Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199 (1930)
L-29333, 27 February 1969
FACTS:
In the general elections held on December 14, 1937, respondent Agripino Ga.
Del Fierro and petitioner Ireneo Moya were contending candidates for the
office of the mayor of the Municipality of Paracale, Camarines Noret. After
canvass of the returns, the Board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the
elected mayor with a majority of 102 votes. However, respondent filed a motion
of protest and judgment was rendered in favor of respondent, declaring him as
the candidate-elect with a majority of 3 votes over his rival. Petitioner now
seeks said judgment for review alleging the ff:
a. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 8 ballots either
inadvertently or contrary to the controlling decisions of this Honorable
Court
b. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 3 ballots marked
"R. del Fierro."
c. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 7 ballots marked
"Rufino del Firro."
d. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 72 ballots marked
"P. del Fierro."
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s contentions are tenable
HELD: NO
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of
government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of
popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority.
He has a voice in his Government and whenever called upon to act in
justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle it. This, fundamentally, is
the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with
utmost, with reasonable, liberality.
It is sufficient to observe, however, in this connection that whatever might have
been said in cases heretofore decided, no technical rule or rules should be
permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention is discoverable
from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes
to the very root of the system. Rationally, also, this must be the justification for
the suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation of ballots which are
now incorporated in section 144 of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No.
357).
Badelles v. Cabili, G.R. No.
FACTS:
Protestant Badelles and protestee Cabili were the duly registered candidates
for the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan City. Badelles impugns the election of
Cabili on the ground that there were “flagrant violatiOn of mandatory provisions
of law relating to or governing elections…”.
What was thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were cast by those not
qualified to do so, numbering 8,300 or more and that an approximately equal
number, who were duly registered with the Commission on Elections, Iligan
City, were unable to vote due to the above circumstances. The proclamation
then could not have reflected the true will of the electorate as to who was the
mayor elected, as the majority of protestee Cabili over the protestant consisted
of only 2,344 votes.
The election protests against the duly proclaimer Mayor (Cabili) were
dismissed by the CFI of Lanao del Norte. In such order of dismissal, it was
admitted that while irregularities as well as misconduct on the part of election
officers were alleged in the election protests filed, there was however an
absence of an allegation that they would change the result of the election in
favor of the protestants and against the protestees, that such irregularities
would destroy the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast, or that the
protestees knew of or participated in the commission thereof. For the lower
court then, the lack of a cause of action was rather evident.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court in ordering the dismissal of the election
protests
HELD: YES
The seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have the elections
conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to
doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the duly elected officials. Such
allegations, it is to be stressed, would have to be accepted at their face value
for the purpose of determining whether there is a cause of action, a motion to
dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission of facts thus pleased. Without
the lower court having so intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial
abnegation of a sworn duty to inquire into and pass upon in an
appropriate proceeding allegations of misconduct and misdeeds of such
character.
1
NOTE:
That if the grievance relied upon is the widespread irregularities and the
flagrant violations of the election law, the proper remedy is the one availed of
here, the protest.
Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148334, 21 January 2004
FACTS:
Following the appointment of Sen. Teofisto Guingona as VP of the Phils., the
Senate passed Resolution No. 84 calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections
on May 14, 2001. The resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate
garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Sen. Guingona.
Petitioners now seek the nullification of the special election and the declaration
of the 13th elected senator (Honasan) for (1) having failed to notify the
electorate of the position to be filled in as required under Sec. 2 of RA 6645;
(2) having failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates
of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections
as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3)
having failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking
election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly
required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Special Election should be nullified for failure to
give notice by the body empowered
HELD: NO
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly
provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general
elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates
as the call for that election.—The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice
of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly
or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election’s
validity. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the
election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election.
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly
provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general
elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates
as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus
prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the
duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty
to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the
election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of
the time and place of the election. Conversely, where the law does not fix the
time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to
fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the
statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure
to do so will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure
to give notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted
in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the
special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of
voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a vacancy,
a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void. The required notice to
the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers two matters.
First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant single three-
year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections scheduled on
the same date. Second, that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial
candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election
NOTES:
The Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the members of the Senate. (Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution)
Section 2 of R.A. 6645 provides for the procedure in calling a special
election.—In case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the
expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires
COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special
election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety
(90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate,
the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding
regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things, the
office or offices to be voted for.
2
DISSENTING OPINION- JUSTICE PUNO for the vacancy, it would have no place there, as the term of office of the
incumbent, if living, would not expire until January 1, 1947.
An outstanding feature of the 1987 Constitution is the expansion of the
democratic space giving the people greater power to exercise their sovereignty

Thus, under the 1987 Constitution, the people can directly exercise their
sovereign authority through the following modes, namely: (1) elections; (2)
plebiscite; (3) initiative; (4) recall; and (5) referendum.

