You are on page 1of 185

1

G.R. No. 159810. October 9, 2006.*


Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
ESTATE OF EDWARD MILLER GRIMM, represented by RAMON J. QUISUMBING Parsons
and RANDY GLEAVE LAWYER, as Judicial Administrators, petitioners, vs. ESTATE
OF CHARLES PARSONS and PATRICK C. PARSONS, G-P AND COMPANY and conclusion. Decidedly, this case falls within the recognized exceptions to the rule
MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., respondents. on the finality of factual findings or conclusions of the CA.
Remedial Law; Appeals; The rule that the Court will not set aside the factual
determinations of the CA lightly nor will it embark in the evaluation of evidence Same; Evidence; Presumptions; A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact
adduced during trial admits of several exceptions.—The respondents’ presumed and to the party against whom it operates rests the burden of
formulation of the grounds for the dismissal of the instant petition is a overthrowing by substantial and credible evidence the presumption.—A party in
statement of the general rule. A resolution of the petition would doubtless entail whose favor a legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal
a review of the facts and evidentiary matters against which the appealed presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to
decision is cast, a procedure which is ordinarily outside the province of the Court prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed and
and the office of a certiorari review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. For, the to the party against whom it operates rests the burden of overthrowing by
rule of long standing is that the Court will not set aside the factual substantial and credible evidence the presumption. Under the law on evidence,
determinations of the CA lightly nor will it embark in the evaluation of evidence it is presumed that “there was sufficient consideration for a contract.”
adduced during trial. This rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Among
these are when the factual conclusions of the CA are manifestly erroneous; are Civil Law; Trust; Trust is the legal relationship between one having an equitable
contrary to those of the trial court; when the judgment of the CA is based on ownership in property and another person owning the legal title to such
misapprehension of facts or overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the
the parties which, if properly considered, would justify a different performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter;
Trust relations may be express or implied.—Trust is the legal relationship
_______________ between one having an equitable ownership in property and another person
owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former
* SECOND DIVISION. entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain
powers by the latter. Trust relations between parties may be express, as when
the trust is created by the intention of the trustor. An express trust is created by
68 the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed or by words
evidencing an intention to create a trust; the use of the word trust is not
required or essential to its constitution, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly
68 intended. Implied trust comes into existence by operation of law, either through
implication of an intention to create a trust as a matter of law or through the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED imposition of the trust irrespective of, and even contrary to any such intention.
2

seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated September 8, 2003 of the Court of
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69990, reversing an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in its Civil Case No. 92-2452.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
At the core of the controversy is a stock certificate of the Manila Golf & Country
Quisumbing, Torres for petitioners. Club, Inc. (“MGCC” or the “Club”, for short) covered by Membership Certificate
(MC) No. 1088 for 100 units, the playing rights over which the Rizal Commercial
69 Banking Corporation (RCBC), the court-appointed receiver, had, in the
meantime, leased out. The Club issued MC No. 1088 to replace MC No. 590.
VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 Asserting clashing ownership claims over MC No.1088, albeit recorded in the
name
69
_______________
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
Parsons 1 Per Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, (ret.) concurred in by Associate
Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam; Annex “A,”
Manuel O. Chan Law Offices for Manila Golf & Country Club, Incorporated. Petition, Rollo, pp. 7 et seq.

Blanco Law Firm and Feria, Feria, Lao, Tantoco co-counsels for respondents 70
Estate of Charles Parsons, Patrick Parsons and G-P & Co.
70
GARCIA, J.:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Because legal and situational ambiguities often lead to disagreements even
between or amongst the most agreeable of persons, it behooves all concerned Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
to put their financial affairs and proprietary interests in order before they depart Parsons
for the great beyond. Leaving legal loose ends hanging or allowing clouds to
remain on property titles when one can do something about them before the of Charles Parsons (“Parsons,” hereinafter) are petitioner Estate of Edward Miller
proverbial thief in the night suddenly comes calling only opens the door to Grimm and respondent G-P and Company (“G-P & Co.,” hereinafter).
bruising legal fights and similar distracting inconveniences. So it was here.
Parsons and Edward Miller Grimm (Grimm), together with Conrado Y. Simon
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Estate of (Simon), formed in 1952 a partnership for the stated purpose of engaging in the
Edward Miller Grimm, represented by its judicial administrators, assails and
3

import/export and real estate business. Per SEC Certificate #3305,2 the
partnership was registered under the name G-P and Company. 6 Id., at p. 2106.

Before September 1964, Parsons and Grimm each owned proprietary 71


membership share in MGCC,3 as evidenced by MC No. 374 for 100 units in the
name of Parsons, and MC No. 590, also for 100 units, in the name of Grimm. Per VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006
records, the Club issued MC No. 590 to Grimm on May 25, 1960.4
71
After Grimm’s demise on November 27, 1977, Parsons and Simon continued
with the partnership under the same name, G-P and Company, as reflected in Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
Articles of Partnership dated December 14, 1977.5 The articles of the Parsons
partnership would later undergo another amendment to admit Parsons’ son,
Patrick, in the partnership.6 After Parsons died on May 12, 1988, Amended among Parsons’ heirs, namely, Patrick, Michael, Peter and Jose, all surnamed
Articles of Partnership of G-P and Company was executed on September 23, Parsons, albeit the amendment appeared to have been registered with the SEC
1988 by and only on March 18, 1993.7

_______________ The herein legal dispute started when brothers Patrick and Jose, both surnamed
Parsons, responding to a letter8 from the Estate of Grimm, rejected the
2 Original Records, p. 2086. existence of a trust arrangement between their father and Grimm involving MC
No. 1088. Thus spurned, the Estate of Grimm filed on August 31, 1992 before the
3 Sec. 6 of the Club’s By-Laws (Exh. “U”) provides: Membership in the Club shall RTC of Makati City, a suit for recovery of MC No. 1088 with damages against the
consist of only the Proprietary Members. A Proprietary Member is one owning Estate of Parsons, Patrick Parsons and MGCC. In its complaint,9 docketed as Civil
one (1) full [MC] and who has been elected …. A full [MC] shall consist of one Case No. 92-2452 and eventually raffled to Branch 135 of the court, the Estate of
hundred (100) units. No [MC] will be issued for more than one hundred (100) Grimm, represented by its judicial administrator, Ramon J. Quisumbing, alleged,
units, but may be issued for less. among other things, the following:

Subject to approval of the Board …., full Proprietary [MCs] may also be acquired “1. That on September 7, 1964, Grimm transferred MC No. 590 in trust to
by Companies …. A Company Proprietary [MC] may only … be utilized by a bona Parsons; on the same day, MGCC cancelled MC No. 590 and issued MC No. 1088
fide official of the Company …. in the name of Parsons;
2. That in separate letters dated February 28, 1968 addressed to MGCC, both
4 Per the Club’s index card #144; Exh. “7-I,” Original Records, p. 2571. Grimm and Parsons stated that the transfer of MC No. 590 was temporary.
Enclosed in that Parsons’ letter was MC No. 1088 which he was turning over for
5 Id., at p. 2102.
4

safekeeping to the Club, thru E.C. Von Kauffmann and Romeo Alhambra, then Co., and alleged, by way of affirmative defense, that the claim set forth in the
MGCC honorary secretary and assistant manager, respectively; complaint is unenforceable, barred inter alia by the dead man’s statute,
3. That on June 9, 1978, or after Mr. Kauffman’s death and Mr. Alhambra’s prescription or had been waived or abandoned.
resignation, MGCC turned over the possession of MC No. 1088 to Parsons;
4. That in 1977, Grimm died; after a protracted proceedings, his estate was Herein respondent G-P & Co., echoing Patrick Parsons’ allegation respecting the
finally settled in 1988, the year Parsons also died; ownership of MC No. 1088, moved to intervene and to implead Far East Bank &
5. That Patrick and Jose Parsons had, when reminded of the trust arrangement Trust Co. (FEBTC), as transfer agent of MGCC, as defendant-in-intervention.
between their late father and Grimm, denied the Attached to its motion was its COMPLAINT In Intervention11 therein alleging (a)
_______________ that on September 1, 1964, Parsons executed a Letter of Trust, infra, in which he
acknowledged the beneficial ownership of G-P & Co. over MC No. 374 and MC
7 Id., at p. 2110. No.1088; (b) that Parsons, as required by the partnership, endorsed both
certificates in blank; and (c) that G-P & Co. carried said certificates amongst its
8 Exh. “C,” Id., at p. 2232. assets in its books of accounts and financial statements and paid the monthly
dues of both certificates to the Club when its membership privileges were not
9 Annex “B,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 114 et seq. temporarily assigned to others. In the same complaint-in-intervention, G-P & Co.
cited certain tax incidents as reasons why the transfer of MC No. 374 and MC
72 No. 1088 from Parsons to the intervenor-partnership cannot as yet be
accomplished.
72
_______________
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
10 Annex “D,” Petition; Id., at pp. 142 et seq.
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
Parsons 11 Id., at pp. 128 et seq.

existence of a trust over the Club share and refused to return the same; and 73
6. That MGCC had refused, despite demands, to cancel MC No. 1088 and issue a
new certificate in the name of the Estate of Grimm.” VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006
Attached to the complaint were the demand letters and other communications
which, to the Estate of Grimm, document the Grimm-Parsons trust arrangement. 73

In his Answer with counterclaim,10 Patrick Parsons averred that his father was, Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
with respect to MC No. 1088, a mere trustee of the true owner thereof, G-P & Parsons
5

After the usual reply and answer to counterclaims had been filed, the Estate of 74
Grimm filed an amended complaint to include Randy Gleave Lawyer, the other
judicial co-administrator, as representative of the Estate. On April 28, 1993, the SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
trial court admitted the amended complaint.
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
After a lengthy trial, the trial court rendered its May 29, 2000 judgment12 Parsons
finding for the Estate of Grimm, as plaintiff a quo, disposing as follows:
In gist, the trial court predicated its ruling on the postulate that the temporary
“1. Ordering defendants ESTATE OF CHARLES PARSONS and PATRICK C. transfer of Grimm’s original share in MGCC—covered by MC No. 590 whence MC
PARSONS: No. 1088 descended—to Parsons, created a trust relationship between the two.
1.1 to turn over [MC] No. 1088 to plaintiff ESTATE OF EDWARD MILLER GRIMM;
1.2 jointly and severally to pay damages to plaintiff ESTATE …in the amount of Therefrom, only herein respondents G-P & Co., Patrick Parsons and the Parsons
P400,000.00 per annum from September 8, 1989 to November 12, 1998, with Estate appealed to the CA, albeit MGCC would, in its brief, reiterate its readiness
legal interest thereon from the date of this Decision until fully paid; to issue the corresponding replacement certificate to whosoever is finally
1.3 Jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff ESTATE … attorney’s fees in the amount adjudged owner of MC No. 1088.
of P1,000,000.00 and the costs;
2. Ordering defendant [MGCC] and defendant-in-intervention [FEBTC] to cancel On September 8, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69990, the appellate court rendered its
[MC] No. 1088 and to issue a new Membership Certificate in lieu thereof in the herein assailed Decision,13 disposing as follows:
name of plaintiff ESTATE ….
3. Ordering Receiver RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION to turn over “WHEREFORE, the Decision of the lower court dated May 29, 2000 is hereby
to plaintiff ESTATE … all income derived from the lease of the playing rights of REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one rendered:
[MC] No. 1088, less Receiver’s fees and charges.
4. Ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim of the defendants … [Parsons]; and 1. Dismissing the complaint filed by … Estate of Edward Miller Grimm for lack of
5. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention and the supplemental merit;
counterclaim of intervenor G-P AND COMPANY. 2. Ordering … Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc., and defendant-in-intervention
SO ORDERED.” (Words in bracket added.) Far East Bank & Trust Company, as transfer agent, to immediately effect the
reconveyance of [MC] No. 1088 to Intervenor-appellant G-P and Company;
_______________ 3. Ordering Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, as receiver, to immediately
turn over to intervenor-appellant G-P and Company all income derived from the
12 Penned by Judge Francisco B. Ibay; Annex “R,” Petition; Id., at pp. 797 et seq. lease of the playing rights of said Membership Certificate, less receiver’s fees;
4. Ordering [the] … Estate of Edward Miller Grimm to pay appellants the amount
74 of P800,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
6

5. Ordering … Estate of Edward Miller Grimm to pay appellants the costs of suit. The respondents’ formulation of the grounds for the dismissal of the instant
SO ORDERED.” (Words in bracket added.) petition is a statement of the general rule. A resolution of the petition would
doubtless entail a review of the facts and evidentiary matters against which the
_______________ appealed decision is cast, a procedure which is ordinarily outside the province of
the Court and the office of a certiorari review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
13 Supra note 1. Court. For, the rule of long standing is that the Court will not set aside the factual
determinations of the CA lightly nor will it embark in the evaluation of evidence
75 adduced during trial. This rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Among
these are when the factual conclusions of the CA are manifestly erroneous; are
VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 contrary to those of the trial court; when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts or overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
75 the parties which, if properly

Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C. _______________
Parsons
14 MGCCI’s Comment on Petitioner’s Petition for Review, Rollo, pp. 252 et seq.
Hence, this petition for review on the lone submission that the CA erred in
finding that respondent G-P & Co. is the beneficial owner of MC No. 1088. 76

In their comment to the petition, the respondents urge the outright dismissal 76
thereof on the ground that it raises only purely factual and evidentiary issues
which are beyond the office of an appeal by certiorari. As argued further, the SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties.
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
It should be made clear right off that respondent Patrick Parsons, in his Parsons
individual capacity, and the Estate of Parsons (collectively, the Parsons) are not
claiming beneficial ownership over MC No. 1088. The same goes for respondent considered, would justify a different conclusion.15 Decidedly, this case falls
MGCC which went to state on record that “[T]he ownership of [MC] No. 1088 within the recognized exceptions to the rule on the finality of factual findings or
(previously No. 590) does not belong to the Club and it does not stand to gain … conclusions of the CA.
from the determination of its real owner.”14
The principal issue tendered in this case turns on who between petitioner Estate
We GRANT the petition. of Grimm and respondent G.P. & Co. beneficially owns MC No. 1088. Corollary
thereto - owing to the presentation by respondents of a LETTER OF TRUST that
7

Parsons allegedly executed in favor of G-P and Company with respect to MC No. VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006
1088 - is the question of whether or not the transfer of MC No. 590 effected on
September 7, 1964 by Grimm in favor of Parsons resulted, as the petitioner 77
would have it, in the formation of a trust relation between the two. Thus
formed, the trust relationship would preclude the trustee from disposing of the Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
trust property, save when repudiation of the trust had effectively supervened. Parsons

The trial court found the September 7, 1964 Grimm- to-Parsons certificate & Co. pertains the beneficial ownership of MC No. 1088, an implied trust in its
transfer to be only temporary and without valuable consideration to favor having been created when MC No. 590 and MC No. 374 were acquired for
accommodate a third person and thus adjudged Grimm to be the real owner of and placed in the names of Grimm and Parsons, respectively, albeit the
MC No. 590, as later replaced by MC No. 1088. According to the trial court, such partnership paid for the price therefor. To the appellate court, the fact that
transfer created a trust, with Parsons, as trustee, and Grimm, as the beneficial these certificates were carried, as of December 31, 1974, November 27, 1977
owner of the share thus transferred, adding that Parsons, as mere trustee, is and December 31, 1978 in the books17 of G-P & Co. as investment assets only
without right to transfer the replacement certificate to G-P & Co. proves one thing: the company paid the acquisition costs for the membership
certificates. If Grimm was the real owner of said share, he should have,
On the other hand, the CA, while eschewing the alternative affirmative defenses according to the appellate court, objected to its inclusion in the partnership
interposed below by respondents, nonetheless ruled for respondent G—P & Co. assets during his lifetime. Completing its ratiocination, the CA wrote:
Citing Article 1448 of the Civil Code,16 the appellate court held that respondent
G—P “x x x. A trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on
another especially between the partners and the company, does not lose that
_______________ character simply because of what appears in a legal document. The transfer
therefore of Grimm’s [MC] No. 590 on September 7, 1964 in favor of Charles
15 Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, Jan. 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220, Parsons resulted merely in the change of the person of trustee but not of the
citing cases. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110207, July 11, 1996, 258 SCRA beneficial owner, the G-P and Company.”
651.
The CA’s ruling does not commend itself for acceptance. As it were, the assailed
16 Art. 1448. There is implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is decision started on the wrong foot and thus had to limp all along to arrive at a
granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having strained and erroneous conclusion. We shall explain.
the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter
is the beneficiary. x x x. A party in whose favor a legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such
legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to
77 prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed and
8

to the party against whom it operates rests the burden of over-throwing by Ironically, while the CA held it against the petitioner for failing to adduce proof
substantial and credible evidence the presump- of payment by Grimm for his MC No. 590, it nonetheless proceeded to declare
respondent G-P & Co. to be the beneficial owner of said certificate even if it, too,
_______________ had not presented proof for such payment. Respondent G-P & Co., in its
complaint-in-intervention (should have been answer-in-intervention), did not
17 Exh. “13” and submarkings; Original Records, pp. 2610-12. allege paying for MC No. 590. Surely, payment cannot be validly deduced, as the
CA did, from the bare fact of such membership certificate being listed in the
78 books of respondent G-P & Co. as partnership investment assets. For one, the
self-serving book entries in question are, as correctly dismissed by the trial court,
78 not evidentiary of ownership. Else, anyone can lay a claim, or worse, acquire
ownership over a share of stock by the simple expedience of
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
Parsons 18 Tison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 582;
Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 363.
tion.18 Under the law on evidence, it is presumed that “there was sufficient
consideration for a contract.”19 19 Rule 131, Sec. 3[r], Rules of Court.

