POLITICAL LAW

Elements of Presidential Communications Privilege

1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power."

2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of

the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
"operational proximity" with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely
contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority. (NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE, G.R. 180643;
Sept. 4, 2008)

Claim for Executive Privilege Properly Invoked

Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the
matter." A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and certain
reason" for preserving their confidentiality. (NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE, G.R.
180643; Sept. 4, 2008)

Precise Time when Just Compensation Should Be Reckoned

In Republic v. Castellvi, this Court held that there is a “taking” when the expropriator
enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a more permanent
duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. Thus, in that case, we
rejected the State’s contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a
permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a determinate
time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a
Page 1 of 71
demand. Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may be exercised by
simply leasing the premises to be expropriated. Where, as here, the owner was
compensated and not deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property by its
being diverted to public use, there is no taking within the constitutional sense. (PNOC vs.
MAGLASANG, G.R. 155407; Nov. 11, 2008)

Page 2 of 71
 LABOR LAW

Labor-Only Contracting Vs. Permissible Job Contracting/ Subcontracting

Labor-only contracting, which is prohibited, is an arrangement where the contractor or

subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service
for a principal. In labor-only contracting, the following elements are present:

(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to
actually perform the job, work or service under its own account and responsibility; and

(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are
performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal.

On the other hand, permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement

whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the
performance or completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite or
predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed
or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. A person is considered
engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:

(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and
undertakes to perform the job, work or service on its own account and under its own
responsibility according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and
direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except
as to the results thereof;

(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and

(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the
contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health
standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social and
welfare benefits. (ILIGAN CEMENT CORP. vs IEWU-SPFL, G.R. 158956; April 24,
2009)

Loss of Trust and Confidence as Reason for Termination from Employment

Page 3 of 71
Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised from the fact
that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This situation holds
where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody,
handling, or care and protection of the employer’s property. But, in order to constitute a
just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be “work-related” such as would show
the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer.

As a general rule, employers are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the
employment of managerial personnel or those who, while not of similar rank, perform
functions which by their nature require the employer’s full trust and confidence. This must
be distinguished from the case of ordinary rank and file employees, whose termination on
the basis of these same grounds requires a higher proof of involvement in the events in
question; mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not suffice.
(PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NLRC, G.R. 123294; Oct. 20, 2010)

Serious Misconduct as Ground for Termination of Employment

Serious misconduct as a valid cause for the dismissal of an employee is defined simply as
improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment. To be serious within the meaning and intendment
of the law, the misconduct must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely
trivial or unimportant. However serious such misconduct, it must, nevertheless, be in
connection with the employee’s work to constitute just cause for his separation. The act
complained of must be related to the performance of the employee’s duties such as would
show him to be unfit to continue working for the employer. On the other hand, moral
turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals. (PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NLRC, G.R. 123294; Oct. 20,
2010)

Unfair Labor Practice

Page 4 of 71
In the past, we have ruled that “unfair labor practice refers to ‘acts that violate the workers'
right to organize.’ The prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self-organization
and to the observance of a CBA.” We have likewise declared that “there should be no
dispute that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the
workers' right to self-organization.” Thus, an employer may only be held liable for unfair
labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his
employees to self-organize. (CULILI vs. EASTERN COMMUNICATIONS
PHILIPPINES INC., G.R. 165381; Feb. 9, 2011)

Award for Reinstatement Is Immediately Executory

The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award [by the Labor Arbiter] for reinstatement
shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite
obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending
appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites
for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the
very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement
order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could
be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled
hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could
easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble
purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224
[including the issuance of a writ of execution] were to govern, as we so declared in
Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by
Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. (PFIZER, INC. vs.
VELASCO, G.R. 177467; Mar. 9, 2011)

Award of Disability Benefits of Seafarers

The application of the provisions of the Labor Code to the contracts of seafarers had long
been settled by this Court. In Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, we
emphatically declared that:

The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to
Page 5 of 71
its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to "secure the best terms and conditions of employment of
Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect
the well-being of Filipino workers overseas." Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC itself
provides that "all rights and obligations of the parties to the Contract, including the
annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines,
international conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory."
Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the
New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor
and similar subjects."

Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the
case of seafarers. x x x.38

The Labor Code defines permanent total disability under Article 192(c)(1), which states:

ART. 192. PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY. – x x x

xxxx

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days,
except as otherwise provided in the Rules.

This concept of permanent total disability is further explained in Section 2(b), Rule VII of
the Implementing Rules of Book IV of the Labor Code (Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation) as follows:

SEC. 2. Disability. – x x x

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee
is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days,
except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.

The exception in Rule X of the Implementing Rules of Book IV (Amended Rules on

Employees Compensation) as mentioned above, on the other hand, pertains to an
employee’s entitlement to temporary total disability benefits under Section 2 of the
aforesaid Rule X, to wit:

SEC. 2. Period of entitlement. — (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the
Page 6 of 71
first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer
than 120 consecutive days except where injury or sickness still requires medical
attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which
case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare
the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total
disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or
mental functions as determined by the System.

In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., the Court discussed how the above-
mentioned provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules should be read in
conjunction with the first paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA SEC, which
states:

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness
allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of
permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no
case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

Correlating the aforementioned provision of the POEA SEC with the pertinent labor laws
and rules, Vergara teaches that:

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the
company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and
treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman
is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage
during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is
acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition
is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine
laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because
the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period
may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to
declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The
seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified
by his medical condition.

xxxx

As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so

declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the
Page 7 of 71
expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of
either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.(FAIR SHIPPING CORP.,
AND/OR KOHYU MARINE CO., LTD. vs. JOSELITO T. MEDEL, G.R. 177907; Aug.
29,2012)

Assumption of Jurisdiction by the Secretary Of Labor

Article 263(g) is both an extraordinary and a preemptive power to address an extraordinary

situation - a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. This
grant is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have
preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or lockout that
in the meanwhile may have taken place. As the term "assume jurisdiction" connotes, the
intent of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within
the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout; it includes and
extends to all questions and controversies arising from or related to the dispute, including
cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. (TABANGAO SHELL
REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM,
G.R. 170007; April 7, 2014)

A validly dismissed employee is not ordinarily entitled to separation pay; Exception

In view of the finding that Santos was validly dismissed from employment, she would not
ordinarily be entitled to separation pay. An exception to this rule is when the court finds
justification in applying the principle of social justice according to the equities of the case.
[International School Manila vs. International School Alliance of Educators
(ISAE), 715 SCRA 343 , February 05, 2014]

Guidelines to consider
Page 8 of 71
Cognizant of the possibility of abuse in the utilization of fixed-term employment contracts,
we emphasized in Brent that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods
have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they
should be struck down as contrary to public policy or morals. We thus laid down
indications or criteria under which “term employment” cannot be said to be in
circumvention of the law on security of tenure, namely: 1) The fixed period of
employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force,
duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any
other circumstances vitiating his consent; or 2) It satisfactorily appears that the employer
and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral
dominance exercised by the former or the latter. (Citation omitted.) These indications,
which must be read together, make the Brent doctrine applicable only in a few special
cases wherein the employer and employee are on more or less in equal footing in entering
into the contract. The reason for this is evident: when a prospective employee, on account
of special skills or market forces, is in a position to make demands upon the prospective
employer, such prospective employee needs less protection than the ordinary worker.
Lesser limitations on the parties’ freedom of contract are thus required for the protection of
the employee. [GMA Network, Inc. vs. Pabriga, 710 SCRA 690 , November 27, 2013]

Illegal Dismissals

Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement shall either be
admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.-
Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement “shall either
be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.”
It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a state or
condition from which one had been removed or separated. The person reinstated assumes
the position he had occupied prior to his dismissal. [Pfizer, Inc. vs. Velasco, 645 SCRA
135 , March 09, 2011]

An order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages

from the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same
was reversed by a higher court without fear of refunding what he had received.
Page 9 of 71
—In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessitates
that it must be immediately self-executory without need for a writ of execution during the
pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose, and any attempt on the part
of the employer to evade or delay its execution should not be allowed. Furthermore, we
likewise restate our ruling that an order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive
his accrued backwages from the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date
when the same was reversed by a higher court without fear of refunding what he had
received. [Pfizer, Inc. vs. Velasco, 645 SCRA 135 , March 09, 2011]

The “unfair labor practice” refers to acts that violate the workers’ right to
organize; The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization
and to the observance of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)

An employer may only be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his
acts affect in whatever manner the right of his employees to self-organize.-—In the past,
we have ruled that “unfair labor practice refers to ‘acts that violate the workers’ right to
organize.’ The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and to
the observance of a CBA.” We have likewise declared that “there should be no dispute that
all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers’
right to self-organization.” Thus, an employer may only be held liable for unfair labor
practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his
employees to self-organize. [Culili vs. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines,
Inc., 642 SCRA 338 , February 09, 2011]

