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1
As I make clear in Section 1, constructivism as a first-level normative account can be
motivated also with the metaethical conviction that constructivism fails as a general view of
normative propositions. I call this “moral constructivism,” since its supporters are especially
concerned with moral obligations. For reasons that will be apparent, I do not regard Rawls’
“political constructivism” as a metaethical position. In this sense, I disagree with Tampio
(2012).
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Street, Malden 02148, USA.
312 Carla Bagnoli
significant consequences for the issue of political legitimacy, which is at the core of
political liberalism. This is because it claims that the results of constructions have
unrestricted authority, rather than being authoritative only for “reasonable people”
already interested in justice.
The most threatening objections to political liberalism come from metaethics,
even though they are rarely addressed as such. Debates on political legitimacy and
debates about the prospects of constructivism as a distinct metaethical option have
only recently merged (see Street 2010; Bagnoli 2011a). Critics argue that construc-
tivism is not a suitable basis for liberalism because it cannot avoid arbitrariness
without relying on an unconstructed foundational basis (see Cohen 2003; Raz 1990,
15; 2003; Timmons 2003).2 In short, it is not a coherent, stable, and self-standing
metaethical doctrine. If these critics are right, the agenda of constructivist liberalism
is self-defeating and liberals should look elsewhere for resources to ground their
conception of political legitimacy. Indeed, some liberals undertake this path exactly
because they share this criticism and argue that liberalism should espouse realism
(Larmore 2008; Bagnoli 2009).
In this article, I endeavor to reassess the prospects of Kantian constructivism as
a metaethical basis of political liberalism. The scope of my argument is limited in
two ways. First, it does not engage in a defense of political liberalism. Second, the
argument is meant to establish the coherence of a thoroughly constructivist rational
justification. Rather than a complete defense of constructivism or an attack on
realism, this is an attempt to show that some common objections from metaethics
are insufficient to defeat constructivism as a general approach to rational
justification.
This is how I shall proceed. In Section 1, I identify the basic claims of Kantian
constructivism understood as a metaethical doctrine. The main body of the article
is devoted to discussing the nature and role of unconstructed elements that feature
in the constructivist account of rational justification. In Section 2, I consider the
basis of construction, which is a conception of rational agency, showing that its role
is not foundational. In sections 3–5, I focus on the status and scope of procedural
constraints, which are formal and constitutive rather than material. By clarifying
the nature of constraints, I draw a contrast between constructivism and founda-
tional methods of ethics, such as deontology and teleology. Finally, in Section 6, I
respond to the objection that Kantian constructivism necessarily presupposes the
value of humanity, by proposing a dialogical view of respect and mutual recog-
nition. I conclude that Kantian constructivism survives current objections from
metaethics and represents a viable basis for political liberalism.
2
Larmore (2008) criticizes constructivism in general, aiming specifically at Korsgaard and
Rawls. Similarly, Budde (2009, 199) focuses on O’Neill’s account of justice but she points to
the incoherence of constructivism in general.
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Kantian Constructivism Reassessed 313
3
Kant’s constructivism is thus a form of practical cognitivism, see Bagnoli 2013, 2011b. For
this reason I disagree with Budde that Rawls is a Kantian constructivist, for reasons also
advanced in O’Neill 2003a. Rawls proposes a “procedural interpretation of Kant’s conception
of autonomy and the categorical imperative,” precisely to avoid Kant’s “dubious metaphys-
ics” of transcendental idealism (Rawls 1971, 256; 2000, 239). In the course of this discussion,
I thus use the name Kantian constructivist only for O’Neill’s and Korsgaard’s theories.
4
It is beyond doubt that Kant’s constructivism is a form of cognitivism, since Kant thought
moral judgments to be necessary and a priori normative truths. I thus disagree with Ronzoni
and Valentini (2008, 419) that “ontological agnosticism” is the general “animating concern of
constructivism.”
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314 Carla Bagnoli
citizens.5 Political liberalism is the view that this criterion of admissibility should
regulate the discussion about the basic structure of our society, and, more generally,
it should govern the coercive use of power.