The right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law. Suffrage
is a privilege granted by the State to such persons as are most likely to
exercise it for the public good.” The existence of the right of suffrage is a
threshold for the preservation and enjoyment of all other rights that it ought to
be considered as one of the most sacred parts of the constitution

The purpose of election laws is to safeguard the will of the people, the purity
of elections being one of the most important and fundamental requisites of
popular government

As worded in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to information is self-
executory

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and
artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and
discussion of issues thereon is vital to the democratic government envisioned
under our Constitution.

The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of

power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and
institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people.
Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the
citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the
power had been delegated . . . x x x x x x x x x .

Notice to the electors that a vacancy exists and that an election is to be

held to fill it for the unexpired term, is essential to give validity to the
meeting of an electoral body to discharge that particular duty, and is also
an essential and characteristic element of a popular election. Public
policy requires that it should be given in such form as to reach the body
of the electorate. Here there had been no nominations to fill the vacancy,
either by the holding of a special primary election, or by nomination by
county political conventions or party committees. The designation of the
office to be filled was not upon the official ballot. As before noted, except

3
Purisima v. Salanga, 15 SCRA 704 (1965) proclamation made notwithstanding such patent defects, without awaiting
proper remedies, is null and void (Ibid.).
FACTS:
Patent erasures and superimpositions in words and figures of the votes stated
In the election of November 12, 1963, Amante Purisima and Gregorio Cordero in the election returns strike at the reliability of said returns as basis for canvass
were among the candidates for any of the three offices of Provincial Board and proclamation. A comparison with the other copies, and, in case of
Member of Ilocos Sur. Purisima noted that during the canvass, the returns of discrepancy, a recount, is the only way to remove grave doubts as to the
41 precincts showed on their faced that the words and figures for Cordero’s correctness of said returns as well as of ascertaining that they reflect the will
votes had been “obviously and manifestly erased” and superimposed with of the people.
other words and figures. Purisima requested for suspension of the canvass
however, the Board of Canvassers denied said request. The BOC continued
and finished the canvass and consequently, proclaimed Cordero the winner.
Purisima filed a petition for recount under Sec. 163 of the Revised Election
Code. The petition for recount was dismissed. In dismissing the petition for
recount, respondent Judge stated that some of the requisites were not present,
namely: first, that it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that a
discrepancy exists; second, that said discrepancy is between the copy
submitted to the board and another authentic copy thereof; third, that said
authentic copy must also be submitted to the board

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not Purisima may file the petition for recount by himself
2) Whether or not the BOC has the duty to suspend canvass in light of the
events

HELD: 1) YES

A candidate affected can file a petition for recount alone, without the
concurrence of the provincial board of canvassers (Cawa vs. Del Rosario, L-
16837-40 May 30, 1960). From the fact, therefore, that the provincial board of
canvassers has not petitioned for a recount it cannot be inferred that they were
not convinced a discrepancy existed

Where a candidate was prevented from securing the Commission on Elections'

copies of the returns to establish a discrepancy between them and the
Provincial Treasurer's copies, the failure to submit the said copies to the board
should not prejudice his right to petition for recount before the court

2) YES

Where, as in the case at bar, there were patent erasures and superimpositions
in words and figures on the face of the election returns submitted to the board
of canvassers, it was imperative for said board to stop the canvass so as to
allow time for verification of authentic copies and recourse to the courts (Javier
vs. Commission on Elections, L22248, January 30, 1965). A canvass or
4
Cauton v. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 911 also tampered like the three copies outside the ballot box. The Commission
may do this on its own initiative, or upon petition by the proper party. That order
FACTS: does not affect the right to vote or the validity of the votes cast.