Inasmuch as Grimm’s name appeared on MC No. 590 as registered owner 20 CA Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 16.
thereof, he is deemed to have paid sufficient consideration for it. The onus of
proving otherwise would fall on respondents G-P & Co. and/or the Parsons. 79
Without so much of an explanation, however, the CA minimized the value of MC
No. 590 as arguably the best evidence of ownership. Corollarily, the appellate VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006
court devalued the rule on legal presumption and faulted petitioner Estate of
Grimm for not presenting evidence to prove that Grimm paid for his original 79
acquisition of MC No. 590. Wrote the CA:
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
“Contrary to the findings of the lower court, [petitioner] failed to establish [its] Parsons
right over the said shares. x x x Not a single evidence of proof of payment for the
said shares was ever presented by the [petitioner] to establish ownership.” listing, without more, the same in the partnership or corporate books. The sheer
(Words in bracket added.)20 absurdity of the notion need no belaboring.
9

For another, what appears or what respondent company uniformly entered as 80


investments are: “Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc. 2 shares.” No reference was
made whatsoever in the books or financial statements about MC No. 590, (MC. 80
No. 1088) and MC. No. 374. In the absence of the number reference or other
similar identifying details, the CA’s categorical conclusion that one of the “2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
shares” referred to is MC No. 1088 is at best speculative. This observation
becomes all the more valid given that Michael Parsons had in his name two (2) Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
Club share certificates. Exhibit “X-4,” a September 21, 1964 letter from Parsons Parsons
to Mr. Kaufmann made specific reference to Michael’s shares:
before the respondent company was established by the execution of the Articles
“Under the circumstance, please disregard … the previous letter which Michael of Partnership on September 23, 1988. The trial court depicted the incongruity
wrote in connection with the shares in his name …. of the situation in the following fashion:

In the case of the two shares in the name of Michael, please leave the two in his “Intervenor [respondent G-P & Co.] is not the same partnership originally
name . . . . formed by Grimm, Parsons and Simon. When Grimm died on November 27,
1977, the original partnership was dissolved. The death of a partner causes
As matter now stands, in summary, I shall retain my shares in my name and dissolution of a partnership [Article 1829, Civil Code]. A new partnership was
continue playing under such shares; Michael will retain two shares … assigning formed with Parsons and Simon as partners. Besides this new partnership
one to Mr. Stoner; and Pete Grimm will assign his playing rights to Mr. Daikichi formed after the death of Grimm, there were five (5) others formed [Exhibit
Yoshida.”21 “DD,” “EE,” “FF,” “GG,” “HH” and “II”] carrying the name, G-P and Company.”22
(Words in bracket in the original)
And for a significant third, respondent G-P & Co. is not the same G-P & Co. that
Parsons, Grimm and Simon organized in 1952, the former being an entity that Independent of the cited Article 1829 of the Civil Code on the matter of
came into existence only on September 23, 1988. It is thus well-nigh impossible partnership dissolution, however, it bears to state that Parsons and Simon
for respondent company to have participated in a transaction that occurred executed on December 13, 1977 a joint affidavit23 wherein they declared the
years before it acquired juridical personality. In the concrete, it is not physically dissolution of the original 3-man G-P & Co., owing to the death of Grimm. The
possible for respondent G-P & Co. to have paid the price for the purchase of registration on December 14, 1977 of a new Articles of Partnership of G-P & Co.
Grimm’s MC No. 590, the same having been acquired in 1960 or some 28 years followed the execution by Parsons and Simon of said affidavit.24

_______________ It may be, as respondents rationalize, that the succeeding G-P & Co. partnerships
merely continued with the business started by the original G-P & Co.25 This
21 Original Records, p. 2427. element of continuity, assuming to be true, does not, however, detract from the
fact that the partnerships of the same name formed after Grimm’s demise are
10

entities altogether different and with personalities distinct from the original trust; the use of the word trust is not required or essential to its constitution, it
partnership. being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.28 Implied trust comes into
existence by operation of law, either through implication of an intention to
This brings us to the next issue of whether or not the transfer to Parsons of MC create a trust as a matter of law or through the imposition of the trust
No. 590, as replaced by MC No. 1088, partook of the nature of a trust irrespective of, and even contrary to any such intention.29
transaction.
Judging from their documented acts immediately before and subsequent to the
_______________ actual transfer on September 7, 1964 of MC No. 590, Parsons, as transferee, and
Grimm, as transferor, indubitably contemplated a trust arrangement. Consider:
22 RTC Decision, p. 10; Rollo, p. 2975.
There can be no quibbling, owing to the letter exchanges between the Club, in
23 Id., at p. 2094. particular its Honorary Secretary E. C. Von Kauffman, and Parsons, that the
reason Grimm transferred his MC No. 590 to Parsons was because of the latter’s
24 Id., at pp. 2103 et seq. wish to accommodate one Daikichi Yoshida. Earlier, Parsons recommended to
Club management the approval of Mr. Yoshida’s “Application For Waiting List
25 Comment to Petition for Review, p. 51; Id., at p. 140. Eligible To [Club] Proprietary Membership.”30 In a letter of August 10, 196431 to
the
81
_______________
VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006
26 Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
81 Philippines, Vol. IV, 1991 ed., p. 669, citing 54 Am Jur. 21.

Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C. 27 Art. 1441, Civil Code; Vda. De Esconde v. Courts of Appeals, G.R. No. 103635,
Parsons February 1, 1966, 253 SCRA 66.

Trust is the legal relationship between one having an equitable ownership in 28 Art. 1444, Civil Code.
property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the
equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain 29 Valdez vs. Olarga, G.R. No. L-22571, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71.
duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter.26 Trust relations
between parties may be express, as when the trust is created by the intention of 30 Exh. “X-2”/ “24-a.”
the trustor.27 An express trust is created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed or by words evidencing an intention to create a 31 Exh. "X-1"/"24." Original Records, p. 2643.
11

xxx xxx xxx


82
As matter now stands, in summary, I shall retain in my name and continue
82 playing under such shares …. And Pete Grimm will assign his playing rights to Mr.
Daikichi Yoshida.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The conclusion easily deductible from the foregoing exchanges is that, given
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C. existing Club restrictions, the simplest way to accommodate and qualify Yoshida
Parsons for Club membership was for Grimm to transfer his 100-unit share to Parsons
who will then assign the playing rights of that share to Yo-
MGCC’s Board of Directors, Parsons endorsed the application of Yoshida as Club
member. While the Club’s response does not appear in its files, it is quite _______________
apparent that Parsons addressed a letter to Kauffman requesting that Yoshida
be taken in as a Company assignee. In his reply-letter32 of August 29, 1964, 32 Exh. “X-3”/ “25.”
Kauffman explained why he cannot, under Club rules, favorably act on Parsons’
specific request, but suggested a viable solution, as follows: 83

Reference to your letter dated August 25th there is a hitch … of assigning the VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006
playing rights to Mr. Daikichi Yoshida, as a company assignee.
83
xxx xxx xxx
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
The only solution that I see is that you transfer Pete Grimm’s 100 units to your Parsons
name and leave the other 100 units in your name, then you may assign the
playing rights of one of the certificates for 100 units to Mr. Yoshida. Mr. Yoshida shida.33 The RTC aptly described the relevant factual situation, viz.:
was approved by the Board but not as a Company assignee. (Emphasis added.)
“With these exchanges between Parsons and Kauffman …, it is apparent that
Parsons’ response to Kauffman’s August 29, 1964 letter partly reads as follows: since the shares held by Parsons and Grimm are individual shares and not
company shares, their shares may not be assigned …. The proposal of Parsons
Thank you for your letter of the 29th …. Under the circumstances, please that “Pete Grimm will assign his playing rights to … Yoshida” was rejected by
disregard the previous letter which I wrote with reference to Pete Grimm’s and Kauffman in his letter dated September 5, 1964 [Exhibit X-5/27] that “Pete
my shares …. Grimm’s assignment to him (Yoshida) cannot be made as the rules are that only
members who holds (sic) 200 units may assign 100 units to an individual.” A
12

letter of the same date … [Exhibit X-6/28] was sent by Kauffman to Mr. Yoshida 84
informing him of his election to the Club apologizing for the delay …. Kauffman
wrote further “ … Mr. Charles Parsons has made arrangement for to play (sic) as SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
assignee of extra membership which he now holds.”
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
The election of Yoshida as assignee of a proprietary member and the resignation Parsons
of Grimm were approved by the Club’s Board… on August 27, 1964. Kauffman
and Parsons were still discussing the ways … Mr Yoshida can be accommodated with the August 10, 1964 endorsement-letter36 of Parsons, yielded the
… as of September 5, 1964, but the resignation of Grimm and election of Yoshida information that he (Yoshida) is the manager of the Manila Liaison Office of
was already approved … more than a week before.”34 (Words in bracket in the Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha desiring to acquire Company membership in the name of
original; Italics added.) his employer Mitsubishi to enable future representatives to avail themselves of
Club facilities. Since Club membership did not seem possible at the time, Yoshida
Even on the above factual perspective alone, it is not difficult to characterize, as had to come in as an assignee of a proprietary member.
did the trial court, the certificate transfer from Grimm to Parsons, as temporary,
there being no evidence whatsoever that the transfer was for value. Such Other compelling evidence attest to the temporary nature of the transfer in
transfer was doubtless meant only to accommodate Yoshida whose stay in the question. The trial court cited two in its Decision. Wrote that court:
country was obviously temporary. As it were, Yoshida’s application35 for Club
membership juxtaposed Even a witness for the (respondents) intervenor and the Parsons, Celso Jamias,
Chief Accountant of G-P and Company, confirmed that the transfer of the share
_______________ to Parsons was temporary. In a letter [Exhibit “7-GG”] dated 10 August 1991
addressed to Atty. Patricia Cecilia B. Bisda, counsel for G-P and Company, Jamais
33 Sec. 31 of the Club’s 1968 By-Laws provides: “A member may own more than wrote:
one (1) full Membership Certificate …. The owner of more than one (1) full
Membership Certificate shall be entitled to transfer such certificate, “. . . please be informed that the accommodation for Mr. Yoshida to have playing
permanently or temporarily, to any person who has been duly elected to rights has not bearing on the ownership of the share. The share of …Grimm
membership …. (EMG) was transferred to Mr. Charles Parsons (CP) to accommodate Mr. Yoshida
due to Manila Golf club requirements.
34 RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 801-802.
Atty. Patricia Cecilia B. Bisda …echoed the view of Jamias, in a letter [Exhibit “Y”]
35 Supra note 30. dated 30 August 1991 addressed to … (the) then General Manager of the Club:
She wrote:
84
13

“Also, we would like to clarify …. That the accommodation of Mr. Yoshida to “is still my property and I wish it recorded as such in the Club’s file.”39 Parsons’
enjoy the playing rights has no bearing to the ownership of the shares. The share letter40 was just as simple as it was revealing, thus:
of Edward Grimm was transferred to Charles Parsons to accommodate D.
Yoshida due to club requirements.”37 “Reference to the transfer of [MC] #590 in the name of Mr. E.M. Grimm to my
name, for which I now have the new Certification No. 1088 …, please be advised
Any lingering doubt, however, as to the temporary nature of the Grimm-to- that this transfer was made on a temporary basis and that said new certificate is
Parsons transfer should, in our view, be put to rest by what MGCC records-file still the property of Mr. E.M. Grimm and I enclose the certificate duly endorsed
contained and the testi- by me for safekeeping.”

_______________ At bottom then, documented events immediately before and after the February
28, 1968 share certificate conveyance in question veritably confirm the trust
36 Supra note 31. arrangement Parsons had or intended to have with Grimm and vice versa, vis-á-
vis MC No. 1088. If, as herein respondent G-P & Co. posits at every turn, Parsons
37 ----Pages 6-7; Rollo, pp. 802-803. was its trustee, then the latter’s act of endorsing MC No. 1088 in blank and then
delivering the same to the Club for safekeeping instead of directly to the G-P &
85 Co. was without sense.

VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 The trial court correctly described the relationship that was formed between
Grimm and Parsons, and the consequence of such relationship, as follows:
85
_______________
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
Parsons 38 Exh. “J,” Original Records, pp. 2244-2245.

mony of its former records custodian, Romeo Alhambra. In his affidavit of May 39 Exh. “L,” Id., at p. 2247.
12, 1989,38 Alhambra stated that “[A]ccording to Club records, the transfer of
[MC] # 580 was only temporary, and that Mr. Grimm was and, according to club 40 Exh. “M,” Id., at p. 2248.
records, is in fact the owner of [MC] # 1088” and that after the transfer, “Mr.
Charles Parsons endorsed the share certificate and turned it over to … 86
Kauffmann … for safekeeping.” Forming parts of the same records were letters
both dated February 28, 1968—the day the share certificate transfer was 86
effected—separately submitted by Grimm and Parsons, to inform MGCC of the
temporary nature of the transfer. In his letter, Grimm stated that MC No. 1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
14

A:
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
Parsons This is Charles Parsons, sir.

