % No % No %
Australiaa 2,913 16.76 2,842 14.51 2,827 14.05 3,201 14.96 3,072 14.59 3,080 14.20
Indonesiab 934 5.37 985 5.03 1,067 5.30 32 0.15 52 0.25 59 0.27
Malaysia 380 2.19 351 1.79 352 1.75 353 1.65 355 1.69 434 2.00
Singapore 1,189 6.84 1,221 6.23 1,189 5.91 1,612 7.53 1,359 6.45 1,290 5.95
Thailand 76 0.44 11 0.06 126 0.63 153 0.71 149 0.71 124 0.57
Total 5,492 31.60 5,410 27.62 5,561 27.63 5,351 25.00 4,987 23.68 4,987 23.00
Regional 17,379 19,588 20,124 21,400 21,058 21,686

a The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has transmitted different number of inspection reports to the Tokyo MoU and IOMOU databases. The
data in the table is as indicated in the AMSA Port State Control annual reports and is closest to the IOMOU database
b Tokyo annual report 2003—The authority reported 1067 inspections in 2003 but only five inspection reports were transmitted to the MoU database
235
236
Table 8.15 IOMOU port state inspection contribution
2001a 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Countries No % No % No % No % No % No %
Australiab 2,913 2, 842 52.13 2, 827 55.51 3, 201 56.26 3, 072 59.02 3, 080 60.10
Eritrea NA 22 0.40 15 0.30 12 0.21 8 0.15 0 0.00
India NA 461 8.46 452 8.87 878 15.43 912 17.52 653 12.74
Iran NA 1, 120 20.54 1, 255 24.64 1, 230 21.62 666 12.80 579 11.30
Kenya NA 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 132 2.57
Maldives NA 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
8
Mauritius NA 16 0.29 1 0.02 2 0.03 8 0.15 20 0.39

Oman NA 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
South Africa NA 714 13.10 264 5.18 222 3.90 508 9.76 654 12.76
Sri Lanka NA 4 0.07 5 0.10 6 0.10 4 0.08 7 0.14
Sudan NA 273 5.01 274 5.38 111 1.95 23 0.44 0 0.00
Tanzania NA 0 0.00 0 0.00 29 0.50 3 0.06 0 0.00
Yemen NA 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.02 0 0.00
Totalc 5,520 5, 452 5, 093 5, 689 5, 205 5, 125

a The IOMOU 2001 annual report does not provide port state inspection reports by individual authorities. Personal email communication E 422 on 28 February
2008 from Mr B. Ganguli, Secretary IOMOU, indicates that as the system was not computerised until 2002, the data for 2001 collated manually cannot be
made available by the secretariat
b The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has transmitted different number of inspection reports to the Tokyo MoU and IOMOU databases. The
data in this table is closest to the IOMOU database and has been taken from the AMSA Port State Control annual reports
c Personal email Communication E 422 on 28 February 2008 from Mr B. Ganguli, Secretary IOMOU, confirms the assumption that where there is no data on
IOMOU member states in the annual reports, that these states have not participated in the PSC regime for that year
8.7
Table 8.16 Indian Ocean port state inspection contribution
2001a 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
No % No % No % No % No % No %
Australiab 2913 35.96 2842 35.44 2827 36.12 3201 40.82 3072 43.15 3080 43.80
Eritrea – – 22 0.27 15 0.19 12 0.15 8 0.11 0 0.00
Structure Over Time
India – – 461 5.75 452 5.77 878 11.20 912 12.81 653 9.29
Indonesiac 934 11.53 985 12.28 1067 13.63 32 0.41 52 0.73 59 0.84
Iran – – 1120 13.97 1255 16.03 1230 15.69 666 9.35 579 8.23
Kenya – – 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 132 1.88
Malaysia 380 4.69 351 4.38 352 4.50 353 4.50 355 4.99 434 6.17
Maldives – – 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Mauritius – – 16 0.20 1 0.01 2 0.03 8 0.11 20 0.28
Oman – – 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Singapore 1189 14.68 1221 15.22 1189 15.19 1612 20.56 1359 19.09 1290 18.34
South Africa – – 714 8.90 264 3.37 222 2.83 508 7.13 654 9.30
Sri Lanka – – 4 0.05 5 0.06 6 0.08 4 0.06 7 0.10
Sudan – – 273 3.40 274 3.50 111 1.42 23 0.32 0 0.00
Tanzania – – 0 0.00 0 0.00 29 0.37 3 0.04 0 0.00
Thailand 76 0.93 11 0.14 126 1.61 153 1.95 149 2.09 124 1.76
Yemen – – 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.01 0 0.00
Total 8099 8020 7827 7841 7120 7032

a The IOMOU 2001 annual report does not provide port state inspection reports by individual authorities. Personal email communication E 422 on 28
February 2008 from Mr B. Ganguli, Secretary IOMOU, indicates that as the system was not computerised until 2002, the data for 2001 collated manually
cannot be made available by the secretariat
b The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has transmitted different number of inspection reports to the Tokyo MoU and IOMOU databases. The
data closest to the IOMOU database has been taken from the AMSA annual reports
c Tokyo MoU annual report 2003—The authority reported were 1,067 inspections in 2003 but only five reports were transmitted to the database
237
8.8 Broader Consequences Across Space
8.8.1 State Learning at the Unit Level

The catastrophe of six bulk carriers sinking in quick succession between January
1990 and August 1991 in the Indian Ocean off Western Australia prompted
Australian maritime authorities to hold an inquiry.116 In all, 47 bulk carriers were
lost worldwide between 1988 and 1991 with 80% suffering structural failure.117
A surprising aspect was that members of IACS, considered to be among the
better-performing classification societies, had the majority of bulk carriers lost.118
The findings of the inquiry made it abundantly clear that competitive (inattentive)
practices of flag states, classification societies and insurers allowed (substandard)
shipowners/operators and charters to sail substandard ships.119 Unseaworthy ships,
poorly trained, inexperienced and grossly mistreated also emerged as a major fac-
tor influencing safety of ships.120 The inquiry called for AMSA to have access
to sufficient resources “to increase the rate and effectiveness of port state control
inspections to the level where it ceases to be viable for substandard shipping to call
at Australian ports”.121
Moreover, the inquiry recommended for that the AMSA impose a penalty sur-
charge, and in a move to “name and shame” substandard ships publish each month
details of inspections, including name of ship, beneficial owner, manager of the ship,
classification society, charter and flag state.122 With regard to the role of port states,
the inquiry makes the assertion that “Regional PSC inspection systems . . . achieve
a much higher effective rate of inspection than does a single nation on its own.”123
In 1997, representatives of 22 Indian Ocean maritime administrations met in
India to take stock of the maritime safety infrastructure in the region.124 There is no
assessment available of the extent of substandard shipping plying the Indian Ocean,
but participants sought regional cooperation in developing flag and port state capa-
bilities in the region. This led to the establishment of the Indian Ocean MoU in
1999 with the “ultimate goal, to identify and eliminate substandard shipping from
the region”.125 The goal is idealistic as there is no charted route for state learning at
the unit level. In the annual reports, there is little evidence of technical expertise and
administrative capacity of the majority of maritime administrations in the region to
function as responsible flag and port states.126
8.8.2 Regional Cooperation at the Subsystem Level

The IOMOU targets substandard shipping throughout the Indian Ocean, but imple-
mentation at the subsystem level displays vast differences in the extent of regional
cooperation. The Persian Gulf countries, for instance, have chosen to establish an
independent GCC MoU on PSC. The countries from the South East Asian region
have opted to join the Tokyo MoU. In the South Asian region, Pakistan is not a
member, and Bangladesh, which participated in the drafting of the MoU, is not a
party to the memorandum. Although most of the major port states along the East
African coast are members, their inspection capacity has been limited as shown in
annual reports.
What is also disappointing is that the annual reports from 2001 to 2007 show a
dismal record of regional cooperation in training and capacity-building. Logically,
developing flag and port state capabilities should have been a key consideration.
There were no training programmes conducted in 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2006.127
In 2005, the IOMOU held its first regional seminar on training and coordination of
PSC activities128 and in 2007 held the second such seminar.129 The annual reports
do not clearly enunciate any of the seminar outcomes.
In contrast, the Tokyo MoU successfully developed and implemented a number
of technical cooperation programmes. By 2006, the region had held its 16th basic
training course and the 14th seminar for PSC officers besides conducting regular
fellowship training courses.130
In sum, there is very little evidence of regional efforts to strengthen mar-
itime administrations of member countries or non-member countries in combating
substandard shipping within the region. As part of its 2008 training and capacity-
building activities, IOMOU had planned to hold a third seminar in Sri Lanka and
conduct the first regional basic PSC course in South Africa.131
8.8.3 International Cooperation at the System Level
At the system level, the IMO as a specialised agency of the United Nations has 168
members132 with 13 land-locked states133 from the 192 UN member states.134 The
cost of administration at the IMO is shared among member states in proportion to
the size of the country’s merchant fleet.135 The top 10 contributors in 2008 were
Panama, Liberia, Bahamas, The UK, Greece, Marshall Islands, Singapore, Japan,
China and the United States.136
The “Assembly” is the highest governing body of the IMO, which approves the
work programme, determines the financial arrangements and elects the council. The
“Council” is the Executive Organ of the IMO and is responsible for supervising the
work of the five “Committees”—Maritime Safety, Marine Environment Protection,
Legal, Technical Cooperation and Facilitation.137
The Council is the only body of the IMO that has representative membership
comprising three different categories of members separately elected by a majority
vote of the assembly. Category (a) includes 10 member states with the largest inter-
est in providing shipping services: China, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Panama,
Russia, Republic of Korea, the UK and the United States. Category (b) includes
10 other member states with the largest interest in international seaborne trade:
Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Netherlands, Spain
and Sweden. Category (c) includes the remaining 20 member states not elected
under (a) or (b) that have special interest in maritime transport or navigation and
whose election will ensure representation of all major geographic areas of the
world: Australia, Bahamas, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Kenya, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey.138 The representative from South
Africa is the vice-chairman of the council. In all, nine Indian Ocean countries are
council members, which is 25% of the States in the region. The membership for the
2010–2011 biennium is unchanged except for Belgium replacing New Zealand in
category (c) reflecting Belgium’s growing presence in international shipping.139
The IMO also maintains a regional presence in select developing regions to
facilitate IMO input into national and regional development polices as part of the
Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme (ITCP). The regional coordinators
identify maritime needs and priorities in conjunction with the concerned country,
plan coordinate and ensure delivery of IMO technical assistance activities, including
cooperation in capacity-building programmes. There are four such regional centres
in Kenya, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and the Philippines.140
The Kenya office for the Eastern and Southern Africa sub-region covers Angola
and Namibia in addition to the following Indian Ocean countries—Botswana,
Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa,
Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.141 Eight of the
countries—Eritrea, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania,
Yemen—are members of the IOMOU on port state control. The inspection con-
tribution of these countries has been limited.
The drafting and adoption of a convention can take several years and, on average,
it takes 5 years for the convention to enter into force after adoption.142 There have
been instances, when confronted with an emergency, that governments have accel-
erated the process in the IMO, such as the implementation of the International Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code on 1 July 2004.
The process involves raising issues of concern in one of the six committees of
the IMO where agreement on the matter is referred to the council that meets every
alternate year and if necessary referred to the Assembly in the following year. On
adoption, the representative of member states in the relevant committee begins the
process of drafting the instrument in consultation with international nongovern-
mental organisations that have a working relationship with the IMO. The draft
instrument is then put before the Council or Assembly to convene a conference for
adoption. All member states participate on equal footing including members. Once
adopted, the convention is opened for signature, usually for a period of 12 months.
The conditions that have to be met vary for each convention to enter into force.
Most conventions require the conditions of a specific number of member states and a
minimum percentage of the world GT to be fulfilled before it can enter into force.143
Once the convention enters into force, it is contingent upon member states to
enact national legislation to enforce the provisions of the convention. Contracting
governments enforce the provisions for their own ships and in certain cases for ships
of other member states through the regime of port state control. Each of the 36
Indian Ocean rim countries are members of IMO, but lack of participation in port
state control weakens the implementation outcomes from international cooperation
within the region.
8.9 Stages of Regime Formation
8.9.1 Agenda Formation

The IMO-established regime for port state control lies within the realm of coastal
state jurisdiction that can monitor Flag State Implementation (FSI) of interna-
tional standards for quality shipping. The regime encourages coastal states to enact
national legislation that empowers Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) to survey,
inspect and detain foreign-flagged vessels failing to comply with international ship
safety and quality standards when in port.
At the invitation of the IMO, when 22 of the 36 Indian Ocean rim countries met
in October 1997 there was immediate recognition of the problem from substandard
shipping in the region. The memorandum of understanding finalised at the second
preparatory meeting in June 1998 established a 4-point agenda and came into effect
on 1 April 1999.144
Foremost, member states must take all necessary steps to ratify/accede to rel-
evant international instruments. Table 8.17 provides the current status of relevant
international instruments that should logically form the basis for PSC activities in
the region. However, the Load Line 1988, SOLAS 1978 and 1988 instruments are
not included as relevant instruments in the memorandum.145
Among the IOMOU member states, Australia, India and Oman are the only three
port states that have acceded to all the relevant IMO conventions, not including
MARPOL Annex VI that entered into force in 2005.
Since the adoption of the IOMOU in 1999, there is evidence of some behavioural
change (in grey colour) among member states in taking steps to accede/ratify rel-
evant international instruments. With Yemen signing the STCW 78 convention
in 2005, all the member states comply with the Load Line, Tonnage, SOLAS,
STCW and COLREG instruments for the purposes of the memorandum. However,
a significant gap remains in the signing of the MARPOL and ILO-related instru-
ments. The new Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) 2006, which consolidates
more than 65 international labour standards related to seafarers, is set to replace
the ILO Convention No 147, ratified so far by India alone from the Indian Ocean
countries.146 Only the Bahamas, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Norway and Panama
have ratified MLC 2006.147 Some member states have taken steps (in grey horizontal
shading) to accede to the other Load Line 1988 and SOLAS 1978 and 1988 instru-
ments. These instruments remain a sticking point with most member states including
Eritrea, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania and
Yemen.
There is also an obligation on the part of member states to establish and maintain
an effective non-discriminatory system for port state control. Each member state
within 3 years of signing the memorandum must achieve an annual target rate of
10% inspections of individual ships visiting its ports.148 Now in the 10th year of
operation, whether or not the IOMOU achieved the annual target rate is difficult to
analyse. The secretariat does not have data on the number of individual ships enter-
ing ports in the region, information that could help establish the target inspection
242
Table 8.17 IOMOU status of port state control relevant IMO instruments
IOMOU TONNAGE LOADLINE SOLAS COLREG STCW MARPOL ILO
Member
states 1969 1966 1988 1974 1978 1988 1972 1978 I/II III IV V VI 147
Australia 21 May 29 Jul 07 Feb 17 Aug 17 Aug 07 Feb 29 Feb 07 Nov 14 Oct 10 Oct 27 Feb 14 Aug 07 Aug
1982 1968 1997 1983 1983 1997 1980 1983 1987 1994 2004 1990 2007
Eritrea 22 Apr 22 Apr 04 Feb 22 Apr 04 Feb 22 Apr 22 Apr
1996 1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 1996
India 26 May 19 Apr 10 Aug 16 Jun 03 Apr 22 Aug 30 16 Nov 24 Sep 11 Jun 11 Jun 11 Jun 26 Sep
1977 1968 2000 1976 1986 2000 May 1984 1986 2003 2003 2003 1996
1973
8
Iran 28 Dec 05 Oct 31 Oct 17 Oct 31 Aug 31 Oct 17 Jan 01 Aug 25 Oct 25 Oct
1973 1973 2006 1994 2000 2006 1989 1996 2002 2002
Kenya 02 Mar 12 Sep 21 Jul 15 Dec 15 Dec 15 Dec 15 Dec 15 Dec 15 Dec
1983 1975 1999 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992
Maldives 02 Jun 29 Jan 14 Jan 20 14 Jan 22 Jan 20 20
1983 1968 1981 May 1981 1987 May May
2005 2005 2005
Mauritius 11 Oct 11 Oct 17 Dec 01 Feb 17 Dec 26 04 Jul 06 Apr 06 Apr 06 Apr 06 Apr
1988 1988 2002 1988 2002 May 1991 1995 1995 1995 1995
1989
Oman 24 Sep 20 Aug 17 Jun 25 Apr 25 Apr 17 Jun 25 Apr 24 Sep 13 Mar 13 Mar 13 Mar 13 Mar
1990 1975 1991 1985 1985 1991 1985 1990 1984 1984 1984 1984
South 24 Nov 14 Dec 23 11 Jan 20 Dec 27 Jul 28 Nov 05 Feb 13
Africa 1982 1966 May 1982 1976 1983 1984 1997 May
1980 1992
Sri 11 Mar 26 Sep 30 Aug 04 Jan 22 Jan 24 Jun 24 Jun 24 Jun 24 Jun
Lanka 1992 1991 1983 1978 1987 1997 1997 1997 1997
8.9
IOMOU TONNAGE LOADLINE SOLAS COLREG STCW MARPOL ILO

Stages of Regime Formation
Member
states 1969 1966 1988 1974 1978 1988 1972 1978 I/II III IV V VI 147
Sudan 21 May 26 Sep 15 11 Mar 26 Feb

2002 1991 May 2003 1997
1990
Tanzania 28 Mar 28 Feb 28 Mar 16 27 Oct
2001 1989 2001 May 1982
2006
Yemen 06 Mar 06 Mar 06 Mar 06 Mar 14 Feb
1979 1979 1979 1979 2005
Entry 18 Jul 21 Jul 03 Feb 25 01 03 Feb 15 Jul 28 Apr 02 Oct 01 Jul 27 Sep 31 Dec 19 28 Nov
into 1982 1968 2000 May May 2000 1977 1984 1983 1992 2003 1988 May 1981
Force 1980 1981 2005
Source: Derived from IMO Website

243
rate achieved.149 Australia, the only member state that publishes data on number of
individual ship visits, has a target inspection rate of 65–70%, well above the stated
10% target. In terms of sheer numbers, there is no visible increase in the total num-
ber of inspections from 2001 through to 2006, with 2007 showing a marked decrease
in the total number of inspections in the region.150 The 2008 annual report suggest
an improvement with all states other than Oman providing inspection data for the
first time since inception of the memoranda 10 years ago.151 Although encouraging,
this increase in inspection reports is insufficient to suggest a behavioural change
in state performance. The IOMOU membership also does not show any significant
increase, with only Kenya joining in 2002, Oman in 2003 and Yemen in 2004.
Further, the agenda seeks the commitment of member states to share information
in advancing the memorandum’s aim of eliminating substandard shipping from the
region. As shown in Table 8.18, there is a significant gap in reporting of inspection
data by member states.
Table 8.18 Inspection contributions by IOMOU member states
Member state 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia X X X X X X X
Eritrea X X X X X
India X X X X X X X
Iran X X X X X X X
Kenya X X X
Maldives X X
Mauritius X X X X X X X
Oman
South Africa X X X X X X X
Sri Lanka X X X X X X
Sudan X X X X X
Tanzania X X X
Yemen X X
Source: Compiled from IOMOU Annual reports 2001–2008

For 2001 there is incomplete data on individual member state contribution
Only Australia, India, Iran, Mauritius and South Africa consistently report
inspection data to the IOMOU secretariat. Kenya and Maldives began reporting in
2006/2007, while Eritrea, Sudan, Tanzania and Yemen stopped reporting in 2006
and Sri Lanka in 2007. Since becoming a member in 2004, Oman remains the only
member state not to have reported inspection data even once. At the same time, there
is progress in sharing of real-time information. The Indian Ocean Computerised
Information System (IOCIS) brought online on 21 June 2005 allows national author-
ities to confidentially consult and share information online.152 Since 2002 the IOCIS
database has stored information for public access.153 In 2007, the number of page
views and data downloaded more than doubled since operationalisation of the
database.154
8.9.2 Institutional Choice

The IOMOU established a port state control committee giving equal representation
to all member states. The work of the committee would be supported by a secretariat
located in Goa, India (Fig. 8.8).
Fig. 8.8 Organisational structure of IOMOU

Source: IOMOU annual report 2007
The committee is charged with promoting by all means necessary the compatibil-
ity of procedures and practices relating to implementation of the memorandum. The
committee also reviews the operational effectiveness of the memorandum in which
representatives of IMO, ILO and other regional MoUs participate as observers.
Since 2001, an inter-sessional management group oversees the technical functions.
However, the institutional capability shows signs of limited capacity. For exam-
ple, amendments to the PSC manual first envisaged in 2003 have yet to be finalised
even at the start of 2008.155 Moreover, deliberations since 2005 are continuing on
finalising the procedures for a “Detention Review Panel” and developing a “Ship
Targeting Factor”, including a white, grey and black list for the region.156 The 2005
Committee deliberations on Inter-Governmental Organisation (IGO) status at IMO
meetings have yet to materialise.157 In 2006, the Paris MoU received IGO status at
the IMO and attended the 14th session of the FSI subcommittee.158
8.9.3 Operationalisation
The responsibility of implementing the memorandum rests with national maritime
administrations. The memorandum in conformity with IMO Assembly resolu-
tion A.787 (19) on “Procedures for Port State Control” details the inspection,
rectification and detention guidelines.159
Under the memorandum, each authority is required to indicate the number of
PSCOs working on port state inspections. So far, within the IOMOU, the Australian
Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) alone has provided this information. In 2007,
42 PSCOs located in 14 ports around Australia conducted port state inspections.160
On average, with 2963 inspections reported during the year each PSCO performed
70 inspections. Altogether, Australia, India, Iran and South Africa account for more
than 95% of the total inspection effort under the memorandum. It is encouraging
to see that 10% of the inspection data reported in 2008 was from other members
(Table 8.19).
Table 8.19 Inspection effort of IOMOU member states
Inspection efforts in % 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia 52.13 55.51 56.26 59.02 60.10 61.60 49.6

India/Iran/South Africa 42.10 38.69 40.95 40.08 36.80 37.11 40.4
Other members 5.77 5.80 2.79 0.90 3.10 1.29 10.0
Source: Derived from IOMOU annual reports 2001–2008

For 2001 there is incomplete data on individual member state contribution
8.10 Analysis of Regime Effectiveness

The IOMOU case study analysed the progress of IOMOU using statistical data.
Again, the story that unfolds is very different from that contained in the IOMOU
documentation for the period 2001–2006. Using the rubric for measuring regime
effectiveness the variables of actor behaviour and leadership, structure over time,
broader consequences across space and stages of regime formation are analysed
for measuring effectiveness of the regime for port state control in the Indian
Ocean.
8.10.1 Stages of Regime Formation
The evidence suggests that although there is acknowledgement of the problem of

substandard shipping in the region the extent of the problem has not been com-
prehensively identified. Moreover, the inspection data of the Paris MoU, Tokyo
MoU and the Indian Ocean MoU suggests that a major component of the ship-
ping fleets of Indian countries is operating within the region. The inspection data
suggests that only nine shipping fleets are trading outside the Indian Ocean Region.
Of these countries, only India, Iran, Maldives and Sri Lanka are members solely
of the IOMOU. Australia is a member of both Indian Ocean and Tokyo MoUs.
The remaining four countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand—are
members only of the Tokyo MoU. In addition, lack of transparency in determin-
ing whether the target inspection rate is being met suggests that the agenda has not
been converted into measures for collective action. Even among the more influential
states, only Australia has consistently reported the inspection rate that well exceeded
the target rate of inspection. This gives a score of 1 on a scale of 1– 5 for agenda
formation.
The evidence also suggests that the institutional choice of a port state committee
supported by a secretariat provides for building of regional administrative capability
and promoting synchronisation and effectiveness of the operation and effectiveness
of the IOMOU, giving a score of 3 on a scale of 1–5 for institutional choice. The
evidence further suggests a number of problems in operationalisation of the regime,
such as lack of resources and non-reporting with 95% of all inspections confined to
just four member states gives a score of 2 on a scale of 1–5 for operationalisation.
The average score for stages of regime formation is 2 on a scale of 1–5
(Table 8.20 and Fig. 8.9).
8.10.2 Actor Behaviour and Leadership
The evidence for structural leadership by power-based actors suggests that port state
control under the IOMOU regional alliance has not been a priority for governments
from the region. Moreover, port state control in the region is fragmented operating
under three if not four different MoUs. The performance of shipping fleets with
30 or more inspections from the region indicates most fleets to be operating in the
grey to black list band (Table 8.8). This tends to suggest less than satisfactory flag
state implementation. Since inception of the regime, only five more states (Iran,
Kenya, Maldives, Oman and Yemen) have become members and a good number of
states from the region have yet to become members of the IOMOU. The evidence
overall gives a score of 2 on a scale of 1–5 for structural leadership and power-based
actors.
Intellectual leadership by knowledge-based actors is a big challenge for the port
state control regime in the region. There is little evidence of knowledge-based actors
raising public awareness and establishing the extent of substandard shipping in the
Indian Ocean Region. The level of consensual level knowledge is very poor giving
a score of 1 on a scale of 1–5. The evidence also suggests keen interest on part of
interest-based actors in current and future impacts of the port state control regime.
Entrepreneurial leadership by interest-based actors is reasonably established and
there is good participation of interest-based actors in institutionalising port state
control measures giving a score of 3 on a scale of 1–5 for entrepreneurial leadership
and interest-based actors.
248
Table 8.20 Numerical score of variable sets and level of collaboration
Behavioural Change Actor behaviour and Knowledge–based actors and Intellectual leadership on part of 1 2.0
leadership (ABL) intellectual leadership (KIL) knowledge–based actors not at
all established. Epsitemic
community and/or non-state
actors inactive. Very poor level
of consensual knowledge base.
Interest–based actors and Entrepreneurial leadership by 3
entrepreneurial leadership interest–based actors reasonably
8
(IEL) established. Good participation

of interest–based actors in
institutional bargaining. Keen
interest in present and future
impacts of the problem.
Power–based actors and Structural leadership by 2
structural leadership (PSL) power–based actors somewhat
established. Commitment to
issue-specific resources is below
average. The more powerful
resource States have not fully
pledged allocative and
authoritative resources. Since
inception of the regime, more
States from the region are party
to the regime.
8.10
Stage of regime formation Agenda formation (AF) Problems that require collective 1 2.0
(SRF) response are not identified.
Institutional choice (IC) The institutional setting has a 3
secretarial role for building
regional administrative
capability in member States and
also provides some descriptive
or informational inputs into the
negotiation process.

operationalisation of the regime
are evident in few member
States from the region.
Institutional Structure over time (SOT) Signification/ level of concern Low level of concern amongst 2 2.0
Effectiveness (SLC) stakeholders. Concerns shared
by few member States from the
region.
Legitimisation/ contractual Low level of credible commitment 2
environment (LCE) amongst member States from
the region. Weak regulatory
framework for legitimising
international norms and
principles within the region.
Domination/ national capacity Low level of political, legal and 2
(DNC) administrative national capacity
amongst member States from
the region. Weak regional effort
at capacity building.
249
250
Broader consequences State learning at the unit level Very poor level of cognitive 1 1.0
across space (BCS) (SL) learning amongst States from
the region about the nature of
problem and information about
the options available for
8
addressing the problem.

Regional Cooperation at the Insignificant cooperation amongst 1
sub-system level (RC) member States from the region
on establishing well-defined
activities and resources, needed
to move from norms to rules.
International cooperation at the Hardly any change in capacities of 1
system level (IC) member States from the region
to effectively participate at the
international level in regime
implementation.
Intervening variable Level of collaboration (LOC) 1.75


Signification/ Knowledge-Based
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
Domination/ Legitimisation/ Power-Based Interest-Based

National Capacity Contractual Environment Structural leadership Entrepreneurial leadership

State Learning
at the Unit level Agenda Formation
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
Operationalisation Institutional choice

International Cooperation Regional Cooperation
at the System level at the SubSystem level
Fig. 8.9 Measure of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness

The average score for actor behaviour and leadership is 2 on a scale of 1–5
8.10.3 Structure Over Time
The evidence suggests a low level of concern among the member states with con-
cerns shared by few member states from the region, giving a score of 2 on a scale of
1–5 for signification—level of concern.
The contractual environment is such that port state control participation by
maritime administrations is limited to the extent that the administrations consider
it possible despite a convergence of expectations. The evidence suggests a low
level of credible commitment where on occasions member states have failed to
provide inspection data operating under the regional port state control MoU indi-
cating a weak regulatory framework. This gives a score of 2 on a scale of 1–5 for
legitimisation—contractual environment. As for domination or the commitment of
resources by governments, the evidence suggests low level of political, legal and
administrative national capacities among most member states in the region, giving
a score of 2 on a scale of 1–5 for domination—national capacity.
The average score for structure over time is 2 on a scale of 1–5 (Table 8.20 and
Fig. 8.9).
8.10.4 Broader Consequences Across Space
The evidence suggests a very poor level of cognitive learning among member states
from the region about the nature of substandard shipping in the region and the
options available to address the problem at the state level, giving a score of 1 on
a scale of 1–5 for state learning at the unit level. With Indian Ocean countries
under four MoUs on port state control, there is insignificant cooperation among
states from the region for establishing well-defined activities and resources needed
to implement port state control in the region, giving a score of 1 on a scale of 1–5 for
regional cooperation at the subsystem level. Although all 36 Indian Ocean countries
are members of the IMO and nine of these countries are members of the IMO coun-
cil, the international cooperation outcomes are weakened by the lack of participation
in regional port state control, giving a score of 1 on a scale of 1–5 for international
cooperation at the system level.
The average score for broader consequences across space is 1 on a scale of 1–5
8.10.5 Level of Collaboration
The analysis of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness gives a good

insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the regime for port state control in
the Indian Ocean Region.
In terms of behavioural change interest-based actors have shown reasonable lead-
ership in institutionalising port state control measures. While power-based actors
have shown some change in behaviour since joining the regime for port state control;
lack of priority and commitment of resources has hampered the operationalisation
of the regime. The problem is exacerbated by the weak agenda and lack of intellec-
tual leadership in identifying the extent of the problem of substandard shipping in
the region (Fig. 8.10).
In terms of institutional effectiveness the low level of concern has yielded a
very poor level of state learning. The contractual environment is weak and there is
insignificant regional cooperation. Efforts at capacity-building are low and national
capacities continue to remain limited. There is hardly any change in capacities of
states from the region to effectively cooperate at the international level in port state
control efforts (Fig. 8.10).
The evidence suggests states in the region are conscious of the need to meet
international obligations in tackling the problem of substandard shipping. There is
I E
N F 5 B
S F E
4
T E H C
I C 3 H
A
T T 2 A
V
U I 1 I N
T V
I E O G
O N U E
N E R
A S A
L S L
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0

recognition of the need for regional cooperation in port state control. In actual prac-
tice there is more than one regional MoU on port state control in the region with the
majority of states from the region as members of one or the other MoU and in some
cases more than one MoU. What this suggests is that states in the region consider
regional cooperation as critical to tackling the problem of substandard shipping.
However, the Indian Ocean states have yet to establish how best to make the regime
for port state control work for them.
All the available evidence points towards the need for power-based actors to give
high priority to port state control and strengthen maritime administrations in the
region. The lack of national capacity in port state is seen as the main obstacle to
greater regional cooperation, which when achieved would only further enhance the
level of collaboration among states and strengthen port state control for the bene-
fit of the Indian Ocean Region as a whole. Making port state control a priority is
likely to come from greater intellectual leadership and is likely to see commitment
by government of the required allocative and authoritative resources to effectively
operationalise the regime.
Table 8.21 Level of collaboration port state control in the Indian Ocean Region
Level of collaboration : 1.75
1 No collaborative action.
2 Elementary understanding and leadership at the national level
and a weak regional structure with comparatively critical
cooperation lead to somewhat significant change in the
capacity of a few of the member states from the region to
participate effectively at the international level.

Table 8.22 Port state control regime effectiveness

1 2 3 4 5
Actor Perfunctory actor Elementary actor Average actor Substantial actor World-class actor
behaviour behaviour and behaviour and behaviour and behaviour and behaviour and
and leadership leadership leadership leadership leadership
leadership
Stages of Perfunctory Elementary Average regime Substantial World-class
regime regime formation regime formation formation in the regime formation regime formation
formation in the region in the region region in the region in the region
Structure Perfunctory Elementary Average Substantial World-class
over time structure over structure over structure over structure over structure over
time time time time time
Broader Perfunctory Elementary Average Substantial World-class
consequences learning and learning and learning and learning and learning and
across space cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation
The combined effect of behavioural change and institutional effectiveness is to

give a level of collaboration of 1.75, closer to 2 on a scale of 1–5. What this means is
that there is perfunctory to elementary understanding and leadership at the national
level and a regional structure weakened by four MoUs with comparatively criti-
cal cooperation limited to a few member states in different MoUs from the Indian
Ocean Region. The potential for regional cooperation is enormous given the com-
mon understanding of the problem of substandard shipping and recognition that
regional agreements are needed to tackle the problem (Table 8.21).
5
4
3
2
1

Fig. 8.11 Port state control
regime effectiveness SOT Structure Over Time
Source: Compiled by author BCS Broader Consequences across Space

8.11 Conclusion 255
8.10.6 Effectiveness of the Regime for Port State Control

In assessing the effectiveness of the regime for port state control, it may be said
that elementary actor–structure interplay has resulted in at best elementary forma-
tion of the regime with less than elementary results for state learning and regional
cooperation in the region (Table 8.22). Taken together with the score for level of
collaboration, the scores of the two sets of variables that define behavioural change
and institutional effectiveness illustrate the assessed effectiveness of a regime on a
scale of 1–5 where a score of 5 indicates a world-class regime (Fig. 8.11).
8.11 Conclusion
The IOMOU port state control case study analyses progress of the regional alliance
using quantitative data from the annual reports. A measure of the effectiveness of
port state control has been possible by the use of regime theory despite being con-
fined to statistical data in annual reports. There is no qualitative information in the
annual reports for analysis and the wider international data was instrumental in
establishing the regime implementation. Drawing on the theoretical framework for
regime analysis, the discussion on the IOMOU regional alliance on port state control
provides key insights into the implementation and effectiveness of the regime.
The IOMOU regional port state control as a negotiated regime arising from a con-
sensus process of bargaining has been thrust upon Indian Ocean states by the need
to maintain their international obligations of enforcing IMO standards for shipping.
The positive aspect has been for the MoU to evince behavioural change in member
states to accede/ratify relevant international instruments. Member states have been
encouraged to share information. The MoU established a clear agenda to achieve
a 10% annual target rate of inspection. However, limited in institutional capac-
ity, member states have been unable to finalise important procedures, such as the
ship-targeting factor. Moreover, operationalisation of port state control continues
to remain embryonic after nearly a decade. Outside the four countries—Australia,
India, Iran and South Africa—there is no significant participation by member states.
Structural leadership in the Indian Ocean Region on port state control has been
fractured by subsystem power plays. Consequently, the Indian Ocean Region is
subject to three PSC control regimes, while the Eastern and Southern Africa sub-
region remains devoid of any substantial port state control. Intellectual leadership by
knowledge-based actors has not created sufficient public and industry awareness for
governments in the region to feel pressurised into implementing port state control.
Entrepreneurial leadership by interest-based actors has to a degree institutionalised
port state control and has gotten the shipping industry in the region to participate in
the various global initiatives to improve the quality of shipping.
Communicating a level of concern over substandard shipping is limited to select
countries in the region. The token participation by the majority of members is sug-
gestive of simply maintaining a front to appear as a responsible flag state, possibly
in an attempt to improve the public image of their shipping industry and no more.
Even as rates of inspection remain poor, the problem is further exacerbated by
the regional alliances’ failure to develop a ship-targeting factor to optimise mea-
gre resources at the disposal of member states. The contractual environment allows
maritime administrations to participate to the extent possible and is jurisdiction-
ally weak in pressurising non-performing administrations to act. Consequently, the
structure over time has been unsuccessful in improving capacity of member states
or facilitating new states in the region to join the IOMOU on port state control.
It took 15 years after the 1982 Paris MoU and 4 years after the 1993
Commonwealth of Australia report into ship safety before the Indian Ocean states
met in 1997 to implement port state control in the region.
State learning has been slow and even now there is no assessment on the extent
of substandard shipping from the region. Nor have member states charted a route to
grasp the extent of the problem and build administrative and technical capacity to
address the issues. There is clear evidence from the statistical data that ships from a
number of flag states in the region are not being picked up by port state control. In
effect, quality of these ships is dependent on the extent of enforcement of interna-
tional standards by flag states. The fractured regional cooperation has created gaps
in the inspection and affected the regional efforts to strengthen maritime adminis-
trations. Effectiveness of international cooperation at the system level is contingent
upon the participation of all the Indian Ocean rim countries in port state control
efforts.
This concludes the analysis of the second case study and the next chapter presents
the summary and conclusions of the research.
Notes
1. See International Maritime Organization (IMO), “International shipping and world trade:
Facts and figures,” Maritime Knowledge Centre, 2008. Available online: http://www.imo.
org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D23754/InternationalShippingandWorldTrade-f
actsandfigures.pdf, Sampson and Bloor (2007, pp. 551–569), Braithwaite and Drahos
(2000).
2. Bad ones are those that exercise the lowest levels of social responsibility (cheapskate policy)
and the good ones are those that exercise the highest (management intensive policy)—see
discussion in Goss (2008, pp. 142–146).
3. IMO (2008).
4. LOSC Article 92, 94.
5. Lloyds Register (2007). Table 1A—China—Hong Kong, Macao; New Zealand—Cook
Islands; Denmark—Denmark (DIS), Faeroe Islands, Faeroes (FAS); France—France (FIS),
Wallis and Futuna; the Netherlands—Aruba, the Netherlands Antilles; Norway—Norway
(NIS); Portugal—Portugal (MAR); Spain—Spain (CSR); and United Kingdom—Anguilla,
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Turks
& Caicos Islands, British Virgin Islands.
6. Llacer (2003, pp. 513–523).
7. Muscat Dhows under French Flag and owned by Muscat Sultanate a British Protectorate
at that time—see Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Muscat Dhows Case: France v
Notes 257
Great Britain,” Award of the tribunal of arbitration constituted in virtue of the com-
promise signed at London on 13 October 1904 between Great Britain and France, The
Hague, 8 August 1905. Available online: http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Muscat%
20Dhows%20English%20Award.pdf.
8. Vorbach (2001, pp. 27–42).
9. International Transport Federation (ITF), Flag of Convenience Campaign, viewed on 22
January 2009, http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm.
10. International Labour Organization (2001).
14. International Maritime Organization (IMO), “Introduction to IMO,” viewed on 17 January
2009, http://www.imo.org.
15. Ibid.
16. IMO, “Status of Multilateral Conventions or Instruments in Respect of Which the
International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other
Functions as at 31 December 2007.”
17. IMO Maritime Knowledge Centre, “International shipping and world trade.”
18. Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat (2008).
19. Lloyds Register (2007).
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Appendix K.
25. Ibid.
26. Data for 2002 has not been included in the analysis, as no logical explanation could be
found for the sudden increase in fleet size from 2001 and an immediate decline in 2003 in
the Lloyds Register (2007).
27. The Merchant Vessel (MV) Amoco Cadiz, a very large crude carrier, split in two after
running aground three miles off the coast of Brittany (France) on 16 March 1978
with its entire cargo of 227,000 tons of crude oil spilling into the sea. It was the
largest oil spill at that time—See Cedre, “Amoco Cadiz,” viewed on 28 March 2009,
http://www.cedre.fr/en/spill/amoco/amoco.php.
28. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1992).
29. Hare (1997) reprinted online, viewed on 4 January 2009, http://www.uctshiplaw.com/
psc2.htm.
30. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1992).
31. Ibid, p. 70.
32. Australia: Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS),
Australian Association for Maritime Affairs (AAMA), Sea Power Centre (SPC); India:
National Maritime Foundation (NMF) and Society of Indian Ocean Studies (SOIS);
Indonesia: Forum for Defence and Maritime Studies; Malaysia: Maritime Institute of
Malaysia; and Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Centre—Institute
of Defence and Strategic Studies (Maritime Security programme); and the Indian Ocean
Research Group (IORG)—potentially the only Indian Ocean-wide think tank.
33. Bell (1993, pp. 367–370).
34. Dijxhoorn (1993, pp. 363–366).
35. Boisson (1994, pp. 363–377).
36. Payoyo (1994, pp. 379–392).
37. Ibid, pp. 391–392.
38. Ibid, p. 392.

39. Wonham (1996, pp. 377–388).
40. Kiehne (1996, pp. 217–224).
41. Ademuni-Odeke (1997, pp. 657–665).
42. Li (1999, pp. 135–143).
43. McDorman 2000, pp. 207–225.
44. McDorman, “Regional Port State Control Arrangements: Some Issues of International
Law,” p. 225.
45. Vorbach (2001).
46. Alderton and Winchester (2002, pp. 151–162), Roberts and Marlow (2002, pp. 437–450).
47. Alderton and Winchester (2002, pp. 157–159).
48. Roberts and Marlow (2002, p. 449).
49. Llacer (2003).
50. Llacer (2003, p. 522).
51. Kovats (2006, pp. 75–81).
52. Hare (1997).
53. Knapp, “The Econometrics of Maritime Safety: Recommendations to Enhance Safety at
Sea,” Econometric Institute, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, viewed on 2 March 2009,
http://repub.eur.nl/publications/eco_man/erim/erim3/580882487, Knapp and Franses (2007,
pp. 550–563, 2008, pp. 653–662).
54. Knapp and Franses (2007).
55. Ibid, p. 557.
56. Ibid, p. 560.
57. Cariou et al. (2008, pp. 491–503).
58. Ibid, p. 503.
59. Knapp and Franses (2008).
60. Ibid, p. 661.
61. International Maritime Organization (1993).
62. International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), “Members,” viewed on 4
January 2009, http://www.iacs.org.uk/explained/members.aspx.
63. DeSombre (2006, p. 186).
64. Personal email communication on 26 March 2008 from Mr H. Oikawa, General Manager,
Information Services Department, Class NK and Peter Graaf, Deputy Head Flag State
Affairs, Class GL.
65. Personal email communication from Peter Graaf, Deputy Head Flag State Affairs, Class GL.
66. International Group of P&I Clubs, “Homepage,” viewed on 10 January 2009,
http://www.igpandi.org/Home.
67. International Group of P&I Clubs, “The role of the group,” viewed on 10 January 2009,
http://www.igpandi.org/About.
68. Ibid, online.
69. UK P&I Club, “History of the P& I Clubs,” viewed on 10 January 2009,
http://www.ukpandi.com/ukpandi/Infopool.nsf/HTML/About_ClubHistory.
70. International Chamber of Shipping, “How ICS works,” viewed on 12 January 2009, http://
www.marisec.org/ICS%20brochure.pdf.
71. International Chamber of Shipping and International Shipping Federation Annual Review
2008.
72. International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) “Membership,”
viewed on 12 January 2009, http://www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=20475.
73. INTERTANKO, “About us,” viewed on 12 January 2009, http://www.intertanko.com/
templates/Page.aspx?id=1086.
74. Ibid, online.
Notes 259
75. Ibid, online.

