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Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company & Armando Pon v. IAC, The Heirs of Paz Vda.

De Pamfilo, The
Heirs Of Norma Neri, and Baylon Sales And Nena Vda. De Rosales| Paras

G.R. Nos. 74387-90 November 14, 1988

FACTS

• A bus owned by petitioner BLTB and driven by petitioner Pon collided with a bus owned by Superlines,
when the former tried to overtake a car just as the Superlines' Bus was coming from the opposite
direction.

• The collision resulted in the death of Rosales, Pamfilo and Neri, as well as injuries to the wife of
Rosales, and Sales. These people were passengers of the petitioner's bus.

• Rosales and Sales, as well as the surviving heirs of Pamfilo, Rosales and Neri instituted separate cases
ih the CFI against BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers. Criminal cases against the drivers
were also filed in a different CFI.

• CFI ruled that only BLTB and Pon should be liable, and they were ordered jointly and severally to pay
damages. On appeal, the IAC affirmed the CFI's ruling.

• Petitioners contended that the CFI erred in ruling that the actions of private respondents are based on
culpa contractual, since if it were private respondents' intention to file an action based on culap
contractual, they could have done so by merely impleading BLTB and Pon. Instead the respondents filed
an action against all defendants based on culpa aquiliana or tort.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

WON erred in ruling that the actions of private respondents are based on culpa contractual

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

IAC anchored its decision on both culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana

The proximate cause of the death and injuries of the passengers was the negligence of the bus driver
Pon, who recklessly overtook a car despite knowing that that the bend of highway he was negotiating on
had a continuous yellow line signifying a “no-overtaking” zone.

It is presumed that a a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation.

In the instant case, the driver of the BLTB bus failed to act with diligence demanded by the
circumstances. Pon should have remembered that when a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a
curve there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver has not the right
to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car is approaching from
the opposite direction comes into view.
As to the liability of the petitioners, Pon is primarily liable for his negligence in driving recklessly the
truck owned by BLTB. The liability of the BLTB itself is also primary, direct and immediate in view of the
fact that the deat of or injuries to its passengers was through the negligence of its employee.

The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its passengers is based on its contractual
obligation to carry its passengers safely to their destination. They are presumed to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they have observed extaordinary diligence. In the case at bar, the
appellants acted negligently.

BLTB is also solidarly liable with its driver even though the liability of the driver springs from quasi delict
while that of the bus company from contract.
ABOITIZ SHIPPING V. CA (G.R. NO. 84458)

Facts:

Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia owned by petitioner Aboitiz Shipping Corp at the port at
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. The vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila and
was taken over by Pioneer Stevedoring for the latter to unload the cargoes from the said vessel pursuant
to their Memorandum of Agreement. An hour after the passengers and Viana had disembarked the
vessel the crane operator began its unloading operation. While the crane was being operated, Viana
who had already disembarked the vessel remembered that some of his cargoes were still loaded there.
He went back and while he was pointing to the crew where his cargoes were, the crane hit him pinning
him between the side of the vessel and the crane resulting to his death. A complaint for damages was
filed against petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner contends that Viana ceased to be a
passenger when he disembarked the vessel and that consequently his presence there was no longer
reasonable. CA affirmed the trial court’s order holding Aboitiz liable. Hence the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the latter had already
disembarked the vessel.

Ruling: YES.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at
the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once created, the relationship
will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from
the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All persons
who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed
passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined
from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person
transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier’s
premises to claim his baggage.

The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of
the victim on or near the petitioner’s vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause. When the
accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do,
from petitioner’s vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely
to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.

Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger
of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
Transportation Case Digest: Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. V. CA Et Al. (1991)

G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991

Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (Transportation)

Laws Applicable: Art. 1733, Art. 1755

FACTS:

May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to Dangwa Transportation
Co. Inc. (Dangwa)

The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when Pedro alighted

Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward

Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicle

Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before bringing
Pedro to Lepanto Hospital where he expired

Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa for the death of Pedro Cudiamat

Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the
co. and the supervision of the employees even as they are not absolute insurers of the public at large

RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence was the cause of his death but
still ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito

CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages, actual and compensatory damages
and cost of the suit

ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore

HELD: YES. CA affirmed.

