regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and
how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET
AL., Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo
for respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH
ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS.
— The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not
confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein
conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon,
and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is
not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of
public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists
for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such
discretion is the making of the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITY. — Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the
National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of
the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon
and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare,
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
(U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made
to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education
and, personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The
moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically
so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the
people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism,
nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on
the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer
of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of
prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public
Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila;
and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its
resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from
1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to
11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public
Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of
Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the
recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal
Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion
thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to
the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the
latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of
animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as
above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening
of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the
Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be
enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a
consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned
to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as
well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by
which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate
rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and
traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is
untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated
than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of cases, namely: ’The true distinction
therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no
valid objection can be made.’ (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Comm’rs.
Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice
Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by
the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature
may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials
thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final
on questions of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing
tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the ’necessity’ of
the case." cralaw virtua1aw
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on,
roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines,
the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval
of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the
construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable
distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily
closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works
and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in
the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." cralaw
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the
Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and
under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts
of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of
traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such
action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest."
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of
what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national
roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be
closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining
whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot
be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As
was said in Locke’s Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less
library than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to
rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet
developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The
proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot
delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would
be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon
which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known
to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry
and determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark,
143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R. Nos. 46076 and
46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation
v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June
26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of
virtua1aw library separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities
of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory
of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been
relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the
legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative
and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also
in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to
promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations
promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with
legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty
and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed
by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of
were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the
least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote
the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of
liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium,
which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment
greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much
is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people.
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number." cralaw virtua1aw library

The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preservation. In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby
denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As
was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.
L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one,
and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed
situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace
to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public
good." And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that
"advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state
today things which were not thought of as being within such power
yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing
population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on
the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care
for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the
police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so
considered." cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained
of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice
is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
 skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid
exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in
character.

In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of

Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation
"in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law." Department Order No.4

1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior

consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the
Republic of the Philippines Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and
SUPREME COURT irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be
Manila further enforced.

EN BANC On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the

respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor
Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan,
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria,
INC., petitioner, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the
vs. Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and
Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a
of the Philippine Overseas Employment police power measure. The only question is whether or not it is
Administration, respondents. valid under the Constitution.

Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction.
It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition
5

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of
1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO
DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it
"does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has
been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." 6
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it
does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power
and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and
sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.
Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it
7
succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its
citizens."8
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self-
protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming
necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 9
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According
to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing
the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably
the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly,
10
the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute
guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to
one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding demands and
11
requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without
its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not
be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that
event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to
advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further
private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear
misuse of the power. 12
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. In the
13
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the
presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the
contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
14
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law"
under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights
15
among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided
that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference
for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working
conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal
abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant
Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture,
confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling
motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker
of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims
of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the
Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the
first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated
instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the
Government should act similarly with respect to male workers.
The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic
notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying
is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic
workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and
not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government
acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of
unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts.
The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are
concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an
inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications
are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by
the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are
generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the
executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts
decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by
which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws,
but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body,
the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief
Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself
has specifically given them enough room on how the law should
be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying
the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly,
that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers
granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact
that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own
persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment
ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to
the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the
avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has
17
no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina
workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for
their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather,
it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions
exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the
administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the
host countries . . ." ), meaning to say that should the authorities
18
arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of
permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is
possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the
circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. — The Secretary
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the
Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of
Filipino workers.19
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable
to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to
"all Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality.
20
Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have
been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of
them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits
is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an
existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or
resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of
persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed
by A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with
the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic
case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A
and gives it to B." It would be an unlawful invasion of property
21
rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid
act. (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such
22
5.4 Hirings by employers in
distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage countries with whom the
of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is Philippines have [sic] bilateral
to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the labor agreements or
cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There understanding.
would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their
status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the xxx xxx xxx
basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the
case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal 7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND
protection." In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly
23
WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing
accords protection to certain women workers, and not the domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills
contrary.) shall be allowed to process with the POEA and
leave for worksite only if they are returning to the
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a same employer to finish an existing or partially
total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of served employment contract. Those workers
the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been returning to worksite to serve a new employer
contemplated. We quote: shall be covered by the suspension and the
provision of these guidelines.
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment
of domestic helpers and workers of similar skills xxx xxx xxx
defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized
under these guidelines and are exempted from 9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of
the suspension. Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
5.1 Hirings by immediate members Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
of the family of Heads of State and suspension in countries where there are:
Government;
1. Bilateral agreements or
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy understanding with the
Minister and the other senior Philippines, and/or,
government officials; and
2. Existing mechanisms providing
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of for sufficient safeguards to ensure
the diplomatic corps and duly the welfare and protection of
accredited international Filipino workers. 24

