1
MICHAEL C. GUY, G.R. No. 163707
Petitioner,
- versus
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR.,
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138,
Makati City and minors, KAREN
DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES
WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES,
Respondents.
Promulgated: September 15, 2006
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which
affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 2000[2]and July 17, 2003[3] of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No.
4549 denying petitioners motion to dismiss; and its May 25,
2004 Resolution[4]denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei
and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes
(Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration [5] before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. The case was
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima
Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate
in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at
P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known
heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne,
Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents
prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly
settlement of Sima Weis estate. They likewise prayed that, in the
meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be
appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Attached to private
respondents petition was a Certification Against Forum
Shopping[6] signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez.
In his Comment/Opposition,[7] petitioner prayed for the dismissal of
the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that
his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued
that private respondents should have established their status as
illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article
175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss[8] on
the ground that the certification against forum shopping should have
been signed by private respondents and not their counsel. They
contended that Remedios should have executed the certification on
behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to
Dismiss,[9] petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents
claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by
reason of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating
that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received
from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate
of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as
the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release
and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been
established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor
daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred. Applying a liberal

application of the rules, the trial court also rejected petitioners
objections on the certification against forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed
a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January
22, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present
petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed
Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July 17, 2003 are hereby
both AFFIRMED. Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED
to resolve the controversy over the illegitimate filiation
of the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes
Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who are claiming
successional rights in the intestate estate of the
deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules
on certification against forum shopping; that the Release and Waiver
of Claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy family
and the estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and that
private respondents do not have the legal personality to institute the
petition for letters of administration as they failed to prove their
filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175
of the Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsels certification can be
considered substantial compliance with the rules on certification of
non-forum shopping, and that the petition raises no new issues to
2
warrant the reversal of the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents
petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules on
certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and
Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their
successional rights; and 3) whether private respondents are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the
certification of non-forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff
or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be
cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of the
rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be
served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,[11] we ruled that while a petition
may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping
was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse
may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice. [12] So it is in
the present controversy where the merits[13] of the case and the
absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be
considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of
the rules.
As regards Remedios Release and Waiver of Claim, the same
does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To
be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party
to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may
not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and
clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.[14]
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary
rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the

purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received
P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters by way
of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of
whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino
Guy Susim.[15] Considering that the document did not specifically
mention private respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima
Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the
hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the
latters claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his
property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons
may be accepted by their parents or
guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the
inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the
poor shall belong to the persons designated by the
testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute
the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in
Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of
their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation
amounts to an alienation of property[16]which must pass the courts
scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been
judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant
case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their
rights as heirs of the deceased.
3
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can
rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of
fact.[17]
In the present case, private respondents could not have
possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove
their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the
deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private
respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that
they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do
not have such right. Hence, petitioners invocation of waiver on the part
of private respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents filiation, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be premature
considering that private respondents have yet to present
evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on
actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime
of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the
minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the
mother a document should appear of which nothing
had been heard and in which either or both parents
recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced
within four years from the finding of the document.
(Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo[18] that illegitimate children who
were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose
putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek
recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority
age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage
of the Family Code.[19]
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family
Code, which superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall
4
be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall
survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of
the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same
period specified in Article 173, except when the action
is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is
established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for
recognition may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime.However, if the action is based upon open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means
allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of
prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private
respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible
to determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of
evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be
resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.

While the original action filed by private respondents was a
petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not precluded
from receiving evidence on private respondents filiation. Its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise
of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate,
including the determination of the status of each heir. [20] That the two
causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence.[21] As held in Briz v. Briz:[22]
The question whether a person in the position of
the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a
complex action to compel recognition as a natural child
and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the
character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this
court must be answered in the affirmative, provided
always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the
two distinct causes of action are present in the
particular case. In other words, there is no absolute
necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and
prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action
in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the
character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar
to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require
that a rule should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not
heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is
undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior
decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and
the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a
natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment,
but who has not been in fact acknowledged, may
maintain partition proceedings for the division of the
5
inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8
Phil., 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same
person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father,
or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs.
Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In
neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree
compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that
in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other
persons who might take by inheritance are before the
court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to
such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742
affirming the denial of petitioners motion to dismiss; and its Resolution
dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to
theRegional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., G.R. No. 187521
Petitioner,
- versus - Promulgated:
HR CONSTRUCTION CORP., March 14, 2012
Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioner F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. (FFCCI) assailing
the Decision[1] dated February 6, 2009 and Resolution[2] dated April 13,
2009 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91860.
The Antecedent Facts
Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the
construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower Agusan
Development Project. On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a
Subcontract Agreement[3] with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC)
for the supply of materials, labor, equipment, tools and supervision for
the construction of a portion of the said project called the East Bank
Levee and Cut-Off Channel in accordance with the specifications of the
main contract.
The subcontract price agreed upon by the parties amounted
to P31,293,532.72. Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC
would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress billing which the latter
would then pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days from
receipt thereof.
The parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment
should include progress accomplishment of its completed works as
approved by FFCCI. Additionally, they agreed to conduct a joint
measurement of the completed works of HRCC together with the
representative of DPWH and consultants to arrive at a common
quantity.
Thereafter, HRCC commenced the construction of the works
pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement.
6
On September 17, 2004, HRCC submitted to FFCCI its first
progress billing in the amount of P2,029,081.59 covering the
construction works it completed from August 16 to September 15,
2004.[4] However, FFCCI asserted that the DPWH was then able to
evaluate the completed works of HRCC only until July 25, 2004. Thus,
FFCCI only approved the gross amount of P423,502.88 for payment.
Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement, FFCCI deducted from the said
gross amount P42,350.29 for retention andP7,700.05 for expanded
withholding tax leaving a net payment in the amount of P373,452.54.
This amount was paid by FFCCI to HRCC on December 3, 2004. [5]
FFCCI and the DPWH then jointly evaluated the completed
works of HRCC for the period of July 26 to September 25, 2004. FFCCI
claimed that the gross amount due for the completed works during the
said period was P2,008,837.52. From the said gross amount due, FFCCI
deducted therefrom P200,883.75 for retention and P36,524.07 for
expanded withholding tax leaving amount of P1,771,429.45 as the
approved net payment for the said period. FFCCI paid this amount on
December 21, 2004.[6]
On October 29, 2004, HRCC submitted to FFCCI its second
progress billing in the amount of P1,587,760.23 covering its completed
works from September 18 to 25, 2004.[7] FFCCI did not pay the amount
stated in the second progress billing, claiming that it had already paid
HRCC for the completed works for the period stated therein.
On even date, HRCC submitted its third progress billing in the
amount of P2,569,543.57 for its completed works from September 26
to October 25, 2004.[8] FFCCI did not immediately pay the amount
stated in the third progress billing, claiming that it still had to evaluate
the works accomplished by HRCC.
On November 25, 2004, HRCC submitted to FFCCI its fourth
progress billing in the amount of P1,527,112.95 for the works it had
completed from October 26 to November 25, 2004.
Subsequently, FFCCI, after it had evaluated the completed
works of HRCC from September 26 to November 25, 2004, approved
the payment of the gross amount ofP1,505,570.99 to HRCC. FFCCI
deducted therefrom P150,557.10 for retention and P27,374.02 for

expanded withholding tax leaving a net payment of P1,327,639.87,
which amount was paid to HRCC on March 11, 2005. [9]
Meanwhile, HRCC sent FFCCI a letter[10] dated December 13,
2004 demanding the payment of its progress billings in the total
amount of P7,340,046.09, plus interests, within three days from
receipt thereof. Subsequently, HRCC completely halted the
construction of the subcontracted project after taking its Christmas
break on December 18, 2004.
On March 7, 2005, HRCC, pursuant to the arbitration clause in
the Subcontract Agreement, filed with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a Complaint[11] against FFCCI praying for
the payment of the following: (1) overdue obligation in the reduced
amount of P4,096,656.53 as of December 15, 2004 plus legal interest;
(2) P1,500,000.00 as attorneys fees; (3) P80,000.00 as acceptance fee
and representation expenses; and (4) costs of litigation.
In its Answer,[12] FFCCI claimed that it no longer has any liability
on the Subcontract Agreement as the three payments it made to HRCC,
which amounted toP3,472,521.86, already represented the amount
due to the latter in view of the works actually completed by HRCC as
shown by the survey it conducted jointly with the DPWH. FFCCI further
asserted that the delay in the payment processing was primarily
attributable to HRCC inasmuch as it presented unverified work
accomplishments contrary to the stipulation in the Subcontract
Agreement regarding requests for payment.
Likewise, FFCCI maintained that HRCC failed to comply with the
condition stated under the Subcontract Agreement for the payment of
the latters progress billings, i.e.joint measurement of the completed
works, and, hence, it was justified in not paying the amount stated in
HRCCs progress billings.
On June 16, 2005, an Arbitral Tribunal was created composed
of Engineer Ricardo B. San Juan, Joven B. Joaquin and Attorney Alfredo
F. Tadiar, with the latter being appointed as the Chairman.
In a Preliminary Conference held on July 5, 2005, the parties
defined the issues to be resolved in the proceedings before the CIAC as
follows:
7
1. What is the correct amount of [HRCCs] unpaid
progress billing?
2. Did [HRCC] comply with the conditions set forth in
subparagraph 4.3 of the Subcontract Agreement for
the submission, evaluation/processing and release
of payment of its progress billings?
3. Did [HRCC] stop work on the project?
3.1 If so, is the work stoppage justified?
3.2 If so, what was the percentage and value of
[HRCCs] work accomplishment at the time it
stopped work on the project?
4. Who between the parties should bear the cost of
arbitration or in what proportion should it be shared
by the parties?[13]
Likewise, during the said Preliminary Conference, HRCC further
reduced the amount of overdue obligation it claimed from FFCCI
to P2,768,916.66. During the course of the proceedings before the
CIAC, HRCC further reduced the said amount to P2,635,397.77 the
exact difference between the total amount of HRCCs progress billings
(P6,107,919.63) and FFCCIs total payments in favor of the latter
(P3,472,521.86).
The CIAC Decision
On September 6, 2005, after due proceedings, the CIAC
rendered a Decision[14] in favor of HRCC, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the Claimant HR CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION and AWARD made on its monetary
claim against Respondent F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., as
follows:
[P]2,239,452.63 as the balance of its unpaid
billings and
101,161.57 as reimbursement of the arbitration
costs.
[P]2,340,614.20 Total due the Claimant

Interest on the foregoing
amount [P]2,239,452.63 shall be paid at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of this Decision. After
finality of this Decision, interest at the rate of 12% per
annum shall be paid thereon until full payment of the
awarded amount shall have been made x x x.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The CIAC held that the payment method adopted by FFCCI is
actually what is known as the back-to-back payment scheme which was
not agreed upon under the Subcontract Agreement. As such, the CIAC
ruled that FFCCI could not impose upon HRCC its valuation of the works
completed by the latter. The CIAC gave credence to HRCCs valuation of
its completed works as stated in its progress billings. Thus:
During the trial, [FFCCIs] Aganon admitted that
[HRCCs] accomplishments are included in its own
billings to the DPWH together with a substantial mark-
up to cover overhead costs and profit. He further
admitted that it is only when DPWH approves its
(Respondents) billings covering [HRCCs] scope of work
and pays for them, that [FFCCI] will in turn pay [HRCC]
for its billings on the sub-contracted works.
On clarificatory questioning by the Tribunal,
[FFCCI] admitted that there is no back-to-back provision
in the sub-contract as basis for this sequential payment
arrangement and, therefore, [FFCCIs] imposition
thereof by withholding payment to [HRCC] until it is first
paid by the project owner on the Main Contract, clearly
violates said sub-contract. It [is] this unauthorized
implementation of a back-to-back payment scheme
that is seen to be the reason for [FFCCIs] non-payment
of the third progress billings.
It is accordingly the holding of this Arbitral
Tribunal that [FFCCI] is not justified in withholding
payment of [HRCCs] third progress billing for this
scheme that [HRCC] has not agreed to in the sub-
contract agreement x x x.
8
xxx
The total retention money deducted by [FFCCI]
from [HRCCs] three progress billings, amounts
to [P]395,945.14 x x x. The retention money is part of
[HRCCs] progress billings and must, therefore, be
credited to this account. The two amounts (deductions
and net payments) total [P]3,868,467.00 x x x. This
represents the total gross payments that should be
credited and deducted from the total gross billings to
arrive at what has not been paid to the [HRCC]. This
results in the amount
of [P]2,239,452.63 ([P]6,107,919.63 - [P]3,868,467.00)
as the correct balance of [HRCCs] unpaid billings.[16]
Further, the CIAC ruled that FFCCI had already waived its right
under the Subcontract Agreement to require a joint measurement of
HRCCs completed works as a condition precedent to the payment of
the latters progress billings. Hence:
[FFCCI] admits that in all three instances where
it paid [HRCC] for its progress billings, it never required
compliance with the aforequoted contractual provision
of a prior joint quantification. Suchrepeated
omission may reasonably be construed as a waiver by
[FFCCI] of its contractual right to require compliance of
said condition and it is now too late in the day to so
impose it. Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides
that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs. The tribunal cannot see any such violation in
this case.
xxx
[FFCCIs] omission to enforce the contractually
required condition of payment, has led [HRCC] to
believe it to be true that indeed [FFCCI] has waived the
condition of joint quantification and, therefore, [FFCCI]
may not be permitted to falsify such resulting
position.[17]