A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders (EVEN when moving as
long as it is still slow in motion)

Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the effect of increasing peril to a passenger while
he is attempting to board the same

Premature acceleration of the bus in this case = breach of duty

Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already considered a passenger and is entitled all
the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation

Duty extends to boarding and alighting


GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his
destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and
any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of
the carrier

EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Art. 1733 and 1755 of
the Civil Code

Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious condition = patent and
incontrovertible proof of their negligence

Hospital was in Bunk 56

1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later called the family of Pedrito on his own will) to
alight and deliver a refrigerator

In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings


IMSON Vs. CA

Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision involving petitioner's Tuyota Corolla and a hino diesel
truck registered under the names of private respondents, FNCB Finance Corp, and Holiday Hills stock
and Breeding Farm Corp. The collision seriously injured petitioner and totally wrecked hs car. A
complaint for damages was instituted against the registered owners of the truck, the truck driver, the
beneficial owners of the truck and the truck insurer, Western Guaranty Corp.In 1987, petitioner and
insurer entered into a compromise agreement, hence the complaint was dismissed against the insurer.
Later, private respondents moved to dismiss the case against all defendants contending that since they
are all indispensable parties, the dismissal of the case against the insurer must result in the dismissal of
the suit against all of them.

Issue: WON all of the defendants were indispensable parties.

Ruling: Petition granted.

Ratio: It is true that all of the petitioners' claims are premised on the wrong committed by the defendant
truck driver. Concededly, the truck driver is an indispensable party to the suit. The other defendants
cannot be as indispensable parties, they are merely proper parties to the case.

Thus, if petitioners did not sue Western Guaranty Corp, the omission would not cause the dismissal of
the suit against the other defendants. Even without the insurer, the trial court would not lose its
competency to act completely and validly on the damage suit.
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEO
ALMARIO, respondents
No. 48006. July 8, 1942

Facts:

A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred.


The carretela was overturned and one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy, the son of
Garcia and Almario, died as a result of the injuries which he received. The driver of the
taxicab, an employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When
the criminal case was instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved their right to institute a
separate civil action for damages. Subsequently, Garcia and Almario instituted a civil
action for damages against Barredo, the employer of the taxicab driver.

Issue:

Whether or not they can file a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo making him
primarily and directly responsible

Held:

(Foreword: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the present Civil
Code. However, the principle enunciated in said case, that responsibility for fault or
negligence as quasi-delict is distinct and separate from negligence penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, is now specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of the Civil Code.)

The defendant maintains that Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the Penal Code,
his (defendant’s) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal Code,
but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted.
To decide the main issue, we must cut thru the tangle that has, in the minds of many,
confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code
and fault or negligence under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. According to the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain:

“Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’ is a separate


legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this
principle, and on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and
direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

“It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver’s negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1903 limits
cuasi-delitos TO ACTS OR OMISSIONS ‘NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW.’ But inasmuch as
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple
imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code has
apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the “confusion worse
confounded.’ However, a closer study shows that such a concurrenceof scope in regard to
negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a
crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. “Some of the differences between
crimes under the Penal Code are:

“1. That crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delitos are only of private concern.

“2. That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the
Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

“3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because for the former are punished only
if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts
in which ‘ any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.’ However, it should be noted that not
all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging
in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic
when nobody is hurt.

“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos


or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction
between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and
that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer – in this case the defendant-petitioner – is
primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.”
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Porfirio P. Cinco V. Hon. Mateo Canonoy Et
Al. (1979)

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

Laws Applicable: Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, Art. 31 and Article 2176 of the
Civil Code

Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated
by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident

At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the
civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section
3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:

(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered

City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case

CFI by certiorari: dismissed

ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action

HELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for

nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant

primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are
principles calculated to protect society

The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in
section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases provided in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.

Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the
criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil
action based on quasi-delict

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to
persons but also damage to property

word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm
done
Torts And Damages Case Digest: German Garcia Et Al., V. The Hon. Mariano
M. Florido Et Al. (1973)

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973

Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his wife,
Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and boarded
a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo
Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City for the purpose of
attending a conference

August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national
highway at 21 km, it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro Tumala

Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical
treatment and hospitalization

Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers and their owners for driving
in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules
and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car

RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is a violation of law
or traffic rules or regulations for excessive speeding

ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite having a
criminal action.

HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to
proceed with the trial of the case

essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil
Code are present, namely:

a) act or omission of the private respondents

b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger
bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car

c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the collision


d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or
negligence of private respondents

e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties

violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the
protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners

petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against
respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either
by conviction or acquittal of said accused

It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages,
petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the
criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case

petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself
(Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended
party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances
of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal
Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs CA

TITLE: Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs. CA

CITATION: 219 SCRA 115

FACTS:

Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married.
She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange
student who later courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to
Marilou’s house to secure approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the
respondent to leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with
him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and
threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in school and
drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner administered a drug
to abort the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since
he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed
marriage or agreed to be married neither sought consent and approval of Marliou’s
parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter
deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The private respondent prayed for
damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.

ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.

HELD:

The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The
court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent
to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that
instance, the court found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to
surrender her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have
carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding
preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws
of the country.
CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. L-12191 OCTOBER 14, 1918

FACTS:

On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Company where
he was an employee. As the train drew near to his destination, he arose from his seat.
When he was about to alight from the train, Cangco accidentally stepped on a sack of
watermelons which he failed to notice because it was already 7:00pm and it was dim when
it happened. As a result, he slipped and fell violently on the platform. His right arm was
badly crushed and lacerated which was eventually amputated.

Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its employees
placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a
menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company’s trains.

The company’s defense was that granting that its employees were negligent in placing an
obstruction upon the platform, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by
plaintiff was his own contributing negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

HELD: In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act –


that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly – the age, sex, and
physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of
the passenger, and should be considered.

The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and off
the train at the station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard
either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the
platform where he was alighting. The Supreme Court’s conclusion was that the conduct
of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
SPOUSES BATAL VS SPOUSES SAN PEDRO (2006)

4 Feb 2018

SPS. ERLINDA BATAL AND FRANK BATAL vs. SPS. LUZ SAN PEDRO AND
KENICHIRO TOMINAGA

[G.R. No. 164601; September 27, 2006] Obligations and Contracts| Culpa| Liabilities in
case of Negligence|

FACTS:

Respondents Sps. Luz and Kenichiro Tominaga contracted the services of petitioner
Frank Batal who represented himself as a geodetic engineer to survey the exact
boundaries of their property for the construction of their perimeter fence. Sometime in
1996, a complaint was lodged against the Sps. that allegedly they encroached upon a
designated right-of-way of an adjoining lot and upon further verification it was found out
that their wall indeed encroached to it. They also discovered that it was not Frank but his
wife Erlinda Batal, who is a licensed geodetic engineer. Frank, consequently admitted that
he made a mistake and offered to share in the expenses for the demolition and
reconstruction of the questioned portion of fence, however failed to deliver on his word,
thus the filing of the instant suit.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners failed to exercise due care and diligence in the conduct of the
resurvey which eventually caused damage to the respondents.

HELD:

Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses, either as:

Culpa Aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a
vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not formally bound by
any other obligation, and is governed by Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, or

Culpa Contractual, which is the fault or negligence incident in the performance of an


obligation which already existed, and which increases the liability from such already
existing obligation, and is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code.

In the present case, it is clear that the petitioners, in carrying out their contractual
obligations, failed to exercise the requisite diligence in the placement of the markings for
the concrete perimeter fence that was later constructed. As a result, the placement of the
monuments did not accurately reflect the dimensions of the lot. Because of the
encroachment, the respondents had to demolish and reconstruct the fence and, thus,
suffered damages. Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners are liable for
damages suffered by the respondents.
Calalas v CA (Torts)

Calalas v CA. G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000 VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA
JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.

FACTS:

At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a
college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the
door at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she
was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion
of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common
carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the
Isuzu truck.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. RTC – Dumaguete – rendered judgment against Salva holding that the driver of the Isuzu truck was
responsible

It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for
quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to
Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.

2. CA – reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of
contract of carriage since the cause of action was based on such and not quasi delict.

Hence, current petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates
his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of
its passengers

In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply?

RULING:

No.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for
the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether
petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.

Quasi-delict / culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual

1. Has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor

2. negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action

3. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable

(device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party,
obligation is created by law itself)

Breach of contract / culpa contractual

1. premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation

2. action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor
(here, the common carrier) failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination

3. not available; it is the parties themselves who create the obligation and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created

In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to
the common carrier the burden of proof.

Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise utmost diligence.