Unlike Rawls’ political constructivism, this third variety of (moral) constructiv-
ism is motivated by skepticism about the prospects of Kantian constructivism as a
global account of normative propositions. For instance, Thomas Scanlon defends
moral constructivism as a first-level account of moral obligations (Scanlon 1998,
chap. 1; Hill 2008). He agrees with realists that “constructivism all the way down”
is doomed to failure because rational justification inevitably makes use of
unconstructed and substantive elements, such as the primitive notion of reason. For
this reason, moral constructivists are not “Kantian constructivists” in the sense that
is under scrutiny in this article (Scanlon 2003, 2012).
In contrast to these political and moral varieties of constructivism, Onora O’Neill
has forcefully argued for an ambitious form of Kantian constructivism, whose
scope is broad enough to include all sorts of normative propositions. She insists
that if constructivists like Rawls fail to provide an adequate account of political
legitimacy, it is only because of their reluctance to undertake a thoroughly con-
structivist account of justification (see O’Neill 1988, 2002, 2003a).6 Against the
mainstream view, O’Neill holds that Kant’s original constructivism provides a
better framework for moral and political justification than our contemporaries
(O’Neill 1989; 2002, ix–x). This is because Kant deploys only weak, uncontroversial,
merely abstract elements to count as “materials of construction” (O’Neill 2002, 7,
48, 64, 179, 210), including a plausible account of rational agents, marked by
specific competences, vulnerabilities, and mutual dependence. Rawls’ error is that
he departs from Kant’s abstract and sober list of materials and instead deploys
controversial idealizations of rational agency and personhood, which are inad-
equate and unrealistic (ibid., 64, 93, 179, 211). Clearly, O’Neill is well aware that this
claim is bound to attract immediate reactions, given that Kant’s ethics is widely
believed to rest on a cumbersome metaphysics, requiring a rather unrealistic sort
of psychology. In claiming allegiance to Kant, O’Neill distinguishes her construc-
tivist theory from Rawls’ under two main aspects: “In the first place it assumes only
an abstract, hence nonidealizing and banal account of agents and of conditions of
action. Secondly, it aims to articulate and to vindicate a conception of practical
reasoning without appeal either to unvindicated ideals or to unvindicated particu-
larities” (ibid., 48). In contrast to Rawls, she argues that the construction must start
from “the least determinate conceptions both of the rationality and of the mutual
independence of agents. A meager and indeterminate view of rationality might
credit agents only with the capacity to understand and follow some form of social
life, and with a commitment to seek some means to any ends (desired or otherwise)
to which they are committed” (O’Neill 1989, 9–10). Moreover, “a meager and
indeterminate view of the identity and of the mutual independence of agents can
5
Here is a neat formulation of this criterion: “No doctrine is admissible as a premise in any
stage of political justification unless it is acceptable to all reasonable citizens, and it need not
be acceptable to anyone else” (Estlund 1998, 254).
6
Interestingly, this was also Richard M. Hare’s charge in his review of A Theory of Justice. Hare
(1989, 145–74) argues that Rawls appeals all too often to intuitions that he never justifies. See
also Brink 1987.
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Kantian Constructivism Reassessed 315
assume only that agents have capacities for varying sorts and degrees of depend-
ence and interdependence” (O’Neill 1988, 10).
My purpose here is not to assess the intramural dispute between Rawls and
O’Neill, but to consider whether a thoroughly constructivist justification is possible.
I will thus focus primarily on O’Neill’s position. The most distinctively “Kantian”
aspect of O’Neill’s theory is her account of practical reason and its authority. Kant’s
objection against foundationalist theories is that they are heteronomous, and
therefore dogmatic. It is important to underscore that the objections of heteronomy
and dogmatism run in parallel. The charge of heteronomy is directed against those
ethical theories, such as intuitionist rationalism, which derive moral obligations
from an external order of value. On this standard rationalist account, the function
of reason is merely recognitional, rather than productive or constructive. Its job is
to recognize truths that are such prior to and independently of reasoning about
them. Practical reasoning is not the agent’s own “doing,” in any significant sense.
Being reasonable means being responsive to reasons that are already there to be
grasped or discovered.
