1
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos,1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel.
Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an
implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares
form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No.
50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic
partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel.2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,
with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995
(reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of
Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel. . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995
(reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/OGCC
(Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.4 In
a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by
Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the
bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . .5 which respondent GSIS refused to
accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian
firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was
referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and
submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.
It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.6
Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership
of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving
51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to
which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and
its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred
after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if
for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer

this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate,
there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done."9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the
term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive
marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel
and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not
make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the
Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a
personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional
provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony.
Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution,
petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the
bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides
that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may
offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is
misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet
arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since
Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving
rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since
respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever
it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for
mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the
2
authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law
of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns
to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is
that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine
of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law
or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into
by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers
who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.
12 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to
operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative
body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate
of the fundamental law.14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it
has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion
to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless
by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not
self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission —

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS,"
can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not
qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?".
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED"
because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which
business may be done. For example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial
structures, et cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the
legislature is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details
may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional
provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate
the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy
for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission
from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-
executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII
is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which
undoubtedly are not self-executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage
3
the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph,
and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the
same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language
require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely
statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed
in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are
simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of
constitutional provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of
the youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of education.
25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice
and human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites
provisions on the promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role
of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development. 33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms
of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be
based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional
right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34
explains —
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to out
rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands,
forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources,
but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it
was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be
truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of
various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural
Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government. it plays
host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.
36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and
Memory of a City. 37 During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military
Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture
Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places
fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of
political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel
reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed
coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine
Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest;
its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51%
of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51%
will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is
not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also
includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the
amendment would consist in substituting the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the
4
following: "CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS
WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to
raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it
preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a
corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference
should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may refer
only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. 39
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as
intended by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-
controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate
his amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."
MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino
enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will
the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE
SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called
"Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of
concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the
subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic
concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never
found in previous Constitutions . . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens
who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence
and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to
Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an
indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be
made between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over
the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent
GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in
accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been
found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has
significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and
marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the
subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite
disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision — by the government itself
— is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure
faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which
evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source
5
of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the
failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable legal
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for
reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of
Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an
interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not
how constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This
argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could
only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee
on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone
makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered "state action"
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public function;" (2) when
the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the
action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore
the transaction. although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions
of power — legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed
to the State is correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to
the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its
authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the
winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be
declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts,
and secured the requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is
not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide
by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to
all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is,
as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the
bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the
land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block
of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional
injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will
have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of
a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and
meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is,
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of
the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign
investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open
to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the
Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to
Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could
participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited
to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the
qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case
before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of
the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad.
Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its
earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent
disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of
action.
6
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the
award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is
a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be
treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of
judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of
the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is
still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the
Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to
the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the
block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect
the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the
Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid
of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987
Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be
enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will
never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the
Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of
this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments.
Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly
sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the
Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately
articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment
for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation
economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived
as obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in connection with a temporary
injunction issued by the Court's First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a
Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in a major daily to the
effect that injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major
obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene
in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or
attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the
laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair
and ill-informed criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and
preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take
 7

precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should
not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines SO ORDERED.
higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution
in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any
economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49

Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and
republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all
government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people
must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any
constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments,
while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. 50

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to
the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary
piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted
many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are
talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong
manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official
visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant
role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this
sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell
the historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For,
indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be
less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a
nation's soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot
be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and
all that it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the
nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity
will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified,
zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the
Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue
to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA

HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT
the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the
subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter
to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for purpose.

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN,
petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of initiative was
unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting
of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original
proponent1 and the main sponsor2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of
the Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative".3 Indeed it is, for both under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of,
the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members and (2) by a constitutional convention.4 For this and the other reasons hereafter
discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)5 wherein
Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative,6 a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize
people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to
8
exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in
proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country,
with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by
individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures,
it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an
order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the
electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition
on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local
circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4
and 7 of Article VI,7 Section 4 of Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution.
Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10
embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited
sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and
after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the
country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037
(INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin
"to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the
signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation
at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on
12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and
Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other
lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
"memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition
raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact,
Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by
People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still
pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on
the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle
on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically
provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of
people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator
Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before
the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as
implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have
been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print
media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments
because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra
vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the
COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of
initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass
the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of
the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the
COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for
the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege
that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded
by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters
amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in
expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the
transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this
9
petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of
procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there
is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition
within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining
order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent
COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the
petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL
TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST
PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC
GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF
THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN
THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN
AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES
SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF
THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE
DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY"
PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE
COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991
PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE
RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE
HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY
SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR
BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A
PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH
RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES
OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE
CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO
DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413,
2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16
which starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft
'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed
on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally
necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement
to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of
the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the
conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such
initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to
amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall
become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section
2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the
Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the
Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or
more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul
the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate
of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if
there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any
event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be
for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
10
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the
Office of the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its
Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power;
and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the
Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution.
Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735
because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle
on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent
provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the
Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does
not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the
Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735
and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to
implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order;
(b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order
filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating
that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the
Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6
January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not
later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a
Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was
later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change
from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure;
and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions,
such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal
access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. 19 A revision

cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other
national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up
the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of
leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few,
and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making
for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble
vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-
interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the
people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a
premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that
implements the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the
proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition
is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and
means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f)
the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of
the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the
appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the
appropriation of funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law,
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a people's
initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains
to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution,
as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's
right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17
and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship
speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20
of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that
the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition
and to order its publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading
contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the
filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of registered voters. He
also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority
and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of
11
signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the
determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a
plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in
Intervention raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on
the initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required
number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by
Congress or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention
filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed
by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the
Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file
within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid
Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a
nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon
within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal
issues, which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the
pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on
amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers
such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on
National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct
of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the
draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an
amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely
intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the
unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is
a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit
copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations
and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have
dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the
Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the
Record of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505,
as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral
Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on
House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the
Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties
thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue
which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF
THE DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the
fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action
12
when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative
answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private
respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding
any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the
proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal
from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84).
In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse
environmental consequences on the body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The
consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political
ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the
Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain
the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard
the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required
them to submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or
specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by
ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing.
The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to
the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over
the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum
number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the
required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be
treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise
of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark
Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT
SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in
the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment
or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No.
332). 30 That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
13
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of
the Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted
a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the
Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed
provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the
registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to
the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no
details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are
leaving this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does
not pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with
respect to the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite
could be called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman
is right. In any event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be
called until after five years from the date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the
first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be
after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National
Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.

FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the details on how this is to be
carried out — is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification
is the work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that
possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a
body could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the
three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that
proposal to the people for ratification through the process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest
constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of
institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment
thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as
written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent
power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the
Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a
separate article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of
amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again
concede to the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of
amending the Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the
National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that
would adequately cover all the conceivable situations. 33
14
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to
proposals to AMEND — not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative,
which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated
from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article
on Amendment or Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as
a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of
Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process
of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by
the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of
modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with
the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into
account the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable
Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified
amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2.
— AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED
BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF
THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION
SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of
the sense contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the
proposed amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly
showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to
set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature from
asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this
particular right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine
anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for
submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words,
none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the
right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative
to AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1
refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
15
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by
Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an
amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal
by the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention
would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional
convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the import being that the process
of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary
legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a
referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the
Legislative because it would require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as
precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by
way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or
on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final
version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as
follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows:
"AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY
THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF
THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION
SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading
on 9 July 1986. 41 Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon
was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In
view thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August
1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by
changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law"
in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the

implementation of the exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text
of the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution
under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who
answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator
Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right
than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the
last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of
Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the
rules implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right]
is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505
and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to
it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which
dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum
under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and
referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral
Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft
bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the House of
Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for
the implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
16
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is
silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power
to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through
the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from
Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local
initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve
or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and
that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage
of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other
systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the
proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case
may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said
paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall
be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).

The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended
or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative
on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and
for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of
the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No.
6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of
things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national
and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local
Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the
scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what
is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can
pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or
resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into
national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and
clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms —
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation;
and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 53
17
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions
not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1)
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an
election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and
proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the
legislative bodies of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law,
may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other
legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings
of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be
petitions for both national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative
and Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and
local initiative and referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts
from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the
Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the
details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation
thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the
Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the
petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for
its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the
petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of
the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local
government unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been
obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the
registered voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all
of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b)
defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems
of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in
an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the
constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e)
provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
18
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount
system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be
cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are
as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5
above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one
which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND
REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the
"sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of
Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly
vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a
petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required
number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the
purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures.
Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before
the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through
its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters
in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment
of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the
actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No.
2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more
than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6
19
December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and
resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the
term limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of,
the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution
should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength.
Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide
for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-
96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as
against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III,
BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO
represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its
Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM
represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen.
Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman,
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay,
JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR.
DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
20
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,
TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T.
VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and
MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO
L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x

SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R.
OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO
LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR.,
and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe
and Peter Doe,, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission
on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987
Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
21
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections
1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." 6 These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition,
the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters'
ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR
THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and
mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the
COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition
since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that
Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an
expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent
COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the
COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition
despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition
as an opposition-in-intervention.

In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the
petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor
General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary
devises to implement the system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing
the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting intervenors 10 uniformly hold the view that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand,
the opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding
precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file
the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the
Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters
supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; 12 (4) the
nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with
the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After
receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit
Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's
glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the
Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on
Elections.
22
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows
a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an
amendment "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to
propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to
them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them and they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional
amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass
it around for signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign
such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft
shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means
two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative
upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given
the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text
of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the
United States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all
States15 which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify
their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the
full text of the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of
various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the
signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and
more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a
significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an
initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the
petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or
even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's
liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person
giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested
interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.17
(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative
commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text
requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can
intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of
full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the
elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from.
23
If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many
instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and
effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which
renders the initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set
forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of
our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American
jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the
full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign
on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the
Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the
people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents
secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are
not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of
the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to
the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements
in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied
with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained,
or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper
that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a
copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed
their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral
arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7
September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached
to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature
sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of
Legislative District: Barangay:
Verified
 24

Signatures: Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from
February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets,
printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF
with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group
OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND
circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25
ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
August 2006 petition.
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"

I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30
August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they
which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my
support for the filing thereof. started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the
25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the
COMELEC, states as follows:
Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification
Number
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal
Last Name, First MM/DD/YY capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities
Name, M.I. of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached,
1 and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
2
3 The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present
4 petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22
has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
5
6
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
7
8 RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S
9 CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S
10 INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
_________________ _________________ __________________
Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines
(ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the
People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's
proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the
this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006. ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the
ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the sometime in October 2005;
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The
signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by
they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted
that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in its final report sometime in December 2005;
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress
which militates against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987
Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of
Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has
unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda through People's
Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the
same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE
MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S
CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE
1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14
January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25
August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC.
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic)
Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of
amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative Commission 24 are vastly
different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or
30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of
the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed
revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the
existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch.
The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the
existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months
before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with
the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the
Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets,
six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft
petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
25
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino
Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed
amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and
paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and
failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the
amended petition was what they had shown to the people during the February to August
2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August
2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006
amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition
together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their
present petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition
together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication
that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino
Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC,"
thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a
signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of
the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.]
Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together
with the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to
have understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative
filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra
had pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In
their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for
initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino
finally stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the
amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did
not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on
the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an
authority that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people.

Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be
attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to
sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be
incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present
initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to,
the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug
from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February
to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended
petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this
Court in their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature
sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino
Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the
Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only
100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the
COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional
copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional copies
the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing
of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino
Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and
reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x."25 This admission
binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group
failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people
who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with
certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage.
If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only
100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet
contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000
signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the
petition before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a
great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the
signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show
to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than
one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
26
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the
proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an
indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this
during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is
also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The
failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the
initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment
must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The
signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not
see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the
nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members
of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who
are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary
elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine the
expiration of their own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's
signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were
proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The
people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or
rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the
people during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament
would be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before
the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended
petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held
simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections
for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections without
specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes,
could have easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government
officials." This would have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held
in the next local elections following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the
absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the
regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of
office. This allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond
their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of
regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of
Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets.
Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire
nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present
initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty.
Lambino and his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the
proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were
led to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for
the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the
signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on
Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a
strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the
Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision
invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential
to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this
as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the
27
same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no
to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and
not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of
Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling,"
which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The
very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the
electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's proponents' simplistic
explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the
electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot
language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal
makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement
that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the
Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the
single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of
logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's
passage, and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the
enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any
structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their
proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions,
when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use
simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and
eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election.
More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an
initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative
process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or
revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people
who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to
propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments
or revisions to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim
Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the
proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed
Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the

Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising
again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific
amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and
why there is a need for such further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in
the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an
initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the
nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30
August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if
the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June
2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of
Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier
than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will
remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister
exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule
elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from
the present members of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present
Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million
people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures
would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that
their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's
choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the
full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a
gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be
"directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign
on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments
cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to
unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
28
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do
not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the
people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to
comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative
must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the
Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can
propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution
provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first
mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is
through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring
to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was
intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that
pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing

the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee
report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph
(c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a
self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not
expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution.
That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would
only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed
amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word
"revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction
between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
29
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a
clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers
intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose
revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may
propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the
Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in
McFadden v. Jordan,32 the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution
x x x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and
amendments to the Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a
constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may
be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution
proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove.
Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the
measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial
revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may
not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a
constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be
amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or
other change only through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution
itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a revision;
and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an
amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV,
Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on the revision of the
constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized by the
1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It
failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required
by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.

While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by
the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be
submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the
requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be
proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x
xx
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments.
There can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a
deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended
in the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to
revise a constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument
is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x
"While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have
power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in
doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled principles of
constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed
the method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the
fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk
from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the
Constitution ― that a people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of
the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present
petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the
fundamental difference in this manner:
30
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding
nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of
the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding
nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an
addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis
supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is
also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic
principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the
constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the
change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision." 37 Whether
there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a
change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government
and the system of check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision
and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes
overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting
a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.40 Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.

Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the
separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the
abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within
the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and
the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily
apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in
the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional
Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions.
The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new
provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that
may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the
guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or
of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to
determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from
the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its
over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a
bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State
constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on
whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment
would x x x affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of
Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as
follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide
for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the
Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of
government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of
the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to
visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is
basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the
whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the
Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on
government.
31
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by
the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail
to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and
conflicts which would result, or if after submission of appropriate amendments the
people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of
this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section
1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could
be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the
answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and
many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to
eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant,
homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we
were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
here.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The
Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature,
it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did
not even touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution
that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the
Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would
be affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no
doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the
structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only
one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative
body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called
"revisions" because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes.
However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called
"amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an
"occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their
Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly
provide for both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and
constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide only for

"amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent
distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the
common people in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of
correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or
vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention
delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their
occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words
"revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process or procedure of
coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision"
cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x
(Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had
drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative,
the changes would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group
concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if
Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the
Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely
amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of
changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict
the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the
Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent
and language.45 Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language
deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating
inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory,
devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only
exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a
proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a
revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American
jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the
Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the
constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely
provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a revision of the
constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.
32
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to
the constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert
that the distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the
scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not
limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot
measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument,
including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of
the government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that,
because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles of
Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII,
section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the
legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit
revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court
concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative,
because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII,
section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the
initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar
sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only
section of the constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it
excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure
before the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not
apply to constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent
of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for
amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum,
colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision.
The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision
begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers
among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in
several sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without
affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment
and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15

years47 is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership
of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election
to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the
Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also
affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the
three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum,
opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A
change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an
amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or
"theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure
of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific
change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions,
as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-
and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a
constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a
revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered
principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake
revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed
and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments
and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions
states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with
the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended
to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a
prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions.
However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its
head this rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the
33
earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one
"shall be amended," which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily
conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a
"surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so
that the later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency.
However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory
Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in
the proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be
resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's
proposed changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models,
which are among the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes
could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government
― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models,
which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets
realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand
parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the
Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of
the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in
gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not
an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to
"[A]mendments to this Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring
RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the
system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago

which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case
before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical
consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of
a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision
on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the
present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the
present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even
before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the
"petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%)
of the total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires
that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition
of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B.
Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as
counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC,
the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely
attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and
amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of
RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No
petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x
x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament
to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more
than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the
electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the
Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed
this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition
warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
34
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could
be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the
Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and
obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly
amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and
revision laid down in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered
waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court
allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed
modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of
changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does
not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes
cast53 − approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That
approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's
sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising
the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino
Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their
sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-
constitutional change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will and
discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend
and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot
override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution
itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the people's fundamental covenant that provides
enduring stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by
political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to
be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino
Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition
with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her
Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino

Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of
the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of
incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The
Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This
Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm
initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the
Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and
desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and
Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET AL.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
Without the rule of law, there can be no lasting prosperity and certainly no liberty.
Beverley McLachlin 1
Chief Justice of Canada
After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful evaluation of the parties' respective
arguments -- both oral and written -- as well as the enlightened and enlightening Opinions
submitted by my esteemed colleagues, I am fully convinced that the present Petition must be
dismissed.
35
I write, however, to show that my present disposition is completely consistent with my
previous Opinions and votes on the two extant Supreme Court cases involving an initiative to
change the Constitution.
In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec,2 I opined "that taken together and
interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), Republic Act
6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient
__________________
'SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.'
"With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too
extremist. It is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to
killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do
we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the
right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a
misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a
right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly,
the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
"While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority openly concedes
— intended by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough
provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. I completely agree with the
inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice
Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently implements
the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I
shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Court's
unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on
Elections, that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to effectuate
their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights
granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any "effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
"No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition
of this, R.A. 6735 wisely empowered the Commission on Election "to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this

Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January
1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws,"
not by the incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting
Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution."
__________________
E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B.
Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired
from the Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other
than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a cherished right of our
people.
"The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws
and local legislations, it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no
basis for such differentiation. The source of and authority for the Resolution is the
same law, R.A. 6735.
"I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the
Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300
provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our
people's power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
"I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin
and the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that
such restraining order as against private respondents should not have been issued,
in the first place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped from using public
funds and government resources to help them gather signatures, I firmly believe that
this Court has no power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative. The
right to propose amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of free
speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and despotic to stop
anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As
the eminent Voltaire once said, 'I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to
the death your right to say it.' After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree
with, but as Justice Holmes wrote, 'freedom for the thought that we hate.'
Epilogue
36
"By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion.
Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino
constitutional system. All three are institutionalized legacies of the world-admired
EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of
popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as
Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA) v. Comelec,3 I joined the rest of the members of the Court in ruling "by a
unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the Comelec in
dismissing the petition filed by
__________________
Constitution x x x." While concededly, petitioners in this case were not direct parties
in Santiago, nonetheless the Court's injunction against the Comelec covered ANY
petition, not just the Delfin petition which was the immediate subject of said case. As
a dissenter in Santiago, I believed, and still do, that the majority gravely erred
in rendering such a sweeping injunction, but I cannot fault the Comelec for
complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio
decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of
the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave
abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse
open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of
the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and
contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable
controversies.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735
"I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to cover initiatives on
the Constitution, and that whatever administrative details may have been
omitted in said law are satisfactorily provided by Comelec Resolution 2300. The
promulgation of Resolution 2300 is sanctioned by Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which vests upon the Comelec the power to "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall." The Omnibus Election Code likewise empowers the electoral
body to "promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code
or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer x x x."
Finally and most relevantly, Section 20 of Ra 6735 specifically authorizes Comelec
"to promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of this Act."
"In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that "there is a right way to do the right thing at
the right time and for the right reason." Let me explain further.

The Right Thing
"A people's initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right thing that citizens
may avail themselves of to articulate their will. It is a new and treasured feature of the
Filipino constitutional system. Even the majority implicitly conceded its value and
worth in our legal firmament when it implored Congress "not to tarry any longer in
complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for implementation of the right
(of initiative) of the people x x x." Hence, in the en banc case of Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. Comelec, [G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996], this
Court unanimously held that "(l)ike elections, initiative and referendum are powerful
and valuable modes of expressing popular
PIRMA therein," since the Commission had "only complied" with the Santiago Decision.
__________________
sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to
nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise."
The Right Way
"From the outset, I have already maintained the view that "taken together and
interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA
6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to
implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution." Let
me now demonstrate the adequacy of RA 6735 by outlining, in concrete terms, the
steps to be taken – the right way – to amend the Constitution through a people's
initiative.
"Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe the form of the
petition which shall contain the proposition and the required number of signatories.
Under Sec. 5(c) thereof, the petition shall state the following:
'c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to be x x x
amended, x x x;
c.2 the proposition [in full text];
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly explained];
c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
37
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100)
words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the
petition.'
"Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires that the petition
include a formal designation of the duly authorized representatives of the signatories.
"Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition
precedent to the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional. Without such requisite
signatures, the Commission shall motu proprio reject the petition.
"Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above requirements, they
may thence file the petition with the Comelec which is tasked to determine the
sufficiency thereof and to verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards. In deciding whether the
petition is sufficient, the Comelec shall also determine if the proposition is proper for
an initiative, i.e., if it consists of an amendment, not a revision, of the Constitution.
Any decision of the electoral body may be appealed to the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from notice.
I added "that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec
Resolution 2300 will not ipso
__________________
"Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the determination of its
sufficiency, the Comelec shall publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice
in newspapers of general and local circulation, and set the date of the plebiscite. The
conduct of the plebiscite should not be earlier than sixty (60) days, but not later than
ninety (90) days after certification by the Comelec of the sufficiency of the petition.
The proposition, if approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite, becomes
effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
"From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding the adequacy of
RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate the
PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far
from it. Among others, PIRMA must still satisfactorily hurdle the following searching
issues:
1. Does the proposed change – the lifting of the term limits of elective officials --
constitute a mere amendment and not a revision of the Constitution?
2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the petition? This
question is relevant considering that under RA 8189, the old registry of voters used in

the 1995 national elections was voided after the barangay elections on May 12, 1997,
while the new list may be used starting only in the elections of May 1998.
3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution really emanate from
the people who signed the petition for initiative? Or it is the beneficiaries of term
extension who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-
interest?
4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they really belong to
qualified warm bodies comprising at least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
therein?
"I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The Right Reason.
Question Nos. 1 and 2 above, while important, are basically legal in character and
can be determined by argumentation and memoranda. However, Question No. 4
involves not only legal issues but gargantuan hurdles of factual determination. This to
my mind is the crucible, the litmus test, of a people's petition for initiative. If herein
petitioners, led by PIRMA, succeed in proving -- not just alleging -- that six million
voters of this country indeed want to amend the Constitution, what power on earth
can stop them? Not this Court, not the Comelec, not even the President or Congress.
facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the
Constitution. Far from it." I stressed that PIRMA must show the following, among others:
__________________
"It took only one million people to stage a peaceful revolution at EDSA, and the very
rafters and foundations of the martial law society trembled, quaked and crumbled. On
the other hand, PIRMA and its co-petitioners are claiming that they have gathered six
million signatures. If, as claimed by many, these six million signatures are fraudulent,
then let them be exposed and damned for all history in a signature-verification
process conducted under our open system of legal advocacy.
"More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member of this Court and as a
citizen of this country, would like to seek: Are these six million signatures real? By
insisting on an entirely new doctrine of statutory inadequacy, the majority effectively
suppressed the quest for that truth.
The Right Reason
"As mentioned, the third question that must be answered, even if the adequacy of RA
6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 were upheld by the majority is:
Does the clamor for the proposed change to the Constitution really emanate from the
people who signed the petition for initiative? Or is it the beneficiaries of term
38
extension who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-
interests? In other words, is PIRMA's exercise of the right to initiative being done in
accordance with our Constitution and our laws? Is such attempted exercise
legitimate?
"In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described initiative, along with
referendum, as the 'ultimate weapon of the people to negate government
malfeasance and misfeasance.' In Subic Bay, we specified that 'initiative is entirely
the work of the electorate x x x a process of lawmaking by the people themselves
without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives.' As
ponente of Subic Bay, I stand foursquare on this principle: The right to amend
through initiative belongs only to the people – not to the government and its
minions. This principle finds clear support from utterances of many constitutional
commissioners like those quoted below:
"[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when they are dissatisfied
with the National Assembly x x x [and] precisely a fallback position of the people in
the event that they are dissatisfied." -- Commissioner Ople
"[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive [and resorted to] only if
the legislature is not as responsive to the vital and urgent needs of people." --
Commissioner Gascon
(1) The proposed change -- the lifting of term limits of elective officials -- "constitute[s] a mere
amendment and not a revision of the Constitution."
_________________
"[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people [and] reserved for the
people [which] should not be frivolously resorted to." -- Commissioner Romulo
"Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the Constitution, or even to revise it,
our Charter itself provides them other ways of doing so, namely, by calling a
constitutional convention or constituting Congress into a constituent assembly. These
are officialdom's weapons. But initiative belongs to the people.
"In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners legitimate people's
organizations or are they merely fronts for incumbents who want to extend their
terms? This is a factual question which, unfortunately, cannot be judicially answered
anymore, because the Supreme Court majority ruled that the law that implements it,
RA 6735, is inadequate or insufficient insofar as initiatives to the Constitutions are
concerned. With such ruling, the majority effectively abrogated a constitutional right
of our people. That is why in my Separate Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed that such
precipitate action "is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats,
and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain." I firmly maintain that to defeat

PIRMA's effort, there is no need to "burn" the constitutional right to initiative. If
PIRMA's exercise is not "legitimate," it can be exposed as such in the ways I have
discussed – short of abrogating the right itself. On the other hand, if PIRMA's position
is proven to be legitimate – if it hurdles the four issues I outlined earlier – by all
means, we should allow and encourage it. But the majority's theory of statutory
inadequacy has pre-empted – unnecessarily and invalidly, in my view – any judicial
determination of such legitimacy or illegitimacy. It has silenced the quest for truth into
the interstices of the PIRMA petition.
The Right Time
"The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when changes thereto may be
proposed. Section 2 of Article XVII precludes amendments "within five years
following [its] ratification x x x nor oftener than once every five years thereafter."
Since its ratification, the 1987 Constitution has never been amended. Hence, the five-
year prohibition is now inoperative and amendments may theoretically be proposed
at any time.
"Be that as it may, I believe – given the present circumstances – that there is no
more time to lift term limits to enable incumbents to seek reelection in the May 11,
1998 polls. Between today and the next national
(2) The "six million signatures are genuine and verifiable"; and they "really belong to qualified
warm bodies comprising at
least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is represented
__________________
by at least 3% of the registered voters therein."
elections, less than eight (8) months remain. Santiago, where the single issue of the
__________________
sufficiency of RA 6735 was resolved, took this Court three (3) months, and another
two (2) months to decide the motion for reconsideration. The instant case, where the
same issue is also raised by the petitioners, took two months, not counting a possible
motion for reconsideration. These time spans could not be abbreviated any further,
because due process requires that all parties be given sufficient time to file their
pleadings.
"Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the adequacy of RA 6735 – as I
believe it should – and allow the Comelec to act on the PIRMA petition, such eight-
month period will not be enough to tackle the four weighty issues I mentioned earlier,
considering that two of them involve tedious factual questions. The Comelec's
decision on any of these issues can still be elevated to this Court for review, and
reconsiderations on our decisions on each of those issues may again be sought.
"Comelec's herculean task alone of verifying each of the six million signatures is
enormously time-consuming, considering that any person may question the
authenticity of each and every signature, initially before the election registrar, then
39
before the Comelec on appeal and finally, before this Court in a separate proceeding.
Moreover, the plebiscite itself – assuming such stage can be reached – may be
scheduled only after sixty (60) but not more than ninety (90) days, from the time the
Comelec and this Court, on appeal, finally declare the petition to be sufficient.
"Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political parties, groups organizations
or coalitions may start selecting their official candidates for President, Vice President
and Senators on November 27, 1997; the period for filing certificates of candidacy is
from January 11 to February 9, 1998; the election period and campaign for national
officials start on February 10, 1998, while the campaign period for other elective
officials, on March 17, 1998. This means, by the time PIRMA's proposition is ready –
if ever – for submission directly to the voters at large, it will have been overcome by
the elections. Time will simply run out on PIRMA, if the intention is to lift term limits in
time for the 1998 elections.
"That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998 elections via a people's
initiative does not detract one whit from (1) my firm conviction that RA 6735 is
sufficient and adequate to implement this constitutional right and, more important, (2)
my faith in the power of the people to initiate changes in local and national laws and
the Constitution. In fact, I think the Court can deliberate on these two items even
more serenely and wisely now that the debates will be free from the din and
distraction of the 1998 elections. After all, jurisprudence is not merely for the here
and now but, more so, for the hereafter and the morrow. Let me therefore stress, by
way of epilogue, my unbending credo in favor of our people's right to initiative.
Epilogue
"I believe in democracy – in our people's natural right to determine our own destiny.
"I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method of enabling our people
to express their will and chart their history. Initiative is an alternative to bloody
revolution, internal chaos and civil strife. It is an inherent right of the people – as
basic as the right to elect, the right to self-determination and the right to individual
liberties. I believe that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above
themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose what is
best for themselves and their posterity.
"Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to perpetuate a
particular official or group of officials in power. Far from it. Such perpetuation is
anathema to democracy. My firm conviction that there is an adequate law

implementing the constitutional right of initiative does not ipso facto result in the
victory of the PIRMA petition or of any proposed constitutional change. There are,
after all, sufficient safeguards to guarantee the proper use of such constitutional right
and to forestall its misuse and abuse. First, initiative cannot be used to revise the
Constitution, only to amend it. Second, the petitioners' signatures must be validated
against an existing list of voters and/or voters' identification cards. Third, initiative is a
reverse power of and by the people, not of incumbent officials and their machinators.
Fourth and most important of all, the signatures must be verified as real and genuine;
not concocted, fictitious or fabricated. The only legal way to do this is to enable the
Commission on Elections to conduct a nationwide verification process as mandated
by the Constitution and the law. Such verification, it bears stressing, is subject to
review by this Court.
"There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million people who gathered at
EDSA in 1986, and yet they changed the history of our country. PIRMA claims six
times that number, not just from the National Capital Region but from all over the
country. Is this claim through the invention of its novel theory of statutory
insufficiency, the Court's majority has stifled the only legal method of determining
whether PIRMA is real or not, whether there is indeed a popular clamor to lift term
limits of elected officials, and whether six million voters want to initiate amendments
to their most basic law. In suppressing a judicial answer to such questions, the Court
may have unwittingly yielded to PIRMA the benefit of the legal presumption of legality
and regularity. In its misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats, it burned down the whole
house. It unceremoniously divested the people of a basic constitutional right.
In both Opinions, I concluded that we must implement "the right thing [initiative] in the right
way at the right time and for the right reason."
In the present case, I steadfastly stand by my foregoing Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA.
Tested against them, the present Petition of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado must be
DISMISSED. Unfortunately, the right thing is being rushed in the wrong way and for the
wrong reasons. Let me explain.
No Grave Abuse
of Discretion by Comelec
As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelec's dismissal of the Lambino
Petition. After all, the Commission merely followed the holding in Santiago permanently
____________________
"In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and to make it prevail.
This mission is undertaken not only to resolve the vagaries of present events but also
to build the pathways of tomorrow. The sum total of the entire process of adversarial
40
litigation is the verity of facts and the application of law thereto. By the majority cop-
out in this mission of discovery, our country and our people have been deprived not
only of a basic constitutional right, as earlier noted, but also of the judicial opportunity
to verify the truth."
enjoining the poll body "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system."
Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws or any jurisprudence.4
Neither can whim, caprice, arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to the
Commission.5 Quite the contrary, it prudently followed this Court's jurisprudence in Santiago
and PIRMA. Even assuming arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult and
unsettled question of law, this Court still cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the poll
body with respect to that action.6
The present Lambino Petition is in exactly the same situation as that of PIRMA in 1997. The
differences pointed out by Justice Reynato S. Puno are, with due respect, superficial. It is
argued that, unlike the present Lambino Petition, PIRMA did not contain verified signatures.
These are distinctions that do not make a difference. Precisely, Justice Puno is urging a
remand, because the verification issue is "contentious" and remains unproven by petitioners.
Clearly, both the PIRMA and the Lambino Petitions contain unverified signatures.
Therefore, they both deserve the same treatment: DISMISSAL.
Besides, the only reason given in the unanimous Resolution on PIRMA v. Comelec was that
the Commission had "only complied" with this Court's Decision in Santiago, the same reason
given by Comelec in this case. The Separate Opinions in PIRMA gave no other reason. No
one argued, even remotely, that the PIRMA Petition should have been dismissed
because the signatures were unverified.
To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, "[b]eing a constitutional requirement, the
number of signatures becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the petition, and is
jurisdictional.7 Without those signatures, the Comelec shall motu proprio reject the petition."
So, until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal moorings of
the exercise of the right are substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for
acting in accord with this Court's pronouncements. Respondent Commission has no
discretion, under any guise, to refuse enforcement of any final decision of this Court.8
The refusal of the poll body to act on the Lambino Petition was its only recourse. Any other
mode of action would appear not only presumptuous, but also contemptuous. It would have
constituted defiance of the Court and would have surely been struck down as grave abuse of
discretion and contumacious disregard of the supremacy of this Court as the final arbiter of
justiciable controversies.

Even assuming further that this Court rules, as I believe it should (for the reasons given in my
Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA), that Republic Act 6735 is indeed sufficient to implement
an initiative to amend the Constitution, still, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to
the Comelec for merely following prevailing jurisprudence extant at the time it rendered its
ruling in question.
Only Amendments,
Not Revisions
I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the proper subject of an
initiative to change the Constitution. This principle is crystal clear from even a layperson's
reading of the basic law.9
I submit that changing the system of government from presidential to parliamentary and the
form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral contemplates an overhaul of the
structure of government. The ponencia has amply demonstrated that the merger of the
legislative and the executive branches under a unicameral-parliamentary system, "[b]y any
legal test and under any jurisdiction," will "radically alter the framework of government as set
forth in the Constitution." Indeed, the proposed changes have an overall implication on the
entire Constitution; they effectively rewrite its most important and basic provisions. The
prolixity and complexity of the changes cannot be categorized, even by semantic generosity,
as "amendments."
In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the Constitution, revisions (or
amendments) may be proposed only through the first two: by Congress or by a constitutional
convention. Under the third mode -- people's initiative -- only amendments are allowed. Many
of the justices' Opinions have cited the historical, philosophical and jurisprudential bases of
their respective positions. I will not add to the woes of the reader by reiterating them here.
Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate an amendment from a revision is
found in the Constitution itself: a revision may be done only when the proposed change
can be drafted, defined, articulated, discussed and agreed upon after a mature and
democratic debate in a deliberative body like Congress or a Convention. The changes
proposed must necessarily be scrutinized, as their adoption or non-adoption must result from
an informed judgment.
Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the 1972 and the 1987 Constitutions
had to spend many months of purposeful discussions, democratic debates and rounds of
voting before they could agree on the wordings covering the philosophy, the underlying
principles, and the structure of government of our Republic.
Verily, even bills creating or changing the administrative structure of local governments take
several weeks or even months of drafting, reading, and debating before Congress can
approve them. How much more when it comes to constitutional changes?
41
A change in the form of government of our country from presidential-bicameral to
parliamentary-unicameral is monumental. Even the initiative proponents admit this fact. So,
why should a revision be rammed down our people's throats without the benefit of intelligent
discussion in a deliberative assembly?
Added to the constitutional mandate barring revisions is the provision of RA 6735 expressly
prohibiting petitions for initiative from "embracing more than one subject matter."10 The
present initiative covers at least two subjects: (1) the shift from a presidential to a
parliamentary form of government; and (2) the change from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature.11 Thus, even under Republic Act 6735 -- the law that Justice Puno and I hold to
be sufficient and valid -- the Lambino Petition deserves dismissal.
12 Percent and 3 Percent Thresholds
Not Proven by Petitioners
The litmus test of a people's petition for initiative is its ability to muster the constitutional
requirement that it be supported by at least 12 percent of the registered voters nationwide, of
which at least 3 percent of the registered voters in every legislative district must be
represented. As pointed out by Intervenors One Voice, Inc., et al., however, records show
that there was a failure to meet the minimum percentages required.12
Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent constitutional requirements
involve "contentious facts," which have not been proven by the Lambino Petition. Thus, he is
urging a remand to the Comelec.
But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent because the Constitution itself
mandates the said requisites of an initiative petition. In other words, a petition that does not
show the required percentages is fatally defective and must be dismissed, as the Delfin
Petition was, in Santiago.
Furthermore, as the ponencia had discussed extensively, the present Petition is void and
unconstitutional. It points out that the Petition dismally fails to comply with the constitutional
requirement that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people. Specifically, the
ponencia has amply established that petitioners were unable to show that the Lambino
Petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed changes.
So, too, a remand is futile. Even if the required percentages are proven before the
Commission, the Petition must still be dismissed for proposing a revision, not an
amendment, in gross violation of the Constitution. At the very least, it proposes more
than one subject, in violation of Republic Act 6735.
Summation
Petitioners plead with this Court to hear the voice of the people because, in the words of
Justice Puno who supports them, the "people's voice is sovereign in a democracy."

I, too, believe in heeding the people's voice. I reiterate my Separate Opinion in PIRMA
that "initiative is a democratic method of enabling our people to express their will and chart
their history. x x x. I believe that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above
themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for
themselves and their posterity."
This belief will not, however, automatically and blindly result in an initiative to change the
Constitution, because the present Petition violates the following:
· The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows only amendments, not revisions,
and requires definite percentages of verified signatures)
· The law (specifically, Republic Act 6735, which prohibits petitions containing more than one
subject)
· Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which dismissed the Petition then under
consideration on the ground that, by following the Santiago ruling, the Comelec had not
gravely abused its discretion).
I submit further that a remand of the Lambino Petition is both imprudent and futile. More
tellingly, it is a cop-out, a hand-washing already discredited 2000 years ago. Instead of
finger-pointing, I believe we must confront the issues head on, because the people expect
no less from this august and venerable institution of supreme justice.
Epilogue
At bottom, the issue in this case is simply the Rule of Law.13 Initiative, like referendum
and recall, is a treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. It was born out of our
world-admired and often-imitated People Power, but its misuse and abuse must be
resolutely rejected. Democracy must be cherished, but mob rule vanquished.
The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between the government and the
people, between each individual and the rest of the citizenry. Through it, the people have
solemnly expressed their will that all of them shall be governed by laws, and their rights
limited by agreed-upon covenants to promote the common good. If we are to uphold the Rule
of Law and reject the rule of the mob, we must faithfully abide by the processes the
Constitution has ordained in order to bring about a peaceful, just and humane society.
Assuming arguendo that six million people allegedly gave their assent to the proposed
changes in the Constitution, they are nevertheless still bound by the social covenant -- the
present Constitution -- which was ratified by a far greater majority almost twenty years ago. 14
I do not denigrate the majesty of the sovereign will; rather, I elevate our society to the loftiest
perch, because our government must remain as one of laws and not of men.
Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme Court took a solemn oath to
uphold the Constitution. Being the protectors of the fundamental law as the highest
42
expression of the sovereign will, they must subject to the strictest scrutiny any attempt to
change it, lest it be trivialized and degraded by the assaults of the mob and of ill-
conceived designs. The Court must single-mindedly defend the Constitution from bogus
efforts falsely attributed to the sovereign people.
The judiciary may be the weakest branch of government. Nonetheless, when ranged against
incessant voices from the more powerful branches of government, it should never cower in
submission. On the other hand, I daresay that the same weakness of the Court becomes its
strength when it speaks independently through decisions that rightfully uphold the
supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law. The strength of the judiciary lies not
in its lack of brute power, but in its moral courage to perform its constitutional duty at all times
against all odds. Its might is in its being right.15
During the past weeks, media outfits have been ablaze with reports and innuendoes about
alleged carrots offered and sticks drawn by those interested in the outcome of this case. 16
There being no judicial proof of these allegations, I shall not comment on them for the nonce,
except to quote the Good Book, which says, "There is nothing hidden that will not be
revealed, and nothing secret that will not be known and come to light."17
Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of history. By its decision, the Court and
each of its members shall be judged by posterity. Ten years, fifty years, a hundred years -- or
even a thousand years -- from now, what the Court did here, and how each justice opined
and voted, will still be talked about, either in shame or in pride. Indeed, the hand-washing of
Pontius Pilate, the abomination of Dred Scott, and the loathing of Javellana still linger and
haunt to this day.
Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let this Court be known throughout the
nation and the world for its independence, integrity, industry and intelligence.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, Petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR.
and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
I agree with the opinion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato Puno, that the Court's
ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC1 is not a binding precedent. However, it is my position that
even if Santiago were reversed and Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. 6735) be held as sufficient
law for the purpose of people's initiative to amend the Constitution, the petition for initiative in
this case must nonetheless be dismissed.
There is absolutely no showing here that petitioners complied with R.A. 6735, even as they
blindly invoke the said law to justify their alleged people's initiative. Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735
requires that "[a] petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve
per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein." On the other hand, Section 5(c)2 of the same law requires that the petition
should state, among others, the proposition3 or the "contents or text of the proposed law
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed." If we were to apply
Section 5(c) to an initiative to amend the Constitution, as petitioners submit, the petition for
initiative signed by the required number of voters should incorporate therein a text of the
proposed changes to the Constitution. However, such requirement was not followed in the
case at bar.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Lambino admitted that they printed a mere 100,000
copies of the text of the proposed changes to the Constitution. According to him, these were
subsequently distributed to their agents all over the country, for attachment to the sheets of
paper on which the signatures were to be affixed. Upon being asked, however, if he in fact
knew whether the text was actually attached to the signature sheets which were distributed
for signing, he said that he merely assumed that they were. In other words, he could not tell
the Court for certain whether their representatives complied with this requirement.
43
The petition filed with the COMELEC, as well as that which was shown to this Court,
indubitably establish that the full text of the proposed changes was not attached to the
signature sheets. All that the signature sheets contained was the general proposition and
abstract, which falls short of the full text requirement of R.A. 6735.
The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed constitutional changes in the petition
for initiative to be signed by the people cannot be seriously disputed. To begin with, Article
XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution unequivocally states that "[a]mendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein." Evidently, for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution, they must, in
the first instance, know exactly what they are proposing. It is not enough that they merely
possess a general idea of the proposed changes, as the Constitution speaks of a "direct"
proposal by the people.
Although the framers of the Constitution left the matter of implementing the constitutional right
of initiative to Congress, it might be noted that they themselves reasonably assumed that the
draft of the proposed constitutional amendments would be shown to the people during the
process of signature gathering. Thus –
MR. RODRIGO. Section 2 of the complete committee report provides: "upon petition
of at least 10 percent of the registered voters." How will we determine that 10 percent
has been achieved? How will the voters manifest their desire, is it by signature?
MR. SUAREZ. Yes, by signatures.
MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to
propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to
them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.4
It may thus be logically assumed that even without Section 5(c) of R.A. 6735, the full text of
the proposed changes must necessarily be stated in or attached to the initiative petition. The
signatories to the petition must be given an opportunity to fully comprehend the meaning and
effect of the proposed changes to enable them to make a free, intelligent and well-informed
choice on the matter.

Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete text of the proposed changes
in the petition for initiative is a safeguard against fraud and deception. If the whole text of the
proposed changes is contained in or attached to the petition, intercalations and riders may be
duly avoided. Only then can we be assured that the proposed changes are truly of the people
and that the signatories have been fully apprised of its implications.
If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud, corruption or deception in the
initiative and referendum process, such provision must be viewed as an indispensable
requirement and failure to substantially comply therewith is fatal. 5 The failure of petitioners in
this case to comply with the full text requirement resultantly rendered their petition for
initiative fatally defective.
The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably infirm because it violates the one subject rule
under Section 10(a) of R.A. 6735:
SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.— The following cannot be the subject of an initiative
or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate;
xxx
The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution, has the same
object and purpose as the one subject-one bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1)6 of
the Constitution.7 To elaborate, the one subject-one bill rule was designed to do away with
the practice of inserting two or more unrelated provisions in one bill, so that those favoring
one provision would be compelled to adopt the others. By this process of log-rolling, the
adoption of both provisions could be accomplished and ensured, when neither, if standing
alone, could succeed on its own merits.
As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is essentially designed to prevent
surprise and fraud on the electorate. It is meant to safeguard the integrity of the initiative
process by ensuring that no unrelated riders are concealed within the terms of the proposed
amendment. This in turn guarantees that the signatories are fully aware of the nature, scope
and purpose of the proposed amendment.
Petitioners insist that the proposed changes embodied in their petition for initiative relate only
to one subject matter, that is – the shift from presidential to a parliamentary system of
government. According to petitioners, all of the other proposed changes are merely incidental
to this main proposal and are reasonably germane and necessary thereto. 8 An examination of
the text of the proposed changes reveals, however, that this is not the case.
The proposed changes to the Constitution cover other subjects that are beyond the main
proposal espoused by the petitioners. Apart from a shift from the presidential to a
parliamentary form of government, the proposed changes include the abolition of one House
of Congress,9 and the convening of a constituent assembly to propose additional
44
amendments to the Constitution.10 Also included within its terms is an omnibus declaration
that those constitutional provisions under Articles VI and VII, which are inconsistent with the
unicameral-parliamentary form of government, shall be deemed amended to conform thereto.
It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear to relate only to a shift in the
form of government, it actually seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably germane
to the constitutional alteration that is purportedly sought. For one, a shift to a parliamentary
system of government does not necessarily result in the adoption of a unicameral legislature.
A parliamentary system can exist in many different "hybrid" forms of government, which may
or may not embrace unicameralism.11 In other words, the shift from presidential to
parliamentary structure and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature is neither the cause
nor effect of the other.
I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent assembly with the proposed change in
our system of government. As a subject matter, the convening of a constituent assembly to
amend the Constitution presents a range of issues that is far removed from the subject of a
shift in government. Besides, the constituent assembly is supposed to convene and propose
amendments to the Constitution after the proposed change in the system of government has
already taken place. This only goes to show that the convening of the constituent assembly is
not necessary to effectuate a change to a parliamentary system of government.
The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI and VII which are inconsistent
with a unicameral-parliamentary system of government shall be deemed amended is equally
bothersome. The statement does not specify what these inconsistencies and amendments
may be, such that everyone is left to guess the provisions that could eventually be affected by
the proposed changes. The subject and scope of these automatic amendments cannot even
be spelled out with certainty. There is thus no reasonable measure of its impact on the other
constitutional provisions.
The foregoing proposed changes cannot be the subject of a people's initiative under Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Taken together, the proposed changes indicate that the
intendment is not simply to effect substantial amendments to the Constitution, but a revision
thereof. The distinction between an amendment and revision was explained by Dean Vicente
G. Sinco, as follows:
"Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different
portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole
constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important
provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that
characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be
carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed
or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a
few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the
advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The
intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it
provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress
portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect."12
The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between amendment and revision has
indeed guided us throughout our constitutional history. However, the distinction between the
two terms is not, to my mind, as significant in the context of our past constitutions, as it
should be now under the 1987 Constitution. The reason for this is apparent. Under our past
constitutions, it was Congress alone, acting either as a constituent assembly or by calling out
a constitutional convention, that exercised authority to either amend or revise the Constitution
through the procedures therein described. Although the distinction between the two terms
was theoretically recognized under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the need to
highlight the difference was not as material because it was only Congress that could effect
constitutional changes by choosing between the two modalities.
However, it is different now under the 1987 Constitution. Apart from providing for the two
modes of either Congress constituting itself as a constituent assembly or calling out for a
constitutional convention, a third mode was introduced for proposing changes to the
Constitution. This mode refers to the people's right to propose amendments to the
fundamental law through the filing of a petition for initiative.
Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes amendment or revision under the past
constitutions is not determinative of what the two terms mean now, as related to the exercise
of the right to propose either amendments or revision. The changes introduced to both the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 could have indeed been deemed an amendment or revision,
but the authority for effecting either would never have been questioned since the same
belonged solely to Congress. In contrast, the 1987 Constitution clearly limits the right of the
people to directly propose constitutional changes to amendments only. We must
consequently not be swayed by examples of constitutional changes effected prior to the
present fundamental law, in determining whether such changes are revisory or amendatory in
nature.
In this regard, it should be noted that the distinction laid down by Justice Felix Q. Antonio in
Javellana v. Executive Secretary13 related to the procedure to be followed in ratifying a
completely new charter proposed by a constitutional convention. The authority or right of the
constitutional convention itself to effect such a revision was not put in issue in that case. As
far as determining what constitutes "amendments" for the purpose of a people's initiative,
therefore, we have neither relevant precedent nor prior experience. We must thus confine
ourselves to Dean Sinco's basic articulation of the two terms.
It is clear from Dean Sinco's explanation that a revision may either be of the whole or only
part of the Constitution. The part need not be a substantial part as a change may qualify as a
45
revision even if it only involves some of the important provisions. For as long as the intention
and plan to be carried out contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution
"to determine which should be altered or suppressed, or whether the whole document should
be replaced with an entirely new one," the proposed change may be deemed a revision and
not merely an amendment.
Thus, it is not by the sheer number alone of the proposed changes that the same may be
considered as either an amendment or revision. In so determining, another overriding factor
is the "original intention and plan authorized to be carried out" by the proposed changes. If
the same relates to a re-examination of the entire document to see which provisions remain
relevant or if it has far-reaching effects on the entire document, then the same constitutes a
revision and not a mere amendment of the Constitution.
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a combination of the quantitative and qualitative
test is necessary in assessing what may be considered as an amendment or revision. It is not
enough that we focus simply on the physical scope of the proposed changes, but also
consider what it means in relation to the entire document. No clear demarcation line can be
drawn to distinguish the two terms and each circumstance must be judged on the basis of its
own peculiar conditions. The determination lies in assessing the impact that the proposed
changes may have on the entire instrument, and not simply on an arithmetical appraisal of
the specific provisions which it seeks to affect.
In McFadden v. Jordan,14 the California Supreme Court laid down the groundwork for the
combination of quantitative and qualitative assessment of proposed constitutional changes, in
order to determine whether the same is revisory or merely amendatory. In that case, the
McFadden court found the proposed changes extensive since at least 15 of the 25 articles
contained in the California Constitution would either be repealed in their entirety or
substantially altered, and four new topics would be introduced. However, it went on to
consider the qualitative effects that the proposed initiative measure would have on
California's basic plan of government. It observed that the proposal would alter the checks
and balances inherent in such plan, by delegating far-reaching and mixed powers to an
independent commission created under the proposed measure. Consequently, the proposal
in McFadden was not only deemed as broad and numerous in physical scope, but was also
held as having a substantive effect on the fundamental governmental plan of the State of
California.
The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was reiterated by the California
Supreme Court in Raven v. Deukmeijan.15 Proposition 115, as the initiative in that case was
called, would vest in the United States Supreme Court all judicial interpretative powers of the
California courts over fundamental criminal defense rights in that state. It was observed that
although quantitatively, the proposition did "not seem so extensive as to change directly the
substantial entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions," the same, nonetheless, "would substantially alter the substance and integrity of
the state Constitution as a document of independent force and effect." Quoting Amador
Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization,16 the Raven court
said:

". . . apart from a measure effecting widespread deletions, additions and
amendments involving many constitutional articles, 'even a relatively simple
enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision also…[A]n enactment which purported
to vest all judicial power in the Legislature would amount to a revision without regard
either to the length or complexity of the measure or the number of existing articles or
sections affected by such change.'" (Underscoring supplied and citations omitted)
Thus, in resolving the amendment/revision issue, the California Court examines both the
quantitative and qualitative effects of a proposed measure on its constitutional scheme.
Substantial changes in either respect could amount to a revision.17
I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the same manner. The experience
of the courts in California is not far removed from the standards expounded on by Dean Sinco
when he set out to differentiate between amendment and revision. It is actually consistent,
not only with our traditional concept of the two terms, but also with the mindset of our
constitutional framers when they referred to the disquisition of Justice Antonio in Javellana.18
We must thus consider whether the proposed changes in this case affect our Constitution in
both its substantial physical entirety and in its basic plan of government.
The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of whether these are
simple or substantial, amount to a revision as to be excluded from the people's right to
directly propose amendments to the fundamental law?
As indicated earlier, we may apply the quantitative/qualitative test in determining the nature of
the proposed changes. These tests are consistent with Dean Sinco's traditional concept of
amendment and revision when he explains that, quantitatively, revision "may result in the
rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater part of it, or perhaps only some of its
provisions." In any case, he continues, "the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is
the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out." Unmistakably, the latter
statement refers to the qualitative effect of the proposed changes.
It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively, the changes espoused by the proponents in
this case will affect only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution,
namely, Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive Department), as well as
provisions that will ensure the smooth transition from a presidential-bicameral system to a
parliamentary-unicameral structure of government. The quantitative effect of the proposed
changes is neither broad nor extensive and will not affect the substantial entirety of the 1987
Constitution.
However, it is my opinion that the proposed changes will have serious qualitative
consequences on the Constitution. The initiative petition, if successful, will undoubtedly alter,
not only our basic governmental plan, but also redefine our rights as citizens in relation to
government. The proposed changes will set into motion a ripple effect that will strike at the
46
very foundation of our basic constitutional plan. It is therefore an impermissible constitutional
revision that may not be effected through a people's initiative.
Petitioners' main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form of government from the
presidential to the parliamentary system. An examination of their proposal reveals that there
will be a fusion of the executive and legislative departments into one parliament that will be
elected on the basis of proportional representation. No term limits are set for the members of
parliament except for those elected under the party-list system whose terms and number
shall be provided by law. There will be a President who shall be the head of state, but the
head of government is the Prime Minister. The latter and his cabinet shall be elected from
among the members of parliament and shall be responsible to parliament for the program of
government.
The preceding proposal indicates that, under the proposed system, the executive and
legislature shall be one and the same, such that parliament will be the paramount governing
institution. What this implies is that there will be no separation between the law-making and
enforcement powers of the state, that are traditionally delineated between the executive and
legislature in a presidential form of government. Necessarily, the checks and balances
inherent in the fundamental plan of our U.S.-style presidential system will be eliminated. The
workings of government shall instead be controlled by the internal political dynamics
prevailing in the parliament.
Our present governmental system is built on the separation of powers among the three
branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the
executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to the application of laws. This
separation is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in one person or group that
might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republican
institutions. In the words of Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is intended to
secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and obtain efficiency.19
In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of formal institutional checks
on the legislative and executive powers of the state, since both the Prime Minister and the
members of his cabinet are drawn from parliament. There are no effective limits to what the
Prime Minister and parliament can do, except the will of the parliamentary majority. This goes
against the central principle of our present constitutional scheme that distributes the powers
of government and provides for counteraction among the three branches. Although both the
presidential and parliamentary systems are theoretically consistent with constitutional
democracy, the underlying tenets and resulting governmental framework are nonetheless
radically different.
Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government cannot be
regarded as anything but a drastic change. It will require a total overhaul of our governmental
structure and involve a re-orientation in the cardinal doctrines that govern our constitutional
set-up. As explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire

constitutional structure.20 It cannot, by any standard, be deemed as a mere constitutional
amendment.
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable
provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific
parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates
a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have
over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent
they should be altered.21 (Underscoring supplied)
The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise shows the intention of
the proponents to effect even more far-reaching changes in our fundamental law. If the
original intent were to simply shift the form of government to the parliamentary system, then
there would have been no need for the calling out of a constituent assembly to propose
further amendments to the Constitution. It should be noted that, once convened, a constituent
assembly can do away and replace any constitutional provision which may not even have a
bearing on the shift to a parliamentary system of government. The inclusion of such a
proposal reveals the proponents' plan to consider all provisions of the constitution, either to
determine which of its provisions should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole
document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are covered by the alleged people's
initiative. The proposal to convene a constituent assembly, which by its terms is
mandatory, will practically jeopardize the future of the entire Constitution and place it on
shaky grounds. The plan of the proponents, as reflected in their proposed changes, goes
beyond the shifting of government from the presidential to the parliamentary system. Indeed,
it could even extend to the "fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican
state."
To say that the proposed changes will affect only the constitution of government is therefore
a fallacy. To repeat, the combined effect of the proposed changes to Articles VI and VII and
those pertaining to the Transitory Provisions under Article XVIII indubitably establish the
intent and plan of the proponents to possibly affect even the constitutions of liberty and
sovereignty. Indeed, no valid reason exists for authorizing further amendments or revisions to
the Constitution if the intention of the proposed changes is truly what it purports to be.
There is no question here that only amendments to the Constitution may be undertaken
through a people's initiative and not a revision, as textually reflected in the Constitution itself.
This conclusion is inevitable especially from a comparative examination of Section 2 in
relation to Sections 1 and 4 of Article XVII, which state:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
47
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
xxxx
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1
hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval
of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the certification by the Commission of Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clear that the right of the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution is limited
to amendments and does not include a revision thereof. Otherwise, it would have been
unnecessary to provide for Section 2 to distinguish its scope from the rights vested in
Congress under Section 1. The latter lucidly states that Congress may propose both
amendments and a revision of the Constitution by either convening a constituent assembly or
calling for a constitutional convention. Section 2, on the other hand, textually commits to the
people the right to propose only amendments by direct action.
To hold, therefore, that Section 2 allows substantial amendments amounting to
revision obliterates the clear distinction in scope between Sections 1 and 2. The
intention, as may be seen from a cursory perusal of the above provisions, is to provide
differing fields of application for the three modes of effecting changes to the Constitution. We
need not even delve into the intent of the constitutional framers to see that the distinction in
scope is definitely marked. We should thus apply these provisions with a discerning regard
for this distinction. Again, McFadden22 is instructive:
". . . The differentiation required is not merely between two words; more accurately it
is between two procedures and between their respective fields of application. Each
procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must be
understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be x x x a mere alternative

procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be understood to
denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of application appropriate
to its procedure. The people of this state have spoken; they made it clear when they
adopted article XVIII and made amendment relatively simple but provided the
formidable bulwark of a constitutional convention as a protection against improvident
or hasty (or any other) revision, that they understood that there was a real difference
between amendment and revision. We find nothing whatsoever in the language of the
initiative amendment of 1911 (art. IV, § 1) to effect a breaking down of that difference.
On the contrary, the distinction appears to be x x x scrupulously preserved by the
express declaration in the amendment x x x that the power to propose and vote on
"amendments to the Constitution" is reserved directly to the people in initiative
proceedings, while leaving unmentioned the power and the procedure relative to
constitutional revision, which revisional power and procedure, it will be remembered,
had already been specifically treated in section 2 of article XVIII. Intervenors'
contention--that any change less than a total one is but amendatory--would reduce to
the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. Each situation
involving the question of amendment, as contrasted with revision, of the Constitution
must, we think, be resolved upon its own facts."
Thus, our people too have spoken when they overwhelmingly ratified the 1987 Constitution,
with the provisions on amendments and revisions under Article XVII. The voice and will of our
people cannot be any clearer when they limited people's initiative to mere amendments of the
fundamental law and excluded revisions in its scope. In this regard, the task of the Court is to
give effect to the people's voice, as expressed unequivocally through the Constitution.
Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a "constitution of sovereignty" because it
defines the constitutional meaning of "sovereignty of the people." It is through these
provisions that the sovereign people have allowed the expression of their sovereign will and
have canalized their powers which would otherwise be plenary. By approving these
provisions, the sovereign people have decided to limit themselves and future generations in
the exercise of their sovereign power.23 They are thus bound by the constitution and are
powerless, whatever their numbers, to change or thwart its mandates, except through the
means prescribed by the Constitution itself.24
It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to the Constitution
through people's initiative because their representatives, whose power is merely delegated,
may do so. While Section 1 of Article XVII may be considered as a provision delegating
the sovereign powers of amendment and revision to Congress, Section 2, in contrast,
is a self-limitation on that sovereign power. In the words of Cooley:
x x x Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the exercise of
sovereign powers to the several departments, they have not thereby divested
themselves of the sovereignty. They retain in their own hands, so far as they have
thought it needful to do so, a power to control the governments they create, and the
three departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed or
abolished by them. But this control and direction must be exercised in the legitimate
48
mode previously agreed upon. The voice of the people, acting in their sovereign
capacity, can be of legal force only when expressed at the times and under the
conditions which they themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the
Constitution, or which, consistently with the Constitution, have been prescribed and
pointed out for them by statute; and if by any portion of the people, however large, an
attempt should be made to interfere with the regular working of the agencies of
government at any other time or in any other mode than as allowed by existing law,
either constitutional or statutory, it would be revolutionary in character, and must be
resisted and repressed by the officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate
government.25 (Underscoring supplied)
Consequently, there is here no case of "the spring rising above its source." Nor is it one
where the people's sovereign power has been relegated to a lesser plane than that of
Congress. In choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no absence or lack of even a
fraction of the sovereign power of the people since self-limitation itself is an expression of
that sovereign power. The people have chosen to delegate and limit their sovereign power
by virtue of the Constitution and are bound by the parameters that they themselves have
ordained. Otherwise, if the people choose to defy their self-imposed constitutional restraints,
we will be faced with a revolutionary situation.26
It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic and republican state.27 Even as
we affirm, however, that aspect of direct democracy, we should not forget that, first and
foremost, we are a constitutional democracy. To uphold direct democracy at the expense of
the fundamental law is to sanction, not a constitutional, but an extra-constitutional recourse.
This is clearly beyond the powers of the Court who, by sovereign mandate, is the guardian
and keeper of the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. NO. 174153
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ENRICO B. AUMENTADO TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), petitioners-intervenors,
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, petitioners-

intervenors,
SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) AND
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, petitioners-intervenors,
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III,
BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE AND CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., oppositors-
intervenors,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., oppositor-intervenor,
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, oppositor-intervenor,
BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FROUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN,
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,LEONARDO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY
SANTIAGO, AND DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, oppositors-intervenors,
LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL, oppositors-intervenors,
LUWALHATI ANTONINO, oppositor-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.ESTRELLA,
TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T.
VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS AND AMADO GAT INCION, oppositors-intervenors,
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR. AND SENATORS SERGIO R.
OSMENA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCIRO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY
ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM, AND PANFILO M. LACSON, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, oppositors-
intervenors,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY AND CEBU CHAPTER, oppositors-
intervenors,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L.
SALVADOR AND RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, oppostors-intervenors,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MANUEL VILLAR,
JR., oppositor-intervenor;
G.R. NO. 174299
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. AND RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG,
petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
SR. AND COMMISSIONERS RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
JR. ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO AND JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE,
respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
CONCURRING OPINION
49
SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ, J.:
Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution should be exercised
in choosing one's battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to one's cause. In its original
context, the complete version of this Latin phrase means exactly the opposite of what it is
frequently taken to mean. It originated from a holy man, the monk Alcuin, who advised
Charlemagne, "nec audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi
semper insaniae proxima sit," meaning, "And those people should not be listened to who
keep on saying, 'The voice of the people is the voice of God,' since the riotousness of
the crowd is always very close to madness."1 Perhaps, it is by providence that the true
meaning of the Latin phrase is revealed upon petitioners and their allies – that they may
reflect upon the sincerity and authenticity of their "people's initiative."
History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God. Wars were
waged, despotism tolerated and oppressions justified – all these transpired as man boasted
of God's imprimatur. Today, petitioners and their allies hum the same rallying call, convincing
this Court that the people's initiative is the "voice of the people" and, therefore, the "voice of
God." After a thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with
his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice of God. It is against
this kind of genius that the Court must guard itself.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the power of initiative under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this Court by Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, et al., entitled "Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria
Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto
Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of the People's
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents."2 The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 127325. On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its Decision in favor
of petitioners, holding that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is "incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned." A majority of eight (8) Justices fully

concurred with this ruling, while five (5) subscribed to the opposite view. One (1) opined that
there is no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.
On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their positions.
One (1) filed an inhibition and the other one (1) joined the minority opinion. As a
consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who participated in the deliberation, six (6) voted in
favor of the majority opinion, while the other six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion.3
A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a similar case,
entitled People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on
Elections4 on the ground that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed PIRMA's Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution "it
appearing that that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of the Court
in G.R. no. 127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
Resolution of June 10, 1997." Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no need to re-
examine its ruling, as regards the issue of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735. Another Justice
concurred, but on the different premise that the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for such
re-examination. Five (5) Justice opined otherwise.
This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), have gathered signatures in support of the proposed
amendments to the Constitution, which entail a change in the form of government from
bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as
follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral
Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by
law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three
hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at
least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at
least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district
for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those
under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number
shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the
parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby
amended to read, as follows:
50
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive
power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The
Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from
among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of
government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-
Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a
new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the
expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to
exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two
thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the
incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In
case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the
incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all
the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however,
that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of
Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;"
that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or
"Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and/or
"Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which are hereby be amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which
are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with
Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a
unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all
references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses
of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references
therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of
Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any

and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to
read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim
Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall
have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent
Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and
shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall
preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the
Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim
Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution
consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong
bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate,
from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who
shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime
Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and
responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament
which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local
government officials. The duty elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and
perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right hand portion is the
abstract of the proposed amendments, quoted as follows:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and VII of the 1987
Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameral-
presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve
greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article
XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?
51
On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein petitioners, filed with
the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution.5 Five (5) days thereafter,
they filed an Amended Petition alleging that they are filing the petition in their own behalf
and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures
on the signature sheets attached thereto. They claimed that the signatures of registered
voters appearing on the signature sheets, constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all
registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least
three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters, were verified by their respective city or
municipal election officers.
Several organizations opposed the petition. 6
In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the petition,
citing as basis this Court's ruling in Santiago, permanently enjoining it "from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until
a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of
the system."
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that this Court set aside the
COMELEC Resolution and direct the latter tocomply with Section 4, Article XVII of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 4 x x x
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition.
I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and grant the petition of
Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners be required to show why they should not be punished for
contempt7 of court for disregarding the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.
I
Respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
Without necessarily brushing aside the other important issues, I believe the resolution of the
present petition hinges on this singular issue -- did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of
discretion when it denied Lambino, et al.'s petition for initiative to amend the Constitution on
the basis of this Court's Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC?
In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved, still, the ultimate
yardstick is the attendance of "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the COMELEC.

Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed
in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.8
The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition for initiative on
the basis of a case (Santiago) decided by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized as
"capricious or whimsical," "patent and gross," or "arbitrary and despotic." On the
contrary, it was the most prudent course to take. It must be stressed that in Santiago, this
Court permanently enjoins respondent COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance
of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law
shall have been validly enacted." It being a fact that Congress has not enacted a sufficient
law, respondent COMELEC has no alternative but to adhere to Santiago. Otherwise, it is
vulnerable to a citation for contempt. As succinctly stated by Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban (then Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in the subsequent case of
PIRMA vs. COMELEC:9
x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed
with said decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by
the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot
constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the
only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted
defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion
and contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of
justiciable controversies.
It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All courts,
tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are obliged to conform
to its pronouncements. It has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any
justifiable controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts should take their bearings.10 As a warning to lower court judges
who would not adhere to its rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,11 held:
Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding
cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his
way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter,
but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must
first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the
Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would
unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses
to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he
cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the
position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the
case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.
52
Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition
of Lambino, et al. for it merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago.
Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,12 a unanimous Court implicitly recognized that its
ruling in Santiago is the established doctrine and that the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in invoking it, thus:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could
be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions of this Court in
G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its resolution on June 10,
1997.
Indeed, I cannot characterize as a "grave abuse of discretion" the COMELEC's obedience
and respect to the pronouncement of this Court in Santiago.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of Santiago
It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the members of this Court or eight (8)
Justices (as against five (5) Justices) concurred in declaring R.A. No. 6735 an insufficient
law. When the motion for reconsideration was denied via an equally-divided Court or a 6-6
vote, it does not mean that the Decision was overturned. It only shows that the opposite view
fails to muster enough votes to modify or reverse the majority ruling. Therefore, the original
Decision was upheld.13 In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,14 this Court
ruled that the denial of a motion or reconsideration signifies that the ground relied
upon have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of
sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order.
With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant petition for initiative, petitioners
persistently stress that the doctrine of stare decisis does not bar its re-examination.
I am not convinced. The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere translates "stand by the
decisions and disturb not what is settled."15 As used in our jurisprudence, it means that
"once this Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts
are substantially the same as in the earlier controversy."16
There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a good or bad
one, but the doctrine is usually justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of
stability and certainty in the law and also by notions of justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process stated:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and
the opposite way between another. 'If a group of cases involves the same point,
the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide
alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me
yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I
am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and
wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my
rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if
litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.17
That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be appreciated by
considering the observation of American philosopher William K. Frankena as to what
constitutes injustice:
The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two similar individuals
in similar circumstances and one of them is treated better or worse than the
other. In this case, the cry of injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent
or group; and unless that agent or group can establish that there is some relevant
dissimilarity after all between the individuals concerned and their circumstances, he
or they will be guilty as charged.18
Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if need be,
overruling prior decisions, "It is x x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable
precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be
decided differently by the current justices. This policy x x x 'is based on the assumption
that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal
system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into
relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.19 Accordingly, a
party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly onerous task, the difficulty of which is
roughly proportional to a number of factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature
and extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with
other related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed to discharge their task.
Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more than nine (9)
years ago. During that span of time, the Filipino people, specifically the law practitioners, law
professors, law students, the entire judiciary and litigants have recognized this Court's
Decision as a precedent. In fact, the Santiago doctrine was applied by this Court in the
subsequent case of PIRMA. Even the legislature has relied on said Decision, thus, several
bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress to cure the deficiency. I cannot
fathom why it should be overturned or set aside merely on the basis of the petition of
Lambino, et al. Indeed, this Court's conclusion in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned remains a precedent and must be upheld.
53
III
The proposed constitutional changes constitute revisions and not mere amendments
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the means for its amendment and revision.
Thus:
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(2) A Constitutional Convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered votes, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means by which the
people can directly propose changes to the Constitution, were not provided for in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions. Thus, under these two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to
draw the distinction between an amendment and a revision, both being governed by a
uniform process. This is not so under our present Constitution. The distinction between an
amendment and a revision becomes crucial because only amendments are allowed under
the system of people's initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive domain of Congress,
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members, or of a Constitutional Convention.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2, Article XVII
covers only amendments, thus:
The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that
pursuant to the mandate given us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing initiative.
This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the
amendment yield to a few questions?
MR. DAVIDE: With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question, Commissioner Davide's proposed
amendment on line I refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word
"revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction
between the words "amendments" and "revision?"
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision"
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.20
Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is imperative to
examine whether petitioners' proposed changes partake of the nature of amendments, not
revisions.
The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et al. sought to amend the
following provisions of the 1987 Constitution: Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The
Legislative Department); Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII (The Executive Department). It
further includes Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) for the purpose of insuring an orderly
transition from the bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.
Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from bicameral-
presidential to unicameral-parliamentary; conversion of the present Congress of the
Philippines to an Interim National Assembly; change in the terms of Members of Parliament;
and the election of a Prime Minister who shall be vested with executive power.
Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of amendments, hence,
within the coverage of a "people's initiative."
54
I disagree.
The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, characterized an amendment and a revision to the
Constitution as follows:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable
provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific
parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the document to determine how
and to what extent they should be altered.21
Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change; any distinction between the two
must be based upon the degree of change contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing,22 the Supreme
Court of Michigan made the following comparison of the two terms:
"Revision" and "amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in
the charter, and are sometimes used in exactly the same sense but there is an
essential difference between them.
"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft without
obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to
fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to
examine the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument whether the
desired changes from the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance of
the general plan and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish
its purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a
correction of detail.
Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a city's form of
government may be accomplished by a process of "amendment," the cases which so hold
seem to involve statutes which only distinguish between amendment and totally new
charters.23 However, as in Maine law, where the statute authorizing the changes
distinguishes between "charter amendment" and "charter revision," it has been held that "(a)
change in the form of government of a home rule city may be made only by revision of
the city charter, not by its amendment."24
In summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form and scheme would
probably be interpreted as a "revision" and should be achieved through the more thorough
process of deliberation.
 55

Although, at first glance, petitioners' proposed changes appear to cover isolated and specific Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than amendments,
provisions only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed especially, with the inclusion of the following "omnibus provision":
changes will alter the very structure of our government and create multifarious
ramifications. In other words, the proposed changes will have a "domino effect" or, more C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to
appropriately, "ripple effect" on other provisions of the Constitution. a unicameral-Parliamnetary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII,
entitled "Transitory Provisions" which shall read, as follows:
At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to effect
changes in the Constitution includes the power to amend anysection in such a manner that xxxxxxxxx
the proposed change, if approved, would "be complete within itself, relate to one subject
and not substantially affect any other section or article of the Constitution or require
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice-
further amendments to the Constitution to accomplish its purpose." 25 This is clearly not
President, with the exceptions of Section 1,2,3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987
the case here.
Constitution which are hereby amended x x x x x x and all other Sections of Article
VII shall be retained and numbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14,
Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government affects the well- unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they
enshrined doctrine of separation of powers of government, embodied in our Constitution, by shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary
providing for an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches. In a Parliamentary form of system of government x x x x x x .
government, the Executive Branch is to a certain degree, dependent on the direct or indirect
support of the Parliament, as expressed through a "vote of confidence." To my mind, this
xxxxxxxxx
doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution, that
any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.
Section 4. (1) x x x
In McFadden vs. Jordan,26 the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the Interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only
Constitution, consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a
through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention
strong bureaucracy.
called for that purpose x x x. Consequently, if the scope of the proposed initiative
measure now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a
substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then The above provisions will necessarily result in a "ripple effect" on the other provisions of the
the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it Constitution to make them conform to the qualities of unicameral-parliamentary form of
is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention. x x x. government. With one sweeping stroke, these proposed provisions automatically revise
some provisions of the Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was considered by the
Court to be in the nature of substantial revision, necessitating a constitutional
Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a mere convention. I quote the pertinent portion of its ruling, thus:
amendment, but is in actuality a revision, as set forth in Adams v. Gunter27:
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and many articles
The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to
and sections of our present Constitution which would be affected, replaced or
provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of
repealed. It purports only to add one new article but its framers found it necessary to
the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch
include the omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that "If any section,
of government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in
subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict with any of the
all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be
provisions of this article, such section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to
difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a
the extent of such conflict hereby repealed. x x x Consequently, if the scope of the
Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically
proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure become
change the whole pattern of the government in this state and tear apart the
law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be be effected, then
whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities
the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first
necessary to carry on government.
agreed upon by a constitutional convention.28

Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere amendments which will
only affect the Articles or Sections sought to be changed. Rather, they are in the nature of
revisions which will affect considerable portions of the Constitution resulting in the alteration
of our form of government. The proposed changes cannot be taken in isolation since these
are connected or "interlocked" with the other provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly, it
has been held that: "If the changes attempted are so sweeping that it is necessary to
include the provisions interlocking them, then it is plain that the plan would constitute
a recasting of the whole Constitution and this, we think, it was intended to be
accomplished only by a convention under Section 2 which has not yet been
disturbed."29
I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake of the nature of a revision of
the Constitution, then they cannot be the subject of an initiative. On this matter, Father
Bernas expressed this insight:
But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments? The answer, which
one can easily glean from the rather long deliberation on initiative and referendum in
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is practicality. In other words, who is to
formulate the revision or how is it to be formulated? Revision, as concretely being
proposed now, is nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional
structure. Who were involved in formulating the structure? What debates ensued?
What records are there for future use in interpreting the provisions which may be
found to be unclear?
In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention, decisions are
reached after much purifying debate. And while the deliberations proceed, the public
has the opportunity to get involved. It is only after the work of an authorized body has
been completed that it is presented to the electorate for final judgment. Careful
debate is important because the electorate tends to accept what is presented
to it even sight unseen.30
IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the People's initiative
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
56
On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means that an enabling law is
imperative for its implementation. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6735 in order to breathe
life into this constitutional provision. However, as previously narrated, this Court struck the
law in Santiago for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R.A. No. 6735. Congress
neither amended it nor passed a new law to supply its deficiencies.
Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360-degree turn, enumerating
three (3) justifications why R.A. No. 6735 must be considered a sufficient law, thus:
1) The text of R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to the right of people to
initiate changes to the Constitution;
2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear intent of the
lawmakers to use it as instrument to implement the people's initiative; and
3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. No. 6735 demonstrate the
legislative intent to use it as instrument to implement people's initiative.
I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.
A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735 leads to the conclusion that it covers only initiatives on
national and local legislation. Its references to initiatives on the Constitution are few,
isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the initiatives on national and local legislation, where R.A.
No. 6735 provides a detailed, logical, and exhaustive enumeration on their implementation, 31
however, as regards initiative on the Constitution, the law merely:
(a) mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2;32
(b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the
three systems of initiative in Section 3;33
(c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on
the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people;34
(d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should
sign the petition;35 and
(e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved proposition. 36
In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on the
Constitution may be accomplished. This is not the enabling law contemplated by the

Constitution. As pointed out by oppositor-intervenor Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the
promulgation of the Decision in Santiago, various bills have been introduced in both Houses
of Congress providing for a complete and adequate process for people's initiative, such as:
· Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be registered voters;
· A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part thereof sought to be
amended and the proposed amendment;
· The manner of initiation - in a congressional district through a petition by any
individual, group, political party or coalition with members in the congressional
district;
· The language used: the petition should be printed in English and translated in the
local language;
· Signature stations to be provided for;
· Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting, that is, after the signatures
shall have been verified by the Commission, the verified signatures shall be posted
for at least thirty days in the respective municipal and city halls where the signatures
were obtained;
· Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to the authenticity of the
signatures to be filed with the COMELEC and decided within sixty (60) days from the
filing of said protest.
None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No. 6735, thus, demonstrating its
incompleteness and inadequacy.
V questioned petition was not initiated directly by the 6.3 million people who allegedly
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to
File the Petition for Initiative
VI
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the COMELEC Does not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6735
I shall discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated and inseparable. The
determination of whether petitioners are proper parties to file the petition for initiative in behalf
of the alleged 6.3 million voters will require an examination of whether they have
complied with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
57
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
(Underscoring supplied)
The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and categorical. For a people's
initiative to prosper, the following requisites must be present:
1. It is "the people" themselves who must "directly propose" "amendments" to the
Constitution;
2. The proposed amendments must be contained in "a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters;" and
3. The required minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters "must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters" of "every
legislative district."
In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.
The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners Lambino and
Aumentado, two registered voters. As shown in the "Verification/Certification with Affidavit
of Non-Forum Shopping" contained in their petition, they alleged under oath that they have
caused the preparation of the petition in their personal capacity as registered voters "and as
representatives" of the supposed 6.3 million registered voters. This goes to show that the
comprised at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, as required by Section 2.
Moreover, nowhere in the petition itself could be found the signatures of the 6.3 million
registered voters. Only the signatures of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado were affixed
therein "as representatives" of those 6.3 million people. Certainly, that is not the petition
for people's initiative contemplated by the Constitution.
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file the petition "as
representatives" of the alleged 6.3 million registered voters. Such act of representation is
constitutionally proscribed. To repeat, Section 2 strictly requires that amendments to the
Constitution shall be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition
of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters." Obviously, the
phrase "directly proposed by the people" excludes any person acting as representative or
agent of the 12% of the total number of registered voters. The Constitution has bestowed
upon the people the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Such right

cannot be usurped by anyone under the guise of being the people's representative. Simply
put, Section 2 does not recognize acts of representation. For it is only "the people"
(comprising the minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein) who are the proper parties to initiate a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution. Verily, the petition filed with the COMELEC by herein petitioners Lambino and
Aumentado is not a people's initiative. Necessarily, it must fail.
Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should "hear" and "heed" "the people's voice" is baseless
and misleading. There is no people's voice to be heard and heeded as this petition for
initiative is not truly theirs, but only of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and their
allies.
VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue that: (1) "the
validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their
will, as expressed by the fact that over six million registered voters indicated their support of
the Petition for initiative is a purely political question;" and (2) "[t]he power to propose
amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people.
Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under
the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit of a political
question."
The "political question doctrine" was first enunciated by the US Supreme Court in Luther v.
Borden.37 Faced with the difficult question of whether the Supreme Court was the appropriate
institution to define the substantive content of republicanism, the US Supreme Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Roger B. Taney, concluded that "the sovereignty in every State
resides in the people, as to how and whether they exercised it, was under the
circumstances of the case, a political question to be settled by the political power." In
other words, the responsibility of settling certain constitutional questions was left to the
legislative and executive branches of the government.
The Luther case arose from the so-called "Dorr Rebellion" in the State of Rhode Island. Due
to increased migration brought about by the Industrial Revolution, the urban population of
Rhode Island increased. However, under the 1663 Royal Charter which served as the State
Constitution, voting rights were largely limited to residents of the rural districts. This severe
mal-apportionment of suffrage rights led to the "Dorr Rebellion." Despairing of obtaining
remedies for their disenfranchisement from the state government, suffrage reformers invoked
their rights under the American Declaration of Independence to "alter or abolish" the
government and to institute a new one. The reformers proceeded to call for and hold an
extralegal constitutional convention, drafted a new State Constitution, submitted the
document for popular ratification, and held elections under it. The State government,
however, refused to cede power, leading to an anomalous situation in that for a few months
58
in 1842, there were two opposing state governments contending for legitimacy and
possession of state of offices.
The Rhode Island militia, under the authority of martial law, entered and searched the house
of Martin Luther, a Dorr supporter. He brought suit against Luther Borden, a militiaman.
Before the US Supreme Court, Luther's counsel argued that since the State's archaic
Constitution prevented a fair and peaceful address of grievances through democratic
processes, the people of Rhode Island had instead chosen to exercise their inherent right in
popular sovereignty of replacing what they saw as an oppressive government. The US
Supreme Court deemed the controversy as non-justiciable and inappropriate for
judicial resolution.
In Colgrove v. Green,38 Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase "political thicket" to
describe situations where Federal courts should not intervene in political questions which
they have neither the competence nor the commission to decide. In Colgrove, the US
Supreme Court, with a narrow 4-3 vote branded the apportionment of legislative districts in
Illinois "as a political question and that the invalidation of the districts might, in
requiring statewide elections, create an evil greater than that sought to be remedied."
While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter's "political thicket," nonetheless, it has
sought to come up with a definition of the term "political question." Thus, in Vera v. Avelino,39
this Court ruled that properly, political questions are "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government." In Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco,40 the Court held that the
term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure.
In Aquino v. Enrile,41 this Court adopted the following guidelines laid down in Baker v. Carr42
in determining whether a question before it is political, rather than judicial in nature, to wit:
1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or
2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or
3) there is the sheer impossibility of deciding the matter without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
4) there is the sheer impossibility of the Court's undertaking an independent
resolution without expressing lack of respect due the coordinate branches of
government; or
 59

5) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more efficient, more
already made; or economical and more responsive government.

6) there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this Court.
Accordingly, the issues are justiciable. What is at stake here is the legality and not the
wisdom of the act complained of.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised before this Court are political in
nature, it is not precluded from resolving them under its expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
it by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, following Daza v. Singson.43 As pointed out in
Marcos v. Manglapus,44 the present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial power which the Court, under previous charters, would
have normally and ordinarily left to the political departments to decide.
CONCLUSION
In fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view that the so-called
people's initiative to amend our Constitution from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-
parliamentary is actually not an initiative of the people, but an initiative of some of our
politicians. It has not been shown by petitioners, during the oral arguments in this case, that
the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures understood what they signed. In
fact, petitioners admitted that the Constitutional provisions sought to be amended and the
proposed amendments were not explained to all those registered voters. Indeed, there will be
no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether they really understood what
petitioners and their group asked them to sign.
Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v. The Executive
Secretary.45 The Court then ruled that "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect," although it had
notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly
ratified by the people in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The Court concluded, among
others, that the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies "was and is null and void ab
initio." That was during martial law when perhaps majority of the justices were scared of the
dictator. Luckily at present, we are not under a martial law regime. There is, therefore, no
reason why this Court should allow itself to be used as a legitimizing authority by the so-
called people's initiative for those who want to perpetuate themselves in power.
At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with our present government
structure. Consequent1y, we must not change it. America has a presidential type of
government. Yet, it thrives ideally and has become a super power. It is then safe to
conclude that what we should change are some of the people running the government,
NOT the SYSTEM.
Is there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified and capable, may be elected as
members and leaders of the unicameral-parliament? Or will the present members of the
Lower House continue to hold their respective positions with limitless terms?
Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and the marginalized?
Will it be able to provide homes for the homeless, food for the hungry, jobs for the jobless and
protection for the weak?
This is a defining moment in our history. The issue posed before us is crucial with
transcendental significance. And history will judge us on how we resolve this issue – shall we
allow the revision of our Constitution, of which we are duty bound to guard and revere, on the
basis of a doubtful people's initiative?
Amending the Constitution involving a change of government system or structure is a
herculean task affecting the entire Filipino people and the future generations. Let us,
therefore, entrust this duty to more knowledgeable people elected as members of a
Constitutional Convention.
Yes, the voice of the people is the voice of God. But under the circumstances in this case,
the voice of God is not audible.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition
in G.R. No. 174299.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 174299

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and JOHN DOE and PETER DOE,
respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I am convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did
not commit an abuse of its discretion in dismissing the amended petition before it. The
proposals of petitioners incorporated in said amended petition are for the revision of the 1987
Constitution. Further, the amended petition before the respondent COMELEC is insufficient in
substance.
The Antecedents
On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the
COMELEC a petition entitled "IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE
1987 CONSTITUTION THROUGH A PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE: A SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT BY AMENDING
ARTICLES VI AND VII; AND PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM." The
case was docketed as EM (LD)-06-01. On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed an amended
petition. For brevity, it is referred to as the petition for initiative.
Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their petition in their own behalf and
together with those who have affixed their signatures to the signature sheets appended
thereto who are Filipino citizens, residents and registered voters of the Philippines, and they
constitute at least twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein
each legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered
voters therein.
Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is based on their
constitutional right to propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution by way of people's
initiative, as recognized in Section 2, Article XVII thereof, which provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
60
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."
According to petitioners, while the above provision states that "(T)he Congress shall provide
for the implementation of the exercise of this right," the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c),
along with Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) 6735,1 are sufficient enabling details for the
people's exercise of the power. The said sections of RA 6735 state:
Sec. 5. Requirements. – (a) To exercise the power x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after
five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
(5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
xxxx
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures
on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification
cards used in the immediately preceding election.

They also alleged that the COMELEC has the authority, mandate and obligation to give due
course to the petition for initiative, in compliance with the constitutional directive for the
COMELEC to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."2
Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the changes they proposed to be
incorporated in the 1987 Constitution and prayed that the COMELEC issue an order:
1. Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at least twice in
newspapers of general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after
the Certification by this Honorable Commission of the sufficiency of this Petition, to
allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable in the premises.
The Ruling of the respondent COMELEC
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC promulgated the assailed Resolution denying due
course and dismissing the petition for initiative. The COMELEC ruled that:
We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional
duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as
in this case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the
Constitution particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be directly proposed
by the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. x x x.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right."
61
The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-self-executory provision
needed an enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the
constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolution, Congress enacted RA 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago v. Commission on
Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned
The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted
to provide for the implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required
minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court
categorically declared RA 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the
people under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the
pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this
right of the people remains nothing but an "empty right," and that this Commission is
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (Citations omitted.)
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to this Court on a petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Petitioners' Case
In support of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that:
I.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO
GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE CITED
SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE
MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, CONSIDERING THAT
UPON ITS RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL VOTING ON 10 JUNE 1997, NO

MAJORITY VOTE WAS SECURED TO DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS
INADEQUATE, INCOMPLETE AND INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.
II.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189
AND EXISTING APPROPRIATION OF THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR
SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND AUTHORITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF PEOPLE'S
INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE AND
COMPLETE.
III.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN
REFUSING TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE,
THEREBY VIOLATING AN EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND
DISREGARDING AND CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE.
A.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
THE INSTANT PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS.
1.
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO GIVE
THE PEOPLE THE POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOW GIVING VIBRANT LIFE
TO THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
2.
PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH
1997, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THE
SOVEREIGN POWER OF INITIATIVE AND RECALL HAS BEEN
INVARIABLY UPHELD
3.
THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH SHALL BE
DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.
62
4.
BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE
PETITION FOR INITIATIVE DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION
OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN TO PERFORM THIS
SACRED EXERCISE OF THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.
B.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
THE INSTANT PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS
C.
THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO V. COMELEC
ONLY APPLIES TO THE DELFIN PETITION.
1.
IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND NOT
OTHER STATEMENTS IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION THAT
GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSY.
IV.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR
PERFORM A DUTY MANDATED BY LAW.
A.
THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET THE INITIATIVE
FOR PLEBISCITE.3
Petitioners Failed to Allege and Demonstrate All the Essential
Facts To Establish the Right to a Writ of Certiorari
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the

facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set out in the petition
and established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. x x x4
The Court has invariably defined "grave abuse of discretion," thus:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the
discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be
a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the
judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law
traditions.5
There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.6 The only question involved is
jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance
of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment.7 An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an appeal. 8
In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC that it denied
the petition for initiative solely in obedience to the mandate of this Court in Santiago v.
Commission on Elections.9 In said case, the Court En Banc permanently enjoined the
COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
63
provide for the implementation of the system. When the COMELEC denied the petition for
initiative, there was as yet no valid law enacted by Congress to provide for the
implementation of the system.
It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due course to the
petition for initiative as "capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." In fact, in so doing, the COMELEC merely followed or
applied, as it ought to do, the Court's ruling in Santiago to the effect that Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is a non self-executory provision and
requires an enabling law for its implementation. In relation thereto, RA 6735 was found by the
Court to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to
implement the constitutional provision on initiative. Consequently, the COMELEC was
"permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system." The decision of the Court En Banc interpreting
RA 6735 forms part of the legal system of the Philippines.10 And no doctrine or principle laid
down by the Court En Banc may be modified or reversed except by the Court En Banc,11
certainly not by the COMELEC. Until the Court En Banc modifies or reverses its decision, the
COMELEC is bound to follow the same.12 As succinctly held in Fulkerson v. Thompson:13
Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is considered as finally settled.
The inferior court is bound by the judgment or decree as the law of the case, and
must carry it into execution according to the mandate. The inferior court cannot vary
it, or judicially examine it for any other purpose than execution. It can give no other or
further relief as to any matter decided by the Supreme Court even where there is
error apparent; or in any manner intermeddle with it further than to execute the
mandate and settle such matters as have been remanded, not adjudicated by the
Supreme Court….
The principles above stated are, we think, conclusively established by the authority of
adjudged cases. And any further departure from them would inevitably mar the
harmony of the whole judiciary system, bring its parts into conflict, and produce
therein disorganization, disorder, and incalculable mischief and confusion. Besides,
any rule allowing the inferior courts to disregard the adjudications of the Supreme
Court, or to refuse or omit to carry them into execution would be repugnant to the
principles established by the constitution, and therefore void.14
At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of Santiago as well as the pronouncement
made by the Court therein. Like petitioners in the instant case, in Santiago, Atty. Jesus Delfin,
the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), et al., invoked Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution as they filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, By People's Initiative" (the Delfin
petition). They asked the COMELEC to issue an order fixing the time and date for signature
gathering all over the country; causing the necessary publications of said order and their
petition in newspapers of general and local circulation and instructing municipal election

registrars in all regions all over the country and to assist petitioners in establishing signing
stations. Acting thereon, the COMELEC issued the order prayed for.
Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing its order. The Court, speaking through Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice), granted the petition as it declared:
1. RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned";
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 230015 invalid insofar as it prescribed rules and regulations on
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution because the COMELEC is without
authority to promulgate the rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative;
and
3. The Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the required number of signatures of
registered voters.
The Court concluded in Santiago that "the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system." The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on
Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the Delfin petition
(UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18, 1996 is made permanent
as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private
respondents.16
64
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santiago in another petition which was filed with the Court by
PIRMA and the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (who were parties in Santiago)
docketed as PIRMA v. Commission on Elections.17 The said petitioners, undaunted by
Santiago and claiming to have gathered 5,793,213 signatures, filed a petition with the
COMELEC praying, inter alia, that COMELEC officers be ordered to verify all the signatures
collected in behalf of the petition and, after due hearing, that it (COMELEC) declare the
petition sufficient for the purpose of scheduling a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Like
the Delfin petition in Santiago, the PIRMA petition proposed to submit to the people in a
plebiscite the amendment to the Constitution on the lifting of the term limits of elected
officials.
The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in PIRMA has
no basis. The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated July 8, 1997, dismissed the PIRMA petition
citing the permanent restraining order issued against it by the Court in Santiago. PIRMA and
the spouses Pedrosa forthwith elevated the matter to the Court alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over, and thereby
dismissing, their petition for initiative to amend the Constitution.
The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the petition filed by PIRMA and the
spouses Albert Pedrosa. The Court declared that the COMELEC merely complied with the
dispositions in the decision of the Court in Santiago and, hence, cannot be held to have
committed a grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the petition before it:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could
be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision
of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution
of June 10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the
second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as
regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the
Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ.,
voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need
for re-examination of said second issue since the case a bar is not the proper vehicle
for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno,
Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was need for such a
re-examination. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.18 (Underscoring supplied.)
In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of petitioners and
argues that the COMELEC should not have applied the ruling in Santiago to the petition for
initiative because the permanent injunction therein referred only to the Delfin petition. The
OSG buttresses this argument by pointing out that the Temporary Restraining Order dated

December 18, 1996 that was made permanent in the dispositive portion referred only to the
Delfin petition.
The OSG's attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Court's decision in
Santiago is futile. It bears stressing that the dispositive portion must not be read separately
but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. To get to the
true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but
the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does
appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo thereof.19
The pronouncement in the body of the decision in Santiago permanently enjoining the
COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system" is thus as much a part of the Court's decision
as its dispositive portion. The ruling of this Court is of the nature of an in rem judgment
barring any and all Filipinos from filing a petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted. Clearly, the
COMELEC, in denying due course to the present petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution conformably with the Court's ruling in Santiago did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. On the contrary, its actuation is in keeping with the salutary principle of hierarchy
of courts. For the Court to find the COMELEC to have abused its discretion when it dismissed
the amended petition based on the ruling of this Court in Santiago would be sheer judicial
apostasy.
As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "there is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts should take their bearings." 20 This truism applies with equal force to
the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for, after all, judicial decisions applying or interpreting
laws or the Constitution "assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but
also of those duty bound to enforce obedience thereto."21
Petitioners Cannot Ascribe
Grave Abuse of Discretion on
the COMELEC Based on the
Minority Opinion in Santiago
It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court, not the opinion
of the minority, prevails. As a corollary, the decision of the majority cannot be modified or
reversed by the minority of the members of the Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit unconvincingly,
that the Court's declaration therein on the inadequacy, incompleteness and insufficiency of
RA 6735 to implement the system of initiative to propose constitutional amendments did not
constitute the majority opinion. This contention is utterly baseless.
65
Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices,22 or the majority of the
members of the Court, who actually took part in the deliberations thereon. On the other hand,
five Justices,23 while voting for the dismissal of the Delfin petition on the ground of
insufficiency, dissented from the majority opinion as they maintained the view that RA 6735
was sufficient to implement the system of initiative.
Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in the
decision in Santiago, the pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned" constitutes a definitive ruling on the matter.
In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration of the Santiago
decision were denied with finality as only six Justices, or less than the majority, voted to grant
the same. The Resolution expressly stated that the motion for reconsideration failed "to
persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March
1977."24 In fine, the pronouncement in Santiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19,
1997 remains the definitive ruling on the matter.
It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve the issue posed
by them and to re-examine its ruling as regards RA 6735. By a vote of seven members of the
Court, including Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that
there was no need to resolve the issue. Five members of the Court opined that there was a
need for the re-examination of said ruling. Thus, the pronouncement of the Court in Santiago
remains the law of the case and binding on petitioners.
If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago,
the Court should have resolved to set aside its original resolution dismissing the petition and
to grant the motion for reconsideration and the petition. But the Court did not. The Court
positively and unequivocally declared that the COMELEC merely followed the ruling of the
Court in Santiago in dismissing the petition before it. No less than Senior Justice Reynato S.
Puno concurred with the resolution of the Court. It behooved Justice Puno to dissent from the
ruling of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of petitioners precisely on the ground
that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago. He did not. Neither did Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.
That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people's right to directly propose
constitutional amendments through the system of initiative had already been conclusively
settled in Santiago as well as in PIRMA. Heeding these decisions, several lawmakers,
including no less than Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo Nachura when he was then a
member of the House of Representatives,25 have filed separate bills to implement the system
of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
In the present Thirteenth (13th) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are pending. In the Senate,
the three (3) pending bills are: Senate Bill No. 119 entitled An Act Providing for People's
Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Luisa "Loi" P. Ejercito Estrada;

Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the
Constitution introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247
entitled An Act Providing for a System of People's Initiative to Propose Amendments to the
Constitution introduced by Senator Richard Gordon.
In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills: House Bill No.
05281 filed by Representative Carmen Cari, House Bill No. 05017 filed by Representative
Imee Marcos, House Bill No. 05025 filed by Representative Roberto Cajes, and House Bill
No. 05026 filed by Representative Edgardo Chatto. These House bills are similarly entitled
An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution.
The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and House bills uniformly recognize that
there is, to date, no law to govern the process by which constitutional amendments are
introduced by the people directly through the system of initiative. Ten (10) years after
Santiago and absent the occurrence of any compelling supervening event, i.e., passage of a
law to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that
would warrant the re-examination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to apply to the
present case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of stare decisis. As earlier shown,
Congress and other government agencies have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The Court can
do no less with respect to its own ruling.
Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality of a law cannot be
made to depend on the individual opinions of the members who compose it – the Supreme
Court, as an institution, has already determined RA 6735 to be "incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned" and therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any change
in the Court's composition.26 Indeed, it is vital that there be stability in the courts in adhering
to decisions deliberately made after ample consideration. Parties should not be encouraged
to seek re-examination of determined principles and speculate on fluctuation of the law with
every change in the expounders of it.27
Proposals to Revise the Constitution,
As in the Case of the Petitioners'
Proposal to Change the Form of
Government, Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative,
Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, is Limited to Amendments
Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its pronouncement in
Santiago and declares RA 6735, taken together with other extant laws, sufficient to
implement the system of initiative, still, the amended petition for initiative cannot prosper.
Despite the denomination of their petition, the proposals of petitioners to change the form of
66
government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of
government are actually for the revision of the Constitution.
Petitioners propose to "amend" Articles VI and VII of the Constitution in this manner:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
"Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral
Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by
law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three
hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.
"(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at
least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at
least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district
for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those
under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number
shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the
parliamentary districts."
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to
read, as follows:
"Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive
power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The
Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from
among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of
government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to
a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII,
entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the
expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to
exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two
thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.,
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the
incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In
case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the

incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all
the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however,
that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of
Representatives" and "House of Congress," "Senator[s] or "Member[s] of the House
of Representatives" and "House of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament";
that any and all references therein to "Member[s] of the House of Representatives"
shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to
the "President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which
are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with
Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a
unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all
references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses
of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references
therein to "Member[s] of Congress," "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of
Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and of "Acting President"
shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim
Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall
have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent
Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and
shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall
preside over its session for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the
Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim
Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
67
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution
consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong
bureaucracy.
"Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate,
from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who
shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime
Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and
responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of
all local government officials. [Thereafter, the Vice-President, as Member of
Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside over
its session for the purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a
majority vote of all its members, from among themselves.] The duly-elected Prime
Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice President.28
Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of registered voters have been
complied with, i.e., the signatories to the petition constitute twelve percent (12%) of all the
registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least
three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. Certifications allegedly executed by the
respective COMELEC Election Registrars of each municipality and city verifying these
signatures were attached to the petition for initiative. The verification was allegedly done on
the basis of the list of registered voters contained in the official COMELEC list used in the
immediately preceding election.
The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the Filipino people in a
plebiscite to be called for the said purpose reads:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR
THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?29
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII would effect a more
efficient, more economical and more responsive government. The parliamentary system
would allegedly ensure harmony between the legislative and executive branches of
government, promote greater consensus, and provide faster and more decisive governmental
action.

Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:
Article XVII
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
It can be readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different modes and procedures
for proposals for the amendment and revision of the Constitution:
1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution
may be proposed by –
a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
b. A constitutional convention.
2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution may be likewise
directly proposed by the people through initiative.
The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms "amendment" and "revision"
and provided for their respective modes and procedures for effecting changes of the
Constitution fully cognizant of the distinction between the two concepts. Commissioner Jose
E. Suarez, the Chairman of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions,
explained:
MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment." However,
the Committee finally agreed to use the terms – "amendment" or "revision" when our
attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in
68
the connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of our research,
we came up with the observations made in the famous – or notorious – Javellana
doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein
he made the following distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing
Constitution: "Revision" may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the
other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of specific
provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire
Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions
deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts
already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a
completely new fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic
concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be
employed in the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the
new Constitution.30
Further, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term "revision" in Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution because it was their intention to reserve the power to propose
a revision of the Constitution to Congress or the constitutional convention. Stated in another
manner, it was their manifest intent that revision thereof shall not be undertaken through the
system of initiative. Instead, the revision of the Constitution shall be done either by Congress
or by a constitutional convention.
It is significant to note that, originally, the provision on the system of initiative was included in
Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on
Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The original draft provided:
SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article __
Section __ of the Constitution.31
However, after deliberations and interpellations, the members of the Commission agreed to
remove the provision on the system of initiative from Section 1 and, instead, put it under a
separate provision, Section 2. It was explained that the removal of the provision on initiative
from the other "traditional modes" of changing the Constitution was precisely to limit the
former (system of initiative) to amendments to the Constitution. It was emphasized that the
system of initiative should not extend to revision.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that
pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing
the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee
report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article
on Amendment or Revision. x x x32
The intention to exclude "revision" of the Constitution as a mode that may be undertaken
through the system of initiative was reiterated and made clear by Commissioner Suarez in
response to a suggestion of Commissioner Felicitas Aquino:
MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together with the provisions of Section
4, except that in Section 4, as it is presently drafted, there is no take-off date for the
60-day and 90-day periods.
MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative mode of
proposing amendments to the Constitution which would further require the process of
submitting it in a plebiscite, in which case it is not self-executing.
MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off period.
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of
initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as
if it were a self-executing provision?
MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into
a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense conveyed by the Committee.
69
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned by the Committee.33
Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also made the clarification with
respect to the observation of Commissioner Regalado Maambong:
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment
on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."34
After several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of the following wording of Section
2:
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS
OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT
LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE
YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:
Article XVII
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(3) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(4) A constitutional convention.

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes a substantial
differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two procedures and their
respective fields of application. Ineluctably, the system of initiative under Section 2, Article
XVII as a mode of effecting changes in the Constitution is strictly limited to amendments – not
to a revision – thereof.
As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in providing for "amendment" and "revision"
as different modes of changing the fundamental law, were cognizant of the distinction
between the two terms. They particularly relied on the distinction made by Justice Felix
Antonio in his concurring opinion in Javellana v. Executive Secretary,35 the controversial
decision which gave imprimatur to the 1973 Constitution of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, as follows:
There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an existing
constitution. Revision may involve a rewriting of the whole constitution. The act of
amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only specific
provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire
constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts of the existing constitution of
the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or
the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of
the times. The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution.
It is a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and
economic concepts.36
Other elucidation on the distinction between "amendment" and "revision" is enlightening. For
example, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, an eminent authority on political law, distinguished the two
terms in this manner:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different
portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole
constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important
provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that
characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be
carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed
or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
70
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a
few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the
advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The
intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to
it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress
portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect. 37
In the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees38 had
the occasion to make the distinction between the two terms with respect to Ga.L. 1945, an
instrument which "amended" the 1877 Constitution of Georgia. It explained the term
"amendment:"
"Amendment" of a statute implies its survival and not destruction. It repeals or
changes some provision, or adds something thereto. A law is amended when it is in
whole or in part permitted to remain, and something is added to or taken from it, or it
is in some way changed or altered to make it more complete or perfect, or to fit it the
better to accomplish the object or purpose for which it was made, or some other
object or purpose.39
On the other hand, the term "revision" was explained by the said US appellate court:
x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same
location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new
house? Some of the materials contained in the old house may be used again, some
of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you
have altogether another or a new house. We conclude that the instrument as
contained in Ga.L. 1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an amendment to the
constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a completely revised or new
constitution.40
Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the Constitutional Commission,
expounded on the distinction between the two terms thus:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable
provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific
parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplate
a re-examination of the entire document – or of provisions of the document (which
have overall implications for the entire document or for the fundamental philosophical
underpinnings of the document) – to determine how and to what extent it should be
altered. Thus, for instance, a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional
structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system
because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.

It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of
change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that
effects revision. Hence, I must reject the puerile argument that the use of the plural
form of "amendments" means that a revision can be achieved by the introduction of a
multiplicity of amendments!41
Given that revision necessarily entails a more complex, substantial and far-reaching effects
on the Constitution, the framers thereof wisely withheld the said mode from the system of
initiative. It should be recalled that it took the framers of the present Constitution four months
from June 2, 1986 until October 15, 1986 to come up with the draft Constitution which, as
described by the venerable Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma, the President of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, "gradually and painstakingly took shape through the crucible of
sustained sometimes passionate and often exhilarating debates that intersected all
dimensions of the national life."42
Evidently, the framers of the Constitution believed that a revision thereof should, in like
manner, be a product of the same extensive and intensive study and debates. Consequently,
while providing for a system of initiative where the people would directly propose
amendments to the Constitution, they entrusted the formidable task of its revision to a
deliberative body, the Congress or Constituent Assembly.
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the principles upon which the
government is founded, and regulating the division of sovereign powers, directing to what
persons each of those powers is to be confided and the manner in which it is to be
exercised.43 The Philippines has followed the American constitutional legal system in the
sense that the term constitution is given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic
instrument, under which governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed.44
The Constitution received its force from the express will of the people. An overwhelming
16,622,111, out of 21,785,216 votes cast during the plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the
present Constitution on February 2, 1987.45 In expressing that will, the Filipino people
have incorporated therein the method and manner by which the same can be amended and
revised, and when the electorate have incorporated into the fundamental law the particular
manner in which the same may be altered or changed, then any course which disregards that
express will is a direct violation of the fundamental law. 46
Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution, where the validity of a
constitutional amendment or revision depends upon whether such provisions have been
complied with, such question presents for consideration and determination a judicial question,
and the courts are the only tribunals vested with power under the Constitution to determine
such question.47
Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the terms "amendment" and
"revision," clearly makes a differentiation not only between the two terms but also between
two procedures and their respective fields of application. On this point, the case of McFadden
71
v. Jordan48 is instructive. In that case, a "purported initiative amendment" (referred to as the
proposed measure) to the State Constitution of California, then being proposed to be
submitted to the electors for ratification, was sought to be enjoined. The proposed measure,
denominated as "California Bill of Rights," comprised a single new article with some 208
subsections which would repeal or substantially alter at least 15 of the 25 articles of the
California State Constitution and add at least four new topics. Among the likely effects of the
proposed measure were to curtail legislative and judicial functions, legalize gaming,
completely revise the taxation system and reduce the powers of cities, counties and courts.
The proposed measure also included diverse matters as ministers, mines, civic centers,
liquor control and naturopaths.
The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of the proposed measure to the
electors for ratification because it was not an "amendment" but a "revision" which could only
be proposed by a convention. It held that from an examination of the proposed measure
itself, considered in relation to the terms of the California State Constitution, it was clear that
the proposed initiative enactment amounted substantially to an attempted revision, rather
than amendment, thereof; and that inasmuch as the California State Constitution specifies
(Article XVIII §2 thereof) that it may be revised by means of constitutional convention but
does not provide for revision by initiative measure, the submission of the proposed measure
to the electorate for ratification must be enjoined.
As piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme Court in McFadden, the
differentiation required (between amendment and revision) is not merely between two words;
more accurately it is between two procedures and between their respective fields of
application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must
be understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be a mere alternative
procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be understood to denote,
respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of application appropriate to its procedure.49
Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in the nature of
safety-valves – they must not be so adjusted as to discharge their peculiar function with too
great facility, lest they become the ordinary escape-pipes of party passion; nor, on the other
hand, must they discharge it with such difficulty that the force needed to induce action is
sufficient also to explode the machine. Hence, the problem of the Constitution maker is, in
this particular, one of the most difficult in our whole system, to reconcile the requisites for
progress with the requisites for safety.50
Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution is,
despite its denomination, one for its revision. It purports to seek the amendment only of
Articles VI and VII of the Constitution as well as to provide transitory provisions. However, as
will be shown shortly, the amendment of these two provisions will necessarily affect other
numerous provisions of the Constitution particularly those pertaining to the specific powers of
Congress and the President. These powers would have to be transferred to the Parliament
and the Prime Minister and/or President, as the case may be. More than one hundred (100)
sections will be affected or altered thereby:

1. Section 19 of Article III (Bill of Rights) on the power of Congress to impose the
death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes;
2. Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of Congress to provide for securing
the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting;
3. All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;
4. All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;
5. The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial Department):
- Section 2 on power of Congress to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts;
- Section 7 on the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications of judges
of lower courts;
- Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC) which includes
representatives of Congress as ex officio members and on the power of the
President to appoint the regular members of the JBC;
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the members of the
Supreme Court and judges of lower courts;
- Section 16 on duty of Supreme Court to make annual report to the
President and Congress.
7. The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):
6. The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional Commissions);
- (B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make annual report to
the President and Congress;
- (B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for the
standardization of compensation of government officials;
- (B) Section 8 which provides in part that "no public officer shall accept,
without the consent of Congress, any present, emolument, etc. x x x"
- (C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments;
72
- (C) Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to recommend to
Congress measures to minimize election spending x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to recommend to the
President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to the President
and Congress a report on the conduct of election, plebiscite, etc.;
- (C) Section 5 on the power of the President, with the favorable
recommendation of the COMELEC, to grant pardon, amnesty, parole, or
suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations;
- (C) Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor of organization
registered under party-list system;
- (C) Section 8 on political parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-
list system;
- (D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) with the consent of the
Commission of Appointments;
- Section 4 on duty of the COA to make annual report to the President and
Congress.
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local government code;
- Section 4 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision
over local government units (LGUs);
- Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own sources of income x x
x, subject to such guidelines as Congress may provide;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to create special metropolitan political
subdivisions;
- Section 14 on the power of the President to provide for regional
development councils x x x;

- Section 16 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision
over autonomous regions;
- Section 18 on the power of Congress to enact organic act for each
autonomous region as well as the power of the President to appoint the
representatives to the regional consultative commission;
- Section 19 on the duty of the first Congress elected under the Constitution
to pass the organic act for autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras.
8. The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers):
- Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, Vice-President, etc.);
- Section 3 on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power of the House to
initiate complaint and sole power of the Senate to try and decide
impeachment cases);
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the Ombudsman and his
deputies;
- Section 16 which provides in part that "x x x no loans or guaranty shall be
granted to the President, Vice-President, etc.
- Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of assets and liabilities by public
officials including the President, Vice-President, etc.
9. The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to allow, by law, small-scale utilization
of natural resources and power of the President to enter into agreements
with foreign-owned corporations and duty to notify Congress of every
contract;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to determine size of lands of public
domain;
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to determine specific limits of forest
lands;
- Section 5 on the power of Congress to provide for applicability of customary
laws;
73
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish an independent economic
and planning agency to be headed by the President;
- Section 10 on the power of Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens or
domestic corporations(at least 60% Filipino-owned) certain areas of
investment;
- Section 11 on the sole power of Congress to grant franchise for public
utilities;
- Section 15 on the power of Congress to create an agency to promote
viability of cooperatives;
- Section 16 which provides that Congress shall not, except by general law,
form private corporations;
- Section 17 on the salaries of the President, Vice-President, etc. and the
power of Congress to adjust the same;
- Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central monetary
authority.
10. The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights):
- Section 1 on the mandate of Congress to give highest priority to enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of people x x x
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to prescribe retention limits in agrarian
reform;
- Section 18 (6) on the duty of the Commission on Human Rights to
recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights;
- Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other cases to fall within
the jurisdiction of the Commission on Human Rights.
11. The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, etc.):
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to increase Filipino equity participation
in educational institutions;

- Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as Congress may provide,
the Government shall sustain the use of Filipino as medium of official
communication;
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish a national language
commission;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to provide for incentives to promote
scientific research.
12. The following Sections of Article XVI (General Provisions):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to adopt new name for the country,
new national anthem, etc.;
- Section 5 (7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which may be
extended by the President in times of war or national emergency declared by
Congress;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to regulate or prohibit monopolies in
mass media;
- Section 12 on the power of Congress to create consultative body to advise
the President on indigenous cultural communities.
13. The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions):
- Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by Congress;
- Section 2 on the duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the
system of initiative;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional convention to
amend or revise the Constitution.
14. All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).
The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that "the big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will
not be affected."51 Petitioners' proposition, while purportedly seeking to amend only Articles
VI and VII of the Constitution and providing transitory provisions, will, in fact, affect, alter,
replace or repeal other numerous articles and sections thereof. More than the quantitative
effects, however, the revisory character of petitioners' proposition is apparent from the
qualitative effects it will have on the fundamental law.
74
I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the revision of a
constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the
procedure for effecting such change; while amendment refers only to particular provisions to
be added to or to be altered in a constitution.52
For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate below Dean Sinco's more
comprehensive differentiation of the terms:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different
portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole
constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important
provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that
characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be
carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed
or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a
few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the
advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The
intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to
it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress
portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect. 53
A change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary,
following the above distinction, entails a revision of the Constitution as it will involve
"alteration of different portions of the entire document" and "may result in the rewriting of the
whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important
provisions."
More importantly, such shift in the form of government will, without doubt, fundamentally
change the basic plan and substance of the present Constitution. The tripartite system
ordained by our fundamental law divides governmental powers into three distinct but co-equal
branches: the legislative, executive and judicial. Legislative power, vested in Congress which
is a bicameral body consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate, is the power
to make laws and to alter them at discretion. Executive power, vested in the President who is
directly elected by the people, is the power to see that the laws are duly executed and
enforced. Judicial power, vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts, is the power to
construe and apply the law when controversies arise concerning what has been done or
omitted under it. This separation of powers furnishes a system of checks and balances which
guards against the establishment of an arbitrary or tyrannical government.
Under a unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the tripartite separation of power is
dissolved as there is a fusion between the executive and legislative powers. Essentially, the
President becomes a mere "symbolic head of State" while the Prime Minister becomes the
 75

head of government who is elected, not by direct vote of the people, but by the members of
the Parliament. The Parliament is a unicameral body whose members are elected by
legislative districts. The Prime Minister, as head of government, does not have a fixed term of
office and may only be removed by a vote of confidence of the Parliament. Under this form of
government, the system of checks and balances is emasculated.
initiative on amendments to the Constitution must be dismissed for being insufficient in form
and substance.
Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that a petition for initiative on the Constitution must state the
following:

Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would be effected, not to 1. Contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
mention that the Constitution's basic plan and substance of a tripartite system of government amended or repealed, as the case may be;
and the principle of separation of powers underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely
destroyed, there can be no other conclusion than that the proposition of petitioners Lambino,
2. The proposition;
et al. would constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment or "such an
addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement or
better carry out the purpose for which it was framed."54 As has been shown, the effect of the 3. The reason or reasons therefor;
adoption of the petitioners' proposition, rather than to "within the lines of the original
instrument" constitute "an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was 4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
framed," is to "substantially alter the purpose and to attain objectives clearly beyond the lines
of the Constitution as now cast."55 5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners' contention that any change less than a total one is 6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words
amendatory would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
preserved. A case might, conceivably, be presented where the question would be occasion to
undertake to define with nicety the line of demarcation; but we have no case or occasion Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in this wise:
here.
SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures
As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, "a switch from the presidential system to a on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification
parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire cards used in the immediately preceding election.
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system
because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. It is thus clear that
The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the signatures. This is a
what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document.
solemn and important duty imposed on the election registrar which he cannot delegate to any
Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision." 56
other person, even to barangay officials. Hence, a verification of signatures made by persons
other than the election registrars has no legal effect.
The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution filed by petitioners Lambino, et
al., being in truth and in fact a proposal for the revision thereof, is barred from the system of
In patent violation of the law, several certifications submitted by petitioners showed that the
initiative upon any legally permissible construction of Section 2, Article XVII of the
verification of signatures was made, not by the election registrars, but by barangay officials.
Constitution.
For example, the certification of the election officer in Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur reads in full:
The Petition for Initiative on
LOCAL ELECTION OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION57
Amendments to the Constitution
is, on its Face, Insufficient in
Form and Substance THIS IS TO CERTIFY that based on the verifications made by the Barangay Officials
in this City/Municipality, as attested to by two (2) witnesses from the same
Barangays, which is part of the 2nd Legislative District of the Province of Lanao del
Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient to implement the system of
Sur, the names appearing on the attached signature sheets relative to the proposed
initiative and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, as it prescribed rules and regulations on
initiative on Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are those of bonafide resident of
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is valid, still, the petition for
the said Barangays and correspond to the names found in the official list of registered

voters of the Commission on Elections and/or voters' affidavit and/or voters'
identification cards.
It is further certified that the total number of signatures of the registered voters for the
City/Municipality of LUMBATAN, LANAO DEL SUR as appearing in the affixed
signatures sheets is ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (1,180).
April 2, 2006
IBRAHIM M. MACADATO
Election Officer
(Underscoring supplied)
The ineffective verification in almost all the legislative districts in the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) alone is shown by the certifications, similarly worded as above-
quoted, of the election registrars of Buldon, Maguindanao;58 Cotabato City (Special
Province);59 Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao;60 Matanog, Maguindanao;61 Parang,
Maguindanao;62 Kabantalan, Maguindanao;63 Upi, Maguinadano;64 Barira, Maguindanao;65
Sultan, Mastura;66 Ampatuan, Maguindanao;67 Buluan, Maguindanao;68 Datu Paglas,
Maguindanao;69 Datu Piang, Maguindanao;70 Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao;71 Pagalungan,
Maguindanao;72 Talayan, Maguindanao;73 Gen. S.K. Pendatun, Maguindanao;74
Mamasapano, Maguindanao;75 Talitay, Maguindanao;76 Guindulungan, Maguindanao;77 Datu
Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao;78 Datu Unsay, Maguindanao;79 Pagagawan, Maguindanao;80
Rajah Buayan, Maguindanao;81 Indanan, Sulu;82 Jolo, Sulu;83 Maimbung, Sulu;84 Hadji
Panglima, Sulu;85 Pangutaran, Sulu;86 Parang, Sulu;87 Kalingalan Caluang, Sulu;88 Luuk,
Sulu;89 Panamao, Sulu;90 Pata, Sulu;91 Siasi, Sulu;92 Tapul, Sulu;93 Panglima Estino, Sulu;94
Lugus, Sulu;95 and Pandami, Sulu. 96
Section 7 of RA 6735 is clear that the verification of signatures shall be done by the election
registrar, and by no one else, including the barangay officials. The foregoing certifications
submitted by petitioners, instead of aiding their cause, justify the outright dismissal of their
petition for initiative. Because of the illegal verifications made by barangay officials in the
above-mentioned legislative districts, it necessarily follows that the petition for initiative has
failed to comply with the requisite number of signatures, i.e., at least twelve percent (12%) of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging certifications because they
themselves submitted the same to the COMELEC and to the Court in the present case to
support their contention that the requirements of RA 6735 had been complied with and that
their petition for initiative is on its face sufficient in form and substance. They are in the nature
of judicial admissions which are conclusive and binding on petitioners. 97 This being the case,
the Court must forthwith order the dismissal of the petition for initiative for being, on its face,
76
insufficient in form and substance. The Court should make the adjudication entailed by the
facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases.98
It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC is correct in relying on
Santiago that RA 6735 is inadequate to cover initiative to the Constitution, this cannot be
used to legitimize its refusal to heed the people's will. The fact that there is no enabling law
should not prejudice the right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which right has already been exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and
resounding act of the particles of sovereignty must not be set aside. Hence, the COMELEC
should be ordered to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution via a writ of
mandamus. The submission of petitioners, however, is unpersuasive.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to compel
the persons of a public duty most especially when mandated by the Constitution. 99 However,
under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, for a petition for mandamus to prosper,
it must be shown that the subject of the petition is a ministerial act or duty and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that petitioner has a well-defined,
clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. A purely ministerial act or duty is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public official and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty should be performed,
such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge
of the same requires neither the exercise of an official discretion nor judgment.100
To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof.101 In this case, petitioners failed to establish their right to a
writ of mandamus as shown by the foregoing disquisitions.
Remand of the Case to the
COMELEC is Not Authorized by
RA 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
The dissenting opinion posits that the issue of whether or not the petition for initiative has
complied with the requisite number of signatures of at least twelve percent (12%) of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. The
dissenting opinion cites the petitioners' claim that they have complied with the same while the
oppositors-intervenors have vigorously refuted this claim by alleging, inter alia, that the
signatures were not properly verified or were not verified at all. Other oppositors-intervenors
have alleged that the signatories did not fully understand what they have signed as they were
misled into signing the signature sheets.
According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition for initiative and its
compliance with the requirements of RA 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a

question that should be resolved by the COMELEC at the first instance. It thus remands the
case to the COMELEC for further proceedings.
To my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not warranted. There is nothing in
RA 6735, as well as in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement
the former statute, that authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing, whether
full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or administrative hearing, on a petition for
initiative.
Section 41 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 provides that "[a]n initiative shall be conducted
under the control and supervision of the Commission in accordance with Article III hereof."
Pertinently, Sections 30, 31 and 32 of Article III of the said implementing rules provide as
follows:
Sec. 30. Verification of signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures
on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification
cards used in the immediately preceding election.
Sec. 31. Determination by the Commission. – The Commission shall act on the
findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has not been obtained, the
petition shall be deemed defeated and the Commission shall issue a declaration to
that effect.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has been obtained, the
Commission shall set the initiative or referendum in accordance with the succeeding
sections.
Sec. 32. Appeal. – The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency
and insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the
Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Clearly, following the foregoing procedural rules, the COMELEC is not authorized to conduct
any kind of hearing to receive any evidence for or against the sufficiency of the petition for
initiative. Rather, the foregoing rules require of the COMELEC to determine the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative on its face. And it has already been shown, by the
annexes submitted by the petitioners themselves, their petition is, on its face, insufficient in
form and substance. The remand of the case to the COMELEC for reception of evidence of
the parties on the contentious factual issues is, in effect, an amendment of the abovequoted
rules of the COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not empowered to do.
The Present Petition Presents a
Justiciable Controversy; Hence,
a Non-Political Question. Further,
77
the People, Acting in their Sovereign
Capacity, Have Bound Themselves
to Abide by the Constitution
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government.102 A political question
has two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity; and (2) matters which have been specifically designated to some other
department or particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act.103
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arroyo v. De Venecia,104 Senior Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno explained the doctrine of political question vis-à-vis the express mandate of
the present Constitution for the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government:
In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason for courts to categorically
reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts "... to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was also not xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM [Constitutional
Commission] granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience
under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative
departments of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the
government can no longer invoke the political question defense.
xxxx
To a great degree, it diminished its [political question doctrine] use as a shield to
protect other abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with
new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government ". . . to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction."
Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but of purportedly
more than six million registered voters who have signified their assent to the proposal to
amend the Constitution, the same still constitutes a justiciable controversy, hence, a non-
political question. There is no doubt that the Constitution, under Article XVII, has explicitly

provided for the manner or method to effect amendments thereto, or revision thereof. The
question, therefore, of whether there has been compliance with the terms of the Constitution
is for the Court to pass upon.105
In the United States, in In re McConaughy,106 the State Supreme Court of Minnesota
exercised jurisdiction over the petition questioning the result of the general election holding
that "an examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised
the authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of
constitutional amendments." The cases cited were Dayton v. St. Paul,107 Rice v. Palmer,108
Bott v. Wurtz,109 State v. Powell,110 among other cases.
There is no denying that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."111 However, I find to
be tenuous the asseveration that "the argument that the people through initiative cannot
propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty in its head. At
the very least, the submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct
sovereignty of the people."112 In effect, it is theorized that despite the unambiguous text of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution withholding the power to revise it from the system of
initiative, the people, in their sovereign capacity, can conveniently disregard the said
provision.
I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign capacity, can
disregard the Constitution altogether. Such a view directly contravenes the fundamental
constitutional theory that while indeed "the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom
springs all legitimate authority"; nonetheless, "by the Constitution which they establish, they
not only tie up the hands of their official agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither
the officers of the state, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take
action in opposition to this fundamental law."113 The Constitution, it should be remembered,
"is the protector of the people, placed on guard by them to save the rights of the people
against injury by the people."114 This is the essence of constitutionalism:
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and
ourselves, hoping that democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic and even
despotic, might now become restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound
ourselves over to a law that we made and promised to keep. And though a
government of laws did not displace governance by men, it did mean that now men,
democratic men, would try to live by their word.115
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is limited only to
proposals to amend to the Constitution, and does not extend to its revision. The Filipino
people have bound themselves to observe the manner and method to effect the changes of
the Constitution. They opted to limit the exercise of the right to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through initiative, but did not extend the same to the revision thereof. The
petition for initiative, as it proposes to effect the revision thereof, contravenes the
Constitution. The fundamental law of the state prescribes the limitations under which the
78
electors of the state may change the same, and, unless such course is pursued, the mere
fact that a majority of the electors are in favor of a change and have so expressed
themselves, does not work a change. Such a course would be revolutionary, and the
Constitution of the state would become a mere matter of form.116
The very term Constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the
provisions contained therein for its revision indicated the will of the people that the underlying
principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of
a like permanent and abiding nature.117
The Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of amendment and revision in Article
XVII of the Constitution. The Court is mandated to ensure that these safety valves embodied
in the Constitution to guard against improvident and hasty changes thereof are not easily
trifled with. To be sure, by having overwhelmingly ratified the Constitution, the Filipino people
believed that it is "a good Constitution" and in the words of the learned Judge Cooley:
x x x should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or
passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the
people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot
blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe,
can be allowed efficiency. Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit
is certain. As Montaign says: "All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good
does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and worse. 118
Indisputably, the issues posed in the present case are of transcendental importance.
Accordingly, I have approached and grappled with them with full appreciation of the
responsibilities involved in the present case, and have given to its consideration the earnest
attention which its importance demands. I have sought to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution at whatever hazard. I share the concern of Chief Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill:119
"it is for the protection of minorities that constitutions are framed. Sometimes constitutions
must be interposed for the protection of majorities even against themselves. Constitutions are
adopted in times of public repose, when sober reason holds her citadel, and are designed to
check the surging passions in times of popular excitement. But if courts could be coerced by
popular majorities into a disregard of their provisions, constitutions would become mere
'ropes of sand,' and there would be an end of social security and of constitutional freedom.
The cause of temperance can sustain no injury from the loss of this amendment which would
be at all comparable to the injury to republican institutions which a violation of the constitution
would inflict. That large and respectable class of moral reformers which so justly demands
the observance and enforcement of law, cannot afford to take its first reformatory step by a
violation of the constitution. How can it consistently demand of others obedience to a
constitution which it violates itself? The people can in a short time re-enact the amendment.
In the manner of a great moral reform, the loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is
the palladium of republican freedom. The young men coming forward upon the stage of
political action must be educated to venerate it; those already upon the stage must be taught
to obey it. Whatever interest may be advanced or may suffer, whoever or whatever may be
'voted up or voted down,' no sacrilegious hand must be laid upon the constitution." 120
 79

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
in G.R. No. 174299.
Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
electorate the question of calling such a convention.
Associate Justice

Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof
____________________ shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of
EN BANC such amendment or revision.

G.R. No. 174153 (RAUL LAMBINO, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.) Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
and the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the
G.R. No. 174299 (MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, sufficiency of the petition.
ET AL.).
This Article states the procedure for changing the Constitution.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
Constitutions have three parts – the Constitution of Liberty, which states the fundamental
SEPARATE OPINION rights of the people; the Constitution of Government, which establishes the structure of
government, its branches and their operation; and the Constitution of Sovereignty, which
provides how the Constitution may be changed.
AZCUNA, J.:
Article XVII is the Constitution of Sovereignty.
"Why, friends, you go to do you know not what."
As a result, the powers therein provided are called constituent powers. So when Congress
-- Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. 2. acts under this provision, it acts not as a legislature exercising legislative powers. It acts as a
constituent body exercising constituent powers.
Article XVII of the Constitution states:
The rules, therefore, governing the exercise of legislative powers do not apply, or do not
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS apply strictly, to the actions taken under Article XVII.

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered votes therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of the people's right directly to propose amendments to the Constitution through
initiative, the act of Congress pursuant thereto is not strictly a legislative action but partakes
of a constituent act.
As a result, Republic Act No. 6735, the act that provides for the exercise of the people of the
right to propose a law or amendments to the Constitution is, with respect to the right to
propose amendments to the Constitution, a constituent measure, not a mere legislative one.
The consequence of this special character of the enactment, insofar as it relates to proposing
amendments to the Constitution, is that the requirements for statutory enactments, such as
sufficiency of standards and the like, do not and should not strictly apply. As long as there is

a sufficient and clear intent to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right, it
should be sustained, as it is simply a compliance of the mandate placed on Congress by the
Constitution.
Seen in this light, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to the procedure for
proposing amendments to the Constitution, can and should be upheld, despite shortcomings
perhaps in legislative headings and standards.
For this reason, I concur in the view that Santiago v. Comelec1 should be re-examined and,
after doing so, that the pronouncement therein regarding the insufficiency or inadequacy of
the measure to sustain a people's initiative to amend the Constitution should be reconsidered
in favor of allowing the exercise of this sovereign right.
And applying the doctrine stated in Senarillos v. Hermosisima,2 penned by Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, in relation to Article 8 of the Civil Code, that a decision of this Court interpreting a law
forms part of the law interpreted as of the time of its enactment, Republic Act No. 6735
should be deemed sufficient and adequate from the start.
This next point to address, there being a sufficient law, is whether the petition for initiative
herein involved complies with the requirements of that law as well as those stated in Article
XVII of the Constitution.
True it is that ours is a democratic state, as explicitated in the Declaration of Principles, to
emphasize precisely that there are instances recognized and provided for in the Constitution
where our people directly exercise their sovereign powers, new features set forth in this
People Power Charter, namely, the powers of recall, initiative and referendum.
Nevertheless, this democratic nature of our polity is that of a democracy under the rule of law.
This equally important point is emphasized in the very Preamble to the Constitution, which
states:
". . . the blessings of . . . democracy under the rule of law . . . ."
Such is the case with respect to the power to initiate changes in the Constitution. The power
is subject to limitations under the Constitution itself, thus: The power could not be exercised
for the first five years after the Constitution took effect and thereafter can only be exercised
once every five years; the power only extends to proposing amendments but not revisions;
and the power needs an act of Congress providing for its implementation, which act is
directed and mandated.
The question, therefore, arises whether the proposed changes in the Constitution set forth in
the petition for initiative herein involved are mere amendments or rather are revisions.
Revisions are changes that affect the entire Constitution and not mere parts of it.
80
The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct proposals by the people through
initiative is a practical one, namely, there is no one to draft such extensive changes, since 6.3
million people cannot conceivably come up with a single extensive document through a direct
proposal from each of them. Someone would have to draft it and that is not authorized as it
would not be a direct proposal from the people. Such indirect proposals can only take the
form of proposals from Congress as a Constituent Assembly under Article XVII, or a
Constitutional Convention created under the same provision. Furthermore, there is a need for
such deliberative bodies for revisions because their proceedings and debates are duly and
officially recorded, so that future cases of interpretations can be properly aided by resort to
the record of their proceedings.
Even a cursory reading of the proposed changes contained in the petition for initiative herein
involved will show on its face that the proposed changes constitute a revision of the
Constitution. The proposal is to change the system of government from that which is
bicameral-presidential to one that is unicameral-parliamentary.
While purportedly only Articles VI, VII, and XVIII are involved, the fact is, as the petition and
text of the proposed changes themselves state, every provision of the Constitution will have
to be examined to see if they conform to the nature of a unicameral-parliamentary form of
government and changed accordingly if they do not so conform to it. For example, Article VIII
on Judicial Department cannot stand as is, in a parliamentary system, for under such a
system, the Parliament is supreme, and thus the Court's power to declare its act a grave
abuse of discretion and thus void would be an anomaly.
Now, who is to do such examination and who is to do such changes and how should the
changes be worded? The proposed initiative does not say who nor how.
Not only, therefore, is the proposed initiative, on this score, a prohibited revision but it also
suffers from being incomplete and insufficient on its very face.
It, therefore, in that form, cannot pass muster the very limits contained in providing for the
power under the Constitution.
Neither does it comply with Republic Act No. 6735, which states in Section 10 that not more
than one subject shall be proposed as an amendment or amendments to the Constitution.
The petition herein would propose at the very least two subjects – a unicameral legislature
and a parliamentary form of government. Again, for this clear and patent violation of the very
act that provides for the exercise of the power, the proposed initiative cannot lie.
This does not mean, however, that all is lost for petitioners.
For the proposed changes can be separated and are, in my view, separable in nature – a
unicameral legislature is one; a parliamentary form of government is another. The first is a
mere amendment and contains only one subject matter. The second is clearly a revision that
affects every article and every provision in the Constitution to an extent not even the

proponents could at present fully articulate. Petitioners Lambino, et al. thus go about
proposing changes the nature and extent of which they do not as yet know exactly what.
The proposal, therefore, contained in the petition for initiative, regarding a change in the
legislature from a bicameral or two-chamber body to that of a unicameral or one-chamber
body, is sustainable. The text of the changes needed to carry it out are perfunctory and
ministerial in nature. Once it is limited to this proposal, the changes are simply one of deletion
and insertions, the wordings of which are practically automatic and non-discretionary.
As an example, I attach to this opinion an Appendix "A" showing how the Constitution would
read if we were to change Congress from one consisting of the Senate and the House of
Representatives to one consisting only of the House of Representatives. It only affects Article
VI on the Legislative Department, some provisions on Article VII on the Executive
Department, as well as Article XI on the Accountability of Public Officers, and Article XVIII on
Transitory Provisions. These are mere amendments, substantial ones indeed but still only
amendments, and they address only one subject matter.
Such proposal, moreover, complies with the intention and rationale behind the present
initiative, which is to provide for simplicity and economy in government and reduce the
stalemates that often prevent needed legislation.
For the nonce, therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the filing of an
appropriate initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution to change Congress into a
unicameral body. This is not say that I favor such a change. Rather, such a proposal would
come within the purview of an initiative allowed under Article XVII of the Constitution and its
implementing Republic Act, and should, therefore, be submitted to our people in a plebiscite
for them to decide in their sovereign capacity. After all is said and done, this is what
democracy under the rule of law is about.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
81
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR.,
and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John
Doe and Peter Doe
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
"It is a Constitution we are expounding…"1
– Chief Justice John Marshall
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is not a fight over molehills. At the crux of the controversy is the critical
understanding of the first and foremost of our constitutional principles — "the Philippines is
a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them."2 Constitutionalism dictates that this creed must be respected
with deeds; our belief in its validity must be backed by behavior.
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus to set aside the resolution of respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the
Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own
behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their
signatures thereon, and praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent COMELEC to set the date of the plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed
amendments to the Constitution in accordance with Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears. In 1996, the Movement for People's
Initiative sought to exercise the sovereign people's power to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Its
founding member, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, filed with the COMELEC on December 6, 1996, a
"Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative" (Delfin Petition). It proposed to amend Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of
Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution by deleting the provisions on
the term limits for all elective officials.

The Delfin Petition stated that the Petition for Initiative would first be submitted to the people
and would be formally filed with the COMELEC after it is signed by at least twelve per cent
(12%) of the total number of registered voters in the country. It thus sought the assistance
of the COMELEC in gathering the required signatures by fixing the dates and time
therefor and setting up signature stations on the assigned dates and time. The petition
prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order (1) fixing the dates and time for signature
gathering all over the country; (2) causing the publication of said Order and the petition for
initiative in newspapers of general and local circulation; and, (3) instructing the municipal
election registrars in all the regions of the Philippines to assist petitioner and the volunteers in
establishing signing stations on the dates and time designated for the purpose.
The COMELEC conducted a hearing on the Delfin Petition.
On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria
Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition before this Court, seeking to restrain
the COMELEC from further considering the Delfin Petition. They impleaded as respondents
the COMELEC, Delfin, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (Pedrosas) in their capacities as
founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA)
which was likewise engaged in signature gathering to support an initiative to amend the
Constitution. They argued that the constitutional provision on people's initiative may only be
implemented by a law passed by Congress; that no such law has yet been enacted by
Congress; that Republic Act No. 6735 relied upon by Delfin does not cover the initiative to
amend the Constitution; and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, the implementing rules
adopted by the COMELEC on the conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as the initiative
to amend the Constitution was concerned. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325,
entitled Santiago v. Commission on Elections.3
Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition and the Pedrosas from conducting a
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the petition for prohibition. The
Court ruled that the constitutional provision granting the people the power to directly amend
the Constitution through initiative is not self-executory. An enabling law is necessary to
implement the exercise of the people's right. Examining the provisions of R.A. 6735, a
majority of eight (8) members of the Court held that said law was "incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned,"4 and thus voided portions of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. It was also held that even if R.A. 6735 sufficiently covered
the initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was valid, the
Delfin Petition should still be dismissed as it was not the proper initiatory pleading
contemplated by law. Under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 5(b)
of R.A. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least twelve per
cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
82
Petition did not contain signatures of the required number of voters. The decision
stated:
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted
to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood,
energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people
under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient
standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission
on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the
DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent
against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.5
Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
(ponente), Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, and Associate Justices Florenz D. Regalado,
Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima,
Jr. and Justo P. Torres, fully concurred in the majority opinion.
While all the members of the Court who participated in the deliberation6 agreed that the Delfin
Petition should be dismissed for lack of the required signatures, five (5) members, namely,
Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J.
Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban, held that R.A. 6735 was sufficient and adequate to
implement the people's right to amend the Constitution through initiative, and that COMELEC

Resolution No. 2300 validly provided the details for the actual exercise of such right. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, on the other hand, opined that the Court should confine itself to resolving the
issue of whether the Delfin Petition sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law on
initiative, and there was no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. 6735.
The COMELEC, Delfin and the Pedrosas filed separate motions for reconsideration of the
Court's decision.
After deliberating on the motions for reconsideration, six (6)7 of the eight (8) majority
members maintained their position that R.A. 6735 was inadequate to implement the provision
on the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Justice Torres filed an inhibition, while
Justice Hermosisima submitted a Separate Opinion adopting the position of the minority that
R.A. 6735 sufficiently covers the initiative to amend the Constitution. Hence, of the thirteen
(13) members of the Court who participated in the deliberation, six (6) members, namely,
Chief Justice Narvasa and Associate Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo and
Kapunan voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six (6) members, namely, Associate
Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the
same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial
adjudication. The motions for reconsideration were therefore denied for lack of sufficient
votes to modify or reverse the decision of March 19, 1997.8
On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Propose
Amendments to the Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was supported by
around five (5) million signatures in compliance with R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC, among others: (1) cause the publication of the
petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation;
(2) order all election officers to verify the signatures collected in support of the petition and
submit these to the Commission; and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite where the following
proposition would be submitted to the people for ratification:
Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President the
chance to be reelected for another term, similarly with the Vice-President, so that
both the highest officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of six years
each, and also to lift the term limits for all other elective government officials, thus
giving Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose, Section 4 of
Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of Article X, respectively?
The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining order
issued by the Court in Santiago v. COMELEC.
PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to set aside the
COMELEC Resolution dismissing its petition for initiative. PIRMA argued that the Court's
decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition
as said ruling was not definitive based on the deadlocked voting on the motions for
83
reconsideration, and because there was no identity of parties and subject matter between the
two petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to reexamine its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC.
The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated
September 23, 1997. It explained:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could
be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision
of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution
of June 10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the
second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as
regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the
Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ.,
voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need
for re-examination of said second issue since the case at bar is not the proper vehicle
for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno,
Francisco, Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a need for such
a re-examination x x x x9
In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice Bellosillo stated
that the PIRMA petition was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to utilize anew the
system of initiative to amend the Constitution, this time to change the form of government
from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary system.
Let us look at the facts of the petition at bar with clear eyes.
On February 15, 2006, Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of Local Authorities of
the Philippines (ULAP), embarked on a nationwide drive to gather signatures to support the
move to adopt the parliamentary form of government in the country through charter change.
They proposed to amend the Constitution as follows:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as
follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a
unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as
may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces,
representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per
district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district

shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory, and each province must have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a
resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected
by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation
as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which
shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per
centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby
amended to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The
executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance
of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the
Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to
the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-
Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a
new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until
the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall
continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless
impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim
parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office
of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as
President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from
office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime
Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister
under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and
Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18
and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26,
unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in
which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all
84
references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and
"Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all
references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s)
of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of
Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting
President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and
Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10,
11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14,
unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they
shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary
System of government; provided, however, that any all references therein to
"Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress"
shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to
"Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of
Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and
any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting President" shall be
changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments,
an interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular
Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be
composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads
of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a
member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene
the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of
the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a
majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among
themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization
and a strong bureaucracy.

Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall
nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim
Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members
thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and
shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him
by the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials. The duly elected Prime Minister
shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities
of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President.10
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper portions of which were written the
abstract of the proposed amendments, to wit:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII of the 1987
Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameral-
presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve
greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article
XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?
The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated non-government organizations
and volunteers of Sigaw ng Bayan, as well as to the local officials. Copies of the draft petition
for initiative containing the proposition were also circulated to the local officials and multi-
sectoral groups.
Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that it also held barangay assemblies which culminated on March
24, 25 and 26, 2006, to inform the people and explain to them the proposed amendments to
the Constitution. Thereafter, they circulated the signature sheets for signing.
The signature sheets were then submitted to the local election officers for verification
based on the voters' registration record. Upon completion of the verification process, the
respective local election officers issued certifications to attest that the signature sheets
have been verified. The verified signature sheets were subsequently transmitted to the office
of Sigaw ng Bayan for the counting of the signatures.
On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with
the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled "In the Matter of
Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People's Initiative: A Shift from a
Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI
and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the
Parliamentary System." They filed an Amended Petition on August 30, 2006 to reflect the text
of the proposed amendment that was actually presented to the people. They alleged that they
85
were filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters
who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. Petitioners
appended to the petition signature sheets bearing the signatures of registered voters which
they claimed to have been verified by the respective city or municipal election officers, and
allegedly constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country,
wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the
registered voters therein.
As basis for the filing of their petition for initiative, petitioners averred that Section 5
(b) and (c), together with Section 7 of R.A. 6735, provide sufficient enabling details
for the people's exercise of the power. Hence, petitioners prayed that the COMELEC
issue an Order:
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in
newspapers of general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after
the Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the
Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective oppositions to the petition for
initiative, among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L.
Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative
Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Senators Sergio Osmeña
III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and
Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana
Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum,
Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students,
Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas; Attys. Pete
Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L.
Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong.
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the Petition for Initiative. It cited
this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC11 permanently enjoining the Commission from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
praying that the Court set aside the August 31, 2006 resolution of the COMELEC, direct
respondent COMELEC to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, and set the
date of the plebiscite. They state the following grounds in support of the petition:

I.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to take cognizance of, and to give due course to the petition for initiative,
because the cited Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 cannot be considered the
majority opinion of the Supreme Court en banc, considering that upon its
reconsideration and final voting on 10 June 1997, no majority vote was secured to
declare Republic Act No. 6735 as inadequate, incomplete and insufficient in
standard.
II.
The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic Act No. 8189 and existing
appropriation of the COMELEC provide for sufficient details and authority for the
exercise of people's initiative, thus, existing laws taken together are adequate and
complete.
III.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to take cognizance of, and in refusing to give due course to the petition for
initiative, thereby violating an express constitutional mandate and disregarding and
contravening the will of the people.
A.
Assuming in arguendo that there is no enabling law, respondent COMELEC
cannot ignore the will of the sovereign people and must accordingly act on
the petition for initiative.
1.
The framers of the Constitution intended to give the people the
power to propose amendments and the people themselves are now
giving vibrant life to this constitutional provision.
2.
Prior to the questioned Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997, the right of
the people to exercise the sovereign power of initiative and recall has
been invariably upheld.
3.
86
The exercise of the initiative to propose amendments is a political
question which shall be determined solely by the sovereign people.
4.
By signing the signature sheets attached to the petition for initiative
duly verified by the election officers, the people have chosen to
perform this sacred exercise of their sovereign power.
B.
The Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 is not applicable to the instant petition
for initiative filed by the petitioners.
C.
The permanent injunction issued in Santiago vs. COMELEC only applies to
the Delfin petition.
1.
It is the dispositive portion of the decision and not other statements
in the body of the decision that governs the rights in controversy.
IV.
The Honorable public respondent failed or neglected to act or
perform a duty mandated by law.
A.
The ministerial duty of the COMELEC is to set the initiative
for plebiscite.12
The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin,
Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.;
Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum,
Migrante Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students,
Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Senate
Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S.
Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada;
Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-
Baraquel; and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma.

Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong moved to intervene in
this case and filed their respective Oppositions/Comments-in-Intervention.
The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M.
Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat
Inciong; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino; and the Senate of the
Philippines, represented by Senate President Manuel Villar, Jr., also filed their respective
motions for intervention and Comments-in-Intervention.
The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc.,
Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya, Philippine Transport and General
Workers Organization, and Victorino F. Balais likewise moved to intervene and submitted to
the Court a Petition-in-Intervention. All interventions and oppositions were granted by the
Court.
The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying due course to the petition for initiative as it merely followed this
Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as affirmed in the case of PIRMA v. COMELEC,
based on the principle of stare decisis; that there is no sufficient law providing for the
authority and the details for the exercise of people's initiative to amend the Constitution; that
the proposed changes to the Constitution are actually revisions, not mere amendments; that
the petition for initiative does not meet the required number of signatories under Section 2,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; that it was not shown that the people have been
informed of the proposed amendments as there was disparity between the proposal
presented to them and the proposed amendments attached to the petition for initiative, if
indeed there was; that the verification process was done ex parte, thus rendering dubious the
signatures attached to the petition for initiative; and that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado
have no legal capacity to represent the signatories in the petition for initiative.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with the Court's resolution of
September 5, 2006, filed its Comment to the petition. Affirming the position of the petitioners,
the OSG prayed that the Court grant the petition at bar and render judgment: (1) declaring
R.A. 6735 as adequate to cover or as reasonably sufficient to implement the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution and as having provided sufficient standards for
subordinate legislation; (2) declaring as valid the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; (3) setting aside the
assailed resolution of the COMELEC for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, (4) directing the COMELEC to grant the
petition for initiative and set the corresponding plebiscite pursuant to R.A. 6735, COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, and other pertinent election laws and regulations.
The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its resolution denying the petition for
initiative is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it merely adhered to the ruling of this
Court in Santiago v. COMELEC which declared that R.A. 6735 does not adequately
87
implement the constitutional provision on initiative to amend the Constitution. It invoked the
permanent injunction issued by the Court against the COMELEC from taking cognizance of
petitions for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a valid enabling law shall have
been passed by Congress. It asserted that the permanent injunction covers not only the
Delfin Petition, but also all other petitions involving constitutional initiatives.
On September 26, 2006, the Court heard the case. The parties were required to argue on
the following issues:13
1. Whether petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present
Petition in behalf of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the
proposal to amend the Constitution.
2. Whether the Petitions for Initiative filed before the Commission on Elections
complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
3. Whether the Court's decision in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, March
19, 1997) bars the present petition.
4. Whether the Court should re-examine the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that
there is no sufficient law implementing or authorizing the exercise of people's
initiative to amend the Constitution.
5. Assuming R.A. 6735 is sufficient, whether the Petitions for Initiative filed with the
COMELEC have complied with its provisions.
5.1 Whether the said petitions are sufficient in form and substance.
5.2 Whether the proposed changes embrace more than one subject matter.
6. Whether the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution.
6.1 Whether the proposed changes are the proper subject of an initiative.
7. Whether the exercise of an initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
a political question to be determined solely by the sovereign people.
8. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Petitions for Initiative filed before it.
With humility, I offer the following views to these issues as profiled:

I II
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present
Petition in behalf of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the
proposal to amend the Constitution.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are not the proper
parties to file the instant petition as they were not authorized by the signatories in the petition
for initiative.
The argument deserves scant attention. The Constitution requires that the petition for
initiative should be filed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the
registered voters therein. The petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado before
the COMELEC was accompanied by voluminous signature sheets which prima facie show
the intent of the signatories to support the filing of said petition. Stated above their signatures
in the signature sheets is the following:
x x x My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend
the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.14
There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate
documents to authorize petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their behalf.
Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado to file the
petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides who may file a petition for certiorari and mandamus. Sections 1 and 3 of
Rule 65 read:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal, board or
officer may file a petition for certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate court. Certainly,
Lambino and Aumentado, as among the proponents of the petition for initiative dismissed by
the COMELEC, have the standing to file the petition at bar.
88
The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination of Santiago.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not
disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts.15 Blackstone observed that
at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents
where the same points come again in litigation."16 As the rule evolved, early limits to its
application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable;"
(2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force
of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the
words or reasoning used to reach the decision."17
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution.18 According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent
"arbitrary discretion in the courts."19 Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the
precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be
rejected."20 Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the
countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent."21 He
added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by
the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that
the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."22
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation
although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare
decisis have been isolated by legal scholars.23 The first, known as vertical stare decisis
deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases
involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high
courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical
stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been
viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command.24 Indeed, stare decisis is not one of
the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis —
constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.25 Constitutional stare decisis
involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves
interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in
refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the
binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing
prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command.
The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a
question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider
a question once decided."26 In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the
ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it."27 In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is

more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by
this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it
acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the
Congress itself."28 This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to
preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons,29 viz: (1) it
legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where30
(1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot
accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to
overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can
dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule
and reversed its decisions in 192 cases.31 The most famous of these reversals is Brown v.
Board of Education32 which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's33 "separate but equal doctrine."
Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public
transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is
inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S.
Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine
setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to
promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,34 we reversed
our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,35 we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for
reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts
are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings.
These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in
fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the
voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.36
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in
constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey.37 It established a 4-pronged test.
The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that
would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost
of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to
have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether
facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.
89
Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should not bar the
reexamination of Santiago. On the factor of intolerability, the six (6) justices in Santiago
held R.A. 6735 to be insufficient as it provided no standard to guide COMELEC in issuing its
implementing rules. The Santiago ruling that R.A. 6735 is insufficient but without striking it
down as unconstitutional is an intolerable aberration, the only one of its kind in our planet. It
improperly assails the ability of legislators to write laws. It usurps the exclusive right of
legislators to determine how far laws implementing constitutional mandates should be
crafted. It is elementary that courts cannot dictate on Congress the style of writing good laws,
anymore than Congress can tell courts how to write literate decisions. The doctrine of
separation of powers forbids this Court to invade the exclusive lawmaking domain of
Congress for courts can construe laws but cannot construct them. The end result of the
ruling of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient is intolerable for it rendered lifeless
the sovereign right of the people to amend the Constitution via an initiative.
On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in Santiago did not induce any
expectation from the people. On the contrary, the ruling smothered the hope of the people
that they could amend the Constitution by direct action. Moreover, reliance is a non-factor in
the case at bar for it is more appropriate to consider in decisions involving contracts where
private rights are adjudicated. The case at bar involves no private rights but the sovereignty
of the people.
On the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities on ground cannot be blinked
away. The urgent need to adjust certain provisions of the 1987 Constitution to enable the
country to compete in the new millennium is given. The only point of contention is the mode
to effect the change - - - whether through constituent assembly, constitutional convention or
people's initiative. Petitioners claim that they have gathered over six (6) million registered
voters who want to amend the Constitution through people's initiative and that their
signatures have been verified by registrars of the COMELEC. The six (6) justices who ruled
that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement the direct right of the people to amend the
Constitution through an initiative cannot waylay the will of 6.3 million people who are
the bearers of our sovereignty and from whom all government authority emanates.
New developments in our internal and external social, economic, and political settings
demand the reexamination of the Santiago case. The stare decisis rule is no reason for
this Court to allow the people to step into the future with a blindfold.
III
A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to implement the
people's initiative.
Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to
implement Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution allowing amendments to the
Constitution to be directly proposed by the people through initiative.

When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are counseled to give life to the intent
of legislators. In enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous that Congress intended the said
law to implement the right of the people, thru initiative, to propose amendments to the
Constitution by direct action. This all-important intent is palpable from the following:
First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the right of the people to initiate
changes to the Constitution:
The policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative
and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
It defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the
Constitution is approved or rejected by the people."
It provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution, viz:
(1) That "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%)
of the registered voters therein;"38 and
(2) That "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years
from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter."39
It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section 9(b) which provides that "(t)he
proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite."
Second. The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to
use it as the instrument to implement people's initiative. No less than former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the ponente in Santiago, concedes:40
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17 x x x x The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
90
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of
Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
Third. The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735 similarly demonstrate beyond
doubt this intent. In his sponsorship remarks, the late Senator Raul Roco (then a Member of
the House of Representatives) emphasized the intent to make initiative as a mode whereby
the people can propose amendments to the Constitution. We quote his relevant remarks: 41
SPONSORSHIP REMAKRS OF REP. ROCO
MR. ROCO. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the committee, we wish to speak in
support of House Bill No. 497, entitled: INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT OF
1987, which later on may be called Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989.
As a background, we want to point out the constitutional basis of this particular bill.
The grant of plenary legislative power upon the Philippine Congress by the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions, Mr. Speaker, was based on the principle that any
power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition is necessarily possessed by
the Philippine Congress unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere. This was a
citation from Vera vs. Avelino (1946).
The presidential system introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw the application of
the principle of separation of powers. While under the parliamentary system of the
1973 Constitution the principle remained applicable, Amendment 6 or the 1981
amendments to the 1973 Constitution ensured presidential dominance over the
Batasang Pambansa.
Our constitutional history saw the shifting and sharing of legislative power between
the legislature and the executive.
Transcending such changes in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration in
the Philippine Constitution that he Philippines is a Republican State where
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to govern is vested in its citizens participating
through the right of suffrage and indicating thereby their choice of lawmakers.
Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress.
However, to institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986
Revolution, there is a practical recognition of what we refer to as people's sovereign
power. This is the recognition of a system of initiative and referendum.
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, and I quote:

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, under the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have
plenary powers. There is a reserved legislative power given to the people expressly.
Section 32, the implementing provision of the same article of the Constitution
provides, and I quote:
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative
and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration
of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of
registered voters, or which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section 1 of Article VI which describes legislative
power, there are reserved powers given to the people. In Section 32, we are
specifically told to pass at the soonest possible time a bill on referendum and
initiative. We are specifically mandated to share the legislative powers of Congress
with the people.
Of course, another applicable provision in the Constitution is Section 2, Article XVII,
Mr. Speaker. Under the provision on amending the Constitution, the section reads,
and I quote:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following
the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker, are charged with the duty to implement the
exercise by the people of the right of initiative and referendum.
House Bill No. 21505, as reported out by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms last December 14, 1988, Mr. Speaker, is the response to such a
constitutional duty.
Mr. Speaker, if only to allay apprehensions, allow me to show where initiative and
referendum under Philippine law has occurred.
91
Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative and referendum is not new. In a very limited
extent, the system is provided for in our Local Government Code today. On initiative,
for instance, Section 99 of the said code vests in the barangay assembly the power
to initiate legislative processes, to hold plebiscites and to hear reports of the
sangguniang barangay. There are variations of initiative and referendum. The
barangay assembly is composed of all persons who have been actual residents of
the barangay for at least six months, who are at least 15 years of age and citizens of
the Philippines. The holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum is also provided
in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Mr. Speaker, for brevity I will not read the pertinent quotations but will just submit the
same to the Secretary to be incorporated as part of my speech.
To continue, Mr. Speaker these same principles are extensively applied by the Local
Government Code as it is now mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we have ample examples of initiative and
referendum similar to what is now contained in House Bill No. 21505. As in the 1987
Constitutions and House Bill No. 21505, the various constitutions of the states in the
United States recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any
statute or to reject any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These states are
Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusetts, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
practically all other states.
In certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and referendum applies
is also without ay limitation, except for emergency measures, which is likewise
incorporated in Section 7(b) of House Bill No. 21505.
The procedure provided by the House bill – from the filing of the petition, the
requirement of a certain percentage of supporters to present a proposition to
submission to electors – is substantially similar to those of many American laws. Mr.
Speaker, those among us who may have been in the United States, particularly in
California, during election time or last November during the election would have
noticed different propositions posted in the city walls. They were propositions
submitted by the people for incorporation during the voting. These were in the nature
of initiative, Mr. Speaker.
Although an infant then in Philippine political structure, initiative and referendum is a
tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and House Bill No. 21505 through the
various consolidated bills is patterned after American experience in a great respect.
What does the bill essentially say, Mr. Speaker? Allow me to try to bring our
colleagues slowly through the bill. The bill has basically only 12 sections. The
constitutional Commissioners, Mr. Speaker, saw this system of initiative and
referendum as an instrument which can be used should the legislature show itself

indifferent to the needs of the people. That is why, Mr. Speaker, it may be timely,
since we seem to be amply criticized, as regards our responsiveness, to pass this bill
on referendum and initiative now. While indifference would not be an appropriate
term to use at this time, and surely it is not the case although we are so criticized,
one must note that it is a felt necessity of our times that laws need to be proposed
and adopted at the soonest possible time to spur economic development, safeguard
individual rights and liberties, and share governmental power with the people.
With the legislative powers of the President gone, we alone, together with the
Senators when they are minded to agree with us, are left with the burden of enacting
the needed legislation.
Let me now bring our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to the process advocated by the bill.
First, initiative and referendum, Mr. Speaker, is defined. Initiative essentially is what
the term connotes. It means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit
fore the consideration and voting of the general electorate a bill or a piece of
legislation.
Under House Bill No. 21505, there are three kinds of initiative. One is an initiative to
amend the Constitution. This can occur once every five years. Another is an initiative
to amend statutes that we may have approved. Had this bill been an existing law, Mr.
Speaker, it is most likely that an overwhelming majority of the barangays in the
Philippines would have approved by initiative the matter of direct voting.
The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a petition proposing to enact
regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay laws or ordinances. It comes from the
people and it must be submitted directly to the electorate. The bill gives a definite
procedure and allows the COMELEC to define rules and regulations to give teeth to
the power of initiative.
On the other hand, referendum, Mr. Speaker, is the power of the people to approve
or reject something that Congress has already approved.
For instance, Mr. Speaker, when we divide the municipalities or the barangays into
two or three, we must first get the consent of the people affected through plebiscite or
referendum.
Referendum is a mode of plebiscite, Mr. Speaker. However, referendum can also be
petitioned by the people if, for instance, they do not life the bill on direct elections and
it is approved subsequently by the Senate. If this bill had already become a law, then
the people could petition that a referendum be conducted so that the acts of
Congress can be appropriately approved or rebuffed.
92
The initial stage, Mr. Speaker, is what we call the petition. As envisioned in the bill,
the initiative comes from the people, from registered voters of the country, by
presenting a proposition so that the people can then submit a petition, which is a
piece of paper that contains the proposition. The proposition in the example I have
been citing is whether there should be direct elections during the barangay elections.
So the petition must be filed in the appropriate agency and the proposition must be
clear stated. It can be tedious but that is how an effort to have direct democracy
operates.
Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr. Speaker. It will not be all that easy to
have referendum or initiative petitioned by the people. Under Section 4 of the
committee report, we are given certain limitations. For instance, to exercise the
power of initiative or referendum, at least 10 percent of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3 percent of the
registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition. These numbers, Mr. Speaker, are not
taken from the air. They are mandated by the Constitution. There must be a
requirement of 10 percent for ordinary laws and 3 percent representing all districts.
The same requirement is mutatis mutandis or appropriately modified and applied to
the different sections. So if it is, for instance, a petition on initiative or referendum for
a barangay, there is a 10 percent or a certain number required of the voters of the
barangay. If it is for a district, there is also a certain number required of all towns of
the district that must seek the petition. If it is for a province then again a certain
percentage of the provincial electors is required. All these are based with reference to
the constitutional mandate.
The conduct of the initiative and referendum shall be supervised and shall be upon
the call of the Commission on Elections. However, within a period of 30 days from
receipt of the petition, the COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the petition,
publish the same and set the date of the referendum which shall not be earlier than
45 days but not later than 90 days from the determination by the commission of the
sufficiency of the petition. Why is this so, Mr. Speaker? The petition must first be
determined by the commission as to its sufficiency because our Constitution requires
that no bill can be approved unless it contains one subject matter. It is conceivable
that in the fervor of an initiative or referendum, Mr. Speaker, there may be more than
two topics sought to be approved and that cannot be allowed. In fact, that is one of
the prohibitions under this referendum and initiative bill. When a matter under
initiative or referendum is approved by the required number of votes, Mr. Speaker, it
shall become effective 15 days following the completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette. Effectively then, Mr. Speaker, all the bill seeks to do is to enlarge
and recognize the legislative powers of the Filipino people.
Mr. Speaker, I think this Congress, particularly this House, cannot ignore or cannot
be insensitive to the call for initiative and referendum. We should have done it in
1987 but that is past. Maybe we should have done it in 1988 but that too had already
passed, but it is only February 1989, Mr. Speaker, and we have enough time this

year at least to respond to the need of our people to participate directly in the work of
legislation.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore our colleagues to approve
House Bill No. 21505 as incorporated in Committee Report No. 423 of the Committee
on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I also request that the prepared text of my speech, together
with the footnotes since they contain many references to statutory history and foreign
jurisdiction, be reproduced as part of the Record for future purposes.
Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the sponsorship speech of former
Representative Salvador Escudero III, viz:42
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF REP. ESCUDERO
MR. ESCUDERO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues: Events in recent years highlighted the need to
heed the clamor of the people for a truly popular democracy. One recalls the
impatience of those who actively participated in the parliament of the streets, some of
whom are now distinguished Members of this Chamber. A substantial segment of the
population feel increasingly that under the system, the people have the form but not
the reality or substance of democracy because of the increasingly elitist approach of
their chosen Representatives to many questions vitally affecting their lives. There
have been complaints, not altogether unfounded, that many candidates easily forge
their campaign promises to the people once elected to office. The 1986 Constitutional
Commission deemed it wise and proper to provide for a means whereby the people
can exercise the reserve power to legislate or propose amendments to the
Constitution directly in case their chose Representatives fail to live up to their
expectations. That reserve power known as initiative is explicitly recognized in three
articles and four sections of the 1987 Constitution, namely: Article VI Section 1; the
same article, Section 312; Article X, Section 3; and Article XVII, Section 2. May I
request that he explicit provisions of these three articles and four sections be made
part of my sponsorship speech, Mr. Speaker.
These constitutional provisions are, however, not self-executory. There is a need for
an implementing law that will give meaning and substance to the process of initiative
and referendum which are considered valuable adjuncts to representative
democracy. It is needless to state that this bill when enacted into law will probably
open the door to strong competition of the people, like pressure groups, vested
interests, farmers' group, labor groups, urban dwellers, the urban poor and the like,
with Congress in the field of legislation.
93
Such probability, however, pales in significance when we consider that through this
bill we can hasten the politization of the Filipino which in turn will aid government in
forming an enlightened public opinion, and hopefully produce better and more
responsive and acceptable legislations.
Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this would give the parliamentarians of the streets and
cause-oriented groups an opportunity to articulate their ideas in a truly democratic
forum, thus, the competition which they will offer to Congress will hopefully be a
healthy one. Anyway, in an atmosphere of competition there are common interests
dear to all Filipinos, and the pursuit of each side's competitive goals can still take
place in an atmosphere of reason and moderation.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when the distinguished Gentleman from
Camarines Sur and this Representation filed our respective versions of the bill in
1987, we were hoping that the bill would be approved early enough so that our
people could immediately use the agrarian reform bill as an initial subject matter or as
a take-off point.
However, in view of the very heavy agenda of the Committee on Local Government,
it took sometime before the committee could act on these. But as they say in
Tagalog, huli man daw at magaling ay naihahabol din. The passage of this bill
therefore, my dear colleagues, could be one of our finest hours when we can set
aside our personal and political consideration for the greater good of our people. I
therefore respectfully urge and plead that this bill be immediately approved.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
We cannot dodge the duty to give effect to this intent for the "[c]ourts have the duty to
interpret the law as legislated and when possible, to honor the clear meaning of statutes as
revealed by its language, purpose and history."43
The tragedy is that while conceding this intent, the six (6) justices, nevertheless, ruled
that "x x x R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" for the
following reasons: (1) Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to
the Constitution; (2) the Act does not provide for the contents of the petition for initiative on
the Constitution; and (3) while the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution.
To say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason to throttle the right of the
sovereign people to amend the Constitution through initiative. R.A. 6735 clearly expressed
the legislative policy for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct
action. The fact that the legislature may have omitted certain details in implementing the
people's initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the conclusion that, ergo, the law is
 94

insufficient. What were omitted were mere details and not fundamental policies which whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
Congress alone can and has determined. Implementing details of a law can be delegated apply to amendments?
to the COMELEC and can be the subject of its rule-making power. Under Section 2(1), Article
IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws and MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
regulations relative to the conduct of initiatives. Its rule-making power has long been
recognized by this Court. In ruling R.A. 6735 insufficient but without striking it down as
Commissioner (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., espoused the same view:45
unconstitutional, the six (6) justices failed to give due recognition to the indefeasible right of
the sovereign people to amend the Constitution.
MR. DAVIDE. x x x x We are limiting the right of the people, by initiative, to submit a
proposal for amendment only, not for revision, only once every five years x x x x
IV
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment
The proposed constitutional changes, albeit substantial, are mere amendments
on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it cover the word "revision" as defined by
and can be undertaken through people's initiative.
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision?"
Oppositors-intervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution,
only allow the use of people's initiative to amend and not to revise the Constitution. They
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be
theorize that the changes proposed by petitioners are substantial and thus constitute a
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
revision which cannot be done through people's initiative. "amendments" not "revision."

In support of the thesis that the Constitution bars the people from proposing substantial
Commissioner (now a distinguished Associate Justice of this Court) Adolfo S. Azcuna also
amendments amounting to revision, the oppositors-intervenors cite the following
clarified this point46 -
deliberations during the Constitutional Commission, viz:44
MR. OPLE. To more closely reflect the intent of Section 2, may I suggest that we add
MR. SUAREZ: x x x x This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
to "Amendments" "OR REVISIONS OF" to read: "Amendments OR REVISION OF
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year,
this Constitution."
has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as
embodied in Section 1. The Committee members felt that this system of initiative
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the MR. AZCUNA. I think it was not allowed to revise the Constitution by initiative.
operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
MR. OPLE. How is that again?
xxxxxxxxxxxx
MR. AZCUNA. It was not our intention to allow a revision of the Constitution by
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative but merely by amendments.
initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another MR. BENGZON. Only by amendments.
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as
if it were a self-executing provision? MR. AZCUNA. I remember that was taken on the floor.

MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into
a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, just amendments.
The oppositors-intervenors then point out that by their proposals, petitioners will "change the
very system of government from presidential to parliamentary, and the form of the legislature
from bicameral to unicameral," among others. They allegedly seek other major revisions like
the inclusion of a minimum number of inhabitants per district, a change in the period for a

term of a Member of Parliament, the removal of the limits on the number of terms, the
election of a Prime Minister who shall exercise the executive power, and so on and so forth. 47
In sum, oppositors-intervenors submit that "the proposed changes to the Constitution effect
major changes in the political structure and system, the fundamental powers and duties of the
branches of the government, the political rights of the people, and the modes by which
political rights may be exercised."48 They conclude that they are substantial amendments
which cannot be done through people's initiative. In other words, they posit the thesis that
only simple but not substantial amendments can be done through people's initiative.
With due respect, I disagree. To start with, the words "simple" and "substantial" are not
subject to any accurate quantitative or qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the quantitative
test, oppositors-intervenors assert that the amendments will result in some one hundred
(100) changes in the Constitution. Using the same test, however, it is also arguable that
petitioners seek to change basically only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987
Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive Department),
together with the complementary provisions for a smooth transition from a presidential
bicameral system to a parliamentary unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987
Constitution will not be affected including Articles I (National Territory), II (Declaration of
Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V (Suffrage), VIII (Judicial
Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions), X (Local Government), XI (Accountability of
Public Officers), XII (National Economy and Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human
Rights), XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The
Family), XVI (General Provisions), and even XVII (Amendments or Revisions). In fine, we
stand on unsafe ground if we use simple arithmetic to determine whether the proposed
changes are "simple" or "substantial."
Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to determine whether
the said changes are "simple" or "substantial" as to amount to a revision of the
Constitution. The well-regarded political scientist, Garner, says that a good constitution
should contain at least three (3) sets of provisions: the constitution of liberty which sets
forth the fundamental rights of the people and imposes certain limitations on the powers of
the government as a means of securing the enjoyment of these rights; the constitution of
government which deals with the framework of government and its powers, laying down
certain rules for its administration and defining the electorate; and, the constitution of
sovereignty which prescribes the mode or procedure for amending or revising the
constitution.49 It is plain that the proposed changes will basically affect only the
constitution of government. The constitutions of liberty and sovereignty remain unaffected.
Indeed, the proposed changes will not change the fundamental nature of our state as
"x x x a democratic and republican state."50 It is self-evident that a unicameral-
parliamentary form of government will not make our State any less democratic or any less
republican in character. Hence, neither will the use of the qualitative test resolve the issue
of whether the proposed changes are "simple" or "substantial."
For this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any quantitative or qualitative
test to determine whether an "amendment" is "simple" or "substantial." Nor did they
provide that "substantial" amendments are beyond the power of the people to propose
95
to change the Constitution. Instead, our Constitutions carried the traditional distinction
between "amendment" and "revision," i.e., "amendment" means change, including complex
changes while "revision" means complete change, including the adoption of an entirely new
covenant. The legal dictionaries express this traditional difference between "amendment"
and "revision." Black's Law Dictionary defines "amendment" as "[a] formal revision or
addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument;
specifically, a change made by addition, deletion, or correction."51 Black's also refers to
"amendment" as "the process of making such a revision."52 Revision, on the other hand, is
defined as "[a] reexamination or careful review for correction or improvement."53 In
parliamentary law, it is described as "[a] general and thorough rewriting of a governing
document, in which the entire document is open to amendment."54 Similarly, Ballentine's
Law Dictionary defines "amendment" – as "[a] correction or revision of a writing to correct
errors or better to state its intended purpose"55 and "amendment of constitution" as "[a]
process of proposing, passing, and ratifying amendments to the x x x constitution." 56 In
contrast, "revision," when applied to a statute (or constitution), "contemplates the re-
examination of the same subject matter contained in the statute (or constitution), and the
substitution of a new, and what is believed to be, a still more perfect rule."57
One of the most authoritative constitutionalists of his time to whom we owe a lot of intellectual
debt, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, of the University of the Philippines College of Law, (later
President of the U.P. and delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1971) similarly spelled
out the difference between "amendment" and "revision." He opined: "the revision of a
constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the
procedure for effecting such change; while amendment refers only to particular provisions to
be added to or to be altered in a constitution."58
Our people were guided by this traditional distinction when they effected changes in
our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In 1940, the changes to the 1935 Constitution which
included the conversion from a unicameral system to a bicameral structure, the
shortening of the tenure of the President and Vice-President from a six-year term without
reelection to a four-year term with one reelection, and the establishment of the COMELEC,
together with the complementary constitutional provisions to effect the changes, were
considered amendments only, not a revision.
The replacement of the 1935 Constitution by the 1973 Constitution was, however,
considered a revision since the 1973 Constitution was "a completely new fundamental
charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts."59 Among those adopted
under the 1973 Constitution were: the parliamentary system in place of the presidential
system, with the leadership in legislation and administration vested with the Prime Minister
and his Cabinet; the reversion to a single-chambered lawmaking body instead of the two-
chambered, which would be more suitable to a parliamentary system of government; the
enfranchisement of the youth beginning eighteen (18) years of age instead of twenty-one
(21), and the abolition of literacy, property, and other substantial requirements to widen the
basis for the electorate and expand democracy; the strengthening of the judiciary, the civil
service system, and the Commission on Elections; the complete nationalization of the
ownership and management of mass media; the giving of control to Philippine citizens of all

telecommunications; the prohibition against alien individuals to own educational institutions,
and the strengthening of the government as a whole to improve the conditions of the
masses.60
The 1973 Constitution in turn underwent a series of significant changes in 1976, 1980,
1981, and 1984. The two significant innovations introduced in 1976 were (1) the creation
of an interim Batasang Pambansa, in place of the interim National Assembly, and (2)
Amendment No. 6 which conferred on the President the power to issue decrees, orders, or
letters of instruction, whenever the Batasang Pambansa fails to act adequately on any matter
for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, or there is grave emergency or
threat or imminence thereof, with such decrees, or letters of instruction to form part of the law
of the land. In 1980, the retirement age of seventy (70) for justices and judges was restored.
In 1981, the presidential system with parliamentary features was installed. The transfer of
private land for use as residence to natural-born citizens who had lost their citizenship was
also allowed. Then, in 1984, the membership of the Batasang Pambansa was reapportioned
by provinces, cities, or districts in Metro Manila instead of by regions; the Office of the Vice-
President was created while the executive committee was abolished; and, urban land reform
and social housing programs were strengthened.61 These substantial changes were
simply considered as mere amendments.
In 1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency, and repudiated the 1973
Constitution. She governed under Proclamation No. 3, known as the Freedom Constitution.
In February 1987, the new constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite and
superseded the Provisional or Freedom Constitution. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz
underscored the outstanding features of the 1987 Constitution which consists of eighteen
articles and is excessively long compared to the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, on which it
was largely based. Many of the original provisions of the 1935 Constitution, particularly those
pertaining to the legislative and executive departments, have been restored because of the
revival of the bicameral Congress of the Philippines and the strictly presidential system. The
independence of the judiciary has been strengthened, with new provisions for appointment
thereto and an increase in its authority, which now covers even political questions formerly
beyond its jurisdiction. While many provisions of the 1973 Constitution were retained, like
those on the Constitutional Commissions and local governments, still the new 1987
Constitution was deemed as a revision of the 1973 Constitution.
It is now contended that this traditional distinction between amendment and revision was
abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. It is urged that Section 1 of Article XVII gives the power
to amend or revise to Congress acting as a constituent assembly, and to a Constitutional
Convention duly called by Congress for the purpose. Section 2 of the same Article, it is said,
limited the people's right to change the Constitution via initiative through simple
amendments. In other words, the people cannot propose substantial amendments
amounting to revision.
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With due respect, I do not agree. As aforestated, the oppositors-intervenors who peddle the
above proposition rely on the opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the course of
the debate on how to frame the amendment/revision provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is
familiar learning, however, that opinions in a constitutional convention, especially if
inconclusive of an issue, are of very limited value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are
an unsafe guide (to the intent of the people) since the constitution derives its force as a
fundamental law, not from the action of the convention but from the powers (of the people)
who have ratified and adopted it.62 "Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes,
but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much
less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law.'"63 Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the
Constitutional Commissioners can likewise lead to the conclusion that there was no
abandonment of the traditional distinction between "amendment" and "revision." For
during the debates, some of the commissioners referred to the concurring opinion of former
Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,64 that stressed the
traditional distinction between amendment and revision, thus:65
MR. SUAREZ: We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is,
"amendment." However, the Committee finally agreed to use the terms –
"amendment" or "revision" when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-
President to the substantial difference in the connotation and significance between
the said terms. As a result of our research, we came up with the observations made
in the famous – or notorious – Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered
by Honorable Justice Makasiar,66 wherein he made the following distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve a
rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a
constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to
amend is not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of
specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of
new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or
unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a
completely new fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic
concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be
employed in the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the
new Constitution.
To further explain "revision," former Justice Antonio, in his concurring opinion, used an
analogy – "When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same
location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new house?
Some of the material contained in the old house may be used again, some of the rooms may

be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have altogether another or a
new house."67
Hence, it is arguable that when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used the word "revision,"
they had in mind the "rewriting of the whole Constitution," or the "total overhaul of the
Constitution." Anything less is an "amendment" or just "a change of specific provisions
only," the intention being "not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement
of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new
conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the
needs of the times." Under this view, "substantial" amendments are still "amendments" and
thus can be proposed by the people via an initiative.
As we cannot be guided with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of the
Commissioners on the difference between "simple" and "substantial" amendments or
whether "substantial" amendments amounting to revision are covered by people's initiative, it
behooves us to follow the cardinal rule in interpreting Constitutions, i.e., construe them to
give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains its
rationale well, viz:68
x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but
from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is
not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the
words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious
to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was
the sense designed to be conveyed. These proceedings therefore are less conclusive
of the proper construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of the
proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the
legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of
the people through the discussion and deliberations of their representatives. The
history of the calling of the convention, the causes which led to it, and the discussions
and issues before the people at the time of the election of the delegates, will
sometimes be quite as instructive and satisfactory as anything to be gathered form
the proceedings of the convention.
Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but
liberally and on broad general lines, to accomplish the object of its establishment and
carry out the great principles of government – not to defeat them.69 One of these great
principles is the sovereignty of the people.
Let us now determine the intent of the people when they adopted initiative as a mode to
amend the 1987 Constitution. We start with the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
which Sinco describes as "the basic political creed of the nation"70 as it "lays down the
policies that government is bound to observe."71 Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution
and Section 1, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, similarly provide that "the Philippines is a
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
97
from them." In a republican state, the power of the sovereign people is exercised and
delegated to their representatives. Thus in Metropolitan Transportation Service v. Paredes,
this Court held that "a republican state, like the Philippines x x x (is) derived from the will of
the people themselves in freely creating a government 'of the people, by the people, and for
the people' – a representative government through which they have agreed to exercise the
powers and discharge the duties of their sovereignty for the common good and general
welfare."72
In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the sovereign people delegated to Congress or
to a convention, the power to amend or revise our fundamental law. History informs us
how this delegated power to amend or revise the Constitution was abused particularly
during the Marcos regime. The Constitution was changed several times to satisfy the power
requirements of the regime. Indeed, Amendment No. 6 was passed giving unprecedented
legislative powers to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. A conspiracy of circumstances
from above and below, however, brought down the Marcos regime through an extra
constitutional revolution, albeit a peaceful one by the people. A main reason for the
people's revolution was the failure of the representatives of the people to effectuate
timely changes in the Constitution either by acting as a constituent assembly or by
calling a constitutional convention. When the representatives of the people defaulted in
using this last peaceful process of constitutional change, the sovereign people
themselves took matters in their own hands. They revolted and replaced the 1973
Constitution with the 1987 Constitution.
It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology of the 1987 Constitution
as it stressed the power of the people to act directly in their capacity as sovereign
people. Correspondingly, the power of the legislators to act as representatives of the
people in the matter of amending or revising the Constitution was diminished for the
spring cannot rise above its source. To reflect this significant shift, Section 1, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution was reworded. It now reads: "the Philippines is a democratic and
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them." The commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explained the
addition of the word "democratic," in our first Declaration of Principles, viz:
MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word "democratic" because of the provisions that we are
now adopting which are covering consultations with the people. For example, we have
provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the people even to participate in lawmaking and
other instances that recognize the validity of interference by the people through people's
organizations x x x x73
MR. OPLE. x x x x The Committee added the word "democratic" to "republican," and,
therefore, the first sentence states: "The Philippines is a republican and democratic
state x x x x

May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word "democratic" to
"republican"? The constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were
content with "republican." Was this done merely for the sake of emphasis?
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x x "democratic" was added because of the need to
emphasize people power and the many provisions in the Constitution that we
have approved related to recall, people's organizations, initiative and the like,
which recognize the participation of the people in policy-making in certain
circumstances x x x x
MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I think it does
meet a need x x x x
MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid, "democracy" here is
understood as participatory democracy. 74 (emphasis supplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Adolfo S. Azcuna
is of the same import:75
MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring
to representative democracy?
MR. AZCUNA. That is right.
MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation under the 1973 and
1935 Constitutions which used the words "republican state" because "republican
state" would refer to a democratic state where people choose their representatives?
MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in
government.
MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept "republican state," we are stressing the
participation of the people x x x x So the word "republican" will suffice to cover
popular representation.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in
view of the introduction of the aspects of direct democracy such as initiative,
referendum or recall, it was necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of
republicanism, of representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the word
"democratic" to emphasize that in this new Constitution there are instances
where the people would act directly, and not through their representatives.
(emphasis supplied)
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Consistent with the stress on direct democracy, the systems of initiative, referendum, and
recall were enthroned as polestars in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Commissioner Blas F.
Ople who introduced the provision on people's initiative said:76
MR. OPLE. x x x x I think this is just the correct time in history when we should
introduce an innovative mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution, vesting
in the people and their organizations the right to formulate and propose their own
amendments and revisions of the Constitution in a manner that will be binding
upon the government. It is not that I believe this kind of direct action by the people for
amending a constitution will be needed frequently in the future, but it is good to
know that the ultimate reserves of sovereign power still rest upon the people
and that in the exercise of that power, they can propose amendments or
revision to the Constitution. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez also explained the people's initiative as a safety valve, as a
peaceful way for the people to change their Constitution, by citing our experiences under the
Marcos government, viz:77
MR. SUAREZ. We agree to the difficulty in implementing this particular provision, but
we are providing a channel for the expression of the sovereign will of the people
through this initiative system.
MR. BENGZON. Is Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not sufficient channel for
expression of the will of the people, particularly in the amendment or revision of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. Under normal circumstances, yes. But we know what happened
during the 20 years under the Marcos administration. So, if the National
Assembly, in a manner of speaking, is operating under the thumb of the Prime
Minister or the President as the case may be, and the required number of votes could
not be obtained, we would have to provide for a safety valve in order that the people
could ventilate in a very peaceful way their desire for amendment to the Constitution.
It is very possible that although the people may be pressuring the National
Assembly to constitute itself as a constituent assembly or to call a
constitutional convention, the members thereof would not heed the people's
desire and clamor. So this is a third avenue that we are providing for the
implementation of what is now popularly known as people's power. (emphasis
supplied)
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong opined that the people's initiative could avert a
revolution, viz:78
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x the amending process of the Constitution could actually
avert a revolution by providing a safety valve in bringing about changes in the

Constitution through pacific means. This, in effect, operationalizes what political law
authors call the "prescription of sovereignty." (emphasis supplied)
The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution which expressed the right of
the sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action or through
initiative. To that extent, the delegated power of Congress to amend or revise the
Constitution has to be adjusted downward. Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution has to be reminted and now provides: "The legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum."
Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that the people through initiative
cannot propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty
on its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the democratic space for the
exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people. It also denigrates the sovereign people who
they claim can only be trusted with the power to propose "simple" but not "substantial"
amendments to the Constitution. According to Sinco, the concept of sovereignty should be
strictly understood in its legal meaning as it was originally developed in law. 79 Legal
sovereignty, he explained, is "the possession of unlimited power to make laws. Its
possessor is the legal sovereign. It implies the absence of any other party endowed with
legally superior powers and privileges. It is not subject to law 'for it is the author and
source of law.' Legal sovereignty is thus the equivalent of legal omnipotence."80
To be sure, sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes the supremacy of the people's
will over the state which they themselves have created. The state is created by and subject to
the will of the people, who are the source of all political power. Rightly, we have ruled that
"the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in
mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew
that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the
absolute right to govern."81
James Wilson, regarded by many as the most brilliant, scholarly, and visionary lawyer in the
United States in the 1780s, laid down the first principles of popular sovereignty during the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention of the 1787 Constitution of the United States: 82
There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which there is no
appeal, and which, for that reason, may be termed supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable.
x x x x Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with sufficient accuracy our
political systems, would answer that, in our governments, the supreme power was
vested in the constitutions x x x x This opinion approaches a step nearer to the truth,
but does not reach it. The truth is, that in our governments, the supreme,
absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our constitutions
99
are superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions.
Indeed the superiority, in this last instance, is much greater; for the people possess
over our constitution, control in act, as well as right. (emphasis supplied)
I wish to reiterate that in a democratic and republican state, only the people is
sovereign - - - not the elected President, not the elected Congress, not this unelected Court.
Indeed, the sovereignty of the people which is indivisible cannot be reposed in any organ of
government. Only its exercise may be delegated to any of them. In our case, the people
delegated to Congress the exercise of the sovereign power to amend or revise the
Constitution. If Congress, as delegate, can exercise this power to amend or revise the
Constitution, can it be argued that the sovereign people who delegated the power has no
power to substantially amend the Constitution by direct action? If the sovereign people do not
have this power to make substantial amendments to the Constitution, what did it delegate to
Congress? How can the people lack this fraction of a power to substantially amend the
Constitution when by their sovereignty, all power emanates from them? It will take some
mumbo jumbo to argue that the whole is lesser than its part. Let Sinco clinch the point: 83
But although possession may not be delegated, the exercise of sovereignty often is.
It is delegated to the organs and agents of the state which constitute its government,
for it is only through this instrumentality that the state ordinarily functions. However
ample and complete this delegation may be, it is nevertheless subject to
withdrawal at any time by the state. On this point Willoughby says:
Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of
government and reserve to themselves a right to control of so slight and so
negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable
occurrence; yet so long as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the
autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and
continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother
countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as
possessing only administrative autonomy and not political independence.
At the very least, the power to propose substantial amendments to the Constitution is
shared with the people. We should accord the most benign treatment to the sovereign
power of the people to propose substantial amendments to the Constitution especially
when the proposed amendments will adversely affect the interest of some members of
Congress. A contrary approach will suborn the public weal to private interest and
worse, will enable Congress (the delegate) to frustrate the power of the people to
determine their destiny (the principal).
All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses acknowledging the right of the
people to exercise initiative and referendum are liberally and generously construed in
favor of the people.84 Initiative and referendum powers must be broadly construed to
maintain maximum power in the people.85 We followed this orientation in Subic Bay

Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections.86 There is not an iota of reason to depart
from it.
V In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and white the requirements for the exercise
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Petitioners submit that "[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to
amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six million registered
voters indicated their support of the Petition for Initiative, is a purely political question which
is beyond even the very long arm of this Honorable Court's power of judicial review. Whether
or not the 1987 Constitution should be amended is a matter which the people and the people
alone must resolve in their sovereign capacity."87 They argue that "[t]he power to propose
amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people.
Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under
the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit of a 'political
question.'"88
The petitioners cannot be sustained. This issue has long been interred by Sanidad v.
Commission on Elections, viz:89
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of
the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the
heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform
such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending
process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a
downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the
President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may
be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether
the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments
and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the
people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious
cycle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the
authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present
Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been
followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselves – of course – who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which
includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for
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amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a
posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
of the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The amendments must be proposed by
the people "upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five
years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter."90 Compliance with these requirements is clearly a justiciable and not a political
question. Be that as it may, how the issue will be resolved by the people is addressed to
them and to them alone.
VI
Whether the Petition for Initiative filed before the COMELEC complied with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. 6735 involves contentious issues of fact which
should first be resolved by the COMELEC.
Oppositors-intervenors impugn the Petition for Initiative as it allegedly lacks the required
number of signatures under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Said provision requires
that the petition for initiative be supported by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein. Oppositors-intervenors contend that no
proper verification of signatures was done in several legislative districts. They assert that
mere verification of the names listed on the signature sheets without verifying the signatures
reduces the signatures submitted for their respective legislative districts to mere scribbles on
a piece of paper.
Oppositor-intervenor ONEVOICE, Inc., submitted to this Court a certification dated August
23, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, Election Officer IV, Third District and OIC, First
and Second District, Davao City, stating that his office has not verified the signatures
submitted by the proponents of the people's initiative. The certification reads:
This is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third District, Davao City) HAS
NOT VERIFIED the signatures of registered voters as per documents submitted in
this office by the proponents of the People's Initiative. Consequently, NO ELECTION
DOCUMENTS AND/OR ORDER ISSUED BY HIGHER SUPERIORS used as basis
for such verification of signatures.91
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among others, further clarified that although
Atty. Casquejo and Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Acting Election Officer IV, First District, Davao
City, later issued certifications stating that the Office of the City Election Officer has examined
the list of individuals appearing in the signature sheets,92 the certifications reveal that the
office had verified only the names of the signatories, but not their signatures. Oppositors-

intervenors submit that not only the names of the signatories should be verified, but also their
signatures to ensure the identities of the persons affixing their signatures on the signature
sheets.
Oppositor-intervenor Luwalhati Antonino also alleged that petitioners failed to obtain the
signatures of at least three per cent (3%) of the total number of registered voters in the First
Legislative District of South Cotabato. For the First District of South Cotabato, petitioners
submitted 3,182 signatures for General Santos City, 2,186 signatures for Tupi, 3,308
signatures for Tampakan and 10,301 signatures for Polomolok, or 18,977 signatures out of
359,488 registered voters of said district. Antonino, however, submitted to this Court a copy
of the certification by Glory D. Rubio, Election Officer III, Polomolok, dated May 8, 2006,
showing that the signatures from Polomolok were not verified because the Book of Voters for
the whole municipality was in the custody of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, Polomolok, South Cotabato.93 Excluding the signatures from Polomolok from the
total number of signatures from the First District of South Cotabato would yield only a total of
8,676 signatures which falls short of the three per cent (3%) requirement for the district.
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino likewise submitted
to this Court a certification issued by Atty. Stalin A. Baguio, City Election Officer IV, Cagayan
de Oro City, stating that the list of names appearing on the signature sheets corresponds to
the names of registered voters in the city, thereby implying that they have not actually verified
the signatures.94
The argument against the sufficiency of the signatures is further bolstered by Alternative Law
Groups, Inc., which submitted copies of similarly worded certifications from the election
officers from Zamboanga del Sur95 and from Compostela Valley.96 Alternative Law Groups,
Inc., further assails the regularity of the verification process as it alleged that verification in
some areas were conducted by Barangay officials and not by COMELEC election officers. It
filed with this Court copies of certifications from Sulu and Sultan Kudarat showing that the
verification was conducted by local officials instead of COMELEC personnel. 97
Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the verification conducted by the election
officers sufficiently complied with the requirements of the Constitution and the law on
initiative.
Contravening the allegations of oppositors-intervenors on the lack of verification in Davao
City and in Polomolok, South Cotabato, petitioner Aumentado claimed that the same election
officers cited by the oppositors-intervenors also issued certifications showing that they have
verified the signatures submitted by the proponents of the people's initiative. He presented
copies of the certifications issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo for the Second and Third
Legislative Districts of Davao City stating that he verified the signatures of the proponents of
the people's initiative. His certification for the Second District states:
This is to CERTIFY that this Office has examined the list of individuals as appearing
in the Signature Sheets of the Registered Voters of District II, Davao City, submitted
101
on April 7, 2006 by MR. NONATO BOLOS, Punong Barangay, Centro, Davao City for
verification which consists of THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO
(30,662) signatures.
Anent thereto, it appears that of the THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-
TWO (30,662) individuals, only TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-
EIGHT (22,668) individuals were found to be REGISTERED VOTERS, in the
Computerized List of Voters of SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, DAVAO
CITY.98
It was also shown that Atty. Casquejo had issued a clarificatory certification regarding the
verification process conducted in Davao City. It reads:
Regarding the verification of the signatures of registered voters, this Office has
previously issued two (2) separate certifications for the 2 nd and 3rd Districts of Davao
City on April 20, 2006 and April 26, 2006, respectively, specifically relating to the
voters who supported the people's initiative. It was stated therein that the names
submitted, comprising 22,668 individual voters in the 2 nd District and 18,469
individual voters in the 3rd District, were found [to] be registered voters of the
respective districts mentioned as verified by this Office based on the Computerized
List of Voters.
It must be clarified that the August 23, 2006 Certification was issued in error and by
mistake for the reason that the signature verification has not been fully completed as
of that date.
I hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the signatures of the voters as
appearing in the signature sheets and has compared these with the signatures
appearing in the book of voters and computerized list of voters x x x 99
Petitioner Aumentado also submitted a copy of the certification dated May 8, 2006 issued by
Polomolok Election Officer Glory D. Rubio to support their claim that said officer had
conducted a verification of signatures in said area. The certification states:
This is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered voters of this municipality, as
of the May 10, 2004 elections, 10,804 names with signatures were submitted for
verification and out of which 10,301 were found to be legitimate voters as per official
list of registered voters, which is equivalent to 15.07% of the total number of
registered voters of this Municipality.100
In addition to the lack of proper verification of the signatures in numerous legislative districts,
allegations of fraud and irregularities in the collection of signatures in Makati City were cited
by Senator Pimentel, among others, to wit:

(1) No notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those who may be concerned,
by the Makati COMELEC Office that signature sheets have already been submitted
to it for "verification." The camp of Mayor Binay was able to witness the "verification
process" only because of their pro-active stance;
(2) In District 1, the proponents of charter change submitted 43,405 signatures for
verification. 36,219 alleged voters' signatures (83% of the number of signatures
submitted) were rejected outright. 7,186 signatures allegedly "passed" COMELEC's
initial scrutiny. However, upon examination of the signature sheets by Atty. Mar-len
Abigail Binay, the said 7,186 signatures could not be accounted for. Atty. Binay
manually counted 2,793 signatures marked with the word "OK" and 3,443 signatures
marked with a check, giving only 6,236 "apparently verified signatures." Before the
COMELEC officer issued the Certification, Atty. Binay already submitted to the said
office not less than 55 letters of "signature withdrawal," but no action was ever taken
thereon;
(3) In District 2, 29,411 signatures were submitted for verification. 23,521 alleged
voters' signatures (80% of those submitted) were rejected outright. Of the 5,890
signatures which allegedly passed the COMELEC's initial scrutiny, some more will
surely fail upon closer examination;
(4) In the absence of clear, transparent, and uniform rules the COMELEC personnel
did not know how to treat the objections and other observations coming from the
camp of Mayor Binay. The oppositors too did not know where to go for their remedy
when the COMELEC personnel merely "listened" to their objections and other
observations. As mentioned earlier, the COMELEC personnel did not even know
what to do with the many "letters of signature withdrawal" submitted to it;
(5) Signatures of people long dead, in prison, abroad, and other forgeries appear on
the Sigaw ng Bayan Signature Sheets. There is even a 15-year old alleged signatory;
(6) There are Signature Sheets obviously signed by one person;
(7) A Calara M. Roberto and a Roberto M. Calara both allegedly signed the Signature
Sheets.101
Also, there are allegations that many of the signatories did not understand what they have
signed as they were merely misled into signing the signature sheets. Opposed to these
allegations are rulings that a person who affixes his signature on a document raises the
presumption that the person so signing has knowledge of what the document contains.
Courts have recognized that there is great value in the stability of records, so to speak, that
no one should commit herself or himself to something in writing unless she or he is fully
aware and cognizant of the effect it may have upon her on him. 102 In the same vein, we have
held that a person is presumed to have knowledge of the contents of a document he has
signed.103 But as this Court is not a trier of facts, it cannot resolve the issue.
102
In sum, the issue of whether the petitioners have complied with the constitutional
requirement that the petition for initiative be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. Its
resolution will require presentation of evidence and their calibration by the COMELEC
according to its rules. During the oral argument on this case, the COMELEC, through
Director Alioden Dalaig of its Law Department, admitted that it has not examined the
documents submitted by the petitioners in support of the petition for initiative, as well as the
documents filed by the oppositors to buttress their claim that the required number of
signatures has not been met. The exchanges during the oral argument likewise clearly show
the need for further clarification and presentation of evidence to prove certain material
facts.104
The only basis used by the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for initiative was this Court's
ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that R.A. 6735 was insufficient. It has yet to rule on the
sufficiency of the form and substance of the petition. I respectfully submit that this issue
should be properly litigated before the COMELEC where both parties will be given full
opportunity to prove their allegations.
For the same reasons, the sufficiency of the Petition for Initiative and its compliance
with the requirements of R.A. 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question
that should be resolved by the COMELEC at the first instance, as it is the body that is
mandated by the Constitution to administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. 105
VII
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied due course to the
Lambino and Aumentado petition.
In denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition, COMELEC relied on this
Court's ruling in Santiago permanently enjoining it from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have
been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Again, I respectfully submit that COMELEC's reliance on Santiago constitutes grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Santiago case did not establish the firm
doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a sufficient law to implement the constitutional provision
allowing people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To recapitulate, the records show that
in the original decision, eight (8) justices106 voted that R.A. 6735 was not a sufficient law;
five (5) justices107 voted that said law was sufficient; and one (1) justice108 abstained from
voting on the issue holding that unless and until a proper initiatory pleading is filed, the said
issue is not ripe for adjudication.109

Within the reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for reconsideration. On
June 10, 1997, the Court denied the motion. Only thirteen (13) justices resolved the motion
for Justice Torres inhibited himself.110 Of the original majority of eight (8) justices, only
six (6) reiterated their ruling that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. Justice Hermosisima,
originally part of the majority of eight (8) justices, changed his vote and joined the minority of
five (5) justices. He opined without any equivocation that R.A. 6735 was a sufficient law, thus:
It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected cluster; another to think under
fire – to think for action upon which great interests depend." So said Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, and so I am guided as I reconsider my concurrence to the holding
of the majority that "R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation" and now to interpose my dissent thereto.
xxx
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.
I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately providing the legal
basis for the exercise by the people of their right to amend the Constitution
through initiative proceedings and to uphold the validity of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 insofar as it does not sanction the filing of the initiatory petition for initiative
proceedings to amend the Constitution without the required names and/or signatures
of at least 12% of all the registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Vitug remained steadfast in refusing to rule on the sufficiency of R.A. 6735. In fine,
the final vote on whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient law was 6-6 with one (1) justice inhibiting
himself and another justice refusing to rule on the ground that the issue was not ripe for
adjudication.
It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who voted that R.A. 6735 is an
insufficient law failed to establish a doctrine that could serve as a precedent. Under any
alchemy of law, a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write
a rule with precedential value. The opinion of the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco is
instructive, viz:
As it stands, of the thirteen justices who took part in the deliberations on the issue of
whether the motion for reconsideration of the March 19, 1997 decision should be
granted or not, only the following justices sided with Mr. Justice Davide, namely:
Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan.
Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Panganiban and the undersigned
voted to grant the motion; while Justice Vitug "maintained his opinion that the matter
was not ripe for judicial adjudication." In other words, only five, out of the other twelve
justices, joined Mr. Justice Davide's June 10, 1997 ponencia finding R.A. No. 6735
103
unconstitutional for its failure to pass the so called "completeness and sufficiency
standards" tests. The "concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took
part in the deliberations" which Article VII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution requires to
declare a law unconstitutional was, beyond dispute, not complied with. And even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that the constitutional requirement on the
concurrence of the "majority" was initially reached in the March 19, 1997 ponencia,
the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for
reconsideration. It was only on June 10, 1997 that the constitutionality of R.A. No.
6735 was settled with finality, sans the constitutionally required "majority." The
Court's declaration, therefore, is manifestly grafted with infirmity and wanting in force
necessitating, in my view, the reexamination of the Court's decision in G.R. No.
127325. It behooves the Court "not to tarry any longer" nor waste this opportunity
accorded by this new petition (G.R. No. 129754) to relieve the Court's
pronouncement from constitutional infirmity.
The jurisprudence that an equally divided Court can never set a precedent is well-settled.
Thus, in the United States, an affirmance in the Federal Supreme Court upon equal division
of opinion is not an authority for the determination of other cases, either in that Court or in the
inferior federal courts. In Neil v. Biggers,111 which was a habeas corpus state proceeding by
a state prisoner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that its equally divided affirmance of
petitioner's state court conviction was not an "actual adjudication" barring subsequent
consideration by the district court on habeas corpus. In discussing the non-binding effect of
an equal division ruling, the Court reviewed the history of cases explicating the disposition
"affirmed by an equally divided Court:"
In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition "affirmed by an equally
divided Court." On what was apparently the first occasion of an equal division, The
Antelope, 10 Wheat, 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), the Court simply affirmed on the point
of division without much discussion. Id., at 126-127. Faced with a similar division
during the next Term, the Court again affirmed, Chief Justice Marshall explaining that
"the principles of law which have been argued, cannot be settled; but the judgment is
affirmed, the court being divided in opinion upon it." Etting v. Bank of United
States, 11 Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L. Ed. 419 (1826). As was later elaborated in such
cases, it is the appellant or petitioner who asks the Court to overturn a lower court's
decree. "If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no order can be
made. The judgment of the court below, therefore, stands in full force. It is indeed,
the settled practice in such case to enter a judgment of affirmance; but this is only the
most convenient mode of expressing the fact that the cause is finally disposed of in
conformity with the action of the court below, and that that court can proceed to
enforce its judgment. The legal effect would be the same if the appeal, or writ of
error, were dismissed." Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, 112, 19 L. Ed. 154
(1869). Nor is an affirmance by an equally divided Court entitled to precedential
weight. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264, 80 S. Ct. 1463, 1464, 4 L.
Ed. 2d 1708 (1960).xxx"

This doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and has been cited with approval
in a number of subsequent cases,112 and has been applied in various state jurisdictions.
In the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Erin G., a Minor Child,113 wherein a putative
father sought to set aside a decree granting petition for adoption of an Indian child on
grounds of noncompliance with the requirements of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that its decision in In re Adoption of T.N.F. (T.N.F.),114 which
lacked majority opinion supporting holding that an action such as the putative father's
would be governed by the state's one-year statute of limitations, was not entitled to stare
decisis effect. In T.N.F., a majority of the justices sitting did not agree on a common
rationale, as two of four participating justices agreed that the state's one-year statute of
limitations applied, one justice concurred in the result only, and one justice dissented. There
was no "narrower" reasoning agreed upon by all three affirming justices. The concurring
justice expressed no opinion on the statute of limitations issue, and in agreeing with the
result, he reasoned that ICWA did not give the plaintiff standing to sue. 115 The two-justice
plurality, though agreeing that the state's one-year statute of limitations applied, specifically
disagreed with the concurring justice on the standing issue. 116 Because a majority of the
participating justices in T.N.F. did not agree on any one ground for affirmance, it was not
accorded stare decisis effect by the state Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise ruled that the doctrine of stare decisis does not
apply to plurality decisions in which no majority of the justices participating agree to the
reasoning and as such are not authoritative interpretations binding on the Supreme Court. 117
In State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,118 the Supreme Court of Florida, in an equally divided
opinion on the matter,119 held that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933 must be allowed to stand,
dismissing a quo warranto suit without prejudice. The Court held:
In a cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute cannot be declared
unconstitutional nor its enforcement nor operation judicially interfered with, except by
the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court sitting in the
cause wherein the constitutionality of the statute is brought in question or judicial
relief sought against its enforcement. Section 4 of Article 5, state Constitution.
Therefore in this case the concurrence of a majority of the members of this court in
holding unconstitutional said chapter 15938, supra, not having been had, it follows
that the statute in controversy must be allowed to stand and accordingly be permitted
to be enforced as a presumptively valid act of the Legislature, and that this
proceeding in quo warranto must be dismissed without prejudice. Spencer v. Hunt
(Fla.) 147 So. 282. This decision is not to be regarded as a judicial precedent on the
question of constitutional law involved concerning the constitutionality vel non of
chapter 15938. State ex rel. Hampton v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37 So. 51.
Quo warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by equal division of the court
on question of constitutionality of statute involved.
104
In U.S. v. Pink,120 the Court held that the affirmance by the U.S. Supreme Court by an
equally divided vote of a decision of the New York Court of Appeals that property of a New
York branch of a Russian insurance company was outside the scope of the Russian Soviet
government's decrees terminating existence of insurance companies in Russia and seizing
their assets, while conclusive and binding upon the parties as respects the controversy in that
action, did not constitute an authoritative "precedent."
In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,121 the U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit, in holding
that printed lyrics which had the same meter as plaintiffs' lyrics, but which were in form a
parody of the latter, did not constitute infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights, ruled that the prior
case of Benny v. Loew's, Inc.,122 which was affirmed by an equally divided court, was
not binding upon it, viz:
Under the precedents of this court, and, as seems justified by reason as well as by
authority, an affirmance by an equally divided court is as between the parties, a
conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles
of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting
prevents the case from becoming an authority for the determination of other cases,
either in this or in inferior courts.123
In Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,124 the Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed
the appeal as it was unable to reach a decision because two judges recused themselves and
the remaining members of the Court were so divided, it was impossible to secure the
concurrence of four judges as is constitutionally required. The Court followed the procedure
employed by the U.S. Supreme Court when the Justices of that Court are equally divided, i.e.
affirm the judgment of the court that was before it for review. The affirmance is a conclusive
determination and adjudication as between the parties to the immediate case, it is not
authority for the determination of other cases, either in the Supreme Court or in any other
court. It is not "entitled to precedential weight." The legal effect of such an affirmance is the
same as if the appeal was dismissed.125
The same rule is settled in the English Courts. Under English precedents,126 an affirmance
by an equally divided Court is, as between the parties, a conclusive determination and
adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles of law involved not having been agreed
upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority for the
determination of other cases, either in that or in inferior courts.
After a tour of these cases, we can safely conclude that the prevailing doctrine is that, the
affirmance by an equally divided court merely disposes of the present controversy as
between the parties and settles no issue of law; the affirmance leaves unsettled the principle
of law presented by the case and is not entitled to precedential weight or value. In other
words, the decision only has res judicata and not stare decisis effect. It is not conclusive and
binding upon other parties as respects the controversies in other actions.

Let us now examine the patent differences between the petition at bar and the Delfin
Petition in the Santiago case which will prevent the Santiago ruling from binding the present
petitioners. To start with, the parties are different. More importantly, the Delfin Petition did
not contain the signatures of the required number of registered voters under the Constitution:
the requirement that twelve per cent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country wherein
each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered
voters therein was not complied with. For this reason, we ruled unanimously that it was not
the initiatory petition which the COMELEC could properly take cognizance of. In contrast,
the present petition appears to be accompanied by the signatures of the required number of
registered voters. Thus, while the Delfin Petition prayed that an Order be issued fixing the
time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, the Lambino and Aumentado
petition, prayed for the calling of a plebiscite to allow the Filipino people to express their
sovereign will on the proposition. COMELEC cannot close its eyes to these material
differences.
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo adds:
Plainly, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition on the basis of its mistaken
notion that Santiago established the doctrine that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. As
aforestressed, that ruling of six (6) justices who do not represent the majority lacks
precedential status and is non-binding on the present petitioners.
The Court's dismissal of the PIRMA petition is of no moment. Suffice it to say that we
dismissed the PIRMA petition on the principle of res judicata. This was stressed by former
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., viz:
The following are my reasons as to why this petition must be summarily dismissed:
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in
Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of
the fact that the former is substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of
the roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not
indispensable, parties in the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs
are raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM,
MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and
CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as "a non-stock, non-profit
organization duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with office address at
Suite 403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with
"ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its "officers." In
Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA
which, as alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to undertake the
signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then,
the PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.
105
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at
the hearing of the Delfin petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-
petitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding member of the
Movement for People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was
noted that said movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity." In their Comment to the petition in
Santiago, the PEDROSAS did not deny that they were founding members of PIRMA,
and by their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had
joined Delfin or his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the
PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them, from the operation of the principle of
res judicata, which needs no further elaboration. (emphasis supplied)
The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2)
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between
the first and second actions identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity
of causes of action.127
Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all the elements of res
judicata are present. For sure, our Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC, which was
promulgated on 19 March 1997, and the motions for reconsideration thereof denied
with finality on 10 June 1997, is undoubtedly final. The said Decision was rendered
by this Court which had jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition under Rule 65.
Our judgment therein was on the merits, i.e., rendered only after considering the
evidence presented by the parties as well as their arguments in support of their
respective claims and defenses. And, as between Santiago v. COMELEC case and
COMELEC Special Matter No. 97-001 subject of the present petition, there is identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are not identical to the
parties in the instant case as some of the petitioners in the latter case were not
parties to the former case. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the parties
in Santiago v. COMELEC included the COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, spouses
Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of PIRMA, as
well as Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra, another founding member of PIRMA, representing
PIRMA, as respondents. In the instant case, Atty. Delfin was never removed, and the
spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa were joined by several others who were made
parties to the petition. In other words, what petitioners did was to make it appear that
the PIRMA Petition was filed by an entirely separate and distinct group by removing
some of the parties involved in Santiago v. COMELEC and adding new parties. But
as we said in Geralde v. Sabido128-

A party may not evade the application of the rule of res judicata by simply
including additional parties in the subsequent case or by not including as
parties in the later case persons who were parties in the previous suit. The
joining of new parties does not remove the case from the operation of the
rule on res judicata if the party against whom the judgment is offered in
evidence was a party in the first action; otherwise, the parties might renew
the litigation by simply joining new parties.
The fact that some persons or entities joined as parties in the PIRMA petition but
were not parties in Santiago v. COMELEC does not affect the operation of the prior
judgment against those parties to the PIRMA Petition who were likewise parties in
Santiago v. COMELEC, as they are bound by such prior judgment.
Needless to state, the dismissal of the PIRMA petition which was based on res judicata
binds only PIRMA but not the petitioners.
VIII
Finally, let the people speak.
"It is a Constitution we are expounding" solemnly intoned the great Chief Justice John
Marshall of the United States in the 1819 case of M'cCulloch v. Maryland.129 Our
Constitution is not a mere collection of slogans. Every syllable of our Constitution is suffused
with significance and requires our full fealty. Indeed, the rule of law will wither if we allow the
commands of our Constitution to underrule us.
The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is the sovereignty of the people.
We ought to be concerned with this first principle, i.e., the inherent right of the sovereign
people to decide whether to amend the Constitution. Stripped of its abstractions, democracy
is all about who has the sovereign right to make decisions for the people and our Constitution
clearly and categorically says it is no other than the people themselves from whom all
government authority emanates. This right of the people to make decisions is the
essence of sovereignty, and it cannot receive any minimalist interpretation from this
Court. If there is any principle in the Constitution that cannot be diluted and is non-
negotiable, it is this sovereign right of the people to decide.
This Court should always be in lockstep with the people in the exercise of their
sovereignty. Let them who will diminish or destroy the sovereign right of the people to
decide be warned. Let not their sovereignty be diminished by those who belittle their brains to
comprehend changes in the Constitution as if the people themselves are not the source and
author of our Constitution. Let not their sovereignty be destroyed by the masters of
manipulation who misrepresent themselves as the spokesmen of the people.
Be it remembered that a petition for people's initiative that complies with the requirement that
it "must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every
106
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein" is but the
first step in a long journey towards the amendment of the Constitution. Lest it be missed,
the case at bar involves but a proposal to amend the Constitution. The proposal will still be
debated by the people and at this time, there is yet no fail-safe method of telling what will be
the result of the debate. There will still be a last step to the process of amendment which is
the ratification of the proposal by a majority of the people in a plebiscite called for the
purpose. Only when the proposal is approved by a majority of the people in the
plebiscite will it become an amendment to the Constitution. All the way, we cannot tie
the tongues of the people. It is the people who decide for the people are not an
obscure footnote in our Constitution.
The people's voice is sovereign in a democracy. Let us hear them. Let us heed them.
Let us not only sing paens to the people's sovereignty. Yes, it is neither too soon nor
too late to let the people speak.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolution of the Commission
on Elections dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by
Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together with some 6.3
million registered voters who affixed their signatures thereon and to REMAND the petition at
bar to the Commission on Elections for further proceedings.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent; TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO
BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT
AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,
MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P.
MEDINA, JR., ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA,
BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN,
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY
SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO

JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,
TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T.
VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY
LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY
A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S.
LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG
MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER
and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA
KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Oppositors-
Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR.,
and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
QUISUMBING, J.:
1. With due respect to the main opinion written by J. Antonio T. Carpio, and the dissent of J.
Reynato S. Puno, I view the matter before us in this petition as one mainly involving a
complex political question.1 While admittedly the present Constitution lays down certain
numerical requirements for the conduct of a People's Initiative, such as the percentages of
signatures – being 12% of the total number of registered voters, provided each legislative
district is represented by at least 3% – they are not the main points of controversy. Stated in
simple terms, what this Court must decide is whether the Commission on Elections gravely
abused its discretion when it denied the petition to submit the proposed changes to the
Constitution directly to the vote of the sovereign people in a plebiscite. Technical questions,
e.g. whether petitioners should have filed a Motion for Reconsideration before coming to us,
are of no moment in the face of the transcendental issue at hand. What deserve our full
attention are the issues concerning the applicable rules as well as statutory and constitutional
limitations on the conduct of the People's Initiative.
2. It must be stressed that no less than the present Constitution itself empowers the people to
"directly" propose amendments through their own "initiative." The subject of the instant
107
petition is by way of exercising that initiative in order to change our form of government from
presidential to parliamentary. Much has been written about the fulsome powers of the people
in a democracy. But the most basic concerns the idea that sovereignty resides in the people
and that all government authority emanates from them. Clearly, by the power of popular
initiative, the people have the sovereign right to change the present Constitution. Whether the
initial moves are done by a Constitutional Convention, a Constitutional Assembly, or a
People's Initiative, in the end every amendment -- however insubstantial or radical -- must be
submitted to a plebiscite. Thus, it is the ultimate will of the people expressed in the ballot, that
matters.2
3. I cannot fault the COMELEC, frankly, for turning down the petition of Messrs. Lambino, et
al. For the COMELEC was just relying on precedents, with the common understanding that,
pursuant to the cases of Santiago v. COMELEC3 and PIRMA v. COMELEC,4 the COMELEC
had been permanently enjoined from entertaining any petition for a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution by no less than this Court. In denying due course below to Messrs.
Lambino and Aumentado's petition, I could not hold the COMELEC liable for grave abuse of
discretion when they merely relied on this Court's unequivocal rulings. Of course, the
Santiago and the PIRMA decisions could be reviewed and reversed by this Court, as J.
Reynato S. Puno submits now. But until the Court does so, the COMELEC was duty bound to
respect and obey this Court's mandate, for the rule of law to prevail.
4. Lastly, I see no objection to the remand to the COMELEC of the petition of Messrs.
Lambino and Aumentado and 6.327 million voters, for further examination of the factual
requisites before a plebiscite is conducted. On page 4 of the assailed Resolution of the
respondent dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC tentatively expressed its view that "even if
the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the
total number of registered voters", the COMELEC could not give the Petition due course
because of our view that R.A. No. 6735 was inadequate. That, however, is now refuted by
Mr. Justice Puno's scholarly ponencia. Now that we have revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC
decision, there is only one clear task for COMELEC. In my view, the only doable option left
for the COMELEC, once factual issues are heard and resolved, is to give due course to the
petition for the initiative to amend our Constitution so that the sovereign people can vote on
whether a parliamentary system of government should replace the present presidential
system.
5. I am therefore in favor of letting the sovereign people speak on their choice of the form of
government as a political question soonest. (This I say without fear of media opinion that our
judicial independence has been tainted or imperiled, for it is not.) Thus I vote for the remand
of the petition. Thereafter, as prayed for, COMELEC should forthwith certify the Petition as
sufficient in form and substance and call for the holding of a plebiscite within the period
mandated by the basic law, not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days from said
certification. Only a credible plebiscite itself, conducted peacefully and honestly, can bring
closure to the instant political controversy.
 108

The COMELEC denied the petition for initiative filed by petitioners purportedly on the basis of
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC2 that: (1) RA 6753 was inadequate to cover the
Associate Justice
system of initiative regarding amendments to the Constitution and (2) the COMELEC was
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative
____________________ regarding amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law was validly enacted to provide
for the implementation of the initiative provision.
EN BANC
However, Santiago should not apply to this case but only to the petition of Delfin in 1997. It
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006 would be unreasonable to make it apply to all petitions which were yet unforeseen in 1997.
The fact is that Santiago was focused on the Delfin petition alone.
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, petitioners, Those who oppose the exercise of the people's right to initiate changes to the Constitution via
vs. initiative claim that Santiago barred any and all future petitions for initiative by virtue of the
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata. The argument is flawed.

G. R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG,
petitioners,
vs.
HE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe,
respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DISSENTING OPINION
CORONA, J.:
The life of the law is not logic but experience.1 Our collective experience as a nation breathes
life to our system of laws, especially to the Constitution. These cases promise to significantly
contribute to our collective experience as a nation. Fealty to the primary constitutional
principle that the Philippines is not merely a republican State but a democratic one as well
behooves this Court to affirm the right of the people to participate directly in the process of
introducing changes to their fundamental law. These petitions present such an opportunity.
Thus, this is an opportune time for this Court to uphold the sovereign rights of the people.
The ponencia of Mr. Justice Puno has amply discussed the arguments relating to stare
decisis. Hence, I will address the argument from the viewpoint of res judicata.
Res judicata is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on
the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them,
constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or
cause of action.3 It has the following requisites: (1) the former judgment or order must be
final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits and (4) there must be identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action between the first and second actions. 4
There is no identity of parties in Santiago and the instant case. While the COMELEC was
also the respondent in Santiago, the petitioners in that case and those in this case are
different. More significantly, there is no identity of causes of action in the two cases. Santiago
involved amendments to Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII and Section 8
of Article X of the Constitution while the present petition seeks to amend Sections 1to 7 of
Article VI and Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Clearly, therefore, the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the present petition for initiative was
barred by Santiago and, on that ground, dismissed the petition.
The present petition and that in Santiago are materially different from each other. They are
not based on the same facts. There is thus no cogent reason to frustrate and defeat the
present direct action of the people to exercise their sovereignty by proposing changes to their
fundamental law.

I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato Puno who has sufficiently explained the
rationale for upholding the people's initiative. However, I wish to share my own thoughts on
certain matters I deem material and significant.
Santiago Does Not Apply to This Case But Only to the 1997 Delfin Petition
People's Initiative Should Not
Be Subjected to Conditions
People's initiative is an option reserved by the people for themselves exclusively. Neither
Congress nor the COMELEC has the power to curtail or defeat this exclusive power of the

people to change the Constitution. Neither should the exercise of this power be made subject
to any conditions, as some would have us accept.
Oppositors to the people's initiative point out that this Court ruled in Santiago that RA 6735
was inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and,
thus, no law existed to enable the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution.
This reasoning is seriously objectionable.
The pronouncement on the insufficiency of RA 6735 was, to my mind, out of place. It was
unprecedented and dangerously transgressed the domain reserved to the legislature.
While the legislature is authorized to establish procedures for determining the validity and
sufficiency of a petition to amend the constitution,5 that procedure cannot unnecessarily
restrict the initiative privilege.6 In the same vein, this Court cannot unnecessarily and
unreasonably restrain the people's right to directly propose changes to the Constitution by
declaring a law inadequate simply for lack of a sub-heading and other grammatical but
insignificant omissions. Otherwise, the constitutional intent to empower the people will be
severely emasculated, if not rendered illusory.
People's Right and Power to Propose Changes to the Constitution Directly Should not
be Unreasonably Curtailed
If Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which are mere representative bodies,
can propose changes to the Constitution, there is no reason why the supreme body politic
itself – the people – may not do so directly.
Resort to initiative to amend the constitution or enact a statute is an exercise of "direct
democracy" as opposed to "representative democracy." The system of initiative allows
citizens to directly propose constitutional amendments for the general electorate to adopt or
reject at the polls, particularly in a plebiscite. While representative government was
envisioned to "refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country,
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations,"7 the exercise of "direct democracy" through initiative reserves direct
lawmaking power to the people by providing them a method to make new laws via the
constitution, or alternatively by enacting statutes.8 Efforts of the represented to control their
representatives through initiative have been described as curing the problems of democracy
with more democracy.9
The Constitution celebrates the sovereign right of the people and declares that "sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."10 Unless the
present petition is granted, this constitutional principle will be nothing but empty rhetoric,
devoid of substance for those whom it seeks to empower.
109
The right of the people to pass legislation and to introduce changes to the Constitution is a
fundamental right and must be jealously guarded. 11 The people should be allowed to directly
seek redress of the problems of society and representative democracy with the constitutional
tools they have reserved for their use alone.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174513.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153
RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT,
ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE
VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III,
BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN
MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE,
GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR.
REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA
THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER
AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM
and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG
PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU
CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Oppositors-
Intervenors;

G.R. No. 174299 entitled
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR.,
and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J:
I join in full the opinion of Senior Associate Justice Puno. Its enviable sang-froid, inimitable
lucidity, and luminous scholarship are all so characteristic of the author that it is hardly a
waste of pen and ink to write separately if only to express my deep admiration for his
disquisition. It is compelling because it derives from the fundamental democratic ordinance
that sovereignty resides in the people, and it seeks to effectuate that principle through the
actual empowerment of the sovereign people. Justice Puno's opinion will in the short term
engender reactions on its impact on present attempts to amend the Constitution, but once the
political passion of the times have been shorn, it will endure as an unequivocal message to
the taongbayan that they are to be trusted to chart the course of their future.
Nothing that I inscribe will improve on Justice Puno's opinion. I only write separately to
highlight a few other points which also inform my vote to grant the petitions.
I.
I agree with Justice Puno that Santiago v. COMELEC1 and PIRMA v. COMELEC2 had not
acquired value as precedent and should be reversed in any case. I add that the Court has
long been mindful of the rule that it necessitates a majority, and not merely a plurality, in
order that a decision can stand as precedent. That principle has informed the members of
this Court as they deliberated and voted upon contentious petitions, even if this consideration
is not ultimately reflected on the final draft released for promulgation.
The curious twist to Santiago and PIRMA is that for all the denigration heaped upon Rep. Act
No. 6735 in those cases, the Court did not invalidate any provision of the statute. All the
Court said then was that the law was "inadequate". Since this "inadequate" law was not
annulled by the Court, or repealed by Congress, it remained part of the statute books. 3
110
I maintain that even if Rep. Act No. 6735 is truly "inadequate", the Court in Santiago should
not have simply let the insufficiency stand given that it was not minded to invalidate the law
itself. Article 9 of the Civil Code provides that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws." 4 As explained by
the Court recently in Reyes v. Lim,5 "[Article 9] calls for the application of equity, which[, in the
revered Justice Cardozo's words,] 'fills the open spaces in the law.'"6 Certainly, any court that
refuses to rule on an action premised on Rep. Act No. 6735 on the ground that the law is
"inadequate" would have been found in grave abuse of discretion. The previous failure by the
Court to "fill the open spaces" in Santiago further highlights that decision's status as an
unfortunate aberration.
I am mindful of the need to respect stare decisis, to the point of having recently decried a
majority ruling that was clearly minded to reverse several precedents but refused to explicitly
say so.7 Yet the principle is not immutable.8 The passionate words of Chief Justice
Panganiban in Osmeña v. COMELEC9 bear quoting:
Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the Court is
maintaining the ad ban to be consistent with its previous holding in NPC vs. Comelec.
Thus, respondent urges reverence for the stability of judicial doctrines. I submit,
however, that more important than consistency and stability are the verity, integrity
and correctness of jurisprudence. As Dean Roscoe Pound explains, "Law must be
stable but it cannot stand still." Verily, it must correct itself and move in cadence with
the march of the electronic age. Error and illogic should not be perpetuated. After all,
the Supreme Court, in many cases, has deviated from stare decisis and reversed
previous doctrines and decisions.10 It should do no less in the present case.11
Santiago established a tenet that the Supreme Court may affirm a law as constitutional, yet
declare its provisions as inadequate to accomplish the legislative purpose, then barred the
enforcement of the law. That ruling is erroneous, illogical, and should not be perpetuated.
II.
Following Justice Puno's clear demonstration why Santiago should not be respected as
precedent, I agree that the COMELEC's failure to take cognizance of the petitions as
mandated by Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion correctible through the
petitions before this Court.
The Court has consistently held in cases such as Abes v. COMELEC12, Sanchez v.
COMELEC13, and Sambarani v. COMELEC14 that "the functions of the COMELEC under the
Constitution are essentially executive and administrative in nature". 15 More pertinently, in
Buac v. COMELEC16, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC relative to the
enforcement and administration of a law relative to a plebiscite fell under the jurisdiction of
the poll body under its constitutional mandate "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of a xxx plebiscite".17

Rep. Act No. 6735 is a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite. The primary task of the
COMELEC under Rep. Act No. 6735 is to enforce and administer the said law, functions that
are essentially executive and administrative in nature. Even the subsequent duty of the
COMELEC of determining the sufficiency of the petitions after they have been filed is
administrative in character. By any measure, the COMELEC's failure to perform its executive
and administrative functions under Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
III.
It has been argued that the subject petitions for initiative are barred under Republic Act No.
6735 as they allegedly embrace more than one subject. Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735
classifies as a "prohibited measure," a petition submitted to the electorate that embraces
more than one subject.18 On this point, reliance is apparently placed on the array of
provisions which are to be affected by the amendments proposed in the initiative petition.
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is a reflection of the long-enshrined constitutional principle
that the laws passed by Congress "shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof".19 The one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the
parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title,
or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.20 An act
having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general object.21
The precedents governing the one-subject, one-title rule under the Constitution should apply
as well in the interpretation of Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735. For as long as it can be
established that an initiative petition embraces a single general subject, the petition may be
allowed no matter the number of constitutional provisions proposed for amendment if the
amendments are germane to the subject of the petition.
Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the Lambino initiative petitions expressly propose the changing
of the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary. Such a
proposal may strike as comprehensive, necessitating as it will the reorganization of the
executive and legislative branches of government, nevertheless it ineluctably encompasses
only a single general subject still.
The 1987 Constitution (or any constitution for that matter) is susceptible to division into
several general spheres. To cite the broadest of these spheres by way of example, Article III
enumerates the guaranteed rights of the people under the Bill of Rights; Articles VI, VII and
VIII provide for the organizational structure of government; while Articles II, XII, XIII & XIV, XV
and XVI enunciate policy principles of the State. What would clearly be prohibited under
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is an initiative petition that seeks to amend provisions which
do not belong to the same sphere. For example, had a single initiative petition sought not
only to change the form of government from presidential to parliamentary but also to amend
111
the Bill of Rights, said petition would arguably have been barred under Section 10, as that
petition ostensibly embraces more than one subject, with each subject bearing no functional
relation to the other. But that is not the case with the present initiative petitions.
Neither can it be argued that the initiative petitions embrace more than one subject since the
proposed amendments seek to affect two separate branches of government. The very
purpose of the initiative petitions is to fuse the powers of the executive and legislative
branches of government; hence, the amendments intended to effect such general intent
necessarily affects the two branches. If it required that to propose a shift in government from
presidential to parliamentary, the amendments to Article VII (Executive Branch) have to be
segregated to a different petition from that which would propose amendments to Article VI
(Legislative Branch), then the result would be two initiative petitions ─ both subject to
separate authentications, consideration and even plebiscites, all to effect one general
proposition. This scenario, which entertains the possibility that one petition would ultimately
fail while the other succeeds, could thus allow for the risk that the executive branch could be
abolished without transferring executive power to the legislative branch. An absurd result,
indeed.
I am not even entirely comfortable with the theoretical underpinnings of Section 10. The
Constitution indubitably grants the people the right to seek amendment of the charter through
initiative, and mandates Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right." In doing so, Congress may not restrict the right to initiative on grounds that are not
provided for in the Constitution. If for example the implementing law also provides that certain
provisions of the Constitution may not be amended through initiative, that prohibition should
not be sustained. Congress is tasked with the implementation, and not the restriction of the
right to initiative.
The one-subject requirement under Section 10 is not provided for as a bar to amendment
under the Constitution. Arguments can be supplied for the merit of such a requirement, since
it would afford a measure of orderliness when the vital question of amending the Constitution
arises. The one-subject requirement does allow the voters focus when deliberating whether
or not to vote for the amendments. These factors of desirability nonetheless fail to detract
from the fact that the one-subject requirement imposes an additional restriction on the right to
initiative not contemplated by the Constitution. Short of invalidating the requirement, a better
course of action would be to insist upon its liberal interpretation. After all, the Court has
consistently adhered to a liberal interpretation of the one-subject, one-title rule.22 There is no
cause to adopt a stricter interpretative rule with regard to the one-subject rule under Section
10 of Rep. Act No. 6735.
IV.
During the hearing on the petitions, the argument was raised that provisions of the
Constitution amended through initiative would not have the benefit of a reference source from
the record of a deliberative body such as Congress or a constitutional convention. It was
submitted that this consideration influenced the Constitutional Commission as it drafted

Section 2, Article XVII, which expressly provided that only amendments, and not revisions,
may be the subject of initiative petitions.
This argument clearly proceeds from a premise that accords supreme value to the record of
deliberations of a constitutional convention or commission in the interpretation of the charter.
Yet if the absence of a record of deliberations stands as so serious a flaw as to invalidate or
constrict processes which change a constitution or its provisions, then the entire initiative
process authorized by the Constitution should be scarlet-marked as well.
Even if this position can be given any weight in the consideration of these petitions, I would
like to point out that resort to the records of deliberations is only one of many aids to
constitutional construction. For one, it should be abhorred if the provision under study is itself
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity. As the Court held in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary:23
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of
the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of
the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us
no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk . . . We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face."24
Even if there is need to refer to extrinsic sources in aid of constitutional interpretation, the
constitutional record does not provide the exclusive or definitive answer on how to interpret
the provision. The intent of a constitutional convention is not controlling by itself, and while
the historical discussion on the floor of the constitutional convention is valuable, it is not
necessarily decisive. The Court has even held in Vera v. Avelino25 that "the proceedings of
the [constitutional] convention are less conclusive of the proper construction of the
fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, since
in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature that courts seek, while in the former courts
are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations
of their representatives."26 The proper interpretation of a constitution depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than the framers' understanding thereof. 27
If there is fear in the absence of a constitutional record as guide for interpretation of any
amendments adopted via initiative, such absence would not preclude the courts from
interpreting such amendments in a manner consistent with how courts generally construe the
Constitution. For example, reliance will be placed on the other provisions of the Constitution
to arrive at a harmonized and holistic constitutional framework. The constitutional record is
hardly the Rosetta Stone that unlocks the meaning of the Constitution.
V.
112
I fully agree with Justice Puno that all issues relating to the sufficiency of the initiative
petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC. Rep. Act No. 6735 clearly reposes on the
COMELEC the task of determining the sufficiency of the petitions, including the
ascertainment of whether twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters, including three
percent (3%) of registered voters in every legislative district have indeed signed the initiative
petitions.28 It should be remembered that the COMELEC had dismissed the initiative petitions
outright, and had yet to undertake the determination of sufficiency as required by law.
It has been suggested to the end of leading the Court to stifle the initiative petitions that the
Court may at this juncture pronounce the initiative petitions as insufficient. The derivation of
the factual predicates leading to the suggestion is uncertain, considering that the trier of facts,
the COMELEC in this instance, has yet to undertake the necessary determination. Still, the
premise has been floated that petitioners have made sufficient admissions before this Court
that purportedly established the petitions are insufficient.
That premise is highly dubitable. Yet the more fundamental question that we should ask, I
submit, is whether it serves well on the Court to usurp trier of facts even before the latter
exercises its functions? If the Court, at this stage, were to declare the petitions as insufficient,
it would be akin to the Court pronouncing an accused as guilty even before the lower court
trial had began.
Matugas v. COMELEC29 inveighs against the propriety of the Court uncharacteristically
assuming the role of trier of facts, and resolving factual questions not previously adjudicated
by the lower courts or tribunals:
[P]etitioner in this case cannot "enervate" the COMELEC's findings by introducing
new evidence before this Court, which in any case is not a trier of facts, and
then ask it to substitute its own judgment and discretion for that of the
COMELEC.
The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the
first time on appeal, and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate
court will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action. This is true
whether the decision elevated for review originated from a regular court or an
administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, and whether it was rendered in a civil
case, a special proceeding, or a criminal case. Piecemeal presentation of evidence is
simply not in accord with orderly justice.30
Any present determination by the Court on the sufficiency of the petitions constitutes in effect
a trial de novo, the Justices of the Supreme Court virtually descending to the level of trial
court judges. This is an unbecoming recourse, and it simply is not done.
VI.