76. INTERTANKO, “Membership Criteria/Best Practices,” 24 May 2007, viewed on 12 January
2009, http://www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=36184; “Mission Statement”
viewed on 12 January 2009, http://www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=1054.
77. International Association of Dry Cargo Owners (INTERCARGO) “What we do” viewed on
12 January 2009, http://www.intercargo.org.
78. INTERCARGO “Industry issues,” 12 January 2009, http://www.intercargo.org.
79. INTERCARGO “Members Charter,” 12 January 2009, http://www.intercargo.org.
80. INTERCARGO “What we do,” 12 Jan 2009, http://www.intercargo.org.
81. Ibid, online.
82. INTERCARGO “Industry issues” online.
83. Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), “About BIMCO,” viewed on
13 January 2009, http://www.bimco.org/Corporate%20Area/About/BIMCO_a_century_of_
service.aspx.
84. MK Shipping, “MK Shipping is a BIMCO member,” viewed on 13 January 2009,
http://www.mkshipping.dk/aboutus/bimcomembership.
85. Ibid, online.
86. BIMCO, “Rules, Rule-06 Application for Membership,” viewed on 13 January 2009,
http://www.bimco.org/Corporate%20Area/About/BIMCO_Rules/Rule_06.aspx.
87. Ibid, online.
88. Roundtable of International Shipping Associations, “Round table strategic plan,” viewed on
13 January 2009, http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/home/roundtable.
89. International Transport Workers Federation list 32 FoC countries: Antigua and Barbuda,
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Cayman Islands,
Comoros, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, French International Ship Register (FIS),German
International Ship Register (GIS), Georgia, Gibraltar (UK), Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon,
Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands (USA), Mauritius, Mongolia, the Netherlands Antilles,
North Korea, Panama, Sao Tome and Príncipe, St Vincent & Grenadines, Sri Lanka, Tonga,
Vanuatu, viewed on 25 January 2009, http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/flags-
convenien-183.cfm.
90. Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), “Members,” viewed on 17 January
2009, http://www.ocimf.com/custom.cfm?action=members.
91. OCIMF, “SIRE introduction,” viewed on 17 January 2009, http://www.ocimf.com/
pages.cfm?action=sire_introduction2.
92. Ibid, online.
93. Ibid, online.
94. RightShip, “About RightShip,” viewed on 17 January 2009, http://site.rightship.com/
about.aspx.
95. RightShip, “Directors/Shareholders,” viewed on 17 January 2009, http://site.rightship.com/
about_directors.aspx.
96. RightShip, “Why RightShip,” viewed on 17 January 2009, http://site.rightship.com/
why.aspx.
97. RightShip, “What is ship vetting,” viewed on 17 January 2009, http://site.rightship.com/
why_whatis.aspx.
98. RightShip, “Live statistics” viewed on 17 January 2009, http://site.rightship.com/
default.aspx.
99. RightShip, “RightShip rating,” viewed on 17 January 2009, http://site.rightship.com/why_
rightship.aspx.
100. RightShip press release, RightShip and INTERCARGO initiative to jointly recognise
quality principles, 26 February 2008, viewed on 28 March 2009, http://site.rightship.com/
resources.ashx/downloads/39/fileName/0692EEF7D4B6F06904B42AA006702B6E/Inter
cargo-Rightship_press_release2_Feb_2008_-_Final_version_26_Feb_2008.pdf.
101. Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (IOMOU on PSC)
Annual reports 2001 to 2008, viewed on 17 January 2009, http://www.iomou.org/history
main.htm.
102. Regimes in the Indian Ocean—IOMOU and Riyadh MoU established in 2005; the 4 regimes
are IOMOU, Tokyo MoU, Abuja MoU and Riyadh MoU.
103. IOMOU on PSC annual report 2007.
104. Reading of memorandum of understanding texts of IOMOU, Riyadh MoU and Tokyo MoU.
105. International Maritime Organization, “Regional cooperation in the control of ships and
discharges,” Assembly 17th session, A.17.res.682, 6 November 1991.
106. Personal email communication on 23 February 2008 from Captain A.M. Al-Janahi, Director
GCC MoU indicated that the MoU has just started functioning and so no other data is
available as yet.
107. Reading of IOMOU on PSC Section 1.3.
108. Personal email Communication on 23 February 2008 from Captain A.M. Al-Janahi.
109. Reading of Tokyo MoU on PSC section 1.4.
110. Tokyo Annual reports 2001–2003, Table 2 Column 1 & 6 totals: [(20124+19588+17379)/
(26142+25202+24590)]100
111. Tokyo Annual reports 2004–2006, Table 2 Column 1 & 6 totals: [(12148+11430+10922)/
(17520+16270+15838)] 100
112. Tokyo MoU on PSC annual report 2004, p. 12.
113. Reading of IOMOU annual reports 2001–2007.
114. IOMOU annual report 2002, p. 6.
115. Personal email communication on 25 Mar 2008 from Mr B. Ganguli, Secretary IOMOU.
116. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (1992, p. xv).
117. Ibid, pp. 2, 6.
118. Ibid, p. 6.
119. Ibid, pp. 28–31, 52–54.
120. Ibid, pp. 31–37.
121. Ibid, p. 81.
122. Ibid, pp. 81, 83.
123. Ibid, p. 70.
125. Ibid.
127. IOMOU annual report 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006.
128. IOMOU annual report 2005.
130. Tokyo MoU annual report 2006.
132. IMO, “Introduction to IMO” online.
133. Mongolia, Nepal, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Austria, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Slovakia, Switzerland, Bolivia, Paraguay—see Gupta (2005).
134. United Nations, “List of member states,” viewed on 17 January 2009, http://www.un.org/
members/list.shtml.
135. IMO, “Budget 2008–2009,” viewed on 17 January 2009, http://www.imo.org.
136. Ibid, online.
137. IMO, “Structure,” viewed on 17 January 2009, http://www.imo.org.
138. IMO, “Council members for the 2008–2009 biennium,” viewed on 22 January 2009,
http://www.imo.org.
Notes 261
139. IMO, “Council member for the 2010–11 biennium,” viewed on 10 December 2009,
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1773&doc_id=12112.
140. IMO, “Regional coordination,” viewed on 22 January 2009, http://www.imo.org.
141. Ibid, online; see Table 3.2 and note 169 for Indian Ocean countries.
142. IMO, “Conventions,” viewed on 22 January 2009, http://www.imo.org.
143. Ibid, online.
144. IOMOU, “History,” viewed on 17 January 2009, http://www.iomou.org/historymain.htm.
145. Reading of IOMOU memorandum.
146. International Labour Organisation (ILO), “Maritime Labour Convention,” viewed on
17 January 2009, http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/InternationalLabourStandards/
MaritimeLabourConvention/lang-en/index.htm.
147. ILO, “Convention no. MLC,” viewed on 23 April 2009, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/ratifce.pl?C186.
148. IOMOU memorandum section 1.3.
149. Personal email communication on 25 Mar 2008 from Mr B. Ganguli, Secretary IOMOU.
153. Ibid.
154. IOMOU annual report 2005, p. 7 and annual report 2007, p. 8.
158. Paris MoU annual report 2006, pp. 5–6.
159. International Maritime Organization, “Procedures for Port State Control,” Assembly 19th
session, A.19.res.787, 23 November 1995.
160. Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Report on Port State Control in Australia 2007, p. 2.
Part IV
Conclusion: Power of the Sea from Coast
to Coast
Map Source: Australian Government, Bureau of Meteorology, Tsunami information page, viewed
21 April 2009, http://www.bom.gov.au/info/tsunami/tsunami_info.shtml and Travel times for
Indian Ocean Tsunami, Map provided by Kenji Satake, Geological Survey of Japan, AIST at
http://www.bom.gov.au/info/tsunami/travel_time.shtml
264 Conclusion: Power of the Sea from Coast to Coast
Chapter 9
Prospects for Regional Cooperation
9.1 Open Maritime Space or a Region
The Indian Ocean maritime space can indeed be conceived as one oceanic space, but
not quite as one region Historians have written about the long history of contact and
trade done by people from its coasts.1 Geographers have for centuries given various
names to the oceanic space.2 Over time the maritime space connecting the shores
of East Africa, Middle East, South Asia, South East Asia and Australia has come to
be recognised as the Indian Ocean. In IR theory and geopolitics the Indian Ocean
is often discussed as four sub-regions—East Africa, Middle East, South Asia and
Australasia (South East Asia and Australia combine)—instead of one region.3
In the post-Cold War era there has been a paradigm shift in the way the Indian
Ocean is viewed in IR theory and geopolitics. The convergence of two related fac-
tors has influenced this change. Both factors came about at nearly the same time
in the early 1990s. First, in the post-Cold War era there has been the emergence
of a new regime for ocean governance, the focus of this research. Second, this new
“ocean regime” is one of interdependence in which the centre of political gravity has
unendingly shifted from land to oceans. These factors are related because without
the power to govern the sea first, a nation is unlikely to be able to project power from
the sea to the land. Here power is not to be confused with superpower, great power
or middle power authority and/or influence in international affairs, but power as the
ability to do or act in national interest and, if called upon, in national defence.4
The growing intensity of ocean use is impinging on the carrying capacity of
ocean, and the Indian Ocean is no exception. There exists potential for conflict
among those competing ocean use. The Law of the Sea convention promises to
radically alter the traditional freedom of access as traditional international and
national mechanisms are further strained in preserving peace. There is increasing
emphasis on interdependence and regional cooperation in areas of marine scien-
tific research, fisheries management, environmental protection, maritime safety and
maritime security as individual states are unable to cope alone with matters of ocean
governance.5
The paradigm shift in thinking stems from the recognition that the power to gov-
ern the sea is beyond the capacity of individual states. Governance at sea stresses
266 9 Prospects for Regional Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region
regional cooperation, and for scholars of IR theory and geopolitics, the maritime
space that defines the Indian Ocean may be better served when the Indian Ocean
is viewed as one macro-region for ocean governance instead of four sub-regions.6
First, without cooperation across the four sub-regions it is difficult to build capacity
in many of the Indian Ocean states for governance of the maritime space.7 Second,
lack of governance at sea by one state would have consequences for neighbouring
states and beyond.8 In other words, regional cooperation in maritime issues across
the Indian Ocean space is in the interests of all states.
The power to govern the sea stems from the political will to be able to act or
function at sea in a manner of governing or control. Indian Ocean nation-states
must articulate a national maritime vision and policy that states the rules, norms,
principles and procedures for the nation, similar to the framework of international
regimes to constitutionally conduct maritime policy, actions and affairs of the nation
at sea.9 The assertion here is that the Indian Ocean can be conceived, understood and
analysed as a “region” through the theoretical framework of international regimes
and practical application of ocean governance conceptual constructs. Just as in his-
tory, through the exploration of cross-cultural interaction and merchant trade, there
is emerging scholarly recognition of the integrated world of the Indian Ocean, long
in effect before European colonisation.10
9.2 International Regimes and Ocean Governance
This book set out to understand international regimes and identify issues in ocean
governance to which international regime theory could apply and determine a
measure of regime effectiveness.
International regimes in theory further cooperate to provide governance by
making expectations of governments consistent with one another. By facilitating
agreement in an otherwise anarchic world of politics, regimes provide a framework
of rules, norms, principles and procedures for cooperation.11 The empirical anal-
ysis validates the theory. In the two case studies examined in this book, many of
the Indian Ocean countries reached agreement for an Indian Ocean Global Ocean
Observing System for marine scientific research and a port state control arrangement
to eliminate substandard shipping in the Indian Ocean Region. The international
regimes under which these regional agreements were reached were sponsored pri-
marily by UN agencies that facilitated agreement at the international level in the first
instance. The internationally agreed-upon regimes made expectations of most Indian
Ocean countries consistent with one another, having reached regional agreement to
meet their obligations under the regime.12
In theory, regimes establish a clear legal framework that specifies legitimate and
illegitimate behaviour.13 In both case studies, Indian Ocean countries established
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that recognised need for cooperation and
collaboration and at the minimum established objectives, commitments, procedures,
shared information protocols and capacity-building efforts. The MoUs may not have
9.2 International Regimes and Ocean Governance 267
specified illegitimate behaviour but they do provide a legal framework of sorts to

legitimise behaviour. In the case of the IOGOOS MoU, there is clear intent and
desire to cooperate in promoting the Global Ocean Observing System for marine
scientific research. In the case of the IOMOU on port state control, again there
is clear intent to align regional efforts with international instruments to increase
maritime safety, protect the marine environment and improve the living and working
conditions of ships. In both cases, international regimes facilitated establishment of
a form of legal framework for the Indian Ocean Region in areas where countries
from the region may otherwise not have considered regional cooperation.14 The
strength and weaknesses or shortcomings of the MoUs are discussed in the section
on regime effectiveness in Chapters 6 and 8 Suffice to say an MoU makes a good
beginning, but arrangements that are more formal are needed to secure commitment
from participating governments.
Regimes in theory are also thought to create mutual trust by improving the
quality and quantity of information exchanged between states.15 The empirical
analysis shows that amidst economic and security concerns countries from the
region were able to align expectations and develop a framework of rules, norms,
principles and procedures for cooperation in marine scientific research. It is true,
that not all countries from the region are members of the Indian Ocean Global
Ocean Observing System. At the same time, there are no rules under the MoU
that exclude other Indian Ocean countries from joining nor were there any stated
positions evident that seek exclusion of specific countries. For example, despite
the well-known competitive security rivalry between India and Pakistan, under
the MoU, Pakistan can join the Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System.
Similarly, the Indian Ocean MoU on port state control seeks membership from all
states in the region. As for exchanging information, in both case studies there is
evidence that member states are willing to exchange information.16 The quantity
and quality of information being exchanged is discussed in the section on regime
effectiveness in Chapters 6 and 8. The port state control regime with at least three
MoUs for the region suggests capacity constraints rather than issues of mutual
trust in the exchange of information. After all, port state control data in the public
domain was accessed for the research.
Finally, even though not cost free, regimes in theory reduce transaction costs
associated with the negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of agreements.17 Both
case studies show that the regional agreements were not cost free. The primary fund-
ing to support IOGOOS activities and operations is through annual subscriptions
from members and voluntary contributions. However, as noted by the IOGOOS
secretariat, the annual subscription is a token contribution and membership is not
annulled if the fee is not paid. There was separate communication to suggest that
at least one of the countries initially hesitated to join IOGOOS as the membership
was tagged to a fee that might have proven to be difficult to honour over time.
Similarly, cost of running the secretariat and information centre under the IOMOU
on port state control was to be met from financial contributions of parties to the
memorandum and gifts and subscriptions by donor countries or organisations.18 The
transaction costs are discussed in the section on regime effectiveness in Chapters
6 and 8. Nevertheless, the cost of membership may have discouraged countries
either from joining the regional alliance as in the case of IOGOOS or those that
did join may have stopped reporting information as they were unable to meet their
obligations as in the case of IOMOU for port state control.
9.3 Effectiveness of Maritime Regimes

The purpose of this subsection is not only to examine the legal framework, quantity
and quality of information exchange and transaction costs but also to compare and
contrast the two regional agreements for their effectiveness.
The two case studies suggest varying degrees in the level of concern also evident
from the agenda of the regimes. Under the IOGOOS regime member states commu-
nicated a high level of concern to accurately identify and agree upon the problems.
While under the port state control regime maritime administrations established an
MoU, but there is little evidence to suggest that member states clearly identified the
problems and extent of substandard shipping in the region and how to deal with the
issue in operationalisation of port state control.19
In both marine scientific research and port state control regimes only one set
of actors provided reasonable leadership in promoting regional cooperation. The
involvement of interest-based actors in IOGOOS and knowledge-based actors in
IOMOU for port state control remains a challenge. More importantly, empirical
findings suggest lack of structural leadership by power-based actors or governments
in both case studies.20
In the case of IOGOOS, knowledge-based actors provided intellectual leader-
ship in taking the initiative to promote regional cooperation in marine scientific
research. Throughout IOGOOS history the test for the epistemic group of scien-
tists has been to get governments to commit resources and build capacity in marine
scientific research. As a consequence even interest-based actors have not commit-
ted to research projects whereas user driven oceanography is key to optimising the
research effort.21
In the case of IOMOU for port state control, it is maritime administrations of
governments as power-based actors that signed the memorandum for regional coop-
eration to undertake port state control. However, it is more from the efforts of
interest-based actors and not the commitment of governments as such that has poten-
tially limited substandard shipping mostly to ports in states that are not members of
any port state control regime or to states that lack the capacity to undertake port
state control inspections. Had there been commitment from power-based actors, all
states in the region would be members and states would be committed to meeting
the target inspection rate, establishing a ship targeting factor and reporting on the
number of port state control officers. There would be no hesitancy in promulgating
black–grey–white lists for flag states as is the case under better-established MoUs
and even starting a new black–grey–white list for classification societies.22
9.3 Effectiveness of Maritime Regimes in the Indian Ocean Region 269
In both cases the legal framework in the form of a memorandum of understand-

ing makes a good beginning for regional cooperation in the region. The strength
of the framework lies in the ability of countries to contribute to regional efforts
depending on their individual capacities. Effectively, the MoUs are as binding as
power-based actors want, and because there are no legally enforceable commit-
ments, these power-based actors seemingly have remained indifferent to making
both regimes more effective. This is despite convergence between states from the
region on issues concerning the Global Ocean Observing System in pursuit of
marine scientific research and port state control to eliminate substandard shipping.23
The evidence suggests that the framework for regional cooperation in the Indian
Ocean Region has been established. The very same memoranda can be transformed
into effective mechanisms for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region,
should countries choose to do so. Take the example of India and Australia, where
both countries are known to have greater resources and greater commitment, the
two countries can build greater capacity in the region increasing the effectiveness of
these maritime regimes in the Indian Ocean.
Both case studies in institutionalising the regimes demonstrate a preference for
a secretariat. As a result, annual meetings are reduced to a meeting of officials.
The Indian Ocean port state control secretariat has some role in building regional
administrative capability though with little success compared to the secretariat for
IOGOOS that seems to rely mainly on the individual research institutions capac-
ity from within existing resources made available by governments. As a result, the
regional effort at capacity-building continues to be weak.24 The lack of institution-
alised mechanisms for higher level political engagement and leadership is seen as an
impediment to building regional capacity and improving the effectiveness of these
regimes. Not surprisingly, both case studies show low levels of political, legal and
administrative capacity among states.25
The quantity and quality of information exchange under both memoranda could
be better. This would greatly enhance effectiveness of the regimes. There is clear
evidence of capacity constraints under both memoranda. Apart from capacity con-
straints the IOGOOS data and information management system suggest significant
problems in exchange of information. It is suggested that information gathering
and exchange for marine scientific research in the region has been hindered by the
structural complexity created from attempting to mirror the international structure.26
On the other hand, the IOMOU on port state control suggests a lack of struc-
ture in data and information gathering and dissemination. The majority of countries
did not publish annual reports and the inspection data is not in public domain.27
The data and information gathering under the GCC MOU is in the initial stages of
development.28 Even the tenth IOMOU annual report of 2008 does not fully report
on the inspection efforts of each country for which information on the number of
ship visits is needed to establish the inspection rate. Encouraging, however, though
is that every member state other than Oman provided inspection data in 2008 unlike
previous years, and for the first time, the annual report has a table reporting on the
results of port state control inspections undertaken by individual member states.29
All these aspects taken together bring to the surface the low level of state learn-
ing in the region. Comparing the two regimes does suggest that where there has
been greater state learning, as in the case of marine scientific research, the level of
regional cooperation and capacity to participate at the international level has been
better than for port state control. In the case of marine scientific research, some
critical cooperation between select states in the region with the research capacity
is already taking place and needs to be not only progressed but also advanced to
include other states. As for the regime for port state control, states are left to their
own devices in conduct of activities and commitment of resources. Greater empha-
sis on regional cooperation could promote a better resourced and more structured
approach to port state control and improve effectiveness of the regime in the Indian
Ocean Region.30
Now in its tenth year of operation in the region the evidence on port state control
suggests a poor level of state learning about the nature of substandard shipping in
the region. The research could not identify any open source of information other
than for port state control inspection data that quantifies the extent of substandard
shipping in the region. Moreover, inspection data by itself is not an indicator of
substandard shipping but serves more as an indicator of deficiencies that need to
be rectified. Further research is needed in identifying trade routes and ports in the
region being visited by substandard ships.
This brings the discussion to transaction costs. Theoretically, regimes reduce
transaction costs. For countries in the Indian Ocean Region by doing nothing there
were no costs and now by joining a regional arrangement there were added trans-
action costs to do something. In other words, where previously countries may
have had no need for committing resources, they now had to invest in building
capacity for conduct of marine scientific research and undertaking port state con-
trol inspections.31 In both case studies the evidence suggests that transaction costs
associated with building national capacity has held back greater participation by
countries in the regime.32 It also depends on how transaction costs are viewed. In
the case of marine scientific research, one could argue that for countries that did join
the IOGOOS MoU their transaction costs were reduced by getting an opportunity
to participate in international marine scientific research programmes that otherwise
may not have been feasible. It could be similarly argued for countries that did join
the IOMOU on port state control to have reduced transaction costs by improving
their international image in eliminating substandard shipping as part of the regional
arrangement in the Indian Ocean.
To the extent that the Indian Ocean states share common interests and agree to
cooperate the two maritime regimes have been effective. Indian Ocean states that are
not members of the regimes are so from their own choosing. The effectiveness of
these regimes in the issue areas of marine scientific research and port state control
is a work in progress. The maritime regimes are well established and are here to
stay. Commitment of resources and leadership in promoting regional cooperation
can deliver on improving the effectiveness of these regimes.
9.4 Challenge to Building Good Order at Sea 271
9.4 Challenge to Building Good Order at Sea and Prospects

for Regional Cooperation
The research has highlighted the absence of power-based actors and structural lead-
ership and other behavioural and institutional challenges facing countries in the
region. One challenge is singled out for more discussion and that is the challenge of
political will and leadership. As the research comes to a close recent events in the
Indian Ocean highlights this as the greatest challenge facing Indian Ocean countries.
The first event, the terrorist attack on Mumbai, where the terrorists came from
the sea, finally awakened India into introducing new maritime security measures
along its coastline.33 All states in the Indian Ocean must have the power to govern
the sea where states in the region must cooperate in building good order in the
knowledge that no state, not even India, with one of largest navies in the world,
can by itself build sufficient power to govern at sea. This leads to articulating a
national maritime vision and policy by each state in the region. Again, articulation
of a national policy alone is not sufficient. Political will and leadership to promote
the policy is paramount. Australia, despite a decade-long commendable National
Ocean’s policy,34 has continued to neglect the importance of oceans for national
prosperity and security.35
The second event relates to piracy off the Somali coast where ship crews now
have to fight off pirates attempting to hijack their ship and take the crew hostage for
a ransom.36 The purpose here is not to launch into a detailed discussion on piracy
but to demonstrate the challenge of political will and leadership in the region and
internationally. Two years ago, on 23 March 2007, 15 British sailors from HMS
Cornwall were taken captive by Iranian forces in the tidal waters of the Shat-al-
Arab.37 Among conflicting claims,38 the incident was a stark reminder of what the
future holds, if nations do not soon come together to address issues of jurisdiction
in policing the oceans under the Law of the Sea. At that time, the author, Hasjim
Djalal, argued in a paper for the political will and leadership in developing a com-
mon doctrine for navies under the aegis of the United Nations where navies could
even agree to fly the United Nations Flag in maintaining good order at sea.39 Under
Article 93 of LOSC, the use of the United Nations Flag at sea on ships employed
on the official service of the United Nations is an acceptable norm.40 It is encour-
aging to see some political leadership from the region, specifically on part of the
Australian government, which has announced an inquiry into piracy even though
there is no piracy in Australian waters.41 More leadership is needed however.
The research indicates that in the implementation of different maritime regimes
prospects for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region are good. Here one
point is worth emphasising. The research analysed two of the most important mar-
itime regimes and found that all states were welcome as members of the regimes
unlike the IOR-ARC regional grouping where some states like India had political
considerations on who is in and who is out.42 The advantage of taking a regimes
approach is that each regime is issue-based where states have an interest in the issue,
agree to comply with international norms and are willing to cooperate regionally in
the implementation of the regime. In addition, there is realisation that no state can
afford to go alone in addressing issues of ocean governance.
Besides the two regimes the other regimes that hold immediate prospect
for regional cooperation are the resource-based fisheries regime of the Indian
Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), regional seas programme of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the emerging maritime security regime under
the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code, Suppression of
Unlawful Acts (SUA) convention, Container Security and the Proliferation Security
initiatives. The prospects are there for regional cooperation. Regimes other than
maritime security have been in existence for quite some time, and although in an
embryonic stage, they remain viable regimes for regional cooperation. Even the
issues surrounding maritime security that demand regional cooperation are well
known to Indian Ocean states. The question is can political will and leadership now
deliver on regional cooperation in the use of the sea by Indian Ocean states for the
benefit of the region as a whole.
9.5 Indian Ocean as a Regional Framework

in International Relations
One of the major hypothesis questions whether maritime regimes can improve
prospects for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean, for a new geopolitical region
to emerge within the geostrategic maritime realm? As indicated at the beginning of
the book the emphasis has been on the regional and not the unit level of analysis
to determine prospects for greater regional cooperation. All of the empirical evi-
dence on regime effectiveness points to the practical aspects of both regimes where
the framework for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region has been firmly
established, and using these and other maritime regimes as the start point, the right
political leadership can deliver on a new geopolitical region within the geostrategic
maritime realm.
It can be said that there is definite value in looking at the Indian Ocean as a
region for future analysis of maritime regimes. The research integrated structura-
tion theory with regime theory relied on original data for analysis, which has not
been featured in the current literature and made the case for maritime regimes in
ocean governance. The research provided a methodological framework in making
the case for the Indian Ocean Region and created a structure for future policy. For
example, the case of marine scientific research that clearly demonstrates the need
for strengthening the regime so that other maritime regimes that affect human and
food security in the Indian Ocean Region can be addressed. Or even the case of port
state control where strengthening the regime would vastly enhance maritime safety
and have a strong bearing on improving maritime security in the region, it is no
longer possible for Indian Ocean states to ignore maritime regimes as they impact
all of humankind.43
Notes 273
Notes
1. See note 1, Introduction; note 2, Chapter 3; and note 3, Chapter 3.
2. See discussion, Chapter 3.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. See discussion, Chapters 2 and 3.
7. See Chapters 6 and 8.
8. See discussion importance of ocean governance by all coastal states, Chapter 2.
10. See note 1 ibid.
12. See Chapters 6 and 8 for analysis.
13. See note 23 and discussion on conceptual clarification of regimes in Chapter 4.
19. See sections on signification—level of concern and agenda formation in Chapters 6 and 8.
20. See section on actor behaviour and leadership in Chapters 6 and 8.
21. See section on actor behaviour and leadership in Chapter 6.
22. See section on actor behaviour and leadership in Chapter 8.
23. See section on legitimisation—contractual environment in Chapters 6 and 8.
24. See sections on institutional choice and structure over time in Chapters 6 and 8.
25. See sections on domination—national capacity and state learning Chapters 6 and 8.
26. See sections on signification—communication and level of concern and domination—
national capacity in Chapter 6.
27. See sections on signification—communication and level of concern and domination—
national capacity in Chapter 8.
28. See Riyadh MoU on port state control database—total number of ships inspected: 428;
2007—96 ships; 2008—273 ships; 2009—59 ships, downloaded on 16 April 2009,
http://www.riyadhmou.org/search.asp.
29. IOMOU on PSC annual report 2008.
30. See section on broader consequences across space in Chapters 6 and 8.
31. See section on domination—national capacity in Chapters 6 and 8.
32. See note 251, Chapter 6, on costs of IOGOOS membership and Tables 8.18 and 8.19 in
Chapter 8 that suggests lack of capacity as a reason for non-reporting of port state control
inspection contributions and effort.
33. Rajat Pandit, The Times of India, “Now, Navy gets charge of coastline”, 1 March
2009, viewed on 16 April 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Opinion/Editorial/
Navy-to-head-Indian-maritime-security-Antony/article
show/4204435.cms.
34. Australian Government Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts,
“Australia’s Ocean Policy”, viewed on 16 April 2009, http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/
oceans-policy/index.html.
35. Bateman in interview with ABC Radio Australia, “Australia urged to better manage mar-
itime domain” viewed on 21 March 2009, http:radioaustralia.net.au/connectasia/stories/
200903/s2520598.htm.
36. See Howden, The Independent, “High seas drama as American sailors fight off pirates”,
9 April 2009, viewed on 16 April 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/
high-seas-drama-as-american-sailors-fight-off-pirates-1666138.html; Paphitis, The
Huffington Post, “Somali pirates: crew use water jets to defend oil tanker”, 2 January 2009,
viewed on 16 April 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/02/somali-pirates-crew-
use-w_n_154744.html; The Telegraph, “Chinese crew use molotov cocktails
to fight off Somali pirates”, 20 December 2008, viewed on 16 April 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/3849969/Chinese-ship-uses-Molotov-
cocktails-to-fight-off-Somali-pirates.html.
37. Sky news, “UK marines and sailors seized by Iran”, 23 March 2007, viewed on 16 April
2009, http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Sky-News-Archive/Article/20080641257281.
38. BBC news, “The capture of the UK crew”, 30 March 2007, viewed on 16 April 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/6502805.stm.
39. Gupta and Djalal (2007).
41. Official website of the Australian Labor Party, “Inquiry into maritime piracy”, 23
February 2009, viewed on 16 April 2009, http://www.alp.org.au/media/0209/mstard
230.php.
42. See note 5, Introduction.
43. LOSC preamble says “common heritage of mankind”.
Appendix A
List of Persons Contacted
Interviews/Formal/Informal Discussions in Australia
1. Bateman, Sam, Research Fellow University of Wollongong

2. Burgess, Phil, Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts
3. Curran, Stuart, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
4. Drummond, Barry, Geoscience Australia
5. Emmett, Lindsay, Australian Maritime Safety Authority
6. Exel, Martin, Austral Fisheries
7. Forbes, Andrew, Sea Power Centre
8. Goldrick, James, Commander Border Protection Command
9. Kenchington, Richard, Visiting Professorial Fellow, University of Wollongong
10. Lee, James, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
11. McCaffrie, Jack, Sea Power Centre
12. Smith, Barbara, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
13. Symonds, Phil, Geoscience Australia
14. Tsamenyi, Martin, University of Wollongong
Interviews/Formal/Informal Discussions in Indonesia

1. Anggoro, J. Kusnanto, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
2. Bandoro, Bantarto, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
3. Barani, Husni Mangga, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries
4. Djalal, Hasjim, Senior Advisor to the Indonesian Minister for Marine Affairs
and Fisheries
5. Hendrawan, Indonesian National Shipowners Association
6. Hilaman, Masnellyarti, Deputy Minister for Nature Conervation Enhancement
and Environmental Degradation Control, Ministry of Environment
7. Hutagalung, P., Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries
8. Indraningsih, Wahyu, State Ministry of Environment
9. Kirom, A. Cholik, Director General of Sea Transportation
10. Mangindaan, Robert, Forum for Defense and Maritime Studies
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-5989-8, C Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010
276 Appendix A
11. Mao, Hidayat, Japan International Cooperation Agency

12. Marsetio, Indonesian Navy
13. Prasetyono, Edy, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
14. Purwanto, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries
15. Sitepu, M.J., Maritime Education and Training Center
16. Sitorus, Thomas A., Japan International Cooperation Agency
17. Soerjo, Astrid, Confederation of ASEAN Journalists
18. Soesastro, Hadi, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
19. Sukarno, Agus, National SAR Agency
20. Sukono, S.E., Asosiasi Pendidikan dan pelatihan maritime Indonesia
21. Tambunan, Adolf R., Ministry of Transportation
22. Tardan, Samsidik, Japan international Cooperation Agency
23. Tarigan, Hartanta, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries
24. Wahab, M.S., Germanischer Lloyd
25. Zainuddin, Ardius Ministry for Marine Affairs and Fisheries
Other Interviews/Formal/Informal Discussions
1. Aggarwal, Vinod K., Berkeley Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Study

Center
2. Berlin, Donald, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
3. Biswas, Aparjita, University of Mumbai
4. Bouchard, Christian, Laurentian University, Canada
5. Chaturvedi, Sanjay, Panjab University, India
6. Doyle, Timothy, University of Adelaide
7. Forbes, Vivian Louis, Curtin University, Australia
8. Hettne, Bjorn, University of Gotheborg, Sweden
9. Rao, P. V., Osmania University, India
10. Richardson, John B, Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs,
European Commission
11. Rumley, Dennis, Edith Cowan University, Australia
12. Telo, Mario, University Livre de Bruxelles, Belgium
13. Valencia, Mark, Internationally Known Maritime Policy Analyst
14. Yasin, Mat Taib, Maritime Institute of Malaysia
Appendix B
Coding and Classification of IOGOOS
Annual Reports
Use of Wef QDA Software
• Each annual report was uploaded by the software.

• Qualitative judgement was made for each sentence of the annual reports and
coded against the 20 different codes representing the five different variables (four
codes each) of the regimes.
• Each selected text was extracted by the software for each code.
• Software generated its own number in brackets [ ] for each extraction.
• All the extracts put together provide a sense of the variable to be assessed.
• Qualitative assessment done for each variable based on the emerging picture.
Example
For power based/structured (POBAS)
In IOGOOS I [140225–140437]—report states:
Should the document be simply an MOU or rather an agreement? It was agreed

that an agreement was a more formal text than an MOU and would require
more formal consideration and signature at a governmental level.
In the book:
When 17 national scientific agencies/institutions from the ten participat-
ing countries signed a MoU, they stopped short of reaching an agreement
requiring formal consideration and signature at the government level.
In IOGOOS-III [35094–35204]—report states:
Important to identify government support before committing funding to those
countries’ participation in workshop.
In the book:
Not surprisingly, government support continued to elude the strong scientific
engagement at subsequent meetings.
277
278 Appendix B
Actor Behaviour/Leadership (ACBEL)

IOGOOS I [12740–12926]
The significance of the conference lies in its explicit statement of com-
mitment of the participating countries, agencies and institutions, and of
interested nongovernmental organisations.
IOGOOS I [31242–31289]
Linking science and management more effectively.
IOGOOS I [35282–35417]
In this model, scientific knowledge, technologies and research provide the
means to design and develop GOOS in response to user needs.
IOGOOS I [113480–113593]
Project objectives include the creation of links amongst scientists (coastal
laboratories), coastal managers and communities.
IOGOOS I [142116–142216]
Nineteen persons representing national agencies/institutions signed the
Memorandum of Understanding.
IOGOOS I [155448–155722]
The private sector and individuals with an interest in ocean science, engi-
neering and management have been meeting regularly since November 2000
to develop and implement WAGOOS, which is being constituted as an
incorporated body to afford appropriate protection for members.
IOGOOS I [166994–167257]
The IOGOOS Conference Chairman, K. Radhakrishnan, stressed the fact that
the conference had shown that the countries of the region and those especially
interested in it had demonstrated a willingness and a capability to cooperate
in a large-scale regional action.
IOGOOS I [208106–208261]
We are also grateful to the Government of India, a “nest” for our newest
GOOS, located at the Indian National Center for Ocean Information Services
in Hyderabad.
IOGOOS II [44027–44223]
Countries interested in undertaking the project increased to 11 from 4. These
include Australia, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Kenya, Mauritius, Reunion, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Thailand.
IOGOOS-III [4935–5104]
Further, he recognised the efforts of Indonesia in setting up Indonesian
GOOS (InaGOOS), which is Indonesia’s new mechanism for coordinating
GOOS activities nationally.
Dr. Jan Sopaheluwakan made a presentation on the establishment of the
Indonesian GOOS [InaGOOS]. He stressed the importance of the seas
around Indonesia due to the strong influence of monsoon, Indian Ocean
ipole mode (IODM) and El Nino. The Indonesian through-flow is a complex
Appendix B 279
phenomenon that is being studied through projects such as INSTANT.

Upwelling and sinking processes are being studied in relation to monsoon
and the El Nino event. He stated that Indonesia is using remote sensing
data operationally for the identification of fishing grounds. He also listed the
imperatives for the formation of InaGOOS and provided the list of marine
institutions in Indonesia that are a part of InaGOOS. Dr. Sopaheluwaken reit-
erated that the effective role of InaGOOS will enhance the regional alliances
like IOGOOS and SEAGOOS. During the discussion that followed, Mr.
William Erb stated that InGOOS could be used by the IOGOOS members as
a model for development of national GOOS organisations elsewhere. He sug-
gested that the list of participants in InaGOOS could be provided to IOGOOS
Secretariat so that they could be loaded onto the IOGOOS website.
IOGOOS-III [13292–13955]
He then made a presentation addressing a proposed strategy revision of
IOGOOS. The initial IOGOOS strategy was written in 2000 and was adopted
by IOGOOS in 2002. The tsunami disaster has suggested that a revision to
the strategy might be appropriate to consider new responsibilities that may
be taken up by IOGOOS. The likelihood of storm surge, tropical cyclones,
droughts and flooding in the Indian Ocean region are far greater than that
of tsunamis. He suggested that awareness building and education will be far
more expensive and time consuming than building the warning/observing
system itself and that IOGOOS should be able to help with capacity building.
IOGOOS-III [14786–15452]
IOGOOS will need strengthening if it is to take on additional IOTWS tasks.
Full-time staff for the secretariat is a critical need even without the IOTWS
tasks. The downside considerations for IOGOOS taking on IOTWS are (a)
IOGOOS is operational oceanography whereas IOTWS is a 24 × 7 warning
system and the communities involved are somewhat different, and (b) the
IOGOOS Secretariat has neither the funding nor staff to take on these addi-
tional tasks. The upside considerations include (1) a moderately developed
communication network and an active community, as well as (2) the fact that
the IOGOOS Secretariat is also the heart of Indian TWS and there already is
some capability.
IOGOOS-III [18825–19064]
Dr. Gary Meyers informed that climate and tsunami requirements for tide
gauges have commonalities; however, there is a conflict between the real-
time data reception for tsunami versus the long-term observations that are
required for climate.
IOGOOS-III [50614–50726]
The scientific basis is strong and the engagement of Indian Ocean scientists
in the process is to be commended.
IOGOOS-III [55285–55641]
In his conclusion, Dr. Meyers noted that in this part of the ocean 60% of the
world population is living and that most members are developing countries.
280 Appendix B
Therefore, as I-GOOS Chair the suggestion is that the focus should be on

operational oceanography that is user-driven to mobilise governments, sci-
entists and citizens. This is the challenge for IOGOOS and GOOS as a
whole.
Power-Based/Structured (POBAS)
IOGOOS I [140225–140437]
Should the document be simply an MOU or rather an agreement? It was
noted that an agreement was a more formal text than an MOU and would
require more formal consideration and a signature, at a governmental level.
IOGOOS I [141151–141330]
It was stressed that no country should have more than three member agen-
cies/institutions and that these were committed to cooperate fully in the
overall interest of the Alliance.
IOGOOS I [181534–181914]
At the beginning of the new millennium, the IOC and the Government of
Australia joined together and established an Office in Perth to assist in the
development of GOOS in the Indian Ocean as well as the South Pacific. The
State Government of Western Australia plays a key role in this partnership
and views Western Australia as helping to pin down the eastern boundary of
IOGOOS.
IOGOOS I [183828–184281]
However, it is unlikely that the UN can underwrite the establishment of a
truly global observing system. GOOS will only be successful in the Indian
Ocean and elsewhere if governments and nations understand its importance
and agree to provide the funds and support required to make it work. IOC
will continue to help, but the real costs involved in running an operational
system will have to be met by the region itself.
IOGOOS II [22899–23206]
The Hyderabad Workshop agreed that the strategy for Oceanographic Data
and Information management in the Indian Ocean region should be based
on the following requirement: The need to sensitise and get commitment
from governments (decision makers) to assure sustainability of the IOGOOS
network.
IOGOOS II [42376–42820]
At the completion of the project, the work of monitoring the keystone ecosys-
tems will be taken over by the governments and/or research institutions of
the respective countries. Therefore, the relevant government departments and
institutes must be engaged at an early stage in the project so that they become
aware of the benefits available and the commitment required and will come
to regard monitoring as a routine part of government business.
IOGOOS-III [35094–35204]
Important to identify government support before committing funding to those
countries’ participation in workshop.
Appendix B 281
Interest-Based/Entrepreneurial (INBAE)
OGOOS I [10008–10642]
The Government of Mauritius, through its Mauritius Oceanography Institute,
facilitated this landmark conference, with sponsorship from 11 international
and national agencies and programmes: Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission, World Meteorological Organization, Department of Ocean
Development of India, U.S. Office of Naval Research, U.S. National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. National Science Foundation,
Mauritius Oceanography Institute, Climate Variability and Prediction
Program, Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organization, Land-Ocean Interaction in the Coastal Zone, Météo France.
IOGOOS I [31058–31242]
For these reasons, environmental scientists and managers are advocating a
new, more integrated approach that considers both environmental effects and
the effects of human activities.
IOGOOS I [32906–32967]
Specified by the users as a user-driven, end-to-end system.
IOGOOS I [34845–34980]
To serve the needs of many user groups, including government agencies,
private enterprise, scientists, educators, NGOs and the public.
IOGOOS I [44793–45488]
These may include the SE Asia Center for Atmospheric and Marine
Prediction; the Regional Cooperation in Scientific Information Exchange
and the Oceanographic Data and Information Network of East Africa; fish-
ery bodies such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Western Indian
Ocean Tuna Organization, Regional Commission for Fisheries and South
West Indian Ocean Fishery Commission; Regional seas conventions such as
the Nairobi Convention; Large Marine Ecosystem Programs (LMEs), such
as those planned for the Agulhas Current, Somali Coastal Current, Arabian
Sea and Bay of Bengal; and the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network and
the Coral Reef Degradation in the Regional Indian Ocean programme.
IOGOOS I [102934–103489]
The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, based in Mauritius, was recognised
as a good focal point for industry and a channel for promoting best scien-
tific practice and informed decisions. Capacity building in this area calls
for joint end-to-end workshops (ocean–climate–fisheries) to better identify
needs and to cross-fertilise ideas. Ocean data and products: The prominent
application areas identified by the working group were oil and gas indus-
try (e.g. WAGOOS Timor Sea Project), coastal erosion, coral reef bleaching,
coastal management and vulnerability.
IOGOOS I [105504–105736]
Community-based monitoring (community, schools, hotels, local govern-
ment) will be used as far as possible, with organisation, motivation and
quality control through a central body, and at various levels of technical
sophistication.
282 Appendix B
IOGOOS I [106187–106363]
Product users: Coastal-zone managers; coastal communities; developers and
owners of hotels and housing estates; port and marina authorities and users;
the scientific community.
IOGOOS I [107104–107547]
Project objectives: Monitor the keystone ecosystems by large-scale remote
sensing, by small-scale remote-sensing in specific areas, by community-
based monitoring at specific sites under the supervision of scientists and
disseminate information to governments, to integrated coastal-zone manage-
ment programmes, to communities and fishermen (especially those depen-
dent on the mangrove ecosystem), tourist organisations and to the IOGOOS
network.
IOGOOS I [108640–108995]
The measurement basis will comprise the following: long-term time-series
measurements made by the community on a regular basis (e.g. every 6
months or 1 year) over a long period, along with regular analysis of remote-
sensing data; large-scale, spatially synoptic measurements will be taken at
the same time with the same method(s) in various places over a wide area.
IOGOOS I [112516–112729]
Sustainability community-based monitoring, which has a low- and a high–
cost effectiveness, will be required, with community cooperation via govern-
ment agencies and integrated coastal-zone management programmes.
IOGOOS I [123900–124163]
The workshop also recommended that IOC approach POGO with a view
to obtaining fellowships to enable data managers from the IOGOOS region
to undertake internships, although it was noted that data management was
currently not identified as a priority area by POGO.
IOGOOS I [136882–137548]
POGO is a recently founded NGO. Its membership comprises 50 insti-
tutions and organisations, including three from the Indian Ocean: the
National Institute of Oceanography (Goa, India); Commonwealth Scientific
and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO, Australia) and the University
of Cape Town. POGO promotes observations and improvement of scien-
tific knowledge, interprets scientific and technical results for policy-makers,
enhances public awareness and provides training and technology transfer.
POGO also supports summer courses, fellowships, workshops and the Argo
programme. It is looking for increased participation by Indian Ocean groups
and institutions.
IOGOOS I [137585–138034]
Srinivasa Kumar briefly described a project funded by the Asian Pacific
Network for Global Change Research. In the Indian Ocean region, five
countries—Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka—undertook
a coastal-fluxes project comprising small-scale studies of sediment sources
and movement, and of the impact of fertilisers in the southeast Asia coastal
Appendix B 283
zone. Capacity—building and regional studies on coastal zone fluxes are also
envisaged.
IOGOOS I [138067–138517]
Yuichiro Kumamoto described the Operation Magellan 2003–2004. This is
a Japanese Marine Science and Technology Center (JAMSTEC) round-the-
world expedition starting in Brisbane and ending in Freemantle, Australia, in
which hydrographic and benthic sampling will be carried out in the southern
hemisphere, in all three major oceans. JAMSTEC is seeking scientific par-
ticipation of scientists of the IOGOOS region in the Indian Ocean leg of this
cruise.
IOGOOS I [156276–156712]
The WAGOOS region hosts many important industries, including oil and gas
operations, and fisheries, and is of national strategic importance. The key
WA stakeholders in this region have identified several important drivers for
research and development: a safe and secure operating environment; man-
agement of risk, particularly of risk to the environment and development of
efficient and cost-effective structures and operating methods.
IOGOOS II [39606–39813]
The medium-term goal would be primarily the development of a detailed
project proposal that could be circulated to various national funding agencies
as well as organisations such as IOC, ONR and World Bank.
IOGOOS II [41087–41179]
Relevant information will be provided to environmental managers and
coastal resource users.
IOGOOS II [46991–47398]
An e-group was set up to facilitate discussions, information sharing and
project development. A request for preliminary country information on exist-
ing monitoring, coastal-zone management framework and current knowledge
of coastal processes was circulated to all the participants in the coastal sec-
tion of the first meeting. However, progress has been minimal due to the
limited response to these requests.
IOGOOS II [47656–48263]
Expansion of network: It was decided to develop a network of contact
persons and institutions in the region who are interested in participating
in this project. These contacts would then undertake the task of filling in
the required details of the coastal-zone management framework, state of
knowledge of coastal processes and existing monitoring programmes for the
respective countries. Compilation of this information would be a ticket to fur-
ther participation in developing the project proposal. Some of those attending
the conference volunteered to compile the information to identify contact
persons.
IOGOOS II [50288–50589]
However, continuous, detailed monitoring by the responsible central author-
ity is not feasible due to the costs involved. Therefore, it was decided to
284 Appendix B
undertake a pilot monitoring programme using the resources available at the

local level such as tourist hotels, fishery harbours and coastal communities.
IOGOOS II [63455–64015]
The IOGOOS project on monitoring of keystone coastal ecosystems is
directly addressing issues concerning degradation of seagrass beds, coral
reefs and mangrove forests. It was recognised that a coherent and coordinated
approach can deliver improved management policies and mitigate impacts.
A draft proposal has been prepared based on the recommendations of the
Census of Marine Life (CoML) Workshop held at Goa during December
2003 to ensure community participation in the measurement/monitoring of
variability and change in these important ecosystems.
IOGOOS II [64016–64239]
The IOGOOS prawn project is addressing the risks and opportunities facing
the prawn industry and establishing a network and website, and pooling the
expertise to gather observations and improve understanding of the issues.
IOGOOS II [64240–64530]
IOGOOS is addressing issues of coastal change and developing a network
of people and countries to examine shoreline position changes in a coherent
and systematic way. A pilot project to be undertaken in Sri Lanka will interact
with the broader GOOS community and demonstrate methodologies.
Knowledge-Based/Intellectual (KNBAI)
IOGOOS I [151482–151818]
In his summation, the chairman, stressed the view that the alliance would
collaborate closely with all the concerned IOC regional bodies. He believed
that it would be vital for the alliance to get the support of universities and
other relevant institutions, with a view to building up a new corps of regional
expertise for ocean/climate monitoring.
IOGOOS I [161013–161494]
Organisationally, the work will be pursued through expert groups and coor-
dination committees. To this end, WIOMAP works closely with JCOMM,
which provides the necessary intergovernmental coordination in the man-
agement of marine meteorology and oceanography in an analogous way to
the WMO Commission on Marine Meteorology in the field of operational
meteorology. JCOMM also services the Convention on Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) in respect to sea ice, waves, surges and pollution.
IOGOOS I [190151–190264]
I encourage you all to take part ownership of these meetings and make it your
goal to contribute and be involved.
IOGOOS-III [53753–53884]
Dr. Francois Gerard—France—congratulated Dr. Gary Meyers and indicated
his belief that the design is scientifically sound and comprehensive.
Appendix B 285
Structure Over Time (STROT)