“Since the transfer of Grimm’s share to Parsons was temporary, a trust was Q:
created with Parsons as the trustee, and Grimm, the beneficial owner of the
share. The duties of trustees have been said, in general terms, to be: “to protect You are familiar with the signature?
and preserve the trust property, and to see to it that it is employed solely for the
benefit of the cestui que trust.” x x x Parsons as a mere trustee, it is not within A:
his rights to transfer the share to G-P and Company (sic).
Yes, sir.
The Court has, to be sure, considered the Letter of Trust41 dated September 1,
1964 largely because, in respondents’ own words, it “provides the answer to the Q:
question of who the real owner of MC #1088 is.”42 In the Letter he purportedly
signed, Parsons declared holding MC No. 374 and MC No. 1088 as “NOMINEE IN I’m showing you Exhibit “I” which is a letter of trust dated September 1, 1964,
TRUST for and in behalf of G-P AND COMPANY … or its nominee.” This piece of comparing those signatures
document is not, however, a winning card for the respondents. The trial court
mentioned two compelling reasons why not, both reasons bearing on the due _______________
execution and genuineness of the document. Wrote the court:
41 Exh. “7-mm.”
This “LETTER OF TRUST” was purportedly signed by Parsons on September 1,
1964. But the transfer of [MC] No. 590 was recorded (and MC No. 1088 issued) 42 Comment to Petition for Review, p. 41; Rollo, p. 130.
only on September 7, 1964 in the Club’s Proprietary Membership Card No. 144
[Exhibit “8”]. With the testimony of Celso B. Jamias, a long time employee of G-P 87
and Company, the doubt as to the genuineness of the signature of Parsons on
the “LETTER OF TRUST” was brought to light. Jamias was cross-examined on the VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006
signatures of Parsons on several documents including the signature of the
LETTER OF TRUST”: 87

Q: Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
Parsons
How about the signature appearing on Exhibit “CC-1” …?
15

that the estate administrator recognized Parsons to be a mere trustee of such


which you identified above the printed name C. Parsons there are, two certificate. While the decision does quite say so, the implication is that Parsons
signatures, the signatures you identified earlier and the one appearing on the was the trustee of G-P & Co.
letter of trust are similar in the sense that the “s” of Parsons is elevated and it
slopes down, is that correct? We cannot agree with this non sequitur approach which, at bottom, clearly
tends to lower the evidentiary bar for respondents. Needless to stress, it is not
for the CA and all courts for

xxx xxx xxx 88

A: 88

Based on how I see, this doesn’t seem to be the signature of Parsons, it looks like SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
but it is not, sir. [TSN, May 4, 1999, pp. 5-6]. (Words in parenthesis added.)
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
And lest it be overlooked, Parsons had previously acknowledged Grimm to be Parsons
the owner of MC No. 1088, after his earlier repeated declarations that the
transfer of the replaced MC No. 580 was temporary. Parsons was thus in that matter to compensate for a burden of proof not discharged or a quantum of
contextually in estoppel to deny, thru the Letter of Trust aforementioned, evidence not met.
hypothetically assuming its authenticity, Grimm’s ownership of the replacement
certificate. The Court cannot, for two reasons, also lend cogency to the CA’s observation
that the heirs of Grimm may have had waived, abandoned or denounced their
Summing up, the Court finds the evidence adduced and admitted by the trial rights to the trust property when, for P100,000.00, they executed a Deed of
court more than adequately supporting a conclusion that MC No. 1088 was Acknowledgment of Satisfaction of Partnership Interests.43 Firstly, the deed, as
issued to and held by Parsons as the trustee thereof of Grimm or his estate. The a quitclaim instrument, did not mention any share certificate at all, which is only
fact that respondent G-P & Co. may have paid, starting 1992, as evidence logical since MC No. 1088 was not a partnership asset in the first place. Secondly,
discloses, the membership fees due on MC No. 1088 does not make Grimm less the intention to waive a known right must be clear and unequivocal. In this case,
of a beneficial owner. Such payment, needless to stress, is not a mode of the intent to renounce beneficial ownership of MC No. 1088 cannot reasonably
acquiring ownership. be drawn from the tenor of the quitclaim document. For perspective, what the
heirs of Grimm stated in the Deed of Acknowledgment is that the amount of
Parenthetically, the CA is observed to have said that in the settlement of the P100,000.00 they received “represents the total liquidation and complete
estate of Parsons, MC No. 1088 was not included in the list of stocks owned by settlement … of the entire partnership interests pertaining to the late Edward
him. And from this inconsequential event, the appellate court would conclude Miller Grimm as partner in G-P AND COMPANY.” If, to borrow from Thompson v.
16

Court of Appeals,44 we apply the standard norm on how a waiver must be In all, the facts and circumstances attendant militate against the CA’s finding
formulated, then clearly the general terms of the aforementioned deed merely pointing to G-P & Co. as the beneficial owner of MC No. 1088. What the
indicate a clearance from general accountability, not specifically an evidence adduced instead proved beyond cavil is that Grimm or his estate is such
abandonment of ownership of the disputed share. For: owner. We therefore reverse.

“x x x. Settled is the rule that a waiver to be valid and effective must, in the first WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
place, be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. x x Case No. 92-2452 is REINSTATED.
x A waiver may not be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not
explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such Costs against the respondents.
person. If we apply the standard rule that waiver must be cast in clear and
unequivocal terms, then clearly the general terms of the cited release and SO ORDERED.
quitclaim indicates merely a clearance from general ac-
Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
_______________
Assailed decision reversed and set aside. That of the Regional Trial Court of
43 Exh. “3-F,” Original Records, pp. 2552 et seq. Makati City reinstated.

44 G.R. No. 116631, October 28, 1998, 298 SCRA 280. Note.—A presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the party
who would be disadvantaged by a finding of the presumed fact. (Mabunga vs.
89 People, 429 SCRA 510 [2004])

VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
Parsons, 504 SCRA 67, G.R. No. 159810 October 9, 2006
89

Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C.
Parsons

countability, not specifically a waiver of Amcham’s beneficial ownership of the


disputed shares.”45
17

[No. 3636. August 29, 1907.] Frederick Garfield Waite, in his own-behalf.

FREDERICK GARFIELD WAITE, plaintiff and appellee, vs. JAMES J. PETERSON ET WILLARD, J.:
AL., defendants and appellants.
1.WRONGFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY; SALE OR TRANSFER; ACTION BY THE The appellant (Kwong We Shing) has not caused the proof in this case to be
TRANSFEREE.—When the property of one person is unlawfully taken by another, brought here. The only question therefore is whether the facts admitted in the
the former has a right of action against the latter for the recovery of the pleadings and those found by the court below in its decision sustain the
property or for damages for the taking or retention, and he is entitled to his judgment appealed from. That court found among other things as follows:
choice of these two remedies. This is also a right which may be transferred by
the sale or assignment of the property, and the transferee can maintain either "From the evidence presented at the trial, the court finds that on December 8,
action against the wrongdoer. 1905, one Henry Manheim delivered to L. K. Tiao Eng a diamond ring on
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SHERIFF.—When, however, the owner consignment for 800 pesos, to be returned, if not sold, in sixty days; that on the
seeks to make the sheriff responsible for such wrongful act he must, in order to 22d day of January, 1906, while the ring was in the possession of L. K. Tiao Eng,
preserve his right against the sheriff, comply with the provisions of section 451 the defendant, as sheriff of Manila, levied upon the said ring; that on the 23d
of the Code of Civil Procedure. day of January, 1906, the aforementioned Henry Manheim, for value received,
3.LEVY UPON PROPERTY; RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CREDITOR.—If a sheriff levies assigned all his right to and interest in said ring to the said plaintiff herein; that
upon property at the instance of a creditor and is indemnified by the latter, the on the 25th day of January, 1906, the plaintiff made demand upon the sheriff of
creditor is thenceforward liable for the acts of the sheriff with respect to the Manila, who had made the levy, as before said, for the said ring, and alleged the
property. value thereof to be 800 pesos; that the sheriff was indemnified by the judgment
450 creditor, in whose favor the levy had been made, as provided by law, and
retained possession of the ring and sold the same at public sale; that the said
450 Henry Manheim has never been paid for the said ring, in accordance with the
terms of the contract hereinbefore mentioned or any part thereof; that at the
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED time of the levy by the sheriff upon the said ring, as before stated, the said
Henry Manheim was the owner of and entitled to possession of the said ring;
Waite vs. Peterson Et Al. that while the ring was in the possession of the sheriff the said Henry Manheim
transferred his ownership and right to possession of said ring to plaintiff herein
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. 451

Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, for appellants. VOL. 8, AUGUST 29, 1907
18

451 The vice in the argument of the appellant consists in the fact that be assumes
that section 451 is the only law which gives the plaintiff a right of action against
Waite vs. Peterson Et Al. the sheriff, and that if be is not included within that section, he can not maintain
any action. This is manifestly erroneous. So far from being the origin of any rights
that the plaintiff thereupon became the owner and entitled to possession of said on the part of the owner of property wrongfully taken by the sheriff, it is rather a
ring." limitation upon his rights previously 'existing. If property of a person is taken by
the sheriff upon an
Judgment was rendered against both of the defendants for the return of the
ring, and, if that could not be had, for the sum of 725 pesos, with interest, and 452
costs.
452
I. The appellant claims that by the terms of section 451 of the Code of Civil
Procedure this action can not be maintained by the plaintiff because he was not PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
the owner of the ring at the time the levy was made. In other words, as we
understand it, his claim is that no action for the value of the property taken can Waite vs. Peterson Et Al.
be maintained except by the person who was the owner thereof at the time it
was seized by the sheriff. We do not think that this contention can be sustained. execution against another person, the sheriff is liable therefor in the absence of
Said section 451 is as follows: statute, as any private person would be. When one's property is wrongfully
taken by another, the former has a right of action against the person who
"Claims by third persons to property levied on.—Property levied on can be interfered with his property, either for the recovery of the property itself or for
claimed by a third person as his property, by a written claim, verified by the oath damages for its taking, and he has his choice of these remedies. If section 451
of such claimant, setting out his title thereto, his right to possession thereof, did not exist, by the general principles of the law the sheriff would always be
stating the grounds of such title, and served upon the governor, or his deputy, or responsible for wrongfully taking the property of another For the purpose of
officer making the levy. The officer in such case is not bound to keep the limiting the responsibility of the sheriff in such cases, and to provide that some
property, unless the plaintiff, or the person in whose favor the writ of execution notice should be given to him of the claims of third persons. this section requires
runs, on demand, indemnify the officer against such claim by an obligation, such third persons to make such claims in writing, so that the sheriff, after the
signed by the plaintiff, with good and sufficient .surety, and no claim to such notice is given to him, can decide for himself whether he will proceed with the
property shall be valid against the officer, or shall be received or be notice of any levy or abandon the property.
rights against him, unless made as herein provided; but nothing herein
contained shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the The right of action given by the general principles of law to the person whose
property by any proper action." property has wrongfully been taken from him, either to recover damages or the
possession of the property, is a right which can be transferred by him, and his
transferee can maintain either one of these actions against the wrongdoer. On
19

this first claim of the appellant, then, the only question is whether this section
451 has taken away from the assignee of the owner his right to maintain an "The demand for indemnity, and the giving of it by the defendants, proceeded
action to recover the value of the property. upon the supposition that the sheriff would without it go no further in that
direction, but would give up the property to the claimant, the present plaintiff,
An examination of the section will show that there is no distinct statement and make his peace on the best terms be could. By the present statute of lowa
therein, that the claim can only be made by a person who was the owner of the he had a right to do this, if the plaintiff in attachment refused to assume the
property at the time the levy was made. As the section is written, we do not hazard of indemnifying him. And if there were no such statute, he had a right to
think that it should be so construed. Such a construction would, in case of the deliver the property to the claimant, and risk a suit by the plaintiff in attachment
involuntary transfer of rights, deprive the transferee of actions which might be rather than a contest with a rightful claimant of the goods.
absolutely necessary to him for the protection of his interests. If we so construed
the section, we should have to hold that if the owner of the property died the "The giving of the bond by the present defendants must, therefore, be held
day after the levy his executor or administrator would have no right to make a equivalent to a personal interference in the course of the proceeding, by-
claim against the sheriff for the return of the property and would be deprived of directing or requesting the sheriff to hold the goods as if they were the property
an action against the sheriff for the recovery of damages for such wrongful of the defendants in attachment. In doing this they assumed the direction and
control of the sheriff's future action, so far as it might constitute a trespass, and
453 they became to that extent the principals, and he their agent in the transaction.
This made them responsible for the continuance of the wrongful possession and
VOL. 8, AUGUST 29, 1907 for the sale and conversion of the goods; in other words, for all the real damages
which plaintiff sustained."
453
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
Waite vs. Peterson Et Al. against the appellant, Kwong We Shing. So ordered.

taking, The same rule would have to be made if an order in bankruptcy was Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
passed against the owner of the property the day after the levy. We do not think
that the section requires any such construction. Judgment affirmed. Waite vs. Peterson Et Al., 8 Phil. 449, No. 3636 August 29,
1907
II. It is further claimed by the appellant that in no event should judgment have
been entered against him—that is to say, against Kwong We Shing. It will be
noticed that the court found that the sheriff was indemnified by the judgment
creditor. This statement is sufficient to make the judgment creditor liable for the
acts of the sheriff. In the case of Lovejoy vs. Murray (3 Wall. U. S., 1) the court
said, at page 9:
20

G.R. No. 161758. June 8, 2007.* _______________

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY represented by its SCHOOL’S * SECOND DIVISION.


DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT, petitioner, vs. CELSO OÑATE, respondent.
State Immunity; An unincorporated government agency, such as the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports can be sued without its permission as a result of 201
its being privy to a Deed of Donation over a disputed property.—We rule that
petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its being privy
to the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay over the VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007
disputed property. When it voluntarily gave its consent to the donation, any
dispute that may arise from it would necessarily bring petitioner DECS down to 201
the level of an ordinary citizen of the State vulnerable to a suit by an interested
or affected party. It has shed off its mantle of immunity and relinquished and Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
forfeited its armor of non-suability of the State.
party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party to a suit
Same; Parties; In a situation involving a contract between a government resulting from said contract as it is assumed that the authority granted to such
department and a third party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be department to enter into such contract carries with it the full responsibility and
impleaded as a party to a suit resulting from said contract as it is assumed that authority to sue and be sued in its name.
the authority granted to such department to enter into such contract carries
with it the full responsibility and authority to sue and be sued in its name.—The Laches; Elements; Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it to any
auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the Philippines is likewise judicial remedies.—Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an
resolved in the negative. While it is true that petitioner is an unincorporated unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which—by the exercise
government agency, and as such technically requires the Republic of the of due diligence—could or should have been done earlier. Verily, laches serves
Philippines to be impleaded in any suit against the former, nonetheless, to deprive a party guilty of it to any judicial remedies. Its elements are: (1)
considering our resolution of the main issue below, this issue is deemed mooted. conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom the defendant
Besides, at this point, we deem it best to lift such procedural technicality in claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay
order to finally resolve the long litigation this case has undergone. Moreover, in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or
even if we give due course to said issue, we will arrive at the same ruling. The notice of the defendant’s conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to
Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-defendant in Civil institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that
Case No. 8715 considering that it impliedly gave its approval to the involvement the complainant would assert the right in which the defendant bases the suit;
of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a situation involving a contract and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
between a government department and a third complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
21

Same; Evidence; Laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements irreconcilable. Common experience tells us that one who owns a property and
must be proved positively—laches is evidentiary in nature which could not be takes possession of it cannot fail to discover and know that an existing
established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a elementary school was built and standing on the lot from the time that the
motion to dismiss.—In Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation, 409 SCRA 306 owner starts possessing a property.
(2003), we held that “[t]hough laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its
elements must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature which could PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved
in a motion to dismiss (emphases supplied).” In the same vein, we explained in The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 98 (1997), that there is “no absolute rule
as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be The Solicitor General for petitioners.
determined according to its particular circumstances.”
Edgardo R. Raneses for respondent.
Same; Common experience tells us that one who owns a property and takes
possession of it cannot fail to discover and know that an existing elementary VELASCO, JR., J.:
school was built and standing on the lot from the time that the owner starts
possessing a property.—Respondent testified that he came to know of Lot 6849 A little neglect may lead to great prejudice.
only in 1973 when he was 23 years old. He asserted that he took possession of
said lot in the The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and
202 set aside the January 14, 2004 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 60659, which affirmed the November 3, 1997 Decision3 of the Legaspi
City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch I, declaring as null and void the December
202 21, 1998 Deed of Donation4 executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in
favor of petitioner, and directing the latter to return to respondent Celso Oñate
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
1 Rollo, pp. 13-48.
same year when his two (2) uncles, the brothers of his late father, passed on to
him the disputed lot as his father’s share of the inheritance from the late Claro 2 Id., at pp. 50-60. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Sergio L.
Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños (his grandparents). However, it is interesting to Pestaño and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon (Chairperson)
note that he testified that he only came to know in 1991 that the elementary and Jose C. Mendoza.
school was built on a portion of Lot 6849, now Lot 6849-A. These assertions are
22

3 Id., at pp. 61-82. publication, and hearing. Consequently, OCT No. RO-189715 was issued in the
name of spouses Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños.
4 Records, pp. 6-7.
On August 26, 1991, a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession
203 was executed by respondent and his three (3) sisters, namely: Melba O. Napil,
Cielo O. Lardizabal, and Maria Visia O. Maldo, who waived their successional
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 rights in favor of respondent Celso Oñate. Asserting that the disputed lot was
inherited by his father, Francisco Oñate, from the latter’s father, Claro Oñate, by
203 virtue of a prior partition among the three (3) sons of Claro Oñate and Gregoria
Los
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
_______________
the possession of the portion of land occupied by the school site of the Daraga
North Central Elementary School. 5 Issued on October 16, 1992.