The worst position this Court could find itself in is to acquiesce to a plea that it make the
choice whether to amend the Constitution or not. This is a matter which should not be left to
fifteen magistrates who have not been elected by the people to make the choice for them.
A vote to grant the petitions is not a vote to amend the 1987 Constitution. It is merely a vote
to allow the people to directly exercise that option. In fact, the position of Justice Puno which I
share would not even guarantee that the Lambino and Sigaw ng Bayan initiative petitions
would be submitted to the people in a referendum. The COMELEC will still have to determine
the sufficiency of the petition. Among the questions which still have to be determined by the
poll body in considering the sufficiency of the petitions is whether twelve percent (12%) of all
registered voters nationwide, including three percent (3%) of registered voters in every
legislative district, have indeed signed the initiative petitions. 31
And even should the COMELEC find the initiative petitions sufficient, the matter of whether
the Constitution should be amended would still depend on the choice of the electorate. The
oppositors are clearly queasy about some of the amendments proposed, or the imputed
motives behind the amendments. A referendum, should the COMELEC find the petitions as
sufficient, would allow them to convey their uneasiness to the public at large, as well as for
the proponents of the amendment to defend their proposal. The campaign period alone would
allow the public to be involved in the significant deliberation on the course our nation should
take, with the ensuing net benefit of a more informed, more politically aware populace. And of
course, the choice on whether the Constitution should be amended would lie directly with the
people. The initiative process involves participatory democracy at its most elemental; wherein
the consequential debate would not be confined to the august halls of Congress or the
hallowed chambers of this Court, as it would spill over to the public squares and town halls,
the academic yards and the Internet blogosphere, the dining areas in the homes of the
affluent and the impoverished alike.
The prospect of informed and widespread discussion on constitutional change engaged in by
a people who are actually empowered in having a say whether these changes should be
enacted, gives fruition to the original vision of pure democracy, as formulated in Athens two
and a half millennia ago. The great hero of Athenian democracy, Pericles, was recorded as
saying in his famed Funeral Oration, "We differ from other states in regarding the man who
keeps aloof from public life not as 'private' but as useless; we decide or debate, carefully
and in person all matters of policy, and we hold, not that words and deeds go ill
together, but that acts are foredoomed to failure when undertaken undiscussed."32
Unfortunately, given the highly politicized charge of the times, it has been peddled that an act
or vote that assists the initiative process is one for the willful extinction of democracy or
democratic institutions. Such a consideration should of course properly play its course in the
public debates and deliberations attendant to the initiative process. Yet as a result of the
harum-scarum, the temptation lies heavy for a member of this Court perturbed with the
prospect of constitutional change to relieve those anxieties by simply voting to enjoin any
legal procedure that initiates the amendment or revision of the fundamental law, even at the
expense of the people's will or what the Constitution allows. A vote so oriented takes the
113
conservative path of least resistance, even as it may gain the admiration of those who do not
want to see the Constitution amended.
Still, the biases we should enforce as magistrates are those of the Constitution and the
elements of democracy on which our rule of law is founded. Direct democracy, as embodied
in the initiative process, is but a culmination of the evolution over the centuries of democratic
rights of choice and self-governance. The reemergence of the Athenian democratic ideal after
centuries of tyrannical rules arrived very slowly, the benefits parceled out at first only to
favored classes. The Magna Carta granted limited rights to self-determination and self-
governance only to a few English nobles; the American Constitution was originally intended
to give a meaningful voice only to free men, mostly Caucasian, who met the property-holding
requirements set by the states for voting. Yet even the very idea of popular voting, limited as
it may have already been within the first few years of the American Union, met resistance
from no less a revered figure as Alexander Hamilton, to whom the progressive historian
Howard Zinn attributes these disconcerting words:
The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally
this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are
turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the
first class a distinct permanent share in the government… Can a democratic
assembly who annually revolve in the mass of the people be supposed steadily to
pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of
democracy…33
This utterly paternalistic and bigoted view has not survived into the present age of modern
democracy where a person's poverty, color, or gender no longer impedes the exercise of full
democratic rights. Yet a democracy that merely guarantees its citizens the right to live their
lives freely is incomplete if there is no corresponding allowance for a means by which the
people have a direct choice in determining their country's direction. Initiative as a mode of
amending a constitution may seem incompatible with representative democracy, yet it
embodies an even purer form of democracy. Initiative, which our 1987 Constitution saw fit to
grant to the people, is a progressive measure that is but a continuation of the line of evolution
of the democratic ideal.
By allowing the sovereign people to directly propose and enact constitutional amendments,
the initiative process should be acknowledged as the purest implement of democratic rule
under law. This right granted to over sixty million Filipinos cannot be denied by the votes of
less than eight magistrates for reasons that bear no cogitation on the Constitution.
I VOTE to GRANT the petitions.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153
RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT,
ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE
VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III,
BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN
MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE,
GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR.
REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA
THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER
AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM
and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG
PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU
CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Oppositors-
Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG,
Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR.,
and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
114
DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the creature of their
will, and lives only by their will. But this supreme and irresistible power to make or unmake,
resides only in the whole body of the people; not in any subdivision of them."
-- Marshall, C.J., Cohens v. Virginia (1821, US) 6 Wheat 264, 389, 5 L ed. 257, 287.
I express my concurrence in the discussions and conclusions presented in the persuasive
and erudite dissent of Justice Reynato S. Puno. However, I make some additional
observations in connection with my concurrence.
While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence to the Philippine Constitution of
1987 for being the supreme law of the land, we should not lose sight of the truth that there is
an ultimate authority to which the Constitution is also subordinate – the will of the people.
No less than its very first paragraph, the Preamble,1 expressly recognizes that the
Constitution came to be because it was ordained and promulgated by the sovereign Filipino
people. It is a principle reiterated yet again in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, which
explicitly declares that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." Thus, the resolution
of the issues and controversies raised by the instant Petition should be guided accordingly by
the foregoing principle.
If the Constitution is the expression of the will of the sovereign people, then, in the event that
the people change their will, so must the Constitution be revised or amended to reflect such
change. Resultantly, the right to revise or amend the Constitution inherently resides in the
sovereign people whose will it is supposed to express and embody. The Constitution itself,
under Article XVII, provides for the means by which the revision or amendment of the
Constitution may be proposed and ratified.
Under Section 1 of the said Article, proposals to amend or revise the Constitution may be
made (a) by Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or (b) by constitutional
convention. The Congress and the constitutional convention possess the power to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, the Constitution not simply because the Constitution so
provides, but because the sovereign people had chosen to delegate their inherent right to
make such proposals to their representatives either through Congress or through a
constitutional convention.
On the other hand, the sovereign people, well-inspired and greatly empowered by the People
Power Revolution of 1986, reserved to themselves the right to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through initiative, to wit –

SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.2
The afore-quoted section does not confer on the Filipino people the right to amend the
Constitution because, as previously discussed, such right is inherent in them. The section
only reduces into writing this right to initiate amendments to the Constitution where they
collectively and willfully agreed in the manner by which they shall exercise this right: (a)
through the filing of a petition; (b) supported by at least twelve percent (12%) of the total
number of registered voters nationwide; (c) with each legislative district represented by at
least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein; (d) subject to the limitation that no
such petition may be filed within five years after the ratification of the Constitution, and not
oftener than once every five years thereafter; and (e) a delegation to Congress of the
authority to provide the formal requirements and other details for the implementation of the
right.
It is my earnest opinion that the right of the sovereign people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through initiative is more superior than the power they delegated to
Congress or to a constitutional convention to amend or revise the Constitution. The initiative
process gives the sovereign people the voice to express their collective will, and when the
people speak, we must be ready to listen. Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution
recognizes and guarantees the sovereign people's right to initiative, rather than limits it. The
enabling law which Congress has been tasked to enact must give life to the said provision
and make the exercise of the right to initiative possible, not regulate, limit, or restrict it in any
way that would render the people's option of resorting to initiative to amend the Constitution
more stringent, difficult, and less feasible, as compared to the other constitutional means to
amend or revise the Constitution. In fact, it is worth recalling that under Article VI,
Section 1 of the Constitution, the legislative power of Congress is limited to the extent
reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and referendum.
It is with this frame of mind that I review the issues raised in the instant Petitions, and which
has led me to the conclusions, in support of the dissent of Justice Puno, that (a) The
Commission on Election (COMELEC) had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion in
summarily dismissing the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution filed by herein
petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado; (b) The Court should revisit the
pronouncements it made in Santiago v. Commission on Elections;3 (c) It is the sovereign
people's inherent right to propose changes to the Constitution, regardless of whether they
constitute merely amendments or a total revision thereof; and (d) The COMELEC should take
cognizance of Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative and, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, determine the factual issues raised by the oppositors before this Court.
115
I
The COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it summarily
dismissed Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative entirely on the basis of the
Santiago case which, allegedly, permanently enjoined it from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative to amend the Constitution in the absence of a
sufficient law.
After a careful reading, however, of the Santiago case, I believe in earnest that the
permanent injunction actually issued by this Court against the COMELEC pertains only to the
petition for initiative filed by Jesus S. Delfin, and not to all subsequent petitions for initiative to
amend the Constitution.
The Conclusion4 in the majority opinion in the Santiago case reads –
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted
to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood,
energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people
under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on
Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN
petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent
as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private
respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
It is clear from the fallo, as it is reproduced above, that the Court made permanent the
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) it issued on 18 December 1996 against the COMELEC.
The said TRO enjoined the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and Alberto
and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative. 5 It was this
restraining order, more particularly the portion thereof referring to the Delfin Petition, which
was expressly made permanent by the Court. It would seem to me that the COMELEC and
all other oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative gave unwarranted
significance and weight to the first paragraph of the Conclusion in the Santiago case. The
first and second paragraphs of the Conclusion, preceding the dispositive portion,
merely express the opinion of the ponente; while the definite orders of the Court for
implementation are found in the dispositive portion.
We have previously held that –
The dispositive portion or the fallo is what actually constitutes the resolution of the
court and which is the subject of execution, although the other parts of the decision
may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for such a resolution.
Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court
contained in the text of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the
theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a
statement ordering nothing. Hence execution must conform more particularly to that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision. 6
Is there a conflict between the first paragraph of the Conclusion and the dispositive portion of
the Santiago case? Apparently, there is. The first paragraph of the Conclusion states that the
COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until the enactment of a valid law. On
the other hand, the fallo only makes permanent the TRO7 against COMELEC enjoining it from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition. While the permanent injunction contemplated in the
Conclusion encompasses all petitions for initiative on amendments to the Constitution, the
fallo is expressly limited to the Delfin Petition. To resolve the conflict, the final order of the
Court as it is stated in the dispositive portion or the fallo should be controlling.
Neither can the COMELEC dismiss Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative on the
basis of this Court's Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in the case of People's Initiative
for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. The Commission on Elections, et al.8 The
Court therein found that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the PIRMA Petition for initiative to amend the Constitution for it only complied with
the Decision in the Santiago case.
116
It is only proper that the Santiago case should also bar the PIRMA Petition on the basis of res
judicata because PIRMA participated in the proceedings of the said case, and had knowledge
of and, thus, must be bound by the judgment of the Court therein. As explained by former
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his separate opinion to the Resolution in the PIRMA
case –
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in
Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of
the fact that the former is substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of
the roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not
indispensable, parties in the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs
are raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM,
MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and Spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and
CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as "a non-stock, non-profit
organization duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with office address at
Suite 403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with
"ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its "officers." In
Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA
which, as alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to undertake the
signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then,
the PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at
the hearing of the Delfin petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-
petitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding member of the
Movement for People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was
noted that said movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity." In their Comment to the petition in
Santiago, the PEDROSA'S did not deny that they were founding members of PIRMA,
and by their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had
joined Delfin or his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the
PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them, from the operation of the principle of
res judicata, which needs no further elaboration.9
While the Santiago case bars the PIRMA case because of res judicata, the same cannot be
said to the Petition at bar. Res judicata is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the
same cause; and its requisites are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the
judgment or order must be one on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first
and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action. 10

Even though it is conceded that the first three requisites are present herein, the last has not
been complied with. Undoubtedly, the Santiago case and the present Petition involve
different parties, subject matter, and causes of action, and the former should not bar the
latter.
In the Santiago case, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Delfin
alone. His petition does not qualify as the initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC can
acquire jurisdiction, being unsupported by the required number of registered voters, and
actually imposing upon the COMELEC the task of gathering the voters' signatures. In the
case before us, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Lambino and
Aumentado, on behalf of the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures on the
signature sheets attached thereto. Their petition prays that the COMELEC issue an Order –
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in
newspapers of general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after
the Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the
Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Although both cases involve the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution,
the personalities concerned and the other factual circumstances attendant in the two cases
differ. Also dissimilar are the particular prayer and reliefs sought by the parties from the
COMELEC, as well as from this Court. For these reasons, I find that the COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it summarily dismissed the petition for initiative filed by
Lambino and Aumentado. It behooves the COMELEC to accord due course to a petition
which on its face complies with the rudiments of the law. COMELEC was openly negligent in
summarily dismissing the Lambino and Aumentado petition. The haste by which the instant
Petition was struck down is characteristic of bad faith, which, to my mind, is a patent and
gross evasion of COMELEC's positive duty. It has so obviously copped out of its duty and
responsibility to determine the sufficiency thereof and sought protection and justification for
its craven decision in the supposed permanent injunction issued against it by the Court in the
Santiago case. The COMELEC had seemingly expanded the scope and application of the
said permanent injunction, reading into it more than what it actually states, which is
surprising, considering that the Chairman and majority of the members of COMELEC are
lawyers who should be able to understand and appreciate, more than a lay person, the legal
consequences and intricacies of the pronouncements made by the Court in the Santiago
case and the permanent injunction issued therein.
No less than the Constitution itself, under the second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4,
imposes upon the COMELEC the mandate to set a date for plebiscite after a positive
117
determination of the sufficiency of a petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
viz –
SEC. 4. x x x
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition.
As a rule, the word "shall" commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent
with the idea of discretion, and that the presumption is that the word "shall" when used, is
mandatory.11 Under the above-quoted constitutional provision, it is the mandatory or
imperative obligation of the COMELEC to (a) determine the sufficiency of the petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution and issue a certification on its findings; and (b) in
case such petition is found to be sufficient, to set the date for the plebiscite on the proposed
amendments not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its certification. The
COMELEC should not be allowed to shun its constitutional mandate under the second
paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, through the summary dismissal of the petition for
initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado, when such petition is supported by 6.3 million
signatures of registered voters. Should all of these signatures be authentic and
representative of the required percentages of registered voters for every legislative district
and the whole nation, then the initiative is a true and legitimate expression of the will of the
people to amend the Constitution, and COMELEC had caused them grave injustice by
silencing their voice based on a patently inapplicable permanent injunction.
II
We should likewise take the opportunity to revisit the pronouncements made by the Court in
its Decision in the Santiago case, especially as regards the supposed insufficiency or
inadequacy of Republic Act No. 6735 as the enabling law for the implementation of the
people's right to initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient or inadequate actually
gave rise to more questions rather than answers, due to the fact that there has never been a
judicial precedent wherein the Court invalidated a law for insufficiency or inadequacy. The
confusion over such a declaration thereby impelled former Chief Justice Davide, Jr., the
ponente in the Santiago case, to provide the following clarification in his separate opinion to
the Resolution in the PIRMA case, thus –
Simply put, Santiago did, in reality, declare as unconstitutional that portion of R.A.
No. 6735 relating to Constitutional initiatives for failure to comply with the
"completeness and sufficient standard tests" with respect to permissible delegation of
legislative power or subordinate legislation. However petitioners attempt to twist the

language in Santiago, the conclusion is inevitable; the portion of R.A. No. 6735 was
held to be unconstitutional.
It is important to note, however, that while the Decision in the Santiago case pronounced
repeatedly that Republic Act No. 6735 was insufficient and inadequate, there is no
categorical declaration therein that the said statute was unconstitutional. The express finding
that Republic Act No. 6735 is unconstitutional can only be found in the separate opinion of
former Chief Justice Davide to the Resolution in the PIRMA case, which was not concurred in
by the other members of the Court.
Even assuming arguendo that the declaration in the Santiago case, that Republic Act No.
6735 is insufficient and inadequate, is already tantamount to a declaration that the statute is
unconstitutional, it was rendered in violation of established rules in statutory construction,
which state that –
[A]ll presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt
(Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [19741). In fact, this Court
does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the
case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be lis mota presented (Tropical Homes v.
National Housing Authority, 152 SCRA 540 [1987]).
First, the Court, in the Santiago case, could have very well avoided the issue of
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 by ordering the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin
petition for the simple reason that it does not constitute an initiatory pleading over which the
COMELEC could acquire jurisdiction. And second, the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
6735 has not been adequately shown. It was by and large merely inferred or deduced from
the way Republic Act No. 6735 was worded and the provisions thereof arranged and
organized by Congress. The dissenting opinions rendered by several Justices in the Santiago
case reveal the other side to the argument, adopting the more liberal interpretation that would
allow the Court to sustain the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735. It would seem that
the majority in the Santiago case failed to heed the rule that all presumptions should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute.
The Court, acting en banc on the Petition at bar, can revisit its Decision in the Santiago case
and again open to judicial review the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735; in which
case, I shall cast my vote in favor of its constitutionality, having satisfied the completeness
and sufficiency of standards tests for the valid delegation of legislative power. I fully agree in
the conclusion made by Justice Puno on this matter in his dissenting opinion12 in the
Santiago case, that reads –
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC
in promulgating the law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As
aforestated, Section 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of the people
118
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by
any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the
standards to canalize the delegated power to the COMELEC to promulgate rules and
regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of signatures
necessary to start a people's initiative, directs how initiative proceeding is
commenced, what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for initiative,
how a proposition is approved, when a plebiscite may be held, when the amendment
takes effect, and what matters may not be the subject of any initiative. By any
measure, these standards are adequate.
III
The dissent of Justice Puno has already a well-presented discourse on the difference
between an "amendment" and a "revision" of the Constitution. Allow me also to articulate my
additional thoughts on the matter.
Oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative argue that the proposed
changes therein to the provisions of the Constitution already amount to a revision thereof,
which is not allowed to be done through people's initiative; Article XVII, Section 2 of the
Constitution on people's initiative refers only to proposals for amendments to the Constitution.
They assert the traditional distinction between an amendment and a revision, with
amendment referring to isolated or piecemeal change only, while revision as a revamp or
rewriting of the whole instrument.13
However, as pointed out by Justice Puno in his dissent, there is no quantitative or qualitative
test that can establish with definiteness the distinction between an amendment and a
revision, or between a substantial and simple change of the Constitution.
The changes proposed to the Constitution by Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative
basically affect only Article VI on the Legislative Department and Article VII on the Executive
Department. While the proposed changes will drastically alter the constitution of our
government by vesting both legislative and executive powers in a unicameral Parliament, with
the President as the Head of State and the Prime Minister exercising the executive power;
they would not essentially affect the other 16 Articles of the Constitution. The 100 or so
changes counted by the oppositors to the other provisions of the Constitution are constituted
mostly of the nominal substitution of one word for the other, such as Parliament for Congress,
or Prime Minister for President. As eloquently pointed out in the dissent of Justice Puno, the
changes proposed to transform our form of government from bicameral-presidential to
unicameral-parliamentary, would not affect the fundamental nature of our state as a
democratic and republican state. It will still be a representative government where officials
continue to be accountable to the people and the people maintain control over the
government through the election of members of the Parliament.
 119

Furthermore, should the people themselves wish to change a substantial portion or even the ____________________
whole of the Constitution, what or who is to stop them? Article XVII, Section 2 of the
Constitution which, by the way it is worded, refers only to their right to initiative on EN BANC
amendments of the Constitution? The delegates to the Constitutional Convention who,
according to their deliberations, purposely limited Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution to G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
amendments? This Court which has the jurisdiction to interpret the provision? Bearing in
mind my earlier declaration that the will of the sovereign people is supreme, there is nothing
or no one that can preclude them from initiating changes to the Constitution if they choose to RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
do so. To reiterate, the Constitution is supposed to be the expression and embodiment of the VOTERS, petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
people's will, and should the people's will clamor for a revision of the Constitution, it is their
will which should prevail. Even the fact that the people ratified the 1987 Constitution, G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
including Article XVII, Section 2 thereof, as it is worded, should not prevent the exercise by
the sovereign people of their inherent right to change the Constitution, even if such change MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG,
would be tantamount to a substantial amendment or revision thereof, for their actual exercise petitioners vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
of the said right should be a clear renunciation of the limitation which the said provision ABALOS, JR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A.
imposes upon it. It is the inherent right of the people as sovereign to change the Constitution, TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter
regardless of the extent thereof. Doe, respondents.

IV x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

Lastly, I fail to see the injustice in allowing the COMELEC to give due course to and take SEPARATE OPINION
cognizance of Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. I
reiterate that it would be a greater evil if one such petition which is ostensibly supported by VELASCO, JR., J.:
the required number of registered voters all over the country, be summarily dismissed.
Introduction
Giving due course and taking cognizance of the petition would not necessarily mean that the
same would be found sufficient and set for plebiscite. The COMELEC still faces the task of
The fate of every democracy, of every government based on the
reviewing the petition to determine whether it complies with the requirements for a valid
Sovereignty of the people, depends on the choices it makes between
exercise of the right to initiative. Questions raised by the oppositors to the petition, such as
these opposite principles: absolute power on the one hand, and on
those on the authenticity of the registered voters' signatures or compliance with the requisite
the other the restraints of legality and the authority of tradition.
number of registered voters for every legislative district, are already factual in nature and
—John Acton
require the reception and evaluation of evidence of the parties. Such questions are best
presented and resolved before the COMELEC since this Court is not a trier of facts.
In this thorny matter of the people's initiative, I concur with the erudite and highly persuasive
opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno upholding the people's initiative and raise some points of
In view of the foregoing, I am of the position that the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 31
my own.
August 2006 denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado
be reversed and set aside for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, and that the Petition be remanded to the COMELEC for further The issue of the people's power to propose amendments to the Constitution was once
proceedings. discussed in the landmark case of Santiago v. COMELEC.1 Almost a decade later, the issue
is once again before the Court, and I firmly believe it is time to reevaluate the
pronouncements made in that case.
In short, I vote to GRANT the petition for Initiative of Lambino and Aumentado.

The issue of Charter Change is one that has sharply divided the nation, and its proponents
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO and opponents will understandably take all measures to advance their position and defeat
Associate Justice that of their opponents. The wisdom or folly of Charter Change does not concern the Court.
The only thing that the Court must review is the validity of the present step taken by the

proponents of Charter Change, which is the People's Initiative, as set down in Article XVII,
Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section
shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
In the Santiago case, the Court discussed whether the second paragraph of that section had
been fulfilled. It determined that Congress had not provided for the implementation of the
exercise of the people's initiative, when it held that Republic Act No. 6735, or "The Initiative
and Referendum Act," was "inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation."2
With all due respect to those Justices who made that declaration, I must disagree.
Republic Act No. 6735 is the proper law for proposing constitutional amendments and
it should not have been considered inadequate.
The decision in Santiago focused on what it perceived to be fatal flaws in the drafting of the
law, in the failings of the way the law was structured, to come to the conclusion that the law
was inadequate. The Court itself recognized the legislators' intent, but disregarded this intent.
The law was found wanting. The Court then saw the inclusion of the Constitution in RA 6735
as an afterthought. However, it was included, and it should not be excluded by the Court via a
strained analysis of the law. The difficult construction of the law should not serve to frustrate
the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution: to give the people the power to propose
amendments as they saw fit. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of
the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.3 The intent of the
legislature was clear, and yet RA 6735 was declared inadequate. It was not specifically struck
down or declared unconstitutional, merely incomplete. The Court focused on what RA 6735
was not, and lost sight of what RA 6735 was.
It is my view that the reading of RA 6735 in Santiago should have been more flexible. It is
also a basic precept of statutory construction that statutes should be construed not so much
according to the letter that killeth but in line with the purpose for which they have been
enacted.4 The reading of the law should not have been with the view of its defeat, but with the
goal of upholding it, especially with its avowed noble purpose.
Congress has done its part in empowering the people themselves to propose amendments to
the Constitution, in accordance with the Constitution itself. It should not be the Supreme
120
Court that stifles the people, and lets their cries for change go unheard, especially when the
Constitution itself grants them that power.
The court's ruling in the Santiago case does not bar the present petition because the
fallo in the Santiago case is limited to the Delfin petition.
The Santiago case involved a petition for prohibition filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago, et al.,
against the COMELEC, et al., which sought to prevent the COMELEC from entertaining the
"Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative" filed by Atty. Jesus Delfin. In the body of the judgment, the Court made the
following conclusion, viz:
This petition must then be granted and the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition or initiative on
amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted
to provide for the implementation of the system (emphasis supplied).
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood,
energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people
under that system.
In the said case, the Court's fallo states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R. A. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on
Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN
petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent
as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.
The question now is if the ruling in Santiago is decisive in this case. It is elementary that
when there is conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of the decision and the opinion
of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter.
An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the decision. 5 The
dispositive portion is its decisive resolution; thus, it is the subject of execution. The other
parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for the
disposition. Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the
court contained in the text or body of the decision, the former must prevail over the
latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order, while the opinion is
merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence, the execution must conform with that which
is ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.6
A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is an informal expression of the
views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be
combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So there is a
distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may
constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment
itself. It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the
court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in
judicial decisions lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the
issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by
the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision. 7
Applying the foregoing argument to the Santiago case, it immediately becomes apparent that
the disposition in the latter case categorically made permanent the December 18, 1996
Temporary Restraining Order issued against the COMELEC in the Delfin petition but did NOT
formally incorporate therein any directive PERMANENTLY enjoining the COMELEC "from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments." Undeniably,
the perpetual proscription against the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction over any other
petition on Charter Change through a People's Initiative is just a conclusion and cannot bind
the poll body, for such unending ban would trench on its constitutional power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall under Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution. RA 6735 gave the
COMELEC the jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the petition on the initiative under
Section 8, Rule 11 and the form of the petition under Section 3, Rule I; hence, it cannot be
barred from entertaining any such petition.
In sum, the COMELEC still retains its jurisdiction to take cognizance of any petition on
initiative under RA 6735 and it can rule on the petition and its action can only be passed upon
by the Court when the same is elevated through a petition for certiorari. COMELEC cannot be
barred from acting on said petitions since jurisdiction is conferred by law (RA 6735) and said
law has not been declared unconstitutional and hence still valid though considered
inadequate in the Santiago case.
121
Respondents, however, claim that the Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA v.
Commission on Elections8 confirmed the statement of the Court in the Santiago case that the
COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition
for initiative on amendments." Much reliance is placed on the ruling contained in a Minute
Resolution which reads:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of Discretion could
be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in Dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only Complied with the DISPOSITIONS in the
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
Resolution of June 10, 1997.
Take note that the Court specifically referred to "dispositions" in the March 19, 1997 Decision.
To reiterate, the dispositions in the Santiago case decision refer specifically to the December
18, 1996 TRO being made permanent against the COMELEC but do not pertain to a
permanent injunction against any other petition for initiative on amendment. Thus, what was
confirmed or even affirmed in the Minute Resolution in the PIRMA case pertains solely to the
December 18, 1996 TRO which became permanent, the declaration of the inadequacy of RA
6735, and the annulment of certain parts of Resolution No. 2300 but certainly not the alleged
perpetual injunction against the initiative petition. Thus, the resolution in the PIRMA case
cannot be considered res judicata to the Lambino petition.
Amendment or Revision
One last matter to be considered is whether the petition may be allowed under RA 6735,
since only amendments to the Constitution may be the subject of a people's initiative.
The Lambino petition cannot be considered an act of revising the Constitution; it is merely an
attempt to amend it. The term amendment has to be liberally construed so as to effectuate
the people's efforts to amend the Constitution.
As an eminent constitutionalist, Dean Vicente G. Sinco,9 explained:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different
portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole
constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important
provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that
characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be
carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed
or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a
few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the
advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The
 122

intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it

provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress
portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.

In this case, the Lambino petition is not concerned with rewriting the entire Constitution. It
was never its intention to revise the whole Constitution. It merely concerns itself with
amending a few provisions in our fundamental charter.

When there are gray areas in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the sovereign
people's political rights, courts must lean more towards a more liberal interpretation favoring
the people's right to exercise their sovereign power.

Conclusion

Sovereignty residing in the people is the highest form of sovereignty and thus deserves the
highest respect even from the courts. It is not something that can be overruled, set aside,
ignored or stomped over by whatever amount of technicalities, blurred or vague provisions of
the law.

As I find RA 6735 to be adequate as the implementing law for the People's Initiative, I vote to
grant the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 174299. The
Amended Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
should be remanded to the COMELEC for determination whether or not the petition is
sufficient under RA 6735, and if the petition is sufficient, to schedule and hold the necessary
plebiscite as required by RA 6735.

It is time to let the people's voice be heard once again as it was twenty years ago. And should
this voice demand a change in the Constitution, the Supreme Court should not be one to
stand in its way

RP v China
Case Digest
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines(Philippines) instituted an arbitration case against the People’s
Republic of China(China) under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea(Convention or UNCLOS) since both parties have ratified the Convention. However,
China have consistently stated its view on the lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the
matter.
The arbitration concerns disputed between the parties regarding the legal basis of maritime
rights and entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain geographic features in
the South China Sea, and the lawfulness of certain actions taken by China in the South China
Sea.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Tribunal has jurisdiction.
2. Whether China have claims under historical rights and the “nine-dash-line”
3. What is the status of features in the South China Sea
4. WON the activities of China in the South China Sea is lawful.
5. WON the actions of China since the commencement of arbitration have aggravated and
extended the dispute.
6. What is China’s future conduct?
RULING:
1. Article 288 of the Conventions states that “In the event of a dispute as to whether a court
or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal.”
2. With respect to Submission No. 1, for the reasons set out above, the Tribunal concludes
that, as between the Philippines and China, the Convention defines the scope of maritime
entitlements in the South China Sea, which may not extend beyond the limits imposed
therein. the Tribunal concludes that, as between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to
historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of
the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to
the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and
substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention. The Tribunal
concludes that the Convention superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights or
jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein.
123
3.
Features that are above water at high tide generate an entitlement to at least a 12 nautical
mile territorial sea, whereas features that are submerged at high tide do not. The Tribunal
noted that the reefs have been heavily modified by land reclamation and construction,
recalled that the Convention classifies features on their natural condition, and relied on
historical materials in evaluating the features.
Article 121 establishes a regime of islands as follows:
Article 121
Regime of Islands
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at
high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
The tribunal found that although there were evidence of transient habitation on the features,
there was no showing of permanent habitation that the features could support a stable
community therefore they are considered rocks. Thus, Having found that none of the features
claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found
that it could—without delimiting a boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the
exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any
possible entitlement of China.
4. the Tribunal finds that China has, by virtue of the conduct of Chinese law enforcement
vessels in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, created serious risk of collision and danger to
Philippine vessels and personnel. The Tribunal finds China to have violated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8,
15, and 16 of the COLREGS and, as a consequence, to be in breach of Article 94 of the
Convention.
5. yes, it has.
(a) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning their respective rights and
entitlements in the area of Mischief Reef by building a large artificial island on a low-tide
elevation located in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.
(b) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning the protection and preservation of
the marine environment at Mischief Reef by inflicting permanent, irreparable harm to the coral
reef habitat of that feature.
(c) China has extended the Parties’ dispute concerning the protection and preservation of the
marine environment by commencing large-scale island-building and construction works at
 124

Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and
Subi Reef.
(d) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning the status of maritime features in
the Spratly Islands and their capacity to generate entitlements to maritime zones by
permanently destroying evidence of the natural condition of Mischief Reef, Cuarteron
Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and Subi Reef.

6.The Tribunal considers it beyond dispute that both Parties are obliged to comply with the
Convention, including its provisions regarding the resolution of disputes, and to respect the
rights and freedoms of other States under the Convention. Neither Party contests this, and
the Tribunal is therefore not persuaded that it is necessary or appropriate for it to make any
further declaration.

G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS,
PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF
LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY
ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER
BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI
CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON
ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA
REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE,
MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN
HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS,
JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO,
DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE
MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO
VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON.
ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE
INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and
classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying,
among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of
which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of
negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046
remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic
125
Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under
scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines
ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio,
length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines7 and sets the
deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these
requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints
around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as
"citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of
RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory,
and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of
the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary
treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime
passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not
only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners
facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the
Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to
determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the
petition’s compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded
on petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and
prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA
9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine
territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not
undermine the country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the
Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’
assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the
islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under
the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily –
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as
citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the
constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522
unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers
because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of
public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we
recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the
resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance
necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is
understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest"
to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict
observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot
issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of
petitioners.18
Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises
its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of
126
certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes,19
and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional import are
sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of
the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds
itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-
compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be
reviewed here is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory"21
because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty
of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition
trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over
waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain
supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’
technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of
nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated
in the Treaty of Paris.22
Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral
treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters
[12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves
that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations
among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the
world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated
authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States
parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn,
either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of
the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like
ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured
from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to
delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this
gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the
exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to
exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the
waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the
Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only
way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn
from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as
petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States
acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and
prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed
by the rules on general international law.26
RA 9522’s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines’ Claim of
Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to
draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG,
"weakens our territorial claim" over that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and
Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss
of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA
3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with
a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’
obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.1avvphi1
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522
merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that
RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline
(and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under
RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines
drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind
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out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’
claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under
RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing
the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its
internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical
miles, as shown in the table below:29
Extent of maritime area using RA 3046, as amended, taking into account the Treaty of Paris’
delimitation (in square nautical miles)
Extent of maritime area using RA 9522, taking into account UNCLOS III (in square nautical
miles)
Internal or archipelagic waters 166,858 171,435
Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106
Exclusive Economic Zone 382,669
TOTAL 440,994 586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA
9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the
Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of
opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in
accordance with UNCLOS III.30
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the
baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2
of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of
the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the
Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have
committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III
requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires

that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent
(3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the
Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable
distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,33 such that any straight
baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took
pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and
the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside
our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states:
"The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga
islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin
although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is
defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang
maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that
is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa
natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na
sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it
should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s
limits.1avvphi1 The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of
basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the
outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner
provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446,
the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil
Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article
47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that "The length of such baselines shall not exceed
100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any
archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted
from the baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
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3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by
geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts
of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on
low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal,
Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests
the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under
UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the
category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime
zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’
claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522
did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as
provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea
around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not
Incompatible with the Constitution’s
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law
unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these
waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight.
Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters
to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution39 or as
"archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty
over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and
of their bed and subsoil. –

1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their
bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other
respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise
by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and
international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if
not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international
navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus,
domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge
of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic
waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical
highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III,
operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters,
subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the
corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely
forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law
without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of
innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis
continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent
passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these
passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by
archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject
to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’
archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands
generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more
than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to
the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of
Principles and State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers
the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do
129
not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II provisions serve as
guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting
executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a
healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present
petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other
provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2,
paragraph 251 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA
9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive
economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living
resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community
since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is
contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to
be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui
generis maritime space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high
seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources
found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the
territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not
bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and
we find petitioners’ reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option
belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at
a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like
the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the
breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-
fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and
exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and
second, it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime
space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and
adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of
the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a
most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent
with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009
ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND
CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M.
HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR.,
MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 165636 April 29, 2009
ELISEO F. SORIANO Petitioner,
vs.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE,
JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO, NOEL R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL BORLAZA, JOSE E.
ROMERO IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their capacity as members of the Hearing and
Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ,
MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA,
JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, in their capacity as complainants
before the MTRCB Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano
seeks to nullify and set aside an order and a decision of the Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterances he made in his
television show, Ang Dating Daan.
Facts of the Case
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating
Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang
gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra
ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.1 x x x
130
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo (INC),2 against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent
Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of
INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.3 Forthwith, the MTRCB sent
petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some
cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan.4
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August
16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in
accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in
relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD
1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.5 The same order also set the
case for preliminary investigation.
The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order,
praying that Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication
board recuse themselves from hearing the case.6 Two days after, however, petitioner sought
to withdraw7 his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition
for certiorari and prohibition,8 docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive
suspension order thus issued.
On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision, disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent
Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months
suspension from his program, "Ang Dating Daan".
Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner,
PBC, are hereby exonerated for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief,
docketed as G.R. No. 165636.
In a Resolution dated April 4, 2005, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 164785 with G.R. No.
165636.
In G.R. No. 164785, petitioner raises the following issues:
THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT
[MTRCB] DATED 16 AUGUST 2004 AGAINST THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING
DAAN x x x IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

(A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS;
(B) BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH;
(C) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW;
(D) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION; AND
(E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.10
In G.R. No. 165636, petitioner relies on the following grounds:
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION x x x CONSIDERING THAT:
I conferred by the Constitution or by statute.12 They have in fine only such powers or authority
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH, AND
EXPRESSION AS IT PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF A SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
CURTAILING THE SAME; CONSEQUENTLY, THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB
PURSUANT THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER
DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED
IN THE CASE AT BENCH;
II
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL
PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW; CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR], RULES OF
PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E.,
DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE
LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH; AND
III
[PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A
SUFFICIENT STANDARD FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION THEREBY RESULTING IN AN
UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY REASON THAT IT DOES NOT
PROVIDE FOR THE PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF ITS PROVISIONS.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR], RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE
MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND
131
ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS
APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH11
G.R. No. 164785
We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785, regarding the assailed order of
preventive suspension, although its implementability had already been overtaken and
veritably been rendered moot by the equally assailed September 27, 2004 decision.
It is petitioner’s threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him and
the relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly
authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.
Petitioner’s contention is untenable.
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,
investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be
as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law.13 And in determining whether an
agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as
existing, the authority given should be liberally construed.14
A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the
agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive
suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its
power of regulation and supervision.
Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:
Section 3. Powers and Functions.—The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers
and duties:
xxxx
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the x x x
production, x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment
of the board applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for
being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the
Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the
commission of violence or of wrong or crime such as but not limited to:
xxxx
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person,
whether living or dead;

xxxx
(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x production,
copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and
materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph
(c) hereof shall be x x x produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited
and/or broadcast by television;
xxxx
k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the
attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x. (Emphasis added.)
The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB’s
authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d),
as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or
cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and
materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph
(c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television."
Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB’s express
regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority
subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would render its power to
regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation.15 And the power to discipline and impose
penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and,
during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.16
To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers
conferred under PD 1986. The MTRCB did not, as petitioner insinuates, empower itself to
impose preventive suspension through the medium of the IRR of PD 1986. It is true that the
matter of imposing preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986. Sec. 3,
Chapter XIII of the IRR provides:
Sec. 3. PREVENTION SUSPENSION ORDER.––Any time during the pendency of the case,
and in order to prevent or stop further violations or for the interest and welfare of the public,
the Chairman of the Board may issue a Preventive Suspension Order mandating the
preventive x x x suspension of the permit/permits involved, and/or closure of the x x x
television network, cable TV station x x x provided that the temporary/preventive order thus
issued shall have a life of not more than twenty (20) days from the date of issuance.
132
But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more,
would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive
suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and
supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others,
indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to
prevent further violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the aforequoted
Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did
the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its authority under the
law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law,
imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB’s duty of regulating or supervising television
programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In
the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD
1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.
Sec. 3(c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the present case, sufficient to authorize the
MTRCB’s assailed action. Petitioner’s restrictive reading of PD 1986, limiting the MTRCB to
functions within the literal confines of the law, would give the agency little leeway to operate,
stifling and rendering it inutile, when Sec. 3(k) of PD 1986 clearly intends to grant the MTRCB
a wide room for flexibility in its operation. Sec. 3(k), we reiterate, provides, "To exercise such
powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes
and objectives of this Act x x x." Indeed, the power to impose preventive suspension is one of
the implied powers of MTRCB. As distinguished from express powers, implied powers are
those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings or conferred by necessary or fair
implication of the enabling act.17 As we held in Angara v. Electoral Commission, when a
general grant of power is conferred or a duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary
implication.18 Clearly, the power to impose preventive suspension pending investigation is
one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB.
We cannot agree with petitioner’s assertion that the aforequoted IRR provision on preventive
suspension is applicable only to motion pictures and publicity materials. The scope of the
MTRCB’s authority extends beyond motion pictures. What the acronym MTRCB stands for
would suggest as much. And while the law makes specific reference to the closure of a
television network, the suspension of a television program is a far less punitive measure that
can be undertaken, with the purpose of stopping further violations of PD 1986. Again, the
MTRCB would regretfully be rendered ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions
petitioner envisages.
Just as untenable is petitioner’s argument on the nullity of the preventive suspension order on
the ground of lack of hearing. As it were, the MTRCB handed out the assailed order after
petitioner, in response to a written notice, appeared before that Board for a hearing on private
respondents’ complaint. No less than petitioner admitted that the order was issued after the
adjournment of the hearing,19 proving that he had already appeared before the MTRCB.
Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension shall issue "[a]ny
time during the pendency of the case." In this particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly

apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 198620 and of administrative
complaints that had been filed against him for such violation.21
At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing.22
Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to the equal protection of the law,
arguing that, owing to the preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the
criticisms coming from the INC ministers.
Petitioner’s position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that "all
persons subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed."23 It guards against undue
favor and individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination.24 Surely, petitioner cannot,
under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are
not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that
the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to that which he used in his
own, necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the preventive
suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his
critics, this does not become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. The Court need
not belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan, on one
hand, and the INC ministers, as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the
purview of this case, simply too different to even consider whether or not there is a prima
facie indication of oppressive inequality.
Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered was
religious speech, adding that words like "putang babae" were said in exercise of his religious
freedom.
The argument has no merit.
The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s utterances in question can come within
the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. The section reads
as follows:
No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular
religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out
with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord
them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another
person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to
place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek
retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC
133
ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station
does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept
that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they
constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival
religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-
calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove
his detractors, but opted for the low road.
Petitioner, as a final point in G.R. No. 164785, would have the Court nullify the 20-day
preventive suspension order, being, as insisted, an unconstitutional abridgement of the
freedom of speech and expression and an impermissible prior restraint. The main issue
tendered respecting the adverted violation and the arguments holding such issue dovetails
with those challenging the three-month suspension imposed under the assailed September
27, 2004 MTRCB decision subject of review under G.R. No. 165636. Both overlapping issues
and arguments shall be jointly addressed.
G.R. No. 165636
Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending him from hosting Ang Dating
Daan for three months on the main ground that the decision violates, apart from his religious
freedom, his freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of the
Constitution, which reads:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievance.
He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec. 3(c) in particular, unconstitutional for
reasons articulated in this petition.
We are not persuaded as shall be explained shortly. But first, we restate certain general
concepts and principles underlying the freedom of speech and expression.
It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television, and motion pictures
come within the broad protection of the free speech and expression clause.25 Each method
though, because of its dissimilar presence in the lives of people and accessibility to children,
tends to present its own problems in the area of free speech protection, with broadcast
media, of all forms of communication, enjoying a lesser degree of protection.26 Just as
settled is the rule that restrictions, be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction
against publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent liability,
whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are
anathema to the freedom of expression. Prior restraint means official government restrictions
on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination.27 The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill
of Rights, is, however, not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important
public interests, some forms of speech not being protected. As has been held, the limits of

the freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern.28 In the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes, the
constitutional guarantee "obviously was not intended to give immunity for every possible use
of language."29 From Lucas v. Royo comes this line: "[T]he freedom to express one’s
sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity
of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper
regard for the rights of others."30
Indeed, as noted in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire,31 "there are certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech that are harmful, the prevention and punishment of
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problems." In net effect, some
forms of speech are not protected by the Constitution, meaning that restrictions on
unprotected speech may be decreed without running afoul of the freedom of speech
clause.32 A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances involved are "no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step of truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."33 Being of little or no value, there is, in dealing with or regulating them,
no imperative call for the application of the clear and present danger rule or the balancing-of-
interest test, they being essentially modes of weighing competing values,34 or, with like
effect, determining which of the clashing interests should be advanced.
Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech.
The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech
or low-value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or
misleading advertisement, insulting or "fighting words", i.e., those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security.
The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to
the average child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court of
Appeals, the Court expressed difficulty in formulating a definition of obscenity that would
apply to all cases, but nonetheless stated the ensuing observations on the matter:
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California
which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. But, it would be a serious
misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in
determining what is "patently offensive." x x x What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue
proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the
judge’s sound discretion.35
134
Following the contextual lessons of the cited case of Miller v. California,36 a patently
offensive utterance would come within the pale of the term obscenity should it appeal to the
prurient interest of an average listener applying contemporary standards.
A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case
reveal that to an average adult, the utterances "Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa
putang babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay
Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!" may not constitute obscene but merely indecent
utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the
context they were used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. The
problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is
rated "G" or for general viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes
and ears of children.
While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally,
children could hardly be expected to have the same discernment. Without parental guidance,
the unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a television broadcast could
corrupt impressionable young minds. The term "putang babae" means "a female prostitute," a
term wholly inappropriate for children, who could look it up in a dictionary and just get the
literal meaning, missing the context within which it was used. Petitioner further used the
terms, "ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba," making reference to the female sexual organ
and how a female prostitute uses it in her trade, then stating that Sandoval was worse than
that by using his mouth in a similar manner. Children could be motivated by curiosity and ask
the meaning of what petitioner said, also without placing the phrase in context. They may be
inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different from a female prostitute and the reasons for the
dissimilarity. And upon learning the meanings of the words used, young minds, without the
guidance of an adult, may, from their end, view this kind of indecent speech as obscene, if
they take these words literally and use them in their own speech or form their own ideas on
the matter. In this particular case, where children had the opportunity to hear petitioner’s
words, when speaking of the average person in the test for obscenity, we are speaking of the
average child, not the average adult. The average child may not have the adult’s grasp of
figures of speech, and may lack the understanding that language may be colorful, and words
may convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject speech is very suggestive
of a female sexual organ and its function as such. In this sense, we find petitioner’s
utterances obscene and not entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom of speech.
Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech,
still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free
speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect
to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.
No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or offensive utterances. But while a
jurisprudential pattern involving certain offensive utterances conveyed in different mediums
has emerged, this case is veritably one of first impression, it being the first time that indecent
speech communicated via television and the applicable norm for its regulation are, in this
jurisdiction, made the focal point. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica

Foundation,37 a 1978 American landmark case cited in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v.
Dans, Jr.38 and Chavez v. Gonzales,39 is a rich source of persuasive lessons. Foremost of
these relates to indecent speech without prurient appeal component coming under the
category of protected speech depending on the context within which it was made, irresistibly
suggesting that, within a particular context, such indecent speech may validly be categorized
as unprotected, ergo, susceptible to restriction.
In FCC, seven of what were considered "filthy" words40 earlier recorded in a monologue by a
satiric humorist later aired in the afternoon over a radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation.
Upon the complaint of a man who heard the pre-recorded monologue while driving with his
son, FCC declared the language used as "patently offensive" and "indecent" under a
prohibiting law, though not necessarily obscene. FCC added, however, that its declaratory
order was issued in a "special factual context," referring, in gist, to an afternoon radio
broadcast when children were undoubtedly in the audience. Acting on the question of
whether the FCC could regulate the subject utterance, the US Supreme Court ruled in the
affirmative, owing to two special features of the broadcast medium, to wit: (1) radio is a
pervasive medium and (2) broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. The US Court,
however, hastened to add that the monologue would be protected speech in other contexts,
albeit it did not expound and identify a compelling state interest in putting FCC’s content-
based regulatory action under scrutiny.
The Court in Chavez41 elucidated on the distinction between regulation or restriction of
protected speech that is content-based and that which is content-neutral. A content-based
restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the expression, whereas a content-neutral
restraint intends to regulate the time, place, and manner of the expression under well-defined
standards tailored to serve a compelling state interest, without restraint on the message of
the expression. Courts subject content-based restraint to strict scrutiny.
With the view we take of the case, the suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was,
in one perspective, permissible restriction. We make this disposition against the backdrop of
the following interplaying factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a
pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak,42 easily "reaches every
home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid viewers of the
programs therein shown"; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there
was a reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his
speech on a "G" or "for general patronage" rated program. Under Sec. 2(A) of Chapter IV of
the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is "[s]uitable for all ages," meaning that
the "material for television x x x in the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain anything
unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or
supervision." The words petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for
children. Where a language is categorized as indecent, as in petitioner’s utterances on a
general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech.
A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only to pornography,43 false or
misleading advertisement,44 advocacy of imminent lawless action, and expression
endangering national security. But this list is not, as some members of the Court would
135
submit, exclusive or carved in stone. Without going into specifics, it may be stated without
fear of contradiction that US decisional law goes beyond the aforesaid general exceptions. As
the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions to the rule against censorship in the
past, this particular case constitutes yet another exception, another instance of unprotected
speech, created by the necessity of protecting the welfare of our children. As unprotected
speech, petitioner’s utterances can be subjected to restraint or regulation.
Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained undisturbed since 1978, petitioner
asserts that his utterances must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a
substantive evil the State has a right and duty to prevent and such danger must be grave and
imminent.45
Petitioner’s invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine, arguably the most permissive
of speech tests, would not avail him any relief, for the application of said test is uncalled for
under the premises. The doctrine, first formulated by Justice Holmes, accords protection for
utterances so that the printed or spoken words may not be subject to prior restraint or
subsequent punishment unless its expression creates a clear and present danger of bringing
about a substantial evil which the government has the power to prohibit.46 Under the
doctrine, freedom of speech and of press is susceptible of restriction when and only when
necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the government may
lawfully protect. As it were, said doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions for rebellion
and other crimes involving the overthrow of government.47 It was originally designed to
determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government
action, or to have serious and substantial deleterious consequences on the security and
public order of the community.48 The clear and present danger rule has been applied to this
jurisdiction.49 As a standard of limitation on free speech and press, however, the clear and
present danger test is not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and does away with
analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which
compels a court to release a defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is invoked,
absent proof of imminent catastrophic disaster.50 As we observed in Eastern Broadcasting
Corporation, the clear and present danger test "does not lend itself to a simplistic and all
embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums."51
To be sure, the clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been applied
by the courts. Generally, said doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of the
government and even other evils which do not clearly undermine national security. Since not
all evils can be measured in terms of "proximity and degree" the Court, however, in several
cases—Ayer Productions v. Capulong52 and Gonzales v. COMELEC,53 applied the
balancing of interests test. Former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in Gonzales v. COMELEC,
elucidated in his Separate Opinion that "where the legislation under constitutional attack
interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more generalized way and where
the effect of the speech and assembly in terms of the probability of realization of a specific
danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic calculation,"54 then the "balancing of
interests" test can be applied.
The Court explained also in Gonzales v. COMELEC the "balancing of interests" test:

When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results
in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine
which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular
circumstances presented. x x x We must, therefore, undertake the "delicate and difficult task
x x x to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced
in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights x x x.
In enunciating standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting social values and
individual interests competing for ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression, the
court in Douds laid the basis for what has been called the "balancing-of-interests" test which
has found application in more recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Briefly stated, the
"balancing" test requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay
of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.
xxxx
Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by Congressional power
restricting the individual’s freedom, and the social importance and value of the freedom so
restricted, "are to be judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions," a wide range of
factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium. Among these
are (a) the social value and importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom
restricted by the legislation; (b) the specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the restriction
is direct or indirect, whether or not the persons affected are few; (c) the value and importance
of the public interest sought to be secured by the legislation––the reference here is to the
nature and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent; (d) whether the specific
restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of
such public interest; and (e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest
involved may be achieved by some other measure less restrictive of the protected
freedom.55
This balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor Kauper,56 rests on the theory that it
is the court’s function in a case before it when it finds public interests served by legislation, on
the one hand, and the free expression clause affected by it, on the other, to balance one
against the other and arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. If, on
balance, it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such nature
that it outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the court will find the legislation valid. In
short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not
absolute, not even those stated in the free speech and expression clause, and that they may
be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests.57 To the mind of
the Court, the balancing of interest doctrine is the more appropriate test to follow.
In the case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene language and a three (3)-month
suspension was slapped on him for breach of MTRCB rules. In this setting, the assertion by
petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is ranged against the duty of the
government to protect and promote the development and welfare of the youth.
136
After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by petitioner in
support of his claim to free speech, the Court rules that the government’s interest to protect
and promote the interests and welfare of the children adequately buttresses the reasonable
curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner’s prayer to continue as program host of Ang
Dating Daan during the suspension period.
No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted to citizens of a State is the
freedom of speech or expression, for without the enjoyment of such right, a free, stable,
effective, and progressive democratic state would be difficult to attain. Arrayed against the
freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
being which the State is constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. Moreover, the State is
also mandated to recognize and support the vital role of the youth in nation building as laid
down in Sec. 13, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility on the State
to provide protection to the youth against illegal or improper activities which may prejudice
their general well-being. The Article on youth, approved on second reading by the
Constitutional Commission, explained that the State shall "extend social protection to minors
against all forms of neglect, cruelty, exploitation, immorality, and practices which may foster
racial, religious or other forms of discrimination."58
Indisputably, the State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to minors
against all forms of neglect, exploitation, and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It
has a compelling interest in helping parents, through regulatory mechanisms, protect their
children’s minds from exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting experiences. The
Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote and protect the
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better prepare
them fulfill their role in the field of nation-building.59 In the same way, the State is mandated
to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character.60
Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt,
was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the
State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae,61 constitute a substantial
and compelling government interest in regulating petitioner’s utterances in TV broadcast as
provided in PD 1986.
FCC explains the duty of the government to act as parens patriae to protect the children who,
because of age or interest capacity, are susceptible of being corrupted or prejudiced by
offensive language, thus:
[B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Although
Cohen’s written message, ["Fuck the Draft"], might have been incomprehensible to a first
grader, Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant. Other

forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the young without restricting the
expression at its source. Bookstores and motion picture theaters, for example, may be
prohibited from making indecent material available to children. We held in Ginsberg v. New
York that the government’s interest in the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents’
claim to authority in their own household" justified the regulation of otherwise protected
expression. The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled
with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent
broadcasting.
Moreover, Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak likewise stressed the duty of the State to attend to the
welfare of the young:
x x x It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less liberal
approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons
have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will
likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. As was observed by
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with
the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State as
parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.62
The compelling need to protect the young impels us to sustain the regulatory action MTRCB
took in the narrow confines of the case. To reiterate, FCC justified the restraint on the TV
broadcast grounded on the following considerations: (1) the use of television with its unique
accessibility to children, as a medium of broadcast of a patently offensive speech; (2) the
time of broadcast; and (3) the "G" rating of the Ang Dating Daan program. And in agreeing
with MTRCB, the court takes stock of and cites with approval the following excerpts from
FCC:
It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our holding. This case does
not involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast
of an Elizabethan comedy. We have not decided that an occasional expletive in either setting
would justify any sanction. x x x The [FFC’s] decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale
under which context is all important. The concept requires consideration of a host of
variables. The time of day was emphasized by the [FFC]. The content of the program in
which the language is used will affect the composition of the audience x x x. As Mr. Justice
Sutherland wrote a ‘nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard.’ We simply hold that when the [FCC] finds that a pig has
entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig
is obscene. (Citation omitted.)
There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time
television are blatantly indecent if not outright obscene. It is the kind of speech that PD 1986
proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of statutory disciplinary powers. It is the
kind of speech that the State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate and prevent
should such action served and further compelling state interests. One who utters indecent,
insulting, or offensive words on television when unsuspecting children are in the audience is,
137
in the graphic language of FCC, a "pig in the parlor." Public interest would be served if the
"pig" is reasonably restrained or even removed from the "parlor."
Ergo, petitioner’s offensive and indecent language can be subjected to prior restraint.
Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or subsequent
punishment that, however, includes prior restraint, albeit indirectly.
After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for his offensive and obscene language in
Ang Dating Daan.
To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed
unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are
movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people,
including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech.
PD 1986 was passed creating the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (now
MTRCB) and which requires prior permit or license before showing a motion picture or
broadcasting a TV program. The Board can classify movies and television programs and can
cancel permits for exhibition of films or television broadcast.lavvphi1.net
The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some prior restraint on radio and
television shows, even religious programs, was upheld in Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of
Appeals. Speaking through Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, the Court wrote:
We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the
respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the
bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of
children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated
by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil
which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding
interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. x x x
xxxx
While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that [PD 1986] is
unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview
and classify TV programs and enforce its decision subject to review by our courts. As far
back as 1921, we upheld this setup in Sotto vs. Ruiz, viz:
"The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated
in order to avoid its abuse. Persons possess no absolute right to put into the mail anything
they please, regardless of its character."63
Bernas adds:

Under the decree a movie classification board is made the arbiter of what movies and
television programs or parts of either are fit for public consumption. It decides what movies
are "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the
Republic of the Philippines or its people," and what "tend to incite subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or sedition," or "tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government and/or duly constituted authorities," etc. Moreover, its decisions are executory
unless stopped by a court.64
Moreover, in MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,65 it was held that the power of
review and prior approval of MTRCB extends to all television programs and is valid despite
the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, all broadcast networks are
regulated by the MTRCB since they are required to get a permit before they air their
television programs. Consequently, their right to enjoy their freedom of speech is subject to
that requirement. As lucidly explained by Justice Dante O. Tinga, government regulations
through the MTRCB became "a necessary evil" with the government taking the role of
assigning bandwidth to individual broadcasters. The stations explicitly agreed to this
regulatory scheme; otherwise, chaos would result in the television broadcast industry as
competing broadcasters will interfere or co-opt each other’s signals. In this scheme, station
owners and broadcasters in effect waived their right to the full enjoyment of their right to
freedom of speech in radio and television programs and impliedly agreed that said right may
be subject to prior restraint—denial of permit or subsequent punishment, like suspension or
cancellation of permit, among others.
The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner
to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by
MTRCB for such broadcast. Rather, the suspension is in the form of permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the offensive and obscene remarks he
uttered on the evening of August 10, 2004 in his television program, Ang Dating Daan. It is a
sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the
free speech clause. And the imposition is separate and distinct from the criminal action the
Board may take pursuant to Sec. 3(i) of PD 1986 and the remedies that may be availed of by
the aggrieved private party under the provisions on libel or tort, if applicable. As FCC
teaches, the imposition of sanctions on broadcasters who indulge in profane or indecent
broadcasting does not constitute forbidden censorship. Lest it be overlooked, the sanction
imposed is not per se for petitioner’s exercise of his freedom of speech via television, but for
the indecent contents of his utterances in a "G" rated TV program.
More importantly, petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of his
freedom of speech to regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as television station owners,
program producers, and hosts have impliedly accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the
broadcast industry.
Neither can petitioner’s virtual inability to speak in his program during the period of
suspension be plausibly treated as prior restraint on future speech. For viewed in its proper
perspective, the suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for uttering an
unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible
138
cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. In fine, the suspension meted was
simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the law
which it is tasked to implement. Viewed in its proper context, the suspension sought to
penalize past speech made on prime-time "G" rated TV program; it does not bar future
speech of petitioner in other television programs; it is a permissible subsequent
administrative sanction; it should not be confused with a prior restraint on speech. While not
on all fours, the Court, in MTRCB,66 sustained the power of the MTRCB to penalize a
broadcast company for exhibiting/airing a pre-taped TV episode without Board authorization
in violation of Sec. 7 of PD 1986.
Any simplistic suggestion, however, that the MTRCB would be crossing the limits of its
authority were it to regulate and even restrain the prime-time television broadcast of indecent
or obscene speech in a "G" rated program is not acceptable. As made clear in Eastern
Broadcasting Corporation, "the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat
lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media." The MTRCB, as a
regulatory agency, must have the wherewithal to enforce its mandate, which would not be
effective if its punitive actions would be limited to mere fines. Television broadcasts should be
subject to some form of regulation, considering the ease with which they can be accessed,
and violations of the regulations must be met with appropriate and proportional disciplinary
action. The suspension of a violating television program would be a sufficient punishment and
serve as a deterrent for those responsible. The prevention of the broadcast of petitioner’s
television program is justified, and does not constitute prohibited prior restraint. It behooves
the Court to respond to the needs of the changing times, and craft jurisprudence to reflect
these times.
Petitioner, in questioning the three-month suspension, also tags as unconstitutional the very
law creating the MTRCB, arguing that PD 1986, as applied to him, infringes also upon his
freedom of religion. The Court has earlier adequately explained why petitioner’s undue
reliance on the religious freedom cannot lend justification, let alone an exempting dimension
to his licentious utterances in his program. The Court sees no need to address anew the
repetitive arguments on religious freedom. As earlier discussed in the disposition of the
petition in G.R. No. 164785, what was uttered was in no way a religious speech.
Parenthetically, petitioner’s attempt to characterize his speech as a legitimate defense of his
religion fails miserably. He tries to place his words in perspective, arguing evidently as an
afterthought that this was his method of refuting the alleged distortion of his statements by
the INC hosts of Ang Tamang Daan. But on the night he uttered them in his television
program, the word simply came out as profane language, without any warning or guidance for
undiscerning ears.
As to petitioner’s other argument about having been denied due process and equal protection
of the law, suffice it to state that we have at length debunked similar arguments in G.R. No.
164785. There is no need to further delve into the fact that petitioner was afforded due
process when he attended the hearing of the MTRCB, and that he was unable to
demonstrate that he was unjustly discriminated against in the MTRCB proceedings.

Finally, petitioner argues that there has been undue delegation of legislative power, as PD
1986 does not provide for the range of imposable penalties that may be applied with respect
to violations of the provisions of the law.
The argument is without merit.
In Edu v. Ericta, the Court discussed the matter of undue delegation of legislative power in
the following wise:
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress
may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to
the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What
cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation
of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the
measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job
must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy,
that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction
has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make laws which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and
delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The Constitution is thus not to
be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to
be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.67
Based on the foregoing pronouncements and analyzing the law in question, petitioner’s
protestation about undue delegation of legislative power for the sole reason that PD 1986
does not provide for a range of penalties for violation of the law is untenable. His thesis is that
MTRCB, in promulgating the IRR of PD 1986, prescribing a schedule of penalties for violation
of the provisions of the decree, went beyond the terms of the law.
Petitioner’s posture is flawed by the erroneous assumptions holding it together, the first
assumption being that PD 1986 does not prescribe the imposition of, or authorize the MTRCB
to impose, penalties for violators of PD 1986. As earlier indicated, however, the MTRCB, by
express and direct conferment of power and functions, is charged with supervising and
regulating, granting, denying, or canceling permits for the exhibition and/or television
broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs, and publicity materials to the end that
139
no such objectionable pictures, programs, and materials shall be exhibited and/or broadcast
by television. Complementing this provision is Sec. 3(k) of the decree authorizing the MTRCB
"to exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment
of the purpose and objectives of [the law]." As earlier explained, the investiture of
supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary power would surely be a meaningless grant if it did
not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised or the regulated as may be
proportionate to the offense committed, charged, and proved. As the Court said in Chavez v.
National Housing Authority:
x x x [W]hen a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. x x x
[W]hen the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed or used by a
government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has the
authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its function.68
Given the foregoing perspective, it stands to reason that the power of the MTRCB to regulate
and supervise the exhibition of TV programs carries with it or necessarily implies the authority
to take effective punitive action for violation of the law sought to be enforced. And would it not
be logical too to say that the power to deny or cancel a permit for the exhibition of a TV
program or broadcast necessarily includes the lesser power to suspend?
The MTRCB promulgated the IRR of PD 1986 in accordance with Sec. 3(a) which, for
reference, provides that agency with the power "[to] promulgate such rules and regulations as
are necessary or proper for the implementation of this Act, and the accomplishment of its
purposes and objectives x x x." And Chapter XIII, Sec. 1 of the IRR providing:
Section 1. VIOLATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS.––Without prejudice to the
immediate filing of the appropriate criminal action and the immediate seizure of the pertinent
articles pursuant to Section 13, any violation of PD 1986 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations governing motion pictures, television programs, and related promotional
materials shall be penalized with suspension or cancellation of permits and/or licenses issued
by the Board and/or with the imposition of fines and other administrative penalty/penalties.
The Board recognizes the existing Table of Administrative Penalties attached without
prejudice to the power of the Board to amend it when the need arises. In the meantime the
existing revised Table of Administrative Penalties shall be enforced. (Emphasis added.)
This is, in the final analysis, no more than a measure to specifically implement the
aforequoted provisions of Sec. 3(d) and (k). Contrary to what petitioner implies, the IRR does
not expand the mandate of the MTRCB under the law or partake of the nature of an
unauthorized administrative legislation. The MTRCB cannot shirk its responsibility to regulate
the public airwaves and employ such means as it can as a guardian of the public.
In Sec. 3(c), one can already find the permissible actions of the MTRCB, along with the
standards to be applied to determine whether there have been statutory breaches. The
MTRCB may evaluate motion pictures, television programs, and publicity materials "applying
contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard," and, from there, determine whether these
 140

audio and video materials "are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, imposing a penalty
and/or good customs, [etc.] x x x" and apply the sanctions it deems proper. The lawmaking of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION on the television program, Ang Dating Daan, subject
body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute.69 of the instant petition.
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle
of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers.70 Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz, and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner,
Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public PBC, are hereby exonerated for lack of evidence.
interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of
the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the Costs against petitioner.
law."71 Allowing the MTRCB some reasonable elbow-room in its operations and, in the
exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample latitude in fixing, by way of SO ORDERED
an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with due regard for the severity of the
offense and attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances, as the case may be, would be
consistent with its mandate to effectively and efficiently regulate the movie and television
industry.

But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose sanctions for
violations of PD 1986, its decision to suspend petitioner must be modified, for nowhere in that
issuance, particularly the power-defining Sec. 3 nor in the MTRCB Schedule of Administrative
Penalties effective January 1, 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the program host or
even to prevent certain people from appearing in television programs. The MTRCB, to be
sure, may prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or cancel permits for exhibition,
but it may not suspend television personalities, for such would be beyond its jurisdiction. The
MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation beyond what the law provides. Only persons,
offenses, and penalties clearly falling clearly within the letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be
considered to be within the decree’s penal or disciplinary operation. And when it exists, the
reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the person charged with violating the statute
and for whom the penalty is sought. Thus, the MTRCB’s decision in Administrative Case No.
01-04 dated September 27, 2004 and the subsequent order issued pursuant to said decision
must be modified. The suspension should cover only the television program on which
petitioner appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what
the law and the facts obtaining call for.

In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in which

absolute permissiveness is the norm. Petitioner’s flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter
profanity on television without adverse consequences, under the guise of free speech, does
not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We repeat: freedoms of speech and
expression are not absolute freedoms. To say "any act that restrains speech should be
greeted with furrowed brows" is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or
expression is per se invalid. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and
expression, and indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or
regulate speech.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the MTRCB in Adm. Case No. 01-04 dated September 27,
2004 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of limiting the suspension to the
program Ang Dating Daan. As thus modified, the fallo of the MTRCB shall read as follows:
141

G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine
Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of
the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R.
MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL
RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various
taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON
ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO
HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS
OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO,
FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective capacities as members of the
Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity
as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and
Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE
OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the
membership thereto of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international business
and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade
liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and
privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of
business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of
promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas,
quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market niches and
becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global
scenario are replacing age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that unilaterally protect weak
and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the
well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the world economy has become
the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity."
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans
for the establishment of three multilateral institutions — inspired by that grand political body,
142
the United Nations — were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was
the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-
ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
which was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization
(ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral
protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a
variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF
and WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT — the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty
adherents with no institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable system
of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy
Round, the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that
administering body — the World Trade Organization — with the signing of the "Final Act" in
Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members.1
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member
with the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra),
of improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products."
The President also saw in the WTO the opening of "new opportunities for the services sector
. . . , (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting . . . , and (the
attraction of) more investments into the country." Although the Chief Executive did not
expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines — and this is of special interest to the legal
profession — will benefit from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication
through the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and
(2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations
where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and
where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of
member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO
"intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme
Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and
to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods."
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide
trade liberalization and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a
global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions
raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
 143

Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the associated legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto
Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the
prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public ANNEX 1
funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
1994. Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
The Facts Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of he
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity). General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994
By signing the Final Act,2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
agreed: General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective Agreement on Rules of Origin
competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
their procedures; and Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating
Measures
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions. Agreement on Safeguards

On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes
1994 from the President of the Philippines,3 stating among others that "the Uruguay Round
Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
VII of the Constitution." Property Rights

On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the ANNEX 2
President of the Philippines4 likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that
"the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial the Settlement of Disputes
Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21,
Article VII of the Constitution." ANNEX 3

On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the
immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization."5
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved,
as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization."6
The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volume
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed7 the Instrument of
Ratification, declaring:
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, after having seen and considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization and the agreements and associated legal instruments included
in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof,

signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and
every Article and Clause thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed
of the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1),
two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof."
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO
Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations
and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In his
Memorandum dated May 13, 1996,8 the Solicitor General describes these two latter
documents as follows:
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a
wide range of matters, such as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification
procedures, relationship of WTO with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements
on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things,
standstill or limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming
measures, market access, national treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of
financial services, commercial presence and new financial service.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on
respondents' comment and petitioners' reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12,
1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective
memoranda. The court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine
Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper,
hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper,"9 for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of
and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy
and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties
signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from
Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other
documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted
for resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a
printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in
another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various "bilateral or multilateral
treaties or international instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty."
144
Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on
January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and
voting leading to the concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization or of the validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the
1987 Philippine Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly
limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under
Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is "vested in the Congress of the Philippines";
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere
with the exercise of judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the ratification
of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and not with the Presidential
submission which included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the several
issues raised by petitioners into the following": 10
1. Whether or not the provisions of the "Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes
one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement" cited by petitioners directly contravene or
undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the
exercise of legislative power by Congress.

3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by
this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate "in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization" implied rejection of
the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the
Solicitor General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a
political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate
(Wigberto E. Tañada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and
(3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when
they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing
notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus:
(1) The "political question" issue — being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that
probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case — was deliberated
upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the
respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any
event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's dismissal as
there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of
estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will
be taken up as an integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor
General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question
the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of
such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public
funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that
transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and
decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural matters. 11
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE
STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES
CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
145
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT,
OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF
JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS
ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE
FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court
Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 13
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly set
out in the 1987 Constitution, 15 as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including
Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. 16 As explained by former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, 17 "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature."
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, 18 it will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters
that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by
any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.

As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that
this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not
review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country
into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said
international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade
barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there
had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part
of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement
and Economic Nationalism
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating
"economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national
treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes
but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec 19, Article II, and
Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows:
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
146
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following
WTO provisions quoted in their memorandum: 19
a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply
any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article II or Article XI of GATT 1994.
2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination
of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained
in the Annex to this Agreement." (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol.
27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in
paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable
under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to
obtain an advantage, and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic
source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of
products, or in terms of proportion of volume or value of its local production; or

(b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related
to the volume or value of local products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative
restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are
mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or compliance
with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production that
it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by
restricting its access to foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or value of its local
production. (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27,
Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p. 22125, emphasis supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like
products of national origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use, the provisions of
this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges
which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on
the nationality of the product." (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying
Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to
paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round,
Legal Instruments p. 177, emphasis supplied).
(b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable
than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property. . .
(par. 1 Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31,
Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 25432 (emphasis supplied)
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set
out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other
147
Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less
favourable than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service
suppliers of any other Member, either formally suppliers of any other Member, either formally
identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services and
service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable
if it modifies the conditions of completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the
Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII,
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p.
22610 emphasis supplied).
It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the
WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution.
They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." The
constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty
imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional
limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential
treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter
provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these
nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation
but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13
thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with Constitution; and
(4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like
the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles
Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies."
The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of
the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These principles in Article II are not intended to be
self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. 23 They are used by the
judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated
vs. Morato, 24 the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of
Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause

of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation."
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25 that broad constitutional principles need
legislative enactments to implement the, thus:
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family)
and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these
are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically not self-
executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate
such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles
ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the
executive and to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the
directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The electorate
could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through
the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of board constitutional
principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial
authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making." Mr.
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 26
explained these reasons as follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific
legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II
(15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed
to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment
grating all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of
law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of
the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or
applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the
148
expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of
the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments —
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with
Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain
Balanced Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general
principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in
relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by
the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising
the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of
human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be
given optimum opportunity to develop. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national
economic development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the
underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism
(1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" 27 and in the use of "Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating the State to "adopt
measures that help make them competitive; 28 and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." 29 In similar
language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires
the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality ad reciprocity"; 30 and speaks of
industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the
protection of "Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance
System, et al., 31 this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable."
However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the
grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and
not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The
issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather,
the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to
allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold
that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. 32 In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out
foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While
the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
149
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to
Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages
to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members.
Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security
Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member's vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN
Security Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial
Conference and the General Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast, except
in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member which
would require three fourths vote. Amendments would require two thirds vote in general.
Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments provision will require assent of all
members. Any member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of six months
from the date of notice of withdrawals. 33
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO
than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing
countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than
outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating
strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development." These basic principles
are found in the preamble 34 of the WTO Agreement as follows:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production
of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources
in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with
their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing
countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development,

Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading
system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade
liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this
multilateral trading system, . . . (emphasis supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos
Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing
basic principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment,
giving their domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus,
with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to developing countries in
terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be
spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed
countries to be effected within a period of six (6) years while developing countries —
including the Philippines — are required to effect an average tariff reduction of only 24%
within ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic
support to agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for
developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to
reduce their budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving
export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For developing countries, however,
the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed countries and a longer
period of ten (10) years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and
trade practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards
against import surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition,
the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the
statement that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that
Filipinos will be deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations
of developing nations like the Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would be
no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their
discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet
uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simply because
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we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of
this case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an
economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Does Not
Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" 35
does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community."
As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean
autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international
community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national
economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources
and public utilities. 36
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without
discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality
and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based
on "equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are
"competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy
against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development
of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino
managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in
Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best
offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers,
Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or
enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be
pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents
claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and
services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the
question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at
large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?

Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will — as
promised by its promoters — expand the country's exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most
reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for which
they are answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions
and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of
discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet
Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted
and ratified in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in
the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of
business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935
Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not
have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines
signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering part of its control over its foreign
relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the
vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and
unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the
assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change
necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist 38
explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom,
the base and frame-work only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream
that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly "in the
crucible of Filipino minds and hearts," where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually
gather its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the
goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it
conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure
and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the
dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law
attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements." 39 Petitioners maintain that this undertaking "unduly limits, restricts and impairs
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Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the
1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on
the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass
legislation that will be good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will
not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods . . . but
also to the flow of investments and money . . . as well as to a whole slew of agreements on
socio-cultural matters . . . 40
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax,
which is lodged in the Congress. 41 And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize
the President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to "specified limits and . . . such limitations
and restrictions" as Congress may provide, 42 as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff
and Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by
International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their
arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute
and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the
family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of
the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our
own laws. 44 One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt
servanda — international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement
is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A
state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations
such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken." 45
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By
their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for
greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits,
they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus,
treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely
diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the
termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the
regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing
conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations. 46 The sovereignty of
a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions

enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family
of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy,
"Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over.
The age of interdependence is here." 47
UN Charter and Other Treaties
Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it
consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-
limitation."47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United
Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and
shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking
preventive or enforcement action." Such assistance includes payment of its corresponding
share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping
operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court
of Justice held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East
and in the Congo were "expenses of the United Nations" under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the
UN Charter. Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses.
In this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled
to appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too,
under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic
privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members
within their own territory. Another example: although "sovereign equality" and "domestic
jurisdiction" of all members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter, such
provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by the Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A final
example: under Article 103, "(i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligation under the present charter shall prevail," thus
unquestionably denying the Philippines — as a member — the sovereign power to make a
choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts —
both bilateral and multilateral — that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are
enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the
Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt from tax, income received in the Philippines by,
among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the
United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in
said convention, wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to its
citizens for labor and personal services performed by them as employees or officials of the
United States are exempt from income tax by the Philippines.
152
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double
taxation with respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from
all customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the
regular equipment, spare parts and supplies arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from
customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel,
lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on
Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air
carriers the same privileges as those granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers under
separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines
exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a
sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59 days.
(i) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of
obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of
Special Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter said premises
without consent of the Head of Mission concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from
customs duties, taxes and related charges.
(k) Multilateral convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed
to be governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal
disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach "of international
obligation."
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its
sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying
consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other
contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials

and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-
GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the
environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty through the
assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in international relations is preferred
as an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of the reciprocal obligations
involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties
that structure relations by reference to durable, well-defined substantive norms and objective
dispute resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic
power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to some form of legal ordering.
In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade
liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger
set of potential new trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced
success to the smaller country's market. 48
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived
without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations."
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes
on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedures. 50
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, 51 it will be fruitful to restate its
full text as follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the
owner referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process
for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant
to prove that the process to obtain an identical product is different from the patented process.
Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any
identical product when produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
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(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and
the owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process
actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall
be on the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or
only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting
their manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (not the words "in
the absence of proof to the contrary") presumption that a product shown to be identical to one
produced with the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the
(illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the patented
product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was
made with the use of the said patented process but the owner of the patent could not
determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical product. Hence, the "burden of
proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged
patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually
refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the
identical (or fake) product to show that his product was produced without the use of the
patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since,
regardless of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has
to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is
"identical" to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of "newness" of
the genuine product or the fact of "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made
by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the
present law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the
Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or
utility model, thus:
Sec. 60. Infringement. — Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall
consist in unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility model for the purpose of
trade or industry in the article or product and in the making, using or selling of the article or
product copying the patented design or utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the
patented design or utility model shall constitute evidence of copying. (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable
presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process in NEW or (2)
there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the
process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used.

Where either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal
systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue —
derogation of legislative power — will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the
reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34
does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the
concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents,
trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be
substantial. 52
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and
Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes — but
not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and
Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services — is defective and
insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in
the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which
in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic
upon authority of the President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the
Senate 53 which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of
concurrence of the Senate.
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding
up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the
texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by
the plenipotentiaries attending the conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a
summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over
several years. The text of the "Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations" is contained in just one page 55 in Vol. I of the 36-volume
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary
Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective
competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with
their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act
required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
154
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for
ratification. They were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which
provides that representatives of the members can meet "to give effect to those provisions of
this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the
operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement." 56
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does
not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which "have indicated in
their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion
of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer
and processing of information, and national treatment with respect to access to payment,
clearing systems and refinancing available in the normal course of business."57
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are
deemed included as its integral parts, 58 as follows:
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional frame-work for the conduct of trade
relations among its Members in matters to the agreements and associated legal instruments
included in the Annexes to this Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3,
(hereinafter referred to as "Multilateral Agreements") are integral parts of this Agreement,
binding on all Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter
referred to as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also part of this Agreement for those
Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral
Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or rights for Members that have not
accepted them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter
referred to as "GATT 1994") is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment, as subsequently rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as
"GATT 1947").
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by
the members' deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos
dated August 11, 1994, 59 the senators
of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: 60

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first
day hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by Senator Tañada that
what was submitted to the Senate was not the agreement on establishing the World Trade
Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round which is not the same as the agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a
point of order which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion
for an alternative solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the
proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the
question of the submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new . . . is he making a
new submission which improves on the clarity of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no
misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Tañada and later on Senator Tolentino since they
were the ones that raised this question yesterday?
Senator Tañada, please.
SEN. TAÑADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being
submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather
the Agreement on the World Trade Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAÑADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tañada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And
after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted
to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the provisions of the
Constitution, and with the Final Act itself . The Constitution does not require us to ratify the
Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final Act
itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with the governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
155
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the
WTO Agreement for the consideration of the respective competent authorities with a view to
seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for
ratification or acceptance as whatever their constitutional procedures may provide but it is the
World Trade Organization Agreement. And if that is the one that is being submitted now, I
think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act itself .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of
record. And they had been adequately reflected in the journal of yesterday's session and I
don't see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any
comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales
out of the abundance of question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating the obvious
and therefore I have no further comment to make.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners
are invoking this Court's constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the
Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of
certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be
grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of
discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition. 63
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under
review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its
 156

actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with
presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international
are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through
Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption their duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice.
of regularity in the Senate's processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute
grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. 64
SO ORDERED.
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to
develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect
and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is
equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not
in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a "trade
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity" and the promotion of industries "which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets," thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too,
the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is
balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and
amity with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate
exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrariness or
despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to
surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that
it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But
that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its
decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and
duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such
exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That
is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation
should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a
matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO
Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian
Renaissance 65 where "the East will become the dominant region of the world economically,
politically and culturally in the next century." He refers to the "free market" espoused by WTO
as the "catalyst" in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries
including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO.
Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO
remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the
development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not
economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the

G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946
RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., respondents.
Placido C. Ramos for petitioners.
Lt. Col. Fred Ruiz Castro and Capt. Ramon V. Diaz, JAGS, PA., for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of Staff and the
General Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist from further
proceedings in the trial of petitioners before that body. Preliminary injunction having been
denied by us and the General Court Martial having gone ahead with the trial, which
eventually resulted in the acquittal of one of the defendants, Ramon Ruffy, the dismissal of
the case as to another, Victoriano Dinglasan, and the conviction of Jose L. Garcia, Prudente
M. Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus, the last-named four petitioners now seek
in their memorandum to convert the petition into one for certiorari, with the prayer that the
records of the proceedings before the General Court Martial be ordered certified to this court
for review.
The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to military law at the time
the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed. In their memorandum
they have raised an additional question of law — that the 93d Article of War is
unconstitutional.
An outline of the petitioner's previous connection with the Philippine Army, the Philippine
Constabulary, and/or with guerrilla organizations will presently be made. This outline is based
on allegations in the petition and the answer, and on exhibits attached thereto and to the
parties' memoranda, exhibits which were offered in the course of the oral argument and
admitted without objection. The said exhibits are public documents certified by the officials
who had them in custody in their official capacity. They are presumed to be authentic, as we
have no doubt they are.
It appears that at the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941, Ramon Ruffy was the Provincial
Commander, Prudente M. Francisco, a junior officer, and Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the
Philippine Constabulary garrison stationed in Mindoro. When, on February 27, 1942, the
Japanese forces landed in Mindoro, Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of
surrendering to the enemy, disbanded his company, and organized and led a guerrilla outfit
known as Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. Lieutenant Francisco, Corporal Fortus and Jose L.
Garcia, the last then a civilian joined Major Ruffy's organization towards the latter part of
1942, while Dominador Adeva and Victoriano Dinglasan, then likewise civilians, became its
members some time in 1943..
157
Meanwhile, Brigadier General Macario Peralta, Jr., then a lieutenant colonel of the Philippine
Army, also took to the hills of Panay and led the operation of the 6th Military District, one of
the districts into which the Philippine Army had been divided before the war. About
November, 1942, Colonel Peralta succeeded in contacting the General Headquarters of
General MacArthur in Australia as the result of which on February 13, 1943, the 6th Military
District was recognized by the Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area as a military unit
and part of its command.
Even before General MacArthur's recognition of the 6th Military District Colonel Peralta had
extended its sphere of operation to comprise Mindoro and Marinduque, and had, on January
2, 1943, named Major Ruffy as Acting Commander for those two provinces and Commanding
Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 66 Infantry 61st Division, Philippine Corps. After the recognition,
2d Lieut. Prudente M. Francisco, by virtue of Special Orders No. 99, dated November 2,
1943, and signed by Enrique L. Jurado, Major, OSE, Commanding, was assigned as S-3 in
the Bolo Area. Major, later Lieut. Col., Jurado, it should be noted, had been dispatched by the
6th Military District to Mindoro to assume operational control supervision over the Bolo Area
unit and to make and direct the necessary report to the Headquarters, 6th Military District, in
Panay. On April 26, 1944, by General Orders No. 40 of the 6th Military District, 2d Lieutenant
Francisco was promoted to the rank of 1st Lieutenant (Brevet), effective April 15, 1944,
subject to approval by the President of the Philippines, and was re-assigned to the Bolo Area.
As to Andres Fortus he was assigned to the same Bolo Area as probationary 3d lieutenant for
two-month probationary training, by the Headquarters of the 6th Military District, as per
Special Orders No. 70, dated May 15, 1944.
According to a memorandum of the Chief of Staff, 6th Military District, dated January 1943,
and signed by L.R. Relunia, Lieut. Col., CE, Chief of Staff, Jose L. Garcia and Dominador
Adeva were appointed 3d lieutenants, infantry as of December 31, 1942. Garcia later was
promoted to the rank of captain, effective March 15, 1943, as per Special Orders No. 82,
issued in the field, 6th Military District, and dated August 28, 1943. On May 24, 1943, Jose L.
Garcia took his oath before Captain Esteban P. Beloncio, then Acting Commanding Officer,
3d Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment, 61st Division, 6th Military District.
As has been said, the 6th Military District sent Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado to be
Commanding Officer of the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro and to undertake other missions
of Military character. Pursuant to instructions, Colonel Jurado on November 2, 1943,
assigned Major Ruffy as Commanding Officer of the Bolo Area with 3d Lieut. Dominador
Adeva and 2d Lieut. Prudente M. Francisco as members of his staff and Victoriano Dinglasan
as Finance Officer, as per Special Orders No. 99 dated November 2, 1943. In a
memorandum of Colonel Jurado for Major Ruffy bearing date 25 June, 1944, it was stated
that Captain Garcia had been given P5,000 for palay and Lieut. Francisco P9,000, P5,000 for
palay and P4,000 for salary of the personnel B. Company.
A change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel Jurado on June 8, 1944:
Major Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as Commanding Officer, Bolo Battalion, and
Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio was put in Ruffy's place. On October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col. Jurado
was slain allegedly by the petitioners. After the commission of this crime, the petitioners, it is

alleged, seceded from the 6th Military District. It was this murder which gave rise to
petitioner's trial, the legality of which is now being contested.
On July 26, 1941, the President of the Untied States issued a military order the pertinent
paragraph of which stated: ". . . as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, I hereby call and order into the service of the armed forces of the United States Army,
for the period of the existing emergency, and place under the command of the general officer,
United States Army, to be designated by the Secretary of War, from time to time, all of the
organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth." Following the issuance
of President Roosevelt's order General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Commanding
General of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East.
It is contended, in behalf of Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus, that "by the enemy
occupation of the Philippines, the National Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating
and governing the existence of the Philippine Army including the Articles of War, were
suspended and in abeyance during such belligerent occupation."
The paragraph quoted in the petitioner's memorandum from Winthrop's Military Law and
Precedents and the subsequent paragraph which has been omitted furnish a complete
answer to petitioner's contention of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men
of the Philippine Army did not cease to be fully in the service, though in a measure,' only in a
measure, they were not subject to the military jurisdiction, if they were not active duty. In the
latter case, like officers and soldiers on leave of absence or held as prisoners of war, they
could not be held guilty of a breach of the discipline of the command or of a neglect of duty,
or disobedience of orders, or mutiny, or subject to a military trial therefor; but for an act
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, or an act which constitutes an offense of the class
specified in the 95th Article of War, they may in general be legally held subject to military
jurisdiction and trial. "So a prisoner of war, though not subject, while held by the enemy, to
the discipline of his own army, would, when exchanged of paroled, be not exempt from
liability for such offenses as criminal acts or injuriuos conduct committed during his captivity
against other officers or soldiers in the same status." (Winthrop's Military Law and
Precedents, 2d Edition, pp. 91, 92.)
The rule invoked by counsel, namely, that laws of political nature or affecting political
relations are considered superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is
intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended
for and does not bind the enemies in arms. This is self-evident from the very nature of things.
The paradox of a contrary ruling should readily manifest itself. Under the petitioner's theory
the forces of resistance operating in an occupied territory would have to abide by the
outlawing of their own existence. They would be stripped of the very life-blood of an army, the
right and the ability to maintain order and discipline within the organization and to try the men
guilty of breach thereof.
The surrender by General Wainright of the Fil-American Forces does not profit the petitioner's
who were former members of the Philippine Constabulary any more than does the rule of war
or international law they cite. The fall of Bataan and Corregidor did not end the war. It did not,
158
legally or otherwise, keep the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines from
organizing a new army, regular or irregular, out of new men and men in the old service who
had refused to surrender or who having surrendered, had decided to carry on the fight
through other diverse means and methods. The fall of Corregidor and Bataan just marked the
beginning of the gigantic preparation for the gigantic drive that was to fight its way to and
beyond the Philippines in fulfillment of General MacArthur's classic promise, "I shall return."
The heroic role which the guerrillas played in that preparation and in the subsequent
liberation of the Philippines is now history.
Independently of their previous connection with the Philippine Army and the Philippine
Constabulary, Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus as well as Major Garcia and
Lieutenant Adeva were subject to military jurisdiction.
The 2d Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to military law as follows:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these articles
and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or
"persons subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular Force of
the Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such
active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called,
drafted, or order to obey the same;
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants;
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Army of the
Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise
subject to these articles;
(d) All persons under sentences adjudged by courts-martial.
It is our opinion that the petitioners come within the general application of the clause in sub-
paragraph (a); "and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty for
training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or
order to obey the same." By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area
from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the
Philippine Army amendable to the Articles of War. The Bolo Area, as has been seen, was a
contigent of the 6th Military District which, as has also been pointed out, had been recognized
by and placed under the operational control of the United States Army in the Southwest
Pacific. The Bolo Area received supplies and funds for the salaries of its officers and men
from the Southwest Pacific Command. As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military
District, the petitioners operated under the orders of duly established and duly appointed
commanders of the United States Army.
 159

The attitude of the enemy toward underground movements did not affect the military status of
guerrillas who had been called into the service of the Philippine Army. If the invaders refused
to look upon guerrillas, without distinctions, as legitimate troops, that did not stop the guerillas
who had been inducted into the service of the Philippine Army from being component parts
thereof, bound to obey military status of guerrillas was to be judged not by the concept of the
army of the country for which they fought.

The constitutionality of the 93d Article of War is assailed. This article ordains "that any person
subject to military law who commits murder in time of was shall suffer death or imprisonment
for life, as the court martial may direct." It is argued that since "no review is provided by that
law to be made by the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life
imprisonment or death", it violates Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of
the Philippines which provides that "the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death
or life imprisonment."

We think the petitioners are in error. This error arose from failure to perceive the nature of
courts martial and the sources of the authority for their creation.

Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the
ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the
President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation." (Winthrop's Military Law and
Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary.
"The Supreme Court of the United States referring to the provisions of the Constitution
authorizing Congress to provide for the government of the army, excepting military offenses
from the civil jurisdiction, and making the President Commander in Chief, observes as
follows: "These provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and
punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized
nations, and that the power to do so is given without any connection between it and the 3d
Article of the United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely independent of each
other."

"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must
pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the
executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him
in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized
under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives." (Winthrop's Military Law
and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Of equal interest Clode, 2 M. F., 361, says of these courts
in the British law: "It must never be lost sight of that the only legitimate object of military
tribunals is to aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army."
(Footnote No. 24, p. 49, Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition.)

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no merit and that it should be dismissed
with costs. It is so ordered.
 160

G.R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000

G.R. No. 138698 October 10, 2000
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP TOMAS
MILLAMENA (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), BISHOP ELMER BOLOCAN (United Church of JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO TAÑADA, ZENAIDA QUEZON-AVENCEÑA, ROLANDO
Christ of the Phil.), DR. REYNALDO LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG SIMBULAN, PABLITO V. SANIDAD, MA. SOCORRO I. DIOKNO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO,
PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR, and the PUBLIC INTEREST JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCISCO C. RIVERA JR., RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, KILOSBAYAN,
LAW CENTER, petitioners, MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
vs. INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY vs.
DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE SECRETARY ORLANDO MERCADO, BRIG. GEN. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO B. FERNAN,
FRANKLIN DRILON, SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON, and SENATOR BLAS F. OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO G. BIAZON, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD, respondents. ACTING THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION, DIRECTION, AND INSTRUCTION IN
RELATION TO THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA), respondents.
x-----------------------x
DECISION
G.R. No. 138572 October 10, 2000
BUENA, J.:
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.(PHILCONSA), EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA,
AMADOGAT INCIONG, CAMILO L. SABIO, AND RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, Confronting the Court for resolution in the instant consolidated petitions for certiorari and
vs. prohibition are issues relating to, and borne by, an agreement forged in the turn of the last
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, HON. ORLANDO MERCADO, as century between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America -the
Secretary of National Defense, and HON. DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., as Secretary of Visiting Forces Agreement.
Foreign Affairs, respondents.
The antecedents unfold.
x-----------------------x
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases
G.R. No. 138587 October 10, 2000 Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory
by United States military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., RAUL S. ROCO, and SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, petitioners, relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on
vs. August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., ORLANDO B. attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.1
MERCADO, MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, BLAS F. OPLE and
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, respondents. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
x-----------------------x agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the
G.R. No. 138680 October 10, 2000 presence of US military bases in the Philippines.2 With the expiration of the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted between the two countries were
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its National President, Jose held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the defense and security relationship between the
Aguila Grapilon, petitioners, Philippines and the United States of America continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense
vs. Treaty.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, in his capacity as President, Republic of the Philippines,
and HON. DOMINGO SIAZON, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign
x-----------------------x Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on "the complementing

strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region." Both
sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA for brevity). Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a consolidated draft text,
which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and negotiations3 that culminated in
Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the
VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites
States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, ratified the VFA.4
On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,5 the Instrument of Ratification,
the letter of the President6 and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign
Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F. Ople, and its Committee on National Defense and
Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for their joint consideration and
recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings were held by the two Committees.7
On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 4438
recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative
Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation. Debates then ensued.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a
two-thirds (2/3) vote9 of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as
Senate Resolution No. 18.10
On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between
respondent Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.
The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for
regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense
personnel may be present in the Philippines, and is quoted in its full text, hereunder:
"Article I
Definitions
"As used in this Agreement, ‘United States personnel’ means United States military and
civilian personnel temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the
Philippine Government.
"Within this definition:
"1. The term ‘military personnel’ refers to military members of the United States Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard.
161
"2. The term ‘civilian personnel’ refers to individuals who are neither nationals of, nor
ordinary residents in the Philippines and who are employed by the United States armed
forces or who are accompanying the United States armed forces, such as employees of the
American Red Cross and the United Services Organization.
"Article II
Respect for Law
"It is the duty of the United States personnel to respect the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and,
in particular, from any political activity in the Philippines. The Government of the United
States shall take all measures within its authority to ensure that this is done.
"Article III
Entry and Departure
"1. The Government of the Philippines shall facilitate the admission of United States
personnel and their departure from the Philippines in connection with activities covered by
this agreement.
"2. United States military personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations
upon entering and departing the Philippines.
"3. The following documents only, which shall be presented on demand, shall be required
in respect of United States military personnel who enter the Philippines:
"(a) personal identity card issued by the appropriate United States authority showing full
name, date of birth, rank or grade and service number (if any), branch of service and
photograph;
"(b) individual or collective document issued by the appropriate United States authority,
authorizing the travel or visit and identifying the individual or group as United States military
personnel; and
"(c) the commanding officer of a military aircraft or vessel shall present a declaration of
health, and when required by the cognizant representative of the Government of the
Philippines, shall conduct a quarantine inspection and will certify that the aircraft or vessel is
free from quarantinable diseases. Any quarantine inspection of United States aircraft or
United States vessels or cargoes thereon shall be conducted by the United States
commanding officer in accordance with the international health regulations as promulgated by
the World Health Organization, and mutually agreed procedures.
"4. United States civilian personnel shall be exempt from visa requirements but shall
present, upon demand, valid passports upon entry and departure of the Philippines.