Likewise, the CIAC held that FFCCIs non-payment of the
progress billings submitted by HRCC gave the latter the right to rescind
the Subcontract Agreement and, accordingly, HRCCs work stoppage
was justified. It further opined that, in effect, FFCCI had ratified the
right of HRCC to stop the construction works as it did not file any
counterclaim against HRCC for liquidated damages arising therefrom.
FFCCI then filed a petition for review with CA assailing the
foregoing disposition by the CIAC.
The CA Decision
On February 6, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed
Decision[18] denying the petition for review filed by FFCCI. The CA
agreed with the CIAC that FFCCI had waived its right under the
Subcontract Agreement to require a joint quantification of HRCCs
completed works.
The CA further held that the amount due to HRCC as claimed by
FFCCI could not be given credence since the same was based on a
survey of the completed works conducted without the participation of
HRCC. Likewise, being the main contractor, it ruled that it was the
responsibility of FFCCI to include HRCC in the joint measurement of the
completed works. Furthermore, the CA held that HRCC was justified in
stopping its construction works on the project as the failure of FFCCI to
pay its progress billings gave the former the right to rescind the
Subcontract Agreement.
FFCCI sought a reconsideration[19] of the said February 6, 2009
Decision but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution [20] dated April 13,
2009.
Issues
In the instant petition, FFCCI submits the following issues for
this Courts resolution:
[I.]
x x x First, [d]oes the act of [FFCCI] in conducting
a verification survey of [HRCCs] billings in the latters
presence amount to a waiver of the right of [FFCCI] to
9
verify and approve said billings? What, if any, is the legal
significance of said act?
[II.]
x x x Second, [d]oes the payment of [FFCCI] to
[HRCC] based on the results of the above mentioned
verification survey result in the former being obliged to
accept whatever accomplishment was reported by the
latter?
[III.]
x x x Third, [d]oes the mere comparison of the
payments made by [FFCCI] with the contested progress
billings of [HRCC] amount to an adjudication of the
controversy between the parties?
[IV.]
x x x Fourth, [d]oes the failure of [FFCCI] to
interpose a counterclaim against [HRCC] for liquidated
damages due to the latters work stoppage, amount to a
ratification of such work stoppage?
[V.]
x x x Fifth, [d]id the [CA] disregard or overlook
significant and material facts which would affect the
result of the litigation?[21]
In sum, the crucial issues for this Courts resolution are: first,
what is the effect of FFCCIs non-compliance with the stipulation in the
Subcontract Agreement requiring a joint quantification of the works
completed by HRCC on the payment of the progress billings submitted
by the latter; and second, whether there was a valid rescission of the
Subcontract Agreement by HRCC.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Procedural Issue:
Finality and Conclusiveness of the CIACs Factual Findings
Before we delve into the substantial issues raised by FFCCI, we shall
first address the procedural issue raised by HRCC. According to HRCC,
the instant petition merely assails the factual findings of the CIAC as
affirmed by the CA and, accordingly, not proper subjects of an appeal

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It likewise pointed out that factual
findings of the CIAC, when affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive
upon this Court.
Generally, the arbitral award of CIAC is final and may not be appealed
except on questions of law.
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1008[22] vests upon the CIAC original and
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with,
contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in
the Philippines. Under Section 19 of E.O. No. 1008, the arbitral award
of CIAC "shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law
which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court."[23]
In Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. v. Lim Kim Steel Builders, Inc.,[24] we
explained raison d etre for the rule on finality of the CIACs arbitral
award in this wise:
Voluntary arbitration involves the reference of a
dispute to an impartial body, the members of which are
chosen by the parties themselves, which parties freely
consent in advance to abide by the arbitral award issued
after proceedings where both parties had the
opportunity to be heard. The basic objective is to
provide a speedy and inexpensive method of settling
disputes by allowing the parties to avoid the formalities,
delay, expense and aggravation which commonly
accompany ordinary litigation, especially litigation
which goes through the entire hierarchy of courts.
Executive Order No. 1008 created an arbitration facility
to which the construction industry in the Philippines can
have recourse. The Executive Order was enacted to
encourage the early and expeditious settlement of
disputes in the construction industry, a public policy the
implementation of which is necessary and important for
the realization of national development goals.
Aware of the objective of voluntary arbitration
in the labor field, in the construction industry, and in
any other area for that matter, the Court will not assist
one or the other or even both parties in any effort to
10
subvert or defeat that objective for their private
purposes. The Court will not review the factual findings
of an arbitral tribunal upon the artful allegation that
such body had "misapprehended the facts" and will not
pass upon issues which are, at bottom, issues of fact, no
matter how cleverly disguised they might be as "legal
questions." The parties here had recourse to arbitration
and chose the arbitrators themselves; they must have
had confidence in such arbitrators. x x x[25] (Citation
omitted)
Thus, in cases assailing the arbitral award rendered by the CIAC,
this Court may only pass upon questions of law. Factual findings of
construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by
this Court on appeal. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions.
In Spouses David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration
Commission,[26] we laid down the instances when this Court may pass
upon the factual findings of the CIAC, thus:
We reiterate the rule that factual findings of
construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not
reviewable by this Court on appeal, except when the
petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was
procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the
arbitrators or of any of them; (3) the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4)
one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act
as such under section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and
willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications
or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award

upon the subject matter submitted to them was not
made. x x x[27] (Citation omitted)
Issues on the proper interpretation of the terms of the Subcontract
Agreement involve questions of law.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be
one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
On the surface, the instant petition appears to merely raise
factual questions as it mainly puts in issue the appropriate amount that
is due to HRCC. However, a more thorough analysis of the issues raised
by FFCCI would show that it actually asserts questions of law.
FFCCI primarily seeks from this Court a determination of
whether amount claimed by HRCC in its progress billing may be
enforced against it in the absence of a joint measurement of the
formers completed works. Otherwise stated, the main question
advanced by FFCCI is this: in the absence of the joint measurement
agreed upon in the Subcontract Agreement, how will the completed
works of HRCC be verified and the amount due thereon be computed?
The determination of the foregoing question entails an
interpretation of the terms of the Subcontract Agreement vis--vis the
respective rights of the parties herein. On this point, it should be
stressed that where an interpretation of the true agreement between
the parties is involved in an appeal, the appeal is in effect an inquiry of
the law between the parties, its interpretation necessarily involves a
question of law.[29]
Moreover, we are not called upon to examine the probative
value of the evidence presented before the CIAC. Rather, what is
actually sought from this Court is an interpretation of the terms of the
11
Subcontract Agreement as it relates to the dispute between the
parties.
First Substantive Issue: Effect of Non-compliance with the Joint
Quantification Requirement on the Progress Billings of HRCC
Basically, the instant issue calls for a determination as to which of the
parties respective valuation of accomplished works should be given
credence. FFCCI claims that its valuation should be upheld since the
same was the result of a measurement of the completed works
conducted by it and the DPWH. On the other hand, HRCC maintains
that its valuation should be upheld on account of FFCCIs failure to
observe the joint measurement requirement in ascertaining the extent
of its completed works.
The terms of the Subcontract Agreement should prevail.
In resolving the dispute as to the proper valuation of the works
accomplished by HRCC, the primordial consideration should be the
terms of the Subcontract Agreement. It is basic that if the terms of a
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
In Abad v. Goldloop Properties, Inc.,[31] we stressed that:
A courts purpose in examining a contract is to interpret
the intent of the contracting parties, as objectively
manifested by them. The process of interpreting a
contract requires the court to make a preliminary
inquiry as to whether the contract before it is
ambiguous. A contract provision is ambiguous if it is
susceptible of two reasonable alternative
interpretations. Where the written terms of the
contract are not ambiguous and can only be read one
way, the court will interpret the contract as a matter
of law. If the contract is determined to be ambiguous,
then the interpretation of the contract is left to the
court, to resolve the ambiguity in the light of the
 12

intrinsic evidence.[32] (Emphasis supplied and citation it, the same being essential to the valuation of the amount that FFCCI
omitted) would pay to HRCC.
Article 4 of the Subcontract Agreement, in part, contained the The parties further agreed that the extent of HRCCs completed
following stipulations: works that would be indicated in the monthly progress billings should
be determined through a joint measurement conducted by FFCCI and
ARTICLE 4
HRCC together with the representative of DPWH and the consultants.
SUBCONTRACT PRICE
4.1 The total SUBCONTRACT Price shall be THIRTY ONE
It is the responsibility of FFCCI to call for the joint measurement of
MILLION
HRCCs completed works.
TWO HUNDRED NINETY THREE THOUSAND FIVE
It bears stressing that the joint measurement contemplated under the
HUNDRED THIRTY TWO PESOS & 72/100 ONLY
Subcontract Agreement should be conducted by the parties herein
([P]31,293,532.72) inclusive of Value Added Tax x
together with the representative of the DPWH and the consultants.
x x.
Indubitably, FFCCI, being the main contractor of DPWH, has the
xxx
responsibility to request the representative of DPWH to conduct the
4.3 Terms of Payment
said joint measurement.
FFCCI shall pay [HRCC] within thirty (30) days
On this score, the testimony of Engineer Antonio M. Aganon,
upon receipt of the [HRCCs] Monthly Progress
Jr., project manager of FFCCI, during the reception of evidence before
Billings subject to deductions due to ten percent
the CIAC is telling, thus:
(10%) retention, and any other sums that may be
MR. J. B. JOAQUIN:
due and recoverable by FFCCI from [HRCC] under
Engr. Aganon, earlier there was a stipulation that in all
this SUBCONTRACT. In all cases, however, two
the four billings, there never was a joint quantification.
percent (2%) expanded withholding tax on the
PROF. A. F. TADIAR:
[HRCCs] income will be deducted from the
He admitted that earlier. Pinabasa ko sa kanya.
monthly payments.
ENGR. R. B. SAN JUAN:
Requests for the payment by the [HRCC] shall
The joint quantification was done only between them
include progress accomplishment of completed
and DPWH.
works (unit of work accomplished x unit cost) as
xxxx
approved by [FFCCI]. Cut-off date of monthly
ENGR. AGANON:
billings shall be every 25th of the month and joint
Puwede ko po bang i-explain sandali lang po regarding
measurement shall be conducted with the
lang po doon sa quantification na iyon? Basically po as
DPWHs representative, Consultants, FFCCI and
main contractor of DPWH, we are the ones who [are]
[HRCC] to arrive at a common/agreed
requesting for joint survey quantification with the
quantity.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
owner, DPWH. Ngayon po, although wala sa papel na
Pursuant to the terms of payment agreed upon by the parties,
nag-witness and [HRCC] still the same po, nandoon din
FFCCI obliged itself to pay the monthly progress billings of HRCC within
po sila during that time, kaya lang ho . . .
30 days from receipt of the same. Additionally, the monthly progress
MR. J. B. JOAQUIN:
billings of HRCC should indicate the extent of the works completed by
 13