The Facts 204


Spouses Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños owned Lot No. 6849 (disputed lot)
with an area of around 27,907 square meters registered under the Torrens 204
System of land registration under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2563.
Claro Oñate had three children, namely: Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco, all SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
surnamed Oñate. Respondent Celso Oñate is the grandson of Claro Oñate, being
the son of Francisco Oñate. Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate

In 1940, Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was constructed on a portion Baños, respondent in turn claimed ownership of said lot through the deed of
of the disputed lot. The school was eventually renamed Daraga North Central extrajudicial settlement.
Elementary School. The Municipality of Daraga leveled the area while petitioner
Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS; now Department of Meanwhile, the issue of whether respondent’s father, Francisco Oñate, truly
Education [DepEd]) developed and built various school buildings and facilities on acquired the disputed lot through a prior partition among Claro Oñate’s three (3)
the disputed lot. children had been passed upon in another case, Civil Case No. 8724 for Partition,
Reconveyance and Damages filed by the heirs of Rafael Oñate before the Legaspi
Sometime in 1991, respondent filed a reconstitution proceeding of OCT No. 2563 City RTC, Branch IX.6 In said case, respondent Celso Oñate, the defendant,
which was granted by the Legaspi City RTC, Branch V after due notice, prevailed and the case was dismissed by the trial court.
23

Thereafter, respondent caused Lot No. 6849 to be subdivided into five (5) lots, VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007
all under his name, except Lot No. 6849-B which is under the name of Mariano
M. Lim. On October 26, 1992, the subdivided lots were issued Transfer 205
Certificate of Titles (TCTs): (1) Lot No. 6849-A (13,072 square meters) under TCT
No. T-83946;7 (2) Lot No. 6849-B (3,100 square meters) under TCT No. T-84049;8 Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
(3) Lot No. 6849-C (10,000 square meters) under TCT No. T-83948;9 (4) Lot No.
6849-D (1,127 square meters) under TCT No. T-83949;10 and (5) Lot No. 6849-E als from 1960.12 The records show that then DECS Director IV Jovencio Revil
(608 square meters) under TCT No. T-83950.11 subsequently referred the matter to the DECS Division Superintendent Rizalina
D. Saquido for investigation.13
On December 15, 1992, through his counsel, respondent sent a letter to
petitioner apprising it about the facts and circumstances affecting the On February 24, 1993, through his counsel, respondent likewise wrote to Engr.
elementary school and its occupancy of Lot No. 6849-A with an area of 13,072 Orlando Roces, District Engineer, Albay Engineering District about the on-going
square meters. Respondent proposed to petitioner DECS that it purchase Lot No. construction projects in the school.14 Engr. Roces then informed respondent’s
6849-A at the Fair Market Value (FMV) of PhP 400 per square meter and also counsel that petitioner DECS is the owner of the school site having acquired the
requested for reasonable rent- disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of
Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner.15
_______________
Consequently, on March 18, 1993, respondent instituted a Complaint16 for
6 Records, pp. 164-171. See the August 14, 1995 Decision entitled Heirs of Rafael Annulment of Donation and/or Quieting of Title with Recovery of Possession of
Oñate, represented by Diego Oñate v. Spouses Celso Oñate and Allem Vellez . Lot No. 6849 located at Barrio Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay before the Legaspi
City RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 8715, against petitioner DECS, Division of
7 Id., at pp. 178-179. Albay, represented by the Division Superintendent of Schools, Mrs. Rizalina D.
Saquido; and the Municipality of Daraga, Albay, represented by the Municipal
8 Id., at pp. 180-181. Mayor, Honorable Cicero Triunfante.

9 Id., at pp. 182-183. In its April 28, 1993 Answer,17 the Municipality of Daraga, Albay, through Mayor
Cicero Triunfante, denied respondent’s ownership of the disputed lot as it
10 Id., at pp. 184-185. alleged that sometime in 1940, the Municipality bought said lot from Claro
Oñate, respondent’s grandfather, and since then it had continually occupied said
11 Id., at pp. 186-187. lot openly and publicly in the concept of an owner until 1988 when the
Municipality donated the school site to petitioner DECS; thus asserting that it
205 could also claim ownership also through adverse possession. Moreover,
24

_______________ Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession disposing of the disputed
lot which was already sold to the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in 1940.
12 Id., at pp. 190-191. Petitioner likewise assailed the issuance of a reconstituted OCT over Lot 6849
when the lower court granted respondent’s petition for reconstitution without
13 Id., at p. 192. notifying petitioner.

14 Id., at p. 193. During the ensuing trial where both parties presented documentary and
testimonial evidence, respondent testified that he came to know of the disputed
15 Id., at p. 194. lot in 1973 when he was 23 years old; that he took possession of the said lot in
the same year; that he came to know that the elementary school occupied a
16 Id., at pp. 1-4. portion of the said lot only in 1991; and that it was only in 1992 that he came to
know of the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay.19
17 Id., at pp. 24-27. Also, Felicito Armenta, a tenant cultivating a portion of disputed Lot 6849,
testified that respondent indeed owned said lot and the share of the crops
206 cultivated were paid to respondent.20

206 _______________

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 18 Id., at pp. 29-31.

Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate 19 TSN, November 3, 1993 and July 12, 1994.

it claimed that the disputed lot had been declared in the name of defendant 20 TSN, February 14, 1994 and August 3, 1995.
municipality in the Municipal Assessor’s Office under Tax Declaration No. 31954
from 1940 until 1988 for purposes of exemption from real estate taxes. Further, 207
defendant Municipality contended that respondent was guilty of laches and was
estopped from assailing ownership over the disputed lot. VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007

Similarly, petitioner’s April 29, 1993 Answer18 reiterated in essence the 207
defenses raised by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay and further contended that
respondent had no cause of action because it acquired ownership over the Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed on December 21, 1988 in
its favor; and that respondent’s claim was vague as it was derived from a void
25

However, after respondent testified, defendants in said case filed a Joint Motion 25 Id., at p. 195.
to Dismiss21 on the ground that respondent’s suit was against the State which
was prohibited without the latter’s consent. Respondent countered with his 26 Id., at p. 101.
Opposition to Joint Motion to Dismiss.22 Subsequently, the trial court denied
the Joint Motion to Dismiss, ruling that the State had given implied consent by 27 Id., at p. 102.
entering into a contract.23
208
Aside from the reconstituted OCT No. RO-18971, respondent presented the TCTs
covering the five (5) portions of the partitioned Lot 6849, Tax Declaration No. 04- 208
006-0068124 issued for said lot, and the April 20, 1992 Certification25 from the
Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay attesting to SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
respondent’s payment of realty taxes for Lot 6849 from 1980 to 1990.
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
After respondent rested his case, the defense presented and marked their
documentary exhibits of Tax Declaration No. 30235 issued in the name of the sequent Tax Declaration Nos. 22184,28 332,29 and 04-006-00068.30
late Claro Oñate, which was cancelled in 1938; Tax Declaration 31954,26 which
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 30235, in the name of Municipality of Daraga with The defense presented the testimony of Mr. Jose Adra,31 the Principal of Daraga
the annotation of Ex Officio Deputy Assessor Natalio Grageda attesting to the North Central Elementary School, who testified on the Municipality’s donation of
purchase by the Municipality under Municipal Voucher No. 69, August 1940 disputed Lot 6849 to petitioner and the improvements on said lot amounting to
accounts and the issuance of TCT No. 4812 in favor of the Municipality; Tax more than PhP 11 million; and Mrs. Toribia Milleza,32 a retired government
Declaration No. 892627 in the name of the Municipality which cancelled Tax employee and resident of Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay since 1955, who testified
Declaration No. 31954; and the sub- on the Municipality’s continuous and adverse possession of the disputed lot
since 1940.
_______________
As mentioned earlier, Civil Case No. 8724 for Partition, Reconveyance and
21 Records, pp. 97-100. Damages was instituted by the heirs of Rafael Oñate in Legaspi City RTC, Branch
IX against Spouses Celso Oñate and Allem Vellez, involving the same disputed
22 Id., at pp. 106-111. lot. Petitioner and co-defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay were about to file
a complaint for intervention in said case, but it was overtaken by the resolution
23 Id., at pp. 112-117, March 11, 1994 Order of the RTC. of the case on August 14, 1995 with the trial court dismissing the complaint.

24 Id., at p. 189. The Ruling of the RTC


26

On November 3, 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondent 4. Ordering the plaintiff for reason of equity, to pay the defendant Municipality
Celso Oñate. The dispositive portion declared, thus: of Daraga, Albay the amount of Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) Pesos pursuant to
Article 479 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines;
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the 5. The defendant Department of Education Culture and Sports being a builder in
plaintiff and against the defendants: good faith, the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines
shall be observed by the parties; and
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay 6. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit. No attorney’s fees is
in favor of the defendant Department of Educa hereby adjudged in favor of plaintiff’s counsel.
_______________ SO ORDERED.”33

28 Id., at p. 103. The trial court ratiocinated that it was clear that subject Lot 6849 was originally
registered under the Torrens System in the name of Spouses Claro Oñate and
29 Id., at p. 104. Gregoria Los Baños as evidenced by OCT No. RO-18971. The right of respondent
Celso Oñate over the disputed lot had not been proven otherwise or overturned
30 Id., at p. 105. in Civil Case No. 8724, and this was bolstered by the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate and Cession, where respondent’s sister waived their
31 TSN, February 22, 1996. successional rights in his favor. Thus, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondent’s title. Besides, it further ruled that defendants could not assail the
32 TSN, September 30, 1996. registered title of respondent in a collateral proceeding.

209 While the Municipality of Daraga, Albay anchored its prior ownership over the
disputed lot by virtue of a sale in 1940 and mentioned TCT No. 4812 supposedly
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 issued in its name,

209 _______________

Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate 33 Supra note 3, at pp. 81-82.

tion Culture and Sports through the Albay Schools Division as null and void; 210
2. Declaring the plaintiff as the owner in fee simple of Lots Nos. 6849-A, 6849-C,
6849-D and 6849-E which are registered in his name; 210
3. Commanding the defendants to return the possession of the portion of the
land occupied by the school site to the herein plaintiff Celso Oñate; SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
27

indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

it however failed to submit any deed of conveyance in its favor, as well as a copy 35 Records, pp. 296 & 298.
of the alleged TCT No. 4812. Hence, the trial court held that its claim over
disputed Lot 6849 was based solely on adverse prescription which could not 36 CA Rollo, p. 17.
prevail over respondent’s registered title.
211
The trial court concluded that given these factual and evidentiary proofs,
petitioner had no right to occupy Lot 6849-A, and the Deed of Donation VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007
executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner must be
nullified. Finally, the trial court awarded PhP 50,000 to the Municipality of 211
Daraga, Albay for the cost of landfill and ordered that Article 44834 of the New
Civil Code be followed by the parties as petitioner was a builder in good faith. Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals tioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration37of the said June 17, 1998
Aggrieved, petitioner DECS and Municipality of Daraga, Albay filed their Resolution and its appeal was subsequently reinstated.38 The Municipality of
respective Notices of Appeal35 assailing the trial court’s Decision before the CA. Daraga, Albay, however, totally lost its appeal due to inaction, and the appellate
However, on June 17, 1998, the appellate court declared the appeals of both court correspondingly issued a Partial Entry of Judgment on July 9, 1998.39
petitioners abandoned and dismissed for their failure to pay the required docket
fees within the reglementary period.36 Peti- Moreover, the appellate court held that there was no jurisdictional defect in the
reconstitution proceeding being one in rem, and in the issuance of OCT No. RO-
_______________ 18971 based on the destroyed or lost OCT No. 2563, even if no notice was sent
to petitioner. Thus, the CA ruled that respondent’s claim of ownership over Lot
34 Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or 6849-A occupied by the school is conclusive for being soundly predicated on TCT
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, No. T-83946 which cancelled the reconstituted OCT No. RO-18971. Furthermore,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 456 it reiterated the trial court’s holding that petitioner is precluded from attacking
and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, collaterally respondent’s title over the disputed lot in this proceeding.
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot
be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the The CA emphasized that petitioner’s failure to present TCT No. 4812—allegedly
building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the issued in the name of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in 1940 in lieu of OCT
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper No. 2563 and the Deed of Conveyance executed by the original owner, Claro
Oñate, in favor of the Municipality—was fatal to the defense. It reasoned that
28

“all the more had their claim of ownership become doubtful when defendants- respondent computed on the basis of the value of the property at the time of
appellants [sic] failed to explain from their pleadings and the evidence submitted the government’s taking of the land.
before Us their failure to present the two documents.”40 The appellate court
concluded that given these facts, no title in the name of the Municipality ever Through its assailed Decision,42 the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal for lack of
existed and thus it could not have validly donated the subject property to merit and affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. It reasoned that laches does
petitioner. not apply, its application rests on the sound discretion of the court, and where
the court believes that its application would result in manifest wrong or
_______________ injustice, it is constrained not to be guided strictly by said doctrine. Besides, it
opined that laches could not defeat the rights of a registered owner.
37 Id., at pp. 18-19.
The Issues
38 Id., at p. 21. Hence, we have the instant petition where petitioner raises the following
assignment of errors:
39 Id., at p. 28.
I
40 Id., at p. 59.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING
212 THAT RESPONDENT’S CAUSE OF ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT YET BARRED BY LACHES.
212
II
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ACCORDING GREAT WEIGHT ON
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate RESPONDENT’S RECONSTITUTED ORIGINAL

Anent the issue of the applicability of Amigable v. Cuenca,41 the CA affirmed the _______________
doctrine enunciated in said case that “to uphold the State’s immunity from suit
would subvert the ends of justice.” In fine, the appellate court pointed out the 41 G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 360.
inconvenience and impossibility of restoring possession of Lot 6849-A to
respondent considering the substantial improvements built on said lot by the 42 Supra note 2.
government which amounted to almost PhP 12 million; and that the only relief
available was for the government to pay just compensation in favor of 213
29

VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 The auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the Philippines is likewise
resolved in the negative. While it is true that petitioner is an unincorporated
213 government agency,

Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate _______________

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. 2563 COVERING SUBJECT PROPERTY. 43 Rollo, pp. 25-26.

III 44 See United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. Nos. 76607, 79470, 80018 &
80258, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644; and Department of Agrarian Reform v.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER MAY BE SUED IN National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993, 227
VIOLATION OF THE STATE’S IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. SCRA 693.

IV 214

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER MAY BE SUED 214
INDEPENDENTLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.43
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Petitioner basically raises two issues—the application of laches and the non-
suability of the State. Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate

The threshold issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued in Civil Case No. and as such technically requires the Republic of the Philippines to be impleaded
8715 without its consent. A supplementary issue is whether petitioner DECS can in any suit against the former, nonetheless, considering our resolution of the
be sued independently of the Republic of the Philippines. main issue below, this issue is deemed mooted. Besides, at this point, we deem
it best to lift such procedural technicality in order to finally resolve the long
We rule that petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its litigation this case has undergone. Moreover, even if we give due course to said
being privy to the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, issue, we will arrive at the same ruling.
Albay over the disputed property. When it voluntarily gave its consent to the
donation, any dispute that may arise from it would necessarily bring petitioner The Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-defendant in
DECS down to the level of an ordinary citizen of the State vulnerable to a suit by Civil Case No. 8715 considering that it impliedly gave its approval to the
an interested or affected party. It has shed off its mantle of immunity and involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a situation involving
relinquished and forfeited its armor of non-suability of the State.44 a contract between a government department and a third party, the Republic of
the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party to a suit resulting from said
30

contract as it is assumed that the authority granted to such department to enter instituted the instant case in 1993, petitioner and its predecessor-in-interest
into such contract carries with it the full responsibility and authority to sue and Municipality of Daraga, Albay had possessed the subject lot for a combined
be sued in its name. period of about fifty two (52) years.

