J. Del Castillo - Labor Law

ABAD / ADAMSON 2018 LABOR DEL CASTILLO CASES & NOTES
FOR PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS (PALS)
JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO CASE DIGESTS

For 2018 LABOR BAR EXAMS
Dean Ada D. Abad
With the Adamson University College of Law
Bar Operations Academic Committee
and doctrinal digests by Dean Antonio H. Abad, Jr.

Far Eastern University Institute of Law
and Adamson University College of Law
A. GENERAL CONCEPTS
1. Employer-Employee relationship
1.1 Four tests to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship
(MEMORY AID: SOUTH WEST DISASTER CONTROL)

a. Selection and hiring;
b. payment of Wages;
c. power of Dismissal;
d. Control test.
• Of these four tests however, the most important test is the element of
control, which has been defined as [MEMORIZE THIS] “one where the
employer has reserved the right to control not only the work to be
achieved, but the manner and method by which such work is to be
achieved.”. (LVN Pictures vs. LVN Musician’s Guild, 1 SCRA 132).
• Important DEL CASTILLO cases on the four-fold test and the power of
control
a. Valeroso v. Skycable Corp., G.R. No. 202015, 13 July 2016
To prove the claim of an employer-employee relationship, the following

should be established by competent evidence: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power
of dismissal; and (4) the employer's power to control the employee with
respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be
accomplished. Among the four, the most determinative factor in
ascertaining the existence of employer-employee relationship is the
"right of control test." Under this control test, the person for whom the
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services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end to
be achieved, but also the means by which such end is reached.
b. Royale Homes Marketing Corp. v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 195190, 28 July

2014
The most determinative factor in ascertaining the existence of employer-

employee relationship is the "right of control test". It is deemed to be such
an important factor that the other requisites may even be disregarded. This
holds true where the issues to be resolved is whether a person who
performs work for another is the latter's employee or is an independent
contractor, as in this case. For where the person for whom the services are
performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved, but
also the means by which such end is reached, employer-employee
relationship is deemed to exist.|||
• CONTRA: But not every form of control is indicative of the existence of an

ER-EE relationship
DEL CASTILLO: Royale Homes Marketing Corp. v. Alcantara, G.R. No.

195190, 28 July 2014. --- Not every form of control that a hiring party
imposes on the hired party is indicative of employee-employer relationship.
Rules and regulations that merely serve as guidelines towards the
achievement of a mutually desired result without dictating the means and
methods of accomplishing it do not establish employer-employee
relationship|||
• Distinguish between “rules that fix methodology” vs. “rules that are
mere guidelines.”
Example: insurance agents; two cases:
Insurance agents are not employees of the insurance companies, in the

absence of evidence that rules or regulations were promulgated or issued
which effectively controlled or restricted the agent’s choice of methods — or
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the methods themselves — of selling insurance. (Insular Life Assurance Co.,

Ltd., vs. NLRC and Melecio Basiao, G.R. 84484, 15 November 1989, 179 SCRA
459).
But this is not to say that ALL insurance agents are NOT employees of the
insurance company. As the Supreme Court clarified in the case of Tongko
vs. Manufacturers' Life Insurance Company (Phils.) Inc. (G.R. No.
167622, 29 June 2010, En Banc), the Insular Life ruling above was
tempered with the qualification that had there been evidence that the
company promulgated rules or regulations that effectively controlled or
restricted an insurance agent's choice of methods or the methods
themselves in selling insurance, an employer-employee relationship would
have existed. In other words, the Court in Insular in no way definitively held
that insurance agents are not employees of insurance companies, but rather
made the same on a case-to-case basis.
1.2 Existence of an employer-employee relationship is a condition sine qua non

for the application of labor laws.
• There must be a REASONABLE CAUSAL CONNECTION between the

parties’ employer-employee relations, as well as the claim asserted, in order for
labor courts to have jurisdiction.
• In the absence of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.
GOOD EXAMPLE: Indophil Textile Mills Vs. Adviento, G.R. No. 171212, 04
August 2014
Facts: Adviento was hired as Civil Engineer (for maintenance of facilities) of

Indophil, whose primary business is the manufacture of textiles. Adviento
developed a chronic allergy on account of the textile dust. He was eventually
dismissed from employment, for which reason he filed two cases against the
company, viz: (a) NLRC for illegal termination; and (b) Regional Trial Court for
damages arising from gross negligence and failure of company to provide a
safe, workable and healthy environment. Company sought to dismiss the RTC
case on account of litis pendencia and lack of jurisdiction, considering that the
claim arises from an employer-employee relationship.
Question: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction?
Answer: YES. No reasonable causal connection between claim and employer-

employee relationship.
Although Adviento contracted the occupational disease during his employment

with the company, there is no reasonable causal connection between the claim
asserted and the employer-employee relations. As such, the case does not fall
within the jurisdiction of the labor courts; but rather with the regular courts that
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have jurisdiction. While the maintenance of a safe and healthy workplace may
be a subject of a labor case, note that the cause of action is one for torts/quasi-
delict and that relief prayed for is the payment for damages arising from alleged
gross negligence on the part of the company to provide a safe, healthy and
workable environment for its employees.
DEL CASTILLO case: De Roca v. Dabuyan, G.R. No. 215281, 05 March

2018 (outside the coverage, but note the principle which subsists until
now) -- "Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision
of law." The contract of employment between respondents, on the one hand,
and Oceanic and Ewayan on the other, is effective only between them; it
does not extend to petitioner, who is not a party thereto. His only role is as
lessor of the premises which Oceanic leased to operate as a hotel; he cannot
be deemed as respondent's employer — not even under the pretext that he
took over as the "new management" of the hotel operated by Oceanic. There
simply is no truth to such claim. Thus, to allow respondents to recover their
monetary claims from petitioner would necessarily result in their unjust
enrichment.
|||
• IS THE TERMINATION OF A HIGHER MANAGEMENT OFFICER “ASST.

VICE-PRESIDENT” “EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT”, OR SIMPLY “VICE-
PRESIDENT” A LABOR CASE OR A CORPORATE CASE
The core issue to be resolved in this case is whether petitioner's complaint for
illegal dismissal constitutes an intra-corporate controversy and thus, beyond
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
The mere fact that the employee was a stockholder of the employer corporation
at the time of the case’s filing did not necessarily make the action an intra–
corporate controversy. “[N]ot all conflicts between the stockholders and the
corporation are classified as intra–corporate. There are other facts to consider
in determining whether the dispute involves corporate matters as to consider
them as intra–corporate controversies.” Time and again, the Court has ruled
that in determining the existence of an intra–corporate dispute, the status or
relationship of the parties and the nature of the question that is the subject of
the controversy must be taken into account. Raul C. Cosare vs. Broadcom
Asia, Inc. and Dante Arevalo, G.R. No. 201298, 05 February 2014
• VERY IMPORTANT DEL CASTILLO CASE ON EXISTENCE OF INTRA-

CORPORATE CONTROVERSY: Real v. Sangu Philippines, Inc., G.R. No.
168757, 19 January 2011
There is a two-tier test in determining the existence of intra-corporate

controversy: relationship test and nature of the controversy test which
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must both be complied with. If not complied with, then this is not an intra-
corporate controversy.
The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are all stockholders or that
the parties involved are the stockholders and the corporation does not
necessarily place the dispute within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the SEC
(now the Regional Trial Court). The better policy to be followed in
determining jurisdiction over a case should be to consider concurrent
factors such as the status or relationship of the parties or the nature of
the question that is subject of their controversy. In the absence of any
one of these factors, the SEC will not have jurisdiction. Furthermore, it
does not necessarily follow that every conflict between the corporation and its
stockholders would involve such corporate matters as only SEC (now the
Regional Trial Court) can resolve in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers.
Intra-Corporate Controversy; relationship test

Initially, the main consideration in determining whether a dispute constitutes an
intra-corporate controversy was limited to a consideration of the intra-corporate
relationship existing between or among the parties. The types of relationships
embraced under Section 5(b) . . . were as follows:
a) between the corporation, partnership or association and the
public;
b) between the corporation, partnership or association and its
stockholders, partners, members or officers; aTEACS
c) between the corporation, partnership or association and the
State as far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is
concerned; and
d) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.
The existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations was sufficient to
confer jurisdiction to the SEC (now the RTC), regardless of the subject matter
of the dispute. This came to be known as the relationship test.
Intra-Corporate Controversy; nature of the controversy test
However, in the 1984 case of DMRC Enterprises v. Esta del Sol Mountain
Reserve, Inc., the Court introduced the nature of the controversy test. We
declared in this case that it is not the mere existence of an intra-corporate
relationship that gives rise to an intra-corporate controversy; to rely on the
relationship test alone will divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction for the
sole reason that the dispute involves a corporation, its directors, officers, or
stockholders. We saw that there is no legal sense in disregarding or minimizing
the value of the nature of the transactions which gives rise to the dispute.
Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that relationship must
also be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether the controversy
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itself is intra-corporate. The controversy must not only be rooted in the

existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the
enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations under
the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of
the corporation. If the relationship and its incidents are merely incidental to the
controversy or if there will still be conflict even if the relationship does not exist,
then no intra-corporate controversy exists.
TWO TESTS MUST BE COMPLIED WITH –
The Court then combined the two tests and declared that jurisdiction should be
determined by considering not only the status or relationship of the parties, but
also the nature of the question under controversy. This two-tier test was
adopted in the recent case of Speed Distribution Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
'To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate
controversy, and is to be heard and decided by the
branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court
to try and decide such cases, two elements must concur:
(a) the status or relationship of the parties, and (2) the
nature of the question that is the subject of their
controversy.
The first element requires that the controversy must arise
out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between any
or all of the parties and the corporation, partnership, or
association of which they are not stockholders, members
or associates, between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership or association of which they are
stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and
between such corporation, partnership, or association and
the State insofar as it concerns the individual franchises.
The second element requires that the dispute among the
parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the
corporation. If the nature of the controversy involves
matters that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the
case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy.'
[Citations omitted.]
Guided by this recent jurisprudence, we thus find no merit in respondents'
contention that the fact alone that petitioner is a stockholder and director of
respondent corporation automatically classifies this case as an intra-
corporate controversy. To reiterate, not all conflicts between the stockholders
and the corporation are classified as intra-corporate. There are other factors
to consider in determining whether the dispute involves corporate matters as
to consider them as intra-corporate controversies.
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2. Burden of proof is always upon employer to show validity of its exercise of

management prerogatives, especially as regards termination of employment.
• NOTE: HOWEVER COMPLAINANT EMPLOYEE INITIALLY HAS THE BURDEN OF

PROVING THAT HE IS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE COMPANY. (Danilo “Bitoy” Javier vs.
CA, G.R. No. 192558, 15 February 2012)
• DEL CASTILLO CASE: Valencia v. Classique Vinyl Products Corp., G.R. No.
206390, 30 January 2017] -- It is an oft-repeated rule that in labor cases, as in
other administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, “the quantum of proof
necessary is substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”
'The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an
issue.' Since it is Valencia here who is claiming to be an employee of Classique
Vinyl, it is thus incumbent upon him to proffer evidence to prove the existence of
employer-employee relationship between them. He needs to show by substantial
evidence that he was indeed an employee of the company against which he claims
illegal dismissal. Corollary, the burden to prove the elements of an employer-
employee relationship, viz.: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2)
the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power of control, lies
upon Valencia.
Indeed, there is no hard and fast rule designed to establish the afore-mentioned
elements of employer-employee relationship. "Any competent and relevant
evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted." In this case, however,
Valencia failed to present competent evidence, documentary or otherwise, to
support his claimed employer-employee relationship between him and Classique
Vinyl. All he advanced were mere factual assertions unsupported by proof.
|||
3. There must exist SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE to prove valid exercise of
management prerogatives, viz., just or authorized cause of termination. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt not required in administrative cases.
QUESTION: Are sworn statements of relatives and friends of respondent

attesting to the existence of an extra-marital affair considered sufficient
evidence to prove immorality, as a just cause for termination?
Answer: YES. The employer’s evidence consists of sworn statements of

either relatives or friends of Thelma and respondent. They either had direct
personal knowledge of the illicit relationship or revealed circumstances
indicating the existence of such relationship. (Alilem Credit Cooperative vs.
Bandiola, G.R. No. 173489, 25 February 2013)
4. In cases of ambiguity, interpretation shall be made in favor of labor.
CONTRA: But where the terms are clear, there is no need for interpretation.
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DEL CASTILLO, Mitsubishi Motors Phil. Salaried Employees Union v. Mitsubishi

Motors Phil. Corp., G.R. No. 175773, [June 17, 2013], 711 PHIL 286-304) --
Complainant employee insists that he is entitled to be reimbursed of the hospitalization
expenses of his dependent-wife, despite the fact that the HMO/insurance provider had
already paid for the same. He rationalizes that the CBA provision provides for hospital
benefits, which sould not be reduced by the amounts paid by Medicard.
The Supreme Court denied the claims for reimbursement of the hospital expenses. The
CBA provision indicates an intention to limit the company’s liability to actual expenses
incurred by the employees’ dependents. This condition is obviously intended to thwart
not only fraudulent claims but also double claims for the same loss/injury. The
employees cannot unduly enrich themselves by claiming reimbursements of expenses
already paid by the dependents’ health providers.
“It is well to note at this point that the CBA constitutes a contract between the parties
and as such, it should be strictly construed for the purpose of limiting the amount of the
employer's liability (in respect of hospital charges). The terms of the subject provision
are clear and provide no room for any other interpretation. As there is no ambiguity, the
terms must be taken in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Consequently,
MMPSEU cannot rely on the rule that a contract of insurance is to be liberally
construed in favor of the insured. Neither can it rely on the theory that any doubt must
be resolved in favor of labor.”|||
5. In the imposition of penalty, whether suspension or termination, the same must

be commensurate to the offense committed. (Sagales v. Rustan’s Commercial
Corporation (G.R. No. 166554, 27 November 2008)
6. But management prerogatives are likewise to be equally protected when

circumstances show the validity of the exercise.
DEL CASTILLO, Tabuk Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Duclan, G.R. No.