Hindi pumirma? statute, or guaranteed by

ENGR. AGANON: constitution, provided such rights and
Hindi sila puwede pumirma kasi ho kami po ang privileges rest in the individual, are
contractor ng DPWH hindi sila.[34] (Emphasis supplied) intended for his sole benefit, do not
FFCCI had waived its right to demand for a joint measurement of infringe on the rights of others, and
HRCCs completed works under the Subcontract Agreement. further provided the waiver of the right
The CIAC held that FFCCI, on account of its failure to demand the joint or privilege is not forbidden by law, and
measurement of HRCCs completed works, had effectively waived its does not contravene public policy; and
right to ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine qua non to the principle is recognized that everyone
HRCCs submission of its monthly progress billings. has a right to waive, and agree to waive,
We agree. the advantage of a law or rule made
In People of the Philippines v. Donato,[35] this Court explained the solely for the benefit and protection of
doctrine of waiver in this wise: the individual in his private capacity, if it
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional can be dispensed with and relinquished
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing without infringing on any public right,
legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which and without detriment to the community
except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; at large. x x x[36] (Emphasis supplied and
the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable citations omitted)
person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent Here, it is undisputed that the joint measurement of HRCCs completed
that such right shall be surrendered and such person works contemplated by the parties in the Subcontract Agreement
forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as never materialized. Indeed, HRCC, on separate occasions, submitted its
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such monthly progress billings indicating the extent of the works it had
right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent completed sans prior joint measurement. Thus:
with claiming it." Progress Billing Period Covered Amount
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, 1st Progress Billing
August 16 to
the authority is settled: dated September 17, P2,029,081.59
[37] September 15, 2004
x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to 2004
rights and privileges of any character, 2nd Progress Billing
September 18 to 25,
and, since the word waiver covers every dated October 29, P1,587,760.23
[38] 2004
conceivable right, it is the general rule 2004
that a person may waive any matter 3rd Progress Billing
September 26 to
which affects his property, and any dated October 29, P2,569,543.57
[39] October 25, 2004
alienable right or privilege of which he 2004
is the owner or which belongs to him or 4th Progress Billing
October 26 to
to which he is legally entitled, whether dated November 25, P1,527,112.95
November 25, 2004
secured by contract, conferred with 2004
 14

FFCCI did not contest the said progress billings submitted by HRCC consequence, [FFCCIs] claim of full payment cannot be
despite the lack of a joint measurement of the latters completed works upheld as this is a result of a quantification that was
as required under the Subcontract Agreement. Instead, FFCCI made contrary to the express provisions of the
proceeded to conduct its own verification of the works actually Subcontract Agreement.
completed by HRCC and, on separate dates, made the following The Court is aware that by ruling so, [FFCCI]
payments to HRCC: would seem to be placed at a disadvantage because it
Date of Payment Period Covered Amount would result in [FFCCI] having to pay exactly what
[HRCC] was billing the former. If, on the other hand, the
December 3,
April 2 to July 25, 2004 P373,452.24 Court were to rule otherwise[,] then [HRCC] would be
2004[40]
the one at a disadvantage because it would be made to
December 21, July 26 to September 25,
[41] P1,771,429.45 accept payment that is less than what it was billing.
2004 2004
Circumstances considered, however, the Court
September 26 to
March 11, 2005[42] P1,327,639.87 deems it proper to rule in favor of [HRCC] because of
November 25, 2004
the explicit provision of the Subcontract Agreement
FFCCIs voluntary payment in favor of HRCC, albeit in amounts
that requires the participation of the latter in the joint
substantially different from those claimed by the latter, is a glaring
measurement. If the Court were to rule otherwise, then
indication that it had effectively waived its right to demand for the joint
the Court would, in effect, be disregarding the explicit
measurement of the completed works. FFCCIs failure to demand a joint
agreement of the parties in their contract.
measurement of HRCCs completed works reasonably justified the
Essentially, the question that should be resolved is this: In view of
inference that it had already relinquished its right to do so. Indeed, not
FFCCIs waiver of its right to demand a joint measurement of HRCCs
once did FFCCI insist on the conduct of a joint measurement to verify
completed works, is FFCCI now barred from disputing the claim of
the extent of HRCCs completed works despite its receipt of the four
HRCC in its monthly progress billings?
monthly progress billings submitted by the latter.
We rule in the affirmative.
FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCCs valuation of the
As intimated earlier, the joint measurement requirement is a
completed works having waived its right to demand the joint
mechanism essentially granting FFCCI the opportunity to verify and, if
measurement requirement.
necessary, contest HRCCs valuation of its completed works prior to the
In view of FFCCIs waiver of the joint measurement requirement,
submission of the latters monthly progress billings.
the CA, essentially echoing the CIACs disposition, found that FFCCI is
In the final analysis, the joint measurement requirement seeks
obliged to pay the amount claimed by HRCC in its monthly progress
to limit the dispute between the parties with regard to the valuation of
billings. The CA reasoned thus:
HRCCs completed works. Accordingly, any issue which FFCCI may have
Verily, the joint measurement that [FFCCI]
with regard to HRCCs valuation of the works it had completed should
claims it conducted without the participation of [HRCC],
be raised and resolved during the said joint measurement instead of
to which [FFCCI] anchors its claim of full payment of its
raising the same after HRCC had submitted its monthly progress
obligations to [HRCC], cannot be applied, nor imposed,
billings. Thus, having relinquished its right to ask for a joint
on [HRCC]. In other words, [HRCC] cannot be made to
measurement of HRCCs completed works, FFCCI had necessarily
accept a quantification of its works when the said
quantification was made without its participation. As a

waived its right to dispute HRCCs valuation of the works it had
accomplished.
Second Substantive Issue:
Validity of HRCCs Rescission of the Subcontract Agreement
Both the CA and the CIAC held that the work stoppage of HRCC was
justified as the same is but an exercise of its right to rescind the
Subcontract Agreement in view of FFCCIs failure to pay the formers
monthly progress billings. Further, the CIAC stated that FFCCI could no
longer assail the work stoppage of HRCC as it failed to file any
counterclaim against HRCC pursuant to the terms of the Subcontract
Agreement.
For its part, FFCCI asserted that the work stoppage of HRCC was
not justified and, in any case, its failure to raise a counterclaim against
HRCC for liquidated damages before the CIAC does not amount to a
ratification of the latters work stoppage.
The determination of the validity of HRCCs work stoppage depends on
a determination of the following: first, whether HRCC has the right to
extrajudicially rescind the Subcontract Agreement; and second,
whether FFCCI is already barred from disputing the work stoppage of
HRCC.
HRCC had waived its right to rescind the Subcontract Agreement.
The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal
obligations. Article 1191 of the Civil Code pertinently reads:
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is
implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors
should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the
fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the
payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the
latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed,
unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a
period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the
rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in
15
accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the
Mortgage Law.
The rescission referred to in this article, more appropriately referred
to as resolution is on the breach of faith by the defendant which is
violative of the reciprocity between the parties.[44] The right to rescind,
however, may be waived, expressly or impliedly.
While the right to rescind reciprocal obligations is implied, that is, that
such right need not be expressly provided in the contract, nevertheless
the contracting parties may waive the same.
Contrary to the respective dispositions of the CIAC and the CA, we find
that HRCC had no right to rescind the Subcontract Agreement in the
guise of a work stoppage, the latter having waived such
right. Apropos is Article 11.2 of the Subcontract Agreement, which
reads:
11.2 Effects of Disputes and Continuing Obligations
Notwithstanding any dispute, controversy,
differences or arbitration proceedings relating
directly or indirectly to this SUBCONTRACT
Agreement and without prejudice to the
eventual outcome thereof, [HRCC] shall at all
times proceed with the prompt performance of
the Works in accordance with the directives of
FFCCI and this SUBCONTRACT
[47]
Agreement. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, in spite of the existence of dispute or controversy
between the parties during the course of the Subcontract Agreement,
HRCC had agreed to continue the performance of its obligations
pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. In view of the provision of the
Subcontract Agreement quoted above, HRCC is deemed to have
effectively waived its right to effect extrajudicial rescission of its
contract with FFCCI. Accordingly, HRCC, in the guise of rescinding the
Subcontract Agreement, was not justified in implementing a work
stoppage.
The costs of arbitration should be shared by the parties equally.
Section 1, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Costs ordinarily follow results of
suit. Unless otherwise provided in these rules, costs
shall be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of
course, but the court shall have power, for special
reasons, to adjudge that either party shall pay the costs
of an action, or that the same be divided, as may be
equitable. No costs shall be allowed against the
Republic of the Philippines unless otherwise provided
by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Although, generally, costs are adjudged against the losing
party, courts nevertheless have discretion, for special reasons, to
decree otherwise.
Here, considering that the work stoppage of HRCC is not
justified, it is only fitting that both parties should share in the burden
of the cost of arbitration equally. HRCC had a valid reason to institute
the complaint against FFCCI in view of the latters failure to pay the full
amount of its monthly progress billings. However, we disagree with the
CIAC and the CA that only FFCCI should shoulder the arbitration costs.
The arbitration costs should be shared equally by FFCCI and HRCC in
view of the latters unjustified work stoppage.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions,
the Decision dated February 6, 2009 and Resolution dated April 13,
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91860 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the arbitration costs shall
be shared equally by the parties herein.
SO ORDERED.
16
G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDWIN MORIAL, LEONARDO MORIAL alias "CARDING" NONELITO
ABIÑON * alias "NOLY", defendants-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
Two of the three appellants herein were sentenced to death by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Southern Leyte for Robbery with
Homicide. The other was sentenced to suffer only the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua on account of minority. The judgment of
conviction is now before this Court on automatic review.
The information charging appellants reads as follows:
That on the 6th day of January 1996, at about 6:30 o'clock [sic]
in the evening more or less, in [B]arangay Cagnituan,
[M]unicipality of Maasin, [P]rovince of Southern Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with
intent of [sic] gain, entered into [sic] the house of Paula
Bandibas and Benjamin Morial and once inside did then and
there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
box, beat and stab the victims Paula Bandibas and Albert
Bandibas, with the use of sharp-pointed weapons and stones
which the accused had provided themselves for the purpose,
thereby inflicting upon the victims mortal wounds which
caused their instantaneous death, after [which], said accused
took, stole and carried away therefrom Cash in the amount of
Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000.00) Philippine Currency,
belonging to said Paula Bandibas and Benjamin Morial, to the
damage and prejudice of the victims and of social order.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1

Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution theorized that the accused committed the robbery in
the early evening of January 6, 1996 so they would have money to
spend for the dance later that night. To obtain the money or to
silence any witnesses, the accused killed the occupants of the house,
Paula Bandibas and her three-year old grandson Albert. In proving its
theory, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Gabriel Guilao,
Benjamin Morial, SPO4 Antonio Macion and Dr. Teodulo Salas.
The crime allegedly took place at 6:00 in the evening in Barangay
Cagnituan, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Gabriel Guilao, 62, had just
finished pasturing his horses and was on his way home. He was
passing through the road near the house of Benjamin Morial when he
heard the voice of Paula Bandibas pleading, "[P]lease don't kill me[.] I
am going to give you money." Finding what he heard "weird," Gabriel
paused and remained at a distance of about eight (8) meters from the
yard of the house. From where he stood, Gabriel saw accused
Nonelito Abiñon slap Paula Bandibas' neck. Paula fell and was
stabbed by accused Edwin Morial with a small, sharp, pointed
weapon. Accused Leonardo Morial stood outside the house.
Gabriel also saw Paula Bandibas' grandson, Albert Bandibas, run
towards his grandmother's garden. Gabriel then heard the crushing
sound of a stone against flesh.
The three accused stayed in the house for about ten minutes after
the killing the victims. Thereafter, they departed and headed towards
the nearby houses.2
Paula Bandibas' common-law husband, Benjamin Morial, 56, was in
neighboring Barangay Maria Clara when the incident took place. He,
along with the father of accused Leonardo Morial, and two others,
Heracleo Alonzo and Leo Padilla, were having drinks in his Maria Clara
residence.
17
Benjamin left Barangay Maria Clara the next day at 2:00 in the
afternoon. He arrived in Barangay Cagnituan, 7½ kilometers away,
two hours later. As was his wont, Benjamin called out Paula's name
when he was some five (5) meters from the house. This time,
however, there was no answer.
Benjamin raced to the house, heading straight to the bedroom.
There, he found the clothes all topsy-turvy. The box where he and
Paula hid their money was turned upside down. Someone had
ransacked their house.
Benjamin moved back and saw Paula lying on the floor with a cut in
her neck. He shouted for help. Responding to his cries, Benjamin's
neighbors, includingbarangay kagawads Patricio Abiñon and Rufino
Guilao, rushed to his house. Benjamin asked his neighbors to help
search for Albert, who was found shortly some 50 meters from the
house. Albert Bandibas laid flat on the ground with two stones near
his head. Benjamin requested Patricio to send someone to report the
incident to the police.3
Upon learning of Benjamin's return to Barangay Cagnituan, Gabriel
Guilao also hurried to Benjamin's house.4 He revealed to the grieving
Benjamin that he witnessed Paula's killing and that the three accused,
Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abiñon, were the
perpetrators. Benjamin advised Gabriel not to tell anyone about what
he knew for fear that they would all be killed since the Abiñons were
"saturated in [their] place." Gabriel heeded Benjamin's advice.5
The police arrived at around 10:00 that evening. SPO4 Antonio
Macion, along with four other police officers, investigated the
tragedy. They found wounds in Paula Bandibas' stomach, breast and
neck. Albert Bandibas, on the other hand, had a contusion on the
right side of his head. Beside him were two stones.6
After examining the victims' wounds, the police officers, along with
Benjamin Morial, proceeded to the bedroom. Benjamin informed the