The Kantian objection is that a foundationalist account of justification takes such
moral truths for granted, and it is thus guilty of dogmatism. Dogmatism is not only
an objectionable ethical and epistemic attitude. It is also ineffective in the face of
widespread ethical disagreements. A dogmatic agent is, by definition, insensitive to
reasoning and challenges. But for this very reason his epistemic attitude is inad-
equate in contexts marked by pluralism. The dogmatic rationalist does not engage
with other evaluators holding (radically) different values. He simply dismisses
them as blind. But this arrogant attitude produces a strategy of insulation that is
ultimately self-defeating. Failure to interact with others amounts to a failure to
provide a credible and authoritative justification for one’s claims.7 Dogmatism
allows only for a parochial authority, which can be challenged from any other
ethical perspective. It thus ends up with no authority at all. Genuine authority is
unrestricted. This leads to the claim that genuine authority is warranted by the
requirement of universality: For something to count as a reason of justification, it
must be such that it could be endorsed as a law. The moral law is valid for and
binds all rational agents.8
Kant’s argument in support of this claim is controversial in many respects, but
my aim is to call attention to the fact that the requirement of universality is justified
as an answer to the issue of authority. For instance, O’Neill appropriates Kant’s
argument against dogmatic doctrines when she writes that all the conceptions of
practical reasoning except constructivism fail the “elementary standard of reason”
(O’Neill 2002, 51–2). In O’Neill’s reformulation, to count as reason a consideration
must be “followable” or “accessible” to others (ibid.). Constructivists hold that to
avoid the charge of arbitrariness and impracticality that begets dogmatic rational-
ism, ethical theory must agree with Kant about the universality of the standards of
7
As Korsgaard puts it, “the realist’s belief in the existence of normative entities is not based
on any discovery. It is based on his confidence that his beliefs and desires are normative”
(Korsgaard 1996, 48, see also 64–6, 40ff., 90).
8
See Kant (1911, 425–6, 4:433). Notice that for Kant the purpose of the moral law is for the
rational agent “to appraise himself and his actions from this point of view,” and this leads to
the idea of universal cooperation represented as the kingdom of ends (see Kant 1996, 433,
425–6).
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316 Carla Bagnoli
rational validity (O’Neill 2003b, 26). Such standards are authoritative only if they
are universally shared. This is a rather strong claim, especially when we consider
its consequences for political legitimacy. In Bernard Williams’s sarcastic words, “the
moral law is more exigent than the law of an actual liberal republic because it
allows no emigration” (Williams 1985, 178). As we shall see in Section 5, it can be
escaped only if rational agency is escapable.
To recommend one as a theory of justice for our societies is to recommend it as a just theory
of justice, that is, as a true, or reasonable, or valid theory of justice. If it is argued that what
makes it the theory of justice for us is that it is built on an overlapping consensus and
therefore secures stability and unity, then consensus-based stability and unity are the values
that a theory of justice, for our society, is assumed to depend on. Their achievement—that is,
the fact that endorsing the theory leads to their achievement—makes the theory true, sound,
valid, and so forth. This at least is what such a theory is committed to. There can be no justice
without truth. (Raz 1990, 15)
For Raz liberalism cannot be defended as a merely “political” doctrine, because “[the
rational justification] of moral and political values depends in part on the way they
can be integrated into a comprehensive view of human well-being” (Raz 1990, 23).9
From this realist standpoint, Raz then argues that liberalism should grant the
relevance of truth, and the liberal conception of justice should be proposed as part
and parcel of a particular moral view that concerns the fundamental nature of moral
value. In other words, the constructivist justification is always incomplete and its
completion inevitably invokes moral truths. To undertake the task of completion is
the path from “epistemic abstinence” to “epistemic indulgence” (Larmore 2008). As
it appears, to follow this path amounts to abandoning the distinctive aspiration of
political liberalism to be universally authoritative, unless one is able to point to a
shared comprehensive view of human well-being. The realist is thus implicitly
committed to denying a “reasonable pluralism,” even though he is not forced to
deny the brute fact of pluralism. It is questionable, then, whether this path is open
to someone committed to the defense of reasonable pluralism.
A second formulation of the objection attacks the logical structure of the
constructivist argument. For instance, Cohen (2003, 221) argues that fundamental
normative principles are not grounded on facts and thus they are not as fact-
sensitive as the constructivist account of rational justification requires. Cohen
considers his arguments against Rawls to be a model of his critical strategy against
constructivism in general (see also Raz 2003, cf. Timmons 2003). I take this to be a
9
Similarly, Besch (2004) argues that constructivism can defend its universalist commitments
only if it invokes a perfectionist view of the good. According to Besch, the universalist
strategy of justification is grounded on moral realism.