Petitioner Lucas Cauton and respondent Pablo Sanidad were 2 of the NOTE: The ballot boxes may be opened in case there is an election contest.
candidates for the Office of Representative in the 2 nd congressional district of They may also be opened, even if there is no election contest, when their
Ilcos Sure. During the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos contents have to be used as evidence in the prosecution of election frauds.
Sure, respondent Sanidad brought to the attention of the Board the fact that Moreover, they may be opened when they are the subject of any official
the entries of votes for the candidates for Representative in those copies of investigation which may be ordered by a competent court or other competent
the election returns that came from the envelopes presented by the provincial authority. The competent authority must include the Commission on Elections
treasurer differed from the entries appearing in the copies of the returns from which is charged with the administration and enforcement of the laws relative
the same election precincts that were in the possession of the Liberal Party. to the conduct of elections.
He then filed a petition with the COMELEC praying for the opening of the ballot
boxes in all the precincts of Candon, Santiago, and Sta. Cruz. Respondent
COMELEC then issued an order directing the opening of the ballot boxes of
said municipalities. Petitioner, however, contends that COMELEC is without
jurisdiction to issue the resolution in question and the same is null and void
and should not be given legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC resolution is void.

HELD: NO

The Commission has the power to decide all administrative questions affecting
elections, except the question involving the right to vote. The Commission on
Elections has the power to investigate and act on the propriety or legality of
the canvass of election returns made by the board of canvassers. The power
of the Commission in this respect is simply administrative and supervisory. It
is intended to secure the proclamation of the winning candidate based on the
true count of the votes cast.

Once the Commission on Elections is convinced that the election returns in

the hands of the board of canvassers do not constitute the proper basis in
ascertaining the true result of the elections. it is duty bound to take the
necessary steps in order that the proper basis for the canvass is made
available. It would be absurd to say the Commission has a legal duty to
perform and at the same time it is denied the necessary means to perform that
duty.

Where the three copies of the election returns outside the ballot box do not
constitute a reliable basis for a canvass, then the Commission on Elections, in
the exercise of its power to administer and enforce the laws relative to the
conduct of elections, may order the opening of the ballot boxes to ascertain
whether the copy inside each ballot box, corresponding to each precinct, is
5
 and adoption of a system of evaluation to ascertain that the minimum system
Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, 10 September 2009 capabilities would be met.

The Court, in its September 10, 2009 Decision, dismissed the petition and the
petition-in-intervention on the following main grounds: 10 February 2010 (Motion for Reconsideration)- DENIED

(1) RA 8436, as amended, does not require that the AES procured or, to be
used for the 2010 nationwide fully automated elections must, as a condition
sine qua non, have been pilot-tested in the 2007 Philippine election, it being
sufficient that the capability of the chosen AES has been demonstrated in an
electoral exercise in a foreign jurisdiction;
By Decision dated September 10, 2009, the Court denied the petition of H.
Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify
the contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint venture
of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic
International Corporation (Smartmatic).

(2) Comelec has adopted a rigid technical evaluation mechanism to ensure Theories, issues, and arguments not raised in the original proceedings cannot
compliance of the PCOS with the minimum capabilities standards prescribed be brought out on review. Basic considerations of fair play impel this rule. The
by RA 8436, as amended, and its determination in this regard must be imperatives of orderly, if not speedy, justice frown on a piecemeal presentation
respected absent grave abuse of discretion; of evidence and on the practice of parties of going to trial haphazardly

(3) Comelec retains under the automation arrangement its supervision,

oversight, and control mandate to ensure a free, orderly, and honest electoral
exercise; it did not, by entering into the assailed automation project contract,
abdicate its duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections and decide, at the first instance, all questions affecting elections; and

(4) in accordance with contract documents, continuity and back-up plans are
in place to be activated in case the PCOS machines falter during the actual
election exercise.

The bottom line is that the required 2007 automation, be it viewed in the
concept of a pilot test or not, is not a mandatory requirement for the choice of
system in, or a prerequisite for, the full automation of the May 2010 elections.

PUNO (C.J.), Separate Concurring Opinion:

A touchstone of our Constitution is that critical public policy judgments belong

to the legislative branch, and the Court must not unduly intrude into this
exclusive domain. In enacting RA 8436 (Election Modernization Act) on
December 22, 1997, the legislature has clearly chosen the policy that an AES
shall be used by the COMELEC for the process of voting, counting of votes
and canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local elections. It
decided to put an end to the manual conduct of our elections that has frustrated
the honest casting of votes by our sovereign people. In the pursuit of its
objective, the legislature defined what it considered an AES and provided the
standards for its implementation. It further determined the minimum functional
capabilities of the system and delegated to the COMELEC the development
6
Arroyo v. DOJ and Comelec, G.R. No. 199082, 18 September 2012
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint
committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies
committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of
officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding
Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial
elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao
were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein
petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.
assistants are given continuing authority as deputies to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election offenses under election laws and
to prosecute the same. The complaints may be filed directly with them or may
be indorsed to them by the petitioner or its duly authorized representatives.
The grant of exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of election
offenses to the Comelec was not by virtue of the Constitution but by the
Omnibus Election Code which was eventually amended by Section 43 of R.A.
9369. Thus, the DOJ now conducts preliminary investigation of election
offenses concurrently with the Comelec and no longer as mere deputies. If the
prosecutors had been allowed to conduct preliminary investigation and file the
necessary information by virtue only of a delegated authority, they now have
better grounds to perform such function by virtue of the statutory grant of
authority. If deputation was justified because of lack of funds and legal officers
to ensure prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses,
the same justification should be cited to justify the grant to the other
prosecuting arms of the government of such concurrent jurisdiction.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a

resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be
filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo,
among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ

Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid

HELD: YES

The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may
avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint
within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with
the office of the fiscal [public prosecutor], or with the Ministry [Department] of
Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. Under the above
provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested
exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same
provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 34 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, provincial and city prosecutors and their
7

Arroyo v. DOJ and Comelec 23 July 2013
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only
when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent
jurisdiction
2) Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the
decisional independence of the Comelec.
HELD:
1) NO
In Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections, 595 SCRA 477 (2009), the
constitutionality of Section 43 of RA 9369 had already been raised by
petitioners therein and addressed by the Court. While recognizing the
Comelec’s exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This
exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by
Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and
other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise
concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election
offenses.
2) NO
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ
nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the
resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses
shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules
of Procedure. With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the
creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelec’s
independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
Ongsioko Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013
FACTS:
On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it contained
material representations. On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC cancelled the
certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On
May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her MR. However, on May 18, 2013,
she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013,
COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the
same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that
time, as her term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013.According to
petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed20Â because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the †œsole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELLEC has jurisdiction over petitioner
HELD: YES
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), the HRET does not
have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of
Representatives, to wit: As to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be
a concurrence of the following requisites:(1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper
oath, and (3) assumption of office.
The petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office; The term
of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.” Thus, until such time, the
Commission on Elections retains jurisdiction.
8

Ongsioko Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, 22 October 2013
In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the
Commission En Banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from
its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); That the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House
of Representatives is a written constitutional provision.
The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was a summary proceeding or one “heard summarily.”
The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, and
its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that
determines who can be legally proclaimed.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction over the qualification of
the Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as
such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC
which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular,
not summary, proceeding
Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a
declaration that certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. Petitioner raises three principal
questions for contention:
(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who
are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of
executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines,
violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim
the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives,
including the President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional
mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates
for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by
Congress; and
(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section) to exercise
the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the
independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional
2) Whether or not Section 18.5 is unconstitutional
3) Whether or not Section 25 is unconstitutional
HELD:
1) NO
The execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act; The
affidavit is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent
resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin.
Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to “resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from
approval of his/her registration,” the Filipinos abroad must also declare that
they have not applied for citizenship in another country.
Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails
to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage
2) YES
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on
the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president
and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.” The provisions
of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part
of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of
the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and
vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
9
 3) YES
Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such person or classes as are
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the most likely to exercise it for the public good. For reasons of public policy,
IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond certain classes of persons are excluded from the franchise. Among the
the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the generally excluded classes are minors, idiots, paupers, and convicts.
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
The right of the State to deprive persons of the right of suffrage by reason of
their having been convicted of crime, is beyond question. The manifest
People v. Corral, 62 Phil. 945 (1936) purpose of such restriction is to preserve the purity of elections. (9 R. C. L.,
1042.)
FACTS:
The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony is unfit
Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold a public office. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)
June 5, 1934. He was convicted on the ground that he had voted while laboring
under a legal disqualification under Section 2462 in connection with Section The exclusion from the exercise of suffrage must be adjudged a mere
432 of the Revised Administrative Code, which reads: disqualification imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding
of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)
The following persons shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight, has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than
eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by
plenary pardon.
(b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to the
United States.
(c) Insane of feeble-minded persons.
(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write.
(e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next proceeding section
who, after failing to make sworn statement to the satisfaction of the board of
inspectors at any of its two meetings for registration and revision, that they are
incapacitated for preparing their ballots due to permanent physical disability,
present themselves at the hour of voting as incapacitated, irrespective of
whether such incapacity be real or feigned.

Appellant was sentenced by final judgment to suffer 8 years and 1 days of

presidio mayor and no evidence was presented to show that prior to said
elections, he had been granted a plenary pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the State has the right to deprive appellant the right of
suffrage by reason of conviction of a crime

HELD: YES

The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of

government. It is a right created by law, not a natural right.
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