Main Issue: Equitable Remedy of Laches Petitioner strongly avers that Claro Oñate, the original owner of subject lot, sold
Petitioner strongly asserts that the Municipality of Daraga, Albay had it to the Municipality. At the very least it asserts that said Claro Oñate allowed
continuous, open, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner over the the Municipality to enter, possess, and enjoy the lot without protest. In fact,
disputed lot since 1940 until December 21, 1988 or for about 48 years. Claro Oñate neither protested nor questioned the cancellation of his Tax
Significantly, it maintains that Tax Declaration No. 31954 covering the disputed Declaration No. 30235 covering the disputed lot and its substitution by Tax
lot in the name of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay contains an annotation Declaration No. 31954 in the name of the Municipality on account of his sale of
certifying that said lot was “under voucher No. 69, August, 1940 accounts. The the lot to the latter. In the same vein, when Claro Oñate and his spouse died,
corresponding Transfer Title No. 4812 has been issued by the Register of Deeds their children Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco who succeeded them also did not
Office of Albay on August 3, 1940.”45 take any steps to question the ownership and possession by the Municipality of
the disputed lot until they died on June 8, 1990, June 12, 1991, and October 22,
When petitioner received the lot as donation from the Municipality on 1957, respectively.
December 21, 1988, it possessed the subject lot also in the concept of an owner
and continued to introduce improvements on the lot. Consequently, when Petitioner maintains that significantly, respondent and his siblings—succeeding
respondent their father Francisco as the alleged owners, from his death on October 22,
1957—also did not take any action to recover the questioned lot from 1957 until
_______________ 1993 when the instant suit was commenced. Petitioner avers that if they were
really the owners of said lot, they would not have waited 52 long years to
45 Records, p. 213. institute the suit assuming they have a cause of action against the Municipality
or petitioner. Thus, petitioner submits that the equitable principle of laches has
215 indubitably set in to bar respondent’s action to recover possession of, and title
to, the disputed lot.
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007
Laches and its elements
215 Indeed, it is settled that rights and actions can be lost by delay and by the effect
of delay as the equitable defense of laches does not concern itself with the
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate character of the defendant’s title, but only with plaintiff’s long inaction or
inexcus-

216
31

46 Soliva v. The Intestate Estate of Marcelo M. Villalba, G.R. No. 154017,


216 December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 277, 286; citing Ramos v. Heirs of Ramos, Sr., G.R.
No. 140848, April 25, 2002, 381 SCRA 594, 605; and Westmont Bank v. Ong, G.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED No. 132560, January 30, 2002, 375 SCRA 212, 222.

Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate 47 Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Baba, G.R. No. 138945,
August 19, 2003, 409 SCRA 306, 315; citing Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 133895,
able neglect to bar the latter’s action as it would be inequitable and unjust to the October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 395, 405-406.
defendant.
48 Id.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which—by the exercise of due diligence—could or 217
should have been done earlier.46 Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty
of it to any judicial remedies. Its elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007
defendant, or of one under whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the
situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the 217
complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendant's conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right in which the defendant bases the suit; and demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the circumstances.”49
complainant, or the suit is not held barred.47
Issue of laches not barred by adverse judgment against Daraga, Albay
In Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation, we held that “[t]hough laches It is unfortunate that defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay lost its appeal in
applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively. CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 before the CA for its failure to pay the required docket
Laches is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere fees within the reglementary period. As a result, a Partial Entry of Judgment was
allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to dismiss made on July 9, 1998 and consequently, the dispositions in the November 3,
(emphases supplied).”48 In the same vein, we explained in Santiago v. Court of 1997 Decision, rendered by the Legaspi City RTC, Branch I in favor of respondent
Appeals that there is “no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness Celso Oñate, became final and executory as against defendant Municipality of
of Daraga, Albay.

_______________ As an off-shoot, with respect to the Municipality of Daraga, the Deed of


Donation in favor of petitioner DECS was annulled——respondent Oñate was
32

declared owner in fee simple of the disputed lots and entitled to possession but
was required to pay PhP 50,000 to the Daraga Municipal Government and the The only remaining issue left is whether laches can inure to the benefit of
costs of suit. By reason of the finality of the Decision against the Municipality of petitioner DECS considering the fact that Lot No. 6849-A was devoted to public
Daraga, Tax Declaration Nos. 04-006-00068, 332, 22184, 31954, and 8926 are all education when the elementary school was built in 1940 under the supervision
cancelled and annulled (if not yet cancelled). and control of DECS up to 1993 when Civil Case No. 8715 was filed by
respondent Oñate.
What are the effects of the final judgment against Municipality of Daraga on its
co-defendant, petitioner DECS? We rule in the affirmative.

Generally, it has no impact on the appeal of DECS unless the decision affects its Laches has set in
defenses. In this petition, DECS no longer questions the declaration of nullity of A brief scrutiny of the records does show tell-tale signs of laches. The first
the Deed of Donation over the disputed lot and hence can be considered as a element is undisputed: the then Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was
final resolution of the issue. Likewise, it does not challenge the ownership of constructed in 1940 on a portion of disputed Lot 6849, specifically Lot No. 6849-
Oñate of the disputed lots, but merely relied on the defense of laches. The final A containing 13,072 square meters under TCT No. T-83946. Moreover, Mrs.
directive for Municipality of Daraga to return possession of the land has no Toribia Milleza,50 a retired government employee and resident of Bagumbayan,
significance Daraga since 1955 pertinently testified, thus:

_______________ Q:

49 G.R. No. 103959, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 98, 112. How long have you been residing in this place, Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay?

218 A:

218 Maybe I stayed there in 1955 until the present.51

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate xxxx

on DECS’ appeal since precisely, it is DECS’ position that it should retain Q:


possession of the land. From these considerations, the final RTC November 3,
1997 Decision against the Municipality of Daraga has no substantial and material Now, can you further recall the kind of building that was constructed in this
effect upon the DECS’ appeal. property?
33

In 1955 only one, the Seva type, then there was constructed five (5) Marcos Type
A: buildings during the Marcos time.52

Seva type, building. The devotion of Lot No. 6849-A to education started in 1940 and continued up to
December 21, 1988 when said lot was donated to the DECS. From then on, DECS
Q: built various buildings and introduced improvements on said lot. Lot No. 6849-A
was continuously used for public education until March 18, 1993 when
At present how many buildings were constructed in this property? respondent Oñate filed Civil Case No. 8715 and thereafter up to the present.

A: Thus, for a total period of more than fifty-two (52) years, Lot No. 6849-A was
exclusively and completely utilized by DECS for public education. This fact was
Plenty of school buildings. not successfully challenged nor refuted by respondent.

_______________ The second element of laches was likewise proven. No evidence was presented
to show that respondent or his predecessors-in-interest ever took any action,
50 Supra note 32. administrative or judicial, nor either party questioned or protested the
Municipality’s adverse occupation of a portion of Lot 6849. As petitioner had
51 Id., at p. 4. demonstrated laches by persuasive and credible evidence, it is incumbent upon
respondent to show that his predecessors-in-interest indeed protected their
219 rights of ownership over the lot. Thus, as early as 1940, when the first Seva type
school building was constructed over a portion of the disputed lot, now Lot
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 6849-A, respondent must prove that his predecessors-in-interest indeed
undertook activities to contest the occupation of the portion of the lot by the
219 Municipality and subsequently by petitioner DECS. Unfortunately, respondent
failed to substantiate such defense of ownership and possession of the lot and
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate even skirted this issue.

Q: _______________

Now, how many buildings were first constructed in [sic] this property? 52 Id., at p. 5.

A: 220
34

220 buildings and facilities on the school site amounting to more than PhP 11 million.
Mr. Jose Adra, School Principal of the Daraga
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
53 Supra note 19.
Respondent testified that he came to know of Lot 6849 only in 1973 when he
was 23 years old.53 He asserted that he took possession of said lot in the same 221
year when his two (2) uncles, the brothers of his late father, passed on to him
the disputed lot as his father’s share of the inheritance from the late Claro Oñate VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007
and Gregoria Los Baños (his grandparents). However, it is interesting to note that
he testified that he only came to know in 1991 that the elementary school was 221
built on a portion of Lot 6849, now Lot 6849-A. These assertions are
irreconcilable. Common experience tells us that one who owns a property and Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
takes possession of it cannot fail to discover and know that an existing
elementary school was built and standing on the lot from the time that the North Central Elementary School, testified on the donation of the disputed lot to
owner starts possessing a property. petitioner and the cost of the improvements on it.54 After more than forty-eight
(48) years of unquestioned, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession by
Nonetheless, even granting that respondent indeed only came to know of such petitioner DECS, it had no knowledge nor reason to believe that respondent
encroachment or occupation in 1991, his rights cannot be better than that of his would assert any right over the lot after the lapse of such long occupation
predecessors-in-interest, that is, Claro Oñate and his uncles, Antonio and Rafael, coupled with a tax declaration in the name of the Daraga Municipality.
who died in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Since respondent’s right over the lot
originated from his predecessorsin-interest, then he cannot have better rights Finally, the last element is likewise proven by the antecedent facts that clearly
over Lot No. 6849-A than the latter. The spring cannot rise higher than its show grave prejudice to the government, in general, and to petitioner, in
source. Besides, respondent has not proffered any explanation why his particular, if the instant action is not barred without even considering the cost of
predecessors-in-interest did not protest and challenge the Municipality’s the construction of the school buildings and facilities and the deleterious effect
occupancy over a portion of their lot. Verily, with the span of around 52 years on the school children and affected school teachers and personnel if Lot No.
afforded respondent and his predecessors-in-interest, their inaction and delay in 6849-A would be returned to respondent.
protecting their rights were certainly excessive and unjustified.
Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
In the third element, the records clearly bear out the fact that petitioner DECS as its application is controlled by equitable considerations. In the instant case,
did not know nor anticipate that their possession and occupancy of a portion of with the foregoing considerations, we are constrained from giving approbation
Lot 6849 would later be questioned. In fact, petitioner built additional school to the trial and appellate courts’ ruling that the application of the principle of
35

laches would subvert the ends of justice. Indeed, it is unjust for the State and the Transfer Certificates of Title on portions of Lot 6849 valid
affected citizenry to suffer after respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had Petitioner contends that the reconstitution of OCT No. 2563—covering subject
slept on their rights for 52 years. lot in 1991 or 52 years after the Municipality owned said lot—does not in any
way affect the latter’s preferential and superior right over the disputed lot. In
Also, the inaction of respondent Oñate and his predecessors-in-interest for over the same vein, it maintains that it is inconsequential that petitioner and the
50 years has reduced their right to regain possession of Lot 6849-A to a stale Municipality failed to present as evidence the deed of conveyance in favor of the
demand. Municipality, as well as TCT No. 4812 as a registered land owner may lose the
right to recover possession of a registered property by reason of laches.
Laches holds over the actual area possessed and occupied by petitioner Petitioner concludes that the long delayed reconstitution of OCT No. 2563 by
We, however, make the clear distinction that laches applies in favor of petitioner respondent was a mere afterthought and intended to camouflage his and his
only as regards Lot 6849-A which is predecessor’s unreasonably long inaction which indicates an awareness that
they have no valid claim whatsoever over disputed Lot 6849.
_______________
We disagree.
54 Supra note 31.
It must be noted that a reconstitution proceeding is one in rem and is thus
222 binding to the whole world. While it is true that laches has set in so far as it
pertains to the portion of Lot 6849, specifically Lot 6849-A where the
222 Municipality and petitioner DECS had constructed the existing school, such does
not hold true for the totality of Lot 6849 as explained above. Indeed, the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED reconstitution proceeding being one in rem,

Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate 223

actually possessed and occupied by it. Laches does not apply to Lot Nos. 6849-B, VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007
6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E. These portions were never occupied by the
Municipality and petitioner. Agricultural tenant Felicito Armenta testified that 223
his father, Antonio Armenta, started cultivating portions of Lot 6849 way back in
the 1940s and that he took over the tenancy in 1960 when his father stopped Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
tilling the land. Besides, if the Municipality indeed owned Lot 6849 by virtue of a
purchase, it is likewise guilty of laches in not protecting or contesting the the consequent issuance of OCT No. RO-18971 in lieu of the lost or destroyed
cultivation by Oñates’ agricultural tenants of said portions of Lot 6849. OCT No. 2563 is valid.
36

Anent the issue of non-notification, we agree with the observation of the courts 224
a quo that even granting arguendo that petitioner was not notified about the
reconstitution proceeding, such deficiency is not jurisdictional as to nullify and SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
prevail over the final disposition of the trial court in a proceeding in rem.
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
More so, while petitioner strongly asserts that the certification in Tax
Declaration No. 31954 attesting to the payment of the disputed lot under No. 6849-A for reason of laches. In the recent case of De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, we
Municipal Voucher No. 69 and the issuance of TCT No. 4812, which was never reiterated the principle we have consistently applied in laches:
disputed nor controverted by respondent, should have been given evidentiary
weight by the trial and appellate courts as the presumptions of regularity and “The law55 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the
validity of such official act have not been overcome, such documents cannot registered owner can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
defeat the registered title of respondent. Nonetheless, while it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible and
imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover the
Between a clear showing of ownership evidenced by a registered title and a possession of his registered property by reason of laches.”56
certification in a tax declaration, albeit done in an official capacity, the former
holds as the latter is only persuasive evidence. Indeed, tax declarations in land Thus, with our resolution of the principal issue of applicability of the equitable
cases per se do not constitute ownership without other substantial pieces of remedy of laches, the issue of suability of the State has been mooted.
evidence.
A final word. Considering our foregoing disquisition and upon grounds of equity,
The records do not show and petitioner has not given any cogent explanation a modification of the final decision prevailing between respondent Oñate and
why the Deed of Conveyance in favor of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay and the Municipality of Daraga, Albay is in order. It would be grossly iniquitous for
TCT No. 4812 were not presented. With clear and affirmative defenses set up by respondent Oñate to pay PhP 50,000 to the Municipality of Daraga, Albay
petitioner and Municipality of Daraga, Albay, it is incumbent for them to present considering that he is not entitled to recover the possession and usufruct of Lot
these documents. Therefore, the unmistakable inference is that there was No. 6849-A.
indeed no sale and conveyance by Claro Oñate of Lot 6849 in favor of the
Municipality. Consequently, the TCTs cancelling OCT No. RO-18971 covering Lot WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the January 14, 2004 Decision
Nos. 6849-A, 6849-B, 6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E were likewise validly issued. of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 affirming the November 3, 1997 Decision of
the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
Thus, notwithstanding valid titles over the portions of Lot 6849, respondent
Oñate cannot now take possession over Lot 1) Declaring the DepEd (formerly DECS), Division of Albay to have the rights of
possession and usufruct over Lot 6849-A with an area of 13,072 square meters
224 under TCT No. T-83946 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay, as a result of laches on
the part of respondent Celso Oñate
37

_______________ c. Lot 6849-E with an area of 608 square meters under TCT No. T-83950 of the
Registry of Deeds of Albay.
55 Act No. 496, Sec. 46 (The Land Registration Act), now P.D. No. 1529 (Property 3) Declaring Mariano M. Lim as true and legal owner of Lot 6849-B with an area
Registration Decree). of 3,100 square meters under TCT No. T-84049 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay;
4) Ordering petitioner DECS and all other persons claiming under said
56 G.R. No. 144103, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 506, 518; citing Isabela Colleges, department to return the possession of Lots 6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E to
Inc. v. Heirs of Nieves Tolentino-Rivera, G.R. No. 132677, October 20, 2000, 344 respondent Celso Oñate and Lot 6849-B to Mariano M. Lim; and
SCRA 95, 106-107. 5) Deleting Item No. 4 of the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC,
which ordered respondent Celso Oñate to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP 50,000)
225 to defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay.
226
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007
226
225
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
Navarro vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.
and his predecessors-in-interest. Respondent Celso Oñate, his heirs, assigns, and
successors-in-interest are prohibited from selling, mortgaging, or encumbering The November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED in all other
Lot 6849-A while the said lot is still being used and occupied by petitioner DECS. respects.
However, the rights of possession and usufruct will be restored to respondent
the moment petitioner DECS no longer needs the said lot. The Registry of Deeds No costs.
of Albay is ordered to annotate the aforementioned restrictions and conditions
at the back of TCT No. T-83946-A in the name of respondent Celso Oñate. Item SO ORDERED.
No. 2 of the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is modified
accordingly; Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales and Tinga, JJ., concur.
2) Declaring Celso Oñate as the true and legal owner in fee simple of the
following lots: Petition granted, judgment affirmed with modifications.
a. Lot 6849-C with an area of 10,000 square meters under TCT No. T-83948 of
the Registry of Deeds of Albay; Notes.—When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby
b. Lot 6849-D with an area of 1,127 square meters under TCT No. T-83949 of the necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. (Republic vs.
Registry of Deeds of Albay; and National Labor Relations Commission, 263 SCRA 290 [1996])
38

An unincorporated government agency such as the Department of Public Works


and Highways (DPWH) is without any separate juridical personality of its own
and hence enjoys immunity from suit. (Republic vs. Nolasco, 457 SCRA 400
[2005])