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Kantian Constructivism Reassessed 317
metaethical statement, even though Cohen is right that his thesis about fact-
insensitivity is neutral with respect to the debate about moral ontology. The
fundamental issue concerns the status of the norms of reasoning, and more
generally the status and role of the starting points of rational justification.10
A third formulation of the objection questions the conception of practical ration-
ality that is at the core of constructivism. For instance, Charles Larmore remarks
that “the essential incompleteness of constructivism,” depends on “the failure to
properly appreciate the truth that reason is responsive to reason” (Larmore 2008,
85, see also 87–167). This diagnosis presupposes the realist view that the function
of practical reason is recognitional, rather than constructive or productive. Reason-
ing amounts to responding to reasons that are already there, prior to and inde-
pendently of our reasoning. As for Raz, for Larmore the constructivist justification
of political liberalism is never complete because it ultimately rests on a moral
principle of respect for persons. This is the pillar of moral thinking that lies beyond
justification.
Cohen’s, Larmore’s, and Raz’s statements are exemplary of a general skepticism
about the capacity of constructivism to stand out as a distinct and internally
coherent metaethical option (see Scanlon 2003, 2012; Shafer-Landau 2003, 42; Enoch
2009; cf. Bagnoli 2011a, 2013). In the following sections, I attempt to show that
constructivism can be defended from this sort of criticism by clarifying the role and
nature of the unconstructed elements of its model of rational justification.
10
I agree with Valentini and Ronzoni’s conclusion that Cohen’s fact-insensitivity thesis does
not provide a successful refutation of constructivism, but I do not agree with their argument
(see Ronzoni and Valentini 2008). They argue that Cohen misses his target because he does
not engage with constructivism at the right level. In contrast, I think that Cohen raises the
right sort of concern about the logical status of the starting points of the constructivist
justification. Insofar as such starting points are unconstructed, the question arises whether
constructivism is coherent. A defense of constructivism from this objection requires an account
of the constitutive role of normative principles of construction. This strategy does not commit
constructivism to anti-realism or ontological agnosticism. Rather, purports to identify a third
view between anti-realism/relativism and realism. I thus disagree with Ronzoni and Valentini
that “justified fundamental normative principles are fact-sensitive follows from a commitment
to agnosticism about the existence of objective moral facts.” See also Section 5.
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318 Carla Bagnoli
discovering moral truths or perceiving moral facts. Moral facts are absolute and
fixed starting points, prior to and independent of any construction. They lay down
the foundation of any further moral conclusion. The realist standards of correctness
are thus material.
By contrast, the standards of correctness for the constructivist justification are
formal. Kantian constructivists qualify the metaphor of construction in terms of a
procedure (Rawls 1993, 116, 239; Street 2010; Bagnoli 2011a). On what grounds is
the procedure selected? Constructivists hold that the procedure is correct not
because it tracks down some independent moral reality, but because it adequately
expresses a shared conception of rational agency. Critics object that the procedure
is either arbitrary or relies on a realist foundation. A convincing reply to the
objection should thus take into account both the basis of the construction and its
procedural constraints.
To be engaged in any sort of rational decision, agents must be free rather than
determined, impeded, or coerced, and they should take themselves to have the
same standing as any other agent. As Rawls emphasizes, this conception of rational
agency marked by freedom and equality works as the “basis of construction.” This
is an important qualification and it should serve as a warning against taking
constructivism to be a mere form of proceduralism, which mechanically transforms
factual inputs and normative outputs.11 The distinctive feature of Kantian construc-
tivism is that the form of justification, which can be represented as a procedure,
expresses the relevant conception of the constructors as rational agents. The
Kantian claim is that the selected procedure is correct not because it tracks down
some moral reality, but because it identifies the practical standpoint from which all
deliberation begins. To this extent, the procedure is respectful of the sort of rational
agents we are. But this is no concession to realism. To identify the practical
standpoint, or to specify the “basis of the construction” is not the same as laying
down foundations. The basis of construction is not analogous to a punctum
Archimedis and its role is not foundational. Rather, to identify a basis of justification
is to say that the issue of justification arises for practical subjects, capable of rational
assessment and sensitive to reason. Unlike the Archimedean point from which the
evaluator assesses the subject of its inquiry at one remove, the practical standpoint
simply identifies an activity, that is, the activity of evaluation. In contrast to realists,
constructivists do not envision the search of objectivity as a search for the
Archimedean point. By contrast, they advocate a conception of objectivity that
results from an ideal agreement among rational agents.