203005, (14 March 2016) -- The law protects both the welfare of employees and
the prerogatives of management. Courts will not interfere with
prerogatives of management on the discipline of employees, as long as they do not
violate labor laws, collective bargaining agreements if any, and general principles of
fairness and justice.|||
7. Paradigm shift towards mutual cooperation - It is high time that employer and
employee cease to view each other as adversaries and instead recognize that there is a
symbiotic relationship, wherein they must rely on each other to ensure the success of
the business. (Toyota Motor Phils. Workers vs. NLRC, 537 SCRA 171)
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B. MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES:
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLE: Management is free to regulate, according to its discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working
methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of
workers, and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. (DEL CASTILLO Ponente:
Julie’s Bakeshop vs. Arnaiz, 666 SCRA 1010 [2012]).
DEL CASTILLO, Pantoja v. SCA Hygiene Products Corporation, G.R. No. 163554,
[April 23, 2010], 633 PHIL 235-243). -- As long as no arbitrary or malicious action
on the part of an employer is shown, the wisdom of a business judgment to implement a
cost saving device is beyond this court's determination. After all, the free will of
management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purposes cannot be
denied. (citing Maya Farms Employees Org. vs NLRC, GR No. 106256, 28 Dec 1994)
2. MEMORIZE ELEMENTS: Valid exercise of management prerogatives
The free will of the management to conduct its own affairs to achieve its purpose cannot
be denied, PROVIDED THAT THE SAME IS EXERCISED:
• IN GOOD FAITH (BONA-FIDE IN CHARACTER),

• FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE EMPLOYER’S INTEREST; AND
• NOT TO CIRCUMVENT THE RIGHTS OF THE EMPLOYEES. (Capitol
Medical Center vs. Meriz; San Miguel Brewery and Union Carbide cases).
3. IMPORTANT DEL CASTILLO CASE ON JURISPRUDENTIAL GUIDELINES IN THE

TRANSFER OF EMPLOYEES: ICT Marketing Services, Inc., etc. vs. Mariphil L. Sales,
G.R. No. 202090, 09 September 2015.
a. Transfer is a movement from one position to another of equivalent rank, level or

salary without break in the service or a lateral movement from one position to
another of equivalent rank or salary;
b. The employer has the inherent right to transfer or reassign an employee for
legitimate business purposes;
c. A transfer becomes unlawful where it is motivated by discrimination or bad faith
or is affected as a form of punishment or is a demotion without sufficient cause;
d. The employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee.
3.1 Transfer as demotion, viz from baker to utility personnel, gives rise to
constructive dismissal -- DEL CASTILLO case: Julie’s Bakeshop vs.
Arnaiz, G.R. No. 173882, 15 Feb 2012.
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In constructive dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the
transfer of an employee is for just or valid ground, such as genuine business
necessity. The employer must demonstrate that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee and that the transfer does not involve
a demotion in rank or a diminution in salary and other benefits. "If the employer
fails to overcome this burden of proof, the employee's transfer is tantamount to
unlawful constructive dismissal."
In this case, petitioners insist that the transfer of respondents was a measure of
self-preservation and was prompted by a desire to protect the health of the
buying public, claiming that respondents should be transferred to a position
where they could not sabotage the business pending resolution of their cases.
According to petitioners, the possibility that respondents might introduce harmful
substances to the bread while in the performance of their duties as chief bakers
is not imaginary but real as borne out by what Tolores did in one of the
bakeshops in Culasi, Antique where he was assigned as baker.
This postulation is not well-taken. On the contrary, petitioners failed to satisfy the
burden of proving that the transfer was based on just or valid ground.
Petitioners' bare assertions of imminent threat from the respondents are
mere accusations which are not substantiated by any proof. This Court is
proscribed from making conclusions based on mere presumptions or
suppositions. An employee's fate cannot be justly hinged upon conjectures
and surmises. The act attributed against Tolores does not even convince us as
he was merely a suspected culprit in the alleged sabotage for which no
investigation took place to establish his guilt or culpability. Besides, Reyes still
retained Tolores as an employee and chief baker when he could have dismissed
him for cause if the allegations were indeed found true. In view of these, this
Court finds no compelling reason to justify the transfer of respondents from chief
bakers to utility/security personnel. What appears to this Court is that
respondents' transfer was an act of retaliation on the part of petitioners due to the
former's filing of complaints against them, and thus, was clearly made in bad
faith. In fact, petitioner Reyes even admitted that he caused the reassignments
due to the pending complaints filed against him.
Transfer as constructive dismissal. -- DEL CASTILLO case: The Orchard

Golf And Country Club vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 178125, 18 March 2013
There was constructive dismissal when Francisco was transferred to the Cost
Accounting Section. Francisco’s transfer to the position of Cost Controller was
without valid basis and that it amounted to a demotion in rank. Hence, there was
constructive dismissal.
The fact that Francisco continued to report for work does not necessarily suggest
that constructive dismissal has not occurred, nor does it operate as a waiver.
Constructive dismissal occurs not when the employee ceases to report for work,
but when the unwarranted acts of the employer are committed to the end that the
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employee’s continued employment shall become so intolerable. In these difficult

times, an employee may be left with no choice but to continue with his
employment despite abuses committed against him by the employer, and even
during the pendency of a labor dispute between them. This should not be taken
against the employee. Instead, we must share the burden of his plight, ever
aware of the precept that necessitous men are not free men.
C. KINDS OF EMPLOYMENT
1. REGULAR EMPLOYEES – those who are hired for activities which are
necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer.
2. PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEES – those who are hired generally for regular

positions but are placed on a probationary status for a period of 6 months (as a
general rule). May become regular once he has qualified as such in accordance
with reasonable standards made known to him at the time of hiring. They are
considered regular if they are allowed to work beyond the probationary period.
3. TERM EMPLOYEES – those who are hired for a specific period, the arrival of the
date specified in the contract of which automatically terminates the employer-
employee relationship. (Brent School vs. NLRC, 181 SCRA 702 [1989], reiterated in
AMA Computer – Paranaque vs. Austria, 538 SCRA 438 [November 2007]).
IMPORTANT DEL CASTILLO RULING ON PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT

WITH FIXED-TERM CONTRACT; expiration of contract NO LONGER valid
ground. -- Colegio del Santissimo Rosario vs. Rojo, G.R. No. 170388, 03
September 2013, reiterating Yolanda Mercado vs. AMA Computer College-
Paranaque 618 SCRA 218 [2010].
Situation: High School teacher on probationary status with fixed term contracts
who was able to complete three consecutive years of service. Teacher no longer
rehired on the ground that with the expiration of the contract to teach, the
employment contract would no longer be renewed.
Issue: May the probationary teacher be validly dismissed for expiration of the
contract to teach?
Answer: NO! Termination of a probationary employee must be for his/her failure

to comply with the reasonable standards for regular employment made known at
the time of the engagement, and NOT simply because the probationary period has
expired.
SC rationale: The fixed-term character of employment essentially refers to the

period agreed upon between the employer and the employee; employment exists
only for the duration of the term and ends on its own when the term expires. In a
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sense, employment on probationary status also refers to a period because of the

technical meaning "probation" carries in Philippine labor law – a maximum period
of six months, or in the academe, a period of three years for those engaged in
teaching jobs. Their similarity ends there, however, because of the overriding
meaning that being "on probation" connotes, i.e., a process of testing and
observing the character or abilities of a person who is new to a role or job.
However, for teachers on probationary employment, in which case a fixed

term contract is not specifically used for the fixed term it offers, it is
incumbent upon the school to have not only set reasonable standards to be
followed by said teachers in determining qualification for regular
employment, the same must have also been communicated to the teachers at
the start of the probationary period, or at the very least, at the start of the
period when they were to be applied. These terms, in addition to those expressly
provided by the Labor Code, would serve as the just cause for the termination of
the probationary contract. The specific details of this finding of just cause must be
communicated to the affected teachers as a matter of due process. Corollarily,
should the teachers not have been apprised of such reasonable standards at the
time specified above, they shall be deemed regular employees.
Yolanda Mercado, et al. vs. AMA Computer College Parañaque City, Inc. 618
SCRA 218 [2010].- The Supreme Court stated that nothing is illegitimate in
defining the school-teacher on fixed term basis. HOWEVER, the school should
not forget that its system of fixed-term contract is a system that operates
during the probationary period and for this reason is subject to the terms of
Article 281 of the Labor Code. Unless this reconciliation is made, the
requirements of this Article on probationary status would be fully negated as the
school may freely choose not to renew contracts simply because their terms have
expired.
Given the clear constitutional and statutory intents, the Supreme Court concluded
that in a situation where the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-term contract
not specifically used for the fixed term it offers, Article 281 should assume
primacy and the fixed-period character of the contract must give way.
NOTE1: In this instance therefore, the School illegally dismissed the teachers
because it simply refused to renew the employment contract. Because the
teachers were under a probationary period, it was incumbent upon the School to
have evaluated said teachers, and to have informed them of their failure to qualify
as regular employees in accordance with standards made known to them at the
time of hiring.
NOTE2: To highlight what the Supreme Court meant by a fixed-term contract

specifically used for the fixed term it offers, a replacement teacher, for example,
may be contracted for a period of one year to temporarily take the place of a
permanent teacher on a one-year study leave. The expiration of the replacement
teacher’s contracted term, under the circumstances, leads to no probationary
status implications as she was never employed on probationary basis; her
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employment is for a specific purpose with particular focus on the term and with
every intent to end her teaching relationship with the school upon expiration of this
term. (Mercado, et al. vs. AMA Computer College Parañaque City, Inc. 618 SCRA
218 [2010]. Emphasis supplied.)
4. PROJECT EMPLOYEES – The principal test for determining whether particular

employees are properly characterized as "project employees" as distinguished from
"regular employees" is whether or not the project employees were assigned to carry
out a "specific project or undertaking," the duration and scope of which were
specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project.
DEL CASTILLO case: Herma Shipyard, Inc. v. Oliveros, G.R. No. 208936, 17
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April 2017. – Project-based employment contracts are valid where employees

knowingly and voluntarily entered into, without vices of consent, and regardless of
whether the activities for which they were hired are directly related to the main
business of the company.
FACTS: Herma Shipyard is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of

shipbuilding and repair. The respondents were its employees occupying various
positions such as welder, leadman, pipe fitter, laborer, helper, etc.
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, regularization, and non-
payment of service incentive leave pay with prayer for the payment of full
backwages and attorney' fees against petitioners. Respondents alleged that they
are Herma Shipyard's regular employees who have been continuously performing
tasks usually necessary and desirable in its business. On various dates, however,
petitioners dismissed them from employment.
Respondents further alleged that as condition to their continuous and uninterrupted
employment, petitioners made them sign employment contracts for a fixed period
ranging from one to four months to make it appear that they were project-based
employees. Per respondents, petitioners resorted to this scheme to defeat their
right to security of tenure, but in truth there was never a time when they ceased
working for Herma Shipyard due to expiration of project-based employment
contracts. In fact, if they were indeed project employees, petitioners should have
reported to the Department or Labor and Employment (DOLE) the completion of
such protect. But petitioners have never submitted such report to the DOLE.
For their defense, petitioners argued that respondents were its project-based
employees in its shipbuilding projects and that the specific project for which they
were hired had already been completed. In support thereof, Herma Shipyard
presented contracts of employment, some of which are written in the vernacular
and denominated asKasunduang Paglilingkod (Pang-Proyektong Kawani).
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are regular or project-based employees.
Answer: Project-based.
The principal test in determining whether particular employees were engaged as
project-based employees, as distinguished from regular employees, is whether
they were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and
13
scope of which was specified at, and made known to them, at the time of their
engagement. It is crucial that the employees were informed of their status as
project employees at the time of hiring and that the period of their employment
must be knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, without any force,
duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employees or any
other circumstances vitiating their consent.
In this case, respondents knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed the
project-based employment contracts. There is no indication that respondents were
coerced into signing their employment contract or that they affixed their signature
thereto against their will. While they claim that they signed the said contracts in order
to secure continuous employment, they have not, however, presented sufficient
evidence to support the same other than their bare allegations. It is settled that
"[c]ontracts for project employment are valid under the law.
It is settled, however, that project-based employees may or may not be performing

tasks usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
The fact that the job is usually necessary or desirable in the business
operation of the employer does not automatically imply regular employment;
neither does it impair the validity of the project employment contract stipulating a
fixed duration of employment.
5. SEASONAL EMPLOYEES -- those hired for work or services which is seasonal

in nature, and the employment is for the duration of the season.
DEL CASTILLO case: Vicmar Development Corp. v. Elarcosa, G.R. No. 202215,
09 December 2015. – Presumption is that employees are regular, where the
activities for which they were hired is necessary or desirable in the usual trade or
business of the company. Continuous hiring of extra/seasonal workers gives rise to
presumption that they have attained status of regular employees.
Vicmar is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing of plywood for export
and for local sale, which employed respondents in various capacities — as boiler
tenders, block board receivers, waste feeders, plywood checkers, plywood sander,
conveyor operator, ripsaw operator, lumber grader, pallet repair, glue mixer, boiler
fireman, steel strap repair, debarker operator, plywood repair and reprocessor, civil
workers and plant maintenance, some of whom started working in 1990.
Company claimed that they were supposedly initially employed as "extra"
(seasonal) workers; then they were hired by an independent contractor.
On account of perceived violations of labor standards, respondents thus filed a
case in DOLE agst Vicmar, especially that most were no longer scheduled for work
nor given any work schedule.
ISSUE: Are they regular or seasonal workers? (Answer: Regular).
There is substantial evidence to prove that respondents were regular employees as
they were shown to have performed activities necessary in the usual business of
Vicmar. Most of them were assigned to activities essential for plywood production,
the central business of Vicmar. In the list above, more than half of the respondents
14
were assigned to the boiler, where pieces of plywood were cooked to perfection.
While the other respondents appeared to have been assigned to other sections in
the company, the presumption of regular employment should be granted in their
favor pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code since they had been performing the
same activity for at least one year, as they were assigned to the same sections, and
there is no indication that their respective activities ceased.
The test to determine whether an employee is regular is the reasonable connection
between the activity he performs and its relation to the employer's business or
trade, as in the case of respondents assigned to the boiler section. Nonetheless,
the continuous re-engagement of all respondents to perform the same kind of tasks
proved the necessity and desirability of their services in the business of
Vicmar. Likewise, considering that respondents appeared to have been performing
their duties for at least one year is sufficient proof of the necessity, if not the
indispensability of their activities in Vicmar's business.
6. CASUAL EMPLOYEES – those who are hired to perform work or service which is
merely incidental to the business of the employer. Any casual employee who has
rendered at least one (1) year of service, whether it be continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity for which he is employed,
and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION AS TO RANK

7. MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES– those vested with powers or prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off,
recall employees. (Art. 212, par. m, Labor Code)
7.1 CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES: Doctrine of necessary implication and/or

confidential employee rule reiterated.
Confidential employees are those who: (1) assist or act in a confidential

capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a
confidential employee — e.g., the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle
the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from
bargaining units of the employees who, in the normal course of their duties,
become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a
principal objective sought to be accomplished by the “confidential employee
rule”. Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery vs. Asia
Brewery, G.R. No. 162025, 03 August 2010.; See also: San Miguel Corporation
Supervisors and Exempt Employees Union vs. Laguesma, 277 SCRA 370 [1997].
15
8. SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES – those who, in the interest of management,

effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is
not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but requires use of independent
judgment. (Art. 212, par. N, Labor Code). Note: Supervisory employees form part
of the managerial staff, which are not covered by the rules on hours of work, viz.,
night shift differentials, overtime pay, etc. (See Art. 82, Labor Code cf. Art. 212
[m]).
9. RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES - All other employees not falling within the

definition of “managerial” or “supervisory” employees, are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of Book V of the Labor Code.
FRAMEWORK:
General rule: Employment is deemed regular
Exception: Probationary Seasonal

Term Casual
Project
Exception to exception:
Probationary employees allowed to work after probn. period
Casual workers rendering service for more than one year
Term employee allowed to work after term has expired/ended
Project employee allowed to work after project without any contract; or project
employee allowed to work project after project but no termination reports.
D. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORSHIP ARRANGEMENTS

VS. LABOR ONLY CONTRACTING
For VALID JOB CONTRACTING --
16
D.1 VALID INDEPENDENT CONTRACTING

OR SUB-CONTRACTING ARRANGEMENTS
Article 106, LB; IRR S8R8B3;
ELEMENTS: (MEMORY AID: I ARM FREE CAPITAL TEMWORK R&B)

• There is a job-contracting permissible by law where the contractor/agency
carries on an INDEPENDENT business and undertakes the contract work on
his ACCOUNT, under his own RESPONSIBILITY, using his own MANNER
AND METHODS, FREE from the control of the principal in all matters
connected with the performance of work excepting the results thereof.
• He has his own CAPITAL in the form of TOOLS, EQUIPMENT, MACHINERY,

WORK PREMISES, and that the agreement between the contractor and
principal assures the former’s employees of ALL RIGHTS AND BENEFITS
under the law.
D.2 ELEMENTS OF LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING PROHIBITED

UNDER THE LAW -- There is labor-only contracting where the contractor or
sub-contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or
service for a principal. Philippine Airlines vs. Ligan, 548 SCRA 181 (2008).
TWO WAYS OF PROVING LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING:

(Memory Aid: No Cap Direct OR No Control)
For labor-only to exist, Sec. 5 of Department Order No. 18-02 requires any two of
the elements to be present, viz.:
• The contractor or sub-contractor DOES NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIAL

CAPITAL or investment to actually perform the job, work or service
under its own account and responsibility; and the employees recruited,
supplied or placed by such contractors are performing activities which
are DIRECTLY RELATED to the main business of the principal;
OR
• The CONTRACTOR has NO CONTROL over the conduct of the work to be
done by his employees.
D.3 EFFECT OF LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING AND VALID JOB

CONTRACTING AGREEMENTS -- San Miguel Corp. vs. MAERC
Integrated Systems, 405 SCRA 579 [10 July 2003]
17
• If labor only contracting: ILLEGAL. The employer is deemed the DIRECT

employer and is made liable to the employees of the contractor for a more
comprehensive purpose (wages, monetary claims, and all other benefits in the
Labor Code such as SSS/Medicare/Pag-Ibig). The labor-only contractor is
deemed merely an agent.
• If job-contracting: LEGAL. The employer is considered an INDIRECT

EMPLOYER, and is made solidarily liable with the contractor to the employees
of the latterr for a more limited purpose, viz.: payment of unpaid wages and
other monetary claims, including 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay.
(New Golden Builders case)
D.4 SYNTHESIS OF DOCTRINES ON JOB-CONTRACTING

VS LABOR ONLY CONTRACTING PER DEL CASTILLO CASES
1. DEL CASTILLO case: Petron vs. Armz Caberte, G.R. No. 182255, 15 June
2015.
To determine whether a contractor is engaged in labor-only contracting or

permissible job contracting, "the totality of the facts and the surrounding
circumstances of the case are to be considered."
Petron contends that the CA erred in ruling that ABC is a labor-only contractor
since respondents failed to prove that ABC is not an independent contractor. The
contention, however, is incorrect.
The law presumes a contractor to be a labor-only contractor and the

employees are not expected to prove the negative fact that the contractor
is a labor-only contractor. Thus, it is not respondents but Petron which bears
the burden of establishing that ABC is not a labor-only contractor but a legitimate
independent contractor. As held in Alilin v. Petron Corporation, "where the
principal is the one claiming that the contractor is a legitimate contractor, the
burden of proving the supposed status of the contractor rests on the principal."
The Court finds that complainants are regular employees of Petron. Gestupa,
Ponteras, Develos, Blanco and Mariano were LPG fillers and maintenance crew;
Caberte was an LPG operator supervisor; Te was a warehouseman and utility
worker; and Servicio and Galorosa were tanker receiving crew and utility
workers. Undoubtedly, the work they rendered were directly related to Petron's
main business, vital as they are in the manufacture and distribution of petroleum
products. Besides, some of the respondents were already working for Petron
even before it engaged ABC as a contractor in 1996. Albeit it was made to
appear that they were under the different contractors that Petron engaged over
the years, respondents have been regularly performing the same tasks within the
premises of Petron. Thus "the repeated and continuing need for the performance
18
of the job is sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of the

activity to the business."
What further militates against Petron's claim that ABC, as an alleged

independent contractor, is the true employer of respondents, is the fact that
Petron has the power of control over respondents in the performance of their
work. It bears stressing that the power of control merely calls for the existence of
the right to control and not necessarily the exercise thereof. Here, Petron
admitted in its Position Paper that the supervision of a Petron employee is
required over LPG and tanker assistance jobs for inventory control and safety
checking purposes. It explained that due to the hazardous nature of its products,
constant checking of the procedures in their handling is essential considering the
high possibility of fatal accidents. It also admitted that it was the one supplying
the needed materials and equipment in discharging these functions to better
insure the integrity, quality and safety of its products.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Petron failed to discharge its burden of proving
that ABC is not a labor-only contractor. Consequently, and as warranted by the
facts, the Court declares ABC as a mere labor-only
DEL CASTILLO case: Alilin v. Petron Corp., G.R. No. 177592, 09 June 2014.
A contractor is presumed to be a labor-only contractor, unless it proves that it has

the substantial capital, investment, tools and the like. However, where the
principal is the one claiming that the contractor is a legitimate contractor, the
burden of proving the supposed status of the contractor rests on the principal.||In
this instance, Petron failed to discharge the burden of proof that the contractor is
a legitimate independent contractor.|
A finding that a contractor is a 'labor-only' contractor is equivalent to declaring

that there is an employer-employee relationship between the principal and the
employees of the supposed contractor." In this case, the employer-employee
relationship between Petron and petitioners becomes all the more apparent due
to the presence of the power of control on the part of the former over the latter.
Petron has maintained power of control over the petitioners. Here, Petron
could order petitioners to do work outside of their regular "maintenance/utility"
job. Also, petitioners were required to report for work everyday at the bulk plant,
observe an 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. daily work schedule, and wear proper uniform
and safety helmets as prescribed by the safety and security measures being
implemented within the bulk plant. All these imply control. In an industry where
safety is of paramount concern, control and supervision over sensitive
operations, such as those performed by the petitioners, are inevitable if not at all
necessary. Indeed, Petron deals with commodities that are highly volatile and
flammable which, if mishandled or not properly attended to, may cause serious
injuries and damage to property and the environment. Naturally, supervision by
Petron is essential in every aspect of its product handling in order not to
19
compromise the integrity, quality and safety of the products that it distributes to
the consuming public.
Moreover, petitioners already attained regular status as employees of
Petron. Petitioners were given various work assignments such as tanker
receiving, barge loading, sounding, gauging, warehousing, mixing, painting,
carpentry, driving, gasul filling and other utility works. Petron refers to these work
assignments as menial works which could be performed by any able-bodied
individual. The Court finds, however, that while the jobs performed by petitioners
may be menial and mechanical, they are nevertheless necessary and related to
Petron's business operations. If not for these tasks, Petron's products will not
reach the consumers in their proper state. Indeed, petitioners' roles were vital
inasmuch as they involve the preparation of the products that Petron will
distribute to its consumers.
DEL CASTILLO case: Alviado et. al. vs. Procter & Gamble, and Promm
Gemm, G.R. No. 160506, 09 March 2010
The law and its implementing rules recognize that management may rightfully
exercise its prerogatives in determining what activities may be contracted out,
regardless of whether such activity is peripheral or core in nature.
The company Procter & Gamble was principally engaged in the manufacture and
production of different consumer and health products, which it sells on a
wholesale basis to various supermarkets and distributors. To enhance consumer
awareness and acceptance of the products, P&G entered into contracts with
Promm-Gem and SAPS for the promotion and merchandising of its products.
The Supreme Court ruled that the where the agency (independent contractor)
complied with all the requisites of permissible job contracting such as substantial
capitalization and there being no control, then complainants were employees of
the job contractors and NOT of the principal Proctor & Gamble.
On the other hand, if the agency failed to comply with the requisites, then ‘labor-
only’ contracting is presumed to exist, and the Labor Code itself establishes an
employer-employee relationship between the employer and the employees of the
‘labor-only’ contractor." The statute establishes this relationship for a
comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor
is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is
responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees
had been directly employed by the principal employer.
20
E. SPECIFIC ISSUES ON LABOR STANDARDS
1. WAGES; SOME GOVERNING RULES:

§ FAIR AND REASONABLE VALUE shall not include any profit to the employer, or
to any person affiliated with the employer.
§ “NO WORK NO PAY” PRINCIPLE. -- If there is no work performed by the

employee, there can be no wage or pay unless the laborer was able, willing, and
ready to work but was prevented by management or was illegally locked out,
suspended or dismissed. But where the failure of employees to work was not due to
the employer’s fault, the burden of economic loss suffered by the employers should
not be shifted to the employer. Each party must bear his own loss.
• EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK. -- Employees who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions should be paid
similar salaries (International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing, GR
No.128845, June 1, 2000).
• CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS:
Art. 1705. The laborer’s wages shall be paid in legal currency.
Art. 1706. Withholding of the wages, except for a debt due, shall not be made by the
employer.
Art. 1707. The laborer’s wages shall be a lien on the goods manufactured or the
work done.
Art. 1708. The laborer’s wages shall not be subject to execution or attachment
except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing, and medical attendance.
Art. 1709. The employer shall neither seize nor retain any tool or other articles
belonging to the laborer.
2. NON-DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS, EXPLAINED:
Art. 100, Labor Code. Prohibition against elimination or diminution

of benefits. — Nothing in this Book shall be construed to eliminate or
in any way diminish supplements, or other employee benefits being
enjoyed at the time of promulgation of this Code.
• General Rule: No diminution of salary or benefits
Exceptions:
21
(a) When employee consents to the deduction

(b) To correct an error (TSPIC vs. Tspic Employees Union, G.R. No. 163419, Feb2008;
Exception to the exception:

If the error is left uncorrected for a reasonable period of time, it ripens into a
company policy and employees can demand for it as a matter of right.
• Elements for diminution of benefits:

(1) the grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice over
a long period of time;
(2) the practice is consistent and deliberate;
(3) the practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful
or difficult question of law; and
(4) the diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer. (Vergara
vs. Coca Cola Bottlers, G.R. No. 176985, 01 April 2013)
• Question: When can a policy be considered to have ripened into a regular

company practice?
Answer: The employee must prove by substantial evidence that the giving of the
benefit is done over a long period of time, and that it has been made consistently
and deliberately. Jurisprudence has not laid down any hard-and-fast rule as to
the length of time that company practice should have been exercised in order to
constitute voluntary employer practice. The common denominator in previously
decided cases appears to be the regularity and deliberateness of the grant of
benefits over a significant period of time. It requires an indubitable showing that
the employer agreed to continue giving the benefit knowing well that the
employees are not covered by any provision of the law or agreement requiring
payment thereof. In sum, the benefit must be characterized by regularity,
voluntary and deliberate intent of the employer to grant the benefit over a
considerable period of time.
3. BONUS
3.1 Nature of a bonus: a prerogative, not an obligation. -- The matter of giving a
bonus over and above the worker’s lawful salaries and allowances is entirely
dependent on the financial capability of the employer to give it. (Traders Royal
Bank vs. NLRC, 189 SCRA 274 [1990]).
EXCEPTION: When demandable under a contract.
3.2 Are commissions included in computing 13th month pay?
a. If the commission form part of the employees’ basic salary, then this will
likewise be included in the computation of 13th month pay. (Philippine
Duplicators, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 380 [1995]).
22
b) If the commissions were in the nature of profit-sharing bonuses (productivity

bonuses), then these do not form part of the “basic salary” and should not
included in the computation of the 13th month pay. (Boie-Takeda Chemicals,
Inc. vs. Dela Serna 228 SCRA 329 [1993]).
5. EMPLOYMENT OF HOUSEHELPERS VS. HOMEWORKERS

(See also KASAMBAHAY LAW)
5.1 Domestic helper or househelpers or domestic servant defined. -- shall refer

to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the
employer’s home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the
maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal
comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family.”
• Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women,

yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar househelps. (Apex Mining
Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 196 SCRA 251 [1991]). – NOTE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN
LAW AND IMPLEMENTING RULES WHICH EXCLUDED THE DRIVERS FROM
COVERAGE.
5.2 Homeworker, defined.-- one who performs in or about his home any
processing of goods or materials, in whole or in part, which have been
furnished directly or indirectly, by an employer and thereafter to be
returned to the latter. (Book III, Rule XIV, Section 1 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code.)
HOUSEHELPERS HOME WORKERS

Minister to the personal needs and Performs in or about his own home any
comfort of his employer in the latter’s processing or fabrication of goods or
home materials, in whole or in part, which have
been furnished directly or indirectly, by an
employer and sold thereafter to the latter.
• RIGHTS and BENEFITS ACCORDED TO HOMEWORKERS (Department Order No. 5,

replacing Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book III of the Labor Code):
1) Formation and registration of labor organization of industrial homeworkers.
2) It also makes explicit the employer’s duty to pay and remit SSS, Philhealth and ECC
premiums.
3) Prohibitions for Homework

Ø explosives, fireworks and articles of like character;
Ø drugs and poisons;
23
Ø other articles, the processing of which requires exposure to toxic substance.
6. EMPLOYMENT OF MINORS: (Sec. 12, R.A. 7610, as amended by R.A.