Redundancy

A position becomes redundant when it is rendered superfluous by any number of factors

such as over-hiring of workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping a particular
product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.-
There is redundancy when the service capability of the workforce is greater than what is
reasonably required to meet the demands of the business enterprise. A position becomes
redundant when it is rendered superfluous by any number of factors such as over-hiring of
workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping a particular product line or service
Page 10 of 71
activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. [Culili vs. Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., 642 SCRA 338 , February 09, 2011]

COMMERCIAL LAW
Page 11 of 71
Philippine National Red Cross ( PNRC) is a sui generis corporation
The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding
the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by
law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation
contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban. A closer look at the nature of the PNRC
would show that there is none like it not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of
history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the international
community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. [Liban vs.
Gordon, 639 SCRA 709 , January 18, 2011]

Philippine National Red Cross ( PNRC) cannot be classified as either a purely private
or government entity
The PNRC cannot be classified as either a purely private or government entity. It is a
hybrid organization that derives certain peculiarities from international humanitarian law.
For this reason, its organizational character does not fit the parameters provided by either
the Corporation Code or Administrative Code. It is a sui generis entity that draws its nature
from the Geneva Conventions, the Statutes of the Movement and the law creating it. .
[Liban vs. Gordon, 639 SCRA 709 , January 18, 2011]

Philippine National Red Cross ( PNRC) cannot be regarded as either a purely

private or government entity
The PNRC cannot also be regarded as a government corporation or instrumentality. To
begin with, it is not owned or controlled by the government or part of the government
machinery. The conditions for its recognition as a National Society also militate against its
classification as a government entity. [Liban vs. Gordon, 639 SCRA 709 , January 18,
2011]

Page 12 of 71
 CIVIL LAW

Condition Imposed On the Perfection of the Contract Vs. Condition Imposed Merely
On The Performance Of An Obligation

Article 1182 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:

Art. 1182. When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole will of the
debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. If it depends upon chance or upon the will
of a third person, the obligation shall take effect in conformity with the provisions of this
Code.

In the past, this Court has distinguished between a condition imposed on the
perfection of a contract and a condition imposed merely on the performance of an
obligation. While failure to comply with the first condition results in the failure of a
contract, failure to comply with the second merely gives the other party the option to either
refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the condition. This principle is evident in
Article 1545 of the Civil Code on sales, which provides in part:

Art. 1545. Where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject
to any condition which is not performed, such party may refuse to proceed with the
contract or he may waive performance of the condition x x x.

Paragraph 1(b) of the Conditional Deed of Sale, stating that respondent shall pay the
balance of the purchase price when he has successfully negotiated and secured a road right
of way, is not a condition on the perfection of the contract nor on the validity of the entire
contract or its compliance as contemplated in Article 1308. It is a condition imposed only
on respondent’s obligation to pay the remainder of the purchase price. In our view and
applying Article 1182, such a condition is not purely potestative as petitioners contend. It
is not dependent on the sole will of the debtor but also on the will of third persons who
own the adjacent land and from whom the road right of way shall be negotiated. In a
manner of speaking, such a condition is likewise dependent on chance as there is no
guarantee that respondent and the third party-landowners would come to an agreement
regarding the road right of way. This type of mixed condition is expressly allowed under
Article 1182 of the Civil Code. (CATUNGAL vs. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. 146839; MAR. 23,
2011)
Page 13 of 71
Contracts Have the Force of Law between Contracting Parties and Should Be
Complied With In Good Faith

It cannot be gainsaid that “contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith.” We have also previously ruled that “being the
primary law between the parties, the contract governs the adjudication of their rights and
obligations. A court has no alternative but to enforce the contractual stipulations in the
manner they have been agreed upon and written.” We find no merit in petitioners’
contention that their parents were merely “duped” into accepting the questioned provisions
in the Conditional Deed of Sale. We note that although the contract was between Agapita
Catungal and Rodriguez, Jose Catungal nonetheless signed thereon to signify his marital
consent to the same. We concur with the trial court’s finding that the spouses Catungals’
claim of being misled into signing the contract was contrary to human experience and
conventional wisdom since it was Jose Catungal who was a practicing lawyer while
Rodriquez was a non-lawyer. It can be reasonably presumed that Atty. Catungal and his
wife reviewed the provisions of the contract, understood and accepted its provisions before
they affixed their signatures thereon. (CATUNGAL vs. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. 146839;
MAR. 23, 2011)

Determining Liability In Payment Of Attorneys Fees And Cost Of Litigation

The award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule and the court must state
explicitly the legal reason for such award.[32] As we held in ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation v. Court of Appeals:

The general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are
not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award
attorney’s fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even
when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad
faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction
of the righteousness of his cause. (DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
TRAVERSE DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. 169293; Oct. 5, 2011)

Page 14 of 71
Pactum Commissorium

Pactum commissoriumis among the contractual stipulations that are deemed contrary to
law. It is defined as "a stipulation empowering the creditor to appropriate the thing given
as guaranty for the fulfillment of the obligation in the event the obligor fails to live up to
his undertakings, without further formality, such as foreclosure proceedings, and a public
sale."33 It is explicitly prohibited under Article 2088 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 2088. The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or
mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

There are two elements for pactum commissoriumto exist: (1) that there should be a pledge
or mortgage wherein a property is pledged or mortgaged by way of security for the
payment of the principal obligation; and (2) that there should be a stipulation for an
automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing pledged or mortgaged in the event of
nonpayment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period. (PRIVATIZATION
AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE vs. PHILNICO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, G.R.
199432; Aug. 27, 2014)

Estoppel

The mortgagor is already estopped from challenging the validity of the foreclosure sale,
after entering into a Contract of Lease with the buyer over one of the foreclosed
properties-
—the title of the landlord is a conclusive presumption as against the tenant or lessee.—
Finally, the Court agrees with the RTC that respondents are already estopped from
challenging the validity of the foreclosure sale, after entering into a Contract of Lease with
petitioner over one of the foreclosed properties. The title of the landlord is a conclusive
presumption as against the tenant or lessee. According to Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, “[t]he tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of
the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.” The juridical
relationship between petitioner as lessor and respondents as lessees carries with it a
recognition of the lessor’s title. As lessees, then respondents are estopped to deny their
landlord’s title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in some third
person while they remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender
Page 15 of 71
possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the
time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may be asserted not only by the
original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title. [Century Savings Bank vs.
Samonte, 634 SCRA 261 , October 20, 2010]

Foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity and that the mortgagor
who alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of proving such fact.- It is an elementary
rule that the “burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.” In
Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 253 (2000), the Court explicitly ruled that
foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity and that the mortgagor who
alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of proving such fact. [Century Savings Bank
vs. Samonte, 634 SCRA 261 , October 20, 2010]

Page 16 of 71
 CRIMINAL LAW

Crime of murder what should be established

According to jurisprudence, to be convicted of murder, the following must be established:

(1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; the killing was with the attendance of
any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4)
the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide. (People of the Philippines vs. Joel
Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014)

Presence of Treachery as qualifying circumstance in the crime of murder

Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the qualifying circumstance of treachery did attend the
killing of Jesus. We have consistently held that treachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. . (People of the
Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January 15,
2014)

Circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery : applicable

penalty under Article 63 of the RPC

However, in contrast to the pronouncements of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, we cannot consider abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance in
this case. As per jurisprudence, when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength
concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. Since there is no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance present, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, in accordance
with Article 63 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, it being the lesser penalty between
the two indivisible penalties for the felony of murder which is reclusion perpetua to death.
. (People of the Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No.
201092, January 15, 2014)

Special complex crime of carnapping with homicide

Page 17 of 71
Jurisprudence tells us that to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also
that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The appellate court
correctly observed that the killing of Jesus cannot qualify the carnapping into a special
complex crime because the carnapping was merely an afterthought when the victim’s death
was already fait accompli. Thus, appellant is guilty only of simple carnapping. . (People of
the Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January
15, 2014)

Physical resistance need not to be established in rape only the use of force or
intimidation

Thus, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs
only to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in
having sexual intercourse with the victim – which it did in the case at bar. (People of the
Philippines vs. Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014)

Exemplary Damages can be awarded even in the absence of an aggravating

circumstances provided the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible
or outrageous conduct of the offender

This Court notes, however, that both the RTC and Court of Appeals overlooked the award
of exemplary damages. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages can be awarded
even in the absence of an aggravating circumstance if the circumstances of the case show
the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. Thus, this Court deems it
necessary to modify the civil liability of appellant Jastiva to include exemplary damages
for the vindication of the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by AAA, a woman of
advanced age, and to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to those who abuse the
elderly, and to protect the latter from sexual assaults. (People of the Philippines vs.
Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014)

Carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental deficiency considered rape

It is settled in jurisprudence that, under the foregoing provision of law, carnal knowledge
of a woman with a mental deficiency is considered rape because such a person is not
Page 18 of 71
capable of giving consent to a sexual act. In a recent case, we had declared that in cases of
rape involving a victim suffering from mental retardation, proof of force or intimidation is
not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish (1) the sexual congress between
the accused and the victim, and (2) the mental retardation of the victim.(People of the
Philippines vs. MarcialBayrante Y Boaquina, G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012)

Libel : Elements

Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or
cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead. Consequently, the following elements constitute libel: (a) imputation
of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity
of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice. (ISAGANI M. YAMBOT, LETTY
JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC, JOSE MA. D. NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T. ENGRACIA, JR.
and VOLT CONTRERAS vs. Hon. ARTEMIO TUQUERO in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice, and ESCOLASTICO U. CRUZ, JR., G.R. No. 169895, March
23, 2011)

Crime committed under the compulsion of an irresistible fear

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal
liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invitofactus non est meus actus.
An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so
formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but
against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for
escape or self-defense in equal combat. (People of the Philippines vs. NelidaDequina Y
Dimapanan, JoselitoJundoc Y Japitana and Nora Jingabo Y Cruz, G.R. No. 177570,
January 19, 2011)

Conspiracy how proved

Page 19 of 71
Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when said
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests.
Although the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to
support a finding of the presence of conspiracy, it need not be proven by direct evidence.
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated. (People of the Philippines vs. NelidaDequina Y Dimapanan,
JoselitoJundoc Y Japitana and Nora Jingabo Y Cruz, G.R. No. 177570, January 19,
2011)

Violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act: Credence given to prosecution witnesses who
are police officers on the presumption that they have performed their duties in a
regular manner unless there is evidence to the contrary

It is equally settled that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Dela Cruz utterly failed to prove that in testifying against him, PO2 Ocampo was
motivated by reasons other than the duty to curb the sale of prohibited drugs. There is no
proof of any ill motive or odious intent on the part of the police authorities to impute
falsely such a serious crime to Dela Cruz.(People of the Philippines vs. ReynaldDela
Cruz Y Libantocia., G.R. No. 177324, March 30, 2011)

Actual force or intimidation need not be employed in incestuous rape of a minor

More importantly, even if we assume for the sake of argument that AAA did not put up a
struggle against accused-appellant, we have consistently held that actual force or
intimidation need not be employed in incestuous rape of a minor. Thus, in the case at bar,
we find that the moral and physical dominion of the ascendant is sufficient to take the
place of actual force or intimidation. (People of the Philippines vs. Jose Galvez y
Blanca., G.R. No. 181827, February 2, 2011)

Force, Intimidation or physical evidence of injury is immaterial in statutory rape

Undeniably, the instant case is one of statutory rape, the gravamen of which is the carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 years old. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years is
always rape. Thus, force, intimidation or physical evidence of injury is immaterial.
(People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Bagos., G.R. No. 177152, January 6, 2010)

Page 20 of 71
Rape; How committed

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

(People of the Philippines vs. Roman Zafra y Serrano, G.R. No. 197363, June 26,
2013)

Absence of external signs of physical injuries does not negate rape

It has been ruled, in a long line of cases, that "absence of external signs of physical injuries
does not negate rape." The doctrine is thus well entrenched in our jurisprudence, and the
Court of Appeals correctly applied it.People of the Philippines vs. Roman Zafra y
Serrano, G.R. No. 197363, June 26, 2013)

Conspiracy; how committed

In People v. Nelmida, we elaborated on the principle of criminal conspiracy and its

ramifications in this manner:

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue
it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for
the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the
agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the
Page 21 of 71
mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of
one is the act of all. (Citation and emphasis omitted.). (People of the Philippines vs.
MarcelinoDadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and AlfemioMalogsi.,
G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014)

Treachery

Time and again, we have declared that treachery is present when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution,
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.Furthermore, we have also
held that the essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done
in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim
no chance to resist or escape.In the case at bar, the manner by which PionioYacapin was
killed carried all the indubitable hallmarks of treachery. . (People of the Philippines vs.
MarcelinoDadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and AlfemioMalogsi.,
G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014)

Award of damages when death occurs due to a crime

Anent the award of damages, it is jurisprudentially settled that when death occurs due to a
crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
(5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. (People of
the Philippines vs. MarcelinoDadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and
AlfemioMalogsi., G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014)

Justifying Circumstanes; Essential elements

We agree that the death of Wilson at the hands of appellant was not occasioned by self-
defense. For this Court to consider self-defense as a justifying circumstance, appellant has
to prove the following essential elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to
self-defense. The Court has repeatedly stated that a person who invokes self-defense has
the burden to prove all the aforesaid elements. The Court also considers unlawful
Page 22 of 71
aggression on the part of the victim as the most important of these elements. Thus,
unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully
pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.(People of the Philippines vs.
MarcialMalicdem y Molina., G.R. No. 184601, November 12, 2012)

Two kinds of Unlawful Aggression

As stated in People v. Fontanilla:

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack
with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent
of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude,
nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to
attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.(People of the
Philippines vs. Marcial Malicdem y Molina., G.R. No. 184601, November 12, 2012)

Self-defense under Article 11, Par. 1 of the RPC; Free from both criminal and civil
liability

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a
deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression
of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is
aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which
is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From
necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when
necessity does, and ends where it ends. Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the
victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed
not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities.(People

Page 23 of 71
of the Philippines vs. Marcial Malicdem y Molina., G.R. No. 184601, November 12,
2012)

Age as an element in statutory rape.

In People v. Teodoro,22 the Court clearly explained the elements of statutory rape
committed under Article 266-A(1)(d):

Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual
modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of
a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of
injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman
and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child’s consent is
immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil. (People of the
Philippinesvs. RoelVergara Y Clavero,G.R. No. 199226, January 15, 2014)

Medical certificate not necessary to prove rape.

With regard to appellant’s argument that the findings of the medico-legal report do not
support the allegation that the victim was indeed raped, we cannot give any credit to such
claim in light of established jurisprudence holding that a medical certificate is not
necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is
not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.(People of the Philippines Vs. Roberto
Velasco,G.R. No. 190318, November 27, 2013)

Abuse of Authority; absorbed in treachery.

We, therefore, rule that the killing of Ernesto was attended by treachery. However, even
assuming for the sake of argument that treachery should not be appreciated, the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength would nevertheless qualify the killing to
murder. Despite being alleged in the Information, this circumstance was not considered in
the trial court as the same is already absorbed in treachery. The act of the accused in
stabbing Ernesto while two persons were holding him clearly shows the deliberate use of
Page 24 of 71
excessive force out of proportion to the defense available in to the person attacked. In
People v. Gemoya, we held:

Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces

between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of in the commission
of the crime (People vs. Bongadillo, 234 SCRA 233 [1994]). When four armed assailants,
two of whom are accused-appellants in this case, gang up on one unarmed victim, it can
only be said that excessive force was purposely sought and employed. (People of the
Philippines vs. Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero,G.R. No. 168169, February 24,
2010)

Treachery.

Treachery is defined under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.

The Solicitor General argues that treachery was amply demonstrated by the restraint upon
Ernesto, which effectively rendered him defenseless and unable to effectively repel, much
less evade, the assault.

We agree with the Solicitor General.

In the cases cited by the appellants, the eyewitnesses were not able to observe any means,
method or form in the execution of the killing which rendered the victim defenseless. In
Amamangpang, the first thing the witness saw was the victim already prostrate on the
bamboo floor, blood oozing from his neck and about to be struck by the accused. In Icalla,
the witnesses merely saw the accused fleeing from the scene of the crime with a knife in
his hand. In Sambulan, the witness saw the two accused hacking the victim with a bolo.
Since, in these cases, there was no restraint upon the victims or any other circumstance
which would have rendered them defenseless, the Court ruled that it should look into the
commencement of the attack in order to determine whether the same was done swiftly and
Page 25 of 71
unexpectedly. However, the swiftness and unexpectedness of an attack are not the only
means by which the defenselessness of the victim can be ensured.

Thus, there is treachery where the victim was stabbed in a defenseless situation, as when
he was being held by the others while he was being stabbed, as the accomplishment of the
accused's purpose was ensured without risk to him from any defense the victim may offer
[People v. Condemena, G.R. No. L-22426, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 910; People v. Lunar,
G.R. No. L-15579, May 29, 1972, 45 SCRA 119.] In the instant case, it has been
established that the accused-appellant stabbed the victim on the chest while his
companions held both of the victim's arms.(People of the Philippines vs. Alberto
Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero,G.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010)

Requisites of self-defense.