How does constructivism select the relevant conception of rational agency?
Rawls says that the relevant conception of rational agency used in Kantian
constructivism is elicited from common moral experience. It is important to explain
how constructivists avoid the objection that the basis of the construction is
ultimately grounded on arbitrary intuitions. First, the conception of rational agency
is abstract and minimal. Second, it largely coincides with our pre-philosophical
representation of ourselves. The hypothesis that we act under the representation of
11
Korsgaard (2003) emphasizes the practical significance of constructivism by focusing on the
deliberative or first person perspective. For a critique of the proceduralist interpretation, and
an alternative definition in terms of practical standpoint, see Street 2010, 366ff.; cf. Bagnoli
2011a.
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Kantian Constructivism Reassessed 319
12
Cf. Street 2010. To be sure, there are important differences among Kantian and non-Kantian
models of reflective agency. My claim is merely that different kinds of deliberative theories
start with this minimal hypothesis.
13
One relevant source of disagreement concerns what the practical standpoint entails; see
Street 2010; cf. also Bagnoli 2011a.
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320 Carla Bagnoli
14
Both O’Neill and Korsgaard use this Wittgensteinian analogy, but I think it is misleading
and unnecessarily strong to put the issue this way (cf. Korsgaard 1996, 138–9).
15
Budde (2009, 209–10) attacks O’Neill on the basis of this misunderstanding about the scope
of the intelligibility requirement.
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Kantian Constructivism Reassessed 321
16
“That people may find this account of reasoning incomprehensible or unconvincing does
not logically entail that it could not be followed” (ibid., 209).
17
Rawls’ Lectures on Kant’s moral philosophy were conceived as the attempt to correct this
mistake (see Rawls 2000).
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322 Carla Bagnoli
never offers such a demonstration. Budde claims that O’Neill’s failure to provide
a thoroughly constructivist justification of the principles of justice “indicates an
inherent contradiction within constructivism” (ibid., 199). As it stands, construc-
tivism is incomplete, and the necessary completion reveals that it rests on unjus-
tified moral grounds.
Kantian constructivism agrees with the basic tenets of the rationalist tradition
that reason is a successful instrument for coordination. Indeed, it also shares the
rationalist claim that morality is a fundamentally cooperative enterprise. Its dis-
tinctive claim is that coordination is something we have to produce, by endorsing
principles of action that others could share as reasons. For instance, O’Neill takes
the requirement of universality or followability to secure “the necessary conditions
for any coordination, however minimal, by those among whom the reasoning is to
count” (O’Neill 2002, 60). To identify the requirement of universality as a necessary
condition for basic coordination commits to the claim that it is also “the most
fundamental principle of practical reasoning” (ibid.). This requirement constrains
any basic coordinative enterprise, such as action and communication.
Budde remarks that coordination is understood to be cooperation among free and
equal agents. Not just any coordination device will do, but only those cooperative
activities that are grounded on respect and mutual recognition of autonomous
agency. For Budde this shows that cooperation represents a substantive moral end.
The authority of O’Neill’s principles of justice and virtues is thus conditional and
parochial. It is conditional upon the endorsement of the value of autonomous
agency, and it is restricted to the specific communities where this value is endorsed
or enforced. O’Neill’s argument can be rationally rejected by those who do not
share the value of autonomous agency, and thus it does not meet its own criterion
of followability. The constructivist argument is self-defeating.