——o0o—— Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate, 524 SCRA


200, G.R. No. 161758 June 8, 2007
39

G.R. No. 147076. June 17, 2004.*


VOL. 432, JUNE 17, 2004
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. ACT
THEATER, INC., respondent. 419
Civil Law; Damages; Definition of a Right; The exercise of rights is not without
limitations; Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater, Inc.
such right is to be exercised.—A right is a power, privilege, or immunity
guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a Same; Same; Same; Petitioner’s act was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the
result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person respondent, justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.—
against the other. Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion of
providing water supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had the the court a quo and the appellate court that the petitioner’s act was arbitrary,
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. However, injurious and prejudicial to the respondent, justifying the award of damages
the exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the right should not be under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised. Article 19 of
the Civil Code precisely sets the norms for the exercise of one’s rights: Art. 19. Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good unjustified act of the other party.—The award of P5,000 as attorney’s fees is
faith. reasonable and warranted. Attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is
compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an
Same; Same; Same; When a right is exercised in a manner which discards the unjustified act of the other party.
norms set in Article 19 of the Civil Code, resulting in damage to another, a legal
wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable.—When a right is PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. In The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the respondent what is
due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondent’s water Anabella S. Altuna for petitioner.
service connection.
Eulogio E. Gatdula for respondent.
_______________
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
* SECOND DIVISION.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Metropolitan
419 Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), seeking to reverse and set aside the
40

Decision1 dated January 31, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 876. The respondent’s employees were subsequently criminally charged
58581, which affirmed the civil aspect of the Decision2 dated May 5, 1997 of the (Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412) before the court a quo. On account of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, directing the petitioner MWSS to incident, the respondent’s water service connection was cut off. Consequently,
pay the respondent Act Theater, Inc. damages and attorney’s fees. the respondent filed a complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. Q-
88-768) against the petitioner MWSS.
The present case stemmed from the consolidated cases of Criminal Case No. Q-
89-2412 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Tabian, et al., for violation In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed with the court a
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 876, quo that the petitioner acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting
and Civil Case No. Q-88-768 entitled Act Theater, Inc. v. Metropolitan off the respondent’s water service connection without prior notice. Due to lack
Waterworks of water, the health and sanitation, not only of the respondent’s patrons but in
the surrounding premises as well, were adversely affected. The respondent
_______________ prayed that the petitioner be directed to pay damages.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices After due trial, the court a quo rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole concurring. which reads:

2 Penned by Judge Normandie B. Pizarro. In Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412

420 “WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the four (4) above-named Accused are hereby
420 ACQUITTED of the crime charged.3

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED In Civil Case No. Q-88-768

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater, Inc. ...

and Sewerage System. The two cases were jointly tried in the court a quo as they 1. Ordering defendant MWSS to pay plaintiff actual or compensatory damages in
arose from the same factual circumstances, to wit: the amount of P25,000.00; and to return the sum of P200,000.00 deposited by
the plaintiff for the restoration of its water services after its disconnection on
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc., September 23, 1988;
namely, Rodolfo Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto Ruales, 2. Defendant’s counterclaim for undercollection of P530,759.96 is dismissed for
were apprehended by members of the Quezon City police force for allegedly lack of merit;
tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 3. Ordering defendant MWSS to pay costs of suit;
41

_______________ II

3 Rollo, p. 35. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY UPHELD THE
AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES;
421
III
VOL. 432, JUNE 17, 2004
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] CORRECTLY APPLIED
421 THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE WITHOUT CONSIDERING
THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 429 OF THE SAME CODE.5
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater, Inc.
Preliminarily, the petitioner harps on the fact that, in quoting the decretal
4. Ordering defendant MWSS to pay plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00 as portion of the court a quo’s decision, the CA erroneously typed P500,000 as the
attorney’s fees; attorney’s fees awarded in favor of the respondent when the same should only
5. Making the mandatory injunction earlier issued to plaintiff Act Theater, Inc. be P5,000. In any case, according to the petitioner, whether the amount is
permanent. P500,000 or P5,000, the award of attorney’s fees is improper considering that
SO ORDERED.”4 there was no discussion or statement in the body of the assailed

Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the aforesaid decision to _______________
the CA. The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. According to the CA,
the court a quo correctly found that the petitioner’s act of cutting off the 4 Id., at p. 37.
respondent’s water service connection without prior notice was arbitrary,
injurious and prejudicial to the latter justifying the award of damages under 5 Id., at pp. 13-14.
Article 19 of the Civil Code.
422
Undaunted, the petitioner now comes to this Court alleging as follows:
422
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] VALIDLY AFFIRMED
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN RESOLVING THE PETITIONER’S Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater, Inc.
APPEAL;
42

decision justifying such award. The petitioner insists that in cutting off the accountable.9 In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the
respondent’s water service connection, the petitioner merely exercised its respondent what is due
proprietary right under Article 429 of the Civil Code.
_______________
The petition is devoid of merit.
6 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 6th Ed., p. 1324.
Article 429 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the petitioner in justifying its act of
disconnecting the water supply of the respondent without prior notice, reads: 7 Rellosa v. Pellosis, 362 SCRA 486 (2001).

Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any 8 Paguio v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc., 393 SCRA 379 (2002).
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use
such force as may be reasonable to repel or prevent an actual or threatened 9 Rellosa v. Pellosis, supra.
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
423
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution,
statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage,6 constitutive of VOL. 432, JUNE 17, 2004
a legally enforceable claim of one person against the other.7
423
Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water supply to
certain consumers including the respondent, had the right to exclude any person Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater, Inc.
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not
without limitations. Having the right should not be confused with the manner by to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondent’s water service
which such right is to be exercised.8 connection. As correctly found by the appellate court:

Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets the norms for the exercise of one’s While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to plaintiff-appellee
rights: prior to the disconnection of the latter’s water services, this was done only a few
hours before the actual disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance ascertain the matter, Act sent its assistant manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and MWSS office but he was treated badly on the flimsy excuse that he had no
good faith. authority to represent Act. Act’s water services were cut at midnight of the day
following the apprehension of the employees. Clearly, the plaintiff-appellee was
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in denied due process when it was deprived of the water services. As a
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held consequence thereof, Act had to contract another source to provide water for a
43

number of days. Plaintiff-appellee was also compelled to deposit with MWSS the 424
sum of P200,000.00 for the restoration of their water services.10
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion of
the court a quo and the appellate court that the petitioner’s act was arbitrary, People vs. Ibarrientos
injurious and prejudicial to the respondent, justifying the award of damages
under Article 19 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 31, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58581 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Finally, the amount of P500,000 as attorney’s fees in that portion of the assailed
decision which quoted the fallo of the court a quo’s decision was obviously a SO ORDERED.
typographical error. As attorney’s fees, the court a quo awarded the amount of
P5,000 only. It was this amount, as well as actual and compensatory damages of Puno (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.
P25,000 and the reimbursement of P200,000 deposited by the respondent for
the restoration of its water supply, that the CA affirmed, as it expressly stated in Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed in toto.
its dispositive portion that “finding no cogent reason to reverse the appealed
Decision which is in conformity with the law and evidence, the same is hereby Note.—The power of the courts to grant damages and attorney’s fees demands
AFFIRMED.”11 factual, legal and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or
conjecture. (Ranola vs. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 1 [2000])
The award of P5,000 as attorney’s fees is reasonable and warranted. Attorney’s
fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to ——o0o—— Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater,
protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.12 Inc., 432 SCRA 418, G.R. No. 147076 June 17, 2004

_______________

10 Rollo, p. 26.

11 Id., at p. 27.

12 Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation vs. Philippine Ports Authority,


378 SCRA 82 (2002).

424
44

Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals


G.R. No. 135219. January 17, 2002.*
a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex-parte writ of
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and possession was applied for.
ERNESTO AUSTRIA and LORETO Q. QUINTANA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Foreclosures; Possession; The obligation of a court to issue an ex- Same; Same; Same; One who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by
parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery.—
sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in Notably, the Civil Code protects the actual possessor of a property, to wit: Art.
possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable
debtor/mortgagor.—Thus, in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for
that the obligation of a court to issue an ex-parte writ of possession in favor of the recovery of the property. Under the aforequoted provision, one who claims
the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate
appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a judicial action for its physical recovery. The term “judicial process” could mean
right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. The same principle was inversely no less than an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership
applied in a more recent case, where we ruled that a writ of possession may be claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
issued in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, only if the debtor is
in possession and no third party had intervened. Although the factual nuances of Same; Same; Same; An ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ under
this case may slightly differ from the aforecited cases, the availing circumstances Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial process”.—An ex-
are undeniably similar—a party in possession of the foreclosed property is parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135
asserting a right adverse to the debtor/mortgagor and is is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial process” as contemplated above. Even if the
same may be considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right
______________ of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in
court, by which one party “sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
* FIRST DIVISION. right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.”

Same; Same; Same; An ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a


23 non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
pursuant to Act 3135.—It should be emphasized that an ex-parte petition for
issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an
VOL. 374, JANUARY 17, 2002 extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. Unlike
a judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court,
23 any property brought within the ambit of the act is foreclosed by the filing of a
45

petition, not with any court of justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the Sometime during the late 70’s, the spouses Godofredo and Wilma Monsod
province where the sale is to be made. obtained a loan in the amount of P120,000.00 from petitioner Philippine
National Bank (PNB). To secure their loan, the Monsods mortgaged to PNB a
Same; Same; Same; The actual possessor of a property enjoys a legal parcel of land covered by TCT No. S-84843, located within the Monte Villa de
presumption of just title in his favor.—Besides, as earlier stressed, Article 433 of Monsod Subdivision in Parañaque, Rizal.
the Civil Code, cited above, requires nothing less than an action for ejectment to
be brought even by the true owner. After all, the actual possessor of a property Due to Monsods’ failure to pay their loan obligation, PNB extrajudicially
enjoys a legal presumption of just title in his favor, which must be overcome by foreclosed the mortgage. At the auction sale of the subject real property, PNB
the party claiming otherwise. was declared the highest bidder. On December 21, 1981, a certificate of sale was
issued in favor of PNB, and was registered on July 11, 1984.1
24
Upon expiration of the redemption period on July 12, 1985, ownership of the
24 property was consolidated in PNB. Thereafter, TCT No. S-84843 was cancelled
and TCT No. 99480 was issued in PNB’s name.2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
On June 23, 1992, PNB filed an “Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of Writ of
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals Possession” with Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed
as LRC Case No. M-2635. Pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3135, as
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. amended, the trial court conducted an ex parte hearing. PNB’s representative
testified that the foreclosed property is occupied by one Ernesto Austria.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. According

Carao, Noblejas & Associates for petitioner PNB. ______________

Luz & Advincula for private respondents. 1 Rollo, pp. 12-13.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: 2 Ibid., at 34.

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking a 25
reversal of the Court of Appeals’ resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 48660 dated
August 25, 1998, which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, VOL. 374, JANUARY 17, 2002
Branch 60 in LRC Case No. M-2635.
25
46

Issuance of Break Open Order”8 and, subsequently, an Opposition to the


Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals Austrias’ Second Motion for Intervention.9

to PNB, Mr. Austria was invited by the bank to a conference to discuss the ______________
ownership of the foreclosed lot, however, he did not honor the bank’s
invitation.3 3 RTC Records, pp. 26-27.

On August 28, 1992, the trial court granted PNB’s petition and a writ of 4 Ibid., at 76.
possession was issued on October 26, 1992.4
5 Id., at 59-63.
On December 11, 1992, respondents Ernesto and Loreto Quintana Austria filed a
“Motion for Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the Enforcement of the Writ 6 Id., at 100 & 103.
of Possession.” The Austrias alleged that they are the actual occupants of the
subject lot, which they purportedly bought from the Monsods as early as 1974. 7 Id., at 104-108.
They claimed that the foreclosed property was enclosed within a concrete fence
and formed part of their family compound. PNB allegedly knew of this fact even 8 Id., at 119.
before it granted the loan to the Monsods, because the bank’s credit
investigators were advised of the same when they inspected the property in the 9 Id., at 129.
summer of 1976. Consequently, the Austrias maintained that the issuance of the
possessory writ ex parte was improper, since it will deprive them of their 26
property without due process.5
26
Due to the Austrias’ refusal to vacate the premises, the sheriff failed to enforce
the challenged writ. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On July 27, 1993, on motion of PNB, the trial court issued an alias writ of Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
possession. Again, the writ was not implemented.6
On January 31, 1994, the trial court denied the Austrias’ second motion and
On September 17, 1993, the sheriff sought to enforce the first alias writ of granted PNB’s “Motion for Issuance of Break Open Order.” The trial court ruled
possession for the second time. The Austrias filed a “Second Motion for that the Austrias can no longer be permitted to intervene in the case during said
Intervention” seeking to restrain the enforcement of the writ of possession stage of the proceedings and that the remedy of the Austrias was to file an
issued on October 26, 1992.7 PNB then filed an “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for ordinary civil action to assert their claim of ownership over the property.10
47

In the meantime, the first alias writ of possession lapsed. PNB thus filed an “Ex-
Parte Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Possession,”11 and on 13 Id., at 185-187.
November 29, 1994, a second alias writ was issued.12
14 Id., at 224.
Unfazed, the Austrias filed an Omnibus Motion on January 25, 1995, seeking a
recall of the second alias writ and a reconsideration of the trial court’s order 15 Id., at 232.
denying their motion to intervene.13 Meanwhile, the second alias writ had
likewise expired. 16 Id., at 244.

PNB filed a “Manifestation and Motion for Issuance of Third Alias Writ of 27
Possession,” which the trial court granted anew in an order dated October 10,
1995.14 VOL. 374, JANUARY 17, 2002

However, on December 12, 1995, the Austrias again filed a motion to set aside 27
the trial court’s order dated October 10, 1995 and to recall the third alias writ.15
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
Consequent to the filing of this fourth motion, the sheriff again failed to
implement the third alias writ, which also lapsed. Thus, on February 15, 1996, ministerial duty on its part. The Austrias failed to establish any legal ground for
PNB filed another “Motion for Issuance of a Fourth Alias Writ,”16 which was recalling the writs, even as they claimed a superior right to the subject
granted on March 26, 1996. property.17

The trial court, after hearing the Austrias’ fourth motion, issued an order on On February 19, 1997, the fourth alias writ was issued by the trial court. The writ
October 4, 1996, denying the same, on the ground that the issuance of a was partially implemented with the posting of PNB security guards within the
possessory writ for a property sold at public auction pursuant to an extra-judicial premises of the foreclosed lot.18
foreclosure proceeding was a
On April 17, 1997, the Austrias, for the fifth time, filed a motion to stop the
______________ enforcement of the fourth alias writ and to set aside all prior writs issued by the
trial court.19
10 Id., at 158-160.
In the meantime, the Austrias filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque,
11 Id., at 171. an action for cancellation of PNB’s title to the property, docketed as Civil Case
No. 97-0184.20
12 Id., at 180-183.
48

On October 28, 1997, the trial court denied the Austrias’ fifth motion but ruled 22 Id., at 455.
that: “any writ of possession that may be issued in this case, is declared
unenforceable against the MOVANTS ERNESTO AUSTRIA and the HEIRS OF 28
LORETO AUSTRIA, until the Court declares otherwise.”21
28
PNB filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on May 20, 1998.22 A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed by PNB SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
before the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition, stating: Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals

There is no prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of OF POSSESSION CANNOT BE ENFORCED AGAINST RESPONDENT AUSTRIA. SAID
respondent Judge in issuing his assailed Order which the Court finds to be in FINDINGS ARE UNPROVEN AND UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
accord with law, the pertinent rules and jurisprudence cited therein.
II
Hence, PNB filed the instant petition, contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS IN:
I
A) SUPPORTING THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THE
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR BY SIMPLY ADOPTING OCTOBER 28, 1997 ORDER. THE RULINGS DO NOT JUSTIFY THE NON-
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT WRIT ENFORCEMENT OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION AGAINST RESPONDENTS.
RESPONDENTS WERE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD BUT NO EVIDENCE
______________ WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM;
B) NOT GIVING DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE FACT THAT PNB HAS THE LEGAL
17 Id., at 310-312. RIGHT TO POSSESS THE PROPERTY AS ITS REGISTERED OWNER;
C) LOSING SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT BELATEDLY ISSUED THE
18 Id., at 319, 322, 324 & 338. OCTOBER 28, 1997 ORDER DIRECTING THAT THE WRIT OF POSSESSION CANNOT
BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS. THE TRIAL COURT HAD EARLIER
19 Id., at 327. ISSUED FOUR (4) POSSESSORY WRITS ALL OF WHICH WERE DIRECTED AGAINST
RESPONDENTS AUSTRIA & QUINTANA.23
20 Id., at 369-370. The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not an ex-parte writ of
possession issued pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended, can be enforced
21 Id., at 417. against a third person who is in actual possession of the foreclosed property and
who is not in privity with the debtor/mortgagor.24
49

On the other hand, respondents assert that the trial court correctly held that the
Petitioner PNB maintains that the trial court’s order was based on the unproven writ of possession can only be implemented against the debtor/mortgagor and
allegation that respondents had purchased the property from the Monsods his successors-in-interest. Since respondents acquired their rights as owners of
before the latter mortgaged it to PNB. According to petitioner PNB, respondents the property by virtue of a sale made to them by the Monsods prior to the
did not adduce any proof to support their claim of ownership, even as they were bank’s mortgage lien, respondents can not be dispossessed therefrom without
repeatedly given the opportunity to do so during the hearings on the numerous due notice and hearing, through the simple expedient of an ex-parte possessory
motions filed by respondents themselves. writ.