The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable
means to prevent and repel aggression.

The Court of Appeals noted that the only evidence presented by the defense to prove the
alleged unlawful aggression was Gary’s own testimony. Citing Casitas v. People, the Court
of Appeals held that the nine stab wounds inflicted upon Ernesto indicate Gary’s intent to
kill, and not merely an intent to defend himself. The number of wounds also negates the
claim that the means used by Gary to defend himself was reasonable.(People of the
Philippines vs. Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero,G.R. No. 168169, February 24,
2010)

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete.

There is incomplete self-defense when the elementof unlawful aggression by the victim is
present, and any of the other two essential requisites for self-defense. Having failed to
prove the indispensable element of unlawful aggression, Gary is not entitled to the
Page 26 of 71
mitigating circumstance, regardless even assuming of the presence of the other two
elements of self-defense.(People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Tabarnero and Gary
Tabarnero,G.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010)

Requisites of voluntary surrender.

In People v. Barcimo, Jr.,the pending warrant for the arrest of the accused and the latter’s
surrender more than one year after the incident were considered by the Court as damaging
to the plea that voluntary surrender be considered a mitigating circumstance. Thus:

The trial court did not err in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the
offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be
spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble
and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender
presupposes repentance. In People v. Viernes [G.R. No. 136733-35, 13 December 20010],
we held that going to the police station to clear one’s name does not show any intent to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities.(People of the Philippines vs. Alberto
Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero,G.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010)

Determining Age for Purpose of Exemption from Criminal Liability under R.A. 9344
or The Juvenile Justice And Welfare Act Of 2006

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of
this Act.

A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of
his/her birthdate.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
Page 27 of 71
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly
refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental
age as argued by accused-appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt
or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Only when the law is
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent. (
People vs. MIlan Roxas y Aguiluz, G.R. 200793; June 4, 2014)

Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape.

Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some
unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused
had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her consent, and
such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. [People vs Paras, GR.
192912, (2014)]

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed.

- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In this case, both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-appellant guilty of rape by having
carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The courts a
quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of
this case, the Court finds that AAA was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony
that the accused-appellant was the one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had
sexual intercourse with her. [People vs Paras, GR. 192912, (2014)]

Page 28 of 71
Acts of Lasciviousness

Elements of.-The crime of acts of lasciviousness, as punished under Article 336 of

the Revised Penal Code, is defined as follows: ART. 336. Acts of lasciviousness.—Any
person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under
any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prisión
correccional. The elements of this crime are: (1) the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by
using force or intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) the
offended party is another person of either sex [People vs Renato Dela Cruz, 724 SCRA
691 , June 04, 2014]

TAXATION LAW

Banks and Banking

In Re: Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Rural Bank of Bokod (Benguet),
Inc., Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 511 SCRA
Page 29 of 71
123 (2006), ruled that Section 52(C) of the Tax Code of 1997 is not applicable to banks
ordered placed under liquidation by the Monetary Board, and a tax clearance is not a
prerequisite to the approval of the project of distribution of the assets of a bank under
liquidation by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation.―This Court has already
resolved the issue of whether Section 52(C) of the Tax Code of 1997 applies to banks
ordered placed under liquidation by the Monetary Board, that is, whether a bank placed
under liquidation has to secure a tax clearance from the BIR before the project of
distribution of the assets of the bank can be approved by the liquidation court. In Re:
Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Rural Bank of Bokod (Benguet), Inc.,
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 511 SCRA 123
(2006), ruled that Section 52(C) of the Tax Code of 1997 is not applicable to banks ordered
placed under liquidation by the Monetary Board, and a tax clearance is not a prerequisite
to the approval of the project of distribution of the assets of a bank under liquidation by the
PDIC. [Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 698
SCRA 311(2013)]

Documentary Stamp Tax (DST)

The Documentary Stamp Tax under Section 181 of the Tax Code is levied on the
acceptance or payment of “a bill of exchange purporting to be drawn in a foreign country
but payable in the Philippines.”-
—The Court agrees with the CTA that the DST under Section 181 of the Tax Code is
levied on the acceptance or payment of “a bill of exchange purporting to be drawn in a
foreign country but payable in the Philippines” and that “a bill of exchange is an
unconditional order in writing addressed by one person to another, signed by the person
giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or
determinable future time a sum certain in money to order or to bearer.” A bill of exchange
is one of two general forms of negotiable instruments under the Negotiable Instruments
Law. [Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited-Philippine Branches vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 724 SCRA 499 , June 04, 2014]

It is worthy to note that in the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues submitted by the
parties, it was explicitly stated that both Bank of Commerce and Traders Royal Bank

Page 30 of 71
continued to exist as separate corporations with distinct corporate personalities, despite the
effectivity of the Purchase and Sale Agreement.- It is worthy to note that in the Joint
Stipulation of Facts and Issues submitted by the parties, it was explicitly stated that both
BOC and TRB continued to exist as separate corporations with distinct corporate
personalities, despite the effectivity of the Purchase and Sale Agreement. Considering the
foregoing, this Court finds no reason to reverse the CTA En Banc’s Amended Decision. In
reconsidering its June 27, 2007 Decision, the CTA En Banc not only took into account the
CTA 1st Division’s ruling in Traders Royal Bank, which, save for the facts that BOC was
not made a party to the case, and the deficiency DST assessed were for taxable years 1996
and 1997, is almost identical to the case herein; but more importantly, the CIR’s very own
ruling on the issue of merger between BOC and TRB, in BIR Ruling No. 10-2006, was
dated well after the case at bar had been filed with the CTA in 2004. [Commissioner of
Internal Revenue vs. Bank of Commerce, 709 SCRA 390 , November 13, 2013]

REMEDIAL LAW

Testimony given in a candid and straightforward manner, there is no room for doubt
that the witness is telling the truth.

Page 31 of 71
Jurisprudence also tells us that when a testimony is given in a candid and straightforward
manner, there is no room for doubt that the witness is telling the truth. A perusal of the
testimony of Jefferson indicates that he testified in a manner that satisfies the
aforementioned test of credibility. More importantly, during his time at the witness stand,
Jefferson positively and categorically identified appellant as one of the individuals who
stabbed his father. (People of the Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”,
G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014)

Defense of Alibi

We have held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that
he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.
These requirements of time and place must be strictly met. A review of the evidence
presented by appellant reveals that it falls short of the standard set by jurisprudence.
Appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to be at San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan when Jesus was murdered.
His own testimony revealed that the distance between the locus delicti and Dasmariñas
City, Cavite is only a four to five hour regular commute. Thus, it would not be physically
impossible for him to make the round trip between those two points from dusk till dawn of
September 5-6, 2002 and still have more than enough time to participate in the events
surrounding the murder of Jesus. (People of the Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y
Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014)

Defense of Alibi should be corroborated only by disinterested witnesses

Furthermore, the only person that could corroborate appellant’s alibi is his friend and
former co-worker, Paul Maglaque. However, we have consistently assigned less probative
weight to a defense of alibi when it is corroborated by friends and relatives since we have
established in jurisprudence that, in order for corroboration to be credible, the same must
be offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. 18 Clearly, due to his friendship with
appellant, Maglaque cannot be considered as a disinterested witness. (People of the
Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January 15,
2014)

Page 32 of 71
Positive identification prevails over alibi

Nevertheless, it is jurisprudentially settled that positive identification prevails over alibi

since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable. (People of the
Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”, G.R. No. 201092, January 15,
2014)

Indication that witness was actuated by improper motive must be alleged and
proved.

it is likewise settled that where there is nothing to indicate that a witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so
actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. In the case at bar, no
allegation was made nor proven to show that Jefferson had any ill motive to falsely testify
against appellant. (People of the Philippines vs. Joel Aquino y Cendanaa.k.a “Akong”,
G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014)

Testimony of rape victim which is accurate and credible, conviction may follow on the
sole basis of the victim’s testimony

In a long line of cases, this Court has held that if the testimony of the rape victim is
accurate and credible, a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victim’s
testimony. This is because no decent and sensible woman will publicly admit to being
raped and, thus, run the risk of public contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.
(People of the Philippines vs. Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014)

Defense of Alibi : Physical impossibility must be established

It has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the
following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime
during its commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of
access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was
committed; the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been
physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was
committed. (People of the Philippines vs. Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268, February
12, 2014)
Page 33 of 71
Hearsay Testimony

At the outset, we agree with accused-appellant that the details concerning the manner of
the commission of the rape, which was merely narrated by AAA at the barangay outpost, is
hearsay and cannot be considered by this Court. A witness can testify only on the facts that
she knows of his own personal knowledge, or more precisely, those which are derived
from her own perception. A witness may not testify on what she merely learned, read or
heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received
as proof of the truth of what she has learned, read or learned. (People of the Philippines
vs. Leonardo Cataytay Y Silvano, G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014)