officers that P11,000.00 was missing from the moneybox. Other than
the cash, nothing else was missing.
Outside the house, Benjamin disclosed to the officers his three
suspects, the accused in this case. He advised them, however, to
bring only Leonardo and Edwin Morial into custody and not to include
Nonelito Abiñon, who had many relatives in Cagnituan. As a former
barangay captain of 22 years, he knew that the Abiñons were "most
feared" in Cagnituan. Benjamin did not tell the police that Gabriel
Guilao had witnessed the incident.7
The police found Edwin and Leonardo Morial in the house of Nonelito
Abiñon and invited the two to the police station, where they were
turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez. The investigation conducted
by SPO4 Fernandez yielded an extra-judicial confession from accused
Leonardo Morial,8 who was assisted by Atty. Tobias Aguilar.
On January 8, 1996, Dr. Teodulo Salas, a rural health physician,
conducted a post-mortem examination on the bodies of the victims.
Dr. Salas found an incised wound at the upper portion of Paula
Bandibas' neck, which he believed was caused by a sharp-edged
weapon or instrument, possibly a knife. Two stab wounds on the
chest below and above the right nipple, both punctured the lung.
Another stab wound at the abdomen pierced the intestine. Dr. Salas
concluded that the cause of death of Paula Bandibas is severe
hemorrhages secondary to the incised wound.
On the remains of Albert Bandibas, Dr. Salas found multiple angular
corrogated wounds on the head, which could have been caused by a
heavy object such as a stone. Multiple stab wounds punctured the
skull. There was also an abrasion on the right side of the face, which
was grossly swollen and disfigured. The abrasion, according to Dr.
Salas, might have been caused by a piece of wood, by friction with the
ground, or by some rough material that struck the child's face. The
last injury was a stab wound on the right forehead. Dr. Salas believed
that the cause of death of Albert Bandibas is the intra-cranial
hemorrhages secondary to the violent injury to the head.9 The
18
foregoing findings and conclusions were reduced to writing in the
doctor's Necropsy Reports.10
The accused, all first-degree cousins, interposed denial and alibi as
their defense. They denied being together at the time of the incident.
Accused Nonelito Abiñon, 22, claimed that he was in his house at
around 6:00 in the evening of January 6, 1996. An hour later, he went
to the house of his sweetheart, Rosalie Mepico, and the two later
attended a dance at around 9:30 that evening. At the dance, they
occupied a table with Renida Mepico, Renato Montederamos and
Edwin Morial. Leonardo Morial, he said, was not with them.11
Accused Edwin Morial, 18, maintained that he was also at home on
January 6, 1996. He slept from 6:00 until 7:30 in the evening. At 9:00
p.m., he went to the dance with Renato Montederamos. Nonelito
Abiñon and Reneda Mepico were also at the dance.12
The defense pinned its bid for exculpation on the lengthy testimony
of accused Leonardo Morial, 20. He narrated as follows:
At around 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. of January 6, 1996, he was at home
washing dishes. He had supper at approximately 7:00 and went to
sleep at about 7:30 or 8:00. Unlike his fellow accused, Leonardo did
not go to the dance.13
At 4:00 in the afternoon of the next day, he was in the basketball
court of their barangay watching Nonelito and Edwin playing
basketball with Jaime Morial, Renato Montederamos, Jimmy Abiñon,
Danilo Morial and Christopher Morial, among others.14 Suddenly,
they heard Benjamin Morial shout for help several times.15 Nonelito
and Edwin, along with the others in the basketball court, all rushed to
Benjamin Morial's house.16 Leonardo Morial also proceeded to
Benjamin's house after bringing home his two-year old sister.17
At the house of Benjamin Morial, they found the lifeless body of Paula
Bandibas on the floor underneath the kitchen table. Her hands were

on her breast, one foot crooked and the other straight. She had
wounds in her neck and breast. The corpse exuded a bad odor.
Benjamin Morial was crying. He said that whoever killed Paula shall
pay.18 Edwin asked Daniel Morial who the suspects to the killing
were. Daniel said he did not know. Edwin went home after about five
minutes.19
After viewing Paula Bandibas' remains, Leonardo went out of the
house because of the unpleasant smell and then headed home.20
Nonelito, on the other hand, departed as people started looking for
the body of Albert Bandibas since it was getting late. That was about
5:15 in the afternoon.21
That night, Edwin and Leonardo slept at Nonelito's house. Nonelito
had invited Edwin to sleep over as they were going to dress a
chicken,22 and Edwin had told Leonardo about it. The cousins had the
chicken for dinner. It was quite late when they finished their supper
so Leonardo also decided to spend the night at Nonelito's house.23
They slept at past 8:00 in the evening.24 According to Nonelito, that
was not the only time that the two had slept over. He said there were
previous occasions that his cousins had spent the night at their
place.25
The Abiñon household was to be roused from its slumber three hours
later. At 11:00 p.m., the police arrived to investigate the killing of the
Bandibases. A police officer asked Edwin where he was at 6:00 in the
evening of January 6, 1996. Edwin replied that he was in their house
sleeping. They also asked the same question to Leonardo Morial, who
answered that he was at home taking care of his younger siblings.
Nonelito, however, was not questioned. A policeman informed Edwin
and Leonardo that they would be brought to the police station for the
continuation of the investigation.26
Edwin and Leonardo went with the police officers and arrived at the
station at around 3:00 dawn the next day. The police told them to go
to sleep.27
19
The suspects were interrogated after they awoke at past 6:00 that
same morning. Edwin was advised to tell the truth so he would not be
killed. Nevertheless, he refused to admit his alleged participation in
the killings. Someone then struck his left hand with a pistol. His hand
swelled. A policeman in uniform warned him that if he did not tell the
truth, he would be brought to the toilet.
Sure enough, Edwin was subsequently brought to the lavatory where
he was boxed at the back and instructed to undress. As Edwin stood
naked, hands on his side, six tires were placed around his body. A
towel soaked with water was pushed into his mouth. Fortunately, the
towel did not go all the way to his throat since another policeman, a
certain Leoni Egido, advised Edwin's tormentors to stop and have pity
on him. Edwin said that around seven policemen were in the toilet
with him though he could not identify any of them in court. He
claimed that he did not have his hand examined by a physician since
he was afraid.28
Like Edwin, Leonardo was also asked where he was on January 6,
1996 at 6:00 in the evening. Leonardo reiterated that he was at
home. He was then brought to a separate room where his
interrogation continued.
Leonardo refused to own up to the incident so a policeman called two
other policemen and directed them to gag Leonardo. The two held
Leonardo's arms while the other stuffed a shirt into his mouth. One of
them inflicted three successive painful blows on Leonardo's left side
as the two others continued to hold his hands.
Leonardo was then seated and his gag removed. The police told
Leonardo to confess to the killings. Leonardo professed that he did
not witness the incident and could not tell them anything about it.
Again, they gagged his mouth and the same policeman who had hit
him then boxed him twice, this time on his right side. Thereafter, they
released their hold and advised him to confess so they would not kill
him. Leonardo repeated that he did not know anything about the
incident. When a policeman attempted to box him again, Leonardo

finally admitted that Nonelito Abiñon and Edwin Morial were
responsible for the death of Paula Bandibas. Leonardo's interrogation
lasted one and a half to two hours.
Asked in court to identify the uniformed policemen who beat him up,
Leonardo said he could not recall their faces. He did not look at the
policemen during his interrogation and did not see their nameplates.
Leonardo did not ask the police for a physician to examine him nor
did he tell anyone about his injuries because he did not know he was
permitted to do so.
Leonardo's statements were then reduced into writing. A policeman
informed him that they were going to contact a lawyer to assist him
during the investigation. Leonardo was told that his counsel would be
a certain Atty. Aguilar whose office was very near the police station.
Leonardo consented.
Having prepared Leonardo's statement, the police then told Leonardo
to come with them to Atty. Aguilar's office, which was about 50
meters from the police station. There, he saw Atty. Aguilar for the
first time. The lawyer read to him the document and asked him
whether its contents were true. The police had instructed Leonardo
to answer "yes" if he was asked that question, and Leonardo heeded
the instructions.
Leonardo denied that Atty. Aguilar examined his body for any injuries.
Atty. Aguilar did ask Leonardo if he was forced or intimidated to
execute the extra-judicial confession. Leonardo, however, did not tell
his lawyer about his injuries since a police officer had warned him
that he would be mauled again should he do so. Leonardo then
signed the extra-judicial confession, after which Atty. Aguilar affixed
his. The signing over, Leonardo was brought back to the police
station.29 Later in court, Leonardo claimed that he merely made up
all the statements in the document because he was afraid.
20
At around 8:30 that morning, Nonelito visited Leonardo and Edwin at
the police station. A police officer informed Nonelito that he was one
of the suspects and handcuffed him.30
To belie Gabriel Guilao's eyewitness account, the defense also
presented Patricio Abiñon and Eulogio Padilla. Patricio and Eulogio
purportedly saw Gabriel in Barangay Maria Clara at the alleged time
of the incident as well as the morning after.
On rebuttal, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Flora
Bandibas, Martin Galope and Erlito Bandibas.
Flora and Martin were presented to disprove the testimony of the
accused that Edwin Morial was not at the dance with his co-accused.
Flora claimed that she saw the three together at the dance with
Rosalia and Reneda Mepico occupying one table. Nonelito and Edwin
danced joyfully, even somewhat unusually, and caught the attention
of other people. Leonardo also danced but did not seem to enjoy
himself.31
Martin, abarangay tanod, was at the dance to help preserve the
peace. He maintained that he saw all the three accused, including
Leonardo Morial, at the dance.32
The defense attempted to diminish these witnesses' credibility by
showing their relation to the victim. On cross-examination, Flora
admitted that she is the wife of Ireneo Bandibas, the barangay
captain, and the son of Paula Bandibas.33 Martin Galope, for his part,
said that the same Ireneo Bandibas had appointed himbarangay
tanod.34
Erlito Bandibas' testimony, on the other hand, was intended to refute
the testimonies of defense witnesses Patricio Abiñon and Eulogio
Padilla that Gabriel Guilao, the alleged eyewitness to the killings, was
in Maria Clara at the purported time of the incident.

On sur-rebuttal, the defense again presented Eulogio Padilla to
dispute the testimony of Erlito Bandibas.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision convicting all the three
accused, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the
accused, namely: LEONARDO MORIAL, NONELITO ABIÑON and
EDWIN MORIAL, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as defined under Article
293 and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code and are hereby sentenced as follows:
1. Accused LEONARDO MORIAL and NONELITO ABIÑON to
each suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
and
2. Accused EDWIN MORIAL, due to his minority, to suffer the
lesser penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Civilly, the three (3) accused aforenamed are held liable
JOINTLY and SEVERALLY as follows:
3. To indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas the amount of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
4. To indemnify the heirs of Albert Bandibas the amount of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
5. To indemnify complainant Benjamin Morial the amount of
P20,546.00 as actual damages for the funeral, burial and wake
expenses;
6. To pay to the heirs [the] aforementioned moral damages of
P60,000.00 for each death; and
7. To restitute or restore to private complainant Benjamin
Morial the P11,000.00 amount robbed;
8. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.35
Appellants' conviction rests on two vital pieces of evidence: the extra-
judicial confession of appellant Leonardo Morial and the eyewitness
account of Gabriel Guilao.
21
The Court finds Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid
since he was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the
custodial investigation.
A custodial investigation is understood to mean as "any questioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner."36 It begins when there is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular
person as a suspect,i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection
with an alleged offense.37
A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights,
which attach upon the commencement thereof. These are the rights
(1) to remain silent, (2) to competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other
rights.38 The prosecution must prove with clear and convincing
evidence that the accused was accorded said rights before he extra-
judicially admitted his guilt to the authorities.39
Thus, the prosecution offered the testimonies of SPO4 Andres
Fernandez and Atty. Tobias Aguilar. SPO4 Fernandez testified that the
investigation he conducted resulted in an admission by Leonardo
Morial that he was one of those who participated in the robbery with
homicide. SPO4 Fernandez asked Leonardo whether he was willing to
reduce his statement into writing and to sign the same. The suspect
answered positively. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right "to
remain silent and [to] have a counsel[,] [and informed him that]
whatever will be his answer will be used as evidence in Court."40
Leonardo told the investigator that he had no money to pay for the
services of counsel. SPO4 Fernandez informed him that there are
many lawyers in their municipality and named some of them.
Leonardo said he did not know any of the lawyers mentioned. SPO4
Fernandez thus volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to