"5. If the Government of the Philippines has requested the removal of any United States
personnel from its territory, the United States authorities shall be responsible for receiving the
person concerned within its own territory or otherwise disposing of said person outside of the
Philippines.
"Article IV
Driving and Vehicle Registration
"1. Philippine authorities shall accept as valid, without test or fee, a driving permit or
license issued by the appropriate United States authority to United States personnel for the
operation of military or official vehicles.
"2. Vehicles owned by the Government of the United States need not be registered, but
shall have appropriate markings.
"Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
"1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect
to offenses committed within the Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines
all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United
States over United States personnel in the Philippines.
"2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel
with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the Philippines,
punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel
with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the United States,
punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under the laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense relating to
security means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.
"3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall
apply:
162
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all
offenses committed by United States personnel, except in cases provided for in paragraphs
1(b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction
over United States personnel subject to the military law of the United States in relation to.
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses solely
against the property or person of United States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other
government to waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good
order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request by the United
States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of particular
importance to the Philippines. If the Government of the Philippines determines that the case
is of particular importance, it shall communicate such determination to the United States
authorities within twenty (20) days after the Philippine authorities receive the United States
request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense charged by
authorities of the Philippines against United states personnel arises out of an act or omission
done in the performance of official duty, the commander will issue a certificate setting forth
such determination. This certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the
Philippines and will constitute sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the purposes
of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this Article. In those cases where the Government of the Philippines
believes the circumstances of the case require a review of the duty certificate, United States
military authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine authorities
at the highest levels may also present any information bearing on its validity. United States
military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position. Where appropriate, United
States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action against offenders in official duty
cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify
the authorities of the other government as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other of the
disposition of all cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and the United States
have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
"4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and United
States shall assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in the Philippines and

in handling them over to authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions of this article.
"5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of the arrest
or detention of United States personnel who are subject of Philippine primary or exclusive
jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall promptly notify United States military authorities of the
arrest or detention of any United States personnel.
"6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise
jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request,
from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States
military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without
delay, make such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or
judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged in
extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States
Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full
account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the
United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one-year period
will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one-year period will not include any
time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities,
after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused,
fail to do so.
"7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities shall
assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigation into offenses and shall
cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production of
evidence, including seizure and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an
offense.
"8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the provisions of this
Article and have been acquitted or have been convicted and are serving, or have served their
sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or suspended, or have been pardoned, they
may not be tried again for the same offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph,
however, shall prevent United States military authorities from trying United States personnel
for any violation of rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which constituted an
offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
"9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted by
Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards established by the
law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States personnel shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against them
and to have reasonable time to prepare a defense;
163
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same basis
as nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the service of a competent interpreter; and
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States authorities,
and to have such authorities present at all judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be
public unless the court, in accordance with Philippine laws, excludes persons who have no
role in the proceedings.
"10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall
be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities.
United States Personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and
material assistance.
"11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of ordinary
jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts.
"Article VI
Claims
"1. Except for contractual arrangements, including United States foreign military sales
letters of offer and acceptance and leases of military equipment, both governments waive any
and all claims against each other for damage, loss or destruction to property of each other’s
armed forces or for death or injury to their military and civilian personnel arising from activities
to which this agreement applies.
"2. For claims against the United States, other than contractual claims and those to which
paragraph 1 applies, the United States Government, in accordance with United States law
regarding foreign claims, will pay just and reasonable compensation in settlement of
meritorious claims for damage, loss, personal injury or death, caused by acts or omissions of
United States personnel, or otherwise incident to the non-combat activities of the United
States forces.
"Article VII
Importation and Exportation
"1. United States Government equipment, materials, supplies, and other property imported
into or acquired in the Philippines by or on behalf of the United States armed forces in
connection with activities to which this agreement applies, shall be free of all Philippine
duties, taxes and other similar charges. Title to such property shall remain with the United

States, which may remove such property from the Philippines at any time, free from export
duties, taxes, and other similar charges. The exemptions provided in this paragraph shall also
extend to any duty, tax, or other similar charges which would otherwise be assessed upon
such property after importation into, or acquisition within, the Philippines. Such property may
be removed from the Philippines, or disposed of therein, provided that disposition of such
property in the Philippines to persons or entities not entitled to exemption from applicable
taxes and duties shall be subject to payment of such taxes, and duties and prior approval of
the Philippine Government.
"2. Reasonable quantities of personal baggage, personal effects, and other property for the
personal use of United States personnel may be imported into and used in the Philippines
free of all duties, taxes and other similar charges during the period of their temporary stay in
the Philippines. Transfers to persons or entities in the Philippines not entitled to import
privileges may only be made upon prior approval of the appropriate Philippine authorities
including payment by the recipient of applicable duties and taxes imposed in accordance with
the laws of the Philippines. The exportation of such property and of property acquired in the
Philippines by United States personnel shall be free of all Philippine duties, taxes, and other
similar charges.
"Article VIII
Movement of Vessels and Aircraft
"1. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines
upon approval of the Government of the Philippines in accordance with procedures stipulated
in implementing arrangements.
"2. Vessels operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines
upon approval of the Government of the Philippines. The movement of vessels shall be in
accordance with international custom and practice governing such vessels, and such agreed
implementing arrangements as necessary.
"3. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces shall
not be subject to the payment of landing or port fees, navigation or over flight charges, or tolls
or other use charges, including light and harbor dues, while in the Philippines. Aircraft
operated by or for the United States armed forces shall observe local air traffic control
regulations while in the Philippines. Vessels owned or operated by the United States solely
on United States Government non-commercial service shall not be subject to compulsory
pilotage at Philippine ports.
"Article IX
Duration and Termination
"This agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the parties have notified each
other in writing through the diplomatic channel that they have completed their constitutional
requirements for entry into force. This agreement shall remain in force until the expiration of
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180 days from the date on which either party gives the other party notice in writing that it
desires to terminate the agreement."
Via these consolidated11 petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners - as legislators,
non-governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers - assail the constitutionality of the
VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
We have simplified the issues raised by the petitioners into the following:
I
Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question
the constitutionality of the VFA?
II
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII
of the Constitution?
III
Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty?
a. Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by
US military personnel?
b. Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or higher?
IV
Does the VFA violate:
a. the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution?
b. the Prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II, Section 8?
c. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution granting the exemption from taxes and duties
for the equipment, materials supplies and other properties imported into or acquired in the
Philippines by, or on behalf, of the US Armed Forces?
LOCUS STANDI
At the outset, respondents challenge petitioner’s standing to sue, on the ground that the latter
have not shown any interest in the case, and that petitioners failed to substantiate that they
have sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA.12

Petitioners, on the other hand, counter that the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a matter of
transcendental importance which justifies their standing.13
A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not
only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or in is in immediate, or imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way." He must show that he has been, or is about to be,
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.14
In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they
have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise
by Congress of its taxing or spending powers.15 On this point, it bears stressing that a
taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.16 Thus, in Bugnay Const. &
Development Corp. vs. Laron17 , we held:
"x x x it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or
injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. Before
he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is
not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public."
Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the
absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally
expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Tañada, Agapito Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as
petitioners-legislators, do not possess the requisite locus standi to maintain the present suit.
While this Court, in Phil. Constitution Association vs. Hon. Salvador Enriquez,18 sustained
the legal standing of a member of the Senate and the House of Representatives to question
the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bull,
we cannot, at this instance, similarly uphold petitioners’ standing as members of Congress, in
the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which
they belong.
Beyond this, the allegations of impairment of legislative power, such as the delegation of the
power of Congress to grant tax exemptions, are more apparent than real. While it may be
true that petitioners pointed to provisions of the VFA which allegedly impair their legislative
powers, petitioners failed however to sufficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct
injury.
In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in
these cases. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the IBP lacks the legal capacity to
165
bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its
National President to commence the present action.19
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of
the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes
aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the
early Emergency Powers Cases,20 where we had occasion to rule:
"x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect
and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection
that they were not proper parties and ruled that ‘transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.’ We have since then applied the exception in many other cases.
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175
SCRA 343)." (Underscoring Supplied)
This principle was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales vs. COMELEC,21 Daza
vs. Singson,22 and Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corporation,23 where we
emphatically held:
"Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the
Court’s duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and
that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. x x x"
Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr.,24 thisCourt ruled that in
cases of transcendental importance, the Court may relax the standing requirements and
allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of
judicial review.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the
doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the departments of the government a
becoming respect for each others’ acts,25 this Court nevertheless resolves to take
cognizance of the instant petitions.
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of which provision of the
Constitution applies, with regard to the exercise by the senate of its constitutional power to
concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering
that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.
Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as
the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary
visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military exercises.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the
Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII, which herein
respondents invoke, reads:
"No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:
"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and
the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State."
Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which
case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required
to make the subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the
Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treatise or international agreements
and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited
to, extradition or tax treatise or those economic in nature. All treaties or international
agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or
particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and
effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which
involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this
provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance
with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the
Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose
if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.
It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other,
actually share some common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases
in the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular,
Section 21 opens with the clause "No treaty x x x," and Section 25 contains the phrase "shall
not be allowed." Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is
indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective.
To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21,
Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is
immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article
166
XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to
comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops
and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of
military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation
and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in
a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with
regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to
obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.
It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law
prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat generali. Thus, where there is in the same
statute a particular enactment and also a general one which, in its most comprehensive
sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be
operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its
general language which are not within the provision of the particular enactment.26
In Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,27 we enunciated:
"x x x that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation
must give way to a special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as
to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo vs.
de los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139), that a specific statute prevails over a general statute (De
Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail (Wil
Wilhensen Inc. vs. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38)."
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere
transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the
establishment of a military base. On this score, the Constitution makes no distinction between
"transient’ and "permanent". Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that
requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is a rudiment in legal hermenuetics that when no distinction is made by law, the Court
should not distinguish- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.
In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not
controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are
involved in the VFA. Notably, a perusal of said constitutional provision reveals that the
proscription covers "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities." Stated differently, this
prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being

established. The clause does not refer to "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities"
collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The use of comma and
the disjunctive word "or" clearly signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
the others included in the enumeration,28 such that, the provision contemplates three
different situations - a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b)
foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities - any of the three standing alone places it under the
coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
To this end, the intention of the framers of the Charter, as manifested during the deliberations
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is consistent with this interpretation:
"MR. MAAMBONG. I just want to address a question or two to Commissioner Bernas.
This formulation speaks of three things: foreign military bases, troops or facilities. My first
question is: If the country does enter into such kind of a treaty, must it cover the three-bases,
troops or facilities-or could the treaty entered into cover only one or two?
FR. BERNAS. Definitely, it can cover only one. Whether it covers only one or it covers three,
the requirement will be the same.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the Philippine government can enter into a treaty covering
not bases but merely troops?
FR. BERNAS. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. I cannot find any reason why the government can enter into a treaty
covering only troops.
FR. BERNAS. Why not? Probably if we stretch our imagination a little bit more, we will find
some. We just want to cover everything."29 (Underscoring Supplied)
Moreover, military bases established within the territory of another state is no longer viable
because of the alternatives offered by new means and weapons of warfare such as nuclear
weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for
months and years without returning to their home country. These military warships are
actually used as substitutes for a land-home base not only of military aircraft but also of
military personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels are mobile as compared to a land-based
military headquarters.
At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the requirements of Section
25 were complied with when the Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the
treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified
167
by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as
a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution, whether under the general requirement in Section 21, Article
VII, or the specific mandate mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter
article requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being
unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or
international agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds
of all the members of the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides
that the treaty be "duly concurred in by the Senate."
Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the
Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly
obtained and deemed present. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among
other things, that the treaty-the VFA, in the instant case-be "duly concurred in by the Senate,"
it is very true however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the clear
mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the
concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by a two -thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to
section 21, Article, VII.
As noted, the "concurrence requirement" under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in
relation to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular language, the
concurrence of the Senate contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least
two-thirds of all the members of the Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty-the VFA
in the instant case.
Under these circumstances, the charter provides that the Senate shall be composed of
twenty-four (24) Senators.30 Without a tinge of doubt, two-thirds (2/3) of this figure, or not
less than sixteen (16) members, favorably acting on the proposal is an unquestionable
compliance with the requisite number of votes mentioned in Section 21 of Article VII. The fact
that there were actually twenty-three (23) incumbent Senators at the time the voting was
made,31 will not alter in any significant way the circumstance that more than two-thirds of the
members of the Senate concurred with the proposed VFA, even if the two-thirds vote
requirement is based on this figure of actual members (23). In this regard, the fundamental
law is clear that two-thirds of the 24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes, suffice so as to
render compliance with the strict constitutional mandate of giving concurrence to the subject
treaty.
Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25, Article XVIII are
present, we shall now pass upon and delve on the requirement that the VFA should be
recognized as a treaty by the United States of America.

Petitioners content that the phrase "recognized as a treaty," embodied in section 25, Article
XVIII, means that the VFA should have the advice and consent of the United States Senate
pursuant to its own constitutional process, and that it should not be considered merely an
executive agreement by the United States.
In opposition, respondents argue that the letter of United States Ambassador Hubbard stating
that the VFA is binding on the United States Government is conclusive, on the point that the
VFA is recognized as a treaty by the United States of America. According to respondents, the
VFA, to be binding, must only be accepted as a treaty by the United States.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.32 To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United
States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution,33 is to accord strict meaning to
the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in
common use.34
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty.35 To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under
international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is "an international
instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever
its particular designation."36 There are many other terms used for a treaty or international
agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d’ arbitrage, concordat,
convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All
writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international
agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no legal significance. Certain
terms are useful, but they furnish little more than mere description.37
Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that "the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding
the use of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or
to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of the State."
Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements
in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have
remained within their powers.38 International law continues to make no distinction between
treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations.39
168
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even
without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern
Sea Trading,40 we had occasion to pronounce:
"x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest
days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as
commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and
copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity and
constitutionality of executive agreements entered into without Senate approval. (39 Columbia
Law Review, pp. 753-754) (See, also, U.S. vs. Curtis Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S.
304, 81 L. ed. 255; U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.S. vs. Pink, 315 U.S.
203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S. 188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15 pp. 1905-1906;
California Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675; Hyde on International Law [revised Edition], Vol.
2, pp. 1405, 1416-1418; willoughby on the U.S. Constitution Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540;
Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218; Hackworth, International Law Digest,
Vol. V, pp. 390-407). (Italics Supplied)" (Emphasis Ours)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution is
enlightening and highly-instructive:
"MR. MAAMBONG. Of course it goes without saying that as far as ratification of the other
state is concerned, that is entirely their concern under their own laws.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, but we will accept whatever they say. If they say that we have done
everything to make it a treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we will accept it as a
treaty."41
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the
terms of the VFA.42 For as long as the united States of America accepts or acknowledges
the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty,
there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence
of the Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nation’s consent
to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and
responsibilities embodied thereunder.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of
the government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is

proclaimed.43 A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a
treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a)
the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating
States agreed that ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the State has
signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty
subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative, or was expressed
during the negotiation.44
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly
believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.45
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the
exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now
becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be
bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution,46 declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally
accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation
devolves upon the state and not upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member
of its government, the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any
branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As an integral part of the
community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our government, Constitution and
laws will carry out our international obligation.47 Hence, we cannot readily plead the
Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and
responsibilities under international law.
Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the
International Law Commission in 1949 provides: "Every State has the duty to carry out in
good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it
may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this
duty."48
Equally important is Article 26 of the convention which provides that "Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." This is known as
the principle of pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of treaties and have been
one of the most fundamental principles of positive international law, supported by the
jurisprudence of international tribunals.49
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In the instant controversy, the President, in effect, is heavily faulted for exercising a power
and performing a task conferred upon him by the Constitution-the power to enter into and
169
ratify treaties. Through the expediency of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners in these
consolidated cases impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the chief Executive in
ratifying the VFA, and referring the same to the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Section
21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.50
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State,
is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the
President is the chief architect of the nation’s foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of
foreign relations is (then) conceded."51 Wielding vast powers an influence, his conduct in the
external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is "executive altogether."52
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests
the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent
ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the
lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress
itself is powerless to invade it.53 Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President
involving the VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and those
necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within the sphere
of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by
this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.
It is the Court’s considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the
same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of the powers
vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no moment that the President, in the exercise of his
wide latitude of discretion and in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of
Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence
under the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave,
patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the President in his act of
ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of complying with the
concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the President merely
performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the
functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence
under the provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of the
Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty
of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious manner.
For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution has broadened the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as
 170

those relating to national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions
such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.54 The High Tribunal’s function, as
sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, "is merely (to) check whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred
or has a different view. In the absence of a showing… (of) grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power…It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error."55

As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the same with the Senate
alone.1âwphi1 Thus, once the Senate56 performs that power, or exercises its prerogative
within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot, in like manner,
be viewed to constitute an abuse of power, much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily, the
Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting within the limits of such power, may not be
similarly faulted for having simply performed a task conferred and sanctioned by no less than
the fundamental law.

For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character;57 the
Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to
either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and whatever action it takes in the exercise
of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. In
this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of
separation of powers and of checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these
cherished rudiments remain true to their form in a democratic government such as ours. The
Constitution thus animates, through this treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthy
system of checks and balances indispensable toward our nation’s pursuit of political maturity
and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining to the wisdom
of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the courts to inquire.

In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, this
Court- as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the
people - is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely
executive and legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the
distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three political
branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it
by law.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS
SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own behalf,
petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH
ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183752 October 14, 2008
CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON. CELSO L. LOBREGAT,
City Mayor of Zamboanga, and in his personal capacity as resident of the City of Zamboanga,
Rep. MA. ISABELLE G. CLIMACO, District 1, and Rep. ERICO BASILIO A. FABIAN, District
2, City of Zamboanga, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING
PANEL (GRP), as represented by RODOLFO C. GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY
CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as
the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183893 October 14, 2008
THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE LLUCH CRUZ,
petitioner,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH
ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and duly appointed
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity
as Executive Secretary. respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183951 October 14, 2008
171
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented by
HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H.
OLVIS, in his capacity as Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, HON. CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman, 1st Congressional
District, HON. CESAR G. JALOSJOS, Congressman, 3rd Congressional District, and
Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga del Norte,
namely, HON. SETH FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON. FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR.,
HON. ULDARICO M. MEJORADA II, HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS, HON. EDGAR J.
BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC L. ADRIATICO, HON. FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO, HON. JOSEPH
BRENDO C. AJERO, HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S. DARUNDAY,
HON. ANGELICA J. CARREON and HON. LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING
PANEL [GRP], as represented by HON. RODOLFO C. GARCIA and HON. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser of Peace Process, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183962 October 14, 2008
ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING
PANEL, represented by its Chairman RODOLFO C. GARCIA, and the MORO ISLAMIC
LIBERATION FRONT PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman
MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N. DEANO,
petitioners-in-intervention,
x--------------------------------------------x
THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P.
SANTOS-AKBAR, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x

THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDADATU, in
his capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of the Province of Sultan Kudarat,
petitioner-in-intervention.
x-------------------------------------------x
RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of Indigenous Peoples in
Mindanao Not Belonging to the MILF, petitioner-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT, JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and
RICHALEX G. JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of Palawan, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC (MUSLAF), respondent-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE & DEVELOPMENT (MMMPD),
respondent-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing
the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict
in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal
issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-
standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It
must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully
exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling
unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive
precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.
I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS
172
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF,
through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to
sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership
of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then
headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the
manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.1
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however,
for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled
signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP
from signing the same.
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several
prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace
negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the
Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General
Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that
the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace
negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and
pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue
advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.2
Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the
GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a
number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town
hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.3 In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared
and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the
MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF,
according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when
President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened
its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with
the GRP.4
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the
Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General
Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF
thereafter suspended all its military actions.5

Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the
outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001)
containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation:
Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the
Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same
be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."
A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which
ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the
Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the
Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia.
Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the
MILF from 2002 to 2003.
Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was
replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's
position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.6
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually
leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to
be signed last August 5, 2008.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an
instrument - the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket
numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain7 and
the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed
a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.9 Invoking the
right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the
contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.10
This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for
Mandamus and Prohibition11 filed by the City of Zamboanga,12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep.
Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive
reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the
173
Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the
MOA-AD be declared null and void.
By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
commanding and directing public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from
formally signing the MOA-AD.13 The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to
the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,14 to which she
complied.15
Meanwhile, the City of Iligan16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief,
docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-
AD or, if the same had already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-
AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as respondent.
The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis
Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members18 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for
Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition,19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia,
that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operative effect, and that
respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a
petition for Prohibition,20 docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting
and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD
and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD
for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent
the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.
Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-
/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-in-Intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas,
former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela21 and
Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat22 and Gov. Suharto
Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte,23 Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao
City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and
businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig,
Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal
Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention.
By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
Respondents filed Comments on the petitions, while some of petitioners submitted their
respective Replies.
Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive
Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address

the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding
exchange of pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from
petitioners.
The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the
following principal issues:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of
the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is
considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
negotiated and initiated the MOA vis-à-vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public
consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]
If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is an appropriate remedy;
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
BINDING itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF
ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines;
174
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga,
Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas
covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.24
The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the
parties submitted their memoranda on time.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD
As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five
petitions and six petitions-in-intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-
in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of the MOA.
The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.
Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier
agreements between the GRP and MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and the
MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of
the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of
President Fidel Ramos.
The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)25 and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),26
and several international law instruments - the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on
the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others.
The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment
emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh
(or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device."
During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through
a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the
Abode of War). The first referred to those lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the
second denoted those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were
outlawed or ineffective.27 This way of viewing the world, however, became more complex
through the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the international community of
nations.
As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and
inter-governmental organizations, the classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-
ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of
perceiving non-Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact)

and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, though under a secular regime,
maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim States, having been bound to
each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to
countries which, though not bound by treaty with Muslim States, maintained freedom of
religion for Muslims.28
It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-
mua'hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF and the
Philippine government - the Philippines being the land of compact and peace agreement -
that partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as "any solemn
agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties
which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]."29
The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS
FOLLOWS," and starts with its main body.
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles,
Territory, Resources, and Governance.
A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.'" It defines
"Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization,
and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.30
Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not
only "Moros" as traditionally understood even by Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of
indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been
specifically defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is
vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.32
Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the
public domain.33
The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which
right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain
authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were
described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the
elements of a nation-state in the modern sense.34
The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the
past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the
175
Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the
Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities
(pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the
others.35
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined
territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce
with foreign nations."
The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that
territory, particularly those known as Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is
equally entitled to be called "First Nation," hence, all of them are usually described
collectively by the plural "First Nations."36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the
Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" - suggesting its exclusive entitlement to that
designation - departs from the Canadian usage of the term.
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to
which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands
of the Bangsamoro.37
B. TERRITORY
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the
atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.38
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM
- thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao
del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.39
Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays,
which are grouped into two categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to
be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus,
Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months
following the signing of the MOA-AD.40 Category B areas, also called "Special Intervention
Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the
signing of a separate agreement - the Comprehensive Compact.41
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural
resources within its "internal waters," defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the
coastline of the BJE area;42 that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall
stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines
(RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial
waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise

joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources.43 Notably, the
jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."
The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the
Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing and
economic cooperation agreement.44 The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct
on the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of
natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police
and safety measures.45 There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed
activities with respect to the internal waters of the BJE.
C. RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade
relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those
countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to include aggression
against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements.46
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central
Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the
BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the
specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official
missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for
environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies
of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain.47
With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of
energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon
is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This
right carries the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so
requires," the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as
may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources.48
The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to
natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.49
The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any
unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their
marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible,
reparation is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties.50
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or
agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA),
Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments
granted by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.51
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D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the
implementation of the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for
the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual
implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the
third party shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central
Government and the BJE.52
The "associative" relationship
between the Central Government
and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as
"associative," characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the
structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative
institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal
framework" shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting
the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and
within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As will be
discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on the legality of this provision.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of
civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police
and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which
shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.
As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia
and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the
MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the
signatories as "the representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF themselves,
and not merely of the negotiating panels.53 In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD
states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the
Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for
Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G.
Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August
5, 2008.
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the
provinces, municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the
discussion on the strand on TERRITORY.

IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. RIPENESS
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.54 Courts decline to
issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic
questions.55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies
defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.56
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.57 The Court can decide the
constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is
submitted for judicial determination.58
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it.59 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is
a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture,60 and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.61 He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of the act complained of.62
The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial
review in the present petitions, reasoning that
The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and
legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful
agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does not automatically
create legally demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative acts required have
been duly complied with. x x x
xxxx
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to
pass upon issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interests with
no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are no
concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts
complained of are mere contemplated steps toward the formulation of a final peace
agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is merely imaginary
and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring
supplied)
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The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:
TERRITORY
xxxx
2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:
xxxx
d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates
to conduct and deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following
the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list and
depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an
integral part of this framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to
complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact
within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD.
xxxx
GOVERNANCE
xxxx
7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this
MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to
enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall
come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non-derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
Compact.64 (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,65 this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action,
the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.
xxxx

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x
settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.66
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United States Supreme Court held that
the challenge to the constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and
speeches before games was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led
under the policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on its face.68
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in
New York v. United States,69 decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that
the action by the State of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take
effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to take immediate
action to avoid the provision's consequences.70
The present petitions pray for Certiorari,71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and
Prohibition are remedies granted by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the
case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.72
Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.73 Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.74
The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3),
issued on February 28, 2001.75 The said executive order requires that "[t]he government's
policy framework for peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative
structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this
Executive Order."76
The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the
terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local government units or communities affected,
nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such
omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No.
3.
Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution.
The MOA-AD provides that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an amendment
of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the
MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its
authority. Again, these points will be discussed in more detail later.
178
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority,
by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes,
the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an
actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of
government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.77
B. LOCUS STANDI
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."78
Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to
affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the
constitutional question raised.79
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to
be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.80
When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has
an interest in the execution of the laws.81
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are
illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.82 The Court retains discretion
whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit.83
In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the
institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be
questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.84
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members,85 but the mere
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of
the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing.86
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an
interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.87
Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention,88 such as a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.

In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi,
given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo,89 where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues
raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the
attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.90 The
Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its
purpose the protection of fundamental rights.
In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine
whether the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside
technical rules of procedure.91
In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of
Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of
Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat,
City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and
substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in
part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they
did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE
territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.
In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III
would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would
be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that
they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de
Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of the transcendental
importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing.
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert
that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional
plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal
standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable
transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in
these petitions.
With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the
Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right
to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite
standing as an intervenor.
With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3rd district of
Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as
members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer,
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resident and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as
taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present petitions. Just the
same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi
given the paramount public interest in the issues at hand.
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an
advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao;
and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim
lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the
resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions
on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing.
B. MOOTNESS
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction
of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the
Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the
government will not sign the MOA."92
In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President
had already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel.93
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not
being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution;95 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is
involved;96 (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public;97 and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.98
Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary
cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and
the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the
tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot
especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible
recurrence of the violation.99
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain
of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in the present
cases as they were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo100 and
Manalo v. Calderon101 where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening
events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.
Petitions not mooted

Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the
eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears
emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court's issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order.
Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of
consensus points," especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed
by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional
implications of these "consensus points," foremost of which is the creation of the BJE.
In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of
respondents to amend and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for
certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not
confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future
negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions have not, therefore,
been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-AD,102 the
manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not
withstanding.
Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest
There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving
a significant part of the country's territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of
affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments
including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court
to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the
government and its negotiating entity.
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues
which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more
harm than good to the nation as a whole."
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was
assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government procurement contract for a
national broadband network involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties-the
government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific
government procurement policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion
in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to
the transactions and parties involved in the controversy.
The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements
In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements
necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the third such component to be
180
undertaken following the implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and the
Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002.
Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the
Solicitor General, has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the
government will not sign the MOA[-AD]," mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the
Tripoli Agreement 2001.
Need to formulate principles-guidelines
Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out
the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which
could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the
Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is both
constitutional and equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be
assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the
government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral Domain.
Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes104 in which he stated that the doctrine of "capable of
repetition yet evading review" can override mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper
case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their
issuance." They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the
doctrine to be invoked.
The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises
original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction
and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching
implications and raises questions that need to be resolved.105 At all events, the Court has
jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions.
Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine
immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases.106 There is a
reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato,
Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and
the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as
respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form.
It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot,
respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners
with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have
been furnished, or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.
V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two
SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was
negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz:
1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and
the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD?
2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?
ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as
provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.107
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has recognized the statutory right to
examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional
status.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the
1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.109
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,110 the Court ruled that access to public
records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public
concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of
social and political significance.
x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role
of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the
public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are
denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed:
"Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its
dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x111
In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies
of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-
making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation112 so
that they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a
responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited
181
exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to
the changes desired by the people.113
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public
concern114 faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is
indeed of public concern.115 In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real
estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds,116 the need for adequate notice to the
public of the various laws,117 the civil service eligibility of a public employee,118 the proper
management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials,119 the recovery
of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth,120 and the identity of party-list nominees,121
among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the
present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature
or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled:
x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for
the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if
no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to
expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which
may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli.
This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation
which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will
prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an
emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."122 (Emphasis and italics in the
original)
Intended as a "splendid symmetry"123 to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the
policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.124
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the
right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The
right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section
28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.125

The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of
public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.126
These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold
public officials at all times accountable to the people.127
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission so disclose:
MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will
not be in force and effect until after Congress shall have provided it.
MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, the
implementing law will have to be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer.128
The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the
issue, is enlightening.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the
Gentleman correctly as having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require
a legislation by Congress to implement?
MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment
from Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interest are modified by the
clause "as may be provided by law"
MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and
Congress may provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest?
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately
influence the climate of the conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no
longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle, which is
inconsistent with this policy.129 (Emphasis supplied)
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a
statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for
"reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-
executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the
broader130 right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the
correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not
enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of
an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.
182
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that
the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people's will.131 Envisioned to be corollary to the twin
rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to
participate? Will the government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can
participate and can react where the existing media facilities are not able to provide full
feedback mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be part of the government
implementing operational mechanisms.
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses
take place. There is a message and a feedback, both ways.
xxxx
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence?
I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials but
also network of private business o[r] community-based organizations that will be reacting. As
a matter of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the private network of volunteers
and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid that there will
be another OMA in the making.132 (Emphasis supplied)
The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in
the "marching orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and
to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly
provided by E.O. No. 3.133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a
need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process
by institutionalizing the people's participation.
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should
be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all
Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending
groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community."134 Included as a component of the
comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which
includes "continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a
peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in
the peace process."135
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing"
consultations, contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient
consultation."136

Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which
is to "[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace
partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render
appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process."137
E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to
consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned
sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the
comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and
consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives."138
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a
corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.
PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion
The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular
way or manner. It may, however, require him to comply with the law and discharge the
functions within the authority granted by the President.139
Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in
justifying the denial of petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the
manner by which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation.
Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different from superficial
conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lip service.140 It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the
premises. The argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit
provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The
executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the GRP
makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers its definite
propositions.141 It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information,
comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of
their unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By
unconditionally complying with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the
document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was complying therewith
ex abundante ad cautelam.
183
Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State
policy to "require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other
concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions"142 is well-taken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations
puts flesh into this avowed policy:
Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied
with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants
in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate
relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.143
(Italics and underscoring supplied)
In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Paño,144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted
provision of the LGU apply only to national programs or projects which are to be implemented
in a particular local community. Among the programs and projects covered are those that are
critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of
a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.145 The
MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a
vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,146 which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose
interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-
AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-
making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies.147 The MOA-AD, an
instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut
mechanisms ordained in said Act,148 which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD,
without which all other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In proceeding
to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which
is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries
of their authority. As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary
changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the effectivity
of all provisions requiring changes to the legal framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will
be discussed in the following section.
Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny
and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating
from them.149

ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all
be accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as
much in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to
amend the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions.
Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because
any provisions therein which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be
effective until the necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this
argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded
therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those
granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the
present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested
in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying
link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of
association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the
Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES,
and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the
MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and
the Central Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity
shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of
governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with
defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be
established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the
Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more
precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a
concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of
international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that
concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term
"associative" in the MOA-AD.
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable
links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the
184
other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations
represent a middle ground between integration and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of
Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands,151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The
currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet
they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international
legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to
UN membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally
have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity
extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal,
civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs,
is obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters
which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either government.
In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S.
government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S.
territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using military
areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar the military
personnel of any third country from having access to these territories for military purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is
understood as an international association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free
Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution,
and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It
has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the
UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an
underlying status of independence.152
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a
transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states
that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua,
St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since
become independent states.153
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international
legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into
economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central
Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over
external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions
bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of

revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of
the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall
Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in
the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any
part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already
requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following
provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
The BJE is a far more powerful
entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the
national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a
state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept
of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.
185
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the
BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the
specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with
the Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis
supplied)
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision
just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on
TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in
addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during
the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are
automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas
under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of
the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001,
however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely
because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
The MOA-AD, moreover, would not
comply with Article X, Section 20 of
the Constitution
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution
and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers
over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied)
Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD
would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere
passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision
would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-
AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance,
to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate
paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that
such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President
who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary155 instructs:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign
nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's
mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in
the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity
and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold
national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties
between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine
territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with
prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM,
and the IPRA.157
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition
of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles
states:
1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those
186
who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including
Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants
whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro.
The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3
of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and
other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro
people and Tribal peoples, as follows:
"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino
citizens residing in the autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions
distinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have
retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions."
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain
of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of
Territory, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules,
"[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric
space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region."
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in
the following provisions thereof:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains
shall be done in accordance with the following procedures:
xxxx
b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated
by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation
filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including
census of all community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral
Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be
done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine
involvement and participation by the members of the communities concerned;

d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or
community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession
or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners
which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;
2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;
3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds,
sacred places and old villages;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into
by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs;
5) Survey plans and sketch maps;
6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers,
creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and
10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.
e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based
thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete
with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced
therein;
f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete copy of the preliminary census
and a report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;
g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native
language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least
fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and
regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto
within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such
newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further,
That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not
available;
187
h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection
process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a
favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is
deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional
evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed
patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of
rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all
concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP:
Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on
the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the
contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the
conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below.
xxxx
To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system,
a discussion of not only the Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is
in order, for
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land."
Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,158 held
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the land on account of
which it ordered the release on bail of a detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation
order had not been executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu159
applied the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals.
International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples," understood
not merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In considering the
question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the
Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC160 had occasion
to acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized
in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond ‘convention' and
is considered a general principle of international law."
Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights161 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights162 which
state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-
determination, "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development."
The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a
unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made between the right of internal and
external self-determination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:

"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination
126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination
of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state.
A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the
assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and,
even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x
External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration
on Friendly Relations, supra, as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration
with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined
by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.
(Emphasis added)
127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of
respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that
support the existence of a people's right to self-determination also contain parallel statements
supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to
prevent threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between
sovereign states.
x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external
self-determination can arise, namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to
foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial context, and - less definitely but asserted
by a number of commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to internal
self-determination. The Court ultimately held that the population of Quebec had no right to
secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being
deprived of the freedom to make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural
development, citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial
institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein.
The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION.163 There, Sweden presented to the Council of the League
of Nations the question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be authorized
to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be
incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the question,
appointed an International Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on the
preliminary issue of whether the dispute should, based on international law, be entirely left to
the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee stated the rule as follows:
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x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of
national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive
International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate
themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any
more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation. Generally
speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own
political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the
sovereignty of every State which is definitively constituted. A dispute between two States
concerning such a question, under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question which
International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned.
Any other solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would
involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be contrary
to the very idea embodied in term "State," but would also endanger the interests of the
international community. If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of a nation,
neither can it be held by the State to which the national group wishes to be attached, nor by
any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a
question which is left by international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby
applying the exception rather than the rule elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the
general rule, however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation
originated at a time when Finland was undergoing drastic political transformation. The
internal situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a
considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist.
In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national
government was disputed by a large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been chased
from the capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps and the
police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was
not, during the relevant time period, a "definitively constituted" sovereign state. The
Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the right to withhold from a portion
of its population the option to separate itself - a right which sovereign nations generally have
with respect to their own populations.
Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in
scholarship as well as international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with
distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been
forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as
"indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now
dominated by others. Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are
culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the
forces of empire and conquest.164 Examples of groups who have been regarded as
indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada.
As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated within states do not
have a general right to independence or secession from those states under international

law,165 but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to
internal self-determination.
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General
Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among
those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination,
encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government, to wit:
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy
or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and
means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal,
economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they
so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.
Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples,
has been understood as equivalent to "internal self-determination."166 The extent of self-
determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more particularly defined in its subsequent
articles, some of which are quoted hereunder:
Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced
assimilation or destruction of their culture.
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct
peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or
resources;
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(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or
undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination
directed against them.
Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their
economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment,
vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure
continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be
paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and
persons with disabilities.
Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories
and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional
occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources.
Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land
tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.
Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples,
unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by
the indigenous peoples concerned.
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned,
through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions,
prior to using their lands or territories for military activities.
Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for
the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.

2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources,
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or
other resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities,
and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic,
social, cultural or spiritual impact.
Article 37
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of
treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their
successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other
constructive arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of
indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate
measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.
Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be
regarded as embodying customary international law - a question which the Court need not
definitively resolve here - the obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the
Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the
particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions
of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the different
States.
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous
peoples their own police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is
the State which will provide protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced
dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally performed by police officers. If the
protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the
responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such
peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement
of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it
upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
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Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does
not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated
state. All the rights recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the
United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as
to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be
reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer,
however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law
or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions
thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They
cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is
reproduced below for convenience:
7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this
MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to
enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall
come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and
within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from
coming into force until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While the
word "Constitution" is not mentioned in the provision now under consideration or anywhere
else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad enough to include the
Constitution.
Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of
incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government, have already violated the Memorandum of
Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations
shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already
discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an
independent status already prevailing.

Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective
because the suspensive clause is invalid, as discussed below.
The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on
E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c), which states that there shall be established Government Peace
Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different rebel groups to be "appointed by the
President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face
discussions with rebel groups." These negotiating panels are to report to the President,
through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the negotiations.
It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem
through its negotiations with the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options
available under the laws as they presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive
peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace," is the pursuit
of social, economic, and political reforms which may require new legislation or even
constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No.
125,167 states:
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the comprehensive peace
process comprise the processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component
processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued
simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be
limited to, the following:
a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component
involves the vigorous implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects
aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may
require administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to
address, pursuant to this provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in
Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think outside the box," so to speak. Hence, they
negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and
political reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the present legal
framework, and which thus would require new legislation and constitutional amendments.
The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot stop here, because it
must be asked whether the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP
Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a).
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the
President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require
new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to
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those solutions which the present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a
discussion of the extent of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in issue was the authority of the President to declare a
state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The
Court held thus:
"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence.
There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of
her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which
are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the
avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of
the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was
a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-
in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her
powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-
Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her
powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has
the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the
more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.169
As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will
show, however, peace is rarely attained by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes,
changes as far-reaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional
structure is required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit:
x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the
core of any post-conflict peace-building mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti
over the last ten years, conflict cessation without modification of the political environment,
even where state-building is undertaken through technical electoral assistance and
institution- or capacity-building, is unlikely to succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of
states emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a substantial proportion of
transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.
The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in
the political and governance transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to

create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get there. The
constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by
which the new democracy will operate.170
In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of
peace agreements, observed that the typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm
mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional
structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human rights institutions.171
In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has
been recognized by no less than the framers of the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the
Constitution on autonomous regions172 is the framers' intention to implement a particular
peace agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP and the MNLF,
signed by then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF
Chairman Nur Misuari.
MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will
reserve my right to ask them if they are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two
questions.
I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim
region; it is working very well; it has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my
question is: since that already exists, why do we have to go into something new?
MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup
Abubakar is right that certain definite steps have been taken to implement the provisions of
the Tripoli Agreement with respect to an autonomous region in Mindanao. This is a good first
step, but there is no question that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Agreement
itself and to the fuller standard of regional autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and
now by state policy.173(Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have,
to the credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still
faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the
President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve
lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of
peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their
implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with
rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their
grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers
viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to
Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures
for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option,
pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended
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amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be
exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and
referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner
that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.
In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of
directly submitting proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the
interim National Assembly which was the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the
power to propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened
the interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act, holding that "the
urges of absolute necessity" compelled the President as the agent of the people to act as he
did, there being no interim National Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Against
this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Court's concern
at present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided in that
controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side.
Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the
President may directly submit proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit
in his opinion is a recognition that he would have upheld the President's action along with the
majority had the President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his
proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined:
"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of
government, defines and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the
exercise of such powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to but has been
withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows that the President's questioned
decrees proposing and submitting constitutional amendments directly to the people (without
the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the power is expressly vested) are
devoid of constitutional and legal basis."176 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course
of conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies
that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without
the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as
a certainty.
Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose
amendments through initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her
recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite
similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of
whether these recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative.

These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's
suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief
Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine "people's initiative." The only initiative
recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court
stated in Lambino v. COMELEC:177
"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the ‘people's voice.' However, the Lambino
Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition
with the COMELEC, that ‘ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her
Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms.' The Lambino
Group thus admits that their ‘people's' initiative is an ‘unqualified support to the agenda' of the
incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of
incantations of ‘people's voice' or ‘sovereign will' in the present initiative."
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office,178 only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the
proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional
amendments, since her authority to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been
an accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the
more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation
Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has
always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which - for all intents and
purposes - is a proposal for new legislation coming from the President.179
The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards
Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments,
she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put
in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these
proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers
are vested.
Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof
which cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force
upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the
legal framework." This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition - defined
in civil law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a question of whether the
necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no
uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state
that the contemplated changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior
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agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
Compact."
Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the
legal framework contemplated in the MOA-AD - which changes would include constitutional
amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears noting that,
By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the
"prior agreements" from which there could be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the
implementing details for these "consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the
contemplated changes to the legal framework.
Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the
President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that
the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to
conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down
as unconstitutional.
A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision
appearing in the 1996 final peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most
instructive.
As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in
two phases. Phase I covered a three-year transitional period involving the putting up of new
administrative structures through Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and
Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development
(SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the new regional autonomous
government through amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act
of the ARMM.
The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the
expanded autonomous region envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the
provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two
agreements. While the MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal
framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus:
"Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress
for incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law."
Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international
law obligation on the part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto,
on the ground that it may be considered either as a binding agreement under international
law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international community
that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither
ground finds sufficient support in international law, however.

The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign
dignitaries as signatories. In addition, representatives of other nations were invited to witness
its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-
AD would have had the status of a binding international agreement had it been signed. An
examination of the prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the contrary
conclusion.
The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty180 (the Lomé Accord
case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lomé Accord was a peace
agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government
had been in armed conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There were non-
contracting signatories to the agreement, among which were the Government of the Togolese
Republic, the Economic Community of West African States, and the UN.
On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and
the Sierra Leone Government, another agreement was entered into by the UN and that
Government whereby the Special Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose
of the Special Court, an international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.
Among the stipulations of the Lomé Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the
members of the RUF with respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as
members of that organization since the conflict began.
In the Lomé Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally
binding obligation not to prosecute the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing,
among other things, the participation of foreign dignitaries and international organizations in
the finalization of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling
that the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights
between the parties in municipal law, not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held,
it is ineffective in depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction.
"37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy
to assume and to argue with some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the
defendants seem to have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict,
the document formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state or their
representatives and representatives of international organizations, means the agreement of
the parties is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.
xxxx
40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or
facilitator of the settlement, or persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took
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place but who are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and who do not
claim any obligation from the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the settlement.
41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF
which has no status of statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within the state.
The non-contracting signatories of the Lomé Agreement were moral guarantors of the
principle that, in the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace agreement is
implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties". The moral guarantors assumed
no legal obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative appended, presumably for
avoidance of doubt, an understanding of the extent of the agreement to be implemented as
not including certain international crimes.
42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations
regulated by international law so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under
international law which will also provide principle means of enforcement. The Lomé
Agreement created neither rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by international
law. An agreement such as the Lomé Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed
conflict no doubt creates a factual situation of restoration of peace that the international
community acting through the Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not
convert it to an international agreement which creates an obligation enforceable in
international, as distinguished from municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a peace
agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to peace in
the determination of the Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual situation of
peace to be visited with possible legal consequences arising from the new situation of conflict
created. Such consequences such as action by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII
arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it.
Such action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which
settles an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same status as one which settles an
international armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more warring States.
The Lomé Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x x"
(Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and
international organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a
binding character under international law.
In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral
declaration of the Philippine State, binding under international law, that it would comply with
all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution
accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view is
Australia v. France,181 also known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).
In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's
nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France refused to appear in the case, but public
statements from its President, and similar statements from other French officials including its

Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the
ICJ to dismiss the case.182 Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking
addressed to the international community, which required no acceptance from other States
for it to become effective.
Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to
the international community in issuing its public statements, viz:
43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or
factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind
may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the
declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the
declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required
to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if
given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of
international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid
pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction
from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement
would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the
pronouncement by the State was made.
44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a
certain position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound-the intention
is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make statements by which their
freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.
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51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French
Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to
terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of these
statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and their legal
consequences must be considered within the general framework of the security of
international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in the relations
among States. It is from the actual substance of these statements, and from the
circumstances attending their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be
deduced. The objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed to the
international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an undertaking
possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic, in
deciding upon the effective cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the
international community to which his words were addressed. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state
representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following
conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international
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community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not
to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international
intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.
The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case
decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali,183 also known as the Case Concerning the
Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of that case was a statement made by the
President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the
decision to be issued by a commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier
dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina Faso.
Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not
a unilateral act with legal implications. It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case
rested on the peculiar circumstances surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to
wit:
40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of
all the factual circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests
cases, the Court took the view that since the applicant States were not the only ones
concerned at the possible continuance of atmospheric testing by the French Government,
that Government's unilateral declarations had ‘conveyed to the world at large, including the
Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests‘ (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para.
51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular circumstances of those cases, the French Government
could not express an intention to be bound otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is
difficult to see how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the
applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its conduct was lawful. The
circumstances of the present case are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder
the Parties from manifesting an intention to accept the binding character of the conclusions of
the Organization of African Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal
agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind was concluded
between the Parties, the Chamber finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration
made by Mali's head of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal implications in
regard to the present case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a
unilateral declaration on the part of the Philippine State to the international community. The
Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the
international community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were
States and international organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and
projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of
Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lomé Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the
parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and
international organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to
create obligations in international law.

Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect
to such commitments would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse - to
the trust and confidence essential in the relations among States.
In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of
Burkina Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to
be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to
hinder the Philippine panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to
manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have come
about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be legally bound to the
international community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the
signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that
commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face
for the Philippine government before the international community, which was one of the
difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with
other countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement
suggests that it had no intention to be bound to the international community. On that ground,
the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral declaration under international law.
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law
notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the
legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave
abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation
of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the
sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act
would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress,
a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for
the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is
through an undue influence or interference with that process.
The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own
territory to the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants,
so long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus
Cogens.184 Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision.
SUMMARY
The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act
of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
196
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted
in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the
eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds
that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of
(a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the
situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June
2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could
contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view
of the respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of
the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.
The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the
Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest
in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction
as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the
design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a
species of these public rights.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise
of the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national
and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
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information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national
offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and
human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,
which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for
clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails,
among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive
Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure
the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with
that process.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration
binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing
amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally
defective.
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening
petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to
information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal
provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived
such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-
AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3,
Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-
AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and
amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It
illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes
that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the
present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does
not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people