9231).
Article 139. Minimum employable age. --

(a) No child below fifteen (15) years of age shall be employed, except when he works
directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or guardian, and his
employment does not in any way interfere with his schooling.
(b) Any person between fifteen (15) and eighteen (18) years of age may be employed
for such number of hours and such periods of the day as determined by the
Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
(c) The foregoing provisions shall in no case allow the employment of a person below
eighteen (18) years of age in an undertaking which is hazardous or deleterious in
nature as determined by the Secretary of Labor.
Article 140. Prohibition against child discrimination..-- No employer shall

discriminate against any person in respect to terms and conditions of employment on
account of his age.
6.1 GENERAL RULE: Employment of any child below fifteen (15) years of age is
prohibited
Ø Note1: Any person between 15 and 18 may be employed in any non-

hazardous work.
Ø Note2: Any person above 18 – NO PROHIBITION.
EXCEPT:
1. When he works directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or guardian,
and his employment does not in any way interfere with his schooling. The
following conditions must be met:
• The employment does not endanger the child’s life, safety, health and morals;
• The employment does not impair the child’s normal development;
• The employer parent or legal guardian provides the child with the primary
and/or secondary education prescribed by the Department of Education
2. Where the child’s employment or participation in public entertainment or

information through cinema, theater, radio or TV is essential provided that:
• The employment does not involve ads or commercials promoting ALCOHOLIC

BEVERAGES, INTOXICATING DRINKS, TOBACCO AND ITS BY-PRODUCTS
OR EXHIBITING VIOLENCE;
• There is a written contract approved by the DOLE; and
24
• the following requirements are strictly complied with:

Ø employer shall ensure protection, health, morals, and normal
development of the child;
Ø employer shall institute measures to prevent child’s exploitation /
discrimination taking into account the system and level of
remuneration, duration, and arrangement of working time;
Ø employer shall formulate and implement a continuing program for
training and skills acquisition of the child, subject to approval and
supervision of competent authorities. (as amended by Rep. Act No.
9231)
6.2 NOTE: In the above-exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the
employer shall first secure, before engaging such child, a work permit from the
Department of Labor and Employment which shall ensure observance of the above
requirements. (Rep. Act. No. 9231).
ON HAZARDOUS WORK. -- Any person between fifteen (15) and eighteen (18) years
of age may be employed for NON-HAZARDOUS WORK for such number of hours and
such periods of the day as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate
regulations. No such prohibition if eighteen (18) years old and above.
PROHIBITION AGAINST CHILD DISCRIMINATION. -- No employer shall discriminate

against any person in respect to terms and conditions of employment on account of his
age.
6.3 Comparisons: (Rep. Act No. 9231)
A child below 15 • Allowed to work for not more than 20 hours a week.
Provided, the work shall not be more than 4 hours in a
day.
• Shall not be allowed to work between 8pm and 6am of
the following day.
A child above 15 • Shall not be allowed to work for more than 8 hours a
years of age but day, and in no case beyond 40 hours a week.
below 18 • Shall not be allowed to work between 10 pm and 6am
the following day
7. APPRENTICESHIP AND LEARNER
7.1 Apprenticeship is the practical on-the-job training as supplemented by related

theoretical instruction (Art. 58 (a), LC).
7.2 Learners are persons hired as trainees in semi-skilled and other industrial
occupations which are non-apprenticeable and may be learned through practical
training on the job in a relatively short period of time which shall not exceed three
months.
25
APPRENTICESHIP LEARNERSHIP
NATURE • highly-technical • semi-skill; non-apprenticeable
PERIOD • SIX (6) months • THREE (3) months
COMITMT TO • At option of learner

HIRE • At option of employer
WAGES • Must always be paid; 75% of

• May be paid or not; if minimum
DOLE paid, 75% of minimum
Approval • No, DOLE approval not required;
• Yes, DOLE approval is inspection only.
essential
DEDUCTION for • None.
Expenses • Yes, expenses for
training deductible
from income tax
8. DISABLED WORKERS
8.1 Equal opportunity for employment.

• No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable
employment. [R.A. 7277, Sec. 5: Magna Carta for Disabled Persons]
• Qualified disabled employees shall be subject to the same terms and

conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits,
fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able-bodied person.
• A worker is not necessarily considered as a handicapped worker if he is

capable, as an able-bodied worker, to function suitably in relation to the work
to which he was hired. (i.e. one-legged transcriptionist)
8.2 Incentives for employment of disabled workers (Sec. 2, RA 7277).
1. Private entities that employ disabled persons who meet the required skills or
qualifications either as regular employee, apprentice or learner, shall be
entitled to an additional deduction from their gross income, equivalent to 25%
of the total amount paid as salaries and wages to disabled persons; Provided,
that the following are complied with:
a. Presentation of proof certified by DOLE that disabled persons are under
their employ; and
b. Disabled employee is accredited with DOLE and DOH as to his
disability, skills and qualifications.
26
2. Private entities that improve or modify their physical facilities to provide

reasonable accommodation for disabled persons shall also be entitled to an
additional deduction from their taxable income, equivalent to 50% of the direct
costs of the improvements or modifications. This does not apply to
improvements required under B.P. Blg. 344.
9. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS; RETIREMENT.

9.1 RETIREMENT AGE
GENERAL RULE: R.A. 7641

a. OPTIONAL at 60 years with minimum 5 years of service
b. MANDATORY at 65 years, no service requirement
EXCEPTION:
Where the company provides for a Retirement Plan with earlier retirement age,
then the company’s Retirement Plan will apply
9.2 RETIREMENT BENEFITS
GENERAL RULE: R.A. 7641

½ month for every year of service (expanded concept per Sec 1, RA 7641)
Expanded concept: 22.5 days (basis: Capitol Wireless vs. Confesor)

15 days + 5 days service incentive leave + 2.5 days prorated 13th month pay
EXCEPTION:
Where the company provides for a Retirement Plan with better benefits, then the
company’s Retirement Plan will apply
9.3 CASES ON RETIREMENT
a) IMPORTANT DEL CASTILLO CASE: Goodyear vs. Marina Angus, G.R.

No. 185499, 14 November 2014. --
Question: Is an employee who was terminated for authorized causes

(redundancy), also entitled to avail of early retirement benefits? Otherwise
stated, may an employee be paid both retirement and separation pay
benefits?
Answer: YES, as a general rule. Exception: When there is an explicit

provision in the company rules prohibiting the availment of both .
27
Employees are legally entitled to recover both separation pay and retirement
benefits in the absence of a specific prohibition in the Retirement Plan or
CBA. In such an instance where both the company rules or CBA and the
retirement plan are silent, an employee is not barred from claiming his early
retirement benefits, even if he/she had already received his retrenchment
pay, and has executed a Quitclaim to that effect. This must be so because
he is legally entitled thereto as a general rule.
See also: Difference between separation pay arising from termination of

employment and retirement.
General Milling Corporation vs. Viajar, G.R. No. 181738, 30 January 2013,
Citing Quevedo vs. Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc., 599 SCRA 438
[2009]. -- While termination of employment and retirement from service are
common modes of ending employment, they are mutually exclusive, with
varying judicial bases and resulting benefits. Retirement from the service is
contractual (i.e. based on the bilateral agreement of the employer and
employee), while termination of employment is statutory (i.e. governed by
the Labor Code and other related laws as to its grounds, benefits and
procedure. The benefits resulting from termination vary, depending on the
cause. For retirement, Article 287 of the Labor Code gives leeway to the
parties to stipulate above a floor of benefits.
b. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT. –
Voluntary retirement cuts employment ties leaving no residual employer

liability; involuntary retirement amounts to a discharge, rendering the
employer liable for termination without cause. The employee’s intent is the
focal point of analysis. In determining such intent, the fairness of the
process governing the retirement decision, the payment of stipulated
benefits, and the absence of badges of intimidation or coercion are relevant
parameters. (ibid.)
F. THE RIGHT TO UNIONIZE AND THE

APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT
1. INTER-UNION AND INTRA-UNION DISPUTES
(DOLE Dept. Order No. 40-03, series of 2003)
DEL CASTILLO CASE: Allan M. Mendoza vs. Officers of Manila Water Employees
Union (MWEU), G.R. No. 201595, 25 January 2016. –
Facts: Petitioner was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union (MWEU), the
bargaining agent of rank-and-file employees within Manila Water Company (MWC).
28
Petitioner refused to give written authorization that would enable deduction of increased
union dues, as he raised an appeal to the MWEU Board questioning the propriety of the
same. The Union did not heed his several appeals and sanctioned him repeatedly, for
which reason he filed the instant ULP case.
Issue: Is the present case an intra-union dispute which deprives the jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiter, or ULP under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter?
Answer: This is ULP, and hence, Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
Rationale: An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union
members, including grievances arising from any violation of the rights and conditions of
membership, violation of or disagreement over any provision of the union’s constitution
and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or disaffiliation of the union. Sections 1
and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate
the following circumstances as inter/intra-union disputes x xx.
However, petitioner’s charge of unfair labor practices falls within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code. In
addition, Article 247 of the same Code provides that "the civil aspects of all cases
involving unfair labor practices, which may include claims for actual, moral, exemplary
and other forms of damages, attorney’s fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters.
The Union was considered guilty of ULP when it adamantly failed to follow its own
appeal procedures in instances where a union member questions union policies or
regulations – as in fact, it did not even act upon the appeals made by petitioner.
Moreover, it did not follow the requisite procedure in imposing the penalty of suspension
and thereafter, expulsion upon one of its own.
As members of the governing board of MWEU, respondents are presumed to know,

observe, and apply the union’s constitution and by-laws. Thus, their repeated violations
thereof and their disregard of petitioner’s rights as a union member – their inaction on his
two appeals which resulted in his suspension, disqualification from running as MWEU
officer, and subsequent expulsion without being accorded the full benefits of due
process – connote willfulness and bad faith, a gross disregard of his rights thus causing
untold suffering, oppression and, ultimately, ostracism from MWEU.
2. CANCELLATION OF UNION REGISTRATION. –
DEL CASTILLO case: Asian Institute of Management v. Asian Institute of

Management Faculty Association, G.R. No. 207971, 23 January 2017. -- The
company is to be considered a party-in-interest, and may properly file a petition for
cancellation of union registration where it appears that the Union members are
managerial employees and hence, absolutely prohibited from forming a union.
In Holy Child Catholic School v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, this Court declared that "[i]n case
of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an
29
employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union's
certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the
circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended."
On the basis of the ruling in the above-cited case, it can be said that petitioner was
correct in filing a petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration.
Petitioner's sole ground for seeking cancellation of respondent's certificate of
registration — that its members are managerial employees and for this reason, its
registration is thus a patent nullity for being an absolute violation of Article 245 of
the Labor Code which declares that managerial employees are ineligible to join
any labor organization — is, in a sense, an accusation that respondent is guilty of
misrepresentation for registering under the claim that its members are not managerial
employees.
However, the issue of whether respondent's members are managerial employees is
still pending resolution by way of petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 197089,
which is the culmination of all proceedings in DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-M-0705-007
— where the issue relative to the nature of respondent's membership was first raised
by petitioner itself and is there fiercely contested. The resolution of this issue cannot
be pre-empted; until it is determined with finality in G.R. No. 197089, the petition for
cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration on the grounds alleged by
petitioner cannot be resolved. As a matter of courtesy and in order to avoid conflicting
decisions, We must await the resolution of the petition in G.R. No. 197089.
G. APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT
1. Bargaining unit, defined. - A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of

employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. (Golden Farms vs.
Calleja, supra.)
2. General Rule: community or mutuality of interests.
The most efficacious bargaining unit is one which is comprised of workers enjoying
community of interests. This is so because the basic test of a bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether it will best assure to all employees concerned of the exercise of
their collective bargaining rights.
3. Factors to be considered: (a) similarity in scale and manner of determining earnings;

(b) similarity in employment benefits, hours of work, other terms and conditions of
employment; (c) similarity in kind of work performed; (d) similarity in qualifications,
skills, training of employees; (e) frequency of contact or interchange between
30
employees; (f) geographic proximity; (g) continuity or integration of production

processes; (h) common supervision and determination of collective bargaining; etc.
4. DEL CASTILLO case: Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical-Super v.

Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., G.R. No. 169717, 16 March 2011. – Charter
certificate need not be certified under oath; legal personality of the union cannot be
attacked collaterally.
In the main, the CA ruled that petitioner union failed to comply with the requisite
documents for registration under Article 235 of the Labor Code and its implementing
rules. It agreed with the Med-Arbiter that the Charter Certificate, Sama-samang
Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization, and Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa
Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas were
not executed under oath. Thus, petitioner union cannot be accorded the status of a
legitimate labor organization.
We disagree.
In accordance with this ruling, petitioner union's charter certificate need not be
executed under oath. Consequently, it validly acquired the status of a
legitimate labororganization upon submission of (1) its charter certificate, (2) the
names of its officers, their addresses, and its principal office, and (3) its constitution
and by-laws — the last two requirements having been executed under oath by the
proper union officials as borne out by the records.
The mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in petitioner union does not
nullify its legal personality as a legitimate labor organization. The legal personality of
petitioner union cannot be collaterally attacked by respondent company in the
certification election proceedings.|||
H. CERTIFICATION ELECTION (FRAMEWORK)

1. Definition and nature of certification election
1.1 Definition: It is the process of determining the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective
bargaining. (Sec. [n], Rule I, Book V, Implementing Rules.)
1.2 Nature of certification election: A certification election is not a litigation but merely
an investigation of a non-adversarial fact-finding character in which the Bureau of
Labor Relations plays the part of a disinterested investigator seeking merely to
ascertain the desires of the employees as to the matter of their representation.
(Airline Pilots Assn. Of the Philippines vs. CIR, 76 SCRA 274.)
2. Role of Employer during certification elections
31
General Rule: The employer is not a party in a certification election, which activity is the
sole concern of the workers. It is improper for the employer to be present at all during
the proceedings, even as an observer, let alone sit and participate therein thru a
representative.
Thus, Republic Act No. 9481 explicitly mandates that the employer is to be a
BYSTANDER in the certification election proceedings. Hence:
“Art. 258-A, LC. -- In all cases, whether the petition for certification election is
filed by an employer or a legitimate labor organization, the employer shall not be
considered a party thereto with a concomitant right to oppose a petition for
certification election. The employer’s participation in such proceedings shall
be limited to: (1) being notified or informed of petitions of such nature; and
(2) submitting the list of employees during the pre-election conference
should the Med-Arbiter act favorably on the petition”
Exception: Where the employer has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to
Art. 258 of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively. Even then,
it becomes a neutral bystander.
DEL CASTILLO case: Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical-Super v.

Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., G.R. No. 169717, 16 March 2011--. The right
to file a petition for certification election is accorded to a labor organization provided that
it complies with the requirements of law for proper registration. The inclusion of
supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit
of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor
organization.
J. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTATIONS

AND AGREEMENT
1. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING DEFINED:
Collective bargaining which is defined as “negotiations towards a collective agreement”,

is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize
the relation between labor and management, and to create a climate of sound and stable
industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the union, and is
characterized as a legal obligation.
Labor Code, Article 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. --

The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual
obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in
good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect
to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of
employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or
question arising under such agreement and executing a contract
32
incorporating such agreements if requested by either party, but such

duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any
concession.” (Underscoring supplied.)
“ Labor Code. Art. 254. Duty to bargain collectively when there

exists a collective bargaining agreement. — When there is a
collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall
also mean that neither party shall terminate or modify the agreement
at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty
of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and
effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the
60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the
parties.”
2. DEL CASTILLO CASES:
Guagua National Colleges v. Guagua National Colleges Faculty Labor Union, G.R.
No. 204693, 13 July 2016. -- Anent the merits of the case, the NLRC held that based
on the totality of conduct of GNC, it was guilty of bad faith bargaining and therefore
committed an unfair labor practice. This was on account of GNC's submission of a
counter-proposal despite the parties already having reached an agreement regarding the
terms of the CBA. To the NLRC, the belated submission of GNC's counter-proposal was
intended to evade the execution of the CBA. With respect to GNC's alleged withdrawal
of employees' benefits, the NLRC ruled that pursuant to Article 253 of the Labor Code,
the parties have the duty to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect
the terms and conditions of their existing agreement within 60 days prior to the expiration
thereof and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. The NLRC, thus, held
that GNC failed to abide by this duty when it discontinued the release of benefits
pending the conclusion of a new CBA|||
K. STRIKES, PICKETING AND LOCK-OUTS

1. Who may declare a strike or lock-out? (B5,R13, S2, IRR)
General Rule: Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may declare a
strike in cases of bargaining deadlocks or ULP.
Exception: In the absence of a certfied or duly recognized bargaining representative,

any legitimate labor organization may declare a strike, BUT ONLY ON THE GROUND
OF ULP.
2. Requisites of a valid strike: (a) Must have a lawful purpose; (b) conducted through
lawful means; and (c) must be in compliance with the procedural requirements under
the Labor Code.
3. Unfair Labor Practices (ULP) by employer; examples under Articles 259, LC:
33
(a) interference, restraint or coercion of the employees in their exercise of right to self-
organization;
(b) yellow-dog contracts, e.g., stipulation requiring employee not to join unions, or for
employee to withdraw from union as condition for continued employment;
(c) refusal to collectively bargain;
(d) economic inducement and/or discrimination in regard to wages, hours of work, in
order to encourage/discourage union membership;
(e) contracting out of services/functions being performed by union members, where
such will interfere in the exercise of right to self-org.,
(f) to dismiss, discharge, discriminate or prejudice an employee about to give testimony
under this Code;
(g) to violate a Collective Bargaining Agreement, among others.
4. Unfair Labor Practices (ULP) by Union; examples under Articles 260, LC:
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization. However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to
whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an
employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under
which membership or continuation of membership is made available to
other members;
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer,
provided it is the representative of the employees;
(d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay
or deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature of an exaction,
for services which are not performed or not to be performed, including the
demand for fee for union negotiations;
(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorney's fees from employers as part of
the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
||
DEL CASTILLO CASES ON STRIKES
Guagua National Colleges vs. Guagua National Colleges Faculty Labor Union,
G.R. No. 204693, 13 July 2016. – company engaged in bad faith bargaining, when it
used dilatory tactics to avoid signing of the CBA.
Facts: The Union Presidents wrote the GNC (College) of its intention to open the
negotiation for the renewal of the then existing CBA. Instead of serving upon
respondents a reply/counter-proposal within 10 days from its receipt of respondents'
proposal, the College wrote respondents calling for a meeting regarding CBA
34
negotiations. No agreement was reached except that the College would notify
respondents of the next negotiation meeting.
Respondents later received from College's Corporate Secretary, stated that the
"management is not inclined to grant the economic/monetary-related proposals.”
Finding their efforts at reaching management to be futile, the Union filed a preventive
mediation case with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
Respondents alleged that after several mediation meetings, the parties finally agreed
on the details regarding the grant of signing bonus. Hence, they undertook to compose
the final draft of the 2009-2014 CBA which it submitted to the NCMB. Atty. Padilla
appeared before the NCMB and asked for 10 days to submit GNC's comment/counter-
proposal to the purported draft CBA of respondents. Thus, respondents filed a notice of
strike.
Issue: Whether GNC is guilty of bad faith bargaining. (YES)
Ruling: The collective conduct of GNC is indicative of its failure to meet its duty to
bargain in good faith. Badges of bad faith attended its actuations both at the plant and
NCMB levels.
At the plant level, GNC failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of serving a
reply/counter-proposal within 10 calendar days from receipt of a proposal, a fact
which by itself is already an indication of lack of genuine interest to bargain. Then, it
led respondents to believe that it was doing away with the reply/counter-proposal
when it proceeded to just orally discuss the economic terms. After a series of
negotiation meetings, the parties finally agreed on the economic terms which based
on the records was the only contentious issue between them.
In the days that followed, however, GNC ignored the follow-ups made by respondents
regarding the signing. It then suddenly capitalized on the fact that it had not yet
submitted a reply/counter-proposal and thereupon served one upon respondents
despite the parties already having reached an agreement.
It could not be any clearer from the above circumstances that GNC has no genuine
intention to comply with its duty to bargain. It merely went through the motions of
negotiations and then entered into an agreement with respondents which turned out
to be an empty one since it later denounced the same by submitting a reply/counter-
proposal. Worse, when respondents tried to clear out matters with the GNC President
through their letter of January 8, 2010, GNC did not even bother to respond.
Club Filipino, Inc., et al. vs. Benjamin Bautista, et al., G.R. No. 168406, 04 January
2015. -- The law requires knowledge of the illegality of the strike on the part of the union
officer before he can be dismisse
5. Assumption of Jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor or Certification of the
Labor Dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission for
Compulsory Arbitration.
35
|||
DEL CASTILLO case: Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Philtranco Workers

Union - Association of Genuine Labor Organizations, G.R. No. 180962, 16 February
2014. --
The character of the case, which involves an impending strike by petitioner's employees;
the nature of petitioner's business as a public transportation company, which is imbued
with public interest; the merits of its case; and the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Secretary of Labor — all these circumstances removed the case from the coverage of
Article 262, and instead placed it under Article 263, of the Labor Code. Besides, Rule
43 does not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code
It cannot be said that in taking cognizance of NCMB-NCR CASE No. NS-02-028-07, the
Secretary of Labor did so in a limited capacity, i.e., as a voluntary arbitrator. The fact is
undeniable that by referring the case to the Secretary of Labor, Conciliator-Mediator
Aglibut conceded that the case fell within the coverage of Article 263 of the Labor Code;
the impending strike in Philtranco, a public transportation company whose
business is imbued with public interest, required that the Secretary
of Labor assume jurisdiction over the case, which he in fact did. By assuming
jurisdiction over the case, the provisions of Article 263 became applicable, any
representation to the contrary or that he is deciding the case in his capacity as a
voluntary arbitrator notwithstanding.
When the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor case in an industry
indispensable to national interest, "he exercises great breadth of discretion" in finding a
solution to the parties' dispute. "[T]he authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and
controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to
enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. This wide
latitude of discretion given to the Secretary of Labor may not be the subject of
appeal.
L. LAW ON TERMINATION
2. GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
2.1 JUST CAUSES FOR TERMINATION (Art. 282, LC)
2.1.2 SERIOUS MISCONDUCT

§ Defined as improper or wrong conduct, a transgression of a
definite rule of action, a forbidden act or dereliction of duty which
36
is willful in character and implies wrongful intent, and not mere

error in judgment.
§ Elements of serious misconduct:

1. Must be serious, of grave and aggravated character, and not
merely trivial or unimportant
2. Must be related to the performance of the employee’s
duties; and
3. must show that he has become unfit to continue
working for the employer.
DEL CASTILLO case:. Reno Foods, Inc. v. Nagkakaisang Lakas

ng Manggagawa-Katipunan, G.R. No. 164016, 15 March 2010. –
Jurisprudence has classified theft of company property as
a serious misconduct and denied the award of separation pay to the
erring employee. We see no reason why the same should not be
similarly applied in the case of Capor. She attempted to steal the
property of her long-time employer. For committing such misconduct,
she is definitely not entitled to an award of separation pay.|
2.1.2 GROSS INSUBORDINATION

Elements:
1. employee’s assailed conduct must be willful or intentional;
2. willfulness characterized by wrongful or perverse attitude;
3. the order violated must be reasonable, lawful and made known to
the employee; and
4. the order must pertain to the duties which the employee has been
engaged to discharge. (The Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf Philippines,
Inc. vs. Rolly P. Arenas G.R. No. 208908, 11 March 2015)
DEL CASTILLO CASES ON GROSS INSUBORDINATION:
Tabuk Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Duclan, G.R. No.

203005, 14 March 2016, Del Castillo. -- An employee's willful and
repeated disregard of a resolution issued by a cooperative's board of
directors (BOD) declaring a moratorium on the approval and release
of loans, thus placing the resources of the cooperative and ultimately
the hard-earned savings of its members in a precarious state,
constitutes willful disobedience which justifies the penalty of dismissal
under Article 282 of the Labor Code.|||
In 2002, TAMPCO introduced Special Investment Loans (SILs) to its

members and prospective borrowers. A year after, the TAMPCO BOD
issued Board Action (BA) No. 28 which limited the grant of SILs to P5
million. This was prompted by a cooperative report stating that too
37
many SILs were being granted, the highest single individual borrowing
reached a staggering P14 million, which thus adversely affected the
cooperative's ability to grant regular loans to other members of the
cooperative.
However, despite said board action, SILs were granted by Duclan to

Falgui and Kotoken over and above the ceiling set. This prompted the
BOD to issue BA No. 55 completely halting the grant of SILs pending
collection of outstanding loans. Duclan and other cooperative officers
were indefinitely suspended, but was later on reinstated.
On an administrative investigation, Duclan admitted that she

continued to approve and release SILs despite the BA, and that she
acknowledged responsibility therefor. Under the foregoing
circumstances, Duclan was validly terminated for gross
insubordination, in willfully disregarding the directives of the
Cooperative, thereby seriously prejudicing its financial stability.
2.1.3 GROSS AND HABITUAL NEGLECT OF DUTIES
a) gross negligence: connotes want of care in the performance of one’s

duties, or absence of even slight care or diligence as to amount to a
reckless disregards of the safety of the person or property
b) habitual neglect: implies repeated failure to perform one’s duties

over a period of time
c) willful neglect of duties: imply bad faith on the part of the employee
in failing to perform his job, to the detriment of the employer and the
latter’s business
d) Totality of infractions ruling: where the employee has been found

to have repeatedly incurred several suspensions or warnings on
account of violations of company rules and regulations, the law
warrants their dismissal as it is akin to “habitual delinquency”. It is the
totality, not the compartmentalization of company infractions that the
employee had consistently committed, which justified the penalty of
dismissal. (Meralco vs. NLRC, 263 SCRA 531 [24 Oct 1996]).
| DEL CASTILLO CASES:
Japos v. First Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No.