which Leonardo Morial consented. SPO4 Fernandez then contacted
Atty. Aguilar.41
Atty. Tobias Aguilar arrived at about 8:00 that morning of January 9,
1996. After being introduced to Leonardo Morial, Atty. Aguilar had a
short conference with him. He asked Leonardo if he was willing to
answer the questions that may be propounded by the police
investigator. Atty. Aguilar warned him that the statements that he
may give might be used in evidence against him. Leonardo said he
was willing to answer the questions voluntarily. According to Atty.
Aguilar, Leonardo was bent on revealing what really happened.
Thereafter, SPO4 Fernandez conducted the investigation in Cebuano.
Midway into the investigation, after the police investigator had asked
"all the material points," Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator that he
be given leave as he had a very important engagement. The
investigator agreed to the lawyer's request.42
Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to
answer the questions in his absence. He also instructed the police
that, after the written confession had been prepared, the accused
and the document containing the confession should be brought to his
office for "further examination." Atty. Aguilar was in the police station
for less than thirty minutes from the start of the interrogation.
At about 1:30 or 2:00 in the afternoon, Leonardo and his policeman-
escort arrived at Atty. Aguilar's office. Atty. Aguilar asked the accused
whether he was maltreated while he was away and examined the
suspect's body for contusions or abrasions. Leonardo told him that he
was not harmed by the police officer. The lawyer then studied the
document to determine whether its contents conformed to the
answers given by the accused in his (counsel's) presence. He
propounded questions to Leonardo with reference to the document.
Atty. Aguilar asked him whether he understood its contents and
whether he was willing to sign it. Leonardo replied in the positive and
signed the document in the presence of Atty. Aguilar and the
policeman-escort.43
22
SPO4 Fernandez confirmed that Atty. Aguilar left during the
investigation. On direct examination, SPO4 Fernandez said the lawyer
left the station while the investigation was still going on, saying that
he had so many things to do in his office.44 On cross-examination,
SPO4 Fernandez hesitated a little when he testified that Atty. Aguilar
"might" have probably gone out in the middle of the investigation.45
Later, he clarified that while in the process of drafting the statement,
Atty. Aguilar told him that he had to go to his office to attend to some
matters.46 SPO4 Fernandez added that while Atty. Aguilar was "in the
police station during the investigation," "he (Atty. Aguilar) [would]
come and go but within the police station."47
During and despite Atty. Aguilar's absence, SPO4 Fernandez
continued with the investigation and propounded several more
questions to Leonardo, which the latter answered.48
The Court has stressed that an accused under custodial interrogation
must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start
thereof.49 InPeople vs. Lucero,50 where the suspect's counsel left just
when the interrogation was starting, this Court chastised both
counsel and the trial court for their lack of zeal in safeguarding the
rights of the accused.
SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming that
when the lawyer left, he knew very well that the suspect had already
admitted that he (Leonardo) and his companions committed the
crime.51 Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize his abandoning his
client by saying that he left only after the latter had admitted the
"material points," referring to the three accused's respective
participation in the crime.52 For even as the person under custodial
investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception, so does he
enjoy such right until its termination — indeed, "in every phase of the
investigation."53 An effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and
logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and
assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first

question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession."54
Furthermore, Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 743855 requires that "[a]ny
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel." The last paragraph of Section 3 of the
same law mandates that "[i]n the absence of any lawyer, no custodial
investigation shall be conducted."
The right of appellant to counsel was therefore completely negated
by the precipitate departure of Atty. Tobias before the termination of
the custodial investigation. InPeople vs. Deniega,56 we explained the
rationale for the rule requiring counsel's continuing presence
throughout the custodial investigation:
Conditions vary at every stage of the process of custodial
investigation. What may satisfy constitutional requirements of
voluntariness at the investigation's onset may not be sufficient
as the investigation goes on. . . . The competent or
independent counsel so engaged should be present from the
beginning to end,i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling
or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while
either to give advice to the accused that he may either
continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
If it were true that Atty. Tobias had to attend to matters so pressing
that he had to abandon a client undergoing custodial investigation, he
could have terminated the same to be continued only until as soon as
his schedule permitted, advising the suspect in the meantime to
remain silent. This he failed to do. Appallingly, he even asked his
client whether he was willing to answer questions during the lawyer's
absence. The records also disclose that Atty. Tobias never informed
appellant of his right to remain silent, not even before the custodial
investigation started.57
23
Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to
remain silent, by his "coming and going" during the custodial
investigation, and by his abrupt departure before the termination of
the proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the framers of the
1987 Constitution contemplated when it added the modifier
"competent" to the word "counsel." Neither can he be described as
the "vigilant and effective" counsel that jurisprudence requires.
Precisely, it is Atty. Tobias' nonchalant behavior during the custodial
investigation that the Constitution abhors and which this Court
condemns. His casual attitude subverted the very purpose for this
vital right, which is to:
. . . curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even
by the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. What is sought to be avoided is the "evil of
extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very
evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him."
These constitutional guarantee have been made available to
protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if not
physical, atmosphere of such investigation.58
Even granting that appellant consented to Atty. Aguilar's departure
during the investigation and to answer questions during the lawyer's
absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel
and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12 (3), Article III of the
Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless the same is made
in writing and in the presence of counsel. No such written and
counseled waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.
That the extra-judicial confession was subsequently signed in the
presence of counsel did not cure its constitutional defects. InPeople
vs. Compil,59 this Court held:
. . . it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately
subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house of
Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to the

Tayabas Police Station where he was further questioned. And
while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again
elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he
confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his
participation therein. In all those instances, he was not
assisted by counsel.
The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even
if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession
does not cure the defect for the investigators were already
able to extract incriminatory statements from accused-
appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect
who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting
incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect
of his supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus inPeople v. de
Jesus [213 SCRA 345 (1992)] we said thatadmissions obtained
during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel
although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of
counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Moreover, appellant's policeman-escort was also present in the
lawyer's office as attorney and client discussed the voluntariness of
the latter's confession. One can hardly expect the suspect, in the face
of such intimidating presence, to candidly admit that he was coerced
into confessing.
As appellant Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of his right to
counsel during custodial investigation, his extra-judicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence against him.60
The confession is also inadmissible against appellant Leonardo
Morial's co-accused, Nonelito Abiñon and Edwin Morial. The rule on
24
res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.61
An exception to theres inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than by such act or declaration. The exception, however, does not
apply in this case since the confession was made after the alleged
conspiracy and not while the declarant was engaged in carrying out
the conspiracy.62
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession
executed by Leonardo Morial, the conviction of appellants is fully
supported by the other pieces of evidence adduced by the
prosecution. It is well settled that where there is independent
evidence, apart from the accused's alleged uncounseled confession,
that the accused is truly guilty, the latter nevertheless faces a
conviction.63 Here, the testimony of eyewitness Gabriel Guilao
certainly deserves credence. He recounted before the trial court:
Q Now, do you still recall Mr. Witness where you were on
January 6, 1996 at more or less 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon?
A I can remember, sir.
Q Where were you if you can recall?
A I was pasturing my horse.
Q How many horses do you have?
A One mature and one young horse, the young one is not
yet tied up.
Q So you have two horses all in all?
PROS. RUIZ:
Q Do you have carabao, Mr. Witness?
A None, Sir.
 25

Q Now, while you were pasturing your horse at more or
less 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 6, 1996, I
withdraw that question, Your Honor.
COURT:
Reform.
PROS. RUIZ:
Q Now, how long did you stay in that pasture land?
A Two minutes, Sir, then I went home.
Q So, after pasturing your horse for two minutes, after
that you went home? Now, on your way home, do you
remember what happened if any?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What was that incident are you referring to?
A When I went home, I passed by on the road near the
house of Benjamin Morial, then I heard the voice of Paula
saying: "please don't kill me I am going to give you money."
Q Now, when you said, Paula are you referring to Paula
one of the victim in this case?
A Yes, Sir.
PROS. RUIZ
Q Now, when you heard that voice of Paula, what did you
do?
A I paused for a while because what I heard I found it
weird.
Q Where did you stay at that moment as what you have
said that you stayed for a while?
A I stayed at a distance of about 8 meters from their yard.
Q Were there trees in the place where you were staying
at that time?
A Yes, Sir.
Q While staying at the distance of 8 meters away from the
yard of the house of Benjamin Morial, what did you observe if
any?
A I saw that the old woman was slapped by Nonelito
Abiñon on her neck.
Q What else have you observed if any?
A Then the old woman was down and when she was
down, this Edwin Morial stabbed her.
Q Would you please tell this Honorable Court what was
that weapon used in stabbing the old woman by Edwin
Morial?
A A small sharp pointed weapon, Sir.
Q Now, have you seen Leonardo Morial in the house of
Benjamin Morial?
WITNESS:
A Leonardo Morial was just outside the house of Paula
Bandibas.
PROS. RUIZ:
Q What was Leonardo Morial doing outside the house of
Benjamin Morial?
A He was just standing thereat.
Q Now, in your estimate, how long did Nonelito and
Edwin were inside the house of Benjamin Morial?
WITNESS:
After they have killed the old woman, two minutes . . .
ATTY. GABUCAN:
The answer is not responsive, the question was how
long?
PROS. RUIZ:
That is the answer of the witness.
COURT:
Continue with the answer.
WITNESS:
A After killing the old woman, they stayed inside the
house for about ten minutes, Sir.
Q Now, after ten minutes, what did they do Mr. Witness?
A They went out of the house.
PROS. RUIZ:
Q After getting out from the house, what did they do?
A They went home, Sir.
Q In what direction?
A Towards the houses nearby.64

The defense has tried to discredit Guilao by harping on the latter's
relationship with private complainant, Benjamin Morial, who is the
brother of Gabriel's wife,65 conveniently forgetting that Gabriel is
also related to all of the accused who are all his nephews.66 On this
score, the Court has held that the weight of testimony of a witness is
not impaired or in any way affected by his relationship to the victim
when there is no showing of improper motive on the part of the
witness.67 A person who was close to the victim would not callously
violate his conscience by blaming it on someone he believed innocent
thereof,68 especially if the accused were his blood relatives.
Anent the failure of Guilao to either attend to the victims or to report
the matter immediately to the authorities, it should be remembered
that different people react differently to an unusual event and there
is no standard of behavior when a person becomes a witness to
something so shocking or gruesome as murder especially if the
assailant is near.69 The initial reluctance of the eyewitness to disclose
what transpired was sufficiently explained: Gabriel, who was 62 years
old at the time of the incident, was too afraid to share what he saw
even to his wife,70 and while he wanted to tell their barangay
captain, the latter was in Davao at that time.71 Instead, he made up
his mind to tell only Benjamin,72 the common-law husband of the
victim Paula, which he promptly did upon Benjamin's arrival at his
house from Maria Clara.73 The failure of Gabriel to execute an
affidavit on what he witnessed was in fact due to the request of
Benjamin who advised him not to tell anybody for fear that they
might all be killed,74 as the Abiñons were the most feared persons in
this place.75
The defense, likewise, tried to show that Gabriel could not have
possibly witnessed the crime because he was in Maria Clara at that
time. Patricio Abiñon, a relative of the accused Nonelito Abiñon,76
testified that he saw Gabriel at Maria Clara at around six o'clock in the
evening of 06 January 1996,77 and again at around eight o'clock in
the morning the following day.78 He surmised that Gabriel stayed in
Maria Clara because it would take him about two (2) hours of hiking
26
to travel from Maria Clara to Cagnituan. However, it could not be
discounted that Patricio was merely making an opinion as to the
travel or hiking time of Gabriel and he also admitted that he was not
wearing a timepiece.79 Hence, as observed by the trial court, it was
not farfetched that Gabriel was in Maria Clara in the afternoon of 06
January 1996, hiked to Cagnituan in time to witness the incident and
then returned to Maria Clara in the morning of 07 January 1996 to
buy some fish.
As regards the defense testimonies that Gabriel could not have
possibly seen the incident from the trail, it should be stressed here
that Gabriel categorically stated that he was about eight (8) meters
from the yard of Benjamin's house when he saw Nonelito Abiñon slap
Paula on the neck after which Edwin Morial stabbed her.80 In
addition, defense witnesses Patricio Abiñon and Eulogio Padilla even
contradicted each other when the former stated it would be possible
to see the inside of the house if the light was on81 while the latter
stated that any person inside could not be seen even if the light was
on.82
Pending review of this case, Gabriel Guilao filed before this Court a
three-page "Manifestation with Prayer," dated 22 June 2000, which in
effect, was a recantation of his testimony in the trial court. He
declared that he was "utilized" by Benjamin Morial against the three
accused because the latter had a long-standing grudge against them
and was impelled by "hatred" and a "false sense of anger." Since
Benjamin could not "pinpoint" the killer of Paula and Albert Bandibas,
it was decided that the three accused be implicated to the crime "as a
way of getting revenge." Gabriel's relation to Benjamin, whose wife is
the sister of Gabriel's wife Regina, accounted for Benjamin's influence
over him. In sum, Gabriel maintained that appellants Edwin Morial,
Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abiñon had "nothing to do with the
crime charged."
The attitude of courts towards affidavits of retraction is one of
distrust, if not of disapprobation, because —