Budde is right that coordination is not part of the circumstances of action, the
facts of the matter. However, this does not prove yet that coordination serves as the
moral foundation of the constructivist reasoning. In contrast to teleological justi-
fication, constructivists do not conceive of coordination as an end to achieve, but
as a problem to solve (Korsgaard 2003). The difference is subtle but important, and
to adequately assess the prospects of constructivism, it is crucial to take this claim
seriously. Practical reasoning is a resource for addressing practical problems. The
problem of coordination is particularly challenging in contexts marked by plural-
ism, but it is not generated by pluralism. The demand that we act in concert is
pervasive in social worlds, where agents are mutually dependent and reciprocally
vulnerable. In all such contexts the issue of coordination importantly arises. The
peculiar challenges presented by value pluralism is that in contexts marked by
value pluralism, rational agents do not share the same conception of the good, they
do not have the same goals, and even more dramatically, they do not each have a
unified account of value to pursue. Value-pluralism is a significant complication not
only in planning shared or collective actions, but also and more basically in
planning individual action. Like Hobbesian rationalists, Kantian constructivists
hold that this problem is to be solved by rational deliberation because they think
of reason as capable of providing arguments of unrestricted authority. They
contend that reason provides a solution to the problem of coordination. In contrast
to other sorts of rationalists, however, Kantians hold that the solution is the
particular sort of coordination marked by equal respect and mutual recognition that
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Kantian Constructivism Reassessed 323
18
This is a significant disagreement between Kantians and Hobbesians, such as Gauthier
1986, Copp 2007, but I have to set this debate aside.
19
The claim is not that such a capacity should be effectively exercised, so it allows for cases
where rational agents fail to act on their best judgment.
20
Critics object that rational agency is optional and conditional as any other ordinary activity
in which we engage; see, e.g., Enoch 2006. For a convincing reply endorsed by other
constitutivists, see Ferrero 2010.
21
For some prominent accounts of rational agency, reflection is the highest form of activity.
Aristotle thinks that reflection is the highest form mental activity, and qualifies reflexivity as
the godlike characteristics of humans (Aristotle 2000, 1178a9-1178b8). On this reading,
contemplation and action are two distinct modes of activity, to which different sorts of
excellences and styles of the good life correspond, Aristotle (2000, 1177b15-1177b25). By
contrast, Kantians recognize the primacy of action.
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324 Carla Bagnoli
performing an action. In this basic sense, rational agency is not optional, and to
this extent it is inescapable. It is a constitutive feature of our human condition
insofar as it depends on the self-reflective structure of the mind.
This hypothesis about reflexivity and rational agency, however cashed out in
detail, is not challenged by the fact of pluralism or the claim that values are
incommensurable. On the contrary, the fact of value pluralism gains relevance
exactly because of the hypothesis of rational agency. Values matter because we take
ourselves to be capable of being guided by them. We are worried by values we do
not share because we recognize others to be capable of being guided by ideals we
find dangerous, repugnant, or simply not worthwhile. We sanction morally inde-
cent practices because we recognize others capable of engaging in such practices
responsibly. But who are “we”? Kantians hold that membership of the moral
community is open to anyone capable of exchanging reasons, hence capable of
mutual recognition. This is because they take the practice of exchanging reasons to
be informed by the principle of recognition of mutual standing.
Is this claim about recognition of equal standing such that it undermines the
constructivist nature of the rational justification that constructivists provide? To
answer in the positive, one needs to show that the principle of equal respect and
recognition is necessarily founded or derived from the value of humanity. In the
next section, I will argue for a dialogical construal of this key practical attitude,
which does not assume realism.
22
For Rawls (1971, 586) this disagreement reveals that respect is not “a suitable basis” for
political liberalism.
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Kantian Constructivism Reassessed 325
in such a situation, each inhabitant makes claims on others that their demand be
satisfied. What are the grounds of such demands? It is important to distinguish
between two levels at which this question arises. First, we should ask how and on
what grounds others are entitled to make these demands. A second, separate issue
is how and on what grounds one agrees to satisfy the requests of others. The first
is an issue that concerns the normative status of persons to make demands. The
second concerns the normative schemes of distributions of goods.
It is easy to equivocate the role that respect plays in these two related but
separate levels of justification. At the first level, the notion of equal respect and
mutual recognition is a practical attitude that demands recognition of equal
standing. Nothing more derives from it, except the requirement that all claims be
heard. At the second level, on the other hand, respect serves as the substantive
ground for a just distribution. This second normative role of respect should be
bracketed when we are assessing the prospects of Kantian constructivism. The
requirement of followability, as well as any other formulation of the universality
requirement, works as a deliberative constraint but it does not directly prescribe
any determined scheme of distribution. The requirement of followability deploys
the notion of respect as a generic recognition of status. Under this capacity, respect
requires that we relate to each other as “self-originating sources of valid claims”
(Rawls 1980, 546).