______________ We agree with respondents. Under applicable laws and jurisprudence, they can
not be ejected from the property by means of an ex-parte writ of possession.
23 Ibid., at 20.
The operative provision under Act No. 3135, as amended,25 is Section 6, which
24 Id., at 130. states:

29 Sec. 6. Redemption.—In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the
special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or
VOL. 374, JANUARY 17, 2002 any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of
trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within
29 the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption
shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as
these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. (Italics ours)
Petitioner PNB also submits that since it is the registered owner of the property,
it is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right. The bank insists that it ______________
could rely on the title of the registered land which does not have any annotation
of respondents’ supposed rights. 25 An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted in or
Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages, as amended by Act No. 4118.
Petitioner PNB likewise avers that the trial court could not now belatedly refuse
to enforce the writ of possession against respondents. The trial court had 30
already issued a total of four possessory writs directing the ouster of all
occupants of the lot, including respondents herein. 30

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


50

26 See IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation v. Nera, 19 SCRA 181,
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals 184 (1967), where the Court explained that Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil
Procedure were superseded by Sections 25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39 of the
Despite the evolutionary development of our procedural laws throughout the Rules of Court which in turn were replaced by Sections 29-31 and Section 35 of
years, the pertinent rule in the Code of Civil Procedure26 remains practically Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
unchanged. Particularly, Rule 39, Section 33, second paragraph, which relates to
the right of possession of a purchaser of property in an extrajudicial foreclosure 27 162 SCRA 358, 363 (1988), citing IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance
sale: Corporation v. Nera, supra; Tan Soo Huat v. Ongwico, 63 Phil. 746 (1936).

Sec. 33. x x x 28 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 70, 77 (1997), citing
Gatchalian v. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 (1977).
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner
shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the 31
judgment obligor to the property at the time of levy. The possession of the
property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer VOL. 374, JANUARY 17, 2002
unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
obligor. (Italics ours) 31

Thus, in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court,27 we held that the obligation Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
of a court to issue an ex-parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there It should be stressed that the foregoing doctrinal pronouncements are not
is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to without support in substantive law. Notably, the Civil Code protects the actual
that of the debtor/mortgagor. The same principle was inversely applied in a possessor of a property, to wit:
more recent case,28 where we ruled that a writ of possession may be issued in
an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, only if the debtor is in Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable
possession and no third party had intervened. Although the factual nuances of presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for
this case may slightly differ from the aforecited cases, the availing circumstances the recovery of the property.
are undeniably similar—a party in possession of the foreclosed property is
asserting a right adverse to the debtor/mortgagor and is a stranger to the Under the aforequoted provision, one who claims to be the owner of a property
foreclosure proceedings in which the ex-parte writ of possession was applied for. possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical
recovery. The term “judicial process” could mean no less than an ejectment suit
______________ or reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending
parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
51

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


An ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No.
3135 is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial process” as contemplated above. Even if Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
the same may be considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s
right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit parte possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary
filed in court, by which one party “sues another for the enforcement or ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due process.
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.”29
Besides, as earlier stressed, Article 433 of the Civil Code, cited above, requires
It should be emphasized that an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of nothing less than an action for ejectment to be brought even by the true owner.
possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure After all, the actual possessor of a property enjoys a legal presumption of just
of mortgage pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. Unlike a judicial foreclosure of title in his favor,31 which must be overcome by the party claiming otherwise.
real estate mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, any property brought
within the ambit of the act is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not with any In the case at bar, petitioner PNB admitted that as early as 1990, it was aware
court of justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale that the subject lot was occupied by the Austrias. Yet, instead of bringing an
is to be made.30 action in court for the ejectment of respondents, it chose to simply file an ex-
parte petition for a writ of possession pursuant to its alleged right as purchaser
As such, a third person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed realty, who in the extra-judicial foreclosure sale. We cannot sanction this procedural
claims a right superior to that of the original mortgagor, will have no opportunity shortcut. To enforce the writ against an unwitting third party possessor, who
to be heard on his claim in a proceeding of this nature. It stands to reason, took no part in the foreclosure proceedings, would be tantamount to the taking
therefore, that such third person may not be dispossessed on the strength of a of real property without the benefit of proper judicial intervention.
mere ex-
Consequently, it was not a ministerial duty of the trial court under Act No. 3135
______________ to issue a writ of possession for the ouster of respondents from the lot subject of
this instant case. The trial court was without authority to grant the ex-parte writ,
29 Section 3 (a), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. since petitioner PNB’s right of possession under said Act could be rightfully
recognized only against the Monsods and the latter’s successors-in-interest, but
30 See Supena v. De la Rosa, 267 SCRA 1, 10 (1997), citing Section 4, Act No. not against respondents who assert a right adverse to the Monsods. Hence, the
3135, as amended. trial court cannot be precluded from correcting itself by refusing to enforce the
writs it had previously issued. Its lack of authority to direct issuance of the writs
32 against respondents assured that its earlier orders would never attain finality in
the first place.
32
52

In the same vein, respondents are not obliged to prove their ownership of the
foreclosed lot in the ex-parte proceedings conducted below. The trial court has Note.—The purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the
no jurisdiction to determine who between the parties is entitled to ownership property. (Suico Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 212
and possession of the foreclosed lot. [1999])

______________ ——o0o—— Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 374 SCRA 22, G.R.
No. 135219 January 17, 2002
31 Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 541. A possessor in the concept of owner
has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he
cannot be obliged to show or prove it.

33

VOL. 374, JANUARY 17, 2002

33

Mateo vs. Diaz

Likewise, registration of the lot in petitioner PNB’s name does not automatically
entitle the latter to possession thereof. As discussed earlier, petitioner PNB must
resort to the appropriate judicial process for recovery of the property and
cannot simply invoke its title in an ex-parte proceeding to justify the ouster of
respondents.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48660 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, resolution affirmed.


53

G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000.* deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68
[78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public
NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF prosecutor.
APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.
Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code Same; Same; Seizure and Forfeiture Procedure; Actions; Replevin; It would be
makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before a seizure
accompanying legal documents unlawful and pun- could be effected where the vehicle owner and his driver immediately went to
court and applied for a writ of replevin.—Note further that petitioners’ failure to
_______________ observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of
1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure
26 Art. 64(1), Revised Penal Code; People vs. Matubis, 288 SCRA 210, 224 [1998]. to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on
the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized
* SECOND DIVISION. vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR.
Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded
for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to
56 the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because
private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of
replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their
56 apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to
require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED effected under the circumstances.

Calub vs. Court of Appeals Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there was a violation of the Revised
Forestry Code and the seizure of the vehicles used in transporting illegally cut
ishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in timber was in accordance with law, the seized vehicles were validly deemed in
Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code.—This provision makes mere custodia legis, hence they could not be subject to an action for replevin.—Since
possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in
documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in
theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present custodia
case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the
seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport 57
said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were
54

of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In
VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000 implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through
the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as
57 officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no
malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who
Calub vs. Court of Appeals represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the
State’s consent.
legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully
taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exhaustion must be
not otherwise. raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a
Same; Same; A property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the
subject of a replevin suit.—Note that property that is validly deposited in 58
custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy
Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further: “. . . the writ of replevin has been
repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken 58
for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or
execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case,
valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the Calub vs. Court of Appeals
simple devise of a writ of replevin . . .”
motion to dismiss, otherwise such ground for dismissal would be deemed
Same; Constitutional Law; State Immunity; A suit against a public officer for his waived.—Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of
official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State the Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion
ultimately liable—thus, a suit against officers who represent the DENR is a suit of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be
against the State and cannot prosper without the States consent.—Well raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the
established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at
And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the
the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the court could take cognizance of the case and try it.
protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to
activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which the
petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
55

Fiel Marmita for petitioners. Calub vs. Court of Appeals

Plaridel Bohol for private respondents. “1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and twenty
six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75, being
QUISUMBING, J.: driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two hundred
For review is the decision1 dated May 27, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA- twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-sourced lumber
G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for certiorari, valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a
prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by certain] Manuela Babalcon. . . .”3
the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to
petitioners’ (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized
respondents, as well as (b) petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Order and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR
of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for a Writ of (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and
replevin.2 Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan.4 Seizure receipts were issued but the
drivers refused to accept the receipts.5 Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows: Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office in
Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.6
apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:
_______________
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 23.
1 Rollo, pp. 22-27.
4 Id. at 23.
2 CA Records, p. 43.
5 Id. at 74.
59
6 Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000 without License.—Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forestland, or timber from alienable or
59 disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
56

timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that the
necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be
as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the loaded on it.9
area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner,
60 and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of
possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin
60 against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted
the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED April 24, 1992.10 Petition-

Calub vs. Court of Appeals _______________

On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and 7 Rollo, p. 70.
Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this
time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. 8 Id. at 23, 78.
The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor.7
9 Id. at 75, 85.
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was
again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and 10 CA Records, p. 43.
Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Rarangay Buray,
Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an equivalent 61
volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal
complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000
Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential
Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the 61
Revised Forestry Code.8
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
57

ers filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.11
13 Id. at 21.
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for 62
Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued a
TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in the 62
civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or
attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the petitioners to see to
it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in a secured Calub vs. Court of Appeals
place and protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and
subject to the direct order of the Supreme Court.12 In a Resolution issued on under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277. 14
September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to respondent appellate
court for appropriate disposition.13 Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to
observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary,
ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of
by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners’
automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order
court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners’ counsel
representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and
forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure,
unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in
added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of custodia legis.15
1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. For it prescribes the
guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in peti-tioners’ claim that
the commission of offenses penalized private respondents’ complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.
Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of state
_______________ immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had not yet
been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover,
11 Supra, note 4. according to respondent appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability
nor loss of property that could ensue against the government. It reasoned that a
12 Id. at 18-19. suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his
58

authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a public (2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT
officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS
property of another.16 LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO.
705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on (3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR
the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
because they were contra- In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:

_______________ (1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143,
is in custodia legis.
14 Id. at 26-A. (2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded
vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.
15 Id. at 25-27. We will now resolve both issues.

16 Id. at 27. The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in
the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78 states:
63
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000 without License.—Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forestland, or timber from alienable or
63 disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
_______________
dicted by its own findings.17 Their petition was found without merit.18
17 Ibid.
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:19
18 Ibid.
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE SEIZURE OF A
CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED 19 Id. at 6.
BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA
LEGIS; 64
59

64 duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest


products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
Calub vs. Court of Appeals policies on the matter.

forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions.—A forest officer or employee of
laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the 65
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed,
as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000
area where the timber or forest products are found.
65
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without
the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties Calub vs. Court of Appeals
imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence
products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in
authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the
presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there offense . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code,
although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements
were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor. Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:

The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture.—All conveyances
commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code used in the transport of any forest product obtained or gathered illegally
is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as follows: whether or not covered with transport documents, found spurious or irregular in
accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly the government or disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation.—In all cases of violation of this policies on the matter.
Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his
60

Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance.—The Secretary or his duly petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor
authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or natural resources give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents
officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are authorized to seize said immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the
conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the
military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or
other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the
offices, and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action circumstances.
and disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by DENR field officer,
the conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in
as the case may be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in
[Emphasis supplied.] custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property
lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without law, and not otherwise.20
pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said
timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed In Mamanteo, et al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264,
under Sections 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a
Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded by
Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property was
did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the property
to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action should be
for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of partial Sheriff’s
66 Return, and wait for the judge’s instructions on the proper procedure to be
observed.
66
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the
SUPREME OURT EPORTS NNOTATED subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we
elucidated further:
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
“. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to
the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation
the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of
the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the _______________
61

the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot
20 Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614, 621 (1991). prosper without the State’s consent.

67 _______________

VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000 21 Mamanteo, et al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, July 28,
1999, 311 SCRA 259, citing Pacis v. Hon. Averia, 18 SCRA 907 (1966).
67
22 ONST., Art. XVI, sec. 3.
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
23 De Leon, The Law on Public Officers and Election Law, 2nd ed., 1994, pp. 228-
of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. 229.
Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be
vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and 24 Philippine Racing Club, Inc., et al. v. Bonifacio, et al., 109 Phil. 233, 241 (1960).
forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ
of replevin . . .”21 25 Sanders v. Veridiano II, 162 SCRA 88, 96 (1988).

On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two 68
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the State?
68
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent.22 And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.23
However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally Calub vs. Court of Appeals
applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and
without willfulness, malice or corruption.24 In the present case, the acts for Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the
which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of
discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised
nature.25 In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or
Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss.26 If not invoked at the proper
and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take
authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against cognizance of the case and try it.27
62

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court 29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order
dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of
_______________ Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject motor
vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and
26 Section 1, Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Court. appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided
the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all
SECTION 1. Grounds.—Within the time for but before filing the answer to the persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code.
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any
of the following grounds: Costs against private respondents.