. . . affidavits of recantation can easily be secured from poor
and ignorant witnesses for monetary consideration or through
intimidation. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable for
there is always the probability that it may later be repudiated.
Courts thus look with disfavor at affidavits of retractions of
testimony given in open court, and are wary or reluctant to
allow a new trial based on retracted testimony. Indeed, it
would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken
before the court of justice simply because the witness later on
changed his mind for one reason or another, for such a rule
will make a solemn trial a mockery and will place the
investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses.83
Further, the defense, during the trial of this case, failed to establish
any grudge or animosity between and against the accused and
Benjamin Morial, as well as against the accused and Gabriel Guilao. In
fact, when Edwin's father died, Benjamin accommodated Edwin and
his mother in his nipa house "kamalig" for more than two (2) years.84
Nonelito Abiñon also testified that he could not recall having personal
differences with Benjamin.85
The accused have no other excuse other than alibi. Interestingly, they
all testified that they were in their respective homes at the time of
the incident. Edwin Morial was sleeping,86 Leonardo Morial was
cooking,87 while Nonelito Abiñon was at home, not doing
anything.88 In a number of cases, the Court has ruled that alibi is the
weakest of all defenses as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove, and it is practically worthless in the face of positive
identification of the accused.89 The Court noted that none of the
accused even presented any of their supposed home companions to
prove that they were at home when the killings took place. In
addition, it was not established that it would have been physically
impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.90 The house of Edwin Morial was about two hundred
(200) meters from the house of Benjamin,91 the house of Leonardo
27
Morial only about sixty (60) meters away,92 while the house of
Nonelito Abiñon was about seven hundred (700) meters from the
house of Benjamin and he could negotiate the distance in about ten
(10) minutes.93 Equally unnatural were the respective reactions of
the accused when the bodies of Paula and Albert were discovered.
Leonardo Morial went home after seeing the body of Paula,94 Edwin
Morial looked at the body of Paula for five (5) minutes after which he
went home,95 while Nonelito Abiñon left the house of Benjamin
while the others who went there upon hearing the shouts of
Benjamin were still searching for the body of Albert.96 The
prosecution was also able to establish that the three accused were in
one table during the benefit dance which transpired on the eve of the
incident,97 contrary to statements of Edwin Morial and Nonelito
Abiñon.
The trial court correctly ruled when it found the accused guilty of
robbery with homicide. It was established that all the elements of the
crime were present;i.e., (1) the taking of personal property
perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person; (2)
the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized
by intent to gain oranimus lucrandi; and (4) on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide was
committed.98
In this case, Benjamin, upon arrival at his house, found that their
room was in disarray, the clothes were scattered and the box where
they kept their money was already turned upside down.99 The
amount of P11,000.00 contained in the box was already missing,100
Paula was already lifeless101 and Albert was nowhere to be
found.102
The trial court also correctly ruled that the accused conspired to
commit the crime. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decide
to commit it.103 It may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the crime, which are indicative of a joint

purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.104 Where
the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators
will be liable as principals.105 To exempt himself from criminal
liability, the conspirator must have performed an overt act to
dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit the
felony.106
In this case, it was established that after the killing of Paula, the
accused even stayed inside the house for about ten (10) minutes,107
presumably to look for the hidden money. After about ten (10)
minutes, they left the house of Benjamin and went home.108 Clearly,
Paula and Albert were already dead or dying but not one of the
accused lifted a finger to show any pity or remorse. Hence, they
should all be made liable for the crime.
Dwelling was correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
because of the sanctity that the law accords to the privacy of the
human abode.109 The home is considered a sacred place to its
owners, and one who goes to another house to slander or hurt him,
or do him wrong, more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. 110
However, evident premeditation is inherent in robbery and should
not have been considered against the accused.111 Treachery could
only be appreciated in crimes against persons,112 the same way with
disregard of respect due to sex and age which can be considered only
in cases of crimes against persons and honor.113
Nevertheless, accused Edwin Morial should still be spared the death
penalty. The records would show that he was a minor at the time of
the execution of the crime.114 InPeople vs. Villagracia,115 the Court
ruled:
In this case, the trial court failed to consider the age of
appellant Nixon Ledesma when the crime was committed. At
the time he testified on May 17, 1989, he stated that he was
only 15 years old (TSN, May 17, 1989, p. 31). No contradictory
28
evidence was presented by the prosecution. So, when the
crime was committed on September 23, 1987, or more than a
year before he was presented as a witness, Nixon Ledesma
was less than 15 years old.
InPeople vs. Lugto, 190 SCRA 754 [1990], we held that the
accused has the burden of proof that he was minor at the time
of the commission of the crime. However, inPeople v. Tismo,
204 SCRA 535 [1991], we upheld appellants' claim that he was
17 years old at the time the crime was committed even
without any proof to corroborate his testimony. Considering
that the prosecution failed to present contradictory evidence,
we applied to appellant therein the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority under the second paragraph of
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Lugto appears to be an aberration from the long line of
decisions antedating it. From U.S. v. Bergantino, 3 Phil. 118
[1903] to People v. Ebora, 141 SCRA 282 [1986], we have
consistently ruled that, although the accused did not offer any
evidence to support his claim of minority, this fact will remain
as such, until disproved by the prosecution (See also U.S. v.
Barbicho, 13 Phil. 616 [1909]; U.S. vs. Agadas, 36 Phil. 247
[1917]; People v. Ebora, 141 SCRA 282 [1986]; People v.
Bernalde, 139 SCRA 426 [1986]).
Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. As the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling attended the commission
thereof, the greater penalty,i.e., death, shall be imposed116 upon
appellants Nonelito Abiñon and Leonardo Morial.
However, appellant Edwin Morial, who was over 15 but under 18
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, is entitled to
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Accordingly, the
penalty next lower,117 i.e.,reclusion temporal, shall be imposed upon
 29

him in its maximum period,118 there being one aggravating (2) indemnify the heirs of Albert Bandibas in the amount of Fifty
circumstance (dwelling). Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as death indemnity;

Said appellant is further entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.119 Under Section 1 thereof, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed in the Code for the offense. Thus, appellant
Edwin Morial is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor as minimum to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporalas
maximum.
As regards the civil liability of appellants, the award of P60,000.00 to
the heirs of each victim as moral damages is hereby reduced to
P50,000.00 each, in conformity with recent jurisprudence.120
Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act
No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is
unconstitutional; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the Court,
by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty
should be imposed accordingly.
(3) indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas and Albert Bandibas in the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for each death as moral
damages;
(4) indemnify Benjamin Morial in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Five Hundred Forty-Six (P20,546.00) pesos as actual damages for the
funeral, burial and wake expenses;
(5) restitute Benjamin Morial the amount of Eleven Thousand
(P11,000.00) Pesos representing the stolen money.
Costs against accused-appellants.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision,
let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for the possible exercise of executive clemency or
pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime of "Robbery with Homicide," with the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abiñon are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection,
while Edwin Morial, on account of his minority, is hereby sentenced
to the indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day
ofprision mayor as minimum; to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal as maximum. The
accused are likewise sentenced, jointly and severally, to:

(1) indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas in the amount of Fifty

Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as death indemnity;

G.R. No. 203882, January 11, 2016
LORELEI O. ILADAN, Petitioner, v. LA SUERTE INTERNATIONAL
MANPOWER AGENCY, INC., AND DEBBIE LAO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
1
By this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Lorelei O. Iladan
(Iladan) assails the May 16, 2012 Decision 2 and October 4, 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 119903,
which reversed the February 23, 20114 and March 31, 20115
Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and
consequently dismissed her complaint for illegal dismissal against
respondents La Suerte International Manpower Agency, Inc. (La
Suerte) and its President and General Manager Debbie Lao (Lao).
Factual Antecedents
La Suerte is a recruitment agency duly authorized by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to deploy workers for
overseas employment. On March 20, 2009, La Suerte hired Iladan to
work as a domestic helper in Hongkong for a period of two years with
a monthly salary of HK$3,580.00.6 On July 20, 2009, Iladan was
deployed to her principal employer in Hongkong, Domestic Services
International (Domestic Services), to work as domestic helper for Ms.
Muk Sun Fan.
On July 28, 2009 or barely eight days into her job, Iladan executed a
handwritten resignation letter.7 On August 6, 2009, in consideration
of P35,000.00 financial assistance given by Domestic Services, Iladan
signed an Affidavit of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim8 duly subscribed
before Labor Attache Leonida V. Romulo (Labor Attache Romulo) of
the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong. On the same date, an
Agreement,9 was signed by Iladan, Conciliator-Mediator Maria Larisa
Q. Diaz (Conciliator-Mediator Diaz) and a representative of Domestic
Services, whereby Iladan acknowledged that her acceptance of the
financial assistance would constitute as final settlement of her
contractual claims and waiver of any cause of action against
respondents and Domestic Services. The Agreement was also
30
subscribed before Labor Attache Romulo. On August 10, 2009, Iladan
returned to the Philippines.
Thereafter, or on November 23, 2009, Iladan filed a Complaint 10 for
illegal dismissal, refund of placement fee, payment of salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract, as well as
moral and exemplary damages, against respondents. Iladan alleged
that she was forced to resign by her principal employer, threatened
with incarceration; and that she was constrained to accept the
amount of P35,000.00 as financial assistance as she needed the
money to defray her expenses in going back to the Philippines. She
averred that the statements in the Affidavit of Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim and the Agreement were not fully explained in the
language known to her; that they were considered contracts of
adhesion contrary to public policy; and were issued for an
unreasonable consideration. Iladan claimed to have been illegally
dismissed and entitled to backwages corresponding to the unexpired
portion of the contract, reimbursement of the placement fee in the
amount of P90,000.00, as well as payment of damages and attorney's
fee for the litigation of her cause.
To prove that she incurred debts for the placement fee, Iladan
presented a) a mortgage deed11 and a deed12 of transfer of rights
over her family's properties in favor of other persons, b) a sworn
statement13 of her mother, Rebecca U. Ondoy (Ondoy), stating that
Iladan paid P30,000.00 in cash to respondents for the placement fee,
and borrowed P60,000.00 from Nippon Credit Corp., Inc. (Nippon), a
lending company referred by respondents, and c) a demand letter 14
from Nippon demanding payment of her loan.
Respondents, on the hand, averred that Iladan was not illegally
dismissed but voluntarily resigned as shown by: (1) her handwritten
resignation letter and (2) the Affidavit of Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim and the Agreement, both voluntarily executed by her
before Philippine Consulate officials in Hongkong. Respondents also
denied collecting a placement fee considering the prohibition in the

POEA rules against the charging of placement fee for domestic
helpers deployed to Hongkong.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
In a Decision15 dated August 11,2010, the Labor Arbiter declared
Iladan to have been illegally dismissed and that she was only forced
by respondents to resign. The Labor Arbiter was not persuaded by
respondents', allegation that Iladan resigned since she was barely
eight days into her job without specifying any credible reason
considering what she had gone through to get employment abroad.
The Labor Arbiter did not consider the Affidavit of Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim and the Agreement as proofs that Iladan voluntarily
resigned because she was not assisted by any lawyer or Consulate
official who could have explained the import of these documents.
Moreover, quitclaims are looked upon with disfavor and do not estop
employees from pursuing their just claims. The Labor Arbiter also
struck down respondents' allegation that they did not charge any
placement fee considering that they are engaged in recruitment and
placement for profit. Besides, Iladan submitted evidence to prove
payment thereof.
Thus, the Labor Arbiter awarded Iladan her salaries corresponding to
the unexpired portion of her contract, net of the P35,000.00 she had
already received. Respondents were also ordered to refund the
placement fee, and to pay moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainant's complaint is
meritorious as she was illegally terminated by respondents.
Respondents La Suerte International Manpower Agency, Domestic
Services International and Debbie S. Lao, are jointly and solidarity
liable to pay complainant Lorelei O. Iladan the following monetary
awards, to wit:
1. Refund of complainant's placement fee of P90,000.00 plus 12% per
annum;
2. Payment of complainant's 24 monthly salary based on the contract
31
at HK$3,580.00 per month or its Philippine Peso equivalent less the
P35,000.00 given as financial assistance;
3. Moral damages of P100,000.00;
4. Exemplary damages of P30,000.00;
5. Attorney's fee of 10% of the total monetary award.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
On appeal with the NLRC, respondents averred that the Labor Arbiter
erred in holding that the resignation was not voluntary. They claimed
that Iladan's unsubstantiated allegations of harassment and coercion
cannot prevail over a waiver and a settlement which were verified by
the Philippine Consulate officials in the regular performance of their
duties. They also insisted that there was no credible proof that
placement fee was paid.
In a Resolution17 dated February 23,2011, the NLRC dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the Labor Arbiter's judgment. The NLRC
observed that respondents' dismissal was without just cause and due
process since no specific reason was given for Iladan's alleged
voluntary resignation. The NLRC found credible Iladan's claim that the
amount she received from respondents as financial assistance was
not a settlement but an enticement for her to leave her workplace.
Further, the NLRC ruled that while the Affidavit of Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim and the Agreement were executed before Consular
officials, it cannot be presumed that the consular officials regularly
performed their duties because respondents failed to adduce proof
that the contents of these documents were fully explained in the
language known to Iladan. The NLRC noted that respondents' general
denial that placement fee was paid cannot prevail over the positive
allegations of witness supported by evidence.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in
the NLRC Resolution18 of March 31, 2011.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondents sought recourse to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari. In
a Decision19 dated May 16, 2012, the CA granted the Petition for