208000, 16 July 2017. -- The evidence shows that prior to his June 22-
28, 2005 absences, petitioner already incurred several unauthorized
absences for 2005, specifically on January 26, February 28, and May 24,
2005, for which written warnings were issued against him. While
FARMCOOP opted not to penalize petitioner with suspension for the
38
February 28 and May 24 absences, as mandated under the AWOL and

AWOP Rules of FARMCOOP's Personnel Policies and Procedures, this
does not take away the fact that these prior absences are nonetheless
infractions — three in all, to be exact. This being the case, petitioner's
June 22-28, 2005 absences become significant because if it is found to
be unauthorized and thus inexcusable; it would constitute a fourth
infraction which merits the penalty of dismissal under the AWOL Rule, as
well as an infraction that merits dismissal under the AWOP Rule, for
being an unauthorized absence of at least six consecutive days. cSEDTC
Santos v. Integrated Pharmaceutical, Inc., G.R. No. 204620, 11 July

2016 – Petitioner was guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duty for
being excessively tardy, and hence, validly terminated.
Records reveal that petitioner was indeed habitually tardy. She was
always late in district meetings and in the submission of her periodic
reports. These are borne out by the evaluation 25 conducted by
petitioner's former supervisor, Arnelo R. Peñaranda, on September 26,
2008 where it was observed that petitioner was "[a]lways late during
District Meetings and [in] passing . . . required reports." Correspondingly,
in a scale of 1-5 (5 being the highest), petitioner was given a low mark of
1.5 as to punctuality. Despite such rock-bottom mark, however, the result
on petitioner's evaluation conducted barely two years later by her new
supervisor did not show any sign of improvement. She still failed "to
report on time both in the office and during regular field work visits."
The memorandum dated April 6, 2010 also bears out petitioner's lack of
deep sense of duty and punctuality. In that memorandum, petitioner was
chastised for arriving in the office late in the afternoon on March 22, 2010
when she was given the specific instruction to be at the office in the
morning of said date. Petitioner was also late for about 4 1/2 hours for her
appointment on April 5, 2010. Her payslips also reveal several deductions
from her salary due to tardiness and absences.
These pieces of documentary evidence already constitute substantial
evidence (or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion) proving petitioner's
habitual tardiness. Her tardiness is so excessive that it already affects the
general productivity and business of Integrated Pharma. It has amounted
to gross and habitual neglect of her duty, which is a just cause for
terminating employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
Quiambao v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., G.R. No. 171023,
18 December 2009. -- We have examined the records which indeed
show that petitioner's unauthorized absences as well as tardiness are
habitual despite having been penalized for past infractions. In Gustilo v.
Wyeth Philippines, Inc., we held that a series of irregularities when put
together may constitute serious misconduct.
39
We also held that gross neglect of duty becomes serious in character due
to frequency of instances. Serious misconduct is said to be a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and indicative of wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment.
Oddly, petitioner never advanced any valid reason to justify his absences.
Petitioner's intentional and willful violation of company rules shows his
utter disregard of his work and his employer's interest. Indeed, there can
be no good faith in intentionally and habitually incurring unexcusable
absences. Thus, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in equating petitioner's gross
neglect of duty to serious misconduct
2.1.4 FRAUD OR WILLFUL BREACH OF TRUST
a) Fraud: the deliberate and false representation of fact, despite

knowledge of its falsehood, in order to induce another who relied
upon it and benefit therefrom.
b) Elements of willful breach of trust leading to loss of trust and

confidence: (1) the breach must be willful and not ordinary
breach [hence, done knowingly and intentionally]; (2) employee
holds a position of trust and confidence; (3) must be in relation to
the work performed; and (4) there must exist substantial evidence,
and should not be based on mere surmises, speculations and
conjectures.
DEL CASTILLO CASES:
Mapili v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 172506, 27 July
2011, Del Castillo. – Complainant is a bus conductor who repeatedly
failed to collect fares from passengers who were his friends or relatives.
The Supreme Court ruled that his dismissal on account of dishonesty
was valid; moreso that he had a propensity to commit repetitious
infractions evinces wrongful intent, making him undeserving of the
compassion accorded by law to labor. aSEHDA|||
It bears stressing that petitioner has been in the employ of PRBLI for
more than eight years already and is a member of the company's labor
union. As such, he ought to know the specific company rules pertaining
to his line of work as a bus conductor. For that matter, his length of
service has even aggravated the resulting consequences of his
transgressions. In addition, on April 8, 1994 and May 3, 1995, he
committed similar infractions of extending free ride to a police officer
40
and a former employee, respectively. These had been brought to the

attention of the petitioner and for which the penalties of relief from duty
and suspension were meted out upon him. Hence, he ought to have
known better than to repeat the same violation as he is presumed to be
thoroughly acquainted with the prohibitions and restrictions against
extending free rides.
We also cannot agree with petitioner's contention that his infraction was
trivial. As a bus conductor whose duties primarily include the collection
of transportation fares, which is the lifeblood of the PRBLI, petitioner
should have exercised the required diligence in the performance thereof
and his habitual failure to exercise the same cannot be taken for
granted. As correctly observed by the CA, petitioner's position is imbued
with trust and confidence because it involves handling of money and
failure to collect the proper fare from the riding public constitutes a
grave offense which justifies his dismissal. Moreover, petitioner's "series
of irregularities when put together may constitute serious misconduct."
DEL CASTILLO case: Capili v. Phil. National Bank, G.R. No.

204750, 11 July 2016. – While managerial employees occupy positions
of trust and confidence, and that a higher standard may thus be applied
to them, the loss of trust and confidence must have substantial basis
and not be simulated or based on conjectures and speculations.
The Supreme Court in this case was not convinced that PNB lost its
confidence on Capili. As properly pointed out by the LA, PNB in fact
gave Capili a "Very Good" rating in her work performance. Particularly,
in her Performance Appraisal Report dated February 27, 2007, Capili
was given a "Very Good" rating by PNB. During this time, PNB was well
aware of the BP 22 cases against her, and the administrative case was
also then pending investigation already. When PNB gave Capili a very
satisfactory rating in her work performance, it did not consider the
pendency of the administrative case as sufficient to prevent her from
performing well in her work; in the process, she continually enjoyed the
trust and confidence of PNB.
DEL CASTILLO case: Rowena Santos vs. Integrated

Pharmaceutical vs. Tantiansu, G.R. No. 204620, 11 July 2016. --
Petitioner's act of deliberately misdeclaring or overstating her actual
travelling expense constitutes dishonesty and serious misconduct,
which are lawful grounds for her dismissal under paragraphs (a) and (c)
of Article 282 of the Labor Code. The fact that petitioner had been
declaring P10.00 as her actual travelling expense for quite some time
cannot be interpreted as condonation of the offense or waiver of
Integrated Pharma to enforce its rules. "A waiver is a voluntary and
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known legal right or
privilege." To be valid and effective, the waiver must be couched in
clear and unequivocal terms leaving no doubt as to the intention of a
41
party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to it. Hence, the
management prerogative to discipline employees and impose
punishment cannot, as a general rule, be impliedly waived.However, it
must be emphasized that the respondent shall be pay P30,000 as
nominal damages to petitioner for non-compliance with the two notice
requirement.
2.1.5 COMMISSION OF CRIME BY EMPLOYEE AGAINST

EMPLOYER
2.1.6 OTHER ANALOGOUS CAUSES
• RESIGNATION -- Voluntary resignation is defined as the act of an

employee, who finds himself in a situation in which he belies that personal
reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service; thus,
he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment.
(Alfaro vs. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 799 [2001]).
General rule: An employee who voluntarily resigns is not entitled to

separation pay.
Exception: Unless stipulated in an employment contract or CBA or

sanctioned by established employer practice or policy.
(CJC Trading, Inc. vs. NLRC, 246 SCRA 724 [1995]; Alfaro vs.
Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 799 [2001]).
DEL CASTILLO case: Emerita G. Malixi vs. Mexicali Philippines, GR

No. 205061 08 June 2016. -- Resignation for promotion considered
valid and binding, there being no vitiated consent
FACTS: Petitioner Malixi was hired by respondents MEXICALI as a team

leader. Subsequently, Mexicali's training officer informed her of the
management's intention to transfer and appoint her as store manager at a
newly opened branch in Alabang Town Center, which is a joint venture
between Mexicali and Calexico Food Corporation (Calexico), due to her
satisfactory performance. She then subsequently submitted a resignation
letter as advised by Mexicali Management, and subsequently started
working as the store manager of the joint venture.
Later on, she was compelled by Teves to sign an end-of-contract letter by

reason of a criminal complaint for sexual harassment she filed against
Mexicali's operations manager. When she refused to sign the end-of-
contract letter, Mexicali's administrative officer personally went to the
branch and caused the signing of the same. Upon her vehement refusal
to sign, she was informed by Luna that it was her last day of work.
42
Thus, Malixi filed a case for illegal dismissal against Mexicali.

Respondents however denied responsibility over petitioner’s dismissal
alleging that the latter resigned on MEXICALI hence, she was no longer
Mexicali’s employee.
ISSUES: WON Malixi is an employee of MEXICALI. (NO)

WON or not she was forced to resign. (NO)
RULING: NO, Malixi was no longer the employee of MEXICALI at the

time of the alleged dismissal because she resigned thereat.
The argument of the petitioner that she was induced into resigning
considering higher position and salary package is untenable.
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation
where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in
favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but
to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement
or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office
accompanied by the act of relinquishment.
Here, petitioner tendered her resignation letter preparatory to her transfer

to Calexico for a higher position and pay. In the same vein, an
inducement for a higher position and salary cannot defeat the
voluntariness of her actions. In termination cases, the employee is not
afforded any option; the employee is dismissed and his only recourse is
to institute a complaint for illegal dismissal against his employer.
• TERMINATION DUE TO UNION SECURITY CLAUSE: For valid termination

on this ground, the following must be proven by the employer --
a) the union security clause is applicable;

b) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union
security provision in the CBA; and
c) there is sufficient evidence to support the Union’s decision
to expel the employee from the union or company.
(Inguillo vs. First Philippines Scales, Inc., 588 SCRA 471 [2009];
See also: PICOP Resources, Inc. (PRI) vs. Anacleto Taneca et.
al, G.R. No. 160828, 09 August 2010).
3. AUTHORIZED CAUSES FOR TERMINATION

(Art. 283-284, LC) Memory aid: DIRe2C
DISEASE 1 MO PAY OR ½ MONTH

FOR EVERY YEAR OF
SERVICE
43
INSTALLATION OF LABOR 1 MO PAY OR 1 MONTH

FOR EVERY YEAR OF
SAVING DEVICES
SERVICE
RETRENCHMENT 1 MO PAY OR ½ MONTH
FOR EVERY YEAR OF
SERVICE
REDUNDANCY 1 MO PAY OR 1 MONTH
FOR EVERY YEAR OF
SERVICE
CLOSURE NOT DUE TO 1 MO PAY OR ½ MONTH
FOR EVERY YEAR OF
SERIOUS BUSINESS LOSSES
SERVICE
3.1 DISEASE (separation pay of 1/2 month pay for every year of
service)
• Employee must be suffering from a disease, and continued

employment is prohibited by law and/or is prejudicial to his health
and/or that of his co-employees;
• Disease cannot cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months, and
said fact is certified by a competent public health authority
• If curable, then employer cannot terminate but may ask employee to
take a leave; immediately upon restoration of normal health, employer
must reinstate employee to former position.
IMPORTANT NOTE: EMPLOYER MUST FURNISH EMPLOYEE TWO

(2) WRITTEN NOTICES ON TERMINATIONS DUE TO DISEASE
Marlo A. Deoferio v. Intel Technology Philippines, Inc.. And/Or Mike