Defense of denial and alibi inherently weak against a positive and credible testimony

We have pronounced time and again that both denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution
witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between categorical testimony
which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former
is generally held to prevail. (People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cataytay Y
Silvano, G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014)

Defense of Alibi must be sufficiently convincing as to preclude any doubt on the

physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the time of the incident

For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be sufficiently convincing as to preclude any
doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or
its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident. In the case at bar, accused-appellant and
his brother, second defense witness Jose, claim that the former was taking care of his
daughter in his house at around 7:00pm of September 7, 2003. He then went out and
proceeded to a videoke bar, which was merely 20 meters away from his house. Accused-
appellant and his brother admitted that their house was merely 50 meters away, or around
one-minute walk, from the house of AAA, where the alleged incident occurred. Accused-
appellant was therefore clearly in the immediate vicinity of the locus criminis at the time
of the commission of the crime, and thus accused-appellant’s defense of alibi must fail.
(People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cataytay Y Silvano, G.R. No. 196315,
October 22, 2014)
Page 34 of 71
Determination by the trial court if the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the
appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect

It is furthermore a fundamental rule that “the determination by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and
credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect.” The trial court, which had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of PO3 Lowaton and MADAC Castillo, on one hand,
and accused-appellant, on the other, was in a better position than this Court to determine
which of them is telling the truth. . (People of the Philippines vs. Marcos Sabadlab y
Narcisoa.k.a “Bong Pango”, G.R. No. 186392, January 18, 2012)

Allegation of denial and frame-up must be prove by strong and convincing evidence

In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to prove his allegation of denial and frame-up
by strong and convincing evidence. He, in fact, presented no evidence to prove the same,
and instead relied on the alleged irregularity in the buy-bust operation brought about by the
inexact name mentioned in the Pre-operation Report from the Makati Police Station and
the Certificate of Coordination from the PDEA. On this matter, the accused-appellant
argued that the buy-bust operation was illegal as it was made without a close coordination
with PDEA. (People of the Philippines vs. Marcos Sabadlab y Narcisoa.k.a “Bong
Pango”, G.R. No. 186392, January 18, 2012)

Assessment of trial court on the credibility of witnesses will generally not disturbed
on appeal. Exceptions.

It is a well-settled rule that the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses will generally not be disturbed on appeal. The rationale for this doctrine is that
the trial court is in a better position to decide the issue, as it heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The only
exceptions to this rule are the following: (1) When patent inconsistencies in the statements
of witnesses are ignored by the trial court; or (2) When the conclusions arrived at are
clearly unsupported by the evidence. (People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Asilan y
Tabornal, G.R. No. 18832, April 11, 2012)

Defense of denial inherently weak

Denial, which is the usual refuge of offenders, is an inherently weak defense, and must be
buttressed by other persuasive evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. The
Page 35 of 71
defense of denial fails even more when the assailant, as in this case, was positively
identified by credible witnesses, against whom no ulterior motive could be ascribed.
(People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Asilan y Tabornal, G.R. No. 18832, April 11,
2012)

Question of sufficiency of information must be raised in the earliest possible time

In this case, Asilan not only failed to question the sufficiency of the Information at any
time during the pendency of his case before the RTC, he also allowed the prosecution to
present evidence, proving the elements of treachery in the commission of the offense.
Asilan is thus deemed to have waived any objections against the sufficiency of the
Information. (People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Asilan y Tabornal, G.R. No. 18832,
April 11, 2012)

Rule 65 proper remedy against resolution of Secretary of Justice on the

determination of probable cause

If the Secretary of Justice reverses the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor who
found no probable cause to hold the respondent for trial, and orders such prosecutor to file
the Information despite the absence of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice acts
contrary to law, without authority and/or in excess of authority. Such resolution may
likewise be nullified in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure(ISAGANI M. YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC, JOSE MA. D.
NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T. ENGRACIA, JR. and VOLT CONTRERAS vs. Hon.
ARTEMIO TUQUERO in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, and ESCOLASTICO
U. CRUZ, JR., G.R. No. 169895, March 23, 2011)

Warrantless arrest and search incidental to lawful arrest

The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were
caught in flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags.
PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even open Dequina’s traveling bag to
determine its content because when the latter noticed the police officers’ presence, she
Page 36 of 71
walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the
zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then
actually being committed by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally
justified, and the following warrantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as
incidental to their lawful arrest. (People of the Philippines vs. NelidaDequina Y
Dimapanan, JoselitoJundoc Y Japitana and Nora Jingabo Y Cruz, G.R. No. 177570,
January 19, 2011)

Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal

We note further that the defense raised its objection and questioned the integrity of the
shabu allegedly seized from Dela Cruz only on appeal. Failure to raise this issue during
trial is fatal to the case of the defense. We explained in People v. Sta. Maria that:

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case
from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question
during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers'
alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before
the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did
appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized
items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise
the question for the first time on appeal. . (People of the Philippines vs. ReynaldDela
Cruz Y Libantocia., G.R. No. 177324, March 30, 2011)

Defense of denial must be proved by clear and convincing evidence otherwise self-
serving

Zafra’s defense of denial must necessarily fail. It is a well-settled doctrine that such
defense will only prosper upon the presentation of clear and convincing evidence
substantiating it. Otherwise, it is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law,
and which cannot prevail over the positive, candid, and categorical testimony of the
complainant.People of the Philippines vs. Roman Zafra y Serrano, G.R. No. 197363,
June 26, 2013)

Page 37 of 71
Retraction of previos testimony should not be given probative value

Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be
given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the
court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one
reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can
easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration,
the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable.(People of the
Philippines vs. Roman Zafra y Serrano, G.R. No. 197363, June 26, 2013)

Findings of trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses entitled to great respect
and accorded the highest consideration by the appellate court

Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest
consideration by the appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within
the province of the trial judge, who had the first hand opportunity to watch and observe the
demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of
their testimony, we have no reason to disregard the findings of the lower court, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.

No arrest, search or seizure can be effected without a valid warrant issued by a

competent judicial authority; Exceptions

Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said
right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures

admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving
vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances.
Page 38 of 71
 On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful
arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances:

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

(People of the Philippines vs. NelidaDequina Y Dimapanan, JoselitoJundoc Y

Japitana and Nora Jingabo Y Cruz, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011)

Date when offense was committed need not to be neccesarily included in the
Complaint or Information except when it is a material ingredient of the offense

Dion disputes the validity of the Complaint in Criminal Case No. 4355-R for
allegedly having grossly violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. Dion argues that because the complaint failed to state
the exact, or at least the approximate, date the purported rape was committed, he was not
able to intelligently prepare for his defense and persuasively refute the indictment against
him.

Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, we are reproducing here Section 11, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:

SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to

state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The

Page 39 of 71
 offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible
to the actual date of its commission. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing that the requirement of indicating in the complaint or
information the date of the commission of the offense applies only when such date is a
material ingredient of the offense. In People v. Espejon, we elucidated on this rule, to wit:

An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the

offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the
commission of a crime is not an essential element of it. Thus, in a
prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the
occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The failure to specify
the exact date or time when it was committed does not ipso facto make the
information defective on its face.

In People v. Cantomayor, we explained when the time of the commission of the

crime becomes relevant:

[T]he time of the commission of the crime assumes importance only when it
creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape or the sufficiency of the
evidence for purposes of conviction. The date of the commission of the rape
becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the
complainant’s narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the
crime.
(People of the Philippines vs. Noel Dion., G.R. No. 181035, July 4, 2011)

Credibility of victim’s testimony in cases of rape; when straightforward,

convincing and consistent

It is settled that when the victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing, and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or
significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the accused may be convicted

Page 40 of 71
solely on the basis thereof. Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her
credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the
essential fact of the commission of rape. The trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’
credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding. (People of the
Philippines vs. Noel Dion., G.R. No. 181035, July 4, 2011)

Positive identification prevails over defense of alibi

The RTC cannot be faulted for not giving probative weight to Dion’s alibi. Besides
being inherently weak for not being airtight, Dion’s alibi cannot prevail against the
positive identification and credible testimony made by AAA. (People of the Philippines
vs. Noel Dion., G.R. No. 181035, July 4, 2011)

Testimony of prosecution witnesses entitled to full faith and credit unless there is
evidence to the contrary

Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the
prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and
their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.In the case at bar, no imputation of
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses was ever made by appellants..
(People of the Philippines vs. MarcelinoDadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi
(deceased) and AlfemioMalogsi., G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014)

Positive identification prevails over alibi; it must be supported by credible

corroboration from disinterested witnesses

It is a time-honored principle in jurisprudence that positive identification prevails over

alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable. Hence, it must be
supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the
accused. An examination of the record would indicate that Eddie and AlfemioMalogsi
were unable to present a corroborating witness to support their alibi that they were
working at a farm owned by a certain Boyle on the date and time of PionioYacapin’s
murder. While the witnesses presented by the defense to corroborate the respective alibis
of MarcelinoDadao and Antonio Sulindao consisted of friends and relatives who are hardly
the disinterested witnesses that is required by jurisprudence.. (People of the Philippines
Page 41 of 71
vs. MarcelinoDadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and
AlfemioMalogsi., G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014)

Dying declaration: Elements

The victim was still alive after the stabbing incident. He had time to reach his house and
confide in his brother, witness Renato, that it was appellant who had stabbed him.

Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 37.Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

The Court has stated in People v. Maglian:

The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the
following circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent
and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would
have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is
offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant’s death." x xx.
(Citation omitted.)

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Florendo made to his brother
Renato has complied with the requisites of a dying declaration. It is important to note that
Florendo, after being stabbed by appellant twice on the chest, went home and under
labored breathing, told Renato that it was appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the
statement made was an expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of his
death, and under the consciousness of impending death. There being nothing in the records
to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been competent to testify had he
survived. It is enough to state that the deceased was at the time competent as a
witness. Lastly, the dying declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves
his death. We reproduce the statement of the RTC:

Page 42 of 71
Moreover, the victim did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the appellant. The
victim, apparently conscious that he could die of his wound, identified his assailant as the
appellant RamilRarugal. Under the rules, statement made by a person under the
consciousness of an impending death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his
death. The positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the
consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the liability of herein
appellant. (People of the Philippines vs. Ramil Rarugal alias “AmayBisaya”., G.R. No.
188603, January 16, 2013)

Modes of appeal from RTC to Court of Appeals

Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 clearly lays down the proper modes of appeal to the
Court of Appeals from the RTCs:

3. Appeals to the Court of Appeals. – On the other hand, appeals by certiorari will not lie
with the Court of Appeals. Appeals to that Court from Regional Trial Courts may be taken:

a) by writ of error (ordinary appeal) – where the appealed judgment was

rendered in a civil or criminal action by the regional trial court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction; or

b) by petition for review – where the judgment was rendered by the regional
trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

The mode of appeal in either instance is entirely distinct from an appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court.

4. Erroneous Appeals. – An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. (Emphases ours.)

The RTC decided Civil Case No. XXI-228 (00) in its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the
RTC Decision dated July 9, 2001, which affirmed the MCTC Judgment of May 29, 2000
against the spouses Leynes, and Resolution inadvertently also dated July 9, 2001, which
denied the spouses Leynes’ Motion for Reconsideration, should have been appealed to the
Court of Appeals by means of a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
(Spouses Ruben and Myrna Leynes vs. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals,
Page 43 of 71
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Branch 1, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, And Spouses Gualberto& Rene Cabahug-
Superales,G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011)

Difference between appeal and petition for certiorari

In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corp.,we presented the following

discourse distinguishing between an appeal (whether an ordinary appeal or a petition for
review) and a petition for certiorari, to wit:

A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for
any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds
of its jurisdiction.

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished

Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which
shall be explained below.

As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of

jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the
simple reason for the rule in this light:

"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every
error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice
would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may

Page 44 of 71
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil
action of certiorari."

The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower
court – on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari.
Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact – a mistake of
judgment – appeal is the remedy.

As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and
power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in
accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts.
An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an
original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original
parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved
party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial
agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).

As to the Subject Matter.Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court
so declare are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari
may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from
the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.

As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the
said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served
within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioner’s timely
filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the
petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order,
or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Page 45 of 71
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the
notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.

As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally
required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate
remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a
judgment or final order.(Spouses Ruben and Myrna Leynes vs. Former Tenth Division of
the Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch 1, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, And Spouses
Gualberto& Rene Cabahug-Superales,G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011)

Certiorari Not the Proper Remedyif Appeal Is Available

Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute
for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy
occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no
available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
(Spouses Ruben and Myrna Leynes vs. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Branch 1, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, And Spouses Gualberto& Rene Cabahug-
Superales,G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011)

Relaxation of rules in admitting late pleadings

The provisions of the Rules of Court, which are technical rules, may be relaxed in certain
exceptional situations. Where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a
substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, it is within
our power to suspend the rules or exempt a particular case from its operation.We
pronounced in Tanenglian v. Lorenzothat:

Page 46 of 71
All things considered, however, we do not agree in the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
dismissing petitioner's Petition based on a procedural faux pax. While a petition for
certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy, there are exceptions to this rule, to
wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the
broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d)
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
(Spouses Ruben and Myrna Leynes vs. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Branch 1, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, And Spouses Gualberto& Rene Cabahug-
Superales,G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011)

Computation of period

In computing said 10-day period, we resort to Rule 22, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:

Section 1.How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or
event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the
date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not
run until the next working day. (Emphases ours.)

We emphasized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, that non-working

days (Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays) are excluded from the counting of the period
only when the last day of the period falls on such days. Rule 22 does not provide for any
other circumstance in which non-working days would affect the counting of a prescribed
period.

The spouses Leynes were served with the summons on May 10, 2000. The last day of the
10-day period within which the spouses Leynes should have filed their answer, May 20,
2000, fell on a Saturday. The next working day was May 22, 2000, a Monday, on which
Page 47 of 71
the spouses Leynes did file their Answer with Counterclaim. Based on the aforequoted
rules, the spouses Leynes’ answer was filed within the reglementary period, and they were
not in default. The MCTC should not have rendered an ex parte Judgment against them.
(Spouses Ruben and Myrna Leynes vs. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Branch 1, Bansalan, Davao Del Sur, And Spouses Gualberto& Rene Cabahug-
Superales,G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011)

Chain of Custody in drugs cases

Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
9165 expounds on the procedure, thus:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.

In People v. Naquita, we expressly declared that non-compliance with Section 21 of

Republic Act No. 9165 does not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.(People of
the Philippines vs. ReynaldDela Cruz Y Libantocia,G.R. No. 177324, March 30, 2011)

Page 48 of 71
Time to move for objection to evidence

Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires
the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without
such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.(People of the
Philippines vs. ReynaldDela Cruz Y Libantocia,G.R. No. 177324, March 30, 2011)

General principles in issuing writ of preliminary injunction

This Court has recently reiterated the general principles in issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction in Palm Tree Estates, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank:

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of

final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or
acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or
interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ
lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be
avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party
applying for the writ is concerned.(Solid Builders, Inc. and Medina Foods Industries,
Inc., vs. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 179665, April 3, 2013)

Doctrine of Strong Arm of Equity

At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled that there is
no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection
than the issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury
where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; "in
cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative
inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and unlawful
invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a
continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish
and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily
interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."(Solid Builders, Inc. and

Page 49 of 71
Medina Foods Industries, Inc., vs. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 179665, April
3, 2013)

Requisites for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction

A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in

the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance
of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites
necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. In this connection,
a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the
applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be
protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that
right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an
irreparable injury.(Solid Builders, Inc. and Medina Foods Industries, Inc., vs. China
Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 179665, April 3, 2013)

Remedy of injunction in foreclosure sale cannot be granted to a party who constantly

defaults in its obligation

Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of nonpayment of mortgage indebtedness. As

this Court held in Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. OJ-Mark Trading, Inc.:

Where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts and promissory
notes that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged properties in case of
default by the mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear right to foreclosure in case of default,
making the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction improper. x xx. (Citation omitted.)

In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies
them from availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. In particular, SBI and
MFII have stated in their Complaint that they have made various requests to CBC for
restructuring of the loan. The trial court’s Order dated December 14, 2000 also found that
SBI wrote several letters to CBC "requesting, among others, for a reduction of interests
and penalties and restructuring of the loan." A debtor’s various and constant requests for
deferment of payment and restructuring of loan, without actually paying the amount due,
Page 50 of 71
are clear indications that said debtor was unable to settle his obligation. SBI’s default or
failure to settle its obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its hands
and disqualified it from availing of the equitable remedy of preliminary injunction.

As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII. The
accessory follows the principal. The accessory obligation of MFII as accommodation
mortgagor and surety is tied to SBI’s principal obligation to CBC and arises only in the
event of SBI’s default.(Solid Builders, Inc. and Medina Foods Industries, Inc., vs. China
Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 179665, April 3, 2013)

Dying Declaration

While Ernesto was not able to testify in court, his statement is considered admissible under
Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 37.Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, we held as follows:

"It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the decedent
that his demise or at least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is
at hand. This may be proven by the statement of the deceased himself or it may be inferred
from the nature and extent of the decedent’s wounds, or other relevant circumstances."