Certiorari, reversed the findings of both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC
and dismissed Iladan's complaint for illegal dismissal. According to the
CA, Iladan was not dismissed but voluntarily resigned as substantially
proven by her resignation letter, the Affidavit of Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim and the Agreement which were both executed before the
Philippine Consulate General as well as her acceptance of P35,000.00
as full settlement of her claims. Iladan's execution and signing of a
settlement and affidavit duly assisted by the Labor Attache and a
Conciliator-Mediator convinced the CA that Iladan voluntarily severed
her employment relation with respondents. Moreover, the CA held
that Iladan failed to prove that she paid any placement fee. Hence,
the CA attributed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
ruling that Iladan was coerced into resigning and in holding that
placement fee was paid despite absence of any factual basis.
Iladan filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the CA
Resolution20 of October 4, 2012.
Issues
Hence, this Petition raising the following issues: (1) whether the CA
may reverse the factual findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC; (2) whether Iladan's resignation and her execution of the
Affidavit of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and the Agreement were
all voluntarily made; (3) whether Iladan's acceptance of the financial
assistance constitutes final settlement of her claims against
respondents; (4) whether Iladan was illegally dismissed; and (5)
whether Iladan paid any placement fee.
Our Ruling
The Petition is without merit. The CA did not err in finding that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in its decision.
Iladan contends that the CA failed to prove any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC and thus had no basis in reversing
the NLRC resolutions which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. She
argues that a writ of certiorari may not be used to correct, the Labor
Arbiter's and NLRC's evaluation of evidence and factual findings. She
avers that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are
32
entitled to great weight and should be accorded respect and finality.
Iladan's arguments are untenable. In a special civil action for
certiorari, the CA has ample authority to receive and review the
evidence and make its own factual determination. 21 Thus, the CA is
not precluded from reviewing factual findings and conclusions of the
NLRC when it finds that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding evidence material to the controversy. 22 In
the present case, we find that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC acted
with grave abuse of discretion because their tactual findings were
arrived at in disregard of the evidence.
Iladan's resignation was voluntary;
there was no illegal dismissal
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that
the employee's dismissal was legal. However, to discharge this
burden, the employee must first prove, by substantial evidence, that
he had been dismissed from employment.23
Iladan maintains that she was threatened and coerced by
respondents to write the resignation letter, to accept the financial
assistance and to sign the waiver and settlement. Consequently, she
Insists that her act of resigning was involuntary.
The Court is not convinced as we find no proof of Iladan's allegations.
It is a settled jurisprudence that it is incumbent upon an employee to
prove that his resignation is not voluntary.24 However, Iladan did not
adduce any competent evidence to prove that respondents used
force and threat.
For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites must be
present; (1) that the intimidation paused the consent to be given; (2)
that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be
real or serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil
and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of
doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil;
and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the
person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to
inflict the threatened injury to his person or property. In the instant
case, not one of these essential elements was amply proven by
[Iladan]. Bare allegations of threat or force do not constitute

substantial evidence to support a finding of forced
resignation.25cralawred
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation
where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in
favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but
to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement
or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the
office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to
relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts
of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be
considered in determining whether in fact, he or she intended to
sever from his or her employment.
In the instant case, Iladan executed a resignation letter in her own
handwriting. She also accepted the amount of P35,000.00 as financial
assistance and executed an Affidavit of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
and an Agreement, as settlement and waiver of any cause of action
against respondents. The affidavit of waiver and the settlement were
acknowledged/subscribed before Labor Attache Romulo on August 6,
2009, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. An affidavit
of waiver duly acknowledged before a notary public is a public
document which cannot be impugned by mere self-serving
allegations. Proof of an irregularity in its execution is absolutely
essential. The Agreement likewise bears the signature of Conciliator-
Mediator Diaz. Thus, the signatures of these officials sufficiently
prove that Iladan was duly assisted when she signed the waiver and
settlement. Concededly, the presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty.28 In this case, no such evidence was presented.
Besides, "[t]he Court has ruled that a waiver or quitclaim is a valid and
binding agreement between the parties, provided that it constitutes a
credible and reasonable settlement, and that the one accomplishing it
has done so voluntarily and with a full understanding of its import." 29
Absent any extant and clear proof of the alleged coercion and threats
Iladan allegedly received from respondents that led her to terminate
33
her employment relations with respondents, it can be concluded that
Iladan resigned voluntarily.
No placement fee was paid.
Anent Iladan's claim of payment of placement fee, the Court finds no
sufficient evidence that payment had been made. Iladan and her
mother's affidavit attesting to its payment are self-serving evidence
and deserve no weight at all. Neither did the mortgage loan and deed
of transfer executed in favor of third persons as well as the letter
from Nippon prove that placement fee was paid to respondents.
These documents merely show that Iladan is indebted to certain
persons and to Nippon; however, they do not prove that these
indebtedness were incurred in connection with the placement fee she
purportedly paid to respondents. As aptly ruled by the CA, Iladan has
the burden of proving, with clear and convincing evidence, the fact of
payment.
All told, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in finding that
petitioner was illegally dismissed as no substantial evidence was
adduced to sustain this finding. As shown above, Iladan failed to
substantiate her claim of illegal dismissal for there was no proof that
her resignation was tainted with coercion and threats, as she strongly
claims.
"Although the Supreme Court has, more often than not, been inclined
towards the workers and has upheld their cause in their conflicts with
the employers, such inclination has not blinded it to the rule that
justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light
of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 16, 2012 Decision and
October 4, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
119903 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189516, June 08, 2016
EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, JEFFREN M. OTAMIAS AND MINOR
JEMWEL M. OTAMIAS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER EDNA
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY COL. VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PENSION AND GRATUITY
MANAGEMENT CENTER (PGMC) OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a retired
officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which is the subject of
a deed of assignment drawn by him granting support to his wife and
five (5) children. The benefit of exemption from execution of pension
benefits is a statutory right that may be waived, especially in order to
comply with a husband's duty to provide support under Article XV of
the 1987 Constitution and the Family Code.
Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel
Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel Otamias) were married on June 16,
1978 and had five (5) children.1ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On September 2000, Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due to his
alleged infidelity.2 Their children remained with
Edna.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel
Otamias before the Provost Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.4 Edna demanded monthly support equivalent to 75%
of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits.5 Colonel Otamias executed
an Affidavit, stating:
That sometime in August or September 2002, I was summoned at the
Office of the Provost Marshal, Philippine Army, in connection with a
complaint affidavit submitted to said Office by my wife Mrs. Edna M.
Otamias signifying her intention 75% of my retirement benefits from
34
the AFP;
That at this point, I can only commit 50% of my retirement benefits to
be pro-rated among my wife and five (5) children;
That in order to implement this compromise, I am willing to enter into
Agreement with my wife covering the same;
That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the
foregoing facts and whatever legal purpose it may serve.6cralawred
On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of
Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and pension benefits
in favor of Edna and their children.7 The Deed of Assignment was
considered by the parties as a compromise agreement. 8 It
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Assignment, made and executed unto this 26th day of February
2003 at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, by the undersigned LTC Francisco
B. Otamias, 0-0-111045 (INP) PA, of legal age, married and presently
residing at Dama De Noche St., Pembo, Makati City.
WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, the undersigned affiant is the legal husband of EDNA M.
OTAMIAS and the father of Julie Ann, Jonathan, Jennifer, Jeffren and
Jemwel all residing at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City;
WHEREAS, the undersigned will be retiring from the military service
and expects to receive retirement benefits from the Armed Forces of
the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the undersigned had expressed his willingness to give a
share in his retirement benefits to my wife and five (5) abovenamed
children,
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing
premises, the undersigned hereby stipulated the following:
1. That the undersigned will give to my legal wife and five (5) children
FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of my retirement benefits to be pro� rated
among them.
2. That a separate check(s) be issued and to be drawn and encash [sic]

in the name of the legal wife and five (5) children pro-rating the fifty
(50%) percent of my retirement benefits.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 26th day of
February 2003 at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City.9cralawred
Colonel Otamias retired on April 1,
2003.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006. 11 Edna alleged
that "the A[rmed] F[orces] [of the] Philippines] suddenly decided not
to honor the agreement"12 between Colonel Otamias and his
legitimate family.
In a letter13 dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Pension and Gratuity Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed
Edna that a court order was required for the AFP PGMC to recognize
the Deed of Assignment.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In another letter15 dated April 17, 2006, the AFP PGMC reiterated that
it could not act on Edna's request to receive a portion of Colonel
Otamias' pension "unless ordered by [the] appropriate
court."16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Heeding the advice of the AFP PGMC, Edna, on behalf of herself and
Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental an
action for support, docketed as F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-
039.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court's Sheriff tried to serve summons on Colonel Otamias
several times, to no avail.18 Substituted service was resorted to.19
Colonel Otamias was subsequently declared in default for failure to
file a responsive pleading despite order of the trial
court.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court ruled in favor of Edna, et al. and ordered the automatic
35
deduction of the amount of support from the monthly pension of
Colonel Otamias.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and in consonance with the legal
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiffs, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, through its Finance Center and/or appropriate Finance
Officer thereof, is thereby ordered to release to Edna Mabugay
Otamias and minor Jemwel M. Otamias, herein represented by his
mother Edna, their fifty (50%) per cent share of each of the monthly
pension due to Colonel Francisco B. Otamias, AFP PA (Retired).
Defendant Francisco Otamias is also ordered to pay plaintiff Edna M.
Otamias, fifty (50%) per cent of whatever retirement benefits he has
already received from the Armed Forces of the Philippines AND the
arrears in support, effective January 2006 up to the time plaintiff
receives her share direct from the Finance Center of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
IT IS SO ORDERED.22cralawred
The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Office of the Judge
Advocate General, filed a Manifestation/Opposition 23 to the Decision
of the trial court, but it was not given due course due to its late
filing.24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Edna, et al., through counsel, filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution25 dated February 22, 2008. The trial court granted the
Motion, and a writ of execution was issued by the trial court on April
10, 2008.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFP Finance
Center), tlirough the Office of the Judge Advocate General, filed a
Motion to Quash27 the writ of execution and argued that the AFP
Finance Center's duty to disburse benefits is ministerial. It releases
benefits only upon the AFP PGMC's

approval.28ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court denied the Motion to Quash and held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the law and existing jurisprudence, the "right to support" is
practically equivalent to the "right to life." The "right to life" always
takes precedence over "property rights." The "right to support/life" is
also a substantive right which always takes precedence over
technicalities/procedural rules. It being so, technical rules must yield
to substantive justice. Besides, this Court's Decision dated February
27, 2007 has long acquired finality, and as such, is ripe for
enforcement/execution.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the instant Motion is hereby
DENIED.29cralawred
The AFP PGMC moved for reconsideration of the order denying the
Motion to Quash,30 but the Motion was also denied by the trial court
in the Order31 dated August 6, 2008.
A Notice of Garnishment was issued by the trial court on July 15, 2008
and was received by the AFP PGMC on September 9,
2008.32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The AFP PGMC filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals granted34 the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition and partially nullified the trial court's Decision insofar as it
directed the automatic deduction of support from the pension
benefits of Colonel Otamias.
The Court of Appeals discussed that Section 3135 of Presidential
Decree No. 1638, otherwise known as the AFP Military Personnel
Retirement and Separation Decree of 1979, "provides for the
exemption of the monthly pension of retired military personnel from
36
execution and attachment[,]"36 while Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules
of Court provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall
be exempt from execution:
....
(1) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained
as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the
Government[.]cralawred
The Court of Appeals also cited Pacific Products, Inc. vs. Ong:37
[M]oneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands
of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific
portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the
foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids
it.38cralawred
In addition, the AFP PGMC was not impleaded as a party in the action
for support; thus, it is not bound by the
Decision.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City dated February
27, 2007 in Civil Case No. 2006-039 is PARTIALLY NULLIFIED in so far
as it directs the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center to
automatically deduct the financial support in favor of private
respondents, Edna Otamias and her children Jeffren and Jemwel
Otamias, from the pension benefits of Francisco Otamias, a retired
military officer. The Order dated June 10, 2008, Order dated August 6,
2008 and Writ of Execution dated April 10, 2008, all issued by the
court a quo are likewise SET ASIDE. Perforce, let a writ of permanent
injunction issue enjoining the implementation of the assailed Writ of
Execution dated April 10, 2008 and the corresponding Notice of