Wentling, G.R. No. 202996, 18 June 2014. -- The Labor Code and its
IRR are silent on the procedural due process required in terminations
due to disease. Despite the seeming gap in the law, Section 2, Rule 1,
Book VI of the IRR expressly states that the employee should be
afforded procedural due process in ALL CASES OF DISMISSALS. Al
In Sy v. Court of Appeals (446 Phil. 404 [2003]) and Manly Express, Inc.
v. Payong, Jr., (510 Phil. 818 [2005]), the Court finally pronounced the
rule that the employer must furnish the employee two written notices in
terminations due to disease, namely: (1) the notice to apprise the
employee of the ground for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
notice informing the employee of his dismissal, to be issued after the
employee has been given reasonable opportunity to answer and to be
heard on his defense. These rulings reinforce the State policy of
protecting the workers from being terminated without cause and without
affording them the opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.
44
3.2 INSTALLATION OF LABOR SAVING DEVICES (sepn pay: 1

mo/yr of service)
• Example: computerization of accounting and payroll system;

mechanization of assembly line, etc.
• Presumption is that the employer does not have any serious business
losses, as to afford the purchase of labor-saving devices.
3.3 RETRENCHMENT (Sepn. Pay: 1/2 month pay for every year of
service)
Retrenchment is the termination of employment by the employer through

no fault of the employees, and is usually resorted to by the employer
primarily to avoid or minimize economic or business reverses during
periods of business recession, industrial depression, seasonal
fluctuations, re-organization or automation of the company operations.1
Where the employer suffers serious and actual business losses,
management has the final say as to whether it will continue to risk its
capital or not.2 However, the employer bears the burden to prove his
allegation of business losses.3
Elements for valid retrenchment:
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, in conjunction with Section 2, Rule
XXIII of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the following
elements must be strictly complied with in order that the retrenchment
may be considered as valid:
a) The losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis

in extent. --
b) The substantial losses apprehended must be reasonably imminent;
c) The retrenchment must be reasonable necessary and likely to
effectively prevent the expected losses; and
d) The alleged losses, if already incurred and the expected imminent
losses sought to be forestalled, must be proved by sufficient and
convincing evidence.4
3.4 REDUNDANCY (Sepn pay: 1 mo/yr of service)
1
See: Sebuguero vs. NLRC, 248 SCRA 533 [1995].
2
San Pedro Hospital of Digos, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor, 263 SCRA 98 [1996].
3
Guerrero vs. NLRC, 261 SCRA 301 [1996]
4
San Miguel Jeepney Services vs. NLRC, 265 SCRA 35 [1996]
45
Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of

what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the business
operations. Succinctly stated otherwise, a position may be declared
redundant and the employee terminated where his position has become
superfluous or is a duplication of work, viz., caused by overhiring of
workers, decreased volume of business, dropping of a particular product
line or service activity.
3.5 CESSATION OR CLOSURE OF EMPLOYER’S BUSINESS (1/2

month pay for every year of service)
IMPORTANT CASE ON GUIDELINES IN CLOSURE OF

BUSINESS:
The Supreme Court made the following summary of principles and

guidelines in the case of Manila Polo Club Employees Union (MPCEU-
FUR-TUCP) vs. Manila Polo Club, G.R. No. 172846, 24 July 2013, as
follows:
1. Closure or cessation of operations of establishment or

undertaking may either be partial or total.
2. Closure or cessation of operations of establishment or

undertaking may or may not be due to serious business losses
or financial reverses. However, in both instances, proof must be
shown that: (1) it was done in good faith to advance the
employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of employees under the law or a valid
agreement; and (2) a written notice on the affected employees
and the DOLE is served at least one month before the intended
date of termination of employment.
3. The employer can lawfully close shop even if not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses but separation pay, which
is equivalent to at least one month pay as provided for by
Article 283 of the Labor Code, as amended, must be given to
all the affected employees.
4. If the closure or cessation of operations of establishment or

undertaking is due to serious business losses or financial
reverses, the employer must prove such allegation in order to
avoid the payment of separation pay. Otherwise, the affected
employees are entitled to separation pay.
5. The burden of proving compliance with all the above-stated falls

upon the employer.
46
Guided by the foregoing, the Court shall refuse to dwell on the issue of
whether respondent was in sound financial condition when it resolved to
stop the operations of its F & B Department. As stated, an employer can
lawfully close shop anytime even if not due to serious business losses or
financial reverses. Furthermore, the issue would entail an inquiry into the
factual veracity of the evidence presented by the parties, the
determination of which is not Our statutory function. Indeed, petitioner is
asking Us to sift through the evidence on record and pass upon whether
respondent had, in truth and in fact, suffered from serious business
losses or financial reverses.
5. PROCEDURE FOR TERMINATION:

5.1 GENERAL RULE:
The twin requirements of NOTICE and HEARING are the essential

elements of due process in termination cases, which cannot be dispensed
with without violating the constitutional right to due process
EXCEPTION: If no due process but with just cause, then Agabon ruling to
apply.
5.2 ILLEGALITY OF THE ACT OF DISMISSAL - DISMISSAL WITHOUT

JUST CAUSE:
Remedies under the Labor Code:
1. Reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights.

If no longer available nor any equivalent position, then separation
pay to be given in lieu or reinstatement computed 1 month pay for
every year of service.
2. Payment of FULL backwages corresponding to the period from his

illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement.
3. Damages plus attorney’s fees.
5.3 ILLEGALITY IN THE MANNER OF DISMISSAL - DISMISSAL

WITHOUT DUE PROCESS: (WENPHIL, SERRANO AND AGABON
RULING)
In any event, NO REINSTATEMENT. However, as regards penalty for

non-compliance with due process requirements, the newest Supreme
Court ruling circa November 2004 is that the employer shall be sanctioned
with penalty of P30,000.00 in accordance with the Agabon vs. NLRC case,
47
which now affirms the Wenphil doctrine and abandoning the Serrano
ruling.
Agabon vs. NLRC ruling, G.R. No. 158693, 11/17/2004 - where there was
substantial evidence proving just cause BUT that due process was not
followed, the termination will be UPHELD (considered valid and effective)
but the employee will be penalized the amount of P30,000.00-50,000.00
(see discussion on difference below).
Difference in separation pay.-- (Jaka Food Processing v. Pacot, G.R. No.

151378; 28 March 2005)
• If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to
be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal
process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee.
Hence: P30,000.00 nominal damages for non-compliance with due
process, because employee has committed an infraction
• On the other hand, if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause

under Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal
process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management
prerogative. Hence, P50,000.00 nominal damages for non-
compliance with due process, because employee did not commit
anything wrong but that the termination was due to an exercise of
management prerogatives.
Should employee seek damages on this account, may file with regular
court. [Governed exclusively by the Civil Code. (Shoemart vs. NLRC,
supra.)]
6. ON NOTICE AND HEARING

Dept. Order No. 10, Article V; IRR B5 R14 S1-11
6.1 TWO NOTICES REQUIRED:
1ST NOTICE: NOTICE OF APPRAISAL, which is a written notice

served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds of
termination, and giving the employee reasonable opportunity within which
to explain his side
2ND NOTICE: NOTICE OF TERMINATION, which is a written notice of

termination served upon the employee, indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to
justify his termination.
48
6.2 HEARING:
The existence of a formal trial-type hearing, ALTHOUGH PREFERRED, is

NOT absolutely necessary to satisfy an employee’s right to be heard.
(Esguerra vs. Valle Verde Country Club, 672 SCRA 177 [2012]). --
Ø a hearing or a conference during which the employee concerned, with

the assistance of counsel if he so desires, is given the opportunity to
respond to the charge, to present his evidence, or to rebut the
evidence presented against him.
Ø note that a formal hearing (as in the manner of regular courts) is not
required; only substantial evidence is necessary.
Ø There is no necessity for a formal hearing where an employee admits

responsibility for the alleged misconduct. It is sufficient that she be
informed of the findings of management and the basis of its decision
to dismiss her.
6.3 Right to counsel on the part of the employee – is this mandatory and
indispensable as part of due process?
NO. In the case of Lopez vs. Alturas Group, 11 April 2011, the Supreme
Court ruled that the “right to counsel and the assistance of one in
investigations involving termination cases is neither indispensable nor
mandatory, except when the employee himself requests for one or that he
manifests that he wants a formal hearing on the charges against him.”
7. ON REINSTATEMENT:
• Where the former position is no longer available, the employee must be

reinstated to an equivalent position.
• Where the reinstatement is no longer viable in view of the strained relations

between the employer and employee, or if the employee decides not to be
reinstated, the employer shall pay him separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
• Nature of the order of the Labor Arbiter on reinstatement. --
The reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even

pending appeal. (Article 223 (3), Labor Code; cf Pioneer Texturizing vs.
NLRC (280 SCRA 806 [1997]).
Hence, it is the obligation of the employer to immediately admit the employee

back to work or reinstate him in the payroll at his option. Otherwise, the
employer will be held liable for backwages from the date of notice of the order
49
(International Container Terminal Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 360 Phil. 527
[1998]), up to the date of employees actual or payroll reinstatement. Thus, it
was held in Garcia vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (531 SCRA 574 [2007]), that
failure on the part of the employer to exercise the options in the alternative,
the employer must pay the employee’s salaries.
2015 CASE: Smart Communications, Inc., et al. vs. Jose Leni Z. Solidum,
G.R. No. 204646, 15 April 2015. -- In illegal dismissal cases, if the LA
ordered reinstatement, and the employer failed to reinstate the employer
either actually or in the payroll, and the NLRC on appeal reversed the
decision of the LA, the employee is entitled to the accrued salaries and other
benefits from the date of the LA’s decision up to the date the NLRC decision
becomes final and executory
8. ON BACKWAGES
8.1 FULL BACKWAGES For termination effected after effectivity of RA

6715
‘FULL” backwages to be computed from the time of termination to the

time of actual reinstatement.
“With the passage of RA 6715 which took effect on 21 March 1989,

Article 2709 of the Labor Code was thus amended to include payment of
“full” backwages. The Mercury drug rule which limited the award of
backwages of illegally dismissed workers to three (3) years without
deduction or qualification, is no longer applicable.” (Ferrer vs. NLRC)
8.2 BASIS FOR COMPUTING BACKWAGES: The workers are to be paid

their backwages fixed as of the time of the dismissal, i.e., unqualified by
any wage increases or other benefits that may have been received by
their co-workers. Awards including salary differentials are not allowed.
(Central Azucarrera de Tarlac vs. Sampang)
8.4 2014-2015 SC CASES ON COMPUTATION OF WAGES/BACKWAGES:
M. JURISDICTION AND REMEDIES

1. Asia Brewery, Inc. vs. Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia (TPMA), G.R.
Nos. 171594-96, 18 Sept. 2013, Del Castillo. -- on application of rules of procedure;
secretary’s certificate and financial statements
50
• It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by
the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural
rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary
rules. While the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not
controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence presented before it must at
least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value.
• Hence, for purposes of ascertaining whether there is substantial bass for a

retrenchment program, it is necessary that the financial statements submitted by the
company be independently audited by third parties. The Statement of Profit and
Losses submitted by the company to prove its alleged losses, without the
accompanying signature of a certified public accountant or audited by an independent
auditor, are nothing but self-serving documents which ought to be treated as a mere
scrap of paper devoid of any probative value.|||
• On the other hand, the Secretary's Certificate attached to the Petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 83168 giving authority to the Union President to file a Petition before the CA to
question the Secretary of Labor's arbitral award, was recognized by the Supreme
Court as valid and binding. While petitioner corporation claims that the proper
procedure for calling such a meeting was not followed, it presented no proof to
establish the same. Neither did the Union President Miranda, who allegedly did not
call for and preside over the said meeting, did not come out to contest the validity of
the aforesaid resolution or Secretary's Certificate. Similarly, petitioner corporation's
claim that the aforesaid resolution was still ineffective at the time of the filing of the
subject Petition is unsubstantiated.
2. Locsin vs. Mekeni Food Corporation, G.R. No. 192105, 09 Dec 2013. Del Castillo. –
on car plan agreement as a benefit and not as a loan.
• In the absence of specific terms and conditions governing a car plan agreement
between the employer and employee, the former may not retain the installment
payments made by the latter on the car plan and treat them as rents for the use of the
service vehicle, in the event that the employee ceases his employment and is unable
to complete the installment payments on the vehicle. The underlying reason is that
the service vehicle was precisely used in the former's business; any personal benefit
obtained by the employee from its use is merely incidental and insignificant, because
for the most part, the vehicle was under Mekeni’s complete control and supervision.
| |.
• Nor can the company retain the counterpart payments made by the employee as
purported loan payments, as it would have this Court believe. In the first place, there
is precisely no stipulation to such effect in their agreement. Secondly, it may not be
said that the car plan arrangement between the parties was a benefit that the
petitioner enjoyed; on the contrary, it was an absolute necessity in Mekeni's business
operations, which benefited it to the fullest extent. In light of the foregoing, petitioner
employee should be granted a refund of all his contributions to the car plan.
51
3. ON QUITCLAIMS
DEL CASTILLO: Iladan v. La Suerte International Manpower Agency, Inc., G.R. No.
203882, 11 January 2016 – Complainant employee alleges that the quitclaim she
signed was done involuntarily, as she was coerced into doing so.
The Court is not convinced as we find no proof of Iladan's allegations. It is a settled
jurisprudence that it is incumbent upon an employee to prove that his resignation is not
voluntary. However, Iladan did not adduce any competent evidence to prove that
respondents used force and threat.
For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites must be
present; (1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that
the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or
serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the
resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act
which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it
produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it
comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury
to his person or property. In the instant case, not one of these essential
elements was amply proven by [Iladan]. Bare allegations of threat or force
do not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding of forced
resignation.
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation
where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of
the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate
oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment
of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by
the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the
overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the
alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether in fact, he
or she intended to sever from his or her employment.” (Citations omitted).
In the instant case, Iladan executed a resignation letter in her own handwriting. She
also accepted the amount of P35,000.00 as financial assistance and executed an
Affidavit of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and an Agreement, as settlement and
waiver of any cause of action against respondents. The affidavit of waiver and the
settlement were acknowledged/subscribed before Labor Attache Leonida Romulo on
August 6, 2009, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong. An
affidavit of waiver duly acknowledged before a notary public is a public document
which cannot be impugned by mere self-serving allegations. Proof of an irregularity in
its execution is absolutely essential. The Agreement likewise bears the signature of
Conciliator-Mediator Diaz. Thus, the signatures of these officials sufficiently prove that
Iladan was duly assisted when she signed the waiver and settlement. Concededly, the
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. In this case, no such evidence was presented.
52
|||
4. ON MOTION TO REDUCE BOND.
DEL CASTILLO case: Turks Shawarma Co. v. Pajaron, G.R. No. 207156, 16 January
2017] –The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law." The party who seeks to
avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to
appeal is lost. Financial difficulties may not be invoked as a valid ground to reduce bond; at
any rate, it was not even substantiated by proof. Moreover, the partial bond in the amount of
P15,000.00 is not reasonable in relation to the award which totalled to P197,936.27. |||
5. ON IMMUTABILITY OF LABOR JUDGMENT AND ITS EXCEPTION:

DEL CASTILLO case: Dutch Movers, Inc. v. Lequin, G.R. No. 210032, 15 April 2017. --
supervening event of bankruptcy; corporate officer can be held personally liable for corporate
debt where it appears that the company was used to evade legal obligations.
General Rule: The principle of immutability of judgment provides that once a judgment has
become final and executory, the same can no longer be altered or modified and the court's
duty is only to order its execution.
Exception: When there is a supervening event occurring after the judgment becomes final
and executory, which renders the decision unenforceable.
To note, a supervening event refers to facts that transpired after a judgment has become final
and executory, or to new situation that developed after the same attained finality.
Supervening events include matters that the parties were unaware of before or during trial as
they were not yet existing during that time.
In Valderrama, the supervening event was the closure of Commodex, the company therein,
after the decision became final and executory, and without any showing that it filed any
proceeding for bankruptcy. The Court held that therein petitioner, the owner of Commodex,
was personally liable for the judgment awards because she controlled the company.
Similarly, supervening events transpired in this case after the NLRC Decision became final
and executory, which rendered its execution impossible and unjust. Like inValderrama,
during the execution stage, DMI ceased its operation, and the same did not file any formal
notice regarding it. Added to this, in their Opposition to the Motion to Implead, spouses Smith
revealed that they only lent their names to petitioners, and they were included as
incorporators just to assist the latter in forming DMI; after such undertaking, spouses Smith
immediately transferred their rights in DMI to petitioners, which proved that petitioners were
the ones in control of DMI, and used the same in furthering their business interests.
In considering the foregoing events, the Court is not unmindful of the basic tenet that a
corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its stockholders, and from other
corporations it may be connected with. However, such personality may be disregarded,
or the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced attaching personal liability against
responsible person if the corporation's personality "is used to defeat public
53
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, or is used as a device to

defeat the labor laws x x x." By responsible person, we refer to an individual or entity
responsible for, and who acted in bad faith in committing illegal dismissal or in violation of
the Labor Code; or one who actively participated in the management of the corporation.
Also, piercing the veil of corporate fiction is allowed where a corporation is a mere alter ego
or a conduit of a person, or another corporation.
Here, the veil of corporate fiction must be pierced and accordingly, petitioners should be
held personally liable for judgment awards because the peculiarity of the situation shows
that they controlled DMI; they actively participated in its operation such that DMI existed not
as a separate entity but only as business conduit of petitioners. As will be shown below,
petitioners controlled DMI by making it appear to have no mind of its own, and used DMI as
shield in evading legal liabilities, including payment of the judgment awards in favor of
respondents.
N. MIGRANT WORKERS AND COMPENSABILITY

OF DEATH, DISEASE OR INJURY
DEL CASTILLO CASES:
1. TSM Shipping (Phils.), Inc. v. De Chavez, G.R. No. 198225, 27 September 2017. -- This
is outside the coverage, but bear in mind the principle that the employee’s heirs cannot
recover death benefits if the cause of death was self-inflicted.
FACTS: On August 23, 2005, petitioners hired Ryan Pableo DeChavez (Ryan) as chief
cook on board the oil tanker vessel Haruna Express for a period of nine months. However,
on February 26, 2006, Ryan was found dead inside his cabin bathroom hanging by the
shower cord and covered with blood. Thus, Ryan's surviving spouse, Shirley G. DeChavez
(Shirley), filed a complaint for death benefits.|||
Shirley is not entitled to death benefits under the POEA-Standard Employment Contract,
because the Medical Certificate of Death, the written statements of the Chief Mate, the Ship
Master, and Messman, as well as the investigation report prepared by International
Inspection and Testing Corporation (INTECO), uniformly found Ryan's cause of death as
suicide|||
Given the evidence on record, we hold that Ryan's death was due to his own deliberate act
and deed. Indeed the Medical Certificate of Death prepared by Dr. Sung Yeoul Hung of the
Ulsan City Hospital, who, it is presumed, must have examined Ryan's cadaver, and the
INTECO's Report which contained information involving the self-same death, must be
deemed as substantial evidence of that fact. We are satisfied that the material facts set
54
forth in the Decisions of both the LA and the NLRC constitute substantial evidence that
Ryan took his own life, that he died by his own hands. As such, his heirs are not entitled to
any benefit.
2. TSM Shipping Phils., Inc. v. Patiño, G.R. No. 210289, 20 March 2017. – Seafarer who
files total permanent disability claim before the lapse of the 120-day period, has no cause of
action as yet because the period for treatment and rehabilitation has not yet expired.
The seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated
physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment.
For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is
on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage
during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged
by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under
the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws.
If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the
seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be
extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare
within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may
of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical
condition.|||
In this case however, there was only 107 days since repatriation when respondent filed a
complaint for total and permanent disability benefits. During this time, he was considered
under temporary total disability inasmuch as the 120/240-day period had not yet lapsed.
Evidently, the complaint was prematurely filed.
Moreover, it is significant to note that when he filed his complaint, respondent was armed
only with the interim medical assessment of the company designated physician and his
belief that his injury had already rendered him permanently disabled. It was only after the
filing of such complaint or on November 9, 2010 that he sought the opinion of Dr. Escutin,
his own physician. As such, the Labor Arbiter should have dismissed at the first instance
the complaint for lack of cause of action.
3. Magsaysay Maritime Corp v. Cruz, G.R. No. 204769, 06 June 2016. – company doctor
is supposed to make a definite diagnoses within the 120-240 day period, and his
failure to do so gives rise to presumption that the seafarer is permanently and totally
disabled.
FACTS: In 2007, Magsaysay employed Rodel Cruz as housekeeping cleaner on board the
vessel Costa Fortuna. Respondent's employment was for 8 months (with 3-month
extension upon mutual consent of the parties) with basic monthly salary of €306.00 and
other benefits. While lifting heavy objects in the course of performing his duties, Cruz
experienced low back pain. As a result, he was repatriated on June 19, 2008, and was
immediately referred to Dr. Benigno A. Agbayani, the company-designated doctor.
55
On September 2008, Dr. Agbayani diagnosed respondent with "Discogenic pain L4/L5;
Myofacial pain syndrome erection sprain S/P Provocative Discogram and Percutaneous
Nucleoplasty." He gave respondent an interim disability rating of Grade 8 for "Moderate
rigidity of two thirds loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk." After more more than 20 PT
sessions, and non-invasive procedures, it was discovered that employee was was
suffering from mild degenerative changes in the lumbar spine. As such, Dr. Agbayani
declared that respondent's illness was work-related, and after almost one year from
respondent's repatriation, Dr. Agbayani gave respondent a disability rating of Grade 8 for
"moderate rigidity or two third loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk."
Cruz then filed a Complaint for permanent and total disability benefits, sickness allowance,
damages and attorney's fees against Magsaysay. He argued that he is entitled to disability
benefits because of the reasonable connection between his work and his illness. He
stressed that before his embarkation lie was declared fit to work; as such, it can be logically
inferred that he acquired his illness while aboard the vessel and by reason of its harsh
working environment.
ISSUE: Should Cruz be entitled to disability compensation under the circumstances?
HELD: Yes. The company-designated doctor is expected to arrive at a definite assessment

of the seafarer's fitness to work or to determine his disability within a period of 120 or 240
days from repatriation. The 120-day period applies if the duration of the seafarer's
treatment does not exceed 120 days, On the other hand, the 240-day period applies in
case the seafarer requires further medical treatment after the lapse of the initial 120-day
period. In case the company-designated doctor failed to issue a declaration within the given
periods, the seafarer is deemed totally and permanently disabled.
Here, it is undisputed that respondent required medical treatment even after the lapse of
120 days from repatriation. As such, Dr, Agbayani should have made his definite
assessment on respondent's condition within the aforesaid 240-day period. Unfortunately,
Dr. Agbayani failed to timely issue a declaration as he only issued an assessment on
respondent's disability on June 1, 2009, almost one year from the latter's repatriation. By
operation of law, respondent is deemed permanently and totally disabled and is thus
entitled to full disability compensation.
4. Doehle-Philman v. Haro, G.R. No. 206522, 18 April 2016. – where the seafarer did not
suffer from any occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC,
seafarer has the burden to prove that his illness is work-related in order that he may
be entitled to disability benefits.
FACTS: Doehle-Philman, in behalf of its foreign principal, Dohle Ltd., hired Haro as oiler
aboard the vessel MV Providencia for a period of nine months with basic monthly salary of
US$547.00 and other benefits. Before deployment, respondent underwent pre-employment
medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea duty. Haro boarded the vessel
and assumed his duties as oiler in June 2008; however, in November 2008, he experienced
heartache and loss of energy after hammering and lifting a 120-kilogram machine;
thereafter, he was confined at a hospital in Rotterdam where he was informed of having a
hole in his heart that needed medical attention.
56
Haro was repatriated on December 2008. He claimed that he was confined for two days in
UST Hospital and that a heart operation was recommended to him. He nevertheless
admitted that he has not yet undergone any surgery. On April 2009, respondent’s personal
doctor, Dr. Luminardo M. Ramos, declared him not fit to work. As such, Haro filed a
Complaint for disability benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees against petitioners.
ISSUE: Was Haro’s alleged inability to work for a period exceeding 120 days sufficient to
justify his entitlement to permanent total disability benefits?
HELD: NO. The Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA-SEC), particularly Section 20(B) thereof,
provides that the employer is liable for disability benefits when the seafarer suffers from a
work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract.
To emphasize, to be compensable, the injury or illness
1) must be work-related and
2) must have arisen during the term of the employment contract.
The Court held that those diseases not listed as occupational diseases may be
compensated if it is shown that they have been caused or aggravated by the seafarer’s
working conditions. The Court stressed that while the POEA-SEC provides for a disputable
presumption of work-relatedness as regards those not listed as occupational diseases, this
presumption does not necessarily result in an automatic grant of disability compensation.
The claimant still has the burden to present substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the illness.
In this case, considering that respondent did not suffer from any occupational disease listed
under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, then to be entitled to disability benefits, the
respondent has the burden to prove that his illness is work-related. Unfortunately, he failed
to discharge such burden. Respondent simply relied on the presumption that his illness is
work-related. He did not adduce substantial evidence that his work conditions caused, or at
the least increased the risk of contracting his illness. Haro did not elaborate on the nature of
his work and its connection to his illness. Certainly, he is not entitled to any disability
compensation
FOR THE 2018 BAR EXAMINEES:

GOOD LUCK AND GOD BLESS YOU ALL!!
DEAN ADA D. ABAD

and the 2018 Adamson University College of Law
Bar Operations Academics Committee
In behalf of Philippine Association of Law Schools (PALS)
57

J. Del Castillo - Labor Law

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ABAD / ADAMSON 2018 LABOR DEL CASTILLO CASES & NOTES

FOR PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS (PALS)

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO CASE DIGESTS

and doctrinal digests by Dean Antonio H. Abad, Jr.

1.1 Four tests to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship

(MEMORY AID: SOUTH WEST DISASTER CONTROL)

a. Valeroso v. Skycable Corp., G.R. No. 202015, 13 July 2016

To prove the claim of an employer-employee relationship, the following

b. Royale Homes Marketing Corp. v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 195190, 28 July

The most determinative factor in ascertaining the existence of employer-

• CONTRA: But not every form of control is indicative of the existence of an

DEL CASTILLO: Royale Homes Marketing Corp. v. Alcantara, G.R. No.

Example: insurance agents; two cases:

Insurance agents are not employees of the insurance companies, in the

the methods themselves — of selling insurance. (Insular Life Assurance Co.,

1.2 Existence of an employer-employee relationship is a condition sine qua non

• There must be a REASONABLE CAUSAL CONNECTION between the

Facts: Adviento was hired as Civil Engineer (for maintenance of facilities) of

Question: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction?

Answer: YES. No reasonable causal connection between claim and employer-

Although Adviento contracted the occupational disease during his employment

DEL CASTILLO case: De Roca v. Dabuyan, G.R. No. 215281, 05 March

• IS THE TERMINATION OF A HIGHER MANAGEMENT OFFICER “ASST.

• VERY IMPORTANT DEL CASTILLO CASE ON EXISTENCE OF INTRA-

There is a two-tier test in determining the existence of intra-corporate

Intra-Corporate Controversy; relationship test

itself is intra-corporate. The controversy must not only be rooted in the

TWO TESTS MUST BE COMPLIED WITH –

2. Burden of proof is always upon employer to show validity of its exercise of

• NOTE: HOWEVER COMPLAINANT EMPLOYEE INITIALLY HAS THE BURDEN OF

QUESTION: Are sworn statements of relatives and friends of respondent

Answer: YES. The employer’s evidence consists of sworn statements of

4. In cases of ambiguity, interpretation shall be made in favor of labor.

DEL CASTILLO, Mitsubishi Motors Phil. Salaried Employees Union v. Mitsubishi

5. In the imposition of penalty, whether suspension or termination, the same must

6. But management prerogatives are likewise to be equally protected when

DEL CASTILLO, Tabuk Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Duclan, G.R. No.

2. MEMORIZE ELEMENTS: Valid exercise of management prerogatives

• IN GOOD FAITH (BONA-FIDE IN CHARACTER),

3. IMPORTANT DEL CASTILLO CASE ON JURISPRUDENTIAL GUIDELINES IN THE

a. Transfer is a movement from one position to another of equivalent rank, level or

Transfer as constructive dismissal. -- DEL CASTILLO case: The Orchard

employee’s continued employment shall become so intolerable. In these difficult

2. PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEES – those who are hired generally for regular

IMPORTANT DEL CASTILLO RULING ON PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT

Answer: NO! Termination of a probationary employee must be for his/her failure

SC rationale: The fixed-term character of employment essentially refers to the

sense, employment on probationary status also refers to a period because of the

However, for teachers on probationary employment, in which case a fixed

NOTE2: To highlight what the Supreme Court meant by a fixed-term contract

4. PROJECT EMPLOYEES – The principal test for determining whether particular

April 2017. – Project-based employment contracts are valid where employees

FACTS: Herma Shipyard is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of

It is settled, however, that project-based employees may or may not be performing

5. SEASONAL EMPLOYEES -- those hired for work or services which is seasonal

EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION AS TO RANK

7.1 CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES: Doctrine of necessary implication and/or

Confidential employees are those who: (1) assist or act in a confidential

8. SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES – those who, in the interest of management,

9. RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES - All other employees not falling within the

Exception: Probationary Seasonal

D. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORSHIP ARRANGEMENTS

D.1 VALID INDEPENDENT CONTRACTING