organizations.
xxx xxx xxx
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel
does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among
other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be
provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid
25
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to
"afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent
26
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the
Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable
27
simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have
stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a
valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No.
1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that
police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean
that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have
mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor
and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
whereof. 28
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits" is not well-taken. The right granted by
29
this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities
of the State's power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
30
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of
employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send
its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy
their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances,
the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling
expatriates have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home. In this case, the
Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot
seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection,
and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban
on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not
indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it
has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain
countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the
petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the
Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
31
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction,
where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned
Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the
Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits
that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of
the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The
Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its
intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a
grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief
prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and Griño-Aquino,
JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager
and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney
Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion
for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his
motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the
majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como
colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para
una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de
cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo
fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la
localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han
celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con
ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar
en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en
la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u
obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un
contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo
fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y
que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron
como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable
de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del
articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque
su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros
pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto
que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por
terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand,
prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority
of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26,
1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY
making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false
and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of
his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army
dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather
soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of
his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY
is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio
Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
(281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to
collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable.
(Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had
been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous
civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made
applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary
provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin
where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair
labor practice for discriminating against the National
Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National
Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to
the respondents that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such
far-reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the
motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor
Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after
stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that
it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of
the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion
for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this,
however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly
procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure
in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding
the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and
emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in
the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the
entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial
Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial
evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to
their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken
contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a
record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing
counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It
is evident that these statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a
part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike
a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented
to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial
Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more
active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are
far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention,
arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or
agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout,
arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of
farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of
Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by
the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by
the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall,
before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the
dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.)
When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall
investigate and study all industries established in a designated
locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of
fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage
or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to
be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners.
(Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in
the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system
of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to
determine specific controversies between labor and capital
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of
executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the
rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R.
No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion
to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No.
46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to
point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires
it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section
20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the
specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award,
order or decision any matter or determination which may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.
(section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals
to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to
carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
There are primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v.
U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129,
"the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected
by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes
in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed.
1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs.
McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence,
without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to
consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the
person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something
to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates
from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a
limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No.
45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G.
1335), but the evidence must be "substantial."
(Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national
labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648,
650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National
Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National
Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97
F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The
statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The
obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical
rules so that the mere admission of matter which would
be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would
not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S.
Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S.
88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States
v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law.
ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go far as to justify
orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated
Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct.
206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate
Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88,
33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know
and meet the case against them. It should not, however,
detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry
may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report
and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial
Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute
or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a
local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the
peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation, and may
delegate to such board or public official such powers and
functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may
deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the
exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section
10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that
it is literally Relations personally to decide all
controversies coming before them. In the United States
the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory
authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to
render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or
commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable
from the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient
to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between
the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix
A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual
basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of
law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a
new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc.,
it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio
Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged
all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and
this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the
"records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of
native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood
Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal."
Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to
the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and
that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far
reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and
its arguments against the petition. By and large, after
considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that
the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is
given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents
referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created
the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that
it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant
and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set
forth hereinabove. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and
Moran, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25003 October 23, 1981
LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS UNION, Affiliated with
the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS,
HERMOGENES ATRAZO, AQUILINO DISTOR, BENJAMIN
GUTIERREZ, JOSE RAMOS, TIBURCIO MARDO, ERNESTO
ALMARIO and DOMINGO LEANO, defendants-appellants.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila declaring permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in this case and condemning the defendants (herein
appellants) to pay plaintiff (herein appellee), the amount of
P10,152.42 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the
commencement of this action until fully paid, P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees and costs.
The case commenced when Liwayway Publications, Inc. brought
an action in the CFI-Manila against Permanent Concrete Workers
Union, et al. for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and for damages it incurred when its employees were prevented
from getting their daily supply of newsprint from its bodega.
Plaintiff alleged that it is a second sublessee of a part of the
premises of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. at 1000
Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila from Don Ramon Roces, a
first lessee from the aforesaid company. The premises of the
plaintiff is separated from the compound of Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. by a concrete and barbed wire fence with its own
entrance and road leading to the national road. This entrance is
separate and distinct from the entrance road of the Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. 1
Plaintiff further alleged that it has a bodega for its newsprint in the
sublet property which it uses for its printing and publishing
business. The daily supply of newsprint needed to feed its
printing plant is taken from this bodega.
On September 10, 1964, the employees of the Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. who are representatives and members of
the defendant union declared a strike against their company.
On October 3, 1964 for unknown reasons and without legal
justification, Permanent Concrete Workers Union and its
members picketed, stopped and prohibited plaintiff's truck from
entering the compound to load newsprint from its bodega. The
union members intimidated and threatened with bodily harm the
employees who were in the truck.
On October 6, 1964, union members stopped and prohibited the
general manager, personnel manager, bodega-in-charge and
other employees of the plaintiff from getting newsprint in their
bodega. 2
Plaintiff made repeated demands to the defendants not to
intimidate and threaten its employees with bodily harm and not to
blockade, picket or prohibit plaintiff's truck from getting newsprint
in their bodega. Defendants refused and continued to refuse to
give in to the demands of the plaintiff.
As a consequence thereof, plaintiff rented another bodega during
the time members of the defendant union prevented its
employees from entering its bodega in the compound of
Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and thus incurred expenses
both in terms of bodega rentals and in transporting newsprint
from the pier to the temporary bodega.
On December 14, 1964, the lower court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from:
(a) threatening and intimidating plaintiff's executive officers and
their representatives, who are going to its bodega as well as its
employees who are getting newsprint from it;
(b) ordering the defendants and their representatives not to
blockade and/or picket the compound and the gate of the plaintiff;
(c) ordering the defendants not to stop, prohibit, molest and
interfere with the free passage of the plaintiff in going in and out
of the bodega.
Defendant union moved to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:
1. That this case arose out of a labor dispute involving unfair
labor practices and, therefore, the Court of First Instance where
this action was brought has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction
since this case fans within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of Industrial Relations;
2. That plaintiff is not the real party in interest in whose name the
present action may be prosecuted in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
On the first ground, defendants argued that the Court of Industrial
Relations is vested with the exclusive power to issue injunctions
in labor disputes involving unfair labor practices and that in the
long line of decisions, the Supreme Court hat, repeatedly held
that ordinary do not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction in any
labor dispute particularly when the Court of Industrial Relations
has already acquired jurisdiction over it.
As to the second ground, defendants argue that the real party in
interest in this case is the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc.
against whom the defendants' strike and picket activities were
directed and confined, and they point to cases between the real
parties in interest, namely: Permanent Concrete products, Inc. on
one hand and the Permanent Concrete Workers Union on the
other, pending before the Court of Industrial Relations docketed
therein as CIR Case No. 156-Inj., Charge 212-ULP and Charge
No. 1414-M.C.
Plaintiff Liwayway Publications, Inc. opposed the motion, alleging
that:
1. There is no employer-employee relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant;
2. There is no labor dispute between them;
3. Plaintiff's compound is separate and distinct from the
compound of the company where the defendant's are employed.
Defendants by way of reply to the abovementioned opposition
argued that even if there was no employer-employee relationship,
still the Court of First Instance would have no jurisdiction to issue
an injunction, citing several cases holding that there could be a
labor dispute regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
proximate relation of employer and employee and that peaceful
picketing is an extension of the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the Constitution, a fundamental right granted to labor which
3
cannot be enjoined.
Since plaintiff averred in its complaint that "it is a second
sublessee of a part of the premises of the Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. at 1000 Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila from
Don Ramon Roces, first lessee from the aforementioned
company, defendants contend that plaintiff has no cause of action
against them but against Don Ramon Roces under the provisions
of Article 1654 of the New Civil Code which obliges the lessor to
maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of
the lease for the entire duration of the contract.
On October 22, 1964, the lower court issued an order denying the
motion to dismiss and motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction on the ground that there was no labor dispute between
the plaintiff and defendant of which the Court of Industrial
Relations may take cognizance.
On November 16, 1964, the court, on motion of the plaintiff,
declared defendants in default. Defendants prayed for the lifting
of the order of default, which plaintiff opposed. In the order of
December 16, 1964, the court denied the motion to lift the order
of default, and subsequently defendants' motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, the court rendered its decision dated
February 16, 1965 which declared permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction and ordered the defendants to pay the
plaintiff jointly and severally the amount of ?10,152.42 with
interest thereon at legal rate from the commencement of the
action until fully paid, Pl,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs.
Copy of this decision was received by defendants on July 20,
1965 and forthwith, defendants filed the notice of appeal on July
26, 1965.
On October 12,1965, Liwayway Publications, Inc. filed with the
Supreme Court a petition praying that a writ of attachment be
issued on any sum of money which is owing from the company to
the union and to other defendants to be used to satisfy the
judgment in its favor should the same be affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
Defendants filed an opposition to the petition for attachment
alleging that even assuming that there is an amount owing to the
union from the company, such would be in the concept of
uncollected wages due the strikers and, therefore, cannot be
subject of attachment as provided by Art. 1708 of the New Civil
Code that the laborer's wages shall not be subject to execution or
attachment except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing
and for medical attendance.
The Supreme Court denied the above petition for attachment but
without prejudice to the movant seeking remedy in the Court of
First Instance.
The sole issue raised in the instant appeal is whether or not the
lower court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
considering that there was a labor dispute between Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. and appellants for alleged unfair labor
practices committed by the former.
The first question that strikes Us to be of determinative
significance is whether or not this case involves or has arisen out
of a labor dispute. If it does, then with certainty, section 9 of
Republic Act 875, the "Industrial Peace Act", would apply. If it
does not, then the Rules of Court will govern the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction because it will not partake the nature
of a labor injunction which the lower court has no jurisdiction to
issue.
The record before Us reveals that appellant union and its
members picketed the gate leading to appellee's bodega. This
gate is about 200 meters from the gate leading to the premises of
the employer of the appellants. Appellee is not in any way related
to the striking union except for the fact that it is the sublessee of a
bodega in the company's compound. The picketers belonging to
the appellant union had stopped and prohibited the truck of the
appellee from entering the compound to load newsprint from its
bodega, the union members intimidating and threatening with
bodily harm the employees of the appellee who were in the truck.
The union members also stopped and prohibited the general
manager, personnel manager including the man in-charge of the
bodega and other employees of the Liwayway Publications, Inc.
from getting newsprint in said bodega. The business of the
appellee is exclusively the publication of the magazines
Bannawag Bisaya, Hiligaynon and Liwayway weekly magazines
which has absolutely no relation or connection whatsoever with
the cause of the strike of the union against their company, much
less with the terms, conditions or demands of the strikers. In such
a factual situation, the query to be resolved is whether the
appellee is a third party or an "innocent bystander" whose right
has been invaded and, therefore, entitled to protection by the
regular courts.
At this juncture it is well to cite and stress the pronouncements of
the Supreme Court on the right to picket. Thus, in the case
of Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs. Judge
Gaudencio Cloribel et al., L-25878, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
465, 472, the Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
said:
The right to picket as a means of communicating
the facts of a labor dispute is a phrase of the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution.
If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed
even in the absence of employer-employee
relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While
peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an
exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are
not without power to confine or localize the sphere
of communication or the demonstration to the
parties to the labor dispute, including those with
related interest, and to insulate establishments or
persons with no industrial connection or having
interest totally foreign to the context of the
dispute. Thus, the right may be regulated at the
instance of third parties or "innocent. bystanders"
if it appears that the inevitable result of its
exercise is to create an impression that a labor
dispute with which they have no connection or
interest exists between them and the picketing
union or constitute an invasion of their rights. In
one case decided by this Court, we upheld a trial
court's injunction prohibiting the union from
blocking the entrance to a feed mill located within
the compound of a flour mill with which the union
had a dispute. Although sustained on a different
ground, no connection was found other than their
being situated in the same premises. It is to be
noted that in the instances cited, peaceful
picketing has not been totally banned but merely
regulated. And in one American case, a picket by
a labor union in front of a motion picture theater
with which the union had a labor dispute was
enjoined by the court from being extended in front
of the main entrance of the building housing the
theater wherein other stores operated by third
persons were located.
The same case state clearly and succinctly the rationalization for
the court's regulation of the right to picket in the following wise
and manner:
Wellington and Galang are mere 'innocent
bystanders'. They are entitled to seek protection
of their rights from the courts and the courts may,
accordingly, legally extend the same. Moreover,
PAFLU's right to peacefully picket METBANK is
not curtailed by the injunctions issued by
respondent judge. The picket is merely regulated
to protect the rights of third parties. And the
reason for this is not far-fetched. If the law fails to
afford said protection, men will endeavor to
safeguard their rights by their own might, take the
law in their own hands, and commit acts which
lead to breaches of the law. 'This should not be
allowed to happen.
It may be conceded that the appellant Union has a labor dispute
with the Permanent Concrete Products company and that the
dispute is pending before the Court of Industrial Relations docket
therein as CIR Case No. 156-Inj., Charge 212-ULP and Charge
No. 1414-M.C. Nonetheless, the rule laid down in the case
of National Garment and Textile Workers' Union (PAFLU) vs.
Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, et al. G.R. No. L-9104, September 10,
1956, cited by the appellants as authority holding that "where the
Court of Industrial Relations has already acquired jurisdiction over
two unfair labor practices cases and much later on as a
consequence thereof, the Court of First Instance cannot legally
issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the picketers.
Besides, the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is
exclusive. (Sec. 5-a, Republic Act 875)" is not controlling, much
less applicable to the instant case where the facts are essentially
and materially different.
Neither is the case of SMB Box factory Workers' Union vs. Hon.
Gustavo Victoriano, et al. G.R. No. L-12820, Dec. 29, 1957,
where We held that "the Court of First Instance cannot take
cognizance of an action for injunction where the issue involved is
interwoven with unfair labor practice cases pending in the Court
of Industrial Relations," nor the rule laid down in Erlanger &
Galinger, Inc. vs. Erlanger & Galinger Employees Association-
NATU, G.R. No. L-11907, June 24, 1958,104 Phil. 17, holding that
"even if no unfair labor practice suit has been filed at all by any of
the parties in the Court of Industrial Relations at the time the
present petition for injunction was filed in the court below, still the
latter court would have no jurisdiction to issue the temporary
restraining order prayed for if it is shown to its satisfaction that the
labor dispute arose out of unfair labor practices committed by any
of the parties. The parties would still have to institute the proper
action in the Court of Industrial Relations, and there ask for a
temporary restraining order under sec. 9 (d) of the Industrial
peace Act. "
We cannot agree that the above rules cited by the appellants are
controlling in the instant case for as We said in Phil. Association
of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et at. vs. Tan, 99 Phil. 854, that
"with regard to activities that may be enjoined, in order to
ascertain what court has jurisdiction to issue the injunction, it is
necessary to determine the nature of the controversy, "
(emphasis supplied) We find and hold that there is no connection
between the appellee Liwayway publications, Inc. and the striking
Union, nor with the company against whom the strikers staged
the strike, and neither are the acts of the driver of the appellee, its
general manager, personnel manager, the man in-charge of the
bodega and other employees of the appellee in reaching the
bodega to obtain newsprint therefrom to feed and supply its
publishing business interwoven with the labor dispute between
the striking Union and the Permanent Concrete Products
company. If there is a connection between appellee publishing
company and the Permanent Concrete Products company; it is
that both are situated in the same premises, which can hardly be
considered as interwoven with the labor dispute pending in the
Court of Industrial Relations between the strikers and their
employer.
The contention of appellants that the court erred in denying their
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action, is likewise without merit.
Article 1654 of the New Civil Code cited by the appellants in
support of their motion to dismiss, which obliges the lessor,
among others, to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and
adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the
contract, and therefore, the appellee publishing company should
have brought its complaint against the first sub-lessee, Don
Ramon Roces, and not against the appellant Union is not in point.
The acts complained of against the striking union members are
properly called mere acts of trespass (perturbacion de mero
hecho) such that following the doctrine laid down in Goldstein vs.
Roces, 34 Phil. 562, the lessor shall not be obliged to answer for
the mere fact of a trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) made
by a third person in the use of the estate leased but the lessee
shag have a direct action against the trespasser. The instant case
fags squarely under the provisions of Article 1664 of the New Civil
Code which provides as follows:
Art. 1664. The lessor is not obliged to answer for
a mere act of trespass which a third person may
cause on the use of the thing leased; but the
lessee shall have a direct action against the
intruder.
There is a mere act of trespass when the third
person claims no right whatever.
The Goldstein doctrine had been reiterated in Reyes vs. Caltex
(Phil). Inc., 84 Phil. 654; Lo Ching, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al. 81 Phil. 601; Afesa vs. Ayala y Cia 89 Phil. 292; Vda. de
Villaruel et al. vs. Manila Motor Co., Inc., et al. 104 Phil.
926; Heirs of B.A. Crumb, et al. vs. Rodriguez, 105 Phil. 391.
The obligation of the lessor under Art. 1654, New Civil Code, to
maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of
the lease for the entire duration of the contract arises only when
acts, termed as legal trespass (perturbacion de derecho), disturb,
dispute, object to, or place difficulties in the way of the lessee's
peaceful enjoyment of the premises that in some manner or other
cast doubt upon the right of the lessor by virtue of which the
lessor himself executed the lease, in which case the lessor is
obliged to answer for said act of trespass.
The difference between simple trespass (perturbacion de mero
hecho and legal trespass (perturbacion de derecho) is simply but
- clearly stated in Goldstein vs. Roces case, supra, thus:
Briefly, if the act of trespass is not accompanied or
preceded by anything which reveals a really juridic
intention on the part of the trespasser, in such
wise that the lessee can only distinguish the
material fact, stripped of all legal form or reasons,
we understand it to be trespass in fact only (de
mero hecho). (pp. 566-567)
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE
FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS'
UNION, defendant-appellant.

Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:p

Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.

The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:

Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a

member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had
been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was
a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter
referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective
bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which
reads as follows:

Membership in the Union shall be required as a

condition of employment for all permanent
Republic of the Philippines
employees workers covered by this Agreement.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964
but was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.
SECOND DIVISION
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay
its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs
precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization of this action.
3

to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if

such labor organization is the representative of the employees." From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on
On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, purely questions of law, assigning the following errors:
introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of
section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional.
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization".
II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced
appellant herein to pay plaintiff the sum of P500
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of as attorney's fees and the cost thereof.
its members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his
resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was
In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3,
3350, the Union contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the
1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company
fundamental right to form lawful associations; that "the very
asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of
phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership in a
the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The
labor organization is banned to all those belonging to such
management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his
religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor organization" ,
4

counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory

"prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining
arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained
any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members
to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee to file an
thereto" ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their
5

action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the

constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or
Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the
organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes
Union from dismissing Appellee. In its answer, the Union invoked
1

obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution.

6

the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining

agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the
case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d)
and (e). Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties during the
2 while the Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining
pre-trial conference, the Court a quo rendered its decision on
August 26, 1965, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
rendered enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in that,
agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves
the employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the
maintenance of union membership as a condition of employment;
and that said Act, furthermore, impairs the Union's rights as it
deprives the union of dues from members who, under the Act, are
relieved from the obligation to continue as such members. 7

Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his

present employment and sentencing the
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350
discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their
members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article Ill,
Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act unduly
protects certain religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to
labor organizations.8
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the
constitutional provision that "no religious test shall be required for
the exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his
civil right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has
to be determined under the Act by his affiliation with a religious
sect; that conversely, if a worker has to sever his religious
connection with a sect that prohibits membership in a labor
organization in order to be able to join a labor organization, said
Act would violate religious freedom. 9
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates
the "equal protection of laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a
discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the
operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia
ni Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages over
their fellow workers, for while the Act exempts them from union
obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same
time to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other
emoluments that the union might secure from the employer. 10
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates
the constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social
justice.11
Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop
provision" in a collective bargaining agreement cannot be
considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for the
amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; and that 12
unless Republic Act No. 3350 is declared unconstitutional, trade
unionism in this country would be wiped out as employers would
prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order
to do away with labor organizations. 13
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that
Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the right to form lawful
associations, for the right to join associations includes the right
not to join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's
conscience does not allow his membership therein, and the Act
has given substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion
of workers to join labor organizations; that said Act does not
14
impair the obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and
was incorporated into, the terms of the closed shop
agreement; that the Act does not violate the establishment of
15
religion clause or separation of Church and State, for Congress,
in enacting said law, merely accommodated the religious needs of
those workers whose religion prohibits its members from joining
labor unions, and balanced the collective rights of organized labor
with the constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his
chosen religion; that the constitutional right to the free exercise of
one's religion has primacy and preference over union security
measures which are merely contractual ; that said Act does not
16
violate the constitutional provision of equal protection, for the
classification of workers under the Act depending on their
religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to
the purpose of the law, and applies to all the members of a given
class; that said Act, finally, does not violate the social justice
17
policy of the Constitution, for said Act was enacted precisely to
equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of
the diversities of their religious beliefs."
18
I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error,
it is necessary to premise that there are some thoroughly
established principles which must be followed in all cases where
questions of constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are
involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of
constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable
doubt, that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived
which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger
must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned
with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and
that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.19
1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No.
3350 prohibits and bans the members of such religious sects that
forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from joining
labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No.
3350; neither can the same be deduced by necessary implication
therefrom. It is not surprising, therefore, that appellant, having
thus misread the Act, committed the error of contending that said
Act is obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of
association.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize
freedom of association. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the
Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the
Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall
have the right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What
the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and
guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations.
Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different
schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a
"right", it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes
to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first,
liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law;
and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases,
join or refrain from Joining an association. It is, therefore, the
employee who should decide for himself whether he should join
or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself
makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and
even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power
to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any
time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes
20
the right to abstain from joining any union. Inasmuch as what
21
both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have
recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join
associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law
also imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to
join associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up
with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by
Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The
legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is
withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an
employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the
employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining
union, and the employees must continue to be members of the
union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs.
Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it
would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discriminate
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from
making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue,
therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of
Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious
beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he
must become a member of the collective bargaining union.
Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is
curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement,
Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to
Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso:
"but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso
jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization.
What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor
unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with
the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement,
members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment
or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not
members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore,
that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional
provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It
does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from
affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the
liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor
unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of
said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they
can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they
refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them
to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and
neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional
for impairing the obligation of its contract, specifically, the "union
security clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement
with the Company, by virtue of which "membership in the union
was required as a condition for employment for all permanent
employees workers". This agreement was already in existence at
the time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961,
and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated
into the agreement. But by reason of this amendment, Appellee,
as well as others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed
from his job even if he should cease to be a member, or
disaffiliate from the Union, and the Company could continue
employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the Union.
The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the express terms of
the union security clause; the Company was partly absolved by
law from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of
employing only Union members in permanent positions, It cannot
be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of said
union security clause.
According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into
the express terms of the contract, or its legal construction, or its
validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement,
impairs the contract. The extent of the change is not material. It is
not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching
in any respect on its obligation or dispensing with any part of its
force. There is an impairment of the contract if either party is
absolved by law from its performance. Impairment has also
22
been predicated on laws which, without destroying contracts,
derogate from substantial contractual rights. 23
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to
impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified.
The prohibition is general, affording a broad outline and requiring
construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to be read
with literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits
unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the constitutional
24
prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard
the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to
safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts
already in effect. For not only are existing laws read into
25
contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also
read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All contracts
made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation
under the police power must be understood as made in reference
to the possible exercise of that power. Otherwise, important and
26
valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device of
entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which
otherwise may be prohibited. The policy of protecting contracts
against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a
government by virtue of which contractual relations are
worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to
secure the peace and good order of society. The contract clause
of the Constitution must, therefore, be not only in harmony with,
but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the
reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the
people. It follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of
impairing a contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional
prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed in the
legitimate exercise of police power, although it incidentally
destroys existing contract rights, must be upheld by the courts.
This has special application to contracts regulating relations
between capital and labor which are not merely contractual, and
said labor contracts, for being impressed with public interest,
must yield to the common good. 27
In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition
against impairing the obligations of contracts has no application
to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the
general legislative powers of the state involving public
welfare. Thus, this Court also held that the Blue Sunday Law
28
was not an infringement of the obligation of a contract that
required the employer to furnish work on Sundays to his
employees, the law having been enacted to secure the well-being
and happiness of the laboring class, and being, furthermore, a
legitimate exercise of the police power. 29
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally
impairs contract obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable
at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of
each statute may be measured or determined, has been
fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its own
circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts
can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the
general good of the people, and when the means adopted to
secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and the
means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the
reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the
constitutional limitation of that power.
30
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic
Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and
religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing
discrimination against those members of religious sects which
prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming
thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the
fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can
maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot
be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.
The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said
religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from
which the individual needs protection. The individual employee, at
various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates
of power — collective labor, directed by a union, and collective
capital, directed by management. The union, an institution
developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus
protect the individual employee from the power of collective
capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights,
and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union
interacts with management, it produces yet a third aggregate of
group strength from which the individual also needs protection —
the collective bargaining relationship. 31
The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly
seen in the Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 5859, which later
became Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:
It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse
employing a person who, on account of his
religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept
 membership in a labor organization although he
possesses all the qualifications for the job. This is
tantamount to punishing such person for believing
in a doctrine he has a right under the law to
believe in. The law would not allow discrimination
to flourish to the detriment of those whose religion
discards membership in any labor organization.
Likewise, the law would not commend the
deprivation of their right to work and pursue a
modest means of livelihood, without in any
manner violating their religious faith and/or
belief.32
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the
Act to achieve that purpose — exempting the members of said
religious sects from coverage of union security agreements — is
reasonable.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of
religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case
of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The
Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several
occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include
freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional
system. Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a
33
fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a preferred
34
position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore,
must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of
religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger.
3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional, appellant Union averred that said Act
discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects in
violation of Section 1 (7) of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution, and
which is now Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
which provides:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination
and preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.
The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the
support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any
sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship, but also assures
35
the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of
utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the
Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose
36
is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even
though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect. But if the stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its
37
power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to
advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its
indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can
accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. 38
In Aglipay v. Ruiz , this Court had occasion to state that the
39
government should not be precluded from pursuing valid
objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would
be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that
the statute, in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional
prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Assessed by
40
these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the
constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion)
clause of the Constitution.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and
temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was
intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that
certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or
be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to
pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security
agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment
whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their
families is a valid objective of the state. In fact, the state is
enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor,
and regulate the relations between labor and capital and
industry. More so now in the 1973 Constitution where it is
41
mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor, promote
full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the
relation between workers and employers. 42
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop
agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit
their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the
protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the
collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of
a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain
extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a
serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people
of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is
our view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop
agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of
any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those
who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members
from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is
merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of
religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or
effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of
some or all religions. The free exercise clause of the
43
Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious
exercise be preferentially aided. 44
We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress
acted consistently with the spirit of the constitutional provision. It
acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain
persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security
agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that burden
when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and,
certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away the
same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be
accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws
conflict with scrupples of conscience, exemptions ought to be
granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. In 45
the instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to
withhold exemption.
Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects
members of certain religious sects, it leaves no right to, and is
silent as to the protection of, labor organizations. The purpose of
Republic Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The
rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No.
875 and the new Labor Code. As to the lamented silence of the
Act regarding the rights and protection of labor unions, suffice it to
say, first, that the validity of a statute is determined by its
provisions, not by its silence ; and, second, the fact that the law
46
may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. 47
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to
compel persons to join and remain members of a union to keep
their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt,
rather than help, labor unions, Congress has seen it fit to exempt
religious objectors lest their resistance spread to other workers,
for religious objections have contagious potentialities more than
political and philosophic objections.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to
the country, and a fortiori to a labor — union assuming that such
unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal
that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious
liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited
48
means.
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350
violates the constitutional prohibition against requiring a religious
test for the exercise of a civil right or a political right, is not well
taken. The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for
joining any lawful association membership in any particular
religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require
affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from
joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing
from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union
requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts
members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of
closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector
is not required to do a positive act — to exercise the right to join
or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without
need of any positive act on his part. A conscientious religious
objector need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of
resigning from the labor union — he is exempted from the
coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may
have entered into. How then can there be a religious test required
for the exercise of a right when no right need be exercised?
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to
enact Republic Act No. 3350, and that its purpose was legal and
in consonance with the Constitution. It is never an illegal evasion
of a constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired
result, which is lawful in itself, by discovering or following a legal
way to do it.49
5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is
a discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the members
of certain religious sects undue advantages over other workers,
thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution
which forbids the denial to any person of the equal protection of
the laws. 50
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the
state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
51
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The
52
very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
53
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
54
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis
and is not palpably arbitrary.55
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the
purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the
state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is
56
not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or
marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it
57
necessary that the classification be made with mathematical
nicety. Hence legislative classification may in many cases
58
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection
59
guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing
degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as
they may appear.
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the
aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees and
workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security
agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs
and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those
whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the
beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not
believe in the same religious faith and different religions differ in
their dogmas and cannons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and
practices, though they are found in all places, and in all times,
take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond imagination.
There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of
religious beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in
which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors,
may be articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in
religion than before, differences in religion do exist, and these
differences are important and should not be ignored.
Even from the phychological point of view, the classification is
based on real and important differences. Religious beliefs are not
mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they carry
with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain
rules. of human conduct and the justification of certain
acts. Religious sentiment makes a man view things and events
60
in their relation to his God. It gives to human life its distinctive
character, its tone, its happiness or unhappiness its enjoyment or
irksomeness. Usually, a strong and passionate desire is involved
in a religious belief. To certain persons, no single factor of their
experience is more important to them than their religion, or their
not having any religion. Because of differences in religious belief
and sentiments, a very poor person may consider himself better
than the rich, and the man who even lacks the necessities of life
may be more cheerful than the one who has all possible luxuries.
Due to their religious beliefs people, like the martyrs, became
resigned to the inevitable and accepted cheerfully even the most
painful and excruciating pains. Because of differences in religious
beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution,
hatred, bloodshed and war, generated to a large extent by
members of sects who were intolerant of other religious beliefs.
The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350,
therefore, rests on substantial distinctions.
The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its
purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who
cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from
being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed
from their work because of union shop security agreements.
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application
to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. The law does
not provide that it is to be effective for a certain period of time
only. It is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions
to which the law is applicable exist. As long as there are closed
shop agreements between an employer and a labor union, and
there are employees who are prohibited by their religion from
affiliating with labor unions, their exemption from the coverage of
said agreements continues.
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious
sects; this is evident from its provision. The fact that the law
grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by
itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to,
the Act only restores to them their freedom of association which
closed shop agreements have taken away, and puts them in the
same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by their
religion from joining labor unions. The circumstance, that the
other employees, because they are differently situated, are not
granted the same privilege, does not render the law
unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by the
Constitution by its nature involves inequality.
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in
actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for
every classification of persons or things for regulation by law
produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid. A classification otherwise reasonable does not
offend the constitution simply because in practice it results in
some inequality. Anent this matter, it has been said that
61
whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law that its object is
for the benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is
to be obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld even
though incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond
those enjoyed by the general public. 62
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350
violates the constitutional provision on social justice is also
baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all
the people. Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar
63
as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their
religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their
being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In
determining whether any particular measure is for public
advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly
benefited — it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited
thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all component
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the
members of the community. Republic Act No. 3350 insures
64
economic stability to the members of a religious sect, like the
Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for
it insures security in their employment, notwithstanding their
failure to join a labor union having a closed shop agreement with
the employer. The Act also advances the proper economic and
social equilibrium between labor unions and employees who
cannot join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from the
compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed
shop agreements and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work
is concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership in labor
unions with those whose religion does not prohibit said
membership. Social justice does not imply social equality,
because social inequality will always exist as long as social
relations depend on personal or subjective proclivities. Social
justice does not require legal equality because legal equality,
being a relative term, is necessarily premised on differentiations
based on personal or natural conditions. Social justice
65
guarantees equality of opportunity , and this is precisely what
66
Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish — it gives
laborers, irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal
opportunity for work.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for — in other
words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this
matter, it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is
not, for that reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the
constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are unconcerned
with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the legislation
in question. Courts do inquire into the wisdom of
67
laws. Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the people, are
68
presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of
the people, and it may change the laws accordingly. The fear is
69
entertained by appellant that unless the Act is declared
unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor
unions, and thus be a fatal blow to unionism. We do not agree.
The threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees
who are members of the religious sects that control the demands
of the labor market. But there is really no occasion now to go
further and anticipate problems We cannot judge with the material
now before Us. At any rate, the validity of a statute is to be
determined from its general purpose and its efficacy to
accomplish the end desired, not from its effects on a particular
case. The essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a
70
mere incidental result arising from its exertion, is the criterion by
which the validity of a statute is to be measured. 71
II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of
which the Union argued that the decision of the trial court
ordering the Union to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly
contravenes Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875, for the instant
action involves an industrial dispute wherein the Union was a
party, and said Union merely acted in the exercise of its rights
under the union shop provision of its existing collective bargaining
contract with the Company; that said order also contravenes
Article 2208 of the Civil Code; that, furthermore, Appellee was
never actually dismissed by the defendant Company and did not
therefore suffer any damage at all . 72
In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in
the instant case there was really no industrial dispute involved in
the attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its membership in the
union under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by its act,
inflicted intentional harm on Appellee; that since Appellee was
compelled to institute an action to protect his right to work,
appellant could legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees under
Articles 1704 and 2208 of the Civil Code. 73
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875
which is relied upon by appellant provides that:
No suit, action or other proceedings shall be
maintainable in any court against a labor
organization or any officer or member thereof for
any act done by or on behalf of such
organization in furtherance of an industrial
dispute to which it is a party, on the ground only
that such act induces some other person to break
a contract of employment or that it is in restraint of
trade or interferes with the trade, business or
employment of some other person or with the right
of some other person to dispose of his capital or
labor. (Emphasis supplied)
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be
disputed for appellant sought the discharge of respondent by
virtue of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of
Republic Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of employment
is included in the term "labor dispute". The discharge or the act
74
of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. It being the labor dispute
itself, that very same act of the Union in asking the employer to
dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act done ... in furtherance of an
industrial dispute". The mere fact that appellant is a labor union
does not necessarily mean that all its acts are in furtherance of an
industrial dispute. Appellant Union, therefore, cannot invoke in
75
its favor Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875. This case is not
intertwined with any unfair labor practice case existing at the time
when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union,
serve as its shield. The article provides that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act
or omission has compelled the plaintiff ... to incur expenses to
protect his interest"; and "in any other case where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered". In the instant case, it cannot be
gainsaid that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's
dismissal caused Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being
dismissed from his job. Costs according to Section 1, Rule 142, of
the Rules of Court, shall be allowed as a matter of course to the
prevailing party.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision,
dated August 26, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellant Union. It is so ordered.

Makalintal, C.J, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,

Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1573 March 29, 1948

KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA

PILIPINAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GOTAMCO SAW MILL, respondent-appellee.

Severino P. Izon for petitioner.

Romeo Perfecto for respondent.

HILADO, J.:

In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the "Kaisahan ng mga

Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas" prays, for the reasons
therein set forth, that we reverse and vacate the orders of the
Court of Industrial Relations dated September 23, 1946 (Annex A)
and March 28, 1947 (Annex B) and its resolution of July 11, 1947
(Annex C).

In the order of September 23, 1946, it is recited that the laborers

in the main case (case No. 31-V of the Court of Industrial
Relations) declared a strike on September 10, 1946, "which
suspended all the work in the respondent company"; that on
September 19, 1946 (presumably after the case had been
brought to the Court of Industrial Relations) said court informed
the parties that the continuation of the strike would necessarily
prejudice both parties, and that a temporary solution, satisfactory
to both parties, must be found to put an end to it, at the same
time, urging both parties to be reasonable in their attitude towards
each other; that ample opportunity was given to both parties to
iron out their differences until September 21, 1946, when the
court continued the conference at which, among other things, the
leader of the laborers informed the court that, although said
laborers were not exactly satisfied with the arrangement, in order
to cooperate with the court and with the parties so that the
laborers could return to work and the company resume its
operation, they had no objection to accepting a temporary
settlement of P3.50 without meal, as against the proposal of the
company of P2.00 without meal; that after a series of conferences
held on September 23, 1946, the date of the order now under
consideration, the labor leader decided to accept a temporary
arrangement of the wage problem as proposed by management,
that is, P2.00 over-all increase without meal to all striking
laborers; that Francisco Cruz, President of the Union, manifested
that he would have a hard time convincing the laborers, but in
view of their desire to preserve that harmony which used to exist
between the parties, they were going to accede to this
proposition, provided that the management would permit the
laborers to bring with them home, if available, small pieces of
lumber to be utilized as firewood; that the negotiations culminated
in an agreement by which the laborers would return to their work
on Tuesday, September 24, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning,
and the respondent company would resume its operation on said
date under the following conditions:
(1) That all the laborers and workingmen will receive an
over-all increase of P2.00 daily, without meal, over the
wages received by them before the strike;
(2) That the management will permit the laborers to bring
with them home, if available, small pieces of lumber to be
utilized as firewood; and
(3) That the foregoing increase and privilege will take
effect upon the return of the workingmen to work until the
final determination of the present controversy.
The same order then proceeds as follows:
Finding the above temporary agreement between the
parties to be reasonable and advantageous to both, the
court approves the same and orders the striking laborers
of the respondent company to return to their work on
Tuesday, September 24, 1946 at 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, and the respondent company to resume its
operation and admit the striking laborers. The respondent
company is enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or dismiss
any laborer affiliated with the petitioning union, nor
suspend the operation of the temporary agreement, and
the labor union is enjoined not to stage a walk-out or
strike during the pendency of the hearing.
From the order of March 27, 1947, it appears that on January 7,
1947, the respondent Gotamco Saw Mill filed with the Court of
Industrial relations an urgent motion asking that the petitioning
union be held for contempt of court for having staged a strike
during the pendency of the main case "in violation of the order of
this court dated September 23, 1946"; that on January 9, 1947,
petitioner filed an answer with a counter-petition alleging, among
other things, that a representative of petitioner conferred with
respondent regarding certain discriminations obtaining in the
respondent's saw mill, but instead of entertaining their grievances
said respondent in a haughty and arbitrary manner ordered the
stoppage of the work and consequently the workers did then and
there stop working; and in the counter-petition said petitioner
asked the respondent be held for contempt for having employed
four new Chinese laborers during the pendency of the hearing of
the main case, without express authority of the court and in
violation of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as
amended. It is also recited in the said order of March 28, 1947,
that on that same date, January 9, 1947, respondent filed with the
court another urgent motion for contempt against the petitioning
union for picketing on the premises of the respondent's saw mill
and for grave threats which prevented the remaining laborers
from working.
Upon request of both parties, the court required the presentation
of evidence pertinent to the incidents thus raised. Thereafter, the
said order of March 28, 1947, was entered, and the court stated
therein the three questions to be determined as follows: first, if
there was a violation by the petitioning union of the order of said
court of September 23, 1946, which would warrant the
commencement of contempt proceedings; second, whether the
facts and circumstances attending the picketing constitute
contempt of court; third, whether there was a violation by the
respondent of section 19 of the Commonwealth Act No. 103, as
amended, in taking four Chinese laborers pending the hearing
and without express authority of the court; and fourth, whether the
dismissal of Maximino Millan was with or without just cause.
The court, passing upon these questions, found and held:
(1) That there was a violation of the order of the court
dated September 23, 1946, by the petitioning union and
thereby ordered Atty. Pastor T. Reyes, special agent of
the court, to take such action as may be warranted in the
premises against the person or persons responsible
therefor for contempt:
(2) That the question of picketing being closely and
intimately related to the strike which had been found
illegal, did not need to be passed upon, it being imbibed
by question No. 1;
(3) That there being no strong and clear proof on the
question of respondent having violated section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, respondent
was thereby exonerated from any liability in connection
with the alleged employment of four Chinamen;
(4) That Maximino Millan being of troublesome nature and
unworthy to work among his fellow laborers, his petition
for reinstatement contained in demand No. 5 of the main
case was thereby denied.
The above cited resolution of July 11, 1947, was entered by the
Court of Industrial Relations, sitting in banc, and denied
reconsideration of its order of March 28, 1947, as requested by
the petitioning union's contention is recited that the provisions of
section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, upon
which order of September 23, 1946, was based, had not been
complied with; in other words, that the said order was not issued
in conformity with the requisites of said section, because, it was
said, before its issuance there had been no proper hearing and
there was and there was no express finding by the court that
public interest required the return of the striking workers. The
further contention is therein recited that, granting that the order of
September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity with said section
19, said provision is unconstitutional for being in violation of the
organic proscription of involuntary servitude. Passing upon these
contentions, the Court of Industrial Relations said:
The order of September 23, 1946, was issued in
conformity with the provisions of section 19. Said order
was proposed and issued on the basis of the agreement
entered into by the parties after the preliminary hearings
and conferences. While it is true that the order of the
Court now in question did not make any express finding
as to whether public interest required the return of the
striking workers, it is undeniable, however, that until the
numerous incidents arising therefrom since the
certification of the dispute promptly, need not be stated in
the said order because it is a fact which is borne out by
the entire record of the case. If the petitioner was
aggrieved by the terms of the order, it could have
objected right then and there and could have appealed
said order within the period prescribed by law, and nor to
wait after it had become final, definite, and conclusive.
The record shows that the petitioner in its answer answer
and counter-petition for contempt based its complaint
upon section 19 (incidental Case No. 31-V [4]). It is,
indeed, strange that after taking advantage of this order
and enjoyed (enjoying) the benefits thereunder, the
petitioner now comes to impugn and challenge the
validity. The second motion for reconsideration is the sad
instance where the petitioner attacks the validity of an
order under which it once took shelter.
The court believes that section 19 is constitutional. To
start with, this section is presumed to be constitutional.
Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the
human rights of individuals were "subjected to regulation
by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount
police power". The provisions of Act No. 103 were
inspired by the constitutional injunction making it the
concern of the State to promote social justice to insure the
well being and economic security of all the people. In
order to attain this object, section 19 was promulgated
which grants to labor what it grants to capital and denies
to labor what it denies to capital. Section 19 complements
the power of the Court to settle industrial disputes and
renders effective such powers which are conferred upon it
by the different provisions of the Court's organic law, more
particularly, sections 1 and 4, and "other plenary powers
conferred upon the Court to enable it to settle all
questions matters, controversies or disputes arising
between, and/or affecting employers and employees", "to
prevent non-pacific methods in the determination of
industrial or agricultural disputes" (International
HardWood and Venser Co. vs The Pangil Federation of
Laborers, G.R. No. 47178, cited in the case of Mindanao
Bus Co. vs. Mindanao Bus Co. Employees' Association,
40 Off. Gaz., 115). Section 4 has been upheld in the case
aforecited. It appearing that the power of this Court to
execute its orders under section 19 is also the same
power it possesses under section 4 of the same act, it
inferentially follows that section 19 is likewise valid.
(Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor
Union, G.R. No. 47796.)
In Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine Labor
Union, supra, this Court said:
In the first place, the ultimate effect of petitioner's theory
is to concede to the Court of Industrial Relations the
power to decide a case under section 19 but deny it, the
power to execute its decision thereon. The absurdity of
this proposition, is too evident to require argument. In the
second place considering that the jurisdiction of the Court
of Industrial Relations under section 19 is merely
incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously
acquired under section 4 of the law, if follows that the
power to execute its orders under section 19 is also the
same power that it possesses under section 4. (40 Off.
Gaz., [14th Supp.], No. 23, p. 178.)
Among the powers thus conferred is that to punish a violation of
an order such as those now under consideration as for contempt
of court.
We agree with the Court of Industrial Relations that section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 is constitutional. It does not offend
against the constitutional inhibition prescribing involuntary
servitude. An employee entering into a contract of employment
said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other
conditions, those prescribed in said section 19, among which is
the "implied condition that when any dispute between the
employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has
been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement
or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending
award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not
strike or walk out of his employment when so joined by the court
after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has
already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of
the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public
interest so requires or when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be
promptly decided or settled ...". (Emphasis supplied.)
The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract
of employment — he has a free choice between entering into it or
not — with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of
involuntary servitude ensuing. The resolution of July 11, 1947,
states that the order of September 23, 1946, was issued after a
series of preliminary hearings or conferences, and we are
satisfied that these were "hearings" within the meaning of the
above mentioned section 19 of the law. The record certainly
reveals that what was done during and what resulted from said
preliminary hearings or conferences were reported to the court at
a formal hearing. As to public interest requiring that the court
enjoin the strike or walk out, or the return of striking laborers,
aside from the legal presumption that the Court of Industrial
Relations complied with the provisions of the law in this respect,
we think that, considering the universally known fact, of which this
Court takes judicial notice, that as a result of the destructions
wrought by the late war, the economic and social rehabilitation of
the country urgently demands the reconstruction work will
inevitably tend to paralyze, impede or slow down the country's
program of rehabilitation which, for obvious and natural reasons,
the government is striving to accelerate as much as is humanly
possible.
Besides, the order of the court was for the striking workers to
return to their work. And that order was made after hearing, and,
moreover, section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, in providing
for an order of the court fro the return of striking workers,
authorizes such order, among other cases, "when the dispute can
not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled". The provision
says: "... and if he has already done so (struck or walked out),that
he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall
be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or
when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or
settled, (emphasis supplied). In other words the order to return, if
the dispute can be promptly decided or settled, may be issued
"only after hearing when public interest so requires", but if in the
court's opinion the dispute can not be promptly decided or settled,
then it is also authorized after hearing to issue the order: we
construe the provision to mean that the very impossibility of
prompt decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the
court the power to issue the order for the reason that the public
has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of
the wheels of industry. And, as well stated by the court's
resolution of July 11, 1947, this impossibility of prompt decision or
settlement was a fact which was borne out by the entire record of
the case and did not need express statement in the order.
Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of fact
made by the Court of Industrial Relations (Commonwealth Act
No. 103, section 15, as amended by Commonwealth Act 559,
section 2; Rule 44, Rules of Court; National Labor Union vs. Phil.
Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz. 8th Supp. p. 134, Bardwell Brothers vs.
Phil. Labor Union, 39 Off. Gaz. 1032; Pasumil Workers' Union vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz. 6th Supp., p. 71).
However, Mr. Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly
reserve our opinion on the constitutionality of the above statutory
and reglementary provisions should it, in the future, become
necessary to decide it.
For all theses considerations, the orders and resolution of the
Court of Industrial Relations assailed by the instant petition are
hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant. So
ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and
Tuason, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION

YUSEN AIR AND G.R. No. 154060

SEA SERVICE
PHILIPPINES, Present:
INCORPORATED,
Petitioner, PANGANIBAN, J.,
Chairman
SANDOVAL-
GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
and
GARCIA, JJ.
 temporary restraining order filed by
ISAGANI A. Promulgated: it against herein respondent, Isagani
VILLAMOR, A. Villamor; and
Respondent.
August 16, 2005 2. Order dated June 21, 2002,
denying petitioners motion for
[2]
x----------------------------------------------------------
reconsideration.
------------------------x

The facts:
DECISION
Petitioner, a corporation organized and existing
GARCIA, J.: under Philippines laws, is engaged in the
business of freight forwarding. As such, it is
contracted by clients to pick-up, unpack,
Via this petition for review on certiorari under consolidate, deliver, transport and distribute all
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Yusen kinds of cargoes, acts as cargo or freight
Air and Sea Service Philippines, Incorporated, accommodation and enters into charter parties
urges us to annul and set aside the following for the carriage of all kinds of cargoes or freight.
orders of the Regional Trial Court at Paraaque On August 16, 1993, petitioner hired respondent
City, Branch 258, in its Civil Case No. 02-0063, to as branch manager in its Cebu Office. Later,
wit: petitioner reclassified respondents position to
that of Division Manager, which position
1. Order dated March 20,
2002, dismissing, on ground of
[1] respondent held until his resignation on February
lack of jurisdiction, petitioners 1, 2002.
complaint for injunction and
damages with prayer for a
 Immediately after his resignation,
respondent started working for Aspac
International, a corporation engaged in the same
line of business as that of petitioner.
On February 11, 2002, in the Regional Trial Court
at Paraaque City, petitioner filed against
respondent a complaint[3] for injunction and
damages with prayer for a temporary restraining
order. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 02-
0063 which was raffled to Branch 258 of the
court, the complaint alleged, inter alia, as
follows:
7. That [respondent] duly signed an
undertaking to abide by the policies
of the [Petitioner] which includes
the provision on the employees
responsibility and obligation in
cases of conflict of interest, which
reads:
No employee may engage in
any business or undertaking
that is directly or indirectly in
competition with that of the
company and its affiliates or
engage directly or indirectly
in any undertaking or activity
prejudicial to the interests of
the company or to the
performance of his/her job or
work assignments. The same
provision will be
implemented for a period of
two (2) years from the date
of an employees
resignation, termination or
separation from the
company.
8. That in clear violation and breach
of his undertaking and agreement
with the policies of [petitioner],
[respondent] joined Aspac
International, within two years from
[his] date of resignation, whose
business is directly in conflict with
that of [petitioner]. (Underscoring
supplied; words in bracket ours).
Petitioner thus prayed for a judgment enjoining
respondent from further pursuing his work
at Aspac International, and awarding
it P2,000,000 as actual damages; P300,000 as
exemplary damages; and another P300,000 as
attorneys fees.
On March 4, 2002, apparently not to be
outdone, respondent filed against petitioner a
case for illegal dismissal before the National
Labor Relations Commission.
Meanwhile, instead of filing his answer in
Civil Case No. 02-0063, respondent filed a Motion
to Dismiss,[4] arguing that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of said case
because an employer-employee relationship is
involved.
On March 20, 2002, the trial court issued the
herein first assailed order dismissing petitioners
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter thereof on the ground that the action was
for damages arising from employer-employee
relations. Citing Article 217 of the Labor Code,
the trial court ruled that it is the labor arbiter
which had jurisdiction over petitioners complaint:
xxx the Court, after going over all the
assertions, averments and arguments of the
parties and after carefully evaluating the
same, is of the firm and honest opinion that
the arguments raised by [respondent]
movant are more in conformity with the
rules and jurisprudence as this case
involves an employer-employee
relationship and is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the NLRC pursuant
to Art. 217 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. Not only that, there is even a
pending case for illegal dismissal against
herein [petitioner] filed by [respondent]
before the Regional Arbitration Branch VII
in Cebu City.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket ours).
In time, petitioner moved for a
reconsideration but its motion was denied by the
trial court in its subsequent order of June 21,
2002.
Hence, petitioners present recourse, maintaining
that its cause of action did not arise from
employer-employee relations even if the claim
therein is based on a provision in its handbook,
and praying that Civil Case No. 02-0063 be
remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings.
The petition is impressed with merit.
At the outset, we take note of the fact that the
2-year prohibition against employment in a
competing company which petitioner seeks to
enforce thru injunction, had already expired
sometime in February 2004. Necessarily, upon
the expiration of said period, a suit seeking the
issuance of a writ of injunction becomes functus
oficio and therefore moot. As things go,
however, it was not possible for us, due to the
great number of cases awaiting disposition, to
have decided the instant case earlier. However,
the issue of damages remains unresolved.
In Philippine National Bank v. CA,[5] we declared:
In the instant case, aside from the
principal action for damages, private
respondent sought the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the
foreclosure sale in order to prevent an
alleged irreparable injury to private
respondent. It is settled that these
injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies
for the protection of substantive rights and
interests. Injunction is not a cause of action
in itself but merely a provisional remedy,
an adjunct to a main suit. When the act
sought to be enjoined ha[s] become fait
accompli, only the prayer for provisional
remedy should be denied. However, the
trial court should still proceed with the
determination of the principal action so
that an adjudication of the rights of the
parties can be had.
Along similar vein, the damage aspect of the
present suit was never rendered moot by the
lapse of the 2-year prohibitive period against
employment in a competing company.
This brings us to the sole issue of whether
petitioner's claim for damages arose from
employer-employee relations between the
parties.
We rule in the negative.
Actually, the present case is not one of first
impression. In a kindred case, Dai-Chi
Electronics Manufacturing vs. Villarama,[6] with a
substantially similar factual backdrop, we held
that an action for breach of contractual
obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute.
There, a complaint for damages was filed with
the regular court by an employer against a
former employee who allegedly violated the non-
compete provision of their employment contract
when, within two years from the date of the
employees resignation, he applied with, and was
hired by a corporation engaged in the same line
of business as that of his former employer. The
employer sought to recover liquidated damages.
The trial court ruled that it had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the controversy
because the complaint was for damages arising
from employer-employee relations, citing Article
217 (4) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 6715, which stated that it is the Labor
Arbiter who had original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
When the case was elevated to this Court, we
held that the claim for damages did not arise
from employer-employee relations, to wit:
Petitioner does not ask for any relief under
the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks
to recover damages agreed upon in the
contract as redress for private respondents
breach of his contractual obligation to its
damage and prejudice. Such cause of
action is within the realm of Civil Law,
and jurisdiction over the controversy
belongs to the regular courts. More so
when we consider that the stipulation
refers to the post-employment relations of
the parties.
[W]hile seemingly the cause of action
arose from employer-employee relations,
the employers claim for damages is
grounded on wanton failure and refusal
without just cause to report to duty
coupled with the averment that the
employee maliciously and with bad faith
violated the terms and conditions of the
contract to the damage of the employer.
Such averments removed the controversy
from the coverage of the Labor Code of
the Philippines and brought it within the
purview of Civil Law.
Indeed, jurisprudence has evolved the rule that
claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article
217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must
have a reasonable causal connection with any of
the claims provided for in that article. Only if
there is such a connection with the other claims
can a claim for damages be considered as arising
from employer-employee relations.
Article 217, as amended by Section 9 of RA
6715, provides:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except
as otherwise provided under this Code, the
Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the
following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and
other forms of
damages arising from
the employer-
employee relations;"
xxx xxx xxx
In San Miguel Corporation vs. National
Labor Relations Commission,[7] we had
occasion to construe Article 217, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 227. Article 217 then
provided that the Labor Arbiter had
jurisdiction over all money claims of
workers, but the phrase arising from
employer-employee relation was deleted.
We ruled thus:
While paragraph 3 above refers to all
money claims of workers, it is not
necessary to suppose that the entire
universe of money claims that might be
asserted by workers against their
employers has been absorbed into the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters. In the first place, paragraph 3
should be read not in isolation from but
rather within the context formed by
paragraph 1 (relating to unfair labor
practices), paragraph 2 (relating to claims
concerning terms and conditions of
employment), paragraph 4 (claims relating
to household services, a particular species
of employer-employee relations), and
paragraph 5 (relating to certain activities
prohibited to employees or employers). It
is evident that there is a unifying element
which runs through paragraph 1 to 5 and
that is, that they all refer to cases or
disputes arising out of or in connection
with an employer-employee relationship.
This is, in other words, a situation where
the rule of noscitur a sociis may be
usefully invoked in clarifying the scope of
paragraph 3, and any other paragraph of
Article 217 of the Labor Code, as
amended. We reach the above conclusion
from an examination of the terms
themselves of Article 217, as last amended
by B.P. Blg 227, and even though earlier
versions of Article 217 of the Labor Code
expressly brought within the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC cases
arising from employer-employee relations,
which clause was not expressly carried
over, in printers ink, in Article 217 as it
exists today. For it cannot be presumed
that money claims of workers which do not
arise out of or in connection with their
employer-employee relationship, and
which would therefore fall within the
general jurisdiction of regular courts of
justice, were intended by the legislative
authority to be taken away from the
jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with
Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis. The
Court, therefore, believes and so holds that
the money claims of workers referred to in
paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces
money claims which arise out of or in
connection with the employer-employee
relationship, or some aspect or incident of
such relationship. Put a little differently,
that money claims of workers which now
fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those
money claims which have
some reasonable causal connection with
the employer-employee relationship.
When, as here, the cause of action is
based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has
no reasonable causal connection with any
of the claims provided for in Article 217,
jurisdiction over the action is with the
regular courts.[8]
As it is, petitioner does not ask for any relief
under the Labor Code. It merely seeks to recover
damages based on the parties contract of
employment as redress for respondent's breach
thereof. Such cause of action is within the realm
of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy
belongs to the regular courts. More so must this
be in the present case, what with the reality that
the stipulation refers to the post-employment
relations of the parties.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed orders of the
lower court are SET ASIDE and Civil Case No.
02-0063 REMANDED to it for trial on the merits
of the main claim for damages.
SO ORDERED.

For sure, a plain and cursory reading of the

complaint will readily reveal that the subject
matter is one of claim for damages arising from a
breach of contract, which is within the ambit of
the regular courts jurisdiction.[9]

It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject

matter is determined upon the allegations made
in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim
asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only
after and as a result of a trial. Neither can
jurisdiction of a court be made to depend upon
the defenses made by a defendant in his answer
or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely upon the defendant.[10]
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO,
JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY,
SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO
MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
(SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98,
QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.
CORTES, J:
Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the
Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security System
Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the
striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or
not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right
to strike.
The antecedents are as follows:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike
and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-
striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members
from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was
reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which
ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to
return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of
the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be
ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein)
be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared
illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to
act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of
the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued
overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of
temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more
of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to
other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the
children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted
certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly
committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo,
pp. 21-241].
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary
restraining order pending resolution of the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this
motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the
issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July
22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion
to dismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction
upon posting of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal
[Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration
of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo,
p. 94], petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a resolution dated October 21,
1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the
case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of
Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its decision on the
referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall the
Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court on June
29,1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577
for being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the
decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this
Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141-
143]. Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners from staging
another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989
and to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152].
The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply
and supplemental reply filed by petitioners, considered the issues
joined and the case submitted for decision.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had
no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue
the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as
jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or
the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case
involves a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the
ground that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil
service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code,
therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the
DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the
Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals
held that since the employees of the SSS, are government
employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined
by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS'
complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.
Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in
deciding whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in excess of
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case and enjoined the
strike are as follows:
1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case
initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with
the strike and to order them to return to work?
These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim
I
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all
workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to
strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service
Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil
service as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to
self-organization shall not be denied to government employees"
[Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights
also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question
that the Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition
also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes
helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A
reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that
drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the
right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of
the provision that "[tlhe right to self-organization shall not be
denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in
answer to the apprehensions expressed by Commissioner
Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission,
explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not
take that long. When we proposed this
amendment providing for self-organization of
government employees, it does not mean that
because they have the right to organize, they also
have the right to strike. That is a different matter.
We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a
union. With regard to the right to strike, everyone
will remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a
provision that the right to form associations or
societies whose purpose is not contrary to law
shall not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of
the state is to prohibit the strikes coming from
employees exercising government functions, that
could be done because the moment that is
prohibited, then the union which will go on strike
will be an illegal union. And that provision is
carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875,
workers, including those from the government-
owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but
they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of
our honorable Vice- President is unfounded. It
does not mean that because we approve this
resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That
is a different matter. As a matter of fact, that
subject is now being discussed in the Committee
on Social Justice because we are trying to find a
solution to this problem. We know that this
problem exist; that the moment we allow anybody
in the government to strike, then what will happen
if the members of the Armed Forces will go on
strike? What will happen to those people trying to
protect us? So that is a matter of discussion in the
Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the
right to form an organization does not carry with it
the right to strike. [Record of the Constitutional
Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875),
which was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974,
expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government,
including instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but
excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:
.Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the
Government. — The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are
governed by law and it is declared to be the policy
of this Act that employees therein shall not strike
for the purpose of securing changes or
modification in their terms and conditions of
employment. Such employees may belong to any
labor organization which does not impose the
obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided,
however, That this section shall apply only to
employees employed in governmental functions
and not those employed in proprietary functions of
the Government including but not limited to
governmental corporations.
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one
time it recognized the right of employees of government
corporations established under the Corporation Code to organize
and bargain collectively and those in the civil service to "form
organizations for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before
its amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it
provided that "[t]he terms and conditions of employment of all
government employees, including employees of government
owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art. 276].
Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not
government employees may strike, for such are excluded from its
coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D. No. 807],
is equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the
right of government employees to organize, the President issued
E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the
right to organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof,
it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be
observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress." The President was apparently referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service
Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the
enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by
government employees ... enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the
confusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing
government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so,
or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from
striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and
as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that
the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against
strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering
that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also
Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service
are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS
is one such government-controlled corporation with an original
charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees
are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870
& 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This
being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS
was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v.
Minister of Labor and Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3,
1:983, 124 SCRA 11 is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for
distinguishing between workers in the private sector and
government employees with regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present
is that 'the terms and conditions of employment in
the Government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof are
governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace
Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277,
the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as
amended). Since the terms and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same
weapons employed by workers in the private
sector to secure concessions from their
employers. The principle behind labor unionism in
private industry is that industrial peace cannot be
 secured through compulsion by law. Relations
between private employers and their employees
rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to
the minimum requirements of wage laws and
other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private
sector are settled through the process of collective
bargaining. In government employment, however,
it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through statutes
or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations,
not through collective bargaining agreements. [At
p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil
Service, in his position paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and quoted with approval by the Court in Alliance, to
wit:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that
by reason of the nature of the public employer and
the peculiar character of the public service, it must
necessarily regard the right to strike given to
unions in private industry as not applying to public
employees and civil service employees. It has
been stated that the Government, in contrast to
the private employer, protects the interest of all
people in the public service, and that accordingly,
such conflicting interests as are present in private
labor relations could not exist in the relations
between government and those whom they
employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National
Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313,
January 17,1985,134 SCRA 172,178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the
right to organize of government employees, while clinging to the
same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow
negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment
involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:
.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of
employment or improvements thereof, except
those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of
negotiations between duly recognized employees'
organizations and appropriate government
authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general
mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes in the public
sector to wit:
.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws
and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be
followed in the resolution of complaints,
grievances and cases involving government
employees. In case any dispute remains
unresolved after exhausting all the available
remedies under existing laws and procedures, the
parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public
Sector Labor- Management] Council for
appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of
the terms and conditions of employment which are within the
ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law.
If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be
referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for
appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages,
like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to
accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III
of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right
of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took
effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions
of employment in the government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned
and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by
law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of
securing changes thereof."
II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to
petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be
issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the
Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code
itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of
government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No.
180 vests the Public Sector Labor - Management Council with
jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government
employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over
the dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded,
in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for
damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike
the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has
not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in
labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council,
and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor
dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a
writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or
overzealousness, for in fact it had proceeded with caution. Thus,
after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the
strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the
respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to
refer the unresolved controversies emanating from their
employer- employee relationship to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].
III
In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory
Injunction," and reiterated in their reply and supplemental reply,
petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld bonuses and
benefits due the individual petitioners and they pray that the Court
issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and mandatory injunction to
restrain the SSS and its agents from withholding payment thereof
and to compel the SSS to pay them. In their supplemental reply,
petitioners annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission,
dated May 5, 1989, which ruled that the officers of the SSSEA
who are not preventively suspended and who are reporting for
work pending the resolution of the administrative cases against
them are entitled to their salaries, year-end bonuses and other
fringe benefits and affirmed the previous order of the Merit
Systems Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court,
it is Our view that petitioners' remedy is not to petition this Court
to issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of the aforesaid
order, if it has already become final.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the
Court of Appeals, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED
and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners'
"Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction"
dated December 13,1988 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.