IOGOOS I [37066–38019]
The design must also take into consideration certain important realities:
priorities vary among nations and regions; many of the elements required
to build the observing system are already in place; those elements of the
observing system required to improve marine services and forecast natu-
ral hazards are most developed while those required for ecosystem-based
environmental protection and management of living resources are least devel-
oped; most nations do not have the capacity to contribute to and benefit
from the observing system at this time. In addition, the design of the coastal
module must take into consideration the importance of the regional scale
that links global- and local-scale changes; that is most agreements and con-
ventions that target environmental protection and resources are regional in
scope and regional bodies provide the most effective venue for specifying
user-group requirements for environmental data and information.
IOGOOS I [39181–39409]
This can best be achieved through a global federation of regional systems in
which the global network is established to measure and process a small set
of common variables that are required by most, if not all, regional systems.
IOGOOS I [39410–39734]
The network provides economies of scale and improves the cost effectiveness
of regional observing systems by minimising redundancy and optimising
data and information exchange; establishes reference and sentinel stations;
and establishes international standards and protocols for measurements, data
exchange and management.
IOGOOS I [55788–55915]
The strategy will be based on the following operational satellites currently
providing oceanographic data for the Indian Ocean.
IOGOOS II [27943–28322]
The IOGOOS-II meeting acknowledged the results of the Hyderabad meet-
ing and endorsed its proposed work plan (attached as Annex-1). The meeting
recalled the importance of capacity building as the basis for the achieve-
ments of IOGOOS objectives in terms of data and information management
and recognised the importance of ODINCINDIO as the capacity-building
instrument for IOGOOS.
IOGOOS II [28740–28929]
The meeting strongly welcomed the close collaboration among IOGOOS,
IOCINDIO, IOCINCWIO and IODE on the advancement of data and
information management capacity in the Indian Ocean region.
IOGOOS II [43198–43277]
It is proposed that the project be considered as a joint IOGOOS/CoML
project.
286 Appendix B
Signification/Level of Concern (SIGLOC)

IOGOOS I [31355–31609]
All parties are encouraged to engage in adaptive management, a process that
depends on our ability to routinely and rapidly detect changes in the envi-
ronment and living marine resources and to provide timely predictions of
changes in or the occurrence of the phenomena of interest.
IOGOOS I [31738–32265]
Effective management and sustainable use also depend on efficient/timely
coupling of the processes by which new scientific knowledge is gained and
the fruits of this knowledge are used for the public good. Today, there is an
unacceptable disconnect between these processes. A new approach is needed
that enables adaptive management through routine, continuous and rapid
provision of data and information over the broad spectrum of time space
scales required to link ecosystem scale changes to basin—and global—scale
forcings.
IOGOOS I [41280–41509]
The data-management and communications subsystem is the “life-blood”
of the observing system, and the development of an integrated data man-
agement and communications subsystem is arguably the highest priority for
implementation.
IOGOOS I [66537–66701]
However, the other elements of the sustained integrated ocean observing sys-
tem for climate that have been identified as needed were not discussed, for
lack of time.
IOGOOS I [162274–163785]
William Erb, speaking on behalf of Gary Meyers (departed), said that the
Ocean Dynamics and Climate Workshop had moved GOOS activity in this
field greatly forward and would ensure a sound basis for future growth.
Mohammed Wafar, speaking on behalf of Tom Malone (departed), stressed
the fact that the Coastal Ocean Observing Workshop had revealed the eager-
ness of the participants to cross barriers as a direct result of their learning
that many of the coastal problems in the region are shared; the workshop
had therefore provided a great opportunity to develop regional cooperation
in this field. Mika Odido, speaking on behalf of Peter Pissierssens (departed),
said that the Data Management Workshop had recognised the challenges: the
diversity and huge volume of the data, which called for rapid evolution in the
application of the latest information technology. To do this, there was a need
to survey present regional capabilities and incorporate them into a complete
network within a regional data-management system. Merv Lynch, speak-
ing for the Satellite Applications Workshop, noted that the role of remote
sensing had been embraced more vigorously than he had expected. The
principal needs now were to disseminate more widely the available remote-
sensing information, facilitate access to it and its exploitation. An inventory
of regional capabilities for IOGOOS purposes is needed, with substantial
Appendix B 287
capacity-building to make this effective and to produce high-quality data

products and interpretation.
IOGOOS I [196602–197822]
As coastal states, we are largely influenced by the sea and we are now
aware of the fragility of our living environment and its sensitivity to cli-
matic change, natural disasters and human impacts. Climatic change and
associated sea-level rise and tropical diseases can seriously undermine our
economy and upset the economic, social and political stability. The rapid
global warming caused by human-induced changes in the atmosphere is pro-
jected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to have
dramatic effects on the ocean, threatening valuable coastal ecosystems and
the economic sectors that depend upon them. The IPCC predicts that storms
and other extreme weather events will increase in frequency and intensity,
increasing natural disturbances to coastal ecosystems and perhaps reducing
their ability to recover. There is particular concern about the possible effects
of global warming on coral reefs. During the intense El Niño of 1997–1998,
extensive coral bleaching occurred on coral reefs worldwide. While some
reefs quickly recovered, others, particularly in the Indian Ocean, south-east
Asia and the far western Pacific, suffered significant mortality, in some cases
more than 90%.
IOGOOS II [22549–22710]
He recalled that the workshop acknowledged that the effective management
of data is central to the successful implementation of GOOS in the Indian
Ocean region.
IOGOOS II [23206–23591]
This will require a marketing strategy; there is a need to give due atten-
tion to local/national problems and produce services to solve these; local
problems often have regional/global sources. To solve local/national prob-
lems data might be required from other countries in the IOGOOS region
This is one of the important justifications for the regional approach of
IOGOOS.
IOGOOS II [34925–35335]
This was done for several reasons including the value of the resource, the ease
of human access to the stocks by virtue of the use of shallow inshore waters
and estuaries by the juvenile stages, the general existence of catch data as
a measure of population fluctuations and the perception of the significance
of the physico-chemical components of the environment in the population
dynamics of these species.
IOGOOS II [35747–35901]
The first step in the development of the programme involved is the forma-
tion of a network of prawn researchers in the Indian Ocean rim and island
countries.
IOGOOS II [36018–36314]
An exploratory workshop funded by the IOC was held in Perth, Australia
in November 2003. This was attended by representatives from Australia,
288 Appendix B
Bangladesh, India, Kenya and South Africa, all of whom gave presenta-
tions on the prawn fisheries and aquaculture situations in their particular
countries.
IOGOOS II [36969–37126]
Additional contacts in Tanzania were established following the Perth work-
shop and contacts in Sri Lanka and Iran during this workshop in Colombo,
Sri Lanka.
IOGOOS II [37366–38068]
It was further agreed that a website be created that would incorporate the
following information: Map of region including institutions and people with
interests, links and expertise relating to penaeid prawns; species involved;
types of fisheries—techniques, fleets; summary fact sheet for each area;
institutional arrangements; bibliography information and literature pertain-
ing to penaeids on a region-specific basis Oceanic events influencing prawn
resources (e.g. currents, water temperature); upcoming events, recent pub-
lications. This was discussed at the IOGOOS II meeting in Colombo, Sri
Lanka in April 2004 and a commitment was made that the network and
website be completed by the end of 2004.
IOGOOS II [38967–39557]
In summary, the short-term goals for the various implementation modules
of the project (to be completed by the end of 2004) are as follows: Sl.
No 8.5.1 8.5.2 action generate the report of the Perth Workshop; circula-
tion of a letter to the Indian Ocean rim countries and islands with prawn
resources and establishment of a network of participants; development of the
website. A capacity-building workshop in remote sensing techniques with
a directed focus for prawn fisheries to be arranged in collaboration with
Dr. Merv Lynch. Time line end of May–December 2004. Action Coordinator
A T. Forbes.
IOGOOS II [44325–44842]
The way forward: During the workshop, the following schedule of events
was agreed upon for 2004/2005: Sl. No Action Time line August–December
2004. Action Coordinator Greg Wagner. Greg Wagner 8.6.1 complete draft
proposal and country implementation plans 8.6.2. Hold regional workshop
(to be attended by two or more experts from each country) to agree on
methodologies, sites, equipment required, budget and implementation strate-
gies and finalise the proposal 8.6.3. Produce final proposal and send it to
funding agencies.
IOGOOS II [46991–47398]
An e-group was set up to facilitate discussions, information sharing and
project development. A request for preliminary country information on exist-
ing monitoring, coastal-zone management framework and current knowledge
of coastal processes was circulated to all the participants in the coastal sec-
tion of the first meeting. However, progress has been minimal due to the
limited response to these requests.
Appendix B 289
IOGOOS II [47656–48263]
Expansion of network: It was decided to develop a network of contact
persons and institutions in the region who are interested in participating
in this project. These contacts would then undertake the task of filling in
the required details of the coastal-zone management framework, state of
knowledge of coastal processes and existing monitoring programmes for the
respective countries. Compilation of this information would be a ticket to fur-
ther participation in developing the project proposal. Some of those attending
the conference volunteered to compile the information to identify contact
persons.
IOGOOS II [51366–51915]
Action plan for next year: The following actions and deadlines were decided
upon for the 12 months following the meeting. Sl. No 8.7.1 Action. Develop
a network of contacts, institutions and countries interested in participat-
ing in the project. Obtain information on the coastal-zone management
framework, state of knowledge of coastal processes and existing monitoring
programmes for these countries. Interact with the COOP panel to develop
suitable and feasible methodologies for monitoring. Time line August 2004.
Action Coordinator Nalin Wikramanayake.
IOGOOS-III [30805–30842]
“What IOGOOS can contribute to IOTWS”.
IOGOOS-III [31123–32504]
The following are the major recommendations:
The sea-level observing system: IOGOOS person should be nominated to
join the ad hoc sea level working group established by ICG-1 under the lead-
ership of Dr. B. Kilonsky. The deep-sea mooring network: The IOGOOS to
identify an individual familiar with the rationale and plan for the IOP network
to join the IOTWS mooring discussion group. Ocean modelling: IOGOOS
to ensure that several people from IOGOOS agencies, with knowledge of
IOGOOS and its work beyond tsunamis, participate in the Hyderabad Ocean
modelling Workshop (12–13 December 2005). Vulnerability and risk assess-
ment: IOGOOS could commit to provide a better characterisation of other
hazards such as sea level changes arising from climate and climate change;
intra-seasonal/tropical cyclone events including both direct (wind, flooding)
and indirect (storm surge) effects; coral bleaching and the vulnerability of the
ocean environment (reefs, ecosystems, etc.). The multi-hazard framework:
IOGOOS should participate in the planned workshop (first quarter of 2006),
with the areas touched on in six to be the main topics of the paper commu-
nication to ICG: This discussion should form the basis of a communication
from IOGOOS to the ICG Chair and Officers, emphasising the need to keep
communication lines open and to ensure the ICG Secretariat and IOGOOS
Office work closely together.
290 Appendix B
IOGOOS-III [34271–35312]
The Coastal Erosion Pilot Project is consistent with the Marine Impacts
on Lowland Agriculture and Coastal Resources project of the COOP
Implementation Strategy for the Coastal Module of GOOS. In order to
progress the pilot project a number of important steps were identified as
follows: (1) Gauge interest in this project at WIOMSA Meeting beginning
September 2005. (2) Poster/written information provided to WIOMSA. Dr.
Wikramanayake to develop flyer/poster to be sent from IOGOOS and pro-
vided to Dr. Bhikajee to deliver. (3) Workshop proposed, follow up to UNEP
Workshop, these may be regional depending on level of interest by March
2006. (4) Workshop(s) would require funding (IOGOOS/IOC/UNEP). (5)
Seek support from IOGOOS to promote projects for funding by member
countries (nominate relevant agency, funding source). Important to identify
government support before committing funding to those countries’ participa-
tion in workshop). (6) Seek to integrate post-tsunami monitoring of shoreline
recovery into the proposal development process.
IOGOOS-III [35655–36591]
In order for the Coastal Pilot Project to progress the following steps were
identified, leading up to a project planning and capacity-building workshop.
(1) Hold preliminary discussions at WIOMSA Symposium early September
2005. (2) Hold project planning workshop on February 16–20, University
of Dar es Salaam (re-evaluate venue). The overall objective of this work-
shop will be to finalise the project proposal for submission to donors and
discuss details of how to implement the project. (3) Country Implementation
Plans (Lead Institutions/individuals responsible, institutions, implementing,
and collaborating). (4) Identify funding sources for the project (CoML, IOC,
POGO). (5) Establish links to other projects. (6) Seek support from IOGOOS
to promote projects for funding by member countries (they need to nominate
relevant agency, funding source). It is important to do this before committing
funding to those that countries’ participation in workshop.
IOGOOS-III [37209–38303]
The following tasks have been identified as necessary to pursue this initia-
tive: (1) Affirm the commitment of individuals in the Indian Ocean region to
a cooperative regional approach in the form of an IOGOOS Coastal Project.
Dr. Keesing to contact interested individuals/organisations in each country
(these already identified for the countries identified above and invite addi-
tional contacts to be put forward by other countries) by September 2005. (2)
Determine the interest/relevance/links to COOP Implementation Strategy for
the Coastal Module of GOOS.
Dr. Keesing to discuss with the IOGOOS Secretariat and IOC Perth Office
the best way to do this. (3) If there is sufficient agreement and commitment
among individuals in the Indian Ocean, then a proposal will be developed
to hold a workshop in 2006 to bring together all existing observations and
make firm plans to finalise the development of and plan implementation of
the project plan. Support and sponsorship for the workshop would need to
Appendix B 291
be sought from a variety of sources. A report on activities would be made at

IOGOOS IV.
IOGOOS-III [38527–38768]
Timor Sea Deep Ocean to Continental Shelf Model Demonstration Proposal:
This project proposed by Dr. Ray Steedman aims to examine the feasibility
of demonstrating the coupling of the deep ocean operational model Bluelink
with a shelf model.
IOGOOS-IV [25091–26809]
Issues of project implementation were discussed during a breakout session at
the Fourth WIOMSA Scientific Symposium held at Grand Baie, Mauritius,
29 August–29 September 2005.
There was extensive e-mail correspondence with all interested participants
from more than ten countries in order to develop contacts with the appro-
priate institutions in each country and to get input into the proposal. This
culminated in holding a Pre-Project Planning Workshop in Phuket, Thailand,
February 17–19 2006, which was attended by two to four people from each
of eight countries that are experts in coral reefs, mangrove forests, seagrass
bed or remote sensing and many of whom were from government institu-
tions. From this workshop, we received the following inputs: standardisation
of methodologies for data collection, work plan and timeframe; and overall
project implementation and country implementation plans, including desig-
nation of lead-implementing institutions and individuals, study sites, budget
and training needs.
Immediately following this workshop, the project was presented at the
conference on Post-Disaster Assessment and Monitoring of Changes in the
Coastal, Ocean and Human Systems in the Indian Ocean and Asian Waters
also held in Phuket, Thailand, February 20–23 2006. Since the Pre-Project
Planning Workshop a lot of the input has been incorporated into the over-
all proposal, although more work is needed to fully capture those extensive
inputs. Through these meetings as well as workshops held in previous years,
valuable input has been received from a large number of people from many
countries and many organisations having a wide range of expertise who, in
addition, have shown their support for the project.
Legitimisation/Contractual Environment (LEGCOE)
IOGOOS I [9847–9874]
Memorandum of Understanding
IOGOOS I [30785–31057]
A compelling case for a more holistic, unified approach to resource manage-
ment and environmental protection, especially in coastal ecosystems where
habitat alterations, water pollution and problems associated with harmful
algal blooms and invasive species are most severe.
292 Appendix B
IOGOOS I [52124–52275]
Within individual countries, different agencies may have different objectives,
and priorities and mechanisms that would allow cooperation are lacking.
IOGOOS I [140225–140438]
Should the document be simply an MOU or rather an agreement? It was
agreed that an agreement was a more formal text than an MOU and would
require more formal consideration and signature at a governmental level.
IOGOOS II [39606–39813]
The medium-term goal would be primarily the development of a detailed
project proposal that could be circulated to various national funding agencies
as well as organisations such as IOC, ONR and World Bank.
IOGOOS II [63171–63454]
IOGOOS is working within the framework of the GOOS Coastal Panel and
taking responsibility in collaboration with that panel in the implementation
of initiatives within the region, including contributions to the measurement
of key common variables and testing of common methodologies.
Domination/Capacity of Governments (DOMCOG)
IOGOOS I [9348–9388]
Many countries in the region have decided to mobilise their resources.
IOGOOS I [51791–51965]
Many of the countries of the region have limited resources and the extra-
funds required to study and monitor their coastal seas and the adjacent oceans
are a lower priority.
IOGOOS I [56338–56695]
The strategy incorporates relevant capacity-building involving the following:
education and training; the building of appropriate institutional support struc-
tures; the creation of networks; development of infrastructural elements (e.g.
platforms, sensors, data and modelling centres); and provision of access to
communication networks for data telemetry and dissemination.
IOGOOS I [57053–57115]
Development and maintenance of a minimum scientific capability.
IOGOOS I [57151–57238]
Raising understanding of the value of in situ and space-based observations
of the ocean.
IOGOOS I [57435–57556]
Collection of ocean data necessary for the calibration, validation and
enhancement of assimilative and predictive models.
IOGOOS I [57557–57874]
Increasing the ability of countries to contribute to and benefit from global
observing systems, by long-term investment in facilities for receiving,
processing and interpreting data from ocean and space-based sources,
accompanied by training in the use of such facilities and in the provision
of services and products.
Appendix B 293
IOGOOS I [71101–71368]
Initiate planning to establish a network of coastal laboratories for Internet-
based data and information exchange relevant to important environmental
and ecological variability and change (sea level, river and stream flows,
habitat modification, biodiversity and so on).
IOGOOS I [89289–89613]
Active support of the IOGOOS Regional Alliance, the IOC Perth Regional
Programme Office, the IOC GOOS Project Office in Paris, the GOOS Coastal
Ocean Observations Panel (COOP) and the Ocean Observations Panel for
Climate (OOPC) will be required to turn the ideas and current enthusiasm of
the participants into real actions.
IOGOOS I [91009–91205]
An array of about 450 floats is required to meet the Argo programme goal
(describe ocean temperature and salinity variability down to 40◦ S, roughly
the southern boundary of the Indian Ocean proper).
IOGOOS I [96652–96896]
The working group noted that substantial ship time will be required to deploy
and maintain mooring arrays in the Indian Ocean, making the shared use of
available ships very important. Suitable ships may be available, if funding
can be supplied.
IOGOOS I [97819–97879]
The working group endorsed a new SOOP XBT sampling strategy.
IOGOOS I [98189–98277]
India, supported by Australia, will take the lead in establishing the new XBT
sections.
IOGOOS I [99057–99596]
The plan to provide the sustained observations required to meet the rel-
evant objectives identified by CLIVAR, GOOS and GCOS include the
following: surface—climate-quality basin-wide SST, surface-wind and sea-
surface-height fields and surface reference sites; upper ocean—seasonal and
longer-time –scale, temperature and salinity fields and certain boundary-
current-flow information; water column—decadal-time scale basin changes
in the carbon inventory and carbon distribution, nutrients and tracers and
flows over certain sills and off certain shelves.
IOGOOS I [106363–106458]
Capacity-building: satellite-data assimilation; modelling of coastal pro-
cesses; GIS applications.
IOGOOS I [109431–109860]
Capacity-building: training of community members involved in coastal
ecosystem monitoring in the relevant techniques; strengthening the capac-
ity of the concerned regional, national and local government agencies
through acquisition of equipment and staff training in monitoring techniques,
data-base management, data analysis and interpretation. Environmental
NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) may also assist in
this.
294 Appendix B
IOGOOS I [130980–131354]
Present capabilities cover: coastal-zone and oceanic applications up to the
regional level, and hazard assessment—storm surges, oil spills, flooding,
habitat mapping. Iran’s satellite remote sensing capabilities are limited; it
currently receives data from NOAA. In the region, such capabilities are
limited to Oman, and there are satellite-receiving facilities in Kuwait.
IOGOOS I [131574–131936]
There is a low level of expertise; fisheries still do not make use of satellite
remote sensing. Hence, there is a need for training courses, to establish a
national oceanographic data centre and a regional oceanographic data centre
for the Persian Gulf. It is also desirable to increase intra-regional cooperation,
possibly through a joint regional pilot project.
IOGOOS I [132087–132645]
S. Rughooputh presented a paper on “Mauritius Marine and Coastal-Zone
Information System”. The main purpose of the system is to provide a large
and organised body of information, mostly in the form of maps, as a geo-
graphical information system, for planners, scientists, and decision-makers.
The information base comprises about 30,000 maps organised in some 12
modules, covering all aspects of the geography of the Island of Mauritius.
Some of these maps concern the coastal zone and territorial waters. One
likely to be most useful is a shore classification.
IOGOOS I [160887–161013]
The work of WIOMAP will be carried out technically using ships, moored
and drifting buoys, Argo floats and sea-level gauges.
IOGOOS I [174087–174279]
At the same time, it is critical that sufficient attention is also given to the
specific priorities and problems of the developing countries, given their weak
scientific and technological base.
IOGOOS I [197823–198305]
As developing nations, we have not been able hitherto to devote sufficient
resources to understand the oceanic processes in this part of the world where
almost one-third of the world population live. We do not have a permanent,
systematic, routine and long-term ocean-observation system for assessing the
state of the marine and coastal environment and to forecast climate variability
and change. Indeed, we have been passive spectators to the changes in our
oceans and coastal seas.
IOGOOS I [199120–199632]
The major limitation in making the Indian Ocean understood is the finan-
cial constraints of the countries of the region. Few of our countries have the
economic or logistical capacity to undertake oceanographic research on their
own. However, by working in partnership and sharing resources available
in the countries, such work is possible. Opening the research work to other
institutions interested in the region and with the assistance of donor agencies
it is possible to develop the oceanography in our region.
Appendix B 295
IOGOOS I [200901–201212]
However, at the national level, Mauritius has taken concrete steps to protect
the coastal zone; namely the complete phasing out of lagoonal sand mining;
the updating of the National Physical Development Plan; and the develop-
ment of an ICZM plan studies on wetlands, coastal erosion, islets, sensitive
areas, and so on.
IOGOOS II [3708–4244]
Dr. Lalith Weeratunga, Secretary to the Honourable Prime Minister of the
Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, underscored
the significant role of IOGOOS for ensuring synergy and regional coop-
eration for oceanographic studies and ocean observations under globally
accepted standards, as many countries in the region, especially the island
nations, have only limited scientific and engineering capability to under-
take oceanographic research and tackle problems related to resources and
environment in the ocean.
IOGOOS II [17554–17947]
IOP members have undertaken drafting of an implementation plan based on
an outline plan prepared by the chair, with initial input due in May, and com-
pletion of the first draft in early 2005. A key aspect of preparing this plan
is to develop a high degree of consensus among all the agencies that can
contribute. This is essential to achieve a high degree of coordination in the
implementation.
IOGOOS II [18984–19288]
Indian Meteorological Department is preparing a proposal to modernise the
Indian coastal tide gauge network using instrumentation developed at NIOT.
The new instrumentation will allow the collection of real time sea level
data, which will assist IMD’s efforts to predict storm surge and coastal
flooding.
IOGOOS II [23596–23891]
There is a need to establish an equitable balance between providing
and requesting of data and services but the different capacity levels
between countries (more developed countries may need to provide more
than they can request from developing countries) must be taken into
consideration.
IOGOOS II [24051–24309]
With respect to capacity building, the Hyderabad Workshop concluded that
there are big differences in data and information management capacity
between IOGOOS members. Therefore, a detailed assessment of available
capacity and requirements is to be undertaken.
IOGOOS II [24778–25014]
However, funding for the ODINCINDIO capacity-building initiatives needs
to be identified, since O D I N C I N D I O itself is in the initial plan-
ning stages. Accordingly, ODINCINDIO should be the capacity building
instrument for IOGOOS.
296 Appendix B
IOGOOS II [39814–40068]
The long-term goals would be the implementation of this project with the
collection of appropriate parameters in various countries around the Indian
Ocean rim to improve management and predictions of change with regard to
prawn fisheries in the region.
IOGOOS II [44848–45202]
Once funding is obtained, launch the project with a capacity building work-
shop, with separate sessions on remote sensing, coral reefs, mangrove forests,
seagrass beds and rocky shores for standardisation of techniques and training
of trainers; as well as plenary sessions so that these groups can interact and
make project implementation more coherent.
IOGOOS II [48276–48614]
It was decided that the methodology to be adopted to monitor shoreline
changes should conform to the guidelines and specifications being developed
by the COOP panel. However, it was recognised that the requirements of the
methodology in terms of cost, equipment and training should be within the
capabilities of the countries concerned.
IOGOOS II [50288–50589]
However, continuous, detailed monitoring by the responsible central author-
ity is not feasible due to the costs involved. Therefore, it was decided to
undertake a pilot-monitoring programme using the resources available at the
local level such as tourist hotels, fishery harbours and coastal communities.
He announced with pleasure, the launch of the Indonesian node of GOOS,
InaGOOS and then signed the InaGOOS declaration.
IOGOOS-III [22379–22983]
Dr. Radhakrishnan briefly described the importance of remote sensing and
indicated that the United States, Europe and India have major remote sensing
programmes that cover the Indian Ocean. He gave an example of fisheries as
a case where remote sensing data is being used for an operational purpose.
Remote sensing data could also be used to provide inputs for coastal land use,
shoreline changes and so on. He suggested that the IOGOOS website should
have a page on remote sensing data availability, tools and so on. He gave
an overview of the training programme offered by CSSTE-AP and Indian
Institute of Remote Sensing.
IOGOOS-III [39419–39575]
Short duration training programmes proposed are as follows: At least two
or three short-duration training programmes are proposed to be conducted
during 2006.
IOGOOS-III [40006–40095]
One long duration training programme: Proposed to be held at CSSTE: Asia-
Pacific, Dehradun.
IOGOOS-III [40102–40576]
IOGOOS website to host ocean remote sensing tutor. Content generation
and case studies to be done by volunteers and IOGOOS Secretariat. The
site could provide links to sources of Remote Sensing data (IOCCG, CEOS,
Appendix B 297
PODAAC, NDC). 11.3.4 Expert Faculty sponsored to Country/Institution:

For on the-job training, it was suggested that a programme be worked out
where the trainer visits the trainees. Sponsorship could be requested from
the Nippon Foundation/POGO.
IOGOOS-III [51135–51955]
For the Bureau of Meteorology, we can confirm our intent to at least sus-
tain and, as resources permit, enhance our ocean observing activity in the
region. The Indian Ocean region remains a top priority. This includes a sur-
face drifter programme through the DBCP; surface met observations through
VOS; upper ocean measurements through XBTs/SOOP; upper ocean mea-
surements from Argo profilers; SST observations; sea-level measurements
(tsunami, climate) through the NTC and various products that will com-
plement the observing system, including surface wind analyses and TC
predictions. With CSIRO, the RAN and AIMS and others, we continue
to advocate a substantial enhancement of the observing system. The so-
called Australian Integrated Ocean Observing System is being developed as
a high-level initiative within Australia.
IOGOOS-III [53753–54847]
Dr. Francois Gerard, France, congratulated Dr. Gary Meyers and indicated
that he believed the design is scientifically sound and comprehensive. He
listed the activities that France conducts in the Indian Ocean such as the
Regional Specialized Centre for Cyclones at La Réunion and the newly estab-
lished Tsunami warning centre. France also has research vessels operating in
the Indian Ocean, able to host people from the region on their research ship.
The RV “Marion Dufresne” is currently operating west of Sumatra for a post
tsunami cruise, and Indian Ocean will be part of the programme of the French
research fleet in 2006. France has agreed to contribute to the IOTWS and has
developed plans to contribute to tidal observation networks in the Western
Indian Ocean and to upgrade the warning dissemination capabilities in the
region. France is willing to continue to contribute to the IBPIO action group
for surface drifters, to the Argo Programme and to XBT lines. France also
has the capability to contribute to ocean monitoring and forecasting thru the
MERCATOR project, which will be presented later.
IOGOOS-III [55669–56223]
Dr. Radhakrishnan made a presentation on the Indian plan for observing sys-
tems in the Indian Ocean, elaborating on ocean observation, information and
advisory services. He also mentioned the satellites planned for launch for
coastal and ocean studies. Dr. Mahesh Zingde of NIO commented on the
in situ observations being implemented by NIO viz. XBT, Drifting buoys
and current meter moorings. Dr. S. Kathiroli, Director, NIO, presented on
the Indian programme on moored data buoys, tide gauges, Argo floats and
research vessels.
IOGOOS-III [56731–56919]
Indonesia is participating and also contributing its research vessels and
scientists for programmes like INSTANT, CoML, as well as several marine
and coastal resources management projects.
298 Appendix B
IOGOOS-III [58439–58755]
Considering the importance of ocean on climate, Mauritius is committed
to contributing to the moorings programme in the Indian Ocean. Two tide
gauges are operational and it is also willing to deploy Argo floats. Mauritius
has expertise and would be willing to collaborate with the IOP and IOGOOS
initiatives.
IOGOOS-III [59214–59481]
Sri Lanka is interested in activities related to upwelling and current systems.
It is operating a tide gauge and are ready to share its data. Sri Lanka wel-
comes deployments of Argo floats in its EEZ. Its vessel can be used to deploy
instruments in the region.
IOGOOS-III [60269–60696]
The United States is ready to support capacity-building activities. IOGOOS
could identify the areas requiring capacity building. Data from satellites also
need to be used. IOGOOS needs to articulate its operational and scientific
needs for satellites so that satellite systems can be sustained. He suggested
IOP to consider adding a statement about the potential role of the Indian
Ocean in the global climate context (teleconnections).
IOGOOS-IV [26813–28389]
Update on Capacity Building Initiatives for Ocean Data and Information
Management by Dr. Zaker. Dr. N. H. Zaker, Chairman of IOCINDIO and
Coordinator of ODINCINDIO, presented a detailed report on the history,
achievements and advances of ODINCINDIO project. ODINCINDIO project
was first initiated at IOGOOS I meeting in 2002 and the meeting recom-
mended the development of an ODIN project for IOCINDIO, complementing
ODINAFRICA. The proposal for the establishment of ODINCIDNIO was
proposed to IODE17 in 2003 by the Chairman of IOCINDIO. It was sup-
ported by IOCINDIO Member States, IOGOOS, ROPME and was discussed
in IOGOOS Workshop on data and information management in Hyderabad
in 2003. Later, it was recognised as the capacity-building tool of IOGOOS
on MDM and MIM in IOGOOS meeting II, 2004. It was also discussed at
the ODINCINDIO planning meeting in Tehran in 2004 and was approved by
IODE 18 and IOC assembly in 2005. ODINCINDIO has become operational
since 2005 and since then several workshops and training courses under this
project has been conducted in IODE office, including ODINCINDIO Marine
Data Management Training Course, October 2005; ODINCINDIO Marine
Information Management Training Course, February 2006; ODINCINDIO
Data Management Training Course, May 2006. Dr. Zaker also briefed
the meeting on the strong support of IOCINDIO VI meeting, 2005, of
ODINCINDIO as the joint activity of IOCINDIO, IODE and IOGOOS. The
meeting welcomed the successful achievements of ODINCINDIO and highly
supported the close collaboration of IOGOOS, IOCINDIO and IODE on this
project.
IOGOOS-IV [30128–30783]
From ocean reanalysis/prediction to coastal applications: Goal—train
IOGOOS members/associates how to use downscaling models and tools.
Appendix B 299
The practice and application of downscaling requires research to make the

model as correct as possible. Actions: IOP chair writes expression of inter-
est to Ehrlich Desa (IOC in charge of capacity building). IOGOOS and
IOP chairs find someone in the modelling community to take charge of
the project (e.g. write proposal). Submit proposal to IOC before March
2007 for a training session in late 2007 or 2008. Resources: Full cash-
funding from IOC required and possibly in kind funding from modelling
groups.
IOGOOS-IV [31180–31593]
IOGOOS members want to participate in global research programmes but
national funding is lacking because it is always directed to local coastal
problems. Programmes like POGO provide resources for visits, but not
research projects per se. Funding for research may be available from
APN for the south-east Asia region and from EU for western Indian
Ocean. IOGOOS needs to develop a strategy to access these funding
resources.
IOGOOS-IV [38034–39072]
The following capacity-building requirements were identified by the work-
ing group. Basic training courses advanced training course on marine
data management: 2007. Advanced training course on marine information
management: 2007. Training course on marine biodiversity data manage-
ment: 2008. Data management and related capacity building for specific
IOGOOS projects workshop on marine RS/GIS data management in relation
to IOGOOS projects: 2007. Workshop on DM and modelling in relation to
IOGOOS projects: 2007. Workshop on sea-level data management in rela-
tion to IOGOOS projects: 2008. Expert exchange and visiting scientists
in relation to IOGOOS projects: 2007–2008. The meeting noted that the
above capacity-building initiatives map well with the training requirements
of IOGOOS’ Remote Sensing Working Group, Ocean and Climate Working
Group, as well as the Coastal Working Group. Hence, it was suggested that
all these initiatives be well coordinated. Funding for this training is to be
drawn from IOGOOS and ODINCINDIO initiatives.
Broader Consequences Across Space (BREAS)