Garnishment dated July 15, 2008. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.40 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred
Edna, et al. moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied by
the Court of Appeals.41ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Edna, et al. filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari 42
on November 11, 2009. In the Resolution 43 dated January 20, 2010,
this Court required respondent to comment.
In the Resolution44 dated August 4, 2010, this Court noted the
Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and required
Edna, et al. to file a reply.45ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A Reply46 was filed on September 27, 2010.
Edna, et al. argue that the Deed of Assignment Colonel Otamias
executed Is valid and legal.47ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
They claim that Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 163848 "does
not include support";49 hence, the retirement benefits of Colonel
Otamias can be executed upon.
Edna, et al. also argue that the Court of Appeals erred in granting
respondent's Petition because it effectively rendered the Deed of
Assignment of no force and effect.50 On the other hand, the trial
court's Decision implements the Deed of Assignment and Edna, et
al.'s right to support.51ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, the AFP PGMC had already recognized the validity of the
agreement and had made payments to them until it suddenly
stopped payment.52 After Edna, et al. obtained a court order, the AFP
PGMC still refused to honor the Deed of
Assignment.53ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Office of the
37
Solicitor General, argues that it was not a party to the case filed by
Edna, et al.54 Thus, "it cannot be compelled to release part of the
monthly pension benefits of retired Colonel Otamias in favor of
[Edna, et al]."55ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Office of the Solicitor General avers that the AFP PGMC never
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 56 It was not a
party to the case as the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
AFP PGMC.57ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Office of the Solicitor General also argues that Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638 and Rule 39, Section 13(1) of the Rules
of Court support the Court of Appeals Decision that Colonel Otamias'
pension benefits are exempt from
execution.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 "does not deprive the
survivor/s of a retired or separated officer or enlisted man of their
right to support."59 Rather, "[w]hat is prohibited is for respondent
[AFP PGMC] to segregate a portion of the pension benefit in favor of
the retiree's family while still in the hands of the A[rmed] F[orces] [of
the] Philippines]."60ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, the AFP PGMC "cannot be compelled to directly give or issue a
check in favor of [Edna, et al.] out of the pension gratuity of Col.
Otamias."61ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In their Reply,62 Edna, et al. argue that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines should not be allowed to question the legal recourse they
took because it was an officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
who had advised them to file an action for
support.63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
They argue that the phrase "while in the active service" in Section 31
of Presidential Decree No. 1638 refers to the "time when the retired
officer incurred his accountabilities in favor of a private creditor[,]" 64

who is a third person. The phrase also "serves as a timeline designed
to separate the debts incurred by the retired officer after his
retirement from those which he incurred prior
thereto."65ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, the accountabilities referred to in Section 31 of Presidential
Decree No. 1638 refer to debts or loans, not to
support.66ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The issues for resolution are:
First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the AFP
Finance Center cannot be directed to automatically deduct the
amount of support needed by the legitimate family of Colonel
Otamias; and
Second, whether Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed
upon for the financial support of his legitimate family.
The Petition is granted.
I When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he
Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.cralawred
The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court
as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege,
which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the
voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right
known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be
surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right;
38
or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming
it.67cralawred
In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, this Court is
guided by the following pronouncement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any
character, and, since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right,
it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which
affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is
the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled,
whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed
by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the
rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or
privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public
policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to
waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely
for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity,
if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any
public right, and without detriment to the community at large[.]68
(Emphasis in the original)cralawred
effectively waived his right to claim that his retirement benefits are
exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits
belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his
retirement benefits does not infringe on the right of third persons,
but even protects the right of his family to receive support.
In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law
between the parties, and its provisions should be respected in the
absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or
defrauded in executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law
between parties and parties are free to stipulate terms and
conditions that are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.69ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not

contrary to law; it was in accordance with the provisions on support
in the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not
to recognize its validity.
Further, this Court notes that the AFP PGMC granted the request for
support of the wives of other retired military personnel in a similar
situation as that of petitioner in this case. Attached to the Petition are
the affidavits of the wives of retired members of the military, who
have received a portion of their husbands'
pensions.70ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
One affidavit stated:
4. That when I consulted and appeared before the Office
of PGMC, I was instructed to submit a Special Power of
Authority from my husband so they can release part of
his pension to me;
5. That my husband signed the Special Power of Attorney
at the PGMC ceding 50% of his pension to me; the SPA
form was given to us by the PGMC and the same was
signed by my husband at the PGMC;. . .
7. That the amount was deposited directly to my account
by the PGMC- Finance Center AFP out of the pension
of my husband;
8. That only the Special Power of Attorney was required
by the PGMC in order for them to segregate my share
of my husband's pension and deposit the same to my
account[.]
The other affidavit stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
8. That my husband signed the Special Power of Attorney
at the PGMC ceding 50% of his pension to me; the SPA
39
form was given to us by the PGMC and the same was
signed by my husband at the PGMC[.]72
In addition, the AFP PGMC's website informs the public of the
following procedure:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Tanong: My husband-retiree cut-off my allotment. How can I have it
restored?
Sagot: Pension benefits are separate properties of the retiree and can
not [sic] be subject of a Ocurt [sic] Order for execution nor can they
be assigned to any third party (Sec 31, PD 1638, as amended).
However, a valid Special Power of Attorney (SPA) by the retiree
himself empowering the AFP Finance Center to deduct certain
amount from his lumpsum [sic] or pension pay as the case maybe, as
a rule, is a valid waiver of rights which can be effectively implemented
by the AFP F[inance] C[enter].73cralawred
Clearly, the AFP PGMC allows deductions from a retiree's pension for
as long as the retiree executes a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing the AFP PGMC to deduct a certain amount for the benefit
of the retiree's beneficiary.
It is curious why Colonel Otamias was allowed to execute a Deed of
Assignment by the administering officer when, in the first place, the
AFP PGMC's recognized procedure was to execute a Special Power of
Attorney, which would have been the easier remedy for Colonel
Otamias' family.
Instead, Colonel Otamias' family was forced to incur litigation
expenses just to be able to receive the financial support that Colonel
Otamias was willing to give to Edna, et al.
II
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as
provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment,
levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned,

ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or
separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under
this Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities
incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of
the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted
man or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be
applied to settle such accountabilities.cralawred
Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits are exempt
from execution. Retirement benefits are exempt from execution so as
to ensure that the retiree has enough funds to support himself and
his family.
On the other hand, the right to receive support is provided under the
Family Code. Article 194 of the Family Code defines support as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation,
in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for
some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or
to and from place of work.cralawred
The provisions of the Family Code also state who are obliged to give
support, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the
following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set
forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and
40
illegitimate children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half- blood.
Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the
full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full
extent set forth in Article 194 except only when the need for support
of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to
the claimant's fault or negligence.
Art. 197. For the support of legitimate ascendants; descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether
legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the
person obliged to give support shall be answerable provided that in
case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the
support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouses
obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the
conjugal partnership[.]cralawred
The provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that are applicable to
this case are in apparent conflict with each other. Section 4 provides
that judgments in actions for support are immediately executory. On
the other hand, Section 13(1) provides that the right to receive
pension from government is exempt from execution, thus:
RULE 39
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS
....
SEC. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. � Judgments in actions for
injunction, receivership, accounting and support, and such other
judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be
immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and
shall not, be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise
ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in
its discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or
granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or
otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or protection
of the rights of the adverse party.

....
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. � Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall
be exempt from execution:
....
(1) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained
as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government;
....
But no article or species of property mentioned in this section shall be
exempt from execution issued upon a judgment recovered for its
price or upon a judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage thereon.
(Emphasis supplied)cralawred
Based on the Family Code, Colonel Otamias is obliged to give support
to his family, petitioners in this case. However, he retired in 2003, and
his sole source of income is his pension. Judgments in actions for
support are immediately executory, yet under Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638, his pension cannot be executed upon.
However, considering that Colonel Otamias has waived a portion of
his retirement benefits through his Deed of Assignment, resolution on
the conflict between the civil code provisions on support and Section
31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 should be resolved in a more
appropriate case.
III
Republic v. Yahon74 is an analogous case because it involved the grant
of support to the spouse of a retired member of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
In Republic v. Yahon, Daisy R. Yahon filed a Petition for the Issuance of
Protection Order under Republic Act No. 9262.75 She alleged that she
did not have any source of income because her husband made her
resign from her job.76 The trial court issued a temporary restraining
order, a portion of which stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
41
To insure that petitioner [Daisy R. Yahon] can receive a fair share of
respondent's retirement and other benefits, the following agencies
thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension
[,] and other benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp
Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders from the
court:
1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro
City.77 (Emphasis in the original)
The trial court subsequently granted Daisy's Petition and issued a
permanent protection order78 and held:
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007,
respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to petitioner
50% of whatever retirement benefits and other claims that may be
due or released to him from the government and the said share of
petitioner shall be automatically deducted from respondent's benefits
and claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.
Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer
of Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG,
Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City for their guidance and strict
compliance.79cralawred
In that case, the AFP Finance Center filed before the trial court a
Manifestation and Motion stating that "it was making a limited and
special appearance"80 and argued that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Hence, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines is not bound by the trial court's
ruling.81ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Armed Forces of the Philippines also cited Pacific Products, where
this Court ruled that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in
the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the
process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its
sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to
garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly.
Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as
they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government,
belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be
entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which
covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public
policy forbids it.82 (Citations omitted)cralawred
This Court in Republic v. Yahon denied the Petition and discussed that
because Republic Act No. 9262 is the later enactment, its provisions
should prevail,83 thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment,
should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule
above stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution.
The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a
percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the
employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the
woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary"84 (Emphasis in
the original)
IV
The 1987 Constitution gives much importance to the family as the
basic unit of society, such that Article XV85 is devoted to it.
The passage of the Family Code further implemented Article XV of the
Constitution. This Court has recognized the importance of granting
support to minor children, provided that the filiation of the child is
proven. In this case, the filiation of Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M.
Otamias was admitted by Colonel Otamias in the Deed of
Assignment.86ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Even before the passage of the Family Code, this Court has given
42
primary consideration to the right of a child to receive support. In
Samson v. Yatco,87 a petition for support was dismissed with
prejudice by the trial court on the ground that the minor asking for
support was not present in court during trial. An appeal was filed, but
it was dismissed for having been filed out of time. This Court relaxed
the rules of procedure and held that "[i]f the order of dismissal with
prejudice of the petition for support were to stand, the petitioners
would be deprived of their right to present and nature
support."88ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Gan v. Reyes,89 Augustus Caezar R. Gan (Gan) questioned the trial
court's decision requiring him to give support and claimed that that
he was not the father of the minor seeking support. He also argued
that he was not given his day in court. This Court held that Gan's
arguments were meant to delay the execution of the judgment, and
that in any case, Gan himself filed a Motion for Leave to Deposit in
Court Support Pendente Lite:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the
paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the
poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him
support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time
continues to slip away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v.
Soriano is relevant, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The money and property adjudged for support and education should
and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to
wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have
suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in
school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of
such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long
afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment
cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with
such belated payment for support and education cannot act as
gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for
the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several
classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to
 43

make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of

the funds when needed.
V
The non-inclusion of the AFP PGMC or the AFP Finance Center in the
action for support was proper, considering that both the AFP PGMC
and the AFP Finance Center are not the persons obliged to give
support to Edna, et al. Thus, it was not a real party-in-interest.91 Nor
was the AFP PGMC a necessary party because complete relief could
be obtained even without impleading the AFP
PGMC.92ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision

dated May 22, 2009 and Resolution dated August 11, 2009 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 02555-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court Decision dated February 27, 2007 in F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-
039 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED