PEOPLE vs. OCIMAR discharge of an accused depends on sound judicial discretion.
Once that discretion is
J. Bellosillo | August 17, 1992
TOPIC: TRIAL OF SEVERAL ACCUSED;
DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED TO BE STATE WITNESS
FACTS
Eduardo Ocimar, Alexander Mendoza, Alfonso Bermudez et al. were charged for
violation of PD 532, known as the “Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974”
On different dates, the accused were arraigned. Ocimar and Mendoza pleaded not
guilty. Bermudez pleaded guilty.
On Oct. 28, 1987, after the prosecution had already presented 4 witnesses, the
prosecuting fiscal moved for the discharge of Bermudez to be utilized as state
witness. Although he had already entered a plea of guilt, no judgment was as yet
rendered against him.
On Nov. 9, 1987, the trial court granted the motion of the prosecution for the
discharge of Bermudez. On Mar. 21, 1988, after he testified for the prosecution,
Bermudez was released.
On Apr. 3, 1990, the trial court convicted Ocimar and Mendoza of violating PD 532
and sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua plus indemnity.
Ocimar and Mendoza are now appealing the case.
ISSUE WON the court erred in discharging Bermudez, who had earlier pleaded
guilty, to be utilized as a state witness – NO
RATIO
On the propriety of utilizing Bermudez as a state witness, Rule 119, Sec. 9 f the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Discharge at accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so
that they may be witnesses for the state when after requiring the prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
As may be gleaned above, the trial court must be satisfied that the conditions
prescribed by the rule exist. The court therefore, upon prior determination by the
public prosecutor, retains the prerogative of deciding when a co-accused may be
discharged to become a state witness. With Sec. 9 providing the guidelines, the
exercised and a co-accused is discharged to become state witness and subsequently
testifies, any legal deficiency or defect that might have attended his discharge from
the information will no longer affect the admissibility and credibility of his testimony,
provided such testimony is otherwise admissible and credible.
Here, Bermudez satisfied the conditions in Sec. 9 for the following reasons:
(a) First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez.
 None of the 4 witnesses could positively identify the accused except Bermudez
 It was the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution.
(b) Second, without his testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the prosecution to
prove the elements of the crime.
(c) Third, his testimony could be substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated by
the trial court in its well-reasoned decision.
(d) Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty.
 He was only invited to a drinking party without having any prior knowledge of the plot
to stage a highway robbery.
 Even assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appeal to be
the most guilty.
 “Most guilty” means the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed.
(e) Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time has been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
Besides, the matter of discharging a co-accused to become state witness is left
largely to the discretion of the trial fiscal, subject only to the approval of the court. The
reason is that the fiscal should know better than the court, and the defense for that
matter, as to who of the accused would best qualify to be discharged to become state
witness. The public prosecutor is supposed to know the evidence in his possession
ahead of all the rest. He knows whom he needs to establish his case.
On the credibility of Bermudez as a state witness, the appellants point to the
inconsistency in his testimony on whether or not he knew appellants before the
commission of the crime and assert that that necessarily discredits the rest of his
testimony under the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. But this is not mandatory.
It does not apply where there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the
testimony, where the mistakes are not on the very material points and where the
errors do not arise from an apparent desire to pervert the truth but from innocent
mistakes and the desire of the witness to exculpate himself though not completely.
More so, the impressions of the trial court on the matter are binding upon the
Supreme Court, unless there appears a graver abuse of discretion or obvious
misapprehension of facts. As such, the Supreme Court is in complete agreement with
the trial court when it found no reason at all to disbelieve the testimony of Bermudez.
DISPOSITIVE
Conviction of Ocimar and Mendoza AFFIRMED