IOGOOS I [9547–9703]
Nineteen organisations of ten Indian Ocean countries signed a Memorandum
of Understanding to create and actively participate in a Regional Alliance for
IOGOOS.
IOGOOS I [9842–10006]
This Memorandum of Understanding is one of the strongest instruments of
cooperation and collaboration in the context of the oceanographic develop-
ment of the region.
300 Appendix B
IOGOOS I [10975–11444]
IOGOOS is intended to elevate the Indian Ocean from one of the least studied
to one of the most studied of the world’s major oceans, with a real emphasis
on the link between societal and scientific issues. The 1.5 billion people of the
Indian Ocean rim can now look forward to an increased ability to make use of
the ocean observations and information produced by GOOS to improve the
management of their marine environment and to use the ocean’s resources
sustainably.
IOGOOS I [46479–46723]
The NOAA–NASA–Navy Indian Ocean Meteorological Imager (IOMI) will
be launched (as GIFTS) in early 2006, spend a year over the United States,
then move (as IOMI) into geosynchronous orbit over the Indian Ocean region
over 75◦ E longitude in 2007.
IOGOOS I [46831–47044]
The Imager will provide enhanced atmospheric-structure information to
national weather services, ensure improved performance of synoptic weather
models and should improve forecasts of typhoon and monsoon intensity
changes.
IOGOOS I [48881–49193]
During its planned 7-year lifespan, IOMI will thus be providing more
detailed environmental information for the Indian Ocean region than will be
available over the United States. How the IOGOOS community pioneers the
applications of this free information will be of great interest to the world’s
environmental scientists.
IOGOOS I [50062–50264]
Since oceanic processes in one part of the globe remotely influence changes
in weather in other parts, there is a need to observe ocean parameters in a
coordinated way through international cooperation.
IOGOOS I [68779–69057]
At the global level, international programmes (e.g. CLIVAR, IOGOOS) will
establish observing networks, and major analysis centres will prepare prod-
ucts and predictions covering global themes relevant to the Indian Ocean
region, such as meteorology, oceanography and climatology.
IOGOOS I [69058–69403]
At the regional level, such global products generally do not have enough
spatial detail for applications (e.g. agriculture, fisheries) and, consequently,
downscaling by statistical and/or dynamical methods is required. Specific
oceanic features may need to be enhanced in the products, which may require
better ocean climatology and bathymetry.
IOGOOS I [70599–70763]
60 representatives of the coastal research and coastal-zone management com-
munities from 16 countries in the Indian Ocean region met for the first time
and agreed to
IOGOOS I [201213–202062]
I understand that one of the highlights will be signing of an MOU, a com-
mitment of the nations in this region to synergise their efforts. I sincerely
Appendix B 301
hope that it will result in increased collaboration in the region. I am sure

that projects will be elaborated, strategies discussed and an operational pro-
gramme would be set up to make the IOGOOS a reality. It is our expectation
that this conference will see the start of new partnerships and finally enable
us to change the reputation of the Indian Ocean from one of the least known
oceans to one that is well studied and sustainably managed. With its strategic
location in the middle of the Indian Ocean, multicultural background, and its
political, social and economic stability, Mauritius offers an ideal platform for
a synergy of African, Asian and Australian oceanographic interests.
IOGOOS I [207136–207528]
This is an onerous task; challenges are many; expectations are high; main-
taining credibility is important. The concern, cooperation and commitment
that was the driving force over the recent past need to be sustained to achieve
our goals. I wish you all success. May God bless us to serve humanity better.
Finally, I thank you once again for repetitive giving me the opportunity to
thank you once again.
IOGOOS I [207717–208106]
We have clearly accomplished the objectives of the conference. The Indian
Ocean GOOS Regional Alliance is now in place, with 19 members and more
to come. The chairman and officers have been elected and the secretary has
been appointed. Under Dr. Radhakrishnan’s leadership, we should move for-
ward quickly towards our goal of a fully operational observing system for
the Indian Ocean.
IOGOOS II [60772–61176]
Over the last 18 months since its formal launch at the First Indian Ocean
Conference held at Mauritius in November 2002, IOGOOS has taken a place
of pride among the GOOS Regional Alliances. The membership of IOGOOS
has grown from 19 to 21 institutions from 13 countries. IOGOOS has
now been endorsed by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
of UNESCO as one of the nine GOOS Regional Alliances.
IOGOOS II [61337–61973]
IOGOOS is providing a focus for the region, developing cooperation and
opportunities for synergy among members, and creating the ability to take
advantage of global initiatives such as Global Ocean Data Assimilation
Experiment (GODAE), Climate Variability and Predictability Programme
(CLIVAR) and Argo. IOGOOS is playing an important regional role in terms
of observations and associated research, using pilot projects and focussed
initiatives to enhance the capacity and productivity of the region. It is facili-
tating regional cooperation with research programmes such as CLIVAR and
Land Ocean Interactions in the Coastal Zone (LOICZ).
IOGOOS II [61974–62660]
IOGOOS has been instrumental in the formation of the Indian Ocean Panel
(IOP) to address the ocean and climate observing system in the region. The
first meeting of IOP held at Pune in February 2004 assessed the state of
the observing networks. IOGOOS members have played a key role in Argo
deployments and in enhancing the tropical moored buoy array. The IOP is
302 Appendix B
operated jointly with CLIVAR and is providing an energetic and effective

link to the climate research community. An implementation plan will be pre-
pared during 2004–05, including extension of the mooring array, assessment
and review of the ship of opportunity programme, and initiating a series of
observing system experiments.
IOGOOS II [62661–63171]
The IOGOOS II meeting endorsed the recommendations of the IOGOOS
Workshop held at Hyderabad in December 2003 and decided to create a
Regional Data Centre at the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information
Services (INCOIS), to provide a focus for data assembly and distribution
activities. The Centre will also develop a clearinghouse for the region to
allow members to efficiently and effectively exploit observations and prod-
ucts from the region. The delivery of key information to users will be
expedited.
IOGOOS II [65258–65538]
IOGOOS welcomed the international adoption of a data policy that will
enhance the timely exchange and utility of observations. The meeting agreed
to test the implementation of the IOC s data policy and to demonstrate the
advantages that accrue to the region from such an approach.
IOGOOS II [65539–65860]
IOGOOS will give specific attention to enhancing the capacity of the region
and developing a coherent education and training programme. The meeting,
above all else, demonstrated that IOGOOS has developed a community spirit
for the region, a oneness among all agencies and participants for the benefit
of the entire region.
IOGOOS-III [48929–49569]
Data management/progress and shortfall: CSIRO and APDRC have com-
piled and carefully edited all the available subsurface temperature data for
the Indian Ocean collected during the twentieth century. Though data from
various instruments at various centres are available, is a one-stop shop for
research is missing. INCOIS and APDRC have the capability to do this. IOP
recommended that they together prepare a joint plan for Indian Ocean data
management and dissemination, optimising the great capability available in
these agencies. Capacity building in all the nations around the Indian Ocean
rim needs to be addressed through ODINCINDIO.
State Learning/Unit Level (SLUL)
IOGOOS I [10975–11444]
IOGOOS is intended to elevate the Indian Ocean from one of the least studied
to one of the most studied of the world’s major oceans, with a real emphasis
on the link between societal and scientific issues. The 1.5 billion people of the
Indian Ocean rim can now look forward to an increased ability to make use of
Appendix B 303
the ocean observations and information produced by GOOS to improve the

management of their marine environment and to use the ocean’s resources
sustainably.
IOGOOS I [18323–18390]
The Indian Ocean is poorly monitored in comparison to the Pacific.
IOGOOS I [22842–22924]
Nevertheless, at this time there are insufficient data for initialising the model.
IOGOOS I [31610–31738]
We do not have this capability today and this is an important reason for
linking the coastal and ocean-climate modules of GOOS.
IOGOOS I [31944–32012]
Today, there is an unacceptable disconnect between these processes.
IOGOOS I [41708–41944]
Data are often not exchanged freely among nations and, even when data
are not proprietary, data management and analysis tend to be programme-
specific, and analyses that require multi-disciplinary data from many sources
take too much time.
IOGOOS I [51677–51790]
Regional marine science cooperation in the Indian Ocean has, in general,
been difficult to initiate and sustain.
IOGOOS I [51965–52124]
Another obstacle is the priority accorded to strategic considerations and
national security that hamper the sharing of information on the marine
environment.
IOGOOS I [57052–57873]
Development and maintenance of a minimum scientific capability to support
and participate in GOOS. Increasing understanding of the value of in situ and
space-based observations of the ocean in solving socio-economic problems,
through educating the public and politicians on the benefits to be obtained
from investing in, developing, maintaining and utilising ocean-observation
systems. Collection of ocean data necessary for the calibration, validation
and enhancement of assimilative and predictive models. Raising the ability
of countries to contribute to and benefit from global observing systems, by
long-term investment in facilities for receiving, processing, and interpreting
data from ocean and space-based sources, accompanied by training in the use
of such facilities and in the provision of services and products.
IOGOOS I [102458–102583]
The capacity-building required in this area involves targeted training in the
application of information and risk management.
IOGOOS I [125445–125775]
The workshop noted that resources allocated to data and information man-
agement were often minimal at the national and regional level, and strongly
urged the member states participating in the Indian Ocean GOOS Regional
Alliance to increase their levels of support to ensure sustained, high-quality
data and information management.
304 Appendix B
IOGOOS I [169245–169329]
In fact, it is the first time that Mauritius is hosting a meeting of oceanogra-
phers.
IOGOOS I [180794–181147]
IOC has had in a relatively short time an influential role in organising Indian
Ocean oceanographic activities. The International Indian Ocean Expedition
in the 1960s included many research cruises by many countries, the study of
oceanographic processes and the creation of oceanographic institutes such as
India’s National Institute of Oceanography.
IOGOOS I [181313–181534]
Other successful projects followed in the 1980s and 1990s, including the
World Ocean Circulation Experiment (WOCE) and the Joint Global Ocean
Flux Study (JGOFS), likewise contributing to the knowledge base of the
region.
IOGOOS II [23206–23591]
This will require a marketing strategy (1) there is a need to give due attention
to local/national problems and producing services to solve these; (2) local
problems often have regional/global sources. To solve local/national prob-
lems data might be required from other countries in the IOGOOS region. This
is one of the important justifications for the regional approach of IOGOOS.
IOGOOS II [23896–23983]
There is a need to empower the countries in the region to generate their own
services.
IOGOOS II [26422–26787]
The objectives that will be met during the short term include the fol-
lowing: (1) identify national/regional problems, required services/products,
required data types, national/regional partners, users/stakeholders through
surveys/studies; (2) arrange the data and Information training (ODIN + cycle,
etc.); and (3) start up limited services to all IOGOOS members for public use.
IOGOOS II [46371–46962]
The objectives of the project are as follows: To assess historical data
on shoreline change, establish trends and place these in the context of
coastal geomorphology, hydrodynamic regime and natural and anthro-
pogenic drivers of change. To establish an adequate, cost effective system
to monitor changes in the shoreline and coastal morphology. To develop a
quantitative understanding of coastal processes and the relationship between
shoreline change and the various natural and anthropogenic drivers. To
develop the ability to make predictions of shoreline change due to extreme
events.
IOGOOS II [49300–49853]
Capacity-building needs: Several capacity-building requirements were iden-
tified during the discussions. One of the first steps toward predicting
shoreline change is to use historical data to obtain an understanding of ongo-
ing coastal processes in the context of geomorphology and forcing. There
appears to be a wide disparity in the state of knowledge of coastal processes
among the countries in the region. Capacity building is also needed to process
Appendix B 305
and interpret remotely sensed data and to model shoreline changes using data
on ocean wind and waves.
IOGOOS II [49854–50213]
Pilot project in Sri Lanka: In response to the severe coastal erosion that has
taken place over the last three decades, many of the activities envisaged by
the project including assessment of historical data, obtaining a qualitative
and quantitative understanding of coastal process and modelling nearshore
hydrodynamics have been carried out in Sri Lanka.
IOGOOS II [52845–53467]
The actual project would have duration of 5–7 years. It is expected that the
first year of project implementation would involve the final selection of sites,
training of personnel involved in monitoring, quality control and data man-
agement and setting up a regional data sharing network. Monitoring would
begin late in the first year and products would be available by the end of the
second year. Acquiring and interpreting remotely sensed data on shoreline
change would also begin in the first year while development of a capability
to predict shoreline change would begin in the second or third year.
Regional Cooperation/Subsystem level (RCSSL)

IOGOOS I [100416–100569]
The working group comprised participants representing the various Indian
Ocean regions—southern Africa, east Africa, south Asia, south-east Asia and
Australia.
IOGOOS I [152689–153711]
GOOS-AFRICA brings an African dimension and contribution to the Global
Ocean Observing System. It aims to build up a Regional Ocean Observing
and Forecasting System for Africa (ROOFS AFRICA) that will develop new
capabilities in the use of remotely sensed data, in situ ocean measurements
and observation/validation networks, coastal and marine modelling and fore-
casting, and delivery systems for user products. It will thus contribute to
the capacity-building (training and technology transfer) essential for the
proper development, management and protection of the socio-economically
important coastal and marine environment of Africa. ROOFSAFRICA will
work interactively with relevant regional and national programmes, such
as IOGOOS. Twenty-six African countries participate in GOOSAFRICA:
Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania
and Togo.
IOGOOS I [158429–158626]
The following countries are participating in SEAGOOS: Australia,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanamar, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Vietnam. The region is characterised by numerous small seas.
306 Appendix B
IOGOOS I [158870–159253]
SEAGOOS countries have had long-term cooperation with WMO in the
field of marine meteorology, but less in the field of operational oceanog-
raphy. However, SEAGOOS is developing this aspect, particularly through
its South-East Asian Center for Atmospheric and Marine Prediction
(SEACAMP), which is running a South China Sea storm-surge, wave and
circulation pilot project with JCOMM.
IOGOOS I [159520–159839]
It was proposed and agreed that each regional GOOS alliance should do three
things: Cooperate closely with national meteorological offices and national
ocean data centres in the execution of GOOS pilot regional projects, link
their websites and send a representative to the meetings of the other regional
GOOS alliances.
IOGOOS I [160266–160886]
Nine countries are participating in WIOMAP. Its creation was preceded by
a survey, in 1997, of the relevant institutions in the Indian Ocean region,
followed by an expert mission in 1999. The WIOMAP project was drafted
in 2000 and reviewed in 2001. It covers operational meteorology, marine
safety and fisheries, and weather forecasting and disaster preparation. It is
aimed at providing services, facilitating marine communication and capacity-
building, and developing an observational network and specialised regional
marine applications centres. It is planning regional marine applications to be
implemented in 2004–2008.
IOGOOS II [50626–50943]
Several connections between the requirements of this project and the activi-
ties planned by other panels under IOGOOS were discussed. The prediction
of shoreline change, particularly in response to extreme events, is one of the
customers of the operational oceanography that is the ultimate goal of the
climate panel.
Dr. Freddy Numberi, Hon. Minister for Marine Affairs and Fisheries of
Indonesia, stated that IOGOOS has taken up the challenge to implement
an ocean observing system in the Indian Ocean and also basin scale
pilot projects. He briefly recalled the history of oceanographic activities in
Indonesia and its recent initiatives in developing the Indian Ocean Tsunami
Warning and Mitigation System (IOTWS). He stressed that IOGOOS III
needs to address the requirements of capacity building for operational
oceanography.
IOGOOS-III [57188–57368]
In short, Indonesia has two agendas—It wishes to intensify its observational
lines, and make Indonesia a hub for data dealing with data archival, rescue
and exchange.
IOGOOS-IV [27725–28080]
ODINCINDIO became operational in 2005 and since then several work-
shops and training courses under this project has been conducted in IODE
Appendix B 307
office, including ODINCINDIO Marine Data Management Training Course,

October 2005; ODINCINDIO Marine Information Management Training
Course, February 2006; ODINCINDIO Data Management Training Course,
May 2006.
International Cooperation/System Level (ICSL)
IOGOOS I [9878–9943]
One of the strongest instruments of cooperation and collaboration.
IOGOOS I [10642–10745]
The oceans may be viewed as keeping countries apart, but GOOS may be
viewed as bringing them together.
IOGOOS I [13149–13220]
For the benefit of all the people of the Indian Ocean region and beyond.
IOGOOS I [44554–44693]
IOGOOS has the potential of being a model for the development of a
regional-observing system in a region dominated by developing countries.
IOGOOS I [45489–45822]
The formation of a GOOS Regional Alliance for IOGOOS should not only
provide the most effective means of establishing regional priorities and user
requirements, it should provide a venue or framework for establishing and
maintaining the regional partnerships that will be needed to implement and
develop the coastal module of IOGOOS.
IOGOOS I [101833–101917]
The working group identified three areas in which regional activity may take
place.
IOGOOS I [101973–102146]
Regional uptake of weather and climate information and predictions by tai-
loring them to specific management decisions in agriculture, water-resource
usage and public safety.
IOGOOS I [102605–102770]
The ocean analyses and predictions will provide relevant data (e.g. high-
resolution SST, altimetry) and integrated analyses to the less competitive
fishing nations.
IOGOOS I [104183–104308]
The capacity-building identified in this area includes technical aspects of a
regional distributed data centre and service.
IOGOOS I [112090–112515]
International cooperation: Keystone coastal ecosystems are interdependent
over large geographical areas; ecosystem changes in one place will affect
other places; therefore, sharing of data on ecosystem condition or change
throughout the region will enable governments, integrated coastal-zone
308 Appendix B
management programmes, marine-protected areas and so on to take neces-

sary action in habitat/ecosystem conservation and restoration planning.
IOGOOS I [113018–114007]
Rationale for choosing penaeid prawns: Regional dependence on fisheries;
the generally poor state of coastal fish stocks; the high value of the prawn
resources; the wide regional distribution of prawns; artisanal and commercial
fisheries already established regionally; generally the same species region-
ally; general availability of catch data; the aquacultural value of prawns;
the prawn life-cycle integrates inshore marine and estuarine environmen-
tal effects. Project objectives: Creation of links amongst scientists (coastal
laboratories), coastal managers and communities; creation of a central data
service/product hub available to all; building of sustainable capacity and
infrastructure; monitoring of prawn recruitment and abundance via existing
fisheries; determination of effects of local conditions (e.g. freshwater run-
off); creation of a link to ocean-climate observations; detection of change
in prawn-fishery yield in relation to local and regional oceanic/climatic
events.
IOGOOS I [131827–131936]
It is also desirable to increase intra-regional cooperation, possibly through a
joint regional pilot project.
IOGOOS I [171397–171735]
Centres of excellence exist in many parts of the world to help foster inter-
national cooperation in capacity building, dissemination of knowledge and
experience and as well as for research activities. In Europe, for example,
there is a network of more than 300 marine research institutes and university
departments to carry out ocean research.
IOGOOS I [179711–180697]
Initiatives such as GOOS are one of the mechanisms that tears down these
barriers of dissention, conflict and fear. GOOS brings nations and peoples
together to work at a common purpose for the good of all. It helps to define
the common problems and needs of a region and then provides the framework
for taking joint action to address those needs. Through meetings, workshops
and projects, people come together and learn to trust and understand each
other’s views and to resolve differences. I am hopeful that IOGOOS will
contribute to this ancillary goal as it goes along its way to establish an
ocean and coastal observing system for the entire Indian Ocean. Representing
UNESCO, as I do, I can easily see how GOOS supports the ideals of the
organisation to build peace in the minds of people. The ocean, the largest
global common on Earth, offers us the opportunity to put into practice these
ideals in an area of activity that we are certain will bring direct benefits to
humankind.
IOGOOS I [199633–199795]
It is possible through regional and international cooperation between our
nations to focus effort on and address the most pressing regional environ-
mental dangers.
Appendix B 309
IOGOOS I [200559–200901]
As one of the oceans where oceanographic understanding is lagging behind
that of other oceans, there is yet much work to be done in the Indian Ocean
region, and I am sure that you will all use the opportunity of this gathering
to define the important issues of the area and develop a viable plan for the
oceanographic future of this region.
IOGOOS II [3708–4245]
Dr. Lalith Weeratunga, Secretary to the Honourable Prime Minister of the
Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, underscored
the significant role of IOGOOS for ensuring synergy and regional coop-
eration for oceanographic studies and ocean observations under globally
accepted standards as many countries in the region, especially the island
nations, have only limited scientific and engineering capability to under-
take oceanographic research and tackle problems related to resources and
environment in the ocean.
IOGOOS II [33651–33877]
It was suggested that IOGOOS may endorse MILAC-India, with the pro-
viso that the efforts of the pilot project would not only result in operational
capability, but also the knowledge base would be adaptable for the entire
region.
IOGOOS-III [43287–43414]
He showed the high correlation between SST and rainfall in Africa and
Indonesia associated with the Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD).
IOGOOS-III [43900–44009]
The Indian Ocean observing system is needed to identify the ocean-processes
and initialise prediction models.
IOGOOS-III [50751–51135]
Australia attaches great importance to the Indian Ocean region for global
and regional weather prediction; tropical cyclone and other extreme weather
prediction; studies and prediction of intra-seasonal variability such as the
MJO; emerging operational ocean analysis and prediction systems; seasonal
to interannual climate prediction; and monitoring and understanding climate
change.
IOGOOS-III [55285–55422]
In his conclusion, Dr. noted that in this part of the ocean 60% of the world
population is living and that most members are developing countries.
IOGOOS-III [57820–58169]
The continuous vandalism is a major obstacle for the mooring array and it
cannot be solved without commitment by IOGOOS member countries to
reach and educate fishing fleets. JAMSTEC is also planning a research cruise
named MISMO focusing on air-sea interaction during MJO in 2006 by R/V
Mirai that will contribute to the Indian Ocean climate studies.
IOGOOS-III [58198–58438]
Mauritius is a small country, but is fully committed to cooperating with the
world community. Mauritius has hosted the IOTWS Meeting and will host
310 Appendix B
the forthcoming WIOMSA Meeting. They are members of IOCINDIO and

have a national GOOS community.
Stages of Regime Formation (STAREGFOR)

IOGOOS I [9195–9545]
Being constantly aware of their living environment and its sensitivity to
climate change, natural disaster and human impact, the Indian Ocean coun-
tries have decided to mobilise their resources to safeguard and manage their
oceans and coastal waters through a permanent ocean observing system, the
Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System (IOGOOS).
IOGOOS I [38020–39096]
These considerations have important consequences in terms of the design of
the coastal module: (1) the design must respect the fact that priorities vary
among regions and should leave system design on the regional scale to stake-
holders in the regions; (2) economies of scale can be achieved by establishing
a global system that measures variables and manages data streams required
by most regions; (3) the global coastal network will come into being through
a combination of national, regional and global processes; (4) the system can
be implemented by selectively linking existing elements and can be devel-
oped by enhancing and complementing these elements over time and (5)
high priority must be placed on capacity-building in developing countries,
establishment of the data communications and management infrastructure,
establishment of internationally accepted standards and protocols for mea-
surements, data exchange and data management; and on marine research to
develop the sensors and models required to achieve those goals that require
biological and chemical data.
IOGOOS I [163786–164383]
William Erb spoke on behalf of IOC; his statement is in Annex 1g. He
believed that the objectives of the conference had been accomplished. The
Indian Ocean GOOS Regional Alliance had been established at this con-
ference, the chairman and officers elected, and its secretary appointed.
Under Dr. Radhakrishnan’s leadership, IOGOOS should move forward
quickly toward becoming a fully operational observing system for the Indian
Ocean. He thanked the Government of India for providing a “nest” for the
newest regional GOOS at the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information
Services, in Hyderabad.
Agenda Formation (AGFOR)
IOGOOS I [11520–11930]
IOGOOS will minimise the disconnect between procedures and requirements
in the observation of the Indian Ocean, and enable the community to derive
Appendix B 311
benefits from baseline data, routine and timely maps of ocean properties and
useful forecasts on all relevant time-scales. This will enable the detection of
climate change in the marine environment with the least possible lag between
changes and their detection.
IOGOOS I [12928–13147]
to the generation of oceanic knowledge, data, and information and their
application to the ocean- and climate-change problems of the Indian Ocean,
and to the free and open access to such knowledge, data and information.
IOGOOS I [28709–30050]
The combined effects of climate and human alterations to the environment
are especially pronounced in the coastal zone where people and ecosystem
goods and services are most concentrated and where inputs of energy and
materials from land, sea and air converge. Simply put, these are the pri-
mary reasons for making the establishment of the coastal module of GOOS
a high priority. The phenomena of interest in coastal ecosystems include
global warming and sea-level rise and changes in circulation, coastal flooding
and erosion, public-health risks, coastal eutrophication, habitat modification,
harmful algal blooms, invasive species, loss of biodiversity, sustainable cap-
ture and aquaculture fisheries, and chemical contamination. Changes in these
phenomena affect marine operations, public safety and health, the integrity
of marine ecosystems and the sustainability of the living marine resources
they support. In terms of human impacts, overfishing was not only the first
major human perturbation of coastal ecosystem dynamics; it is also a primary
driver of ecosystem degradation on a global scale in that it exacerbates the
effects of nutrient pollution, contributes to habitat modification and loss of
biodiversity, and increases the susceptibility of coastal ecosystems to invasive
species, harmful algal blooms and outbreaks of disease.
IOGOOS I [35782–36362]
The sponsors charged COOP to formulate design and implementation plans
for an observing system that will provide the data and information required
to achieve six goals: (1) improve the safety and efficiency of marine opera-
tions, (2) mitigate the effects of natural hazards on coastal communities and
ecosystems more effectively, (3) improve predictions of climate changes and
their effects on coastal communities and ecosystems, (4) minimise public-
health risks, (5) more effectively protect and restore healthy coastal marine
ecosystems and (6) sustain living marine resources.
IOGOOS I [39096–39181]
Clearly, the coastal module must include both global- and regional-scale
components.
IOGOOS I [42422–43376]
The creation of a Joint Technical Commission for Oceanography and Marine
Meteorology and initiatives such as the Argo and GODAE projects reflect
the progress that is being made in the design and implementation of the
global ocean module of GOOS. In contrast, although a high priority of the
international community, progress in developing the coastal module has been
slow. This is primarily a consequence of (1) the challenge of designing and
312 Appendix B
implementing an internationally accepted coastal module to achieve the six

goals in a diversity of complex coastal ecosystems; (2) the challenges of
developing the regional and global partnerships needed to fund, implement,
operate, and develop operational observing systems; (3) inefficient and inef-
fective data communications and management systems and (4) the primitive
state of our capacity to rapidly and routinely detect and predict changes that
require measurements of biological and chemical variables.
IOGOOS I [49827–50061]
Our ability to forecast weather, to sustainably use the marine resources
and maintain the ecosystem values of the marine environment is effectively
dependent on rapid detection and timely prediction of the changes in ocean
processes.
IOGOOS I [58252–58374]
The purpose of the workshop was to take the next steps in planning
implementation of a basin-wide, pilot observing system.
IOGOOS I [65951–66536]
The working group proposed three pilot projects: (1) to develop the deploy-
ment of Argo floats, from the current level of about 67–170 in 2003, and
to 450 in 2005; (2) to develop Indian Ocean mooring arrays, not only in
the equatorial zone, but also in the four zones of high seasurface tem-
perature anomalies (northern Bay of Bengal, off the southern coasts of
Sumatra and Java, western Arabian Sea and the southern Indian Ocean);
(3) the implementation of a new ship-of-opportunity XBT Project, with
emphasis on high-resolution, frequently repeated lines across the Indian
Ocean.
IOGOOS I [68514–68654]
The working group covered three main issues: exploitation of climate
predictability, fishery applications, and ocean data and data products.
IOGOOS I [69404–69695]
At the local level, which was specifically addressed by the confer-
ence’s Coastal Ocean Observing Workshop, the regional concerns, such
as management of the risk of climate variability and of change in the
marine environment, fish production and coastal erosion, will need to be
addressed.
IOGOOS I [70766–71101]
Formulate three proposed pilot projects that (1) target high-priority phenom-
ena of interest in coastal waters that are important to at least one of the six
goals of GOOS and (2) require regional (multi-national) to global approaches
to improve the ability to more rapidly detect changes and/or to provide timely
predictions of changes.
IOGOOS I [71947–72521]
To achieve these goals, it was agreed that a representative from each country
would briefly describe 2–3 phenomena that are accorded the highest priority
in the country. The presentations are summarised below. This provided the
basis for selecting 2–3 phenomena that are (1) high priorities for the Indian
Appendix B 313
Ocean region in terms of their impact on the socio-economics of the countries

in the region; (2) are feasible and (3) make good subjects for pilot projects
that would demonstrate the effectiveness of the GOOS approach and would
therefore be likely to attract funding.
IOGOOS I [85050–85623]
In the light of these country reports, the phenomena of interest in coastal
waters were prioritorised as follows: coastal erosion, habitat/biodiversity,
nutrient pollution, sustainable fisheries, chemical contamination, non-native
species, aquaculture, coastal flooding, harmful algal blooms and safety of life
at sea. It was decided to develop pilot projects for three of these as follows:
coastal erosion, habitat/biodiversity, and sustainable fisheries, the latter being
preferred to nutrient pollution on the grounds that it encompassed a wider
range of environmental factors.
IOGOOS I [104801–104898]
The working group proposed a pilot project on monitoring and predicting
coastal shoreline change.
IOGOOS I [106639–106785]
The working group proposed a pilot project on multi-scale monitoring and
mapping of keystone coastal ecosystems. Greg Wagner presented the report.
IOGOOS I [112775–112927]
The working group proposed a pilot project on the development of a moni-
toring and management system for the penaeid prawn resources in the Indian
Ocean.
IOGOOS I [128035–128335]
It is also necessary to decide which possible products are appropriate; for
this, it is necessary to know precisely what the problems are. That of fish-
ery management, especially in shallow water, is a common one. And the
assimilation of data into models is another; but the question is: which
models?
IOGOOS I [131354–131574]
The priorities for Iran are habitat, pollution and coastal-zone mapping, and
the needs are for increasing public awareness, capacity-building, data and
information exchange within the region and with the outside world.
IOGOOS I [138563–139045]
Mark Jury presented three regional pilot projects: Storm surges in the Bay of
Bengal; the Western Indian Ocean Marine Application Project (WIOMAP)
and the Indian Ocean Moored Array Project (I-MAP). These projects are
part of the Indian Ocean Observing Strategy. The Bay of Bengal storm-surge
project is important because of the tremendous loss of life and property from
such surges. IMAP is proposing nine deep-sea moorings, involving Australia,
France, India and the United States.
IOGOOS I [139122–139263]
WIOMAP seeks to enhance coastal observations and the training of local
people in oceanography and meteorology. I-MAP also involves WIOMAP
countries.
314 Appendix B
IOGOOS I [146678–146940]
The Development Committee expanded on the draft of the Indian Ocean
Observing Strategy, originally drafted by the IOC Perth Regional Programme
Office. This strategy is underpinned by the intention to anchor IOGOOS
firmly in the IOC Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS).
IOGOOS I [153907–154214]
Priorities issues for GOOSAFRICA are (1) sustainable use of living marine
resources; (2) management of key habitats and ecosystems; (3) coastal ero-
sion; (4) pollution, including land-based sources and marine pollution and
(5) socio-economic benefits to be derived from the development of the
ROOFSAFRICA.
IOGOOS I [155799–156276]
The WAGOOS goal is to establish GOOS activities in western Australia
(WA) to benefit the State and Australia and the GOOS community of nations.
Consistent with this goal, a preliminary strategy for the period 2002–2007
has been developed. The outcome is expected to be a unified regional net-
work that systematically acquires, integrates and distributes observations,
analyses, forecasts and other useful products to users throughout western
Australia and its adjacent seas.
IOGOOS I [156712–156867]
The development of best practice in safety and environmental management
is a high priority and this requires knowledge and a detailed information
database.
IOGOOS I [158627–158870]
SEAGOOS priorities currently lie in CLIVAR, coastal dynamics and pollu-
tion, ecosystems, and fisheries. Climate variation is important on the seasonal
scale (featuring tropical storms) and the interannual scale (featuring droughts
and floods).
IOGOOS I [184625–184753]
GOOS is designed with a broad purpose of “public service” in mind, and its
development is financed by the member states of IOC.
IOGOOS I [189403–189631]
You may have noticed that this is not a typical conference with papers to read
and people to listen to. It is a series of meetings designed to produce plans,
recommendations and objectives for establishing an Indian Ocean observing
system.
IOGOOS I [195702–196601]
As we are all aware, the study of the Indian Ocean is important for the coun-
tries of the region and outside the region for various reasons. It is important to
understand ocean processes for several reasons; namely, the optimum explo-
ration and sustainable exploitation of ocean resources. Tuna migration has
a direct relation to variations in the sea surface temperature pattern where
the season air–sea interactions in the open ocean also affect the weather
globally and regionally; for example a direct correlation has been found
between the sea surface temperature in the Indian Ocean and the rainfall
Appendix B 315
in the region. The circulation of oceans transports pollutants across national

and geopolitical boundaries and can affect regions near and far from where
these pollutants originated. Resources in the ocean, such as pelagic species,
know no boundaries, travelling from one national water to another.
IOGOOS I [199796–200559]
I think I express the wish of all the countries of the region when I say that
equal importance should be given to coastal and oceanic processes. Most of
the countries here today, representing the Indian Ocean region, have a large
percentage of their population living in coastal areas. These areas are facing
increasing pressures from land-based activity due to development, grow-
ing populations and global problems such as sea level rise. This particular
problem due to global warming will become a real threat to small islands
like those in the southwest Indian Ocean. Hence, coastal issues need to be
urgently addressed. By addressing pressing issues of the coastal states in the
region, the IOGOOS has better chances of becoming a successful operational
system.
IOGOOS I [208261–209104]
Although much work is yet to be done, we have discovered that there are
products and applications that can be delivered to the users in this region
with the tools that already exist. It is a matter of organising ourselves to
deliver them, and the conference has identified many people and institutions
to assist in this task. There are some things we still need to do: We must have
pilot projects to pave the way for operational observing systems. Capacity-
building in data collection, modelling and applications is necessary. We must
build awareness of GOOS and secure funds to carry out our work. We must
develop plans for implementation of ocean and climate, and coastal-ocean
observing systems. Improved use of satellites for our applications is essential.
We must strengthen communication links and improve infrastructure in the
region.
IOGOOS II [5274–5794]
He reiterated that systematic ocean observation is essential for understanding
the structure and dynamics of ocean as well as for improving predictability
of ocean and climate, especially for the Indian Ocean that is quite complex
and unique, but still underobserved. After giving an overview of the progress
accomplished by IOGOOS since its formal launch in November 2002, he
stated that the focus of this meeting is to come up with concrete action plans
and proposals as IOGOOS is entering the phase of implementation.
IOGOOS II [20130–20389]
Briefly, the TOR instructs the panel to provide scientific and technical over-
sight of oceanographic observations; develop an implementation plan for
sustained observations Liaise with relevant bodies (e.g. AAMP JCOMM);
and report to CLIVAR SSG and GOOS.
IOGOOS II [20436–20681]
IOP faces two important future challenges. First, it is essential to build
bridges to the coastal component of IOGOOS. Climate impact is one of the
316 Appendix B
key drivers of coastal ecosystems, fisheries (prawn in particular), and coastal

erosion.
IOGOOS II [21112–21515]
Second, IOP needs to develop an integrated theme of oceanographic research
on the role of the Indian Ocean in climate variability and change. The theme
needs to explore the full impact of the Indian Ocean, from regionally con-
trolled monsoon variability to the global ocean linkages that play a role in
the global transports of mass, heat, freshwater, nutrients, carbon and other
important properties.
IOGOOS II [22899–23205]
The Hyderabad Workshop agreed that the strategy for oceanographic data
and information management in the Indian Ocean region should be based
on the following requirements: the need to sensitise and get commitment
from governments (decision makers) to assure sustainability of the IOGOOS
network.
IOGOOS II [30539–30951]
The group ultimately converged on some more specific projects. Following
the suggestion of Prof. Lynch in the Plenary session, the group agreed that
an initiative to develop an advanced high-resolution SST product for the
Indian Ocean region would both meet identified needs across a range of areas
and provide a framework for cooperation in delivering a unique product: a
product that would be associated with IOGOOS.
IOGOOS II [31565–31646]
It was also agreed that a regional ocean colour product should also be
developed.
IOGOOS II [33651–33877]
It was suggested that IOGOOS may endorse MILAC-India, with the pro-
viso that the efforts of the pilot project would not only result in operational
capability, but also the knowledge base would be adaptable for the entire
region.
IOGOOS II [34164–34722]
A major outcome of the inaugural meeting of the Indian Ocean Global Ocean
Observing System (IOGOOS) held in Grand Baie, Mauritius in November
2002 was the incorporation of a coastal component into what had historically
been a programme aimed at oceanic processes. This developed from a survey
of Indian Ocean rim and island countries in which representatives were asked
what they considered to be major coastal environmental problems. These
were then, by consensus, reduced to three: biodiversity loss, coastal erosion
and sustainability of fisheries.
IOGOOS II [34800–34925]
After consideration by the relevant committee the sustainable fishery issue
was focused on the shallow water prawn resource.
IOGOOS II [40400–41087]
The primary keystone ecosystems in the Indian Ocean region are coral
reefs, mangrove forests, seagrass beds and rocky shores, which have been
Appendix B 317
partially or severely degraded in most countries and which have therefore

been selected as the targets of this project. Monitoring of these ecosystems
will facilitate their proper management, which can have significant posi-
tive impact on the entire coastal/marine environment. Goal or development
objective: The goal of this project is to take a regional approach to rapidly
detecting changes and making timely predictions of changes in high priority
phenomena of interest in coastal waters; namely, keystone ecosystems and
their biodiversity.
IOGOOS II [46260–46371]
The aim of the project is to establish a regional network to quantify,
understand and predict shoreline change.
IOGOOS II [52352–52844]
Outlook for the future: Looking beyond the 1-year period covered by the
action plan outlined above, the following activities are anticipated over the
next few years: Capacity-building workshops in the assessment of shoreline
change using existing data, use of remote sensing data to quantify shoreline
change and modelling of nearshore hydrodynamics using large-scale ocean
data, 2005/2006. Final project proposal development workshop for late 2005.
Initiation of project late 2006 or beyond.
IOGOOS II [64530–64793]
The IOGOOS II meeting recognised the urgent need for satellite products
and associated capacity building, through all activities, and agreed to assist
in the development of enhanced SST products as well as other products for
the coastal and biological community.
Dr. Radhakrishnan, chairman of IOGOOS, recalled the evolution and growth
of IOGOOS since its formal launch at Mauritius in November 2002, and
acknowledged the contributions made by several individuals and institu-
tions to bring it up as one of the best GOOS regional alliances (GRA)
with 19 members from 12 countries in the region and 2 associate mem-
bers. He informed the meeting that the IOP had made excellent progress in
preparing a draft implementation plan for ocean observations in the Indian
Ocean for climate. He stressed that the coastal GOOS pilot projects have to
be evolved into concrete proposals in conformance with the IOC’s Coastal
GOOS implementation plan.
IOGOOS-III [46031–46345]
The high level objective of the observing system is to observe, describe,
understand, model and predict: seasonal monsoon variation with related
intra-seasonal variability; the interactions among monsoon—El Nino
Southern Oscillation—Indian Ocean dipole; and the multi-decadal warming
trends and natural variation.
IOGOOS-IV [29172–29445]
How can IOP activities (large-scale oceanography and climate) connect with
African activity? Ocean reanalysis and climate model results linked to coastal
IOGOOS: How to get the products out? IOC/IOGOOS science programmers:
318 Appendix B
How can the region become active in the science? Through a permanent
ocean-observing system.
Institutional Choice (INCHO)
IOGOOS I [9445–9487]
IOGOOS I [39734–39838]
GOOS Regional Alliances, guided by national and regional priorities, create
Regional Application Centers.
IOGOOS I [40271–40346]
The global network will not, by itself, provide all of the data/information.
IOGOOS I [41043–41247]
Regional observing systems are critical building blocks of the coastal mod-
ule of GOOS, especially for achieving the goals of sustaining and restoring
healthy marine ecosystems and living marine resources.
IOGOOS I [41280–41509]
The data-management and communications subsystem is the “life-blood”
of the observing system, and the development of an integrated data man-
agement and communications subsystem is arguably the highest priority for
implementation.
IOGOOS I [41957–42166]
to establish an integrated data-management subsystem that serves data in
both real-time and delayed mode and allows users to exploit multiple data
sets from many different sources through “one-stop-shopping.”
IOGOOS I [42422–43377]
The creation of a Joint Technical Commission for Oceanography and Marine
Meteorology and initiatives such as the Argo and GODAE projects reflect the
progress that is being made in the design and implementation of the global
ocean module of GOOS. In contrast, although a high priority of the interna-
tional community, progress in developing the coastal module has been slow.
This is primarily a consequence of (1) the challenge of designing and imple-
menting an internationally accepted coastal module to achieve the six goals
in a diversity of complex coastal ecosystems; (2) the challenges of develop-
ing the regional and global partnerships needed to fund, implement, operate
and develop operational observing systems; (3) inefficient and ineffective
data communications and management systems and (4) the primitive state of
our capacity to rapidly and routinely detect and predict changes that require
measurements of biological and chemical variables.
IOGOOS I [50701–50844]
A data-management and communication system that provides rapid access to
data and information will be the “lifeline” of the observing system. I should
develop a hierarchical, distributed network of local, national and regional
mechanisms feeding eventually into a global framework,
Appendix B 319
IOGOOS I [50914–51052]
IOGOOS I [71369–71558]
This will be the first step toward establishing the data communications infras-
tructure that will be required to build the data-management infrastructure for
the coastal component of IOGOOS.
IOGOOS I [71559–71942]
Establish a development committee that will (1) oversee the development
of pilot projects, including the coastal laboratory network, and (2) serve as
a point of contact for the ocean climate component of IOGOOS and other
bodies interested in the development of the coastal component of IOGOOS
(other regional bodies, research programmes important to the development
of IOGOOS and so on).
IOGOOS I [86821–87324]
The Breakout Session II concluded by forming an IOGOOS Coastal
Development Committee (ICDC) with an Executive Committee (∗ in mem-
bership list below) that will (1) promote the development of the three pilot
projects and a network of coastal laboratories for data and information
exchange, (2) coordinate their development with ocean climate pilot projects
and (3) provide the focal point for the IOGOOS Secretariat to coordinate the
development of the ocean climate and coastal modules of IOGOOS.
IOGOOS I [109937–110454]
Institutional and infrastructural development. Development of a network of
universities and government offices to help in designing and implementing
the project; many universities and governments have environmental moni-
toring programmes, so that sharing information amongst them would help
to optimise project design, thus enabling the project to be carried out in
many countries in a standardised way. Designation of contact persons in each
country to help network people in their country with those in other countries.
IOGOOS I [115172–115871]
The International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange (IODE)
programme was established by the IOC in 1960 to (1) facilitate and promote
the exchange of oceanographic data and information; (2) develop standards,
formats and methods for the global exchange of oceanographic data and
information and (3) assist member states to acquire the necessary capacity
to manage oceanographic data and information and become partners in the
IODE network. More than 60 centres have been established; these include
Designated National Agencies (DNAs), National Oceanographic Data and
Information Centers (NODCs), Responsible National Oceanographic Data
Centers (RNODCs) and World Data CentersOceanography (WDCs).
IOGOOS I [125258–125445]
Since it was agreed that the ODIN strategy should benefit the entire region,
the workshop therefore recommended the development of an ODIN project
for IOCINDIO, complementing ODINAFRICA.
320 Appendix B
IOGOOS I [145286–145781]
Conference had created a good spirit of cooperation, thanks to the hard work
of the last 2 years, and a good basis for future work. In particular, he con-
firmed the continuing support of the Government of India in the development
of IOGOOS, not least through its hosting of the IOGOOS Secretariat at
the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS), in
Hyderabad, for a period of 6 years beginning 7 November 2002. The cost
of running the Secretariat will be met by INCOIS.
IOGOOS I [149386–149702]
The organisation of a joint Ocean Dynamics and Climate and Coastal Ocean
Observation Workshop to develop a sound overall coordination of IOGOOS
projects (possibly in May 2003). The nomination of a project coordina-
tor to ensure effective follow-up. The creation of an IOGOOS bulletin.
Improvement of the IOGOOS website.
IOGOOS I [151819–152008]
He also called on the countries represented in the alliance to establish
national IOGOOS committees with a view to developing the appropriate
national activities in support of the alliance.
IOGOOS I [170050–170434]
These challenges will require an array of new knowledge and technologies
to erect a shield of protection, biological, physical, environmental and strate-
gic, in order to ensure our sustainable development. At the same time, these
challenges will require an institutional response by governments and agen-
cies and by society at large on the way we do business, with new ways of
thinking and new ideas.
IOGOOS I [185268–186490]
There are several aspects to this challenge. The first one is institutional devel-
opment. Member states, and the IOC, need to prepare themselves to meet the
needs posed by the development of GOOS. The financing of ocean research
has allowed the building of much of what we have today, especially the trial
scaled-up runs of prototype systems. However, the financing of the fully
operational GOOS cannot depend exclusively on the funding for science.
Since no other known source is visible on the horizon, waiting to fill the
gap, this shifting of the sources of funding is perceived as a huge menace
to the stability of ongoing international research efforts. The second chal-
lenge refers to the use of the data and information generated by operational
oceanographic services. Effective use requires the organisation of sophisti-
cated systems for processing, modelling and distributing the information. It
is not just a matter of securing access to the data, important as this aspect
is. It is necessary to establish a highly technical and dedicated organisation
with the mission of using the data, and producing and distributing final prod-
ucts. These organisations exist today, both in the public and in the private
sector.
Appendix B 321
IOGOOS II [25443–26242]
With respect to structure and coordination, the Hyderabad Workshop con-
cluded that at the national level, a mix of distributed as well as centralised
mechanism is to be adopted. Each country needs to have a focal point for
data management and the NODC could take up this responsibility. Countries
without an NODC should be encouraged to establish such a facility. It is
necessary to have a coordination mechanism for data and information man-
agement at the regional level as well. An IOGOOS data and information
management working group is to be set up with national contact points and
experts as members. The need for a regional data archive for the Indian Ocean
was discussed and it was decided this should be agreed upon during the first
meeting of the data and information management working group.
IOGOOS II [41514–41868]
This project will be a multi-scale operation involving, first, large-scale
remote sensing over wide areas; second, detailed remote sensing in particular
areas of interest and third, community-based or participatory monitoring in
situ at selected sites. Measurements at all three levels of monitoring will be
repeated on a regular basis over time.
IOGOOS II [50943–51366]
The project has many requirements related to capacity building in process-
ing and interpreting remotely sensed data. It was also recognised that the
creation of a clearinghouse for all available data on the winds and waves in
the Indian Ocean whether from satellites or global models would be a very
useful step in stimulating work throughout the region in linking observed
shoreline changes to the ocean climate.
IOGOOS II [63171–63454]
IOGOOS is working within the framework of the GOOS Coastal Panel and
taking responsibility in collaboration with that panel in the implementation
of initiatives within the region, including contributions to the measurement
of key common variables and testing of common methodologies.
IOGOOS II [64793–65258]
The IOGOOS II meeting noted that the Secretariat at INCOIS, Hyderabad
has been energetic, competent and proactive in supporting the activities of
IOGOOS, in cooperation with the IOC Perth Office. With the support of
the Department of Ocean Development, India, the Secretariat, has grown
significantly supporting various activities such as data management. The
Secretariat has developed an informative website that is providing effective
communication for the region.
IOGOOS-III [51955–52210]
The strategic approach has been endorsed and we are planning to establish a
secretariat over the coming months, probably in the National Oceans Office.
The Indian Ocean region is a major focus of this plan and it will be strongly
guided by the IOP Panel.
322 Appendix B
Operationalisation (OPSTA)
IOGOOS I [32607–32724]
An operational observing system for the marine environment is a new con-
cept for oceanographers and marine ecologists, in which the provision of
data and data-products is sustained and routine in forms and at rates that are
specified by the users.
IOGOOS I [32801–32929]
IOGOOS I [32968–33421]
It requires a managed and efficient flow of data and information among
three essential subsystems: (1) an analysis and modelling subsystem, the data
requirements of which guide the development of, (2) an integrated data com-
munications and management subsystem for serving data of known quality
in real-time or delayed mode as needed and (3) an observing subsystem for
monitoring the required variables on specified time-space scales, precision
and accuracy.
IOGOOS I [101218–101506]
For applicability at the regional level, the global products will have to be
downscaled for practical applications (e.g. agriculture, fisheries). Specific
oceanic features such as fronts, upwelling zones or the resolution of sea state
and currents may need to be enhanced in the products.
IOGOOS I [105754–105946]
A phased approach, beginning with assessment and a shoreline monitoring
system; incorporation of local funding; then development of analytical and
modelling capability as data become available.
IOGOOS I [110455–112089]
Establishment of marine-protected areas (MPAs) to act as control areas
(unlikely to experience significant impacts of human activities) with which
to compare other areas that receive significant human impacts; establishment
of reference stations, which would have a use similar to that of MPAs, but,
in addition, may be selected so as to represent areas that are least likely
to experience natural disasters. In addition, sentinel sites carefully chosen
in order to quickly detect change and allow rapid planning of appropri-
ate mitigation measures. Identification and management of the drivers of
ecosystem degradation (i.e. human activities and natural phenomena). For
coral reefs: The relevant human activities are destructive fishing, overfish-
ing, coral mining, nutrient and chemical water pollution, boat transport and
anchoring, and land-based activities that cause sedimentation. The relevant
natural phenomena are coral bleaching (possibly due to climate change),
outbreaks of the crown-of-thorns starfish, and storms and cyclones. For
mangroves: The relevant human activities are harvesting of mangroves for
fuel, building poles and boat-making, clear-cutting of mangrove forests for
construction of houses and roads, aquaculture, agriculture and salt-making.
The relevant natural phenomena are sea-level rise, storms and cyclones,
Appendix B 323
and floods. For seagrass beds: The relevant human activities are destruc-
tive fishing practices (drag nets, trawling); movement of boats and people;
and land-based activities that cause sedimentation. The relevant natural phe-
nomena are cyclones, storms and excessive rainfall that causes increased
sedimentation.
IOGOOS I [119888–121052]
Gary Meyers noted that the data and data products required for the Ocean
Dynamics and Climate pilot projects are composed of two streams: (1) large-
scale data products and analyses on a global scale (e.g. climate prediction,
ocean state, weather products, wave products); and (2) local scale. The data
and data products on the local scale are lacking and will require special
efforts in the region to develop them. There may also be some problems of
downscaling data products from the large scale to the local scale, but “exter-
nal” sources (e.g. Global GOOS) could be combined with “local sources”
(e.g. IOGOOS), if downscaling problems can be overcome. Tom Malone
pointed out that coastal data is nearly always “local”. In general, the diversity
of data required for the proposed IOGOOS pilot projects is huge and varies
from country to country. In addition, very few data-management systems are
available in the region to deal with these data. The challenges will therefore
be substantial, but so will be the benefits if the necessary systems can be
put in place. A clearing-house mechanism will be necessary to assemble and
make available the relevant data.
IOGOOS I [121247–121882]
Mervyn Lynch informed the workshop that there is limited experience in
the remote-sensing community concerned with the IOGOOS programme.
Quite independently and to serve their own needs, the wider remote-sensing
community has established data centres, sets of data products, quality con-
trol procedures and metadata-base management systems. However, there are
some areas of concern, such as the often onerous access to such data, the
need for validation of remote-sensing data with field data and their proper
integration, product consistency across laboratories for the same sensor, or
product consistency between different/new sensors.
IOGOOS I [122575–122899]
Peter Pissierssens thought that independent local data management was still a
long way off, but ODINAFRICA data centres could help in the Indian Ocean;
so could POGO and INCOIS. The current weakness of the IODE data-centre
system was the still relative separation of the data management community
from the wider user community.
IOGOOS I [123455–123899]
It recommended that IOC undertake a survey to identify and document in
detail all existing ocean data and management facilities in the region. This
will enable the identification of suitable data and information-management
partners able to handle all relevant data types and develop the required data
products and services. Particular attention should be given to whether these
centres are covering or can cover all data types relevant to IOGOOS.
324 Appendix B
IOGOOS I [126643–127143]
About a dozen satellites covering the Indian Ocean are now operating.
Regarding the application of satellite remote sensing in the region, it appears
necessary to stimulate regional interest and to identify problems whose solu-
tion would be facilitated by satellite remote sensing, and to set priorities. As
a first step, it would be useful to construct inventories of experts, of interests,
and of existing infrastructure. Training workshops and demonstration pilot
projects would help in this sense.
IOGOOS I [127144–127310]
The likely problems lie predominantly in the data acquisition, management
and archiving, in the exploitation of the data and the development of useful
data products.
IOGOOS I [128336–128567]
There are still some credibility gaps with respect to satellite remote sensing,
and capabilities vary from nation to nation. So capacity-building and training
are needed, preceded, however, by an assessment of training facilities.
IOGOOS I [128697–128775]
The majority of the relevant data come from the SeaWiFS and are held at
NASA.
IOGOOS I [129364–129418]
SeaWiFS and OCM satellites carry ocean-colour scanners;
IOGOOS I [129986–130109]
Although the coral reefs and mangroves are being monitored, it is not easy
to show changes in mangrove species composition.
IOGOOS I [130688–130856]
It is clearly very important to ensure that the data products are useful and
made available at the right levels: societal, national, and of international
organisations.
IOGOOS I [132752–133566]
Regarding data exchange, some of the problems are technical. The hardware
and software needs of users need to be determined. Duplication (in data
acquisition, processing and so on) must be avoided and made unnecessary
by full and free access by all participants in IOGOOS pilot projects to all
data in relevant data sources. The needs of the Ocean Dynamics and Climate
pilot projects are reasonably well met, now, but those in Coastal Ocean
Observing are more difficult to meet, because the algorithms are more com-
plex, and compliance with standards and protocols for measurements and for
data products is more difficult to achieve. The priority for the coastal pilot
projects is the detection of environmental change (mitigation/degradation),
and for this it is necessary to concentrate on quality control of the data.
IOGOOS I [133567–134336]
There are also some pragmatic questions, particularly regarding costs and
title to data or data products, to be resolved. High spatial- and spectral-
resolution data may be necessary for some purposes but are costly, so hard
choices often have to be made. Planned actions are to prepare the following:
Appendix B 325
a resource directory of satellites and their data products—descriptors, accu-