In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab wounds which caused his death within the next 48
hours. At the time he uttered his statement accusing Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his
body was already very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his inability to speak and write
towards the end of the questioning. (People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Tabarnero and
Gary Tabarnero,G.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010)

Irregularity of arrest must be objected to before plea; otherwise the objection is

deemed waived

Page 51 of 71
Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his
arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against
him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must
be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

Nevertheless, even if appellant’s warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such
a scenario would still not provide salvation to appellant’s cause because jurisprudence also
instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

Solicitor General is the representative of the People in criminal proceedingsbefore the

Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court; it is the People’s appellate counsel

Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point. In the recent case of Cariño v. De Castro,
it was held:In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme
Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under
Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to
"represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings." This provision has been carried over to the Revised Administrative Code
particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.

Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina, the Court made the following
pronouncement:

Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced by
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
The fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the
trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial
courts and the regional trial courts. However, when such criminal actions are brought to
the Court of Appeals or this Court, it is the Solicitor General who must represent the
People of the Philippines not the fiscal.

Page 52 of 71
And in Labaro v. Panay, the Court held:

The OSG is the law office of the Government authorized by law to represent the
Government or the People of the Philippines before us and before the Court of Appeals in
all criminal proceedings, or before any court, tribunal, body, or commission in any matter,
action, or proceeding which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General, affects the welfare of
the people as the ends of justice may require.

Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given the
opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The records show that the CA failed to
require the Solicitor General to file his Comment on Duca’s petition. A copy of the CA
Resolution dated May 26, 2004 which required the filing of Comment was served upon
Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for Duca), Atty. VillamorTolete (counsel for private
complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it shown that the
Solicitor General had ever been furnished a copy of the said Resolution. The failure of the
CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment deprived the prosecution of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. (People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F.
Duca,G.R. No. 171175, October 30, 2009)

Dismissal of the petition for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court on service upon the OSG in appealed criminal cases

The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be
given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine
consistently adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due process is
void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of
due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.

The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor
General the chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the
State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA.
The said decision is, therefore, a nullity.Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision
of the RTC via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The
respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of

Page 53 of 71
his petition for review upon the adverse party, in this case, the People of the Philippines
through the OSG. Respondent failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead
served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City. The service of a copy
of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be
inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the
People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The
respondent’s failure to have a copy of his petition served on the People of the Philippines,
through the OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in
Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to dismiss
the petition.(People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F. Duca,G.R. No. 171175, October 30,
2009)

When motion for reconsideration is not required before filing a petition for certiorari

However, in Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that while

generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in
order to give the lower court an opportunity to rectify its errors, this rule admits of
exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the circumstances of the
case. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a condition sine qua non when the
issue raised is purely one of law, or where the error is patent or the disputed order is void,
or the questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already squarely presented to and
passed upon by the lower court.(People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F. Duca,G.R. No.
171175, October 30, 2009)

Effect of death of the accused while case is on appeal

Given Paniterce’s death, we are now faced with the question of the effect of such death on
the present appeal.

Paniterce’s death on August 22, 2009, during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not
only his criminal liabilities for the rape and acts of lasciviousness committed against his
daughters, but also his civil liabilities solely arising from or based on said crimes.1awphi1

Page 54 of 71
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.

Applying the foregoing provision, we laid down the following guidelines in People v.
Bayotas13:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in sensostrictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death
of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

x xxx

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,

Page 55 of 71
 depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.14

Clearly, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on Paniterce’s appeal. Whether or not he
was guilty of the crimes charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of
the Revised Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming Paniterce had
incurred criminal liabilities, they were totally extinguished by his death. Moreover,
because Paniterce’s appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been
rendered against him when he died, his civil liabilities arising from the crimes, being civil
liabilities ex delicto, were likewise extinguished by his death.(People of the Philippines
vs. Domingo Paniterce,G.R. No. 186382, April 5, 2010)

Judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory
and generally not stayed by appeal

The ATO claims that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and the subsequent writ of preliminary
injunction through the Order dated March 29, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 30,2006,
respectively.

Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the key to that question: Sec. 21.
Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – The judgment of
the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. (Emphasis supplied.)

Page 56 of 71
This reflects Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:

Sec. 21.Appeal. - The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate
Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by
this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70
shall be deemed repealed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

The above provisions are supplemented and reinforced by Section 4, Rule 39 and Section
8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court which respectively provide:

Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. – Judgments in actions for injunction,

receivership, accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now or may
hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition
and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial
court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion may make an order
suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or
award of support.

The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be
considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of the adverse party.

x xxx

Sec. 8.Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.–

(a) Upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the corresponding
docket and other lawful fees, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner.

The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals
filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the petition, the Regional Trial
Court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties
which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2
of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
Page 57 of 71
(b) Except in civil cases decided under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the appeal shall
stay the judgment or final order unless the Court of Appeals, the law, or these Rules shall
provide otherwise. (Emphases supplied.)

The totality of all the provisions above shows the following significant characteristics of
the RTC judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it:

(1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is immediately

executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom;
and

(2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom,
unless otherwise ordered by the RTC or, in the appellate court’s discretion,
suspended or modified.(Air Transportation Office (ATO) vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals (Nineteenth Division) and Bernie G. Miaque, G.R. No. 173616,
June 25, 2014)

Hence, duty of RTC in issuing writ of execution becomes a ministerial task

The RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution under Section 21 of Rule 70 is ministerial and
may be compelled by mandamus. Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes that the defendant in
a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the RTC’s judgment and
appeals to a higher court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution
without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course.The rationale of immediate execution
of judgment in an ejectment case is to avoid injustice to a lawful possessor. Nevertheless,
it should be stressed that the appellate court may stay the writ of execution should
circumstances so require.(Air Transportation Office (ATO) vs. Hon. Court of Appeals
(Nineteenth Division) and Bernie G. Miaque, G.R. No. 173616, June 25, 2014)

Judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are not covered by the
general rule in Section 2, Rule 39 (judgment stayed by appeal) but constitute an
exception thereto. Discretionary execution is authorized while the trial court, which
rendered the judgment sought to be executed, still has jurisdiction over the case as the
period to appeal has not yet lapsed and is in possession of either the original record or the
Page 58 of 71
record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of the motion for execution.
It is part of the trial court’s residual powers, or those powers which it retains after losing
jurisdiction over the case as a result of the perfection of the appeal. 53 As a rule, the
judgment of the RTC, rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, being sought to
be executed in a discretionary execution is stayed by the appeal to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, execution of
the RTC’s judgment under Section 21, Rule 70 is not discretionary execution but a
ministerial duty of the RTC.54 It is not governed by Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court but by Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on judgments not stayed by appeal.
In this connection, it is not covered by the general rule, that the judgment of the RTC is
stayed by appeal to the Court of Appeals under Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, but constitutes an exception to the said rule.(Air Transportation Office (ATO) vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals (Nineteenth Division) and Bernie G. Miaque, G.R. No. 173616,
June 25, 2014)

Writ of preliminary injunction before the CA as available remedy in immediately

executory judgments of RTC under Rule 70

In connection with the second characteristic of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case
appealed to it, the consequence of the above distinctions between discretionary execution
and the execution of the RTC’s judgment in an ejectment case on appeal to the Court of
Appeals is that the former may be availed of in the RTC only before the Court of Appeals
gives due course to the appeal while the latter may be availed of in the RTC at any stage of
the appeal to the Court of Appeals. But then again, in the latter case, the Court of Appeals
may stay the writ of execution issued by the RTC should circumstances so require.City of
Naga v. Hon. Asuncion56 explains:This is not to say that the losing defendant in an
ejectment case is without recourse to avoid immediate execution of the RTC decision. The
defendant may x xx appeal said judgment to the Court of Appeals and therein apply for a
writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, as held in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, even if RTC
judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction
may still be granted. (Air Transportation Office (ATO) Vs. Hon. Court of Appeals
(Nineteenth Division) and Bernie G. Miaque, G.R. No. 173616, June 25, 2014)

Page 59 of 71
Contempt may be validly imposed by COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
function. The main thrust of petitioner’s argument is that the COMELEC exceeded its
jurisdiction in initiating the contempt proceedings when it was performing its
administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions as the National Board of Canvassers for
the election of senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC may only punish
contemptuous acts while exercising its quasi-judicial functions.

Task Force Maguindanao’s fact-finding investigation – to probe into the veracity of the
alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine
whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election
offense had possibly been committed – could by no means be classified as a purely
ministerial or administrative function.

The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial
power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required
the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to
argue and support their respective positions.