The crucial question is whether the recognition of equal status is an act that
constructivism can successfully explain without resting the argument on the
absolute value of humanity. According to critics, it cannot. The prospects of such
an argument to be authoritative depend on its completion by an additional
argument proving the value of humanity to be the true one. Interestingly, this is a
position that several Kantians share (cf. Audi 2004; Larmore 2008). These Kantians
side with realists against constructivists because they hold that rational justification
begins with the recognition of a moral fact, namely, the value of humanity.
Accordingly, they take respect to be the practical attitude we owe to others because
it responds to the recognition of a substantive value property. It is the attitude fit to
a specific sort of substantive value. On the basis of this construal of respect, we are
required to respect others because and insofar as others possess a given value
property (e.g., dignity or autonomy of the will). The question arises as to how to
show that others embody some such value.
On the other hand, the constructivist is not under pressure to provide any proof
of the value of humanity. This is because she can take respect as a constitutive
mode of valuing persons as such. I call this account of respect dialogical.23 Respect
is the practical attitude of holding each other accountable, rather than the fitting
response to a value property. It is a normative relation that we entertain with
ourselves and with others, rather than a form of epistemic awareness. This is
simply to say that respect and mutual recognition are part of the basis of
construction, in the sense outlined in Section 2.
Respecting others as sources of valid claims means respecting them as constraints
on our deliberation. This means that respect is the source of procedural constraints.
23
The dialogical account of respect is similar but not identical with Darwall’s account of the
second-person standpoint (Darwall 2006). Darwall takes his proposal to be a variation of the
fitting attitude theory (cf. Bagnoli 2007).
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326 Carla Bagnoli
24
I cannot deal with the large meta-ethical debate about the capacity of realism to account
for normativity. My point here is simply that realism faces difficulties in this domain that
constructivism avoids.
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doctrine faced with the objection of dogmatism. Furthermore, to link the agenda of
liberalism to that of realism is a dangerous move, considering the serious difficul-
ties that realist metaethical theories encounter. Perhaps these difficulties are not
insurmountable, but realism appears to have no metaethical advantage over
constructivism.
An important challenge to political liberalism is that it depends on an unstable
and doubtful metaethics, namely, constructivism. The objection is that constructiv-
ism is an internally incoherent metaethical doctrine, which ultimately rests on a
realist foundation and is at a loss to establish the universal authority of its
conclusions. What drives this sort of objection is the conviction that there is no
logical space between realism and relativism. My reply is that Kantian construc-
tivism importantly deploys unconstructed elements, but such elements do not play
a foundational role, and thus do not undermine the constructivist structure of its
justification. I thus claim that Kantian constructivism survives the objections from
metaethics. Clearly, this argument in itself is not meant to provide a complete
defense of political liberalism. Nonetheless, I hope to have shown that it is a more
plausible basis for political liberalism than many of its critics have found it; and this
I believe is an achievement of sorts.25
References
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Audi, R. 2004. The Good in the Right. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bagnoli, C. 2007. Respect and Membership in the Moral Community. Ethical Theory
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Bagnoli, C. 2009. Review of Charles Larmore “The Autonomy of Morality.” The
Philosophical Review 118: 536–40.
Bagnoli, C. 2011a. Constructivism in Meta-Ethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Winter Archive: 1–51.
Bagnoli, C. 2011b. Emotions and the Categorical Authority of Morality. In C.
Bagnoli Ed. Morality and the Emotions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 62–81.
Bagnoli, C. 2013. Constructivism about Practical Knowledge. In Constructivism in
Ethics. Ed. C. Bagnoli, 153–82. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Besch, T. M. 2004. On Practical Constructivism and Reasonableness. Doctoral Thesis.
University of Oxford.
Brink, D. 1987. Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory. Canadian Journal of
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Budde, K. 2009. Constructivism all the Way Down—Can O’Neill Succeed where
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Cohen, G. A. 2003. Facts and Principles. Philosophy and Public Affairs 31: 211–45.
25
I would like to thank Ian Carter, Michele Bocchiola, Elijah Millgram, Valeria Ottonelli, and
Robert Schwartz for comments on previous drafts.
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328 Carla Bagnoli
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Kantian Constructivism Reassessed 329
Ratio Juris, Vol. 27, No. 3 © 2014 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.