racy, spatial and temporal resolution, availability (real time, delayed time);
an inventory of research and capacity-building centres; and a list of specific
needs for capacity-building with respect to scatterometry, altimetry, inshore
currents, sea-surface temperature and ocean fronts, and the oceanic water
column (chlorophyll a, suspended sediments, dissolved organic compounds,
light attenuation and so on).
IOGOOS I [154215–154633]
Work on these priority issues will be enabled through four inter-related
technical activities: (1) improving the African Network of In Situ Ocean
Measurements and Observation Validation, with particular emphasis on the
Sea-Level Network; (2) improving access to remote-sensing technology and
information; (3) (insuring) validation and forecasting modelling; and (4)
developing of an enduser interactive information delivery system.
IOGOOS I [164383–164925]
The conference had made it clear that there are products and applications that
can be delivered to the users in this region, but some things are still needed:
pilot projects to pave the way for operational systems; capacity-building in
data collection, modelling, and applications; building awareness of GOOS
and securing funds for the work; plans for implementation of ocean and cli-
mate, and coastal-ocean observing systems; improved use of satellites for
IOGOOS applications and better communication links and infrastructure in
the region.
IOGOOS I [172740–173070]
The existing multilateral frameworks should however be revitalised to ensure
that they develop and implement specific initiatives, such as funding mecha-
nisms to facilitate international scientific collaboration between countries.
Joint research projects and information-sharing networks should be other
components of their output.
IOGOOS I [186524–186692]
Is this a development that each member state of the IOC wishes to face inde-
pendently, or would it be a possible “joint” effort within IOC, organised at a
regional scale.
IOGOOS I [186953–187274]
The third challenge is economic in nature. Global observations constitute a
very particular case of all the observations that can be made. The main feature
is the very large scale at which they are collected. At the upper limit, GOOS
will be sampling the properties of a single system: the ocean. The sample
size is one.
IOGOOS I [187431–187790]
In theory, full forecasting capabilities would be available only if all scales
were properly sampled. This is a huge technical requirement. Conceptually
this is not a minor detail. In GOOS, what is a local observation made on
the east coast of Africa becomes a “remote and distant” observation for a
forecast in the Bay of Bengal, for example, and vice versa.
326 Appendix B
IOGOOS II [17553–17947]
IOP members have undertaken drafting of an implementation plan based on
an outline plan prepared by the chair, with initial input due in May, and com-
pletion of the first draft in early 2005. A key aspect of preparing this plan is
to develop a high degree of consensus among all the agencies that can con-
tribute. This is essential to achieving a high degree of coordination in the
implementation.
IOGOOS II [20682–21112]
A capability for downscaling the basin scale observations to the smaller
scales of interest at the coasts needs to be addressed and founded on a
two-way flow of information and plans between developers of the climate
component and users of marine information in the coastal environment. With
this challenge in mind, IOP will open a discussion with GODAE to identify
how products can be made available to IOGOOS users.
IOGOOS II [23992–24051]
Coastal and climate GOOS require data at different scales.
IOGOOS II [26788–27169]
The objectives to be met during the medium term are as follows: (1) assist
members to develop the necessary national capacity to participate fully in
IOGOOS (ODIN+, modelling and data assimilation, satellite oceanogra-
phy); (2) start data collection, management and service/product development
through relevant pilot projects and (3) provide services to all IOGOOS
members for public use.
IOGOOS II [38072–38463]
Substantial discussion at the Sri Lankan meeting was devoted to the poten-
tial and feasibility of the use of remote sensing techniques in monitoring
of environmental parameters of possible significance to prawn population
dynamics. This technique was also mooted as being of potential significance
to the other two coastal IOGOOS pilot projects on costal biodiversity and
shoreline dynamics.
IOGOOS II [41514–41867]
This project will be a multi-scale operation involving, first, large-scale
remote sensing over wide areas; second, detailed remote sensing in particular
areas of interest; and third, community-based or participatory monitoring in
situ at selected sites. Measurements at all three levels of monitoring will be
repeated on a regular basis over time.
IOGOOS II [41906–42375]
Data from all levels of monitoring will be fed into GIS databases and pro-
cessed to obtain a number of valuable outputs, including maps, baseline
information, detection of change over time and predictions about future
changes. Interpretation of these outputs will result in outputs at a higher level
such as recommendations for management and/or further research, as well
as information that can be used to increase environmental awareness of the
respective communities.
Appendix B 327
IOGOOS II [43278–44023]
Progress during the IOGOOS Workshop at Colombo, April 26–29 2004: It is
gratifying that significant progress was made during the workshop in terms
of valuable input by additional countries, new commitments to undertake the
project, recruitment of individuals and exchange of information. The main
inputs/changes in the proposal as a result of this workshop included a new
title, so that it mentions the purpose of the project as being to facilitate sus-
tainable management; improvements in methodologies on remote sensing,
identification of possible sources of funding, the necessity of linking data
from the climate community, particularly, temperature, salinity, turbidity, sea
level and so on, which all affect ecosystem health and area coverage.
IOGOOS II [48782–49299]
Two types of remotely sensed data will be required for this project. The first
type is high resolution data on shoreline change while the second is lower res-
olution data on wind and waves. The second category can be supplemented
by the output of global climate models, particularly for the case of wind data.
It was noted that wave and wind statistics compiled from such sources are
already available commercially for the region. Local measurements of waves
and wind are needed to validate the hydrodynamic models.
IOGOOS II [52845–53467]
The actual project would have duration of 5–7 years. It is expected that
the first year of project implementation would involve the final selection of
sites, training of personnel involved in monitoring, quality control and data
management, and setting up a regional data sharing network. Monitoring
would begin late in the first year and products would be available by the
end of the second year. Acquiring and interpreting remotely sensed data on
shoreline change would also begin in the first year while development of
a capability to predict shoreline change would begin in the second or third
year.
IOGOOS II [61176–61338]
The second annual meeting (IOGOOS II) held at Colombo during April
26–29, 2004 agreed on a detailed action plan and on the implementation of
several initiatives.
Dr. Radhakrishnan, chairman of IOGOOS, recalled the evolution and growth
of IOGOOS since its formal launch at Mauritius in November 2002, and
acknowledged the contributions made by several individuals and institu-
tions to bring it up as one of the best GOOS regional alliances (GRA)
with 19 members from 12 countries in the region and 2 associate members.
He informed in the meeting that the IOP had made excellent progress in
preparing a draft implementation plan for ocean observations in the Indian
Ocean for climate. He stressed that the coastal GOOS pilot projects must
be evolved into concrete proposals in conformance with the IOC’s Coastal
GOOS implementation plan.
328 Appendix B
IOGOOS-III [22379–22983]
Dr. Radhakrishnan briefly described the importance of remote sensing and
indicated that the United States, Europe and India have major remote sensing
programmes that cover the Indian Ocean. He gave an example of fisheries as
a case where remote sensing data is being used for an operational purpose.
Remote sensing data could also be used to provide inputs for coastal land use,
shoreline changes and so on. He suggested that the IOGOOS website should
have a page on remote sensing data availability, tools and so on. He gave
an overview of the training programme offered by CSSTE-AP and Indian
Institute of Remote Sensing.
IOGOOS-III [33786–34231]
The foundation of the website for this project has been constructed with an
emphasis on graphics and user friendliness as it is intended to be accessed as
a general source of information and used not only by researchers in the field.
It is expected, pending adequate funding, that the bulk of the website details
will be completed by the end of 2005 and the site hosted by the IOGOOS
secretariat by mid-2006 in advance of the IOGOOS IV meeting.
IOGOOS-III [41034–41485]
The Panel has met face-to-face twice (Pune, India, 2004; Hobart, Australia,
2005), but works primarily between sessions by e-mail and Internet.
The panel’s plan for IOGOOS is reported on the website of the
International CLIVAR Project Office at http://www.clivar.org/organization/
indian/IOOS/obs.html. The panel has published a report entitled, “The Role
of the Indian Ocean in the Climate System—an implementation plan for
sustained observations”.
IOGOOS-III [45571–46030]
Dr. Gary Meyers presented an overview of the design for an Indian Ocean
Observing System. It is integrated in the sense (1) that it makes use of all the
available types of instrumentation that can be deployed in the ocean for long
periods of time; (2) it provides data for a wide range of parameters relevant
to the physical and biological state of the ocean; and (3) it observes all the
relevant time-scales of variability from intra-seasonal to multi-decadal.
IOGOOS-III [49569–49846]
The major issues that have to be resolved to fully establish the mooring array
include ship time (180 days per year), fishing vandalism, operational fund-
ing, international coordination, system integration (e.g. commonalities with
multi-hazard warning system) and data management.
IOGOOS-III [51955–52210]
The strategic approach has been endorsed and we are planning to establish a
secretariat over the coming months, probably in the National Oceans Office.
The Indian Ocean region is a major focus of this plan and it will be strongly
guided by the IOP Panel.
IOGOOS-III [54989–55285]
One of the concerns is the way that the network will be implemented and
sustained. It also has to cater to operational activities since just science
Appendix B 329
objectives will not be sufficient to sustain funding. He noted that the GEOSS
framework can provide new approaches for securing long-term funding.
IOGOOS-III [58828–59024]
He commented that progress in the IOGOOS projects has not been as rapid
as required and that the IOGOOS officers could be given the responsibility
of individual projects based on their expertise.
IOGOOS-III [61223–62674]
Dr. K. Radhakrishnan, Chairman IOGOOS, elicited suggestions from the
participants to improve the functioning of IOGOOS. IOGOOS has already
achieved some good progress in respect of the evolution of a design for
basin-scale observations. It has also embarked on coastal pilot projects that
are complex and would take some time to see the results. The recent tsunami
demanded serious attention of some of the IOGOOS functionaries for evolv-
ing the tsunami early warning system and related capacity building for the
Indian Ocean. The following suggestions were received from the partici-
pants on how to further enhance the effectiveness of IOGOOS. There is a
need to collaborate on regional projects. Individual champions are needed to
take ahead successful projects. Projects should be able to cut across national
boundaries and countries should be sufficiently convinced that the project
is useful to them. Activities of IOGOOS, including the pilot projects and
progress, need to be made known at the national level. National GOOS
coordinating committees should be formed that also include the government
agencies that are involved in the pilot projects. IOGOOS probably needs to
spend more time on delivering products and useful information through the
website, capacity building for modelling, tsunami, coastal inundation mod-
elling and so on. It might be useful to have an IOGOOS workshop along with
the IGOOS meeting. IOGOOS needs to develop a user interface.
IOGOOS-IV [23582–25015]
Dr. Meyers presented an overview of the implementation plan for sustained
observations for climate research and operational prediction. The mooring
array is composed of 44 moorings to observe weather and upper ocean
parameters and three moorings to observe the deep equatorial currents. The
rationale for the array was discussed. At the present time, the three deep
moorings and nine of the surface moorings are active, located near 80◦ and
90◦ E. An additional three moorings are scheduled for implementation in late
2006/early 2007, including one in the western Indian Ocean. Implementation
of a mooring south of Java is under discussion. Challenges in implement-
ing the full array are vandalism by fishers and commitment of ship time.
Maintenance of the full array will require about 142 days of ship time per
year. About 400 Argo floats are now active in the Indian Ocean out of 480
required for full implementation. Floats to complete the array are available,
but ships to take them to the void locations are lacking. Implementation of all
the XBT lines is on track except IX10 (lacking a principal investigator) and
IX08 (lacking useful shipping.) The XBT line IX07 was dropped because it is
redundant and not as effective as IX08 for monitoring inflow to the western
330 Appendix B
boundary current system. NOAA and NIO are working together to imple-
ment IX08. Dr. Meyers reported progress (though limited) in coordinating
IOP activity with IOTWS.
IOGOOS-IV [29445–30125]
The participants identified three possible projects that address these ques-
tions: (1) Easy access/small data sets: Goal—provide the ocean re-analysis
and/or climate prediction data required for two or three specific projects in
an archive and format that will be user-friendly. The data will be targeted
specifically for IOGOOS members/associates. Actions: IOGOOS Secretariat
announces opportunity and call for proposals. IOGOOS chairman, IOP chair
and possibly a panel select the projects, taking account of common need
for data. Chair of ODIN-INCINDIO responsible for assembly of data set.
Resources: US $300,000–$400,000 for data assembly. Projects to be funded
by national resources.
IOGOOS-IV [31595–31807]
IOGOOS needs to develop a strategy to maximise IOGOOS mem-
bers/associates participation in IOC training programmes. IOGOOS needs
to develop a strategy to convert regional research projects to operational
activity.
IOGOOS-IV [31927–32185]
For the ecosystem project, it was suggested that perhaps we should start small
and set up a pilot project. While beginning with a pilot test, the project should
remain as an integrated whole. Suggested that India and Tanzania could start
with pilot testing.
IOGOOS-IV [35475–36058]
Coastal Erosion and Prawn Pilot Projects. The coordinators of these projects
did not turn up for the meeting. It was also noted that there was no progress
in the activities identified in the previous annual meetings. Considering this,
the meeting decided that these projects are to be abandoned unless other sci-
entists have the interest in taking over and coordinating them. As such, the
action decided was for the IOGOOS Secretariat to contact the project coor-
dinators and determine new leaders or termination of the project. Complete
action by February 2007, and report to membership.
IOGOOS-IV [41293–41611]
The meeting suggested that an audit could be coordinated from IOGOOS
as a basis for a more targeted activity in the future. This audit could cover
national programmes in coastal monitoring, in situ and remote sensing activ-
ities, data products, modelling and prediction activities, data and information
management and so on.
Process of Regime Formation (PROREGFOR)
IOGOOS I [10745–10975]
International conventions, such as the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change and the Convention on Biodiversity, and the economic
Appendix B 331
challenges and social commitments have mandated countries to implement

ocean observing systems.
IOGOOS I [53868–53945]
The strategy will take advantage of existing observing systems and facilities.
IOGOOS I [54186–54236]
It will also take advantage of some pilot projects.
IOGOOS I [54743–54808]
The strategy will take advantage of some pre-operational projects.
IOGOOS I [55303–55474]
For data management, the strategy will take advantage of the following
projects that are part of the IOC’s International Oceanographic Data and
Information Exchange (IODE).
IOGOOS I [55788–55915]
The strategy will be based on the following operational satellites providing
current oceanographic data for the Indian Ocean.
IOGOOS-III [69226–69580]
The members noted the efforts put in by IOGOOS Members & IOGOOS
Secretariat over the last 2 years for the GRAND Project. After detailed
assessment of its utility vis-à-vis the efforts put in, it was considered appro-
priate to withdraw from the GRAND Project. On behalf of IOGOOS,
the chairman was authorised to communicate the same to the GRAND
Secretariat.
Imposition (IMPOS)
IOGOOS I [10745–10974]
International conventions, such as the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change and the Convention on Biodiversity, and the economic
challenges and social commitments have mandated countries to implement
ocean-observing systems.
IOGOOS I [13222–13514]
Through the Conference, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
(of UNESCO) and its UN and regional partners are now one step closer to
establishing a fully operational Global Ocean Observing System in the Indian
Ocean with the collaboration of the countries of the Indian Ocean region.
IOGOOS I [33421–33531]
Under the oversight of the GOOS sponsors (IOC, UNEP, WMO, ICSU,
FAO), the observing system is being organised.
IOGOOS I [34064–34356]
The GOOS movement is an attempt to more effectively link and enhance
existing programmes for more cost-effective use of existing knowledge,
infrastructure and expertise; and more rapid detection and timely predic-
tion of environmental changes and events in coastal marine and estuarine
systems.
332 Appendix B
IOGOOS I [34676–34979]
The observing system is envisioned as a network of national, regional and
global systems that rapidly and systematically acquire and disseminate data
and data products to serve the needs of many user groups, including gov-
ernment agencies, private enterprise, scientists, educators, NGOs and the
public.
IOGOOS I [36809–36931]
The fact that the phenomena of interest are globally ubiquitous and tend to
be local expressions of larger-scale forcings.
IOGOOS I [140844–140950]
It was agreed that GOOS principles apply to all GOOS activities, including
data acquisition and exchange.
IOGOOS I [188373–188857]
Simply look at Europe and the United States to see how much they are invest-
ing in GOOS to benefit their own regions. The IOC and its UN partners, the
World Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Programme,
as well as the International Council of Science (ICSU), will continue to sup-
port the development process, but the implementation phase requires your
countries’ support. This begins with signing the IOGOOS Memorandum of
Understanding to become a contributing member.
IOGOOS II [4813–5273]
In his opening remarks, Dr. K. Radhakrishnan, Chairman IOGOOS and Vice
Chairman IOC, stated that the Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS)
envisages (1) an internationally accepted global design to address the broad
realms of oceans and climate and coastal ocean, (2) a set of regional alliances
of countries that will focus on issues of common concerns and interests of the
region and (3) national contributions for implementation of the observational
systems.
IOGOOS II [15157–15436]
GOOS (through Indian Ocean GOOS and the Perth Office of the IOC)
and CLIVAR have established the Indian Ocean Panel initially charged to
develop, coordinate and implement a plan for sustained ocean observations
of the Indian Ocean for climate research and ocean state estimation.
IOGOOS-III [69226–69580]
The members noted the efforts put in by IOGOOS members and IOGOOS
Secretariat over the last 2 years for the GRAND Project. After detailed
assessment of its utility vis-à-vis the efforts put in, it was considered appro-
priate to withdraw from the GRAND Project. On behalf of IOGOOS,
the Chairman was authorised to communicate the same to the GRAND
Secretariat.
Appendix B 333
Negotiation (NEGOT)
IOGOOS I [44694–44792]
Implementing the coastal module in the Indian Ocean will require partnering
among regional bodies.
IOGOOS I [45823–45920]
In addition, the development of IOGOOS should involve collaboration with
GOOS-AFRICA and SEAGOOS.
IOGOOS I [94609–94707]
However, the working group could not finalise the large-scale, open-ocean
moored-buoy array design.
Self-Generation (SELFG)
IOGOOS II [27169–27529]
The long-term objectives identified are as follows: (1) empower ALL mem-
bers to generate/share and disseminate products and services by themselves
using data from national and regional sources; (2) develop user-oriented and
user friendly ocean services system accessible by all and (3) ensure long-term
sustainability of the national and regional IOGOOS facilities.
Appendix C
Intra-Indian Ocean Trade (in USD Millions)
2001 to 2007
Value of Intra-Indian Ocean trade (in USD millions) 2001–2007
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 13765.43 13745.94 14678.40 19639.35 22844.84 26771.79 30658.66
Bahrain 1395.69 1303.89 1501.84 2152.50 2790.67 3432.79 4002.48
Bangladesh 293.14 253.21 299.90 320.70 456.12 624.07 706.86
Comoros 6.97 3.90 2.86 6.35 6.09 4.83 5.77
Djibouti 181.68 194.39 236.76 240.76 263.46 325.70 406.65
Egypt 1023.17 1043.92 1425.64 2087.11 3021.64 3539.94 4318.39
Eritrea
Ethiopia 181.85 144.80 198.17 139.17 216.93 249.96 310.27
India 10340.82 14060.55 18815.51 24673.45 31805.77 37358.50 47144.02
Indonesia 14058.83 14867.46 15789.48 18741.20 23268.59 33693.21 37951.49
Iran 3302.33 2811.17 3626.07 5523.12 6623.60 8334.54 8766.39
Iraq 836.12 936.56 410.86 396.70 293.96 651.27 429.03
Israel 2312.70 2199.10 2408.50 2972.30 3224.90 3340.40 4086.40
Jordan 1362.67 1515.65 1438.18 1743.61 2064.49 2375.53 2744.19
Kenya 679.42 672.79 710.93 838.06 885.93 1055.37 1307.89
Kuwait 4170.44 4004.61 4653.16 6891.30 8966.37 10757.72 12702.65
Madagascar 145.28 53.46 105.12 80.97 60.62 65.89 81.73
Malaysia 26745.48 29446.26 33110.96 41081.31 48173.94 54600.08 60965.60
Maldives 27.28 31.02 43.31 51.00 45.97 84.21 80.26
Mauritius 140.96 139.62 210.91 232.11 372.47 472.65 601.21
Mozambique 117.41 137.53 187.22 251.77 335.11 436.86 425.37
Myanmar 1159.56 1394.46 1414.28 1853.45 2416.74 3023.00 3183.16
Oman 4068.61 4281.10 3851.07 3679.24 5729.56 8677.87 7383.94
Pakistan 2119.22 2479.92 3104.54 2972.71 3713.96 4297.45 5370.15
Qatar 1990.03 2675.74 2692.11 4734.94 5496.96 8405.48 10637.28
Saudi Arabia 16967.82 15438.86 19360.11 26278.18 35081.82 44588.60 48347.31
Seychelles 6.30 4.65 2.63 19.95 27.33 43.62 58.08
Singapore 37212.35 38518.44 58212.30 71801.85 85631.90 99958.05 112861.75
Somalia 64.03 96.89 133.39 169.75 234.49 281.18 356.20
South Africa 3902.74 3828.83 4923.72 6243.40 7979.52 7802.70 9669.33
Sri Lanka 658.33 723.06 871.44 1041.72 1314.69 1511.46 1889.44
Sudan 185.30 286.06 954.49 533.11 501.04 621.69 560.96
Tanzania 180.16 183.29 225.51 311.04 329.77 403.37 481.90
Thailand 14632.19 15845.57 19314.88 24860.35 29271.89 33760.34 41707.99
United Arab Emirates 11279.00 11683.01 14437.25 20114.52 27044.67 35139.37 40530.78
Yemen 2082.32 1960.21 1751.82 2431.23 2266.31 3041.88 3880.59
Grand Total 177595.59 186965.88 231103.31 295108.25 362762.09 439731.36 504614.15
Source: Developed from International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade online
335
336 Appendix C
Value of exports to the world (in USD millions) 2001–2007

Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 63399.30 65221.20 70900.20 86161.80 105055.00 121827.00 141350.00
Bahrain 8254.80 8455.21 10354.40 13592.50 15943.40 19793.00 24023.10
Bangladesh 5735.61 5443.26 6229.39 7585.60 8494.40 12740.20 13909.70
Comoros 37.50 28.47 32.96 34.51 24.09 31.94 30.53
Djibouti 236.27 202.28 247.11 252.31 274.49 340.22 422.66
Egypt 4140.41 7048.54 8499.16 12187.10 15593.00 20704.40 23229.40
Eritrea
Ethiopia 285.93 421.46 467.86 570.37 781.89 1085.64 1207.21
India 45512.70 50496.30 61118.50 75385.20 97918.10 123032.00 151932.00
Indonesia 56317.70 57154.30 61012.60 71550.20 85622.60 113601.00 129428.00
Iran 24336.90 22176.20 31782.30 40997.50 55402.80 70594.10 81865.40
Iraq 11064.50 9133.97 8140.66 16119.10 17656.70 23863.40 27271.90
Israel 29046.00 29512.10 31291.20 38519.80 42513.60 46448.50 54048.50
Jordan 2291.50 2769.49 3081.12 3530.40 4300.60 5203.56 5534.00
Kenya 1872.57 2143.97 2403.73 2702.77 3544.70 4107.56 4846.27
Kuwait 16155.10 15525.80 18746.10 25520.10 35190.80 42220.30 47312.50
Madagascar 673.89 494.69 848.13 1253.25 1004.83 1071.49 1221.68
Malaysia 88201.00 93386.60104968.00 126509.00 140977.00 160664.00 176207.00
Maldives 76.57 90.71 112.71 122.83 98.72 167.15 170.35
Mauritius 1524.91 1746.41 1807.97 1914.13 2000.19 2177.47 2256.65
Mozambique 703.70 682.02 1043.91 1503.86 1745.26 2381.13 2764.24
Myanmar 2625.44 2753.15 2767.95 3158.84 3702.15 4377.99 4786.62
Oman 10681.10 11126.70 10361.70 12725.60 17419.40 23665.50 24760.80
Pakistan 9211.43 9880.35 11928.00 13284.20 16046.00 17183.00 19626.80
Qatar 10868.50 10976.50 13380.10 18545.80 18001.00 25090.40 30767.60
Saudi Arabia 68831.90 66140.40 86547.20 112687.00 156967.00 189418.00 200491.00
Seychelles 152.44 174.80 213.86 367.93 416.74 350.34 339.14
Singapore 121826.00 125219.00160073.00 198694.00 229447.00 272057.00 299173.00
Somalia 77.20 112.95 150.50 190.09 250.63 301.21 380.15
South Africa 29510.30 29898.70 36353.30 45554.80 51561.60 52439.00 63484.30
Sri Lanka 4722.42 4678.38 5133.30 5757.23 6383.65 7494.75 8522.03
Sudan 1699.87 1941.58 2609.37 3773.70 4821.78 5699.26 8703.83
Tanzania 774.44 948.64 934.14 1220.71 1474.42 1572.38 1827.32
Thailand 65113.20 68849.80 80318.20 96213.90 110158.00 130555.00 152459.00
United Arab
Emirates
39878.70 39135.70 50096.20 66787.90 93172.80 111980.00 126705.00
Yemen 3370.17 3270.99 3724.01 4076.39 5606.29 6440.51 7171.40
Grand Total 729209.97 747240.61 887678.83 1109050.42 1349570.63 1620678.40 1838229.08

All data is as generated from the IMF database. From the database the subsequent
totals of exports to developing countries and industrialised countries do not add up
to world exports
Appendix C 337
Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as percentage of world exports 2001–2007

Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 21.71 21.08 20.70 22.79 21.75 21.98 21.69
Bahrain 16.91 15.42 14.50 15.84 17.50 17.34 16.66
Bangladesh 5.11 4.65 4.81 4.23 5.37 4.90 5.08
Comoros 18.59 13.70 8.68 18.40 25.26 15.13 18.89
Djibouti 76.89 96.10 95.81 95.42 95.98 95.73 96.21
Egypt 24.71 14.81 16.77 17.13 19.38 17.10 18.59
Eritrea
Ethiopia 63.60 34.36 42.36 24.40 27.74 23.02 25.70
India 22.72 27.84 30.79 32.73 32.48 30.36 31.03
Indonesia 24.96 26.01 25.88 26.19 27.18 29.66 29.32
Iran 13.57 12.68 11.41 13.47 11.96 11.81 10.71
Iraq 7.56 10.25 5.05 2.46 1.66 2.73 1.57
Israel 7.96 7.45 7.70 7.72 7.59 7.19 7.56
Jordan 59.47 54.73 46.68 49.39 48.00 45.65 49.59
Kenya 36.28 31.38 29.58 31.01 24.99 25.69 26.99
Kuwait 25.81 25.79 24.82 27.00 25.48 25.48 26.85
Madagascar 21.56 10.81 12.39 6.46 6.03 6.15 6.69
Malaysia 30.32 31.53 31.54 32.47 34.17 33.98 34.60
Maldives 35.63 34.20 38.43 41.52 46.56 50.38 47.11
Mauritius 9.24 7.99 11.67 12.13 18.62 21.71 26.64
Mozambique 16.69 20.17 17.93 16.74 19.20 18.35 15.39
Myanmar 44.17 50.65 51.09 58.68 65.28 69.05 66.50
Oman 38.09 38.48 37.17 28.91 32.89 36.67 29.82
Pakistan 23.01 25.10 26.03 22.38 23.15 25.01 27.36
Qatar 18.31 24.38 20.12 25.53 30.54 33.50 34.57
Saudi Arabia 24.65 23.34 22.37 23.32 22.35 23.54 24.11
Seychelles 4.13 2.66 1.23 5.42 6.56 12.45 17.12
Singapore 30.55 30.76 36.37 36.14 37.32 36.74 37.72
Somalia 82.94 85.78 88.63 89.30 93.56 93.35 93.70
South Africa 13.23 12.81 13.54 13.71 15.48 14.88 15.23
Sri Lanka 13.94 15.46 16.98 18.09 20.59 20.17 22.17
Sudan 10.90 14.73 36.58 14.13 10.39 10.91 6.45
Tanzania 23.26 19.32 24.14 25.48 22.37 25.65 26.37
Thailand 22.47 23.01 24.05 25.84 26.57 25.86 27.36
Yemen 61.79 59.93 47.04 59.64 40.42 47.23 54.11

338 Appendix C
Value of exports to developing countries (in USD millions) 2001–2007

Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 31052.40 31952.70 34141.50 43919 .50 55503.20 65322.00 78762.30
Bahrain 1865.14 1779.36 2111.48 2860.92 3595.01 4364.55 5200.54
Bangladesh 542.67 528.82 557.13 652.68 850.38 1288.28 1522.64
Comoros 8.08 4.37 3.82 8.72 7.15 7.34 18.01
Djibouti 183.58 195.61 239.26 243.41 265.41 328.51 412.12
Egypt 1566.86 1929.57 2704.32 4389.43 5811.48 7063.00 8847.23
Eritrea
Ethiopia 185.77 165.04 223.73 201.44 322.77 563.74 623.74
India 20042.70 24647.40 32229.20 41891.20 55035.20 69418.50 89578.40
Indonesia 25141.20 26974.20 29503 .70 35311.10 44509.10 60536.00 70591.20
Iran 10388.10 8829.13 12889.60 17590.10 24394.80 33609.40 40481.70
Iraq 1847.71 2466.10 1185.31 2979.76 3452.83 4454.23 5350.74
Israel 7011.40 6947.80 7307.70 9986.80 10986.40 12499.80 14783.80
Jordan 1657.86 1865.31 1885.28 2224.26 2677.07 3037.27 3508.79
Kenya 1280.87 1371.00 1484.59 1716.11 1900.94 2302.01 2857.05
Kuwait 7955.95 8101.11 10172.00 14477.90 20068.80 24989.10 28994.60
Madagascar 166.64 69.66 130.61 112.53 98.10 109.51 134.91
Malaysia 43354.50 49191.30 56594.00 69322.80 77872.00 89920.50 103119.00
Maldives 30.90 32.96 46.71 51.97 51.16 96.21 94.69
Mauritius 161.67 203.79 251.73 272.96 445.10 588.29 745.89
Mozambique 174.88 201.07 290.87 383.24 486.05 611.67 801.62
Myanmar 1589.14 1871.79 1910 .29 2417.85 3127.54 3735.71 4075.45
Oman 7768.98 8236.61 8057.62 10321.00 13786.20 19686.70 20073.50
Pakistan 3937.62 4232.31 5274.29 5662.83 7295.64 9179.63 11235.80
Qatar 4591.34 4710.10 5733.21 8333.65 6641.03 9248.42 12120.60
Saudi Arabia 32516.30 30935.00 40523.90 55192.30 76425.50 95484.90 108315.00
Seychelles 9.58 5.16 5.65 45.61 49.34 61.87 86.74
Singapore 71793.40 75950.40 103115.00 129051.00 154418.00 185337.00 210445.00
Somalia 72.97 109.77 148.14 186.46 248.23 298.09 374.03
South Africa 8586.06 8634.65 11010.00 13995.50 16321.80 18375.80 24465.10
Sri Lanka 1148.93 1163.02 1375.98 1660.90 1954.25 2317.35 2898.37
Sudan 1219.31 1493.60 2159.60 3180.89 4024.98 2698.69 6745.42
Tanzania 247.52 343.79 505.75 667.72 869.39 978.14 1156.43
Thai land 28151.30 30907.20 38786.60 48448.20 58143.20 69787.20 85698.90
Yemen 2909.65 2980.54 3448.34 3723.43 4577.79 5481.92 6070.96
Grand Total 337345.06 357456.94 439551.81 563599.98 699963.34 860096.34 1015266.86

Appendix C 339
Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as percentage of exports to developing countries 2001–2007

Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 200 6 2007
Australia 44.33 43.02 42.99 44.72 41.16 40.98 38.93
Bahrain 74.83 73.28 71.13 75.24 77.63 78.65 76.96
Bangladesh 54.02 47.88 53.83 49.14 53.64 48.44 46.42
Comoros 86.25 89.27 74.82 72.82 85.15 65.79 32.04
Djibouti 98.97 99.37 98.95 98.91 99.26 99.15 98.67
Egypt 65.30 54.10 52.72 47.55 51.99 50.12 48.81
Eritrea
Ethiopia 97.89 87.73 88.58 69.09 67.21 44.34 49.74
India 51.59 57.05 58.38 58.90 57.79 53.82 52.63
Indonesia 55.92 55.12 53.52 53.07 52.28 55.66 53.76
Iran 31.79 31.84 28.13 31.40 27.15 24.80 21.66
Iraq 45.25 37.98 34.66 13.31 8.51 14.62 8.02
Israel 32.98 31.65 32.96 29.76 29.35 26.72 27.64
Jordan 82.19 81.25 76.28 78.39 77.12 78.21 78.21
Kenya 53.04 49.07 47.89 48.83 46.60 45.85 45.78
Kuwait 52.42 49.43 45.74 47.60 44.68 43.05 43.81
Madagascar 87.18 76.74 80.49 71.95 61.79 60.17 60.58
Malaysia 61.69 59.86 58.51 59.26 61.86 60.72 59.12
Maldives 88.30 94.11 92.72 98.12 89.85 87.52 84.76
Mauritius 87.19 68.51 83.78 85.04 83.68 80.34 80.60
Mozambique 67.14 68.40 64.36 65.69 68.94 71.42 53.06
Myanmar 72.97 74.50 74.03 76.66 77.27 80.92 78.11
Oman 52.37 51.98 47.79 35.65 41.56 44.08 36.78
Pakistan 53.82 58.59 58.86 52.50 50.91 46.82 47.80
Qatar 43.34 56.81 46.96 56.82 82.77 90.89 87.76
Saudi Arabia 52.18 49.91 77.47 47.61 45.90 46.70 44.64
Seychelles 65.76 90.09 46.59 43.73 55.39 70.51 66.96
Singapore 51.83 50.72 56.45 55.64 55.45 53.93 53.63
Somalia 87.76 88.27 90.04 91.04 94.47 94.33 95.23
South Africa 45.45 44.34 44.72 44.61 48.89 42.46 39.52
Sri Lanka 57.30 62.17 63.33 62.72 67.27 65.22 65.19
Sudan 15.20 19.15 44.20 16.76 12.45 23.04 8.32
Tanzania 72.78 53.32 44.59 46.58 37.93 41.24 41.67
Thailand 51.98 51.27 49.80 51.31 50.34 48.38 48.67
Yemen 71.57 65.77 50.80 65.30 49.51 55.49 63.92

340 Appendix C
Value of exports to industrialised countries (in USD millions) 2001–2007

Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 30625.60 31846.20 35443.50 40574.90 47956.10 5469 3.10 60659.00
Bahrain 1102.00 937.30 979.78 1192.67 1449.36 1958.16 2105.93
Bangladesh 4273.74 4033.87 4688.50 5921.80 6354.97 9858.73 10409.90
Comoros 29.28 23.95 28.95 25.54 16.66 24.25 12.10
Djibouti 52.70 6.67 7.85 8.90 9.08 11.71 10.54
Egypt 1775.08 4252.42 4698.06 6357.22 8135.75 11607.30 11857.80
Eritrea
Ethiopia 100.10 254.91 242.80 362.62 455.42 517.33 577.79
India 23780.70 24960.40 28497.90 33054.40 42554.90 53208.60 61850.90
Indonesia 31101.30 30119.70 31486.80 36229.90 411 04.90 53053.80 58824.00
Iran 10305.90 9473.51 14196.70 17193.50 22555.40 26358.20 28564.00
Iraq 9216.83 6667.87 6955.36 13139.30 14203.90 19409.20 21921.20
Israel 20712.50 21094.00 22473.80 27031.10 30094.50 32811.70 37171.40
Jordan 350.34 686.66 974.99 1176.62 1289.53 1775.11 1502.95
Kenya 533.59 691.09 793.28 830.31 1465.12 1584.77 1715.22
Kuwait 8199.11 7424.73 8574.07 11042.20 15122.10 17231.20 18317.90
Madagascar 497.28 414.39 701.03 1119.07 881.99 931.41 1048.83
Malaysia 44806.70 44170.30 4833 9.10 57117.70 63031.10 70683.00 73002.30
Maldives 45.67 57.75 66.00 70.86 47.56 70.93 75.66
Mauritius 1363.15 1542.58 1550.90 1634.05 1554.45 1589.05 1510.60
Mozambique 487.11 431.41 681.83 1035.86 1172.41 1634.45 1795.08
Myanmar 1008.29 850.95 819.18 690.45 516.87 570.91 622.60
Oman 2912.11 2890.13 2304.07 2404.57 3633.28 3978.76 4687.31
Pakistan 5266.57 5643.85 6651.68 7613.81 8739.18 7989.51 8373.85
Qatar 6268.60 5741.63 6772.13 8802.02 11360.00 15842.00 18647.00
Saudi Arabia 36273.90 35161.10 45969.50 57423.50 80444.20 93811.10 92029.30
Seychelles 142.35 169.18 207.86 321.85 366.88 287.83 251.59
Singapore 49646.30 48837.20 56425.90 68954.90 74198.80 85691.50 87897.70
Somalia 4.20 3.15 2.31 3.56 2.34 3.03 6.01
South Africa 13262.90 13833.70 19972.30 25752.20 30243.30 33983.00 38882.20
Sri Lanka 3530.77 3447.35 3540.46 4043.26 4280.72 4993.65 5395.63
Sudan 479.36 446.67 428.40 583.75 781.78 2982.01 1957.15
Tanzania 526.62 597.18 418.69 540.25 590.47 576.24 648.55
Thailand 36820.00 37058.60 41240.60 47425.20 51642.50 60438.30 66239.40
United Arab E mirates 15805.90 14447.40 18960.30 24627.40 35761.70 38487.50 40905.80
Yemen 303.87 283.72 267.15 326.19 995.82 918.20 1050.33
Grand Total 361610.41 358501.51 415361.74 504631.44 603013.02 709565.54 760527.53

Appendix C 341
Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as percentage of exports to industrialised countries 2001–2007

Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia 44.95 43.16 41.41 48.40 47.64 48.95 50.54
Bahrain 126.65 139.11 153.28 180.48 192.54 175.31 190.06
Bangladesh 6.86 6.28 6.40 5.42 7.18 6.33 6.79
Comoros 23.81 16.28 9.88 24.86 36.52 19.92 47.68
Djibouti 344.77 2915.19 3014.45 2705.72 2903.10 2781.40 3858.13
Egypt 57.64 24.55 30.35 32.83 37.14 30.50 36.42
Eritrea
Ethiopia 181.66 56.80 81.62 38.38 47.63 48.32 53.70
India 43.48 56.33 66.02 74.64 74.74 70.21 76.22
Indonesia 45.20 49.36 50.15 51.73 56.61 63.51 64.52
Iran 32.04 29.67 25.54 32.12 29.37 31.62 30.69
Iraq 9.07 14.05 5.91 3.02 2.07 3.36 1.96
Israel 11.17 10.43 10.72 11.00 10.72 10.18 10.99
Jordan 388.96 220.73 147.51 148.19 160.10 133.82 182.59
Kenya 127.33 97.35 89.62 100.93 60.47 66.59 76.25
Kuwait 50.86 53.94 54.27 62.41 59.29 62.43 69.35
Madagascar 29.22 12.90 15.00 7.24 6.87 7.07 7.79
Malaysia 59.69 66.67 68.50 71.92 76.43 77.25 83.51
Maldives 59.73 53.72 65.62 71.97 96.65 118.71 106.07
Mauritius 10.34 9.05 13.60 14.20 23.96 29.74 39.80
Mozambique 24.10 31.88 27.46 24.31 28.58 26.73 23.70
Myanmar 115.00 163.87 172.65 268.44 467.57 529.51 511.27
Oman 139.71 148.13 167.14 153.01 157.70 218.10 157.53
Pakistan 40.24 43.94 46.67 39.04 42.50 53.79 64.13
Qatar 31.75 46.60 39.75 53.79 48.39 53.06 57.05
Saudi Arabia 46.78 43.91 42.12 45.76 43.61 47.53 52.53
Seychelles 4.42 2.75 1.27 6.20 7.45 15.16 23.08
Singapore 74.95 78.87 103.17 104.13 115.41 116.65 128.40
Somalia 1523.46 3079.69 5764.39 4762.93 10029.43 9267.57 5922.85
South Africa 29.43 27.68 24.65 24.24 26.38 22.96 24.87
Sri Lanka 18.65 20.97 24.61 25.76 30.71 30.27 35.02
Sudan 38.65 64.04 222.80 91.33 64.09 20.85 28.66
Tanzania 34.21 30.69 53.86 57.57 55.85 70.00 74.30
Thailand 39.74 42.76 46.83 52.42 56.68 55.86 62.97
Yemen 685.28 690.89 655.74 745.33 227.58 331.29 369.46

Appendix D
Intra-Indian Ocean Exports by Value (in USD Millions) by Country 2001
Intra-Indian Ocean exports by value (in USD millions) by country 2001
AUS BHR BGD COM DJI EGY ERI ETH IND IDN IRN IRQ ISR JOR KEN KWT MDG MYS MDV MUS MOZ MMR OMN PAK QAT SAU SYC SGP SOM ZAF LKA SDN TZA THA ARE YEM Total
AUS 51.508 183.374 0.095 0.342 372.565 0.379 3.071 1242.660 1663.680 387.807 438.877 143.341 48.087 49.430 251.418 3.280 1335.850 8.612 68.724 98.958 19.568 106.755 222.336 61.008 1352.450 2.858 2768.230 0.122 672.161 177.493 67.654 65.296 1177.030 657.620 62.790 13765.429
BHR 4.049 0.000 0.000 13.379 0.000 0.000 246.694 21.653 65.689 0.064 7.164 71.574 56.062 47.136 50.698 0.419 30.103 0.000 0.000 39.263 38.808 20.005 180.853 6.922 180.898 0.005 44.329 17.566 0.002 51.612 51.881 138.273 10.588 1395.689
BGD 13.604 1.453 0.000 1.361 7.023 0.000 0.408 60.800 4.859 36.845 2.445 0.000 1.297 2.550 2.762 0.119 4.765 0.242 0.023 0.274 0.677 0.951 25.597 1.815 11.783 0.000 35.653 0.000 2.020 2.019 2.470 1.046 16.735 50.558 0.985 293.139
COM 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.428 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 6.428 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.971
DJI 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 44.494 0.427 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.266 0.031 0.000 0.001 1.428 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.041 88.492 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 46.130 181.679
EGY 1.687 2.314 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.421 2.501 252.132 9.174 4.297 90.559 189.862 25.197 19.853 16.755 1.459 9.724 0.000 5.205 0.726 0.020 4.195 20.855 4.593 146.882 0.002 86.125 0.102 4.752 0.602 33.358 3.800 8.790 59.048 17.949 1023.170
ERI 0.000
ETH 1.166 0.000 0.000 0.000 121.376 0.019 9.698 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.749 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.144 0.000 37.533 181.845
IND 409.360 81.779 1086.810 1.297 20.424 258.478 82.954 442.053 509.801 75.038 390.455 66.748 148.465 187.121 16.713 702.188 37.308 145.326 22.888 53.047 205.973 219.144 79.071 681.470 5.898 1016.690 8.170 245.148 546.801 100.712 79.520 611.724 1679.360 122.881 10340.815
IDN 1844.890 17.906 215.608 2.126 14.847 196.804 3.100 6.395 1053.940 121.498 82.968 0.000 68.709 25.181 74.510 19.004 1778.630 11.311 36.754 7.968 68.978 19.936 178.634 20.754 482.472 2.197 5363.830 12.522 160.061 159.472 62.140 36.496 1063.620 756.978 88.587 14058.826
IRN 13.691 0.000 9.338 0.000 0.000 9.647 0.000 462.229 120.050 0.000 0.000 10.732 9.097 0.000 1.799 135.576 0.024 6.258 0.000 0.000 41.964 198.296 22.428 108.170 0.016 519.416 0.000 1027.000 211.999 0.000 4.847 69.314 316.091 4.352 3302.334
IRQ 0.000 0.005 0.214 0.000 0.895 0.000 54.048 0.001 21.645 0.000 622.650 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 2.847 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 63.278 0.000 0.000 0.000 70.381 0.000 0.077 836.117
ISR 231.200 0.200 0.000 0.000 47.100 1.100 5.900 471.600 24.400 0.000 65.300 24.200 0.000 615.900 6.000 0.000 0.300 0.000 0.000 261.800 0.000 166.400 56.700 0.000 4.400 330.200 0.000 2312.700
JOR 1.274 18.667 0.664 0.000 0.787 23.426 2.959 5.907 205.212 29.985 9.222 533.840 111.974 3.391 36.946 0.002 23.545 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.913 25.624 25.630 142.120 0.000 1.812 0.499 4.589 1.344 24.263 0.322 5.394 91.694 17.660 1362.665
KEN 9.998 0.436 0.357 4.514 10.741 90.639 6.045 27.409 30.064 0.906 5.312 0.000 15.406 1.353 0.422 3.265 3.138 0.030 4.324 3.766 1.144 0.041 112.993 0.048 7.359 2.707 6.753 30.879 5.388 2.442 31.152 171.976 7.044 64.092 17.274 679.417
KWT 62.546 14.929 25.511 0.000 0.000 45.837 0.882 551.835 643.902 10.167 0.000 16.672 6.253 0.023 60.615 0.001 0.178 0.000 0.000 38.349 721.046 14.036 100.214 0.000 1237.180 0.000 93.619 6.389 0.000 2.040 307.126 94.546 116.539 4170.435
MDG 0.751 0.000 0.040 2.245 0.017 0.249 0.001 1.465 22.441 0.007 0.000 0.393 0.004 1.218 0.000 0.182 0.000 23.438 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.133 0.838 81.520 0.000 2.054 0.149 0.304 0.511 6.083 0.766 0.006 145.283
MYS 2052.090 27.119 171.335 0.204 4.582 209.917 0.205 6.168 1577.050 1563.110 178.346 33.029 0.000 66.454 20.384 63.292 7.330 28.891 27.090 4.664 197.011 96.737 399.270 29.482 341.235 2.144 14912.900 2.618 256.078 187.001 19.488 16.041 3359.950 833.448 50.820 26745.483
MDV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.211 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.482 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.719 0.000 15.785 0.000 7.064 0.021 27.282
MUS 3.873 1.107 0.257 3.603 0.022 0.492 0.025 2.246 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.913 0.000 5.769 0.016 95.183 0.431 0.003 1.034 0.047 0.077 0.123 0.000 0.056 5.138 1.400 0.000 12.331 1.082 0.086 2.762 0.324 2.052 0.010 140.956
MOZ 0.590 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.534 0.018 0.808 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.661 0.000 0.000 1.289 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.041 0.012 1.173 0.000 107.635 0.000 0.000 0.181 0.127 1.110 0.000 117.414
MMR 11.121 0.413 17.924 0.000 2.2 0 179.827 18.933 0 0.000 0 0.024 0 2.066 0 71.088 0 0.313 0.144 15.88 0 0.774 0 102.135 0.000 0.114 1.138 0.000 0 735.406 0 0.055 1159.555
OMN 1.038 15.357 0.414 0.051 2.159 147.652 0.667 2.292 143.145 32.348 454.836 20.735 0.000 44.304 29.004 25.376 0.017 303.235 0.121 0.415 0.075 0.002 7.382 20.786 188.740 0.000 508.608 10.644 121.522 5.326 16.893 64.652 1031.740 822.393 46.682 4068.611
PAK 102.214 45.051 119.483 0.349 1.493 44.534 0.000 1.776 66.183 95.089 28.934 22.660 0.000 25.251 28.373 53.128 7.958 53.303 1.657 29.545 0.000 3.263 48.683 34.917 296.031 0.270 46.892 3.538 71.679 74.857 8.397 23.001 53.180 697.106 30.427 2119.222
QAT 171.376 29.581 4.017 0.001 11.675 2.492 0.876 156.667 19.855 5.479 0.178 15.285 4.173 17.442 23.082 41.260 0.014 0.009 0.489 0.006 6.421 12.550 150.550 0.022 737.568 0.073 51.252 11.704 3.831 13.690 257.379 233.182 7.853 1990.032
SAU 578.932 1554.240 215.742 0.000 105.719 616.976 13.056 183.088 1196.660 1194.670 201.400 0.000 142.265 182.514 539.925 6.068 578.628 0.667 34.714 0.792 2.450 168.220 1034.190 181.618 36.922 3844.720 4.364 1730.440 32.355 140.896 52.935 1226.030 888.455 278.170 16967.821
SYC 0.393 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 3.568 0.051 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.000 1.912 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 6.298
SGP 3171.130 20.912 846.599 1.252 9.234 125.508 3.843 2743.510 0.000 251.088 0.000 191.843 14.066 17.466 66.558 36.695 21122.000 105.234 83.339 3.754 423.234 72.540 365.297 38.661 312.722 22.184 0.000 259.810 395.545 23.112 10.188 5304.380 1146.720 23.922 37212.346
SOM 0.004 2.097 0.000 0.000 0.401 0.418 0.000 2.534 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.871 0.114 3.073 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.733 0.919 0.000 6.538 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.000 0.023 0.007 2.471 38.182 2.378 64.031
ZAF 440.338 6.235 3.933 8.838 6.707 30.625 1.632 12.771 361.932 98.962 57.333 3.129 509.882 12.788 218.452 14.898 53.270 153.309 1.639 244.473 664.260 0.235 5.029 63.672 8.658 122.141 25.749 231.549 0.147 21.759 20.279 179.817 169.316 143.796 5.187 3902.740
LKA 45.214 1.805 10.084 0.000 13.612 0.760 71.985 5.456 29.450 19.063 55.306 22.045 1.564 9.093 1.566 6.651 50.451 1.219 0.000 0.593 4.634 24.871 0.884 31.060 0.395 57.120 0.000 10.143 0.033 0.191 36.877 145.381 0.823 658.329
SDN 0.095 2.106 5.047 0.000 0.000 58.240 0.000 0.802 7.678 31.312 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.892 11.918 0.622 0.070 0.212 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.265 3.801 0.000 26.078 0.000 9.797 0.777 0.162 0.000 0.044 6.365 0.000 4.999 185.297
TZA 2.476 0.044 0.902 0.017 0.028 1.834 0.336 0.734 82.203 3.302 0.054 0.000 1.905 0.093 38.412 0.036 0.674 2.957 0.262 0.329 1.497 0.232 0.544 7.005 0.000 4.894 0.035 5.954 0.148 8.946 0.136 0.238 4.277 9.555 0.098 180.157
THA 1358.120 33.016 231.125 3.333 3.630 142.290 7.627 481.888 1365.730 132.062 57.774 455.539 38.667 29.086 65.013 4.730 2721.610 12.700 27.315 10.865 355.040 40.141 178.474 19.450 348.160 2.121 5287.440 17.110 315.199 140.709 18.237 33.922 636.347 57.715 14632.185
ARE 438.050 111.999 102.288 4.293 10.328 100.964 0.000 1057.220 157.797 1484.530 0.000 53.408 479.811 275.177 54.078 148.947 29.521 32.824 12.129 0.000 1496.000 1183.670 177.572 575.730 19.524 1240.590 12.837 99.250 137.251 14.432 99.068 1390.000 279.708 11278.996
YEM 0.000 10.395 0.304 0.000 6.894 10.965 3.034 3.353 618.522 0.900 0.049 4.889 1.403 0.058 64.180 0.000 218.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.931 1.293 1.718 67.879 0.000 316.798 8.718 111.508 0.220 2.500 0.024 605.680 19.827 2082.316
Total 10967.226 2050.479 3255.850 32.217 321.093 2583.963 35.426 404.037 13396.816 7571.510 3996.693 1385.248 2068.568 1385.729 1429.022 1825.959 387.453 30145.666 289.107 808.109 834.289 1125.852 2417.460 5066.498 763.134 5687.021 135.954 38872.790 201.765 5649.018 2207.844 590.500 918.389 17926.033 9526.669 1332.198 177595.585
Source: Developed from International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics online
Appendix E
AUS 53.395 172.107 0.138 1.303 359.093 0.430 4.467 1353.810 1695.900 332.235 362.642 134.610 64.210 43.658 285.915 3.059 1243.630 13.442 75.649 97.008 8.891 95.296 230.219 44.826 1283.960 3.341 2641.010 0.517 708.533 161.710 79.256 61.361 1371.270 691.333 67.713 13745.937
BHR 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.520 0.000 0.000 113.046 38.664 51.278 0.067 9.483 32.666 57.984 51.510 35.100 2.383 33.549 0.000 0.000 78.625 40.558 30.593 250.200 0.050 67.178 0.006 10.622 95.133 0.002 63.972 52.034 147.000 27.662 1303.885
BGD 13.162 0.903 0.000 0.927 11.765 0.000 0.097 39.326 7.082 38.236 0.000 0.000 1.312 3.959 3.684 0.177 5.550 0.000 0.043 0.180 0.966 1.116 27.180 2.312 11.997 0.000 26.557 0.078 3.090 1.938 16.685 0.126 11.117 21.879 1.767 253.211
COM 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.422 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.012 0.066 0.000 0.011 0.006 0.000 3.167 0.128 0.001 0.000 0.000 3.900
DJI 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 54.849 0.727 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.019 0.000 0.000 8.129 0.000 0.286 0.000 0.297 96.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 33.983 194.385
EGY 14.698 2.511 6.569 0.000 0.000 0.456 17.611 177.195 19.26 13.249 93.664 18.455 69.164 33.08 17.330 2.337 14.567 0.08 9.165 0 0.022 15.617 36 14.219 197.477 0.017 77.388 0.110 10.315 0 36.203 4.759 9.512 93 39.892 1043.922
ERI
ETH 0.896 0.000 0.000 0.000 54.350 4.887 10.969 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.138 0.000 0.024 0.001 0.000 4.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.777 0.000 28.071 0.000 1.425 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.258 0.009 1.073 0.000 7.646 144.795
IND 482.638 93.551 1132.540 5.384 32.120 339.365 69.182 753.804 554.305 212.858 582.909 96.583 191.694 239.485 14.268 755.453 30.409 163.997 42.731 71.528 186.204 190.624 84.330 912.166 6.065 1309.260 18.708 451.218 848.459 109.430 109.290 691.681 3118.560 159.746 14060.545
IDN 1924.360 16.670 245.709 2.215 12.585 179.643 3.895 11.745 1301.960 128.586 62.793 0.000 91.388 23.497 74.261 14.276 2029.950 10.401 33.457 9.503 54.361 18.820 264.892 24.306 474.963 1.688 5349.080 3.246 167.205 153.350 92.580 57.185 1227.350 719.552 81.983 14867.455
IRN 20.866 0.000 9.083 0.000 0.000 10.258 0.000 240.618 60.658 0.000 0.000 11.266 2.792 0.000 3.374 118.497 0.006 5.248 0.000 0.000 20.439 185.801 17.116 81.919 0.000 543.333 0.000 916.835 166.534 0.000 3.517 56.389 332.091 4.529 2811.169
IRQ 20.525 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.952 0.000 0.027 93.180 13.631 0.000 683.911 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 86.782 0.013 0.000 0.000 37.393 0.000 0.000 936.563
ISR 267.700 0.000 0.000 0.000 26.200 1.200 2.500 613.700 9.900 0.000 69.100 27.500 0.000 289.700 5.600 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 276.500 0.000 164.200 47.400 0.000 3.300 393.600 0.000 2199.100
JOR 1.298 19.256 2.062 0.000 0.829 18.982 0.525 16.607 226.391 20.850 11.411 603.969 136.701 1.989 36.249 0.000 17.259 0.000 0.803 3.083 0.024 15.184 31.376 28.393 156.483 0.000 1.986 0.926 7.823 1.846 34.935 0.299 3.706 95.881 18.527 1515.653
KEN 5.979 6.910 0.352 3.459 5.983 85.739 5.477 25.151 32.290 2.429 1.818 0.000 15.931 1.537 0.855 8.332 3.974 0.000 2.074 4.233 0.986 0.423 105.914 0.007 5.727 3.114 3.350 57.859 6.578 1.893 35.790 180.079 4.038 31.343 23.161 672.785
KWT 87.374 15.874 106.723 0.000 0.000 48.740 0.264 139.137 614.033 12.460 0.000 16.040 18.035 1.952 42.124 0.001 1.390 0.000 0.000 25.461 688.768 26.245 113.724 0.000 1587.230 0.000 18.247 87.909 0.000 1.273 117.546 95.091 138.972 4004.613
MDG 0.173 0.369 0.096 1.640 0.006 0.297 0.055 1.825 0.530 0.000 0.002 0.356 0.050 1.870 0.000 0.194 0.000 15.630 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.396 0.000 0.287 0.514 20.741 0.000 0.926 0.556 0.032 0.000 6.733 0.177 0.001 53.460
MYS 2108.490 32.125 225.845 0.287 5.043 295.537 1.167 5.963 1760.850 1801.220 229.474 74.280 0.000 62.744 13.455 71.002 8.143 19.726 43.570 61.583 239.188 49.551 524.416 39.500 383.284 4.761 15958.500 3.425 250.913 233.269 17.925 13.785 3972.220 858.463 76.554 29446.258
MDV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 2.787 0.001 13.936 0.000 13.279 0.123 31.019
MUS 3.235 0.004 0.396 3.197 0.002 0.627 0.000 3.366 1.112 0.000 0.000 0.967 0.091 7.011 0.023 68.344 0.960 0.000 1.798 0.001 0.915 0.170 0.010 0.085 13.186 7.736 0.000 19.109 1.400 0.003 3.479 1.002 1.386 0.000 139.615
MOZ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.594 0.417 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.298 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.905 0.000 120.412 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.199 0.327 0.000 137.532
MMR 9.888 0.448 21.612 0.000 2.387 0.000 314.217 28.617 0.179 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 2.137 0.000 69.785 0.000 0.426 0.330 13.735 0.324 0.689 0.000 97.260 0.000 0.105 1.073 0.000 0.000 831.193 0.000 0.044 1394.455
OMN 2.582 22.437 0.806 0.115 5.267 5.829 1.294 4.495 121.581 17.037 520.020 69.881 0.000 24.546 64.466 26.230 0.000 268.781 0.181 0.152 0.032 0.205 13.607 34.205 180.950 0.105 425.127 16.251 4.367 3.462 11.654 74.770 1283.840 1026.730 50.095 4281.100
PAK 113.153 43.112 103.802 0.355 3.514 53.286 0.048 5.302 48.860 81.430 41.877 32.922 0.000 24.103 92.912 59.927 9.751 64.064 2.532 25.375 3.879 7.835 47.946 32.367 389.696 0.314 53.129 3.515 82.903 71.325 15.325 28.539 67.183 834.600 35.041 2479.922
QAT 54.645 29.253 2.075 0.019 263.419 0.132 2.843 101.981 11.693 24.235 0.166 13.354 4.106 32.899 0.271 4.401 0.013 0.825 1.167 1.428 9.884 16.570 191.027 0.000 1017.080 0.066 46.907 23.411 1.099 0.555 375.313 436.087 8.815 2675.739
SAU 674.335 1652.670 94.396 0.000 112.414 656.047 13.883 100.974 449.581 1003.200 304.344 0.000 131.431 155.222 509.231 3.283 361.874 0.467 45.946 3.946 2.605 200.425 1195.610 229.180 53.168 3467.180 4.640 1293.900 141.146 149.819 42.978 1113.410 951.364 320.191 15438.860
SYC 0.456 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.237 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.146 2.646 0.018 0.000 0.109 0.128 0.000 0.073 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.420 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.000 4.652
SGP 3372.950 30.038 749.165 1.760 12.483 127.632 3.473 2649.450 0.000 319.964 0.000 143.536 23.011 25.670 66.997 28.198 21807.100 93.443 76.288 4.996 524.199 48.376 393.384 43.579 356.284 24.087 0.000 239.559 382.164 15.263 9.432 5709.770 1215.910 20.278 38518.439
SOM 0.001 2.276 0.000 0.000 0.435 0.454 0.000 21.420 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.031 3.179 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.221 0.984 0.413 5.383 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.025 0.005 1.578 33.364 17.618 96.887
ZAF 483.988 9.483 4.875 12.617 5.678 17.723 1.986 16.364 349.711 103.847 34.794 1.288 518.268 14.397 220.890 9.395 39.027 165.033 1.347 253.701 597.015 0.582 5.284 43.068 4.418 126.344 33.535 167.949 0.364 24.532 28.824 191.349 187.605 150.250 3.300 3828.831
LKA 47.167 2.649 10.183 0.000 0.000 0.201 170.575 8.407 35.046 22.725 39.422 23.176 2.588 9.685 1.877 8.664 45.910 1.725 0.000 0.274 4.936 28.842 0.992 30.303 0.000 72.250 0.000 10.588 0.039 0.000 14.158 130.041 0.633 723.056
SDN 0.076 2.286 4.032 0.000 0.000 63.206 0.000 0.739 19.750 0.241 1.997 0.000 0.000 10.178 2.932 0.643 0.000 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.126 4.633 1.356 149.238 0.000 10.644 0.843 0.329 0.000 0.105 9.532 0.000 3.013 286.062
TZA 3.000 0.000 1.155 0.359 0.050 1.665 0.235 0.372 64.241 4.097 0.163 0.000 4.335 0.002 35.342 0.000 0.689 2.933 0.217 0.290 1.630 0.583 0.071 8.800 0.000 15.445 0.284 3.949 0.339 16.532 0.085 0.269 1.728 14.398 0.034 183.292
THA 1640.250 34.918 229.023 3.721 2.383 125.627 14.982 413.166 1678.330 176.985 75.708 499.731 53.040 27.568 66.964 3.704 2834.910 14.405 26.042 8.831 323.527 42.923 228.423 22.383 393.915 3.302 5553.510 15.073 332.393 152.009 21.230 33.371 716.823 76.395 15845.565
ARE 207.932 119.092 138.342 4.565 10.982 107.357 0.000 860.469 104.548 1956.500 0.000 71.375 335.468 259.534 31.551 128.254 25.459 52.543 6.195 0.000 1496.390 1197.970 259.593 743.747 5.956 1429.140 13.650 67.105 244.461 15.346 88.256 1298.310 402.916 11683.006
YEM 0.001 13.478 0.050 0.000 9.076 14.304 3.585 2.509 545.963 50.960 0.274 3.475 1.249 0.126 103.306 0.097 199.449 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 17.507 1.762 0.384 93.405 0.242 123.716 9.183 57.915 0.086 1.758 0.001 619.813 86.540 1960.214
Total 11561.826 2203.883 3260.998 39.812 275.449 2835.541 34.313 360.745 12161.336 8211.745 4803.397 1616.440 2110.432 1566.997 1368.767 1937.062 296.902 30477.786 260.422 873.728 847.942 1238.211 2391.146 5495.777 941.051 6577.069 153.729 40299.419 244.836 5096.003 2859.100 685.750 971.798 19483.575 11802.386 1620.509 186965.882
Appendix F
AUS 69.061 147.216 0.268 0.158 158.012 3.524 4.522 2194.250 1863.410 168.853 162.569 128.074 85.086 18.883 364.135 7.406 1354.870 9.838 65.856 147.957 7.970 132.014 237.377 82.828 1182.550 3.655 2232.950 0.236 863.012 104.867 95.035 34.507 1461.700 1226.830 58.922 14678.401
BHR 0.000 0.000 0.000 18.378 0.000 0.000 78.339 42.555 56.996 0.074 17.042 145.912 64.450 16.826 40.237 0.726 83.755 0.000 0.000 120.816 71.742 58.692 185.293 0.067 55.757 0.007 2.349 3.673 12.560 80.968 85.346 224.273 35.011 1501.844
BGD 12.229 1.421 0.000 3.385 5.990 0.000 0.000 55.340 8.231 36.548 0.000 0.000 1.232 2.314 2.927 0.108 3.879 0.000 0.140 0.461 2.441 0.847 42.696 1.654 11.292 0.000 37.538 0.000 3.952 5.801 23.515 2.451 9.449 22.257 1.799 299.897
COM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.402 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.010 0.667 0.000 0.020 0.136 0.000 1.424 0.036 0.001 0.021 0.000 2.859
DJI 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 60.167 0.999 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.015 0.000 0.000 5.591 0.000 0.168 0.000 0.151 121.552 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.003 0.005 4.909 43.011 236.755
EGY 9.763 3.178 9.347 0.000 0.000 0.578 20.671 118.452 27.973 14.727 104.108 20.273 107.173 58.128 19.262 7.665 21.147 0.127 12.629 0 0.028 20.514 32.302 26.369 275.382 0 113.27 0.140 47.246 3.518 94.733 6.023 48.425 152 50.490 1425.641
ERI 0.000
ETH 1.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 119.825 2.372 7.593 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.505 0.000 0.816 0.053 0.000 1.943 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.251 0.000 35.770 0.000 1.148 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.418 0.000 1.029 0.000 16.174 198.171
IND 564.263 108.606 1599.550 3.060 64.609 350.174 75.817 1053.100 852.263 110.095 701.620 138.695 223.006 301.958 33.016 856.914 39.651 193.357 63.526 86.001 243.894 266.744 120.358 1077.660 9.103 1949.020 35.068 525.505 1219.640 106.826 160.701 801.561 4676.050 204.101 18815.512
IDN 1791.600 17.407 265.786 1.145 16.297 170.351 2.098 19.554 1742.490 185.022 12.372 0.000 89.423 28.245 73.079 14.691 2363.850 10.275 32.186 21.586 45.659 16.586 265.383 24.618 434.553 2.379 5399.660 1.262 233.204 184.931 48.230 70.713 1392.630 759.792 52.423 15789.480
IRN 33.675 0.000 18.097 0.000 0.000 12.436 0.000 240.630 88.181 0.000 0.000 13.708 29.937 0.000 76.168 91.042 0.000 0.613 0.000 0.000 41.558 273.958 16.373 104.725 0.000 685.595 0.000 1237.750 226.827 13.697 4.264 65.257 346.091 5.490 3626.072
IRQ 27.577 0.007 0.000 0.000 1.154 0.000 0.100 0.028 15.166 0.000 340.579 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.032 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 24.156 2.000 0.000 410.859
ISR 278.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 26.200 1.200 10.800 720.200 9.900 0.000 86.800 36.400 0.000 274.800 5.500 0.000 1.800 0.000 0.000 281.900 0.000 174.500 41.400 0.000 4.600 454.100 0.000 2408.500
JOR 2.216 18.255 1.768 0.000 0.522 26.898 0.504 7.145 199.004 27.110 26.710 542.516 108.027 2.232 39.687 0.052 19.459 0.000 0.549 0.000 0.000 16.917 22.980 26.465 161.716 0.000 0.564 0.932 5.893 2.334 28.656 1.096 8.058 117.266 22.647 1438.178
KEN 8.772 0.567 0.381 4.050 4.982 71.808 5.408 21.393 32.894 2.991 0.971 0.045 16.317 1.377 0.732 6.240 4.419 0.008 9.792 2.971 0.000 0.679 120.530 0.138 5.102 2.618 2.296 49.297 14.036 3.443 57.662 192.114 7.663 27.757 31.480 710.933
KWT 89.041 19.244 157.679 0.000 0.000 59.088 42.196 137.943 624.192 13.864 0.000 18.862 9.055 0.049 49.072 0.002 1.347 0.000 0.000 31.598 756.208 18.670 118.528 0.017 1921.340 0.000 82.956 15.609 2.885 1.544 152.329 161.364 168.477 4653.159
MDG 0.199 0.035 0.000 2.089 0.000 0.380 0.021 4.120 0.151 0.016 0.002 0.254 0.000 0.430 0.000 0.476 0.000 44.010 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.393 0.001 0.808 0.584 24.770 0.000 16.171 0.249 0.065 0.033 8.924 0.875 0.000 105.124
MYS 2613.740 33.146 320.315 0.401 12.788 454.656 0.268 5.770 2533.820 2129.150 328.218 12.522 0.000 79.198 18.243 89.776 7.114 21.763 50.208 17.316 140.230 52.359 670.852 39.309 408.709 3.479 16522.600 3.416 334.075 304.238 41.385 26.442 4615.310 1115.550 104.591 33110.957
MDV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.348 4.798 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 3.264 0.000 15.344 0.000 18.512 0.001 43.310
MUS 3.804 0.003 0.017 4.550 0.003 0.619 0.321 6.058 0.554 0.012 0.000 1.244 0.000 8.042 0.053 117.000 7.380 0.013 1.789 0.000 0.140 0.685 0.004 0.011 9.698 11.991 0.000 28.197 1.068 0.004 2.317 1.208 4.102 0.025 210.912
MOZ 0.000 0.000 0.958 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.609 2.984 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.233 0.000 0.000 1.482 0.613 0.000 0.000 0.419 0.000 0.244 0.000 0.501 0.000 169.634 0.000 0.000 1.265 2.029 0.244 0.000 187.215
MMR 10.058 0.567 30.208 0.000 3.021 0.000 355.244 13.590 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 2.375 0.001 72.620 0.000 0.349 1.115 8.364 0.345 0.655 0.000 76.223 0.000 0.323 2.082 0.000 0.000 826.958 9.909 0.056 1414.275
OMN 2.728 21.296 0.769 0.231 8.517 8.603 1.582 8.983 67.980 118.382 429.523 23.594 0.000 58.784 2.517 44.331 0.117 342.280 0.329 0.188 0.046 0.068 11.939 29.831 197.570 0.000 277.258 17.585 5.723 0.000 17.671 16.078 1267.190 807.567 61.807 3851.067
PAK 115.385 39.399 166.332 1.467 4.572 41.075 0.341 2.352 83.535 47.305 82.091 3.600 0.000 24.583 85.410 76.901 19.410 94.042 2.572 33.583 12.969 5.341 41.901 34.368 469.224 0.534 137.770 4.378 114.703 83.542 11.559 21.220 69.392 1121.030 52.653 3104.539
QAT 40.794 35.386 9.472 0.038 24.310 0.218 4.300 147.826 3.147 10.501 3.915 8.460 6.828 32.665 0.432 4.548 0.000 0.000 18.669 0.000 13.869 16.326 196.875 0.000 1273.610 0.007 38.397 23.461 1.695 4.839 399.007 369.305 3.210 2692.110
SAU 584.831 2003.550 181.812 0.000 136.280 795.333 16.831 231.307 617.732 1362.000 338.628 0.000 589.030 290.977 566.595 5.581 530.118 0.381 53.383 16.731 3.159 204.026 1288.040 264.634 58.948 3566.030 5.626 1944.470 68.482 399.902 52.103 1560.420 1235.000 388.171 19360.111
SYC 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.019 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.000 0.204 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.926 0.000 0.574 0.555 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 2.631
SGP 4681.030 31.499 682.488 2.207 16.229 109.826 7.846 3091.770 15776.800 394.716 0.000 169.218 19.327 21.510 89.451 39.823 22793.200 113.327 86.485 13.644 650.876 83.455 455.779 62.529 336.252 26.616 0.000 306.954 485.321 21.574 11.305 6156.460 1451.520 23.267 58212.304
SOM 0.003 2.880 0.000 0.000 0.551 0.575 0.000 12.654 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.411 0.108 3.533 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 8.724 0.526 0.493 6.881 0.000 0.000 0.118 0.000 0.330 0.007 0.455 72.818 22.299 133.388
ZAF 740.939 11.328 6.182 16.127 4.052 35.211 2.982 17.231 378.034 163.179 39.721 3.530 505.694 9.864 286.065 19.407 98.662 225.279 1.702 269.799 741.163 0.587 10.016 85.581 7.282 152.304 38.506 227.182 0.135 24.047 41.085 247.440 215.458 294.750 3.194 4923.718
LKA 57.590 3.300 11.170 0.000 11.120 0.418 245.050 8.560 35.280 8.720 45.002 29.020 3.320 9.990 5.331 12.460 55.460 3.199 0.000 0.240 3.126 36.730 1.077 29.980 0.000 65.860 0.000 12.970 0.160 0.000 11.540 163.510 1.260 871.443
SDN 28.224 37.926 15.810 0.000 0.041 62.274 0.000 0.535 79.003 36.176 5.418 0.061 0.000 21.189 15.702 2.270 0.057 12.594 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 1.774 14.632 1.497 447.270 0.000 5.569 0.013 11.988 0.000 0.000 14.143 140.304 0.000 954.487
TZA 3.205 0.000 0.000 0.455 0.064 2.107 0.297 0.000 95.250 11.266 0.181 0.000 4.182 0.042 16.373 0.000 2.885 2.919 0.275 0.652 1.459 0.738 0.785 8.793 0.067 1.734 0.168 7.809 0.429 17.657 0.000 0.149 13.073 32.455 0.042 225.511
THA 2167.400 40.683 273.068 4.243 5.482 173.455 10.097 640.938 2273.520 297.784 110.740 529.856 76.048 36.242 82.237 11.527 3886.570 21.283 28.307 10.975 439.396 51.635 338.080 28.206 435.271 4.633 5872.980 14.125 378.773 160.540 18.313 29.939 758.959 103.574 19314.879
ARE 632.606 144.376 171.762 5.534 13.314 130.150 0.000 1621.930 102.796 2176.900 0.000 130.880 382.116 288.770 24.159 272.518 32.359 15.805 10.314 0.000 1288.990 1322.820 296.590 870.645 6.077 1715.280 16.548 72.768 163.600 78.204 106.994 1853.990 488.459 14437.254
YEM 19.889 17.059 0.000 0.000 11.488 18.104 4.538 9.164 29.887 26.572 0.305 3.862 1.965 7.448 114.826 0.022 192.863 0.000 3.235 0.000 0.000 12.619 3.510 0.861 78.223 0.000 159.562 11.623 26.815 0.327 2.225 0.001 897.549 97.273 1751.815
Total 14521.291 2660.186 4070.187 45.827 423.197 2773.680 40.369 560.610 15543.443 25828.749 5510.632 1102.325 2231.359 1948.791 1739.492 2289.463 494.658 33534.079 310.091 996.428 1081.644 1384.534 2399.958 6360.283 1143.259 7225.541 167.082 42631.798 282.379 6670.749 3144.899 1125.582 1078.968 22443.347 15395.798 1942.633 231103.311
Appendix G
AUS 82.139 195.954 0.019 1.488 476.834 0.594 4.998 3994.560 2377.240 111.812 345.699 94.138 88.683 28.873 383.777 3.620 1766.500 14.774 93.959 239.538 20.381 180.754 379.539 89.617 1516.170 2.726 2368.650 0.158 1178.200 156.405 141.747 54.522 2233.660 944.525 67.099 19639.352
BHR 0.000 0.000 0.000 24.136 0.000 0.000 93.621 97.945 74.125 0.096 5.150 182.657 83.819 22.098 71.142 31.571 132.931 0.000 0.000 157.126 57.713 72.222 409.505 0.088 67.902 0.010 23.749 33.001 33.385 106.338 79.011 291.675 1.487 2152.503
BGD 13.569 1.695 0.000 0.976 8.702 0.000 1.157 66.147 9.003 34.855 0.000 0.000 1.790 4.451 3.674 0.138 7.739 0.000 0.000 0.911 1.889 0.793 40.455 2.635 17.907 0.000 33.171 0.000 4.886 9.679 19.473 0.367 12.518 20.428 1.689 320.697
COM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.106 0.020 0.000 5.688 0.068 0.001 0.001 0.000 6.349
DJI 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 57.653 2.365 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.027 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.677 0.000 0.263 0.000 0.057 159.639 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.074 6.384 13.566 240.755
EGY 26.2 4.174 6.185 0.000 0.000 0.759 27.706 115.629 16.660 19.153 135.397 26.364 274.875 73.789 25.051 10.066 28.022 0.286 17.217 0.000 0.036 26.679 49.620 18.278 385.349 0.000 229.578 0.184 16.744 1.160 189.773 7.911 75.895 197.682 80.687 2087.109
ERI 0.000
ETH 1.406 0.000 0.000 0.000 27.119 2.401 9.454 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.444 0.000 1.061 0.037 0.000 3.450 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.473 0.000 40.966 0.000 2.291 0.000 0.000 0.000 12.540 0.987 2.029 0.000 15.516 139.174
IND 661.346 134.089 1624.820 2.312 111.395 409.343 60.361 1251.220 1138.840 115.156 923.455 127.579 368.471 382.847 35.088 970.457 42.466 236.892 76.142 104.705 257.237 450.816 135.009 1308.140 10.100 3377.840 45.091 853.788 1345.110 255.010 170.209 849.972 6605.000 233.141 24673.447
IDN 1887.360 19.768 281.669 1.077 22.879 197.268 6.120 30.924 2170.510 188.381 43.114 0.000 310.648 34.802 63.407 9.914 3016.050 14.679 35.247 33.694 60.282 20.861 415.896 35.493 418.242 2.333 6001.180 1.124 260.026 238.314 54.611 80.425 1976.240 744.622 64.039 18741.199
IRN 20.653 0.000 15.377 0.000 0.000 16.455 0.000 332.648 64.495 0.000 0.000 8.266 23.801 0.000 100.788 234.992 0.009 6.419 0.000 0.000 47.845 247.290 12.426 248.771 0.000 932.627 0.000 2356.520 380.679 24.951 5.642 36.457 398.455 7.552 5523.118
IRQ 4.264 0.009 0.000 0.000 1.527 0.000 0.778 64.964 17.461 0.000 58.466 0.000 0.000 0.008 141.332 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.422 0.030 0.277 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.000 104.186 2.303 0.557 396.695
ISR 381.600 0.300 0.000 0.000 29.200 0.400 14.000 1035.600 11.200 0.000 133.000 47.200 0.000 203.300 7.800 0.000 1.600 0.000 0.000 357.500 0.000 233.900 44.800 0.000 8.800 462.100 0.000 2972.300
JOR 1.658 19.183 1.072 0.000 0.123 29.814 0.616 74.324 249.966 34.531 51.445 621.522 108.900 11.019 53.114 0.002 23.079 0.000 1.044 3.649 0.000 15.518 20.986 23.079 198.993 0.000 2.069 0.955 6.052 3.486 34.008 4.729 7.585 114.598 26.486 1743.605
KEN 6.641 2.301 1.284 4.611 6.619 87.372 2.583 28.013 52.373 6.001 1.585 0.008 11.173 0.460 0.256 3.546 5.470 0.000 7.677 7.214 0.000 0.774 143.469 0.218 18.845 3.058 2.428 41.369 20.838 4.876 70.406 226.350 13.027 30.264 26.951 838.060
KWT 82.786 25.465 580.537 0.000 0.000 78.187 0.533 232.501 969.431 15.961 0.000 26.318 11.508 0.065 61.364 0.234 7.191 0.000 0.000 36.379 909.105 25.714 186.494 0.022 2871.810 0.000 53.025 13.561 9.230 2.042 281.784 185.778 224.279 6891.304
MDG 0.284 0.046 0.000 2.743 0.001 0.500 0.000 6.273 0.492 0.021 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.000 3.573 0.000 30.823 0.089 0.000 0.000 1.486 0.108 0.074 0.767 26.891 0.000 1.222 1.256 0.069 0.043 3.054 1.138 0.000 80.966
MYS 4153.360 34.637 364.224 0.376 13.383 365.420 0.703 8.885 3002.750 3072.940 345.872 60.337 0.000 343.647 42.904 107.949 9.530 36.382 54.995 16.016 149.348 71.448 701.298 50.302 481.762 4.394 18993.800 4.209 478.078 345.002 39.182 23.118 6040.490 1553.450 111.115 41081.306
MDV 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.458 0.976 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.654 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.075 0.000 4.826 0.046 15.127 0.000 28.818 0.015 50.997
MUS 5.064 0.313 1.252 4.342 0.006 0.274 0.039 18.140 0.938 0.037 0.000 1.452 0.090 9.041 0.031 97.790 2.608 0.559 3.309 0.000 0.901 0.737 0.012 0.053 11.855 5.244 0.000 28.168 2.576 0.000 5.878 3.113 28.291 0.000 232.113
MOZ 0.000 0.000 3.880 0.000 0.000 0.000 33.052 5.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.645 0.000 0.000 4.023 0.195 0.000 0.000 1.304 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.231 0.000 193.994 0.000 0.000 2.231 2.455 0.758 0.000 251.769
MMR 12.075 0.745 24.817 0.000 3.968 0.000 363.684 15.835 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.000 3.089 0.002 97.145 0.015 0.534 1.451 19.169 0.172 0.621 0.000 64.511 0.000 0.205 1.847 0.000 0.000 1230.340 12.887 0.004 1853.453
OMN 1.478 28.179 0.000 0.305 11.270 11.384 2.094 0.000 25.161 0.639 494.510 27.163 0.000 8.464 1.179 51.038 0.155 361.263 0.482 1.592 0.061 0.090 28.109 40.266 146.459 0.000 73.915 23.270 3.719 2.725 4.217 21.275 1323.980 929.753 55.048 3679.243
PAK 125.465 44.090 197.483 4.936 2.222 48.293 0.765 3.547 157.712 57.080 102.710 4.374 0.000 21.233 59.559 75.251 16.415 64.709 1.952 35.513 18.587 2.456 56.054 37.565 335.998 0.202 80.347 3.802 151.501 134.244 15.949 13.806 61.027 982.038 55.823 2972.708
QAT 159.862 36.868 3.508 0.016 17.730 0.036 10.816 1005.760 23.824 60.810 2.936 27.565 10.441 77.543 0.709 14.340 0.000 1.457 9.258 0.000 27.287 116.703 194.033 0.000 1694.830 0.000 77.424 10.588 8.990 1.148 511.710 616.183 12.561 4734.936
SAU 762.881 2651.160 148.695 0.000 180.331 1052.410 22.271 346.322 1027.370 1787.970 389.862 0.000 1469.840 362.022 652.321 7.385 895.630 1.177 46.875 5.235 4.179 234.895 1879.470 519.222 78.002 4589.690 7.444 2643.650 161.597 428.628 68.944 2112.860 1421.860 317.981 26278.179
SYC 0.715 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.410 0.054 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.195 0.577 0.007 6.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.705 0.000 4.273 1.299 0.000 0.000 5.429 0.048 0.000 19.947
SGP 6611.900 38.374 742.163 4.225 13.253 129.070 7.437 4174.400 19019.700 533.795 0.000 225.884 35.581 21.606 76.540 43.667 27280.300 186.354 99.168 11.482 651.872 86.761 556.913 90.617 322.884 35.252 0.000 474.602 592.319 30.831 12.658 7756.550 1902.670 33.024 71801.852
SOM 0.038 3.783 0.000 0.000 0.724 0.755 0.000 6.651 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.470 1.031 4.595 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.346 2.922 0.516 6.373 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.192 0.009 5.593 94.703 30.035 169.751
ZAF 1020.250 11.921 7.392 11.512 6.059 24.767 2.707 37.318 563.385 161.486 53.463 16.356 631.917 13.753 446.909 22.362 88.790 265.217 4.542 267.953 782.099 1.244 25.520 83.831 10.306 222.784 34.226 306.892 0.165 25.131 47.041 339.221 350.646 339.713 16.519 6243.397
LKA 53.881 5.052 13.917 0.000 12.512 0.422 391.508 8.741 57.893 10.843 28.964 31.629 5.399 10.058 2.842 9.036 61.432 3.638 0.000 0.210 2.541 39.454 1.904 31.033 0.184 86.481 0.000 12.003 0.288 1.663 19.408 137.784 0.995 1041.715
SDN 0.020 0.000 14.412 0.000 0.000 108.504 0.000 1.569 27.905 50.637 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.557 2.180 0.736 0.020 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 7.301 0.600 164.194 0.000 49.694 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.130 85.527 0.000 533.110
TZA 2.455 0.000 0.000 0.597 0.084 2.768 0.390 0.000 112.325 11.382 0.236 0.000 4.636 0.055 23.076 0.000 3.789 9.951 0.361 2.756 3.139 0.969 1.021 17.371 0.094 1.987 0.221 12.037 0.564 31.850 0.073 0.000 24.492 42.208 0.152 311.039
THA 2459.780 51.416 373.254 2.758 5.662 217.326 11.720 909.884 3207.430 451.686 169.414 563.905 93.917 58.775 93.711 26.500 5295.100 29.446 32.728 41.375 604.882 73.780 434.750 49.476 616.508 3.511 7008.980 12.499 656.006 182.447 26.385 38.992 964.652 91.695 24860.350
ARE 690.716 191.044 197.905 7.323 17.618 172.219 0.000 3592.200 309.471 2506.260 0.000 131.996 516.834 332.461 31.968 410.673 60.550 57.432 21.949 0.000 1484.020 1611.440 344.976 1078.700 8.041 1688.130 21.896 107.585 184.265 217.499 141.577 3373.530 604.243 20114.521
YEM 28.793 0.357 0.648 0.000 10.235 12.848 1.907 4.311 540.259 0.350 2.998 10.731 1.362 0.455 59.417 0.066 29.972 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 4.678 6.038 0.724 96.390 0.578 192.701 18.798 113.464 0.330 3.078 0.086 1180.850 108.787 2431.228
Total 19176.506 3386.818 4800.748 47.136 431.463 3541.987 41.945 732.055 24315.651 32637.658 6654.054 1563.149 2637.232 3224.474 2351.743 2563.084 515.368 41277.789 487.278 1188.293 1273.747 1604.143 2825.690 8227.863 1561.581 8449.870 195.560 51134.696 341.177 9985.586 3892.007 1667.483 1338.976 30179.014 18764.179 2092.244 295108.247
Appendix H
AUS 87.616 179.086 0.000 1.533 263.397 0.409 2.597 5266.280 2757.120 132.487 218.332 120.363 68.931 32.279 359.603 3.198 1914.750 14.954 77.337 308.400 30.729 176.295 359.976 99.070 1323.910 3.002 3043.640 0.081 1434.590 136.528 164.457 30.822 3144.190 944.503 144.375 22844.840
BHR 0.000 0.000 0.000 27.577 0.000 0.000 155.140 125.660 94.384 0.123 5.498 208.701 106.727 25.249 98.325 13.641 156.740 0.000 0.000 200.069 40.070 55.947 520.715 0.101 132.990 0.011 47.175 3.323 166.491 121.500 106.953 371.391 6.165 2790.666
BGD 29.549 2.106 0.000 0.635 11.669 0.000 1.731 118.880 23.102 46.047 0.000 0.000 1.754 2.928 5.516 0.903 10.356 0.000 0.000 0.661 1.507 0.668 52.002 3.191 26.060 0.000 53.141 0.000 5.588 8.809 9.105 0.339 14.496 21.118 4.257 456.118
COM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.793 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.211 0.021 0.009 0.000 0.060 0.772 0.000 3.935 0.283 0.001 0.000 0.000 6.085
DJI 0.058 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 59.007 2.969 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.031 0.009 0.060 0.000 0.819 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.115 182.400 0.000 0.000 0.188 0.004 0.219 8.129 9.334 263.456
EGY 10.378 4.769 19.128 0.000 0.000 0.867 46.508 183.306 36.415 24.387 172.401 44.636 334.641 84.310 31.898 11.502 33.530 0.354 19.416 1.650 0.042 33.970 113.408 42.910 725.136 0.000 260.723 0.210 27.441 1.572 335.864 9.039 58.611 251.709 100.910 3021.641
ERI 0.000
ETH 2.222 0.000 0.000 0.000 53.119 13.563 9.136 0.000 0.000 0.000 21.805 0.000 2.438 0.111 0.000 5.803 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.882 0.000 53.786 0.000 7.627 0.000 0.000 0.000 20.011 1.261 1.313 0.000 21.852 216.929
IND 788.889 181.479 1632.110 4.597 205.039 609.388 68.816 1361.730 1190.160 141.843 1161.760 168.367 533.479 486.138 44.958 1134.690 62.301 211.148 123.624 110.748 370.349 641.652 240.637 1708.220 10.543 5177.530 47.890 1410.000 1867.160 314.462 223.425 1022.040 8281.560 269.037 31805.769
IDN 2227.610 17.849 353.301 0.586 42.448 290.485 1.106 44.409 2878.350 289.540 85.486 0.000 156.635 42.801 83.584 21.223 3431.300 17.280 42.193 23.893 77.990 29.215 634.220 61.696 524.242 3.424 7836.590 8.896 313.999 337.930 77.794 84.480 2246.460 906.654 74.924 23268.593
IRN 25.665 0.000 21.293 0.000 0.000 22.384 0.000 560.864 72.015 0.000 0.000 21.351 32.376 0.000 137.102 316.338 0.013 1.816 0.000 0.000 63.510 329.938 47.440 442.817 0.000 1166.650 0.000 2256.580 476.241 51.173 7.675 37.220 528.908 4.229 6623.598
IRQ 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.000 2.077 0.000 1.653 0.130 23.178 0.000 25.235 0.000 0.000 0.010 27.243 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 1.257 0.035 0.338 0.000 0.000 0.307 0.000 0.070 0.001 208.611 3.056 0.748 293.964
ISR 419.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 93.200 0.500 41.900 1224.200 12.900 0.000 116.200 48.800 0.000 129.900 6.300 0.000 1.800 0.000 0.000 365.500 0.000 271.200 36.800 0.000 8.500 448.100 0.000 3224.900
JOR 2.057 20.629 1.286 0.000 0.212 45.467 0.588 36.790 348.974 13.521 37.223 735.579 118.300 1.255 72.516 0.001 24.114 0.093 2.452 0.740 0.000 27.653 21.769 34.593 252.827 0.000 1.908 0.384 4.336 2.557 43.637 1.857 6.550 171.144 33.479 2064.491
KEN 11.381 2.629 0.000 5.269 7.563 99.829 2.952 23.409 43.482 8.975 2.019 0.011 18.636 1.624 0.326 4.051 6.434 0.008 8.727 3.218 0.000 0.985 164.714 3.262 7.510 3.494 9.106 47.268 31.139 6.277 36.970 258.623 15.141 38.535 12.361 885.928
KWT 180.864 34.640 1071.600 0.000 0.000 106.357 1.268 383.512 1159.410 21.187 0.000 55.640 15.654 0.088 247.420 1.801 0.761 0.000 0.000 48.290 1148.920 42.735 203.057 0.030 3351.920 0.000 47.157 7.007 14.765 2.778 282.612 246.602 290.297 8966.372
MDG 0.812 0.053 0.000 3.134 0.001 0.571 0.000 12.761 0.559 0.027 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 1.904 0.000 13.440 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.856 0.050 0.471 0.877 16.929 0.000 1.751 0.649 0.330 0.049 3.932 1.449 0.000 60.619
MYS 4765.890 41.687 409.372 0.651 21.810 457.090 0.244 8.466 3955.040 3322.330 358.784 23.564 0.000 113.773 51.854 122.160 13.356 53.675 60.374 15.212 245.696 81.005 740.632 95.954 473.165 6.494 22009.600 7.274 571.549 438.418 128.084 30.089 7584.640 1846.980 119.029 48173.941
MDV 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.002 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.513 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.000 5.744 0.000 16.157 0.000 22.409 0.003 45.966
MUS 3.921 0.005 2.518 3.745 0.202 0.088 0.796 8.720 0.630 0.001 0.000 1.749 0.121 7.021 0.070 114.350 3.517 0.381 1.290 0.000 0.290 0.600 0.010 0.112 14.213 7.422 0.000 26.711 1.618 0.002 2.678 3.448 166.240 0.000 372.469
MOZ 0.000 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000 25.307 3.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.107 0.000 0.000 3.853 0.577 0.000 0.000 1.483 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.430 0.000 282.867 0.000 0.101 0.452 10.994 1.745 0.000 335.105
MMR 11.107 0.851 29.345 0.000 4.534 0.000 449.135 12.868 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.263 0.000 3.933 0.002 121.513 0.000 0.864 1.847 35.776 0.829 0.709 0.000 98.532 0.000 1.217 3.697 0.000 0.000 1622.980 16.409 0.000 2416.740
OMN 1.631 38.332 0.000 0.415 15.331 15.486 2.848 0.000 179.679 0.314 656.413 36.056 0.000 10.925 1.604 67.748 0.211 463.626 0.279 1.076 0.083 0.123 32.888 70.220 220.799 0.000 225.245 31.653 123.698 3.260 9.693 28.940 2197.560 1234.150 59.271 5729.557
PAK 120.373 41.677 234.358 6.648 3.707 52.079 0.157 3.316 337.387 68.274 178.356 17.526 0.000 25.649 66.434 77.456 28.081 66.630 2.933 34.114 43.332 2.248 51.522 40.326 354.938 0.364 32.427 2.982 221.773 153.736 24.113 15.421 90.918 1256.220 58.488 3713.963
QAT 132.582 45.643 8.223 0.000 38.253 0.000 8.330 880.049 4.404 0.000 0.352 31.096 34.640 16.731 1.948 27.132 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.000 11.654 206.841 173.429 0.000 2103.820 0.000 159.547 17.017 13.066 7.223 520.275 1050.120 4.500 5496.957
SAU 1022.820 3606.340 265.911 0.000 245.302 1431.580 30.295 545.520 1398.480 2465.700 517.503 0.000 2254.600 492.456 865.891 10.046 1407.060 1.028 105.066 2.317 5.685 311.799 2563.130 522.745 106.106 8143.380 10.126 0.000 134.397 570.422 93.785 3676.460 1887.370 388.499 35081.819
SYC 1.722 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.913 0.169 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.222 0.259 0.038 8.684 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.708 0.000 2.774 0.709 0.716 0.000 10.211 0.061 0.000 27.329
SGP 8429.070 170.404 695.873 3.155 10.090 152.303 8.620 5896.720 22109.100 493.639 0.000 344.710 33.625 40.973 101.561 40.617 30405.000 196.792 120.077 9.534 596.461 89.706 646.810 116.411 424.343 48.067 0.000 550.117 681.282 41.005 12.778 9431.280 3693.230 38.550 85631.903
SOM 0.008 4.322 0.000 0.000 0.827 0.862 0.000 9.577 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.611 1.178 5.851 0.000 2.434 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.446 4.069 1.474 7.824 0.000 0.000 0.988 0.000 0.292 0.010 7.149 120.585 51.980 234.488
ZAF 1412.180 15.132 10.170 7.495 5.641 38.597 3.959 25.570 1182.310 238.158 128.845 12.015 759.575 25.127 459.316 29.189 84.892 236.592 2.449 338.010 994.008 2.702 29.067 157.447 12.221 0.000 96.650 415.285 0.733 28.548 65.872 418.693 269.777 437.066 36.229 7979.520
LKA 64.593 4.841 15.767 0.000 14.478 0.503 566.409 25.159 74.140 20.247 50.950 27.466 4.402 12.228 2.927 14.457 27.269 2.505 0.000 2.447 6.415 43.556 2.948 38.589 0.953 79.392 0.001 11.563 0.497 1.714 27.398 170.289 0.590 1314.693
SDN 0.000 0.000 19.686 0.000 0.000 78.692 2.502 55.128 30.771 40.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.115 2.215 1.556 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 18.078 0.398 136.425 0.000 5.833 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.673 90.037 10.846 501.043
TZA 3.773 0.000 0.000 0.682 0.096 3.162 0.446 0.000 111.316 8.301 0.300 0.000 5.727 0.102 26.366 0.000 4.329 19.664 0.412 2.382 3.965 1.107 1.301 12.078 0.130 3.342 0.253 6.195 0.644 38.682 0.104 0.000 21.081 53.744 0.082 329.766
THA 3151.270 65.867 392.655 2.801 6.907 265.814 21.875 1519.810 3953.500 314.755 142.876 578.699 109.841 65.640 152.406 33.750 5780.740 38.325 41.975 42.872 706.634 157.694 587.907 112.194 1002.550 3.372 7640.980 1.188 840.395 193.064 45.857 37.205 1167.940 92.528 29271.886
ARE 296.333 259.875 321.130 9.961 23.965 234.268 0.000 3994.870 311.564 3326.810 0.000 192.511 703.045 441.308 43.485 681.812 106.509 110.575 37.893 0.000 1969.880 2381.810 588.392 1422.190 10.938 2306.970 29.785 412.844 269.374 358.873 192.586 5181.220 823.893 27044.669
YEM 35.676 0.532 0.029 0.000 9.442 22.377 4.621 6.412 910.635 0.230 0.099 21.163 1.630 0.281 117.129 0.023 26.298 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.257 2.068 3.077 128.391 0.037 39.985 29.152 2.946 0.541 13.726 0.371 666.303 212.880 2266.311
Total 23151.538 4647.301 5682.972 49.139 653.870 4395.627 51.494 1010.971 32648.430 38135.465 7910.644 1627.578 3226.910 3786.331 2964.617 3161.636 626.777 46643.237 540.535 1366.760 1612.692 1785.919 3687.888 10947.784 2198.895 10176.805 308.918 64552.252 400.678 9099.217 4826.775 2507.636 1592.299 38946.224 25179.827 2656.453 362762.094
Appendix I
AUS 96.624 140.050 0.017 1.265 314.529 0.706 2.588 6738.870 3327.570 310.633 91.593 133.122 80.151 43.147 406.188 5.178 2078.530 17.237 90.400 237.461 26.082 205.985 234.239 149.365 1675.650 4.513 3459.630 0.146 1743.740 126.845 214.156 24.534 3239.360 1439.260 112.430 26771.794
BHR 1.445 0.000 0.000 34.083 0.000 0.000 191.742 155.128 116.518 0.151 30.994 257.938 131.755 31.206 127.846 16.859 38.664 0.000 0.000 246.986 49.524 110.979 642.825 0.125 321.055 0.014 33.928 4.107 77.946 150.165 194.704 458.483 7.620 3432.790
BGD 29.181 2.603 0.000 0.785 14.422 0.000 2.139 146.927 28.519 56.845 0.000 0.000 1.344 3.618 6.809 1.116 20.740 0.000 0.247 0.000 1.862 0.825 64.271 3.809 32.171 0.000 102.936 0.000 11.644 10.887 16.173 0.419 32.441 26.071 5.261 624.065
COM 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.980 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.261 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.074 0.952 0.000 2.504 0.000 0.002 0.039 0.000 4.831
DJI 0.183 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 72.928 3.670 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.012 0.000 0.039 0.377 0.000 0.000 1.012 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.273 225.433 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.005 0.039 10.036 11.537 325.702
EGY 12.762 5.894 22.907 0.000 0.000 1.071 57.481 226.552 44.955 30.106 212.829 70.091 444.170 104.200 39.378 14.215 44.488 0.438 25.400 0.000 0.051 41.936 140.164 81.571 895.183 0.000 76.720 0.259 94.685 1.943 389.291 11.171 14.573 310.735 124.718 3539.937
ERI 0.000
ETH 2.815 0.000 0.000 0.000 65.652 16.763 11.291 0.000 0.000 0.000 20.091 10.159 3.013 0.138 0.000 3.516 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.562 0.000 66.399 0.000 0.286 0.000 3.552 0.000 12.227 1.559 1.861 0.000 27.008 249.961
IND 961.420 224.294 1967.800 5.681 253.413 753.158 85.052 1681.060 1469.250 175.106 1303.000 161.674 659.340 600.139 55.565 1211.980 76.999 449.962 83.772 136.877 457.197 793.034 410.095 2108.800 13.030 4439.730 59.188 1586.360 2307.670 544.582 276.137 1491.020 10223.600 332.510 37358.495
IDN 3233.170 22.439 396.407 0.736 53.365 365.194 1.391 55.830 3618.620 346.634 102.342 79.182 131.914 53.809 100.066 26.681 4501.630 21.724 67.240 26.642 98.048 34.975 797.332 118.674 627.617 4.305 13415.400 11.184 437.960 424.841 65.091 106.207 3166.930 1085.440 94.193 33693.213
IRN 29.320 0.000 25.504 0.000 0.000 28.141 0.000 705.110 86.215 0.000 0.000 7.905 40.703 0.000 172.362 528.376 0.017 2.163 0.000 0.000 76.033 414.793 48.442 530.136 0.000 1587.950 0.000 2709.900 598.723 42.855 9.648 51.723 633.203 5.317 8334.539
IRQ 115.600 0.015 0.000 0.000 2.611 0.000 2.078 0.156 27.748 0.000 6.599 0.000 0.000 0.013 34.678 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 1.581 0.060 0.405 0.000 0.000 154.900 0.000 0.000 0.001 300.224 3.659 0.941 651.270
ISR 437.200 1.500 0.000 0.000 125.800 0.000 10.600 1270.400 12.800 0.000 136.800 49.600 0.000 67.800 3.800 0.000 0.600 0.000 0.000 410.300 0.000 329.300 45.000 0.000 18.700 420.200 0.000 3340.400
JOR 1.043 23.058 5.050 0.000 0.806 56.018 0.785 3.635 396.850 21.576 65.692 634.393 132.531 8.560 97.264 0.014 44.897 0.085 2.431 2.875 0.000 21.718 7.143 52.810 396.683 0.032 0.572 0.578 7.302 2.084 54.507 1.530 5.449 291.388 36.167 2375.526
KEN 12.162 3.249 0.000 6.512 9.347 123.381 3.648 28.932 53.741 11.080 2.492 0.013 16.455 1.343 0.403 5.007 11.013 0.010 12.050 2.817 0.000 1.216 203.574 1.531 9.271 4.318 9.842 58.420 23.866 7.757 36.227 319.638 13.201 47.572 15.277 1055.365
KWT 164.648 43.548 1281.820 0.000 0.000 133.711 1.594 482.146 1388.030 25.364 0.000 31.986 19.680 0.111 279.406 2.264 0.526 0.000 0.000 57.812 1444.410 78.284 243.098 0.038 4098.460 0.000 21.549 8.809 28.046 3.493 258.702 295.229 364.957 10757.721
MDG 0.383 0.065 0.000 3.874 0.001 0.706 0.000 15.772 0.690 0.033 0.004 0.000 0.019 0.012 0.001 0.425 0.000 13.712 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.058 0.025 0.582 1.083 19.118 0.000 1.933 0.802 0.345 0.061 3.401 1.789 0.000 65.894
MYS 4553.360 54.561 422.217 0.865 32.969 342.000 0.105 12.476 5128.620 4074.020 441.387 27.667 0.000 150.182 78.324 159.935 11.307 67.168 79.206 23.803 165.025 99.813 842.869 186.414 530.310 9.822 24743.900 6.224 667.825 534.135 51.554 68.109 8501.780 2269.740 262.389 54600.081
MDV 0.642 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.238 0.112 0.000 0.275 0.000 0.381 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.031 2.894 0.000 19.969 3.301 55.305 0.004 84.207
MUS 3.951 0.070 3.357 4.270 0.000 0.124 0.530 12.371 2.124 0.026 0.000 2.789 0.067 4.359 0.097 103.869 7.178 0.046 1.111 0.008 4.216 0.734 0.000 0.065 14.967 4.567 0.000 46.918 0.670 0.000 1.225 5.167 247.773 0.000 472.649
MOZ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 30.197 13.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.403 0.000 0.000 9.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.255 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.494 0.000 361.707 0.000 0.000 4.522 3.648 3.523 0.000 436.855
MMR 15.921 1.052 33.282 0.000 5.603 0.000 555.097 15.886 0.407 0.000 0.182 0.311 0.000 4.856 0.002 113.533 0.000 1.073 2.280 44.216 1.788 0.876 0.000 63.180 0.000 2.906 4.569 0.000 0.000 2135.720 20.257 0.000 3022.997
OMN 2.087 48.191 0.000 0.522 19.274 19.469 3.581 0.000 225.890 0.376 785.850 43.166 0.000 13.112 2.017 81.107 0.266 804.097 0.351 8.962 0.104 0.155 41.347 109.950 264.338 0.000 204.703 39.794 1821.410 4.099 27.555 36.383 2517.690 1477.510 74.514 8677.870
PAK 116.309 51.509 261.726 8.217 4.582 64.365 0.194 4.098 416.986 84.285 220.181 21.636 0.000 20.704 82.108 95.619 34.707 53.952 3.625 35.536 31.755 2.778 63.604 47.263 438.172 0.450 41.817 3.685 132.312 190.006 30.955 19.059 92.160 1550.810 72.287 4297.452
QAT 200.846 51.907 30.201 0.000 20.550 0.000 12.332 1647.030 24.332 0.000 0.706 43.896 23.052 20.126 0.203 54.154 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000 13.085 374.030 216.214 0.000 3208.740 0.041 133.357 44.247 10.739 23.247 930.346 1318.210 3.871 8405.484
SAU 946.480 4533.840 316.951 0.000 308.391 1799.770 38.087 685.819 1758.150 2951.920 619.549 0.000 2668.270 619.108 1036.640 12.630 2117.990 1.293 114.572 1.686 7.148 373.282 3222.320 762.952 133.395 8448.600 12.730 3598.540 168.962 590.300 117.905 3873.360 2259.540 488.415 44588.595
SYC 2.540 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.128 0.209 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.275 0.477 0.047 29.730 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.000 2.353 0.000 2.221 0.877 0.827 0.000 2.687 0.076 0.000 43.624
SGP 10186.400 55.619 931.887 3.370 13.023 291.790 8.288 7672.860 24901.300 456.399 0.000 357.303 42.870 48.716 120.921 35.505 35537.200 196.629 96.861 13.562 563.277 99.675 771.387 181.548 743.751 54.502 0.000 1046.880 921.643 29.376 19.063 11312.700 3193.860 49.887 99958.052
SOM 0.035 5.341 0.000 0.000 1.022 1.066 0.000 11.837 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.518 1.456 7.223 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 17.834 5.029 2.210 9.659 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.536 0.012 4.292 148.863 64.243 281.178
ZAF 1190.720 11.932 25.669 8.332 16.476 31.779 4.352 33.905 782.175 210.609 212.486 32.344 665.859 23.000 476.778 23.238 72.623 347.001 3.141 289.044 909.696 0.000 50.352 160.750 21.426 294.633 72.838 492.403 0.449 22.791 63.137 400.363 266.151 552.387 33.858 7802.697
LKA 69.991 5.983 17.899 0.000 17.894 0.622 700.040 31.059 91.526 24.995 32.182 18.042 5.441 15.096 3.618 19.772 33.703 2.250 0.000 3.024 7.919 53.832 6.481 47.639 1.178 48.115 0.001 15.223 0.000 2.119 24.859 210.222 0.730 1511.455
SDN 0.012 0.000 22.393 0.000 0.000 97.258 3.092 68.134 38.031 49.475 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.638 2.738 1.921 0.014 0.208 0.710 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 22.343 1.086 168.417 0.000 15.389 0.000 0.345 0.000 0.000 2.933 111.151 13.405 621.694
TZA 8.155 0.000 1.044 0.843 0.118 3.908 0.551 0.000 137.578 10.248 0.370 0.000 6.273 0.077 32.586 0.000 5.351 33.661 0.510 1.118 7.612 1.369 1.606 14.927 1.793 4.126 0.312 3.343 0.796 42.971 0.128 0.000 15.545 66.347 0.101 403.367
THA 4379.130 79.250 469.773 2.319 14.055 379.737 29.781 1822.020 3335.960 565.820 198.920 587.148 148.166 72.222 193.221 20.358 6655.950 58.764 48.321 33.731 761.729 232.859 651.776 194.270 1253.410 8.553 8411.190 5.189 1100.960 296.535 89.521 49.027 1485.920 124.759 33760.344
ARE 947.089 326.711 364.257 12.523 30.129 294.519 0.000 5022.300 373.002 3982.820 0.000 195.385 883.858 528.329 54.669 880.849 133.901 94.877 53.926 0.000 2358.320 2994.370 900.737 1702.640 13.751 3799.850 37.446 570.003 338.654 404.245 242.117 6562.300 1035.790 35139.367
YEM 75.560 0.658 0.027 0.000 11.669 27.656 5.711 7.925 1125.480 0.284 0.122 26.125 3.824 0.347 144.597 0.029 47.342 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.000 12.663 2.556 1.386 158.499 0.045 13.429 36.030 0.000 0.668 0.000 0.459 1075.920 262.802 3041.884
Total 27699.120 5648.427 6743.166 58.081 836.342 5366.005 63.274 1184.689 40953.777 42836.065 9828.296 1591.990 3406.208 4376.128 3578.475 3815.067 667.194 55638.470 635.521 1508.322 1430.553 1768.033 4482.192 13364.596 3474.949 13062.691 337.288 77452.743 497.607 16704.197 6087.421 2780.212 1910.181 46576.430 30005.460 3362.185 439731.355
Appendix J
AUS 111.247 175.051 0.051 2.010 319.855 0.719 2.126 8279.130 3346.840 160.454 6.772 138.087 63.714 51.329 477.753 6.357 2653.490 21.157 82.511 271.631 30.478 295.767 344.645 164.533 1776.450 10.932 3296.720 0.253 1893.530 116.833 131.780 24.422 3666.090 2632.760 103.179 30658.656
BHR 1.794 0.000 0.000 42.297 0.000 0.000 237.951 200.955 150.939 0.196 68.305 320.100 170.678 38.726 111.706 20.922 47.982 0.000 0.000 319.950 61.459 143.764 832.727 0.155 228.573 0.017 35.498 5.096 54.391 186.354 118.565 593.927 9.456 4002.483
BGD 30.025 3.231 0.000 0.975 17.898 0.000 2.654 182.335 36.945 73.638 0.000 0.091 2.032 4.490 8.821 1.384 29.384 0.000 0.306 0.000 2.311 1.069 79.760 4.934 41.675 0.000 76.966 0.000 24.332 13.511 14.209 0.520 13.061 33.773 6.529 706.859
COM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.216 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.324 0.096 0.017 0.000 0.092 1.234 0.000 2.786 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 5.768
DJI 0.160 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 90.504 4.554 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.048 1.959 0.000 0.000 1.256 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.621 279.760 0.000 0.000 0.282 0.006 0.000 13.000 14.317 406.647
EGY 14.497 7.315 28.427 0.000 0.000 1.330 71.333 281.150 58.235 39.000 275.703 85.273 536.990 129.312 51.011 17.641 77.768 0.544 31.522 0.000 0.064 54.325 173.943 105.668 1159.640 0.000 60.043 0.322 29.195 2.411 448.155 13.863 6.400 402.532 154.774 4318.386
ERI 0.000
ETH 3.589 0.000 0.000 0.000 81.473 20.803 14.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 23.636 11.928 3.740 0.178 0.000 2.129 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.420 0.000 86.015 0.000 2.777 0.000 4.481 0.000 14.509 1.935 1.043 0.000 33.516 310.270
IND 1181.940 278.348 2442.030 7.051 314.484 934.664 105.549 2177.670 1903.290 226.835 1535.550 275.040 818.237 777.430 68.956 1872.980 95.556 558.400 103.961 169.863 592.261 984.150 531.244 2731.780 16.170 5335.490 73.452 1776.420 2863.800 496.818 342.684 1895.470 13243.800 412.643 47144.016
IDN 4019.180 27.070 478.218 0.888 64.378 440.563 1.678 67.353 4365.430 408.899 120.726 80.727 109.045 64.914 118.040 32.187 5666.620 26.207 81.118 32.141 118.283 41.258 961.887 139.991 740.353 5.194 13324.800 13.492 634.758 512.520 71.936 128.126 3659.470 1280.410 113.632 37951.492
IRN 30.111 0.000 30.767 0.000 0.000 33.949 0.000 850.631 101.702 0.000 0.000 6.735 49.103 0.000 207.934 388.882 0.020 2.610 0.000 0.000 89.691 500.398 57.143 625.362 0.000 1223.000 0.000 2956.520 722.288 44.964 11.640 79.582 746.943 6.414 8766.389
IRQ 13.762 0.018 0.000 0.000 3.150 0.000 2.507 0.184 32.733 0.000 11.242 0.000 0.000 0.015 42.840 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 1.907 0.071 0.478 0.000 0.000 257.908 0.000 0.000 0.001 56.756 4.316 1.135 429.025
ISR 519.900 0.000 0.000 0.000 153.400 0.200 12.000 1613.200 17.400 0.000 250.300 97.200 0.000 70.100 10.000 0.000 1.300 0.000 0.000 415.600 0.000 393.100 60.200 0.000 15.100 457.400 4086.400
JOR 1.680 44.954 2.045 0.003 0.974 72.974 0.626 11.505 459.006 31.194 33.051 712.292 158.526 7.396 71.867 0.631 54.176 0.098 0.816 2.063 0.000 22.951 33.724 58.799 414.383 0.000 3.406 0.509 6.923 1.712 54.296 3.071 6.106 429.631 42.798 2744.186
KEN 13.192 4.032 0.000 8.081 11.600 153.115 4.527 35.904 66.692 14.353 3.228 0.017 19.818 1.907 0.522 6.214 11.380 0.012 14.955 3.496 0.000 1.576 252.634 1.983 12.010 5.359 8.898 72.498 28.235 9.627 52.027 396.669 12.743 61.626 18.959 1307.889
KWT 210.762 52.536 1546.360 0.000 0.000 161.306 1.923 581.652 1637.360 29.921 0.000 124.170 23.741 0.134 546.990 2.732 0.634 0.000 0.000 68.196 1742.510 92.346 286.764 0.046 4624.630 0.000 1.132 10.627 15.591 4.214 147.837 348.259 440.277 12702.650
MDG 0.470 0.081 0.000 4.808 0.001 0.876 0.000 19.573 0.894 0.043 0.006 0.000 0.447 0.015 0.001 1.275 0.000 17.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.313 0.032 0.754 1.345 20.748 0.000 5.876 0.996 0.327 0.076 2.440 2.318 0.000 81.731
MYS 5938.700 61.399 406.653 1.620 79.311 476.905 1.422 12.682 5884.090 5171.300 617.698 20.477 0.006 87.352 101.916 168.175 23.234 112.410 84.042 35.410 210.504 151.604 1257.200 292.202 716.050 10.993 25771.500 15.405 809.790 371.406 52.934 123.288 8729.710 2947.500 220.710 60965.598
MDV 0.811 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.537 0.145 0.000 0.341 0.000 0.243 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.039 2.118 0.000 24.781 4.096 46.072 0.005 80.260
MUS 2.718 0.086 4.166 5.299 0.000 0.154 0.658 15.352 2.752 0.034 0.000 1.455 0.054 5.409 0.126 128.901 6.201 0.057 1.379 0.010 5.462 0.911 0.001 0.085 18.573 9.965 0.000 62.199 0.831 0.264 1.521 5.619 320.970 0.000 601.212
MOZ 0.930 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 37.474 16.948 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.535 1.741 0.000 0.000 1.392 0.000 0.000 0.000 7.762 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.516 0.000 336.011 0.000 0.000 5.612 9.843 4.564 0.045 425.373
MMR 19.765 1.305 41.303 0.000 6.954 0.000 688.872 20.578 0.527 0.000 0.727 0.789 0.000 6.290 0.003 126.638 0.000 1.332 2.954 54.872 2.316 1.134 0.000 55.615 0.000 14.387 5.670 0.000 0.000 2104.890 26.242 0.000 3183.163
OMN 3.305 58.136 0.000 0.630 23.252 23.487 4.320 0.000 272.510 0.443 927.009 50.920 0.000 14.478 2.433 95.676 0.321 425.903 0.424 10.811 0.125 0.186 49.880 129.700 311.820 0.000 235.847 48.007 417.681 4.944 13.100 43.892 2381.900 1742.910 89.892 7383.942
PAK 127.095 63.923 324.801 10.197 5.686 79.877 0.241 5.086 517.476 109.184 285.226 28.027 0.000 19.158 101.895 123.867 43.071 75.693 4.499 44.100 39.408 3.448 82.394 61.225 567.616 0.558 48.485 4.574 136.578 235.796 36.191 23.652 62.469 2008.950 89.708 5370.154
QAT 221.127 62.619 36.433 0.000 24.791 0.000 14.878 1986.940 28.703 0.000 0.833 7.406 27.810 23.742 0.245 21.537 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 15.436 451.223 255.052 0.000 3808.450 0.050 105.931 53.379 28.105 28.045 1874.850 1555.000 4.670 10637.282
SAU 789.423 5469.540 382.364 0.000 372.037 2171.210 45.947 827.360 2121.000 3482.150 730.836 0.000 2588.950 746.881 1222.840 15.236 1796.860 1.559 138.218 2.034 8.623 440.334 3887.350 899.998 160.925 8012.160 15.358 3623.740 203.832 595.109 142.238 4198.570 2665.410 589.215 48347.307
SYC 3.554 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.400 0.270 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.341 0.067 0.058 36.895 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.000 1.781 0.000 6.197 1.088 1.091 0.000 5.014 0.098 0.000 58.076
SGP 11190.900 53.677 936.349 5.486 9.104 330.726 16.148 10000.200 29466.800 534.027 0.000 464.239 54.777 48.130 249.098 47.919 38626.300 236.893 115.495 31.244 778.029 125.119 846.481 251.565 838.277 52.832 0.000 733.232 836.493 27.173 27.790 12390.300 3485.920 51.026 112861.749
SOM 0.155 6.629 0.000 0.000 1.268 1.323 0.000 14.689 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.424 1.807 9.357 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 23.102 6.241 2.863 12.513 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.173 0.015 3.073 192.840 79.726 356.200
ZAF 1276.800 22.593 19.825 12.067 10.105 66.841 6.288 34.030 1350.640 222.946 213.311 47.902 854.432 12.713 643.463 40.083 162.956 407.000 3.043 270.126 1267.710 0.000 39.820 220.934 37.396 336.389 58.290 359.268 1.118 25.491 92.818 382.600 431.177 710.499 28.656 9669.330
LKA 77.565 7.425 22.212 0.000 22.206 0.771 868.744 40.235 118.564 32.379 33.636 16.589 6.752 19.555 4.490 29.230 41.825 2.792 0.000 3.753 10.259 66.805 8.396 61.712 1.462 63.211 0.001 19.727 0.000 2.629 33.279 272.326 0.905 1889.435
SDN 0.007 0.000 21.913 0.000 0.000 80.716 3.201 27.472 33.901 62.483 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.799 1.977 2.100 0.047 0.073 0.408 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 50.354 0.814 146.880 0.000 0.239 0.000 0.812 0.000 0.000 0.669 104.294 15.804 560.964
TZA 6.168 0.000 1.295 1.047 0.147 4.850 0.684 0.000 170.734 13.275 0.480 0.000 6.455 0.085 40.439 0.000 6.640 34.102 0.633 1.387 9.447 1.698 2.080 18.525 2.323 5.345 0.387 3.803 0.988 51.951 0.159 0.000 10.698 85.947 0.125 481.897
THA 5725.850 96.322 510.998 3.941 15.386 479.417 41.247 2664.120 4767.770 775.237 202.915 700.889 173.903 105.226 225.120 32.649 7792.170 55.274 65.331 63.216 958.760 280.875 661.913 216.079 1368.830 5.985 9534.630 1.096 1322.180 273.550 87.422 84.731 2206.570 208.387 41707.989
ARE 1509.790 394.138 439.433 15.108 36.347 355.302 0.000 6058.810 440.002 4698.240 0.000 261.195 1066.270 623.231 65.952 1175.630 161.536 114.458 65.056 0.000 2781.930 3612.360 1062.530 2008.470 16.589 4174.840 45.174 690.518 408.545 436.700 292.085 6270.990 1249.550 40530.779
YEM 0.009 0.816 0.034 0.000 14.481 34.321 7.088 9.834 1396.710 0.368 0.158 33.843 48.784 0.431 187.313 0.036 26.128 0.001 0.089 0.000 0.000 16.403 3.173 1.796 205.323 0.056 56.807 44.713 141.891 0.829 0.000 0.569 1308.150 340.438 3880.592
Total 32933.940 6827.457 7852.471 76.277 1043.019 6513.930 78.271 1391.017 51044.238 51470.086 11736.592 1759.843 4103.547 4755.846 4472.581 4672.874 912.592 62076.942 785.868 1733.077 1928.321 2287.310 5464.818 16340.187 4269.712 15545.341 365.890 80766.293 616.787 16520.733 6766.415 2770.365 2291.446 49990.237 38463.778 3986.048 504614.149
Appendix K
Indian Ocean Shipping Fleets
Shipping fleets by country of registration 31 December 2007
Ships of
Total Cargo carrying ships miscellaneous
S. no. Registration activities
No GT Age No GT Dwt Age No GT Age
1 Australia 696 1,911,160 23 169 1,351,433 1,541,588 22 527 559,727 23
2 Bahrain 182 325,126 20 16 222,459 317,294 31 166 102,667 19
3 Bangladesh 320 440,517 32 219 412,485 608,397 33 101 28,032 30
4 Comoros 264 755,304 31 184 675,289 964,547 32 80 80,015 26
5 Djibouti 15 4,104 27 1 500 50 27 14 3,604 27
6 Egypt 344 1,113,268 26 122 983,828 1,484,097 25 222 129,440 27
7 Eritrea 14 14,478 19 6 13,087 15,717 34 8 1,391 9
8 Ethiopia 10 122,729 17 10 122,729 159,314 17
9 India 1417 9,168,046 18 652 8,407,884 14,348,787 15 765 760,162 20
10 Indonesia 4469 5,669,830 21 2464 5,145,628 6,806,563 24 2002 524,202 18
11 Iran 508 3,576,860 22 243 3,430,445 5,884,213 19 265 146,415 26
12 Iraq 89 159,118 34 21 87,060 132,291 28 68 72,058 35
13 Israel 51 728,130 19 22 717,373 846,536 17 29 10,757 21
14 Jordan 28 368,722 26 27 368,546 508,158 26 1 176 29
15 Kenya 36 15,110 26 12 7,318 10,410 35 24 7,792 22
16 Kuwait 212 2,426,799 24 61 2,389,287 3,954,784 20 151 37,512 25
17 Madagascar 106 35,363 29 32 22,365 29,466 39 74 12,998 24
18 Malaysia 1151 6,974,618 16 556 6,360,309 8,618,250 20 595 614,309 13
19 Maldives 94 125,545 28 76 115,981 159,934 29 18 9,564 24
20 Mauritius 43 39,733 27 4 13,556 11,821 18 39 26,177 28
21 Mozambique 129 37,914 27 7 5,223 9,968 36 122 32,691 27
22 Myanmar 118 203,219 27 51 179,798 226,039 25 67 23,421 29
23 Oman 36 24,132 16 12 16,157 10,260 22 24 7,975 12
24 Pakistan 53 348,964 24 17 326,386 538,056 27 36 22,578 23
25 Qatar 84 619,535 15 22 568,095 852,373 15 62 51,440 15
26 Saudi Arabia 311 942,204 23 74 822,932 1,028,012 28 237 119,272 22
27 Seychelles 54 182,643 19 16 138,821 213,409 19 38 43,822 19
28 Singapore 2257 36,251,735 10 1317 34,965,786 54,378,645 11 940 1,285,949 8
29 Somalia 18 9,912 35 5 5,022 6,259 44 13 4,890 32
30 South Africa 250 192,585 31 6 28,066 30,615 31 244 164,519 31
31 Sri Lanka 85 163,283 26 36 144,503 204,950 26 49 18,780 26
32 Sudan 19 25,904 30 6 22,640 28,009 38 13 3,264 26
33 Tanzania 53 38,138 30 34 33,216 40,296 32 19 4,922 27
34 Thailand 858 2,846,939 26 633 2,740,045 4,186,416 26 225 106,894 23
35 United Arab Emirates 446 807,218 21 142 635,453 877,174 21 304 171,765 22
36 Yemen 47 29,169 25 6 16,171 22,973 37 41 12,998 23
Total 14867 76,698,054 24 7,281 71,495,876 109,055,671 26 7583 5,202,178 23
World total 94936 721,855,399 22 50214 687,980,619 1,014,553,957 20 44722 33,874,780 24
% of world total 15.7% 10.6% 14.5% 10.4% 10.7% 17.0% 15.4%
Source: Developed from Lloyds Register Fairplay – World Fleet Statistics 2007
357
358 Appendix K
Shipping fleets by nationality of owner 1000 GT and above 31 December 2007