1. Jeepney was not properly parked;

2. Overloading of passengers.
Vergara v. CA

Facts:

A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck
belonging to petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the store-residence of private respondent Amadeo
Azarcon, causing damage assessed at P53,024.22. The trial court rendered decision in favor of private
respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Traveller’s Insurance and Surety
Corporation, the following: (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c)
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs. The
insurance company was sentenced to pay to the petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party
liability under its comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b) P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto; hence, this instant petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict

Held:

It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at
bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which
defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause
and effect between such negligence and the damages. The fact of negligence may be deduced from the
surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck was travelling on
the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side
of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed
the store warehouse of the plaintiff." According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes
but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap
caused by defective brakes can not be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects
were curable and the accident preventable.
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Natividad V. Andamo, Et Al., V. Intermediate Appellate Court Et Al.
(1990)

G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built through its agents, waterpaths,
water conductors and contrivances including an artificial lake within its land

inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo's land, caused a young man to
drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction

July 1982:spouses instituted a criminal action

February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil case for damages

CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until after judgment in
the related Criminal Case

spouses contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case since it is
predicated on a quasi-delict

ISSUE: W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private propety

HELD: YES. REVERSED and SET ASIDE

All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:

(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff

(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond

(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff

While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of
the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances
built by respondent corporation

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual
and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care
so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,
the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil
action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter
Insurance Case Digest: FGU Insurance Corporation V. CA (2005)

G.R.No. 137775 March 31, 2005

Lessons Applicable: Loss caused by negligence of the insured (Insurance)

FACTS:

Anco Enterprises Company (ANCO), a partnership between Ang Gui and Co To, was engaged in the
shipping business operating two common carriers

M/T ANCO tugboat

D/B Lucio barge - no engine of its own, it could not maneuver by itself and had to be towed by a tugboat
for it to move from one place to another.

September 23 1979: San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shipped from Mandaue City, Cebu, on board the D/B
Lucio, for towage by M/T ANCO:

25,000 cases Pale Pilsen and 350 cases Cerveza Negra - consignee SMC’s Beer Marketing Division (BMD)-
Estancia Beer Sales Office, Estancia, Iloilo

15,000 cases Pale Pilsen and 200 cases Cerveza Negra - consignee SMC’s BMD-San Jose Beer Sales
Office, San Jose, Antique

September 30, 1979: D/B Lucio was towed by the M/T ANCO arrived and M/T ANCO left the barge
immediately

The clouds were dark and the waves were big so SMC’s District Sales Supervisor, Fernando Macabuag,
requested ANCO’s representative to transfer the barge to a safer place but it refused so around the
midnight, the barge sunk along with 29,210 cases of Pale Pilsen and 500 cases of Cerveza Negra totalling
to P1,346,197

When SMC claimed against ANCO it stated that they agreed that it would not be liable for any losses or
damages resulting to the cargoes by reason of fortuitous event and it was agreed to be insured with FGU
for 20,000 cases or P858,500

ANCO filed against FGU

FGU alleged that ANCO and SMC failed to exercise ordinary diligence or the diligence of a good father of
the family in the care and supervision of the cargoes

RTC: ANCO liable to SMC and FGU liable for 53% of the lost cargoes

CA affirmed

ISSUE: W/N FGU should be exempted from liability to ANCO for the lost cargoes because of a fortuitous
event and negligence of ANCO

HELD: YES. Affirmed with modification. Third-party complainant is dismissed.


Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735, and
1745 Nos. 5, 6, and 7 . . .

Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods,
unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

. . .

Art. 1739. In order that the common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the natural disaster
must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. However, the common carrier must exercise
due diligence to prevent or minimize loss before, during and after the occurrence of flood, storm, or
other natural disaster in order that the common carrier may be exempted from liability for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods . . .

Caso fortuito or force majeure

extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which though
foreseen, were inevitable

not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it
must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid - not in this case

other vessels in the port of San Jose, Antique, managed to transfer to another place

To be exempted from responsibility, the natural disaster should have been the proximate and only cause
of the loss. There must have been no contributory negligence on the part of the common carrier.

there was blatant negligence on the part of M/T ANCO’s crewmembers, first in leaving the engine-less
barge D/B Lucio at the mercy of the storm without the assistance of the tugboat, and again in failing to
heed the request of SMC’s representatives to have the barge transferred to a safer place

When evidence show that the insured’s negligence or recklessness is so gross as to be sufficient to
constitute a willful act, the insurer must be exonerated.

ANCO’s employees is of such gross character that it amounts to a wrongful act which must exonerate
FGU from liability under the insurance contract

both the D/B Lucio and the M/T ANCO were blatantly negligent
CASE DIGEST

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs Suyom

388 SCRA 445 (2002)

Facts:

On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna
Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed which caused death and injury. Tutor
was charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple
physical injuries.

Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, it was known that the registered owner of the
tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On April 15, 1995, respondents filed
against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a
Complaint for damages.

The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no
longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an
employee, not of Equitable, but of Ecatine.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner was liable for damages based on quasi delict for the negligent acts.

Held:

The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the intention of the parties
to enter into a finance lease agreement. Ownership of the subject tractor was to be registered in the
name of petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully paid by Edwin Lim.

Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. Thus, a Deed of Sale over the tractor
was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not
registered with the LTO.

Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of
the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of
a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are
concerned.

Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the
deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.
Metro Manila Transit vs. CA; Torts- Vicarious
Liability of Employers
7/15/2013

0 Comments

G.R. No. 116617. November 16, 1998

Facts:
MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area and Musa was its
driver . The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-year high school student at the
University of the Philippines Integrated School.

At around a quarter past one in the afternoon of August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus No. 27, which was
driven by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. An eye
witness said the girl was already near the center of the street when the bus, then bound for the
south, hit her. She fell to the ground upon impact, rolled between the two front wheels of the bus,
and was run over by the left rear tires thereof. Her body was dragged several meters away from the
point of impact. Liza Rosalie was taken to the Philippine Heart Center, but efforts to revive her
proved futile.
Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. However, for the civil
liability, Souses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC, Musa, MMTC
Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
They subsequently amended their complaint to include Feliciana Celebrado, a dispatcher of the
MMTC, as a defendant therein.

To free themselves from liability, petitioners attempted to prove that it exercise diligentissimi patris
familias in the selcetion and supervision of employees through oral evidence.

The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Rosales, but made MMTC primarily liable and Musa secondarily
liable.

Issue:
Whether or not MMTC is solidarily liable with Musa.

Ruling
Yes!
Petitioner’s attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of
employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other
evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.

Although, MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective employees on
vehicle maintenance, traffic regulations, and driving skills and claimed that applicants are given tests
to determine driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision, there is no record that Musa attended
such training programs and passed the said examinations before he was employed. No proof was
presented that Musa did not have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records of daily
inspections, allegedly conducted by supervisors, ever presented.

The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other documentary proof
tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the trial
court and the opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.

As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its employee in view of
Art. 2180. Pursuant to Art. 2181, it can recover from its employee what it may pay. This does not
make the employee’s liability subsidiary. It only means that if the judgment for damages is satisfied
by the common carrier, the latter has a right to recover what it has paid from its employee who
committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Hence, the
spouses Rosales have the option of enforcing the judgment against either MMTC or Musa.

From another point of view, Art. 2194 provides that “the responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.” We ruled in Gelisan v. Alday that “the registered
owner/operator of a public service vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages
incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of
said vehicle.” In Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appealsit was held that “to escape solidary liability
for a quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it
exercised such degree of care.” Finally, we held in the recent case of Philtranco Service Enterprises,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals that “the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle . . . for
damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or
solidary with the driver.”

Rationale for Imposing Vicarious liability


What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate
allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are
sure to occur in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a
required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an
enterprise, which will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the tort of
employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff,
should bear them; and because he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through
prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at
large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that an employer who is held strictly liable is
under the greatest incentive to be careful in the selection, instruction and supervision of his
servants, and to take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted safely.
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Taylor V. Manila Electric Railroad And Light Co.(1910)

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910

Lessons Applicable:

Elements of quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer,
more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in
mechanics with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla
del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to
make them a cylinder for a miniature engine

After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open
space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground

These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has
attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity

They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a
considerable explosive power the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each
took end, and carried them home

After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's
home

The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps trust the ends of the wires into an electric
light socket - no result break the cap with a stone – failed opened one of the caps with a knife, and
finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches David held the cap while Manuel
applied a lighted match to the contents

An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three

Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and
started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck

Manuel had his hand burned and wounded

David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye
to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons

Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable

ISSUE:
1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable - NO

2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. sufficiently proved that they employed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to avoid the damage – NO

HELD: reversing the judgment of the court below

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and omissions
or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.

ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors
who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.

xxx xxx xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —

1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for kindling
of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place.

in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:

Damages to the plaintiff

Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty.

The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

while we hold that the entry upon the property without express invitation or permission would not have
relieved Manila Electric from responsibility for injuries incurred, without other fault on his part, if such
injury were attributable to his negligence, the negligence in leaving the caps exposed on its premises
was not the proximate cause of the injury received

cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the
explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted

Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred
2 years before the accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland
transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical
engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and
continued in that employment for 6 months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy
of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys
of 15

The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by Jessie
who even ran away

True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which
might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the
resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be
expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would
be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and
caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly
responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.

The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand
and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to
fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be
impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of
negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts
and their consequences

he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate
the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which
resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the
direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these
injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the
accident which inflicted the injury

rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire

just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he
can not demand reparation therefor from another

Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.

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