(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party; SO ORDERED.
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid; Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same Petition granted, judgment set aside.
cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of Notes.—In United States of America vs. Ruiz, the Supreme Court clarified that its
limitations; pronouncement in Harry Lyons vs. United States of America, 104 Phil. 593
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; (1958), with respect to the waiver of State immunity, was obiter and “has no
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, value as an imperative authority.” (JUSMAG Philippines vs. National Labor
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; Relations Commission, 239 SCRA 224 [1994])
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the
provisions of the statute of frauds; and When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. consent to an unrestrained execution against it. (Republic vs. National Labor
27 Soto v. Jareno, 144 SCRA 116, 119 (1986). See also Section 1(j), Rule 16, 1997 Relations Commission, 263 SCRA 290 [1996])
Rules of Court.
——o0o——
69
Calub vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 55, G.R. No. 115634 April 27, 2000
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
63

G.R. No. 169596. March 28, 2007.* conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and PEDRO BALUBAL, respondents. conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
Appeals; The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, as a rule, issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties; appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
Exceptions.—While it is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not, (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties, a which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
number of exceptions have petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
_______________ contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
* SECOND DIVISION if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. x x x (Italics in
original; underscoring supplied; citations omitted) As will be discussed below,
number 11 of the foregoing enumeration applies in the present case.
433
Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; In the exercise of the Court’s equity
jurisdiction, however, procedural lapses may be disregarded so that a case may
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 be resolved on its merits.—Respecting the second procedural issue, as a rule, the
failure of a petitioner to comply with any of the requirements under Section 4,
433 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of and the documents which
should accompany the petition constitutes sufficient ground for its dismissal. In
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, however, procedural lapses may be
National Construction Company disregarded so that a case may be resolved on its merits. As held in Durban
Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan, 477 SCRA 801 (2005): It is well to
nevertheless been recognized by the Court. These exceptions are enumerated in remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases
Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 428 SCRA 79 (2004): It shall be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for
is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the ventilation of their
Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination
of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case 434
considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the
Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or 434
64

taken from the plaintiff unlawfully x x x, (or as) the writ by virtue of which the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the property therein described
and transfer it to the plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine the sheriff to prove his title, or return the chattels taken if he fail so to do; the
National Construction Company same authority states that the term, “to replevy” means “to redeliver goods
which have been distrained to the original possessor of them, on his giving
causes and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural pledges in an action of replevin.” The term therefore may refer either to the
imperfections. In so doing, the ends of justice would be better served. The action itself, for the recov-
dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of
procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are 435
adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat
their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite
the resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007
application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote justice must be avoided. 435

Actions; Replevin; Words and Phrases; In a complaint for replevin, the claimant Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the National Construction Company
possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is
in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same; The term ery of personalty, or the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by
replevin is popularly understood as “the return to or recovery by a person of which possession of the property may be obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and retained
goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained upon the person’s during the pendency of the action. (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations
giving security to try the matter in court and return the goods if defeated in the omitted) In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that
action.”—On to the substantive issues. Tillson v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 587 he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought
(1991), discusses the term replevin as follows: The term replevin is popularly to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession
understood as “the return to or recovery by a person of goods or chattels thereof, wrongfully detains the same.
claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained upon the person’s giving security to
try the matter in court and return the goods if defeated in the action”; “the writ Same; Searches and Seizures; The seizures and impounding of a vehicle involved
by or the common-law action in which goods and chattels are replevied,” i.e., in an accident, on a policeman’s request, is unquestionably violative of “the right
taken or gotten back by a writ for replevin”; and to replevy, means to recover to be let alone” by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.—In
possession by an action of replevin; to take possession of goods or chattels upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint, the Court of Appeals held that
under a replevin order. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines replevin as “a form of while “there is no law authorizing the impounding of a vehicle involved in an
action which lies to regain the possession of personal chattels which have been accident by the police authorities, x x x neither is there a law making the
65

impounding of vehicles involved in accidents illegal.” It added that “the Supreme


Court is of the view that there is yet no clear-cut policy or rule on the matter.” imprudence resulting to damage to property in which the bus could possibly be
The appellate court is mistaken. The Constitution grants the right against held as evidence does not affect the outcome of this case. As explained in
unreasonable seizures. Thus, Section 2, Article III provides: The right of the Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991): It is true that property held as
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies only where
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis. As the Court said in Tamisin v.
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he Odejar, 108 Phil. 560 (1960), “A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in
persons or things to be seized. (Italics supplied) The seizure and impounding of pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.” Only when property is lawfully taken
petitioner’s bus, on Lopera’s request, were unquestionably violative of “the right by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and not
to be let alone” by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution. otherwise. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original; citations
omitted) Petitioner’s prayer for recovery of possession of the bus is, in light of
Same; Same; Custodia Legis; Words and Phrases; The rule that property held as the foregoing discussion, thus in order.
evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied applies only where the property
is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless Same; Same; Same; Where the police authorities have turned over the vehicle to
searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions; “A thing is in custodia legis a third person, a contract of deposit was perfected between them and the
when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a latter.—As for petitioner’s claim for damages, the Court finds that it cannot pass
judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.” Only upon the same without impleading Lopera and any other police officer
when property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus. The police
custody of the law, and not otherwise.—That a year after the incident the driver authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the bus to respondents for
of the bus was criminally charged for reckless safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected between them and
respondents.
436
Same; Parties; Pleadings and Practice; Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not
a ground for the dismissal of an action.—Petitioner’s failure to implead
436 indispensable parties is not, of course, fatal to its cause of action, misjoinder or
non-joinder of parties not being a ground for its dismissal. Domingo v. Scheer,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 421 SCRA 468 [2004] elucidates: However, the non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of
National Construction Company the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to
66

implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may The incident was initially investigated by respondent PNCC’s toll way patrol,
dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply Sofronio Salvanera, and respondent Pedro Balubal (Balubal), then head of traffic
therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. control and security department of the South Luzon tollway.2 The bus3 was

437 _______________

VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 1 Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso; CA Rollo, pp. 147-
437 158.

Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine 2 TSN, January 16, 1997, pp. 3-7; TSN, June 14, 1996, pp. 7-8.
National Construction Company
3 Description:
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Make—Fuso (replaced with Nissan Engine)
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Type—Bus
Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.
Motor Number—072020 (replaced with Motor No. 05184)
Glenna Jean R. Organ and Fatima L. Caluya for respondents.
Serial/Chassis Number—BM 115LL-20359
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Certificate of Registration No.—0200047-1
Assailed via petition for review is the Court of Appeals’ Decision1 dated
September 6, 2005 dismissing for lack of merit the appeal of petitioner Official Receipt No.—316890066
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (petitioner), docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 61144. Bus Body No.—719

Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of providing public 438


transportation. On December 13, 1990, one of its buses, while traveling north
and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane, swerved and crashed into 438
the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC).
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
67

Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine Plate No.—TB-DVN-19


National Construction Company
(CA Rollo, pp. 148-149; Folder of Exhibits, pp. 1-2)
thereafter turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for it to conduct its own
investigation of the incident. Because of lack of adequate space, the bus was, on 4 TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6.
request of traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera (Lopera), towed by the PNCC
patrol to its compound where it was stored.4 5 TSN, December 8, 1994, pp. 5-6; Folder of Exhibits, p. 3.

Subsequently, petitioner made several requests for PNCC to release the bus, but 6 Records, pp. 1-8.
respondent Balubal denied the same, despite petitioner’s undertaking to repair
the damaged radio room. Respondent Balubal instead demanded the sum of 439
P40,000.00, or a collateral with the same value, representing respondent PNCC’s
estimate of the cost of reconstruction of the damaged radio room. By VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007
petitioner’s estimate, however, the damage amounted to P10,000.00 only.5
439
Petitioner thus filed a complaint for recovery of personal property (replevin)
with damages6 against respondents PNCC and Balubal with the Regional Trial Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
Court of Gumaca, Quezon, praying as follows: National Construction Company

xxxx (3) the sum of P20,000.00 as litis expenses; and


(4) the cost of suit.7
2. after trial on the issues, judgment be rendered— In view of its inability to put up the bond for the issuance of a writ of replevin,
a) adjudging that plaintiff has the right to the possession of subject personal petitioner opted to forego the same and just wait for the court’s final judgment.
property and awarding the material possession of said property to plaintiff as
the sole and absolute owner thereof; In respondents’ Answer8 to the complaint, they claimed that they merely towed
b) ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the following: the bus to the PNCC compound for safekeeping pursuant to an order from the
(1) the sum of P500,000.00 representing unrealized income as of the date of the police authorities; that respondent Balubal did not release the bus to petitioner
filing of the instant complaint and, thereafter, the sum of P7,500.00 daily until in the absence of an order from the police authorities; that petitioner, in
subject passenger bus shall have been delivered to and in actual material claiming the bus, failed to present the certificate of registration and official
possession of plaintiff; receipt of payment to establish ownership thereof; and that the bus subject of
(2) the sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; the complaint was not the same bus involved in the December 13, 1990
_______________ accident.
68

The appellate court thus concluded that the case should have been brought
By way of Counterclaim, respondents prayed for the award of P40,326.54 in against the police authorities instead of respondents.
actual damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P130,000.00 in
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Hence, the present petition for review.

By Decision of December 9, 1997, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s The petition is impressed with merit.
complaint. On respondents’ Counterclaim, it ordered petitioner to pay
respondent PNCC the amount of P40,320.00 representing actual damages to the Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised in the petition, the Court
radio room resolves to dispose first the procedural issues raised by respondents in their
Comment.10
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals9 which held that the storage of the
bus for safekeeping purposes partakes of the nature of a deposit, hence, custody Respondents contend that the petition raises only questions of fact and suffers
or authority over it remained with Lopera who ordered its safekeeping; and that from a procedural defect in that it failed to include “such material portions of
Lopera acted as respondent PNCC’s agent, hence, absent any instruction from the record as would support the petition” as required under Section 4, Rule 4511
him, respondent PNCC may not release the bus. of the Rules of Court, hence, it should be dismissed outright.

_______________ _______________

7 Id., at p. 5. 10 Rollo, pp. 42-47.

8 Id., at pp. 15-19. 11 Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:

9 CA Rollo, pp. 147-158. SEC. 4. Contents of petition.—The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies,
with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the
440 petitioner, and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as the
petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower
440 courts or judges thereof either as petitioner or respondents; (b) indicate the
material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED subject thereof was received when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if
any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set forth
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments
National Construction Company relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order
69

or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond
number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
441 petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
441 if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. x x x” (Italics in
original; italics supplied; citations omitted)
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
National Construction Company As will be discussed below, number 11 of the foregoing enumeration applies in
the present case.
Contrary to respondents’ contention, the petition raises questions of law
foremost of which is whether the owner of a personal property may initiate an _______________
action for replevin against a depositary and recover damages for illegal distraint.
12 G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 85-86.
In any event, while it is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not,
as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties, a 442
number of exceptions have nevertheless been recognized by the Court. These
exceptions are enumerated in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of 442
Appeals:12
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review,
the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re- Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial National Construction Company
of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and
binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to Respecting the second procedural issue, as a rule, the failure of a petitioner to
this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, comply with any of the requirements under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, Court regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the the petition constitutes sufficient ground for its dismissal.13
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
70

In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, however, procedural lapses may be 15 G.R. No. 89870, May 28, 1991, 197 SCRA 587, 597-598.
disregarded so that a case may be resolved on its merits. As held in Durban
Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan:14 443

“It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007
that cases shall be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties
for ventilation of their causes and defense, rather than on technicality or some 443
procedural imperfections. In so doing, the ends of justice would be better
served. The dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
the rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for National Construction Company
they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby
defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to taken or detained upon the person’s giving security to try the matter in court
expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and and return the goods if defeated in the action”; “the writ by or the common-law
rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to action in which goods and chattels are replevied,” i.e., taken or gotten back by a
frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided. writ for replevin”; and to replevy, means to recover possession by an action of
replevin; to take possession of goods or chattels under a replevin order.
x x x x” (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines replevin as “a form of action which lies to
regain the possession of personal chattels which have been taken from the
The facts and circumstances attendant to the case dictate that, in the interest of plaintiff unlawfully x x x, (or as) the writ by virtue of which the sheriff proceeds
substantial justice, this Court resolves it on the merits. at once to take possession of the property therein described and transfer it to
the plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to prove
On to the substantive issues. Tillson v. Court of Appeals15 discusses the term his title, or return the chattels taken if he fail so to do; the same authority states
replevin as follows: that the term, “to replevy” means “to re-deliver goods which have been
distrained to the original possessor of them, on his giving pledges in an action of
“The term replevin is popularly understood as “the return to or recovery by a replevin.” The term therefore may refer either to the action itself, for the
person of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully recovery of personality, or the provisional remedy traditionally associated with
it, by which possession of the property may be obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and
_______________ retained during the pendency of the action.” (Emphasis and italics supplied;
citations omitted)
13 Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either
14 G.R. No. 167136, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 801, 809. the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be
71

recovered,16 and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession It was thus not distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law,
thereof, wrongfully detains the same.17 or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise
placed under custodia legis.
Petitioner’s ownership of the bus being admitted by respondents,18
consideration of whether respondents have been wrongfully detaining it is in In upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint, the Court of Appeals held
order. that while “there is no law authorizing the impounding of a vehicle involved in an
accident by the police authorities, x x x neither is there a law making the
Following the conduct of an investigation of the accident, the bus was towed by impounding of vehicles involved in accidents illegal.” It added that “the Supreme
respondents on the request of Lopera.19 Court is of the view that there is yet no clear-cut policy or rule on the matter.”20
The appellate court is mistaken.
_______________
The Constitution grants the right against unreasonable seizures. Thus, Section 2,
16 Distilleria Washington, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 622; 263 SCRA 303 Article III provides:
(1996).
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
17 Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Rufina and Company, G.R. No. 160191, June effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
8, 2006, 490 SCRA 368. any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
18 Records, p. 16. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
19 TSN, November 8, 1996, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 6-8. and the persons or things to be seized.” (Italics supplied)

444 The seizure and impounding of petitioner’s bus, on Lopera’s request, were
unquestionably violative of “the right to be let alone” by the authorities as
444 guaranteed by the Constitution.21

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Victory Liner, Inc. v. Bellosillo22 to justify the
impounding of vehicles involved in accidents by police authorities is misplaced.
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine The Victory Liner case was an administrative case against a trial court judge. This
National Construction Company Court explicitly declined to rule on the legality of such an order:

_______________
72

20 CA Rollo, p. 156. case which involves the seizure and distraint implemented by respondents upon
a verbal order by Lopera without the benefit or color of legality afforded by a
21 Vide Bagalihog v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 96356, June 27, 1991, 198 SCRA 614. court process, writ or order.

22 A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 79. That a year after the incident the driver of the bus was criminally charged for
reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property in which the bus could
445 possibly be held as evidence does not affect the outcome of this case.24 As
explained in Bagalihog v. Fernandez:25
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007
“It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied.
445 But the rule applies only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in
accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and seizures or its
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine accepted exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in
National Construction Company custodia legis. As the Court said in Tamisin v. Odejar,26 “A thing is in custodia
legis
“In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to determine
the issue of the legality of respondent’s order requiring VLI to post a cash bond _______________
for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should have raised that issue in the
proper courts and not directly to us, and much less by way of an administrative 23 Supra at pp. 87-88.
case. x x x
24 Folder of Exhibits, p. 43.
xxxx
25 Supra at p. 621.
To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon directly
from us through an administrative case would be to countenance a disregard of 26 108 Phil. 560 (1960).
the established rules of procedure and of the hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus
be able to evade compliance with the requirements inherent in the filing of a 446
property petition, including the payment of docket fees. Hence, we shall shun
from passing upon that issue in this case.”23 (Italics supplied) 446

This Court’s statement in Victory Liner on the lack of a “clear-cut policy” refers to SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the practice, rightly or wrongly, of trial court judges of issuing orders for the
impounding of vehicles involved in accidents. It has no application to the instant Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
73

National Construction Company SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.—Neither misjoinder nor non-
joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped
when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at
judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.” Only any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
when property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
custody of the law, and not otherwise.” (Emphasis and italics supplied; italics in
the original; citations omitted) 29 G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 468, 483-484.

Petitioner’s prayer for recovery of possession of the bus is, in light of the 447
foregoing discussion, thus in order.
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007
As for petitioner’s claim for damages, the Court finds that it cannot pass upon
the same without impleading Lopera and any other police officer responsible for 447
ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus. The police authorities, through
Lopera, having turned over the bus to respondents for safekeeping, a contract of Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
deposit27 was perfected between them and respondents. National Construction Company

Petitioner’s failure to implead indispensable parties is not, of course, fatal to its “However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
cause of action, misjoinder or non-joinder of parties not being a ground for its dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of
dismissal.28 Domingo v. Scheer29elucidates: the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as
are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
_______________ despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for
the petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the
27 Article 1962 of the Civil Code provides: non-party claimed to be indispensable.” (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations
omitted)
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing
belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning For petitioner to pursue its claim for damages then, it or the trial court motu
the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable parties—Lopera and any
the contract, there is not deposit but some other contract. other responsible police officers.

28 Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
74

The prayer of petitioner, Superlines Transportation Company, Inc., for recovery ——o0o—— Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine National
of possession of personal property is GRANTED. Construction Company, 519 SCRA 432, G.R. No. 169596 March 28, 2007

The records of the case are REMANDED to the court of origin, the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, which is DIRECTED to REINSTATE petitioner’s
complaint to its docket if petitioner is still interested to pursue its claim for
damages and to act in accordance with the foregoing pronouncement of the
Court.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Assailed decision reversed and set aside.

Notes.—It is error for a court to order a creditor to return the car earlier seized
by virtue of a writ of replevin or to pay its equivalent value when the debtor has
not yet been fully

448

448

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Barba vs. Court of Appeals

paid the purchase price. (Orosa vs. Court of Appeals, 329 SCRA 652 [2000])

A property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a


replevin suit. (Calub vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 55 [2000])
75

G.R. No. 187944. March 12, 2014.* Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must
CARMENCITA SUAREZ, petitioner, vs. MR. and MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR. and sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within
MARILOU P. EMBOY--DELANTAR, respondents. the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to
parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the
Civil Law; Possession; The registered owner of real