Ships of
Total Cargo carrying ships miscellaneous
S. no. Registration
activities
No GT Age No GT Dwt Age No GT Age
1 Australia 85 1,783,475 15 65 1,426,914 1,456,748 14 20 356,561 17
2 Bahrain 11 53,095 34 3 42,963 59,771 33 8 10,132 34
3 Bangladesh 47 403,973 25 46 400,747 566,499 25 1 3,226 16
4 Comoros
5 Djibouti
6 Egypt 144 1,096,390 25 115 1,030,733 1,344,798 26 29 65,657 22
7 Eritrea 4 11,126 31 4 11,126 12,757 31
8 Ethiopia 9 117,747 17 9 117,747 149,990 17
9 India 538 9,736,879 17 393 9,134,045 15,587,451 16 145 602,834 19
10 Indonesia 850 5,331,002 23 818 5,225,610 7,192,815 23 32 75,392 21
11 Iran 179 5,900,355 16 156 5,826,769 10,191,362 14 23 73,586 27
12 Iraq 26 118,607 31 14 83,559 126,546 26 12 35,048 37
13 Israel 72 2,007,371 18 70 2,004,897 2,585,618 17 2 2,474 33
14 Jordan 26 482,175 28 26 482,175 685,765 28
15 Kenya 7 18,936 37 7 18,936 22,070 37
16 Kuwait 69 3,402,004 16 67 3,396,810 5,295,131 16 2 5,194 3
17 Madagascar 8 12,336 39 8 12,336 17,046 39
18 Malaysia 393 8,877,388 16 297 8,533,087 10,669,378 16 96 344,301 15
19 Maldives 19 81,596 31 18 80,165 106,666 30 1 1,431 42
20 Mauritius 1 2,709 25 1 2,709 3,357 25
21 Mozambique 2 3,420 4 2 3,420 4
22 Myanmar 29 141,375 21 23 132,602 159,200 21 6 8,773 19
23 Oman 17 161,521 8 3 130,763 84,526 11 14 30,758 8
24 Pakistan 33 641,028 26 30 631,118 1,044,254 27 3 9,910 17
25 Qatar 33 458,932 7 13 420,962 570,115 3 20 37,970 10
26 Saudi Arabia 165 7,228,610 15 112 7,142,775 12,867,337 16 53 85,835 12
27 Seychelles 4 93,045 2 4 93,045 152,987 2
28 Singapore 869 17,742,911 15 717 17,160,420 27,805,450 16 152 582,491 10
29 Somalia
30 South Africa 34 214,667 24 7 108,299 166,297 12 27 106,368 27
31 Sri Lanka 21 119,389 25 18 115,425 171,858 26 3 3,964 24
32 Sudan 3 21,311 35 3 21,311 26,179 35
33 Tanzania 8 22,678 35 8 22,678 29,088 35
34 Thailand 342 2,694,242 23 322 2,657,087 4,007,848 23 20 37,155 24
35 United Arab Emirates 425 6,453,382 21 346 6,256,971 8,761,847 21 79 196,411 22
36 Yemen 17 134,301 29 17 134,301 218,307 29
Total 4490 75,567,976 22 3740 72,859,085 112,139,061 22 750 2,678,891 20
World total 39209 703,263,146 22 33730 680,847,086 1,003,865,069 21 5479 22,416,060 23
% of world total 11.5% 10.7% 11.1% 10.7% 11.2% 13.7% 12.0%
Source: Developed from Lloyds Register Fairplay – World Fleet Statistics 2007
Indian Ocean Region principal merchant fleets 31 December 2007
Country of 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
registration No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age
Appendix K
Australia 622 1,887,808 19 624 1,861,321 22 643 1,905,778 21 652 1,971,876 22 671 1,794,928 22 672 1,852,796 23 692 1,911,160 23
Egypt 364 1,350,449 23 361 1,274,990 25 346 1,151,430 25 341 1,143,201 25 344 1,128,712 25 348 1,141,729 26 344 1,113,268 26
India 1018 6,688,153 17 1010 6,142,073 18 1028 6,960,567 18 1066 7,517,583 18 1096 8,065,009 19 1181 8,381,185 19 1417 9,168,046 18
Indonesia 2528 3,613,139 24 2628 3,723,052 26 2700 3,840,408 25 2826 4,072,144 26 3214 4,330,407 25 4271 5,287,148 22 4469 5,669,830 21
Iran 389 3,943,576 20 380 4,128,389 22 382 4,851,927 20 430 5,324,254 21 453 5,270,599 22 475 5,207,276 22 508 3,576,860 22
Kuwait 200 2,291,672 23 201 2,255,972 24 208 2,324,290 23 213 2,377,628 23 222 2,315,680 23 220 2,156,836 24 212 2,426,799 24
Malaysia 882 5,207,136 16 915 5,394,356 17 972 5,745,771 17 1013 6,056,561 17 1052 5,758,729 16 1101 6,389,000 16 1151 6,974,618 16
Saudi Arabia 274 1,132,533 22 280 1,472,135 23 285 1,363,912 22 292 1,678,474 23 300 1,028,103 23 304 1,021,845 23 311 942,204 23
Singapore 1729 21,022,604 11 1768 21,148,090 12 1761 23,240,945 11 1842 26,282,777 11 1977 30,989,786 11 2079 32,173,922 11 2257 36,251,735 10
Thailand 568 1,771,382 24 629 1,879,581 25 671 2,268,686 24 751 2,889,877 24 789 3,025,332 25 789 2,882,703 25 858 2,846,939 26
Total 8574 48,908,452 20 8796 49,279,959 21 8996 53,653,714 21 9426 59,314,375 21 10118 63,707,285 21 11440 66,494,440 21 12219 70,881,459 21
World total 87939 574,551,264 20 89010 585,583,396 21 89899 605,218,368 21 89960 633,321,120 22 92105 675,115,956 22 94936 721,855,399 22 94936 721,855,399 22
% of world total 9.7% 8.5% 9.9% 8.4% 10.0% 8.9% 10.5% 9.4% 11.0% 9.4% 12.1% 9.2% 12.9% 9.8%
Nationality of owner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

1000 GT and above No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age No GT Age
Australia 87 2,239,678 15 438 2,282,537 19 88 2,214,007 16 85 2,227,457 15 80 2,136,764 16 85 2,547,226 16 85 1,783,475 15
Egypt 126 1,084,686 22 329 1,108,230 25 114 921,448 23 119 1,031,543 23 127 1,101,760 23 139 1,150,512 25 144 1,096,390 25
India 407 7,082,501 16 740 6,496,075 18 394 7,363,160 17 386 7,600,321 17 411 8,273,962 17 456 8,782,101 18 538 9,736,879 17
Indonesia 605 3,419,365 20 1400 3,671,433 25 616 3,599,745 22 672 4,288,581 22 724 4,663,221 22 793 4,978,382 23 850 5,331,002 23
Iran 163 3,731,500 16 286 4,173,180 20 156 5,027,552 16 172 5,481,274 16 179 5,694,064 16 184 5,766,156 16 179 5,900,355 16
Kuwait 35 2,187,098 17 135 2,024,959 24 32 2,010,569 18 57 2,891,308 18 69 3,302,733 18 68 3,148,137 18 69 3,402,004 16
Malaysia 312 5,466,785 13 535 5,650,037 16 335 7,290,745 14 327 7,321,482 15 325 7,521,941 15 357 6,248,611 16 393 8,877,388 16
Saudi Arabia 121 5,729,753 18 334 6,206,391 20 126 6,689,528 17 123 6,131,429 17 134 6,314,713 16 150 6,658,587 16 165 7,228,610 15
Singapore 714 11,113,528 15 1284 12,147,642 15 758 14,420,979 15 715 12,940,212 15 764 14,300,265 16 794 15,842,261 15 869 17,742,911 15
South Africa 27 154,974 21 126 191,323 27 27 127,192 24 29 176,400 22 26 160,529 23 30 163,584 24 34 214,667 24
Thailand 258 1,444,423 22 396 1,464,755 25 254 1,450,984 24 298 1,935,607 23 316 2,102,819 24 298 1,931,098 23 342 2,694,242 23
United Arab Emirates 185 2,505,906 21 4 4,181 9 1 3,463 4 1 3,463 5 301 4,323,046 21 366 5,005,335 22 425 6,453,382 21
Total 3040 46,160,197 18 6007 45,420,743 20 2901 51,119,372 18 2984 52,029,077 17 3456 59,895,817 19 3720 62,221,990 19 4093 70,461,305 19
World total 35471 557,130,893 17 35678 567,632,818 21 36105 587,414,421 21 36252 615,535,866 21 37644 657,048,704 22 39209 703,263,146 22 39209 703,263,146 22
% of world total 8.6% 8.3% 16.8% 8.0% 8.0% 8.7% 8.2% 8.5% 9.2% 9.1% 9.5% 8.8% 10.4% 10.0%
Source: Developed from Lloyds Register Fairplay -- World Fleet Statistics 2007
359
Appendix L
Indian Ocean countries Port State Control Inspection Data 2001 to 2006
Indian Ocean countries Port State Control inspection data 2001–2006
Number of inspections Number of detentions Inspections with deficiencies
Country PSC
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0
Australia
Tokyo MoU 10 10 6 10 12 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 1 5 8 4
Total 10 10 6 20 13 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 1 10 8 4
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 5 3 5 2 5 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 2 1 2 2 1
Bahrain
Tokyo MoU 3 4 4 2 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 3 3 2 0 0
Total 8 7 9 4 6 6 0 0 1 0 1 0 6 5 4 4 2 1
IOMOU 5 17 15 21 13 7 0 10 4 8 6 3 2 17 13 17 13 6
Paris Mo 6 0 2 12 0 1 2 0 2 2 0 0 6 0 2 9 0 1
Bangladesh
Tokyo MoU 13 14 11 12 9 7 6 1 3 2 2 1 13 14 9 9 9 7
Total 24 31 28 45 22 15 8 11 9 12 8 4 21 31 24 35 22 14
IOMOU 2 4 15 7 11 15 1 0 2 2 3 10 2 0 4 3 7 15
Paris Mo 3 25 49 9 130 120 2 10 15 2 26 23 3 20 44 9 95 93
Comoros
Tokyo MoU 1 2 3 9 7 14 0 0 0 2 0 4 1 2 3 9 7 14
Total 6 31 67 25 148 149 3 10 17 6 29 37 6 22 51 21 109 122
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Djibouti
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indian Ocean countries Port State Control inspection data 2001–2006 (continued)
362

Country PSC
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IOMOU 21 17 18 12 7 8 1 3 4 1 1 0 14 8 10 10 6 5
Paris Mo 62 68 52 14 59 46 11 9 7 2 0 6 46 57 38 13 19 33
Egypt
Tokyo MoU 12 11 17 7 5 14 0 1 5 1 1 1 6 9 13 6 2 11
Total 95 96 87 33 71 68 12 13 16 4 2 7 66 74 61 29 27 49
IOMOU 2 7 8 8 4 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 3 4 3 1
Paris Mo 11 14 8 3 12 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 11 10 7 3 9 5
Ethiopia
Tokyo MoU 1 3 1 3 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 3 4 2
Total 14 24 17 14 21 9 0 2 1 1 0 1 12 16 10 10 16 8
IOMOU 88 78 52 74 45 49 4 6 5 6 6 2 51 42 29 38 29 26
Paris Mo 79 53 39 111 58 41 13 3 4 5 2 0 55 36 28 75 28 16
India
Tokyo MoU 55 67 71 78 57 65 1 6 6 3 6 6 40 50 58 43 38 50
Total 222 198 162 263 160 155 18 15 15 14 14 8 146 128 115 156 95 92
IOMOU 22 15 15 17 23 18 3 4 5 9 8 7 19 13 15 17 23 16
Paris Mo 1 0 0 225 1 1 1 0 0 63 0 0 1 0 0 202 1 0
Indonesia
Tokyo MoU 129 128 222 211 201 187 46 29 61 60 47 42 117 122 203 188 189 175
Total 152 143 237 453 225 206 50 33 66 132 55 49 137 135 218 407 213 191
IOMOU 44 40 13 26 22 16 5 5 4 1 4 0 37 31 9 20 18 12
Paris Mo 80 70 64 57 93 77 12 4 7 5 2 2 44 44 42 57 56 39
Iran
Tokyo MoU 24 20 44 58 66 50 2 5 4 5 3 1 5 13 31 43 47 37
Total 148 130 121 159 181 143 19 14 15 11 9 3 86 88 82 120 121 88
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iraq
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Appendix L

Country PSC
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Appendix L
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 23 13 18 33 16 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 15 1 1
Israel
Tokyo MoU 12 23 29 33 35 25 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 10 17 15 23 17
Total 35 36 47 66 51 37 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 10 17 30 24 18
IOMOU 2 3 6 8 9 11 0 0 2 5 5 9 0 1 4 8 7 11
Paris Mo 0 3 1 4 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 3 3 1
Jordan
Tokyo MoU 0 0 2 8 3 2 0 0 1 5 1 1 0 0 2 8 3 1
Total 2 6 9 20 15 14 0 1 4 11 7 11 0 4 7 19 13 13
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kenya
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IOMOU 23 14 11 8 9 6 1 1 2 0 3 0 9 7 8 4 5 4
Paris Mo 15 12 9 24 11 12 2 1 0 0 0 0 9 6 3 13 5 4
Kuwait
Tokyo MoU 9 5 8 16 16 8 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 4 8 2 2
Total 47 31 28 48 36 26 5 2 2 0 3 0 21 14 15 25 12 10
IOMOU 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Madagascar
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
IOMOU 78 77 64 81 65 44 5 5 3 5 5 5 53 48 41 50 39 32
Paris Mo 45 62 58 357 36 34 3 2 2 21 1 1 30 33 29 252 16 16
Malaysia
Tokyo MoU 349 234 246 306 238 194 32 30 22 19 21 16 234 224 208 216 179 134
Total 472 373 368 744 339 272 40 37 27 45 27 22 317 305 278 518 234 182
363
364
Country PSC Number of inspections Number of detentions Inspections with deficiencies

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IOMOU 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 2 3 2 1 1
Paris Mo 0 0 0 5 2 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 2
Maldives
Tokyo MoU 8 7 12 5 11 11 1 1 1 1 1 2 8 7 11 4 11 9
Total 10 9 15 12 14 15 2 1 3 3 2 2 10 9 14 10 14 12
IOMOU 2 3 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 2
Paris Mo 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Mauritius
Tokyo MoU 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
Total 7 5 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 0 1 3
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mozambique
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IOMOU 11 5 10 14 13 8 2 1 0 3 1 1 8 4 8 12 12 6
Paris Mo 12 16 7 49 9 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 7 8 2 39 4 0
Myanmar
Tok y o MoU 33 40 37 44 35 31 4 0 7 4 4 2 28 27 31 32 28 18
T o ta l 56 61 54 107 57 41 6 1 7 12 5 3 43 39 41 83 44 24
IO M OU 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oman
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
IOMOU 6 3 7 6 4 9 0 0 2 0 2 2 6 3 5 4 4 8
Paris Mo 8 10 4 12 5 8 2 2 0 0 1 2 6 9 3 11 5 8
Pakistan
Tokyo MoU 10 15 15 12 9 11 2 0 1 0 1 0 9 14 13 11 8 10
Total 24 28 26 30 18 28 4 2 3 0 4 4 21 26 21 26 17 26
Appendix L

Country PSC
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Appendix L
IOMOU 18 11 8 8 8 2 1 2 0 2 2 0 2 4 1 5 3 1
Paris Mo 11 7 9 4 7 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 6 1 3 4 7
Qatar
Tokyo MoU 4 12 6 3 8 3 1 1 2 0 0 0 3 9 6 2 3 1
Total 33 30 23 15 23 15 3 3 2 2 2 0 14 19 8 10 10 9
IOMOU 24 23 23 10 8 3 6 1 3 2 0 0 6 10 6 4 0 2
Paris Mo 26 16 16 11 18 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 6 3 9 3 10
Saudi Arabia
Tokyo MoU 7 11 10 9 12 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 7 7 4 2
Total 57 50 49 30 38 24 7 1 3 2 0 0 27 23 16 20 7 14
IOMOU 2 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 2 2
Paris Mo 0 2 3 1 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 0
Seychelles
Tokyo MoU 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1
Total 2 6 7 3 8 4 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 5 5 3 4 3
IOMOU 215 235 200 260 254 266 12 17 15 15 16 19 114 118 107 136 143 149
Paris Mo 193 207 240 761 317 324 12 6 8 31 5 3 91 80 104 459 135 130
Singapore
Tokyo MoU 599 639 579 577 621 699 14 21 28 23 20 11 276 490 396 338 356 397
Total 1007 1081 1019 1598 1192 1289 38 44 51 69 41 33 481 688 607 933 634 676
IOMOU 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Somalia
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
IOMOU 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Paris Mo 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
South Africa
Tokyo MoU 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0
Total 3 3 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 2 0 0
365
366
Country PSC Number of inspections Number of detentions Inspections with deficiencies
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Sri Lanka IOMOU 5 11 9 17 19 10 0 1 3 3 5 3 2 8 9 15 19 9
Paris Mo 0 1 2 5 6 4 0 0 1 2 1 2 0 0 1 4 5 4
Tokyo MoU 0 1 0 5 5 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 4 5 1
Total 5 13 11 27 30 15 0 1 4 7 7 6 2 8 10 23 29 14
Sudan IOMOU 4 6 5 1 0 0 1 3 2 1 0 0 1 5 3 1 0 0
Paris Mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tokyo MoU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 4 6 5 1 0 0 1 3 2 1 0 0 1 5 3 1 0 0
Tanzania IOMOU 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
Paris Mo 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0
Tokyo MoU 1 0 4 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 2 1 2
Total 4 0 4 5 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5 1 3
Thailand IOMOU 40 31 29 72 53 58 3 1 2 14 3 4 23 18 14 47 38 33
Paris Mo 36 35 36 294 80 90 0 1 1 33 9 7 25 22 25 222 54 60
Tokyo MoU 211 227 185 265 321 316 23 18 16 27 27 29 175 175 169 211 261 231
Total 287 293 250 631 454 464 26 20 19 74 39 40 223 215 208 480 353 324
UAE IOMOU 14 18 12 20 11 8 1 2 3 5 3 5 5 11 6 11 8 7
Paris Mo 14 14 21 6 8 9 1 0 1 1 0 0 6 7 6 3 4 3
Tokyo MoU 3 3 4 3 3 7 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 4 2 3 1 3
Total 31 35 28 29 22 24 3 2 5 6 3 6 14 22 14 17 13 13
Source: Compiled by author from annual reports for Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and Indian Ocean MoU
Appendix L
Inspection data reported by Australia under the Tokyo MoU and Indian Ocean MoU has been adjusted with the data only added to inspections
under the Indian Ocean MoU
Appendix M
Indian Ocean Port State Control Inspection
Data for Classification Societies
Indian Ocean port state control inspection data for classification societies
No of inspections No of detentions
BG GW Excess
Classification society List
2001 2002 2003 Total 2001 2002 2003 Total limit limit factor
American Bureau of
585 520 414 1519 18 30 27 75 123 89 –0.35 W
Shipping
Bureau Veritas 413 198 353 964 28 16 43 87 81 54 1.19 B
China Classification
129 128 179 436 7 7 10 24 40 21 0.15 G
Society
Det Norske Veritas 558 530 522 1610 15 16 33 64 130 95 –0.71 W
Germanischer Lloyd 375 453 380 1208 25 26 34 85 100 69 0.51 G
Korean Register of
169 155 158 482 7 13 9 29 43 24 0.26 G
Shipping
Lloyd's Register 896 848 723 2467 48 52 75 175 194 151 0.55 G
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 1555 1551 1422 4528 61 62 77 200 346 288 –0.68 W
Registro Italiano Navale 85 92 71 248 13 6 9 28 24 10 1.41 B
Russian Maritime Register
390 430 531 1351 5 12 50 67 110 79 –0.32 W
of Shipping
Indian Register of
60 58 44 162 2 2 8 12 17 5 0.56 G
Shipping
Non IACS 305 489 296 1090 62 64 97 223 91 62 4.83 B
IACS + Associate 5215 4963 4797 14975 229 242 375 846 1100 996 –0.34 W
Total 5520 5452 5093 16065 291 306 472 1069 1178 1071 0.00 W
No of inspections No of detentions BG GW Excess

Classification society List
2004 2005 2006 Total 2004 2005 2006 Total limit limit factor
American Bureau of
466 442 461 1369 42 31 27 100 112 80 0.63 G
Shipping
Bureau Veritas 423 485 437 1345 52 53 29 134 110 78 1.56 B
China Classification
210 226 228 664 6 6 15 27 58 35 –0.47 W
Society
Det Norske Veritas 535 518 460 1513 23 30 27 80 123 89 –0.22 W
Germanischer Lloyd 415 418 444 1277 31 29 27 87 105 74 0.42 G
Korean Register of
187 222 227 636 6 15 12 33 56 33 –0.03 G
Shipping
Lloyd's Register 852 785 757 2394 77 47 43 167 189 147 0.49 G
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 1700 1602 1668 4970 76 56 76 208 378 318 –0.77 W
Registro Italiano Navale 89 99 96 284 12 13 13 38 27 12 2.08 B
Russian Maritime Register
470 115 66 651 56 11 15 82 57 34 2.18 B
of Shipping
Indian Register of
64 44 45 153 7 7 5 19 16 5 1.47 B
Shipping
Non IACS 279 249 235 763 101 76 117 294 66 41 10.54 B
IACS + Associate 5411 4956 4889 15256 388 298 289 975 1120 1016 –0.09 W
Total 5690 5205 5124 16019 489 374 406 1269 1175 1068 1.19 W
Source: Compiled from annual reports for Indian Ocean MoU
367
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August 2008.
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March 2009.
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27 March 2009.
Index
A B
Abuja MoU, 215, 217 Bahrain, 25, 59, 148, 186–189, 199,
Actor behaviour 215–216, 231
interest based actors, 141 Baltic and International Maritime Council,
knowledge based actors, 140–141 230, 259
power based actors, 141–142 Bangladesh, 25–26, 59, 149, 158–160,
Adaptive management, 32–33, 38, 162–163, 186–189, 199, 202, 226, 231,
142, 286 234, 238–239
Bareboat charters, 203–204
Ademuni-Odeke, 222, 258
Bipolar, 22, 52–53, 60
Africa, 3–4, 9, 13, 49, 52–56, 58–59, 61–68,
Boisson, 222, 257
139–140, 146–150, 153, 156–163, 175,
Broader consequences across space
177, 181, 184–187, 189–190, 192, 195,
international cooperation, 148–152
197, 199, 206, 209, 211, 213, 217, 219,
regional cooperation, 146–148
223, 226, 231, 234, 236–237, 239–242,
state learning, 145–146
244, 246, 255, 265
Bulk cargo, 3, 230, 232
Aid, 22
Alderton, 223, 258
C
Amoco Cadiz, 213, 257
Capacity-building, 33, 109, 143–146, 160, 163,
Aquaculture, 29, 152, 158
234, 239–240, 252, 266, 269
Archipelagic state, 20, 26, 131 Cariou, 224, 258
Archipelagic waters, 20, 131 Casualty rates of ships, 223
Asia, 3–4, 9, 49, 52–54, 58, 61–66, 95–96, Center for Strategic and International
146, 148–149, 184–185, 189–192, 196, Studies, 11
199–200, 265 Classification societies, 216, 221–222,
Asia Pacific, 4, 13, 49–50, 55, 61–64, 96, 129, 225–228, 230–231, 238, 258, 268
184, 202, 214, 223 Climate change, 7, 24, 29–30, 43, 129, 136,
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, 184 141–142, 144, 152, 160
Association of South East Asian Nations, 31 Coastal communities, 11, 24, 40, 140–141,
Australia, 3, 9, 13, 25, 26, 29, 49, 53–56, 158–159
58–59, 62–66, 139–140, 145–146, 149, Coastal erosion, 29–30, 32, 146, 152, 155,
156–157, 159–163, 165, 174, 177, 158, 160
184–187, 189–192, 194, 197, 199–200, Coastal state, 7, 20, 23–26, 38, 58–59, 62–63,
202, 204, 206–219, 223, 226, 229, 75, 130–135, 148, 152, 175, 241, 273
231–232, 234, 238–239, 241–242, 244, Coastal tourism, 21, 29
246–247, 255–257, 260–261, 265, 269, Coastal waters, 21, 145
271, 273 Coastal zone, 23, 27, 45–46, 132, 135–136,
Australian Maritime Safety Authority, 141, 147, 158
217–218, 235–237, 246, 261 Cognitivism, 8, 76–79, 88
395
396 Index
Cold war, 3, 6, 22, 50, 52, 60–61, 63–64, F

66, 265 Financial resources, 28, 31, 40–42
Co-management, 36 Fisheries, 4, 7, 23–24, 39, 43, 69, 76, 129, 136,
Common heritage of mankind, 18, 26–27, 39, 147, 152, 155, 158–160, 177, 265, 272
75, 133, 274 Fish stocks, 23, 42, 147, 159
Comoros, 59, 62, 149, 160, 162, 186–187, 189, Flag of Convenience, 204, 257
226, 240, 259 Flagging out, 204
Complex interdependence, 18, 44 Flag state, 13, 76, 131, 203–205, 216–217,
Concept comprehensiveness, 35, 37 219, 221–223, 225–226, 229–231, 233,
Consistent practice, 35, 37 238, 241, 247, 255–256, 258, 268
Container Security Initiative, 39, 42, 76 Flag State Implementation, 222, 241, 247
Container shipments, 3 Food and Agricultural Organisation, 24
Continental shelf, 5, 20, 23, 25–26, 39, 97, Food security, 11, 22, 24, 272
130–132, 207 Forum for Defence and Maritime Studies,
Contractualist theory, 6, 79 11, 257
Control and regulation, 4, 10, 17, 20, 38, 40, France, 19, 26, 29, 50, 58, 60–61, 64, 67, 139,
43, 95 145, 156, 159, 181, 204, 214, 231, 239,
Coral reefs, 24, 159 256–257
Crude oil, 3, 257 Franses, 224, 258
Customary law, 17 Freedom of the seas, 19, 40
Cyclones, 24, 135, 141, 158, 160
G
D GCC MoU, 215, 217, 233–234, 238, 260, 269
Developing countries, 26, 141, 147, 171, Genuine link, 203, 205, 223
184–187, 189–200, 200–202 Geographic Information System, 34
Dijxhoorn, 222, 257 Global governance, 11
Direct method, 36 Globalisation, 19, 22, 50, 70
Disarmament, 6, 24 Global Ocean Observing System, 11–12, 129,
Disaster management, 7, 42–43 136–140, 153, 174, 176–177, 179,
Djibouti, 26, 59, 62, 149, 186–189, 202, 266–267, 269
226, 240 Global security, 40, 42–43, 52
Drug trafficking, 22, 51 Good order at sea, 7, 11, 35, 44, 271–272
Dumping, 24, 206 Graaf, 226, 258
Great power, 40, 50, 53–54, 60, 265
E Greece, 26, 29, 204, 214, 230–231, 239
East Asia, 3–4, 9, 31, 49, 52–54, 58, 61–63, 65, Gross Domestic Product, 184
95–96, 146, 184–185, 189–191, 194,
196, 199, 202, 208–209, 217, 238, 265 H
Ecuador, 29, 214 Hare, 213, 223–224, 257–258
Egypt, 25, 59, 62, 149, 162–163, 186–187, High seas, 17, 19–20, 23, 27, 38–40, 57,
189, 199, 204, 207–214, 216, 75–76, 95, 130–133, 135, 274
231, 239 Hurricanes, 24, 135
Environmental degradation, 11, 22,
42, 51 I
Environmental Impact Assessment, 32 Illegal immigration, 22, 51
Epistemic communities, 6, 77, 81, 88, 106, Imports, 183
108, 110, 118, 142, 166, 232 Imposition, 9, 79, 104, 140, 174
Ethiopia, 12, 25, 56, 59, 149, 186–187, 189, India, 25–26, 45, 50, 53–57, 59, 62–64, 134,
202, 217, 226, 240, 260 139–140, 145, 149, 156, 158–165, 174,
European fleets, 204 177, 184–187, 189, 191–192, 195–200,
Exclusive economic zone, 5, 7, 20–21, 23, 202, 207–213, 215–219, 226, 229, 231,
75–76, 131 234, 236–239, 241–242, 244–247, 255,
Exports, 12, 67, 183–202 257, 267, 269, 271, 273
Index 397
Indian Ocean Computerised Information Standards of Training, Certification and

System, 244 Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 76, 206
Indian Ocean Global Ocean Observing System, Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
12, 139–140, 177, 266–267 Safety of Maritime Navigation, 39, 207
Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding, International Labour Organisation, 206, 261
12, 203, 260 International Maritime Organisation, 205–207
Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional International Monetary Fund, 12, 183
Cooperation, 3, 61, 68 International registers, 204, 231
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, 147, 272 International Seabed Authority, 5, 23, 39, 133
Indirect method, 36 International Shipping Federation, 229, 258
Indonesia, 11, 25–26, 45, 53, 59, 63, 139, 142, International Ship and Port Facility Security
145, 147, 149, 156, 159, 161–162, 165, Code, 43
170, 186–187, 189, 191–192, 194–196, International Transport Federation, 204, 257
199, 202, 208–214, 216–219, 226, 231, International Union for the Conservation of
239, 247, 257 Nature and Natural Resources, 27
Intra-Indian Ocean, 11–12, 183–202
Industrial capacity, 40–41
Iran, 25–26, 53, 59, 62–64, 139, 141, 149,
Industrialised countries, 184–186, 188–190,
159–163, 186–189, 192, 199, 202,
201–202
208–213, 215–218, 226, 231, 234,
Institutional integration, 28 236–237, 242, 244, 246, 255, 274
Integrated Coastal Management, 27 Iraq, 25–26, 53, 59, 62, 64, 149, 162,
Integrated management, 27–28, 39, 45 186–189, 202
Integrated Technical Cooperation Island states, 9, 53, 58, 62, 148–149
Programme, 240 Israel, 59, 62, 162, 186–187, 189, 197, 199,
Interdependence, 6, 18, 22, 25, 27, 42–44, 214, 226, 231
51–52, 65, 265
Intergenerational equity, 35, 44 J
Intergovernmental, 28, 35, 61, 81, 137, 148, Japan, 3, 26, 50, 53, 60, 64, 149, 156, 208, 214,
150, 175 231, 239, 263
Jordan, 25, 59, 62, 149, 186–189, 199, 202,
Internal waters, 19–20, 130
214, 231
International Association of Classification
Societies, 225, 258 K
International Association of Dry Cargo Kenya, 25–26, 59, 62, 139, 141, 149, 158–163,
Shipowners, 230 177, 186–187, 189, 215–217, 231, 234,
International Association of Independent 236–237, 240–242, 244, 247
Tanker Owners, 229, 258 Kiehne, 222, 258
International Chamber of Shipping, 229, 258 Knapp, 224, 258
International Conventions Korea, 3, 134, 149, 208, 214, 231, 239, 259
Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Kovats, 223, 258
Water and Sediments, 207 Kuwait, 25–26, 59, 149, 162–163, 186–187,
Liability and Compensation for Damage 189, 191, 202, 208–213, 215–216, 226,
in connection with the Carriage of 229, 231
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by L
sea, 207 Land locked, 17, 58–59, 148, 202, 239
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Latin American MoU, 224
Dumping of Wastes and Other Law of the Sea Convention, 17, 39, 46, 96, 265
Matter, 206 Leadership
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 76, 206 entrepreneurial, 141
Safe Containers, 206 intellectual, 140–141
Safety of Life at Sea, 76, 206 structural, 141–142
Standards of Training, Certification and Li, 223, 258
Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Llacer, 223, 256, 258
Personnel, 206 Load Line, 241
398 Index
M Mozambique, 25–26, 59, 65, 139, 141, 149,

Madagascar, 25–26, 59, 62, 139, 141, 149, 158, 160, 162, 177, 186–189, 240
158, 160, 162–163, 177, 186–189, 202, Myanmar, 25, 59, 149, 162, 186–189, 202,
231, 234, 240 231, 234
Malaysia, 11, 26, 53, 59, 63, 139, 149,
160–162, 186–187, 189, 191, 192–194, N
196, 199, 202, 208–214, 216–219, 226, National fleet, 43, 47
231, 234–235, 237, 240, 247, 257 National identity, 17
Maldives, 59, 139, 149, 162, 186–189, 202, National interest, 17–18, 40, 42, 52, 95, 172,
207, 215–219, 226, 234, 236–237, 265
240–242, 244, 247 National jurisdiction, 7, 20–21, 23, 27, 39, 133
Marine environment, 18, 22–26, 42, 46, 69, 74, National security, 17, 49–52, 61, 145
76, 97, 129–130, 132–133, 135, 142, National vision, 41
144–145, 148, 160, 163, 205, 233, Nation-states, 4–5, 17–19, 22, 24, 32, 42–43,
239, 267 50–53, 55, 60–64, 97, 266
Marine leisure, 21, 29 Natural resources, 19, 23, 27, 39, 132–134
Marine resources, 5, 42, 137, 160 Negotiation, 9, 25, 71–72, 78–79, 104, 107,
Marine scientific research, 5, 7–12, 22–23, 113, 132, 140, 174, 216, 249, 267
43–44, 69, 76, 97, 125, 129–182, Neoliberalism, 8, 76–79
265–270, 272 New ocean regime, 5, 7, 38, 40–41, 95
Maritime affairs, 4, 11, 17, 219, 257 Non-governmental organisations, 11, 30, 53,
Maritime borders, 43 61, 81, 140–141, 159, 240
Maritime domain, 41, 43, 273 Non-military, 18, 51, 61
Maritime forces, 41–43 Norms, 8, 49, 70–75, 77, 83–84, 89, 99, 107,
Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 11, 257 109, 115–116, 120, 168–169, 249–250,
266–267, 272
Maritime Labour Convention, 206, 241, 261
North East Asia, 4, 54, 95–96
Maritime operations, 41–42
Maritime policy, 12, 40–41, O
221, 266 Ocean governance, 4–10, 15–126, 265–267,
Maritime power, 23–24, 26, 40–41, 272–273
60, 135 Oceanic, 10, 20, 55–56, 62, 65–66, 70, 90, 97,
Maritime safety, 4, 7, 10–11, 13, 22, 28, 129–130, 133–135, 139–141, 147–148,
42–44, 76, 205–206, 213, 217–218, 156–157, 159, 265
221, 223–224, 233, 235–239, 246, 258, Oceanic space, 265
261, 265, 267, 272 Ocean regime, 5, 7, 22, 38, 40–41, 69, 95, 265
Maritime security, 4, 22, 38, 42–44, 69, 76, Ocean use, 22–23, 38, 95, 135, 265
221, 257, 265, 271–273 Oil Companies International Marine Forum,
Maritime technology, 41–42 232, 259
Maritime zones, 20, 28–31, 33–34, 42, Oman, 25–26, 59, 62–63, 65, 149, 162,
130–131, 134 186–189, 199, 215–217, 226, 234,
Marlow, 223, 258 236–237, 241–242, 244, 247, 269
Mauritius, 25–26, 59, 61, 139, 141, 145, 149, Open registers, 203–204, 223
159–163, 177, 186–187, 189, 215–217, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
226, 231, 234, 236–237, 240–242, Development, 27
244, 259
McDorman, 175–176, 223, 258 P
Middle East, 4, 9, 13, 15, 46, 49, 52–54, Pakistan, 25–26, 53, 59, 63–64, 149, 161–162,
58, 61–63, 146, 148–149, 184–185, 186–187, 189, 192, 199–200, 226, 229,
189–191, 195, 199, 208–209, 265 231, 238, 267
Middle power, 265 Paris Memorandum of Understanding, 213
Military, 17–18, 21, 24, 40–42, 44, 51, 53, Paris MoU, 13, 214, 217–218, 223, 230,
60–62, 134–135 245–246, 256, 261
Monsoons, 24, 135, 156, 160, 180 Participatory planning, 30
Index 399
Payoyo, 222, 257 Roundtable of International Shipping

Philippines, 29, 149, 204, 214, 231, 240 Associations, 230–232, 259
P&I clubs, 222, 228, 230–231, 258 Rules, 8, 38, 40, 49, 70–74, 76–78, 82–87,
Piracy, 22, 271, 274 89–90, 96, 98–100, 103, 106, 109, 116,
Political will, 28, 31, 35, 40–41, 266, 271–272 120, 132, 169, 175, 205, 225, 230, 250,
Pollutants, 24 259, 266–267
Port state control, 7, 8–13, 42, 76, 175, 183,
202–261, 266–270, 272–273 S
Power to govern the sea, 10, 40–42, 44, 65, Saudi Arabia, 45, 53, 59, 149, 162–163,
127–261 186–187, 189, 191–192, 199, 202,
Precautionary principle, 31, 35 208–213, 215–216, 226, 231, 240
Principal merchant fleets, 208–213 Seaborne trade, 207, 239
Principles, 6, 20, 26, 28, 30–33, 35–38, 40, Sea denial, 22
69–76, 83, 89, 96, 99, 107, 109, 115, Sea of Eden, 25
120, 133, 135–136, 168, 204, 249, 259, Sea-level rise, 29–30, 32, 158
266–267 Sea power, 40–42, 55, 257
Process aggregation, 35, 37 Sectoral integration, 28
Proliferation Security Initiative, 39, 42, 76, 272 Self generation, 9, 79, 104, 140, 174
Seychelles, 59, 62, 139, 149, 162, 186–187,
Q 189, 234, 240
Qatar, 25, 59, 149, 162, 186–187, 189, 191, Ship Inspection Report, 232
202, 215–216 Ship management, 222, 229
Shipping industry, 203, 222, 228–231, 255–256
R Ships of Shame, 219
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Ship-targeting factor, 233, 245, 255–256, 268
12, 257 Singapore, 12, 26, 59, 63–64, 149, 161,
Realism, 8, 76–79 186–189, 191–192, 194, 196, 199, 202,
Regime formation, 9–10, 69, 76–82, 96, 99, 207–214, 216–219, 226, 229, 231,
103–104, 106, 108, 110, 113, 118–119, 234–235, 237, 239–240, 247, 257
122–125, 136–140, 152–155, 164–165, Small Island Developing States, 24
167, 170, 173–174, 213, 216, 241–247, Somalia, 25–26, 59, 62, 149, 186–189, 202,
249, 251, 254 226, 234, 240
Regimes, 3–10, 13–14, 17, 25, 43, 49, 56, 66, South Africa, 53–54, 59, 63–64, 68, 139–140,
69–73, 75–82, 86–90, 95–99, 102–104, 149, 156, 159–163, 177, 186–187, 189,
106–107, 214, 217, 219, 222, 232, 255, 192, 195, 197, 199, 206, 209, 211–213,
260, 266–273 215–217, 219, 223, 226, 231, 234,
Regime theory, 6–11, 15–127, 255, 266, 272 236–237, 239–242, 244, 246, 255
Regionalism, 8–11, 50–51, 61–64, 66–68, 95 South Asia, 4, 9, 13, 49, 52–54, 58, 61–63,
Regional management, 43 146, 184–185, 189–190, 200, 265
Regional orders, 7, 9–10, 18, 50–51, 60 South East Asia, 3, 9, 49, 53–54, 58, 62–63,
Regional security complex, 10, 52, 67 65, 146, 184–185, 189–192, 196,
Regions, 1–14, 17, 49–55, 62–64, 66–67, 199, 265
85–86, 95–97, 146, 155, 174, 184, Southern Africa, 9, 52–54, 58, 61–63, 217,
189–190, 192, 213, 223–224, 240, 240, 255
265–266 Spatial integration, 28
Renewable energy, 21, 29 Sri Lanka, 25–26, 29, 59, 139–141, 145–146,
Resource conservation, 35, 44 149, 158–160, 162–163, 177, 186–187,
Resource degradation, 29 189, 199, 215–219, 231, 234, 236–237,
Resource planning, 31 239, 241–242, 244, 247, 259
Resource scarcity, 22, 51 Stages of regime formation
RightShip, 232, 259–260 agenda formation, 152–153
Roberts, 223, 258 institutional choice, 153
Rochdale Committee, 204 operationalisation, 153–155
400 Index
Stakeholder integration, 28 207, 224–225, 228–229, 239, 256–257,

Stevedores, 228 265–266, 270
Stienberg, 183 Tragedy of Commons, 27
Strategic Impact Assessment, 32, 34 Transnational, 8, 22, 43, 51, 53, 95
Structuration theory, 8–11, 66, 69–93, Transportation, 3, 29, 85, 221, 232
103–104, 272 Treaty of Tordesillas, 19
Structure over time
domination, 144–145 U
legitimisation, 143 United Arab Emirates, 25–26, 59, 149,
signification, 142–143 186–187, 189, 191–192, 197, 199–201,
Sub-Saharan Africa, 4, 49, 62 209, 215–216
Substandard shipping, 213, 216, 219, 222–225, United Kingdom, 26, 29, 58, 61, 63–64, 67,
232, 238–239, 241, 244, 246–247, 181, 214, 256
252–256, 266, 268–270 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sudan, 25, 45, 59, 62, 67, 149, 186–187, 189, Sea, 17
202, 215–217, 234, 236–237, 240–241, United Nations Environmental Programme,
243–244 27, 39
Superpower, 50, 53, 60, 265 United States, 26, 29, 39, 43, 47, 50, 60–61,
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention, 76 64, 133, 140, 145, 156, 213–214,
Sustainable development, 22–23, 27–28, 31, 223, 239
33–35, 39, 41 Use of power, 40–41, 44
Sweden, 12, 26, 29, 204, 214, 231, 239 User pays principle, 31
Use of the sea, 38, 40–41, 272
T
Tanzania, 59, 61, 139, 142, 145, 149, 159–160,
162, 170, 182, 186–187, 189, 215–217, V
234, 236–237, 240–241, 243–244 Vasco da Gama, 183
Technological capability, 40–42, 134 Vorbach, 223, 257–258
Temporal integration, 28
Territoriality, 17, 64 W
Territorial sea, 19–20, 25, 130–131 Winchester, 223, 258
Terrorism, 22, 38, 46, 50–51, 60 Wonham, 222, 258
Thailand, 25, 29, 53, 59, 139, 149, 159–162, World Commission on Environment and
186–187, 189, 191–192, 196–197, 199, Development, 27, 39, 45, 69
202, 208–214, 216–218, 226, 231, 235, World economy, 203
237, 240, 247 World fleet, 12, 207–213, 231
Timor-Leste, 12, 59, 149 World population, 3, 19, 141
Tokyo MoU, 13, 214–219, 230, 234–239,
246–247, 260 Y
Torremolinos Protocol, 206 Yemen, 25–26, 46, 59, 62, 149, 186–189, 200,
Trade, 3, 7, 10–12, 22–24, 38, 41, 49, 55, 202, 215–217, 234, 236–237, 240–241,
60–61, 63, 66, 175, 183–202, 205, 243–244, 247

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The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific

For further volumes:

Indian Ocean Region

Maritime Regimes for Regional Cooperation

Foreword by Hasjim Djalal and Jon Van Dyke

ISSN 1866-6507 e-ISSN 1866-6515

Library of Congress Control Number: 2010930825

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

originality and creativity, provides a new ocean-focussed perspective to regional

Professor Jon Van Dyke

Canberra, Australia Manoj Gupta

Part I Introduction: Power of the Oceans Across Regions

Part II Ocean Governance, Regional Cooperation

5.8 Broader Consequences of Regime Effectiveness Across Space . . 101

Part III Indian Ocean Rim Power to Govern the Sea

6.12.1 Stages of Regime Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

8.8.2 Regional Cooperation at the Subsystem Level . . . . . . 238

Part IV Conclusion: Power of the Sea from Coast to Coast

Regional Cooperation/Subsystem level (RCSSL) . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

2.1 Possible boundary limits for ocean governance . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2.1 Indian Ocean states membership in interest groups . . . . . . . . . 25

7.5 Value of intra-Indian Ocean trade as a percentage of exports

AAMP Asian Australian Monsoon Panel

FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangement

IOP Indian Ocean Panel

PICO Panel for Integrated Coastal Observations

Source: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation Intergovernmental

1.1 Indian Ocean Region

1.2 Maritime Regime Building for Regional Cooperation

1.3 Importance of the Indian Ocean

The literature review in Chapter 3 reveals a limited body of pre-1991 work on

1.4 Regional Cooperation for Ocean Governance

1.5 Centrality of the Book

1.6 Factors and Approach to Research

The effectiveness of international maritime regimes in ocean governance for the

Essential recursiveness of social life as constituted in social practices: structure is both

1.7 Contribution of the Book to IR and IO Studies

1.8 Structure of Book

1.9 A Note on Sources and Methods

de Bruxelles, Belgium; Professor Bjorn Hettne from University of Gothenburg,

1.9.1 Case Study on IOGOOS

1.9.2 Case Study on IOMOU for PSC

available from the Australian Government Department of Infrastructure, Transport,

21. Keohane and Nye (1977).

2.1 Emergence of the New Legal Regime for the Oceans

2.2 Regime Change in the Oceans

A necessary condition for a successful international regime in the oceans is

2.3 Importance of Oceans

Extent of salt water

Fig. 2.1 Possible boundary limits for ocean governance

Conservation Coastal Engineering Resources

Waste Disposal Recreation Strategic

Fig. 2.2 Activity in the coastal and open ocean

2.4 Changing Maritime Dimensions

These changes in maritime dimension point towards increasing interdependence

2.5 Regime for Ocean Governance “History in the Making”

Table 2.1 Indian Ocean states membership in interest groups

Coastal states Australia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Strong EEZ; counter and

Table 2.1 (continued)

Margineers or broad shelf Australia, India, Madagascar, Exercise continental shelf

Special interest group Other states Common interests of the group