The effectiveness of the quasi–judicial power vested by law on a government institution

hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the
hearings or proceedings. (LintangBedolvs. Commission on Elections,G.R. No. 179830,
December 3, 2009)

Duties of Board of Canvassers not purely ministerial; hence contempt may be validly
imposed by the board

Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at that
time it required petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the
powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi-
judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether the papers
transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper officers.
(LintangBedolvs. Commission on Elections,G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009)

Page 60 of 71
Indirect contempt proceeding may be instituted via verified petition or by the Board
motuproprio.The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the
COMELEC motuproprio. Furthermore, the above-quoted provision of Section 52(e),
Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties
provided by the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, Rule 71, said proceedings may be
initiated motuproprio by the COMELEC, viz:

SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be

initiated motuproprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order
or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition
with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for
civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a
principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but
said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its
discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint
hearing and decision.

Hence, the COMELEC properly assumed jurisdiction over the indirect contempt
proceedings which were initiated by its Task Force Maguindanao, through a Contempt
Charge and Show Cause Order, notwithstanding the absence of any complaint filed by a
private party.(LintangBedolvs. Commission on Elections,G.R. No. 179830, December 3,
2009)

Independent relevant statement as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule.

True, there were instances when the Court rejected newspaper articles as hearsay, when
such articles are offered to prove their contents without any other competent and credible
evidence to corroborate them. However, in Estrada v. Desierto, et al., the Court held that
not all hearsay evidence is inadmissible and how over time, exceptions to the hearsay rule
have emerged. Hearsay evidence may be admitted by the courts on grounds of "relevance,

Page 61 of 71
trustworthiness and necessity."When certain facts are within judicial notice of the Court,
newspaper accounts "only buttressed these facts as facts."

Another exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of independently relevant statements,
where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity
thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the statements are
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but
primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact.

Here, the newspaper clippings were introduced to prove that petitioner deliberately defied
or challenged the authority of the COMELEC. As ratiocinated by the COMELEC in the
challenged Resolution of August 7, 2007, it was not the mere content of the articles that
was in issue, but petitioner’s conduct when he allowed himself to be interviewed in the
manner and circumstances, adverted to in the COMELEC Resolution, on a pending
controversy which was still brewing in the COMELEC.(LintangBedolvs. Commission on
Elections,G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009)

Fresh-period rule.

Jurisprudence has settled the "fresh period rule," according to which, an ordinary appeal
from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the
trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.Taking our bearings from Neypes, in
Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a notice of appeal which was
purportedly filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within which
to file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the therein petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.(Ermelinda C. Manaloto, Aurora J. Cifra, Flordeliza J.
Arcilla, Lourdes J. Catalan, Ethelinda J. Holt, Bienvenido R. Jongco, Artemio R.
Jongco, Jr. And Joel JongcoVs. Ismael Veloso Iii,G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010)

Fresh-period rule has retroactive application.

Also in Sumiran, we recognized the retroactive application of the fresh period rule to cases
pending and undetermined upon its effectivity: The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in
Page 62 of 71
cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of Neypes
on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v.
Homena-Valencia, stating thus:

The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could
retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September
2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of
the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they
do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing.

Principle of abuse of rights.

The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above article, departs from the classical
theory that "he who uses a right injures no one." The modern tendency is to depart from
the classical and traditional theory, and to grant indemnity for damages in cases where
there is an abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit.

Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide
specifically in statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable
for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make
him liable. The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through
the forms or technicalities of the law, together with an absence of all information or belief
of fact which would render the transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means
good faith as understood by men of affairs.

While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle, the "cardinal
law on human conduct" expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that
where a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties
in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to
liability. The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
Page 63 of 71
The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law.
The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be
exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan
for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and
civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently
protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not
exalted - then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons
are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person's dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind.

It is petitioner's position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of those
enumerated in Arts. 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The violations mentioned
in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude
other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a
person's dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language.
Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation,
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission.(Ermelinda C. Manaloto, Aurora J. Cifra, Flordeliza J. Arcilla, Lourdes J.
Catalan, Ethelinda J. Holt, Bienvenido R. Jongco, Artemio R. Jongco, Jr. And Joel
JongcoVs. Ismael Veloso Iii,G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010)

Exception To The Rule That Jurisdiction May Be Raised At Anytime.

While it is a rule that jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, this, however,
admits of an exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened. The Court has, time
and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction when adverse.(SIMEON VALDEZ vs. GSIS, G.R. 146175; June 30, 2008)

Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

It is an elementary principle that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be used if
the proper remedy is appeal. Being an extraordinary remedy, a party can only avail
Page 64 of 71
himself of certiorari, if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.Here, appeal is the correct mode but was not seasonably utilized by
the petitioner. Resort to this petition for certiorari is, therefore, improper because certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal. Petitions for certiorari are
limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve
questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. For, it is basic that
certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a
general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of review. Its
principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked
only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issued by the
court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. It is not to be
used for any other purpose, such as to cure errors in proceedings or to correct erroneous
conclusions of law or fact, as what petitioner would like the Court to venture into.
(SIMEON VALDEZ vs. GSIS, G.R. 146175; June 30, 2008)

Notice of Sale of Property upon Execution.

SEC. 15. Notice of sale of property on execution. Before the sale of property on
execution, notice thereof must be given as follows:

(a) In case of perishable property, by posting written notice of the time and
place of the sale in three (3) public places, preferably in conspicuous areas of the
municipal or city hall, post office and public market in the municipality or city where the
sale is to take place, for such time as may be reasonable, considering the character and
condition of the property;

(b) In case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in the three
(3) public places above-mentioned for not less than five (5) days;

(c) In case of real property, by posting for twenty (20) days in the three (3)
public places above-mentioned a similar notice particularly describing the property and
stating where the property is to be sold, and if the assessed value of the property exceeds
fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, by publishing a copy of the notice once a week for two
(2) consecutive weeks in one newspaper selected by raffle, whether in English, Filipino, or
Page 65 of 71
any major regional language published, edited and circulated or, in the absence thereof,
having general circulation in the province or city;

(d) In all cases, written notice of the sale shall be given to the judgment obligor,
at least three (3) days before the sale, except as provided in paragraph (a) hereof where
notice shall be given at any time before the sale, in the same manner as personal service of
pleadings and other papers as provided by Section 6 of Rule 13.

Section 15(d) of Rule 39, cited by petitioners must be read in relation to Section 6, Rule
13, which in turn provides:

Sec. 6. Personal service. Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a
copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a
person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known,
or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning
and six in the evening, at the party's or counsel's residence, if known, with a person of
sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.

Verily, following Section 6, Rule 13, the written notice of sale to the judgment
obligor need not be personally served on the judgment obligor himself. It may be served
on his counsel, or by leaving the notice in his office with his clerk or a person having
charge thereof. If there is no one found at the judgment obligor’s or his counsel’s office or
if such office is not known/inexistent, it may be served at the residence of the judgment
obligor or his counsel and may be received by any person of sufficient age and discretion
residing therein. Thus, petitioners’ theory (that only written notice of sale served on
petitioners’ themselves would be valid) is utterly bereft of merit. (TAGLE vs. CA, G.R.
162738; July 8,2009)

Res Judicata in the Concept of Conclusiveness of Judgment.

The concept of conclusiveness of judgment is explained in Nabus v. Court of Appeals as

follows:

Page 66 of 71
The doctrine states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit, and was
there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action
and persons in privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action
between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action, while the judgment remains
unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The only identities thus required for the
operation of the judgment as an estoppel x x x are identity of parties and identity of issues.

It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential
that the issues be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action,
and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties [or their privies] will be final and conclusive in
the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit.
(TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. PILIPINAS
SHELL PETROLEUM, G.R. 170007; April 7, 2014)

Searches and Seizure Incidental to Lawful Arrest.

Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest.– A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within
reach."13 It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law
enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully
arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the
safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and
within the reach of the arrestee.

In People v. Valeroso, this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible reach of a
Page 67 of 71
valid warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest
itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction.

Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending
officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in
the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the
seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or
within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate
control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be
as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested. (PEOPLE vs. CALANTIAO, G.R. 203984; June 18, 2014)

Plain View Doctrine.

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and
premises under his immediate control. This is so because "objects in the ‘plain view’ of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence." "The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it
be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused
– and permits the warrantless seizure.(PEOPLE vs. CALANTIAO, G.R. 203984; June 18,
2014)

Inventory and Chain of Custody of Evidence.

Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the marijuana is
Page 68 of 71
still inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the apprehending officers to
comply with the rules on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the police station.

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
Page 69 of 71
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.

This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically
impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1) physical
inventory, and (2) taking of photographs. As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia20:

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is
the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the
evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the
place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of
the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. (PEOPLE vs. CALANTIAO,
G.R. 203984; June 18, 2014)

Page 70 of 71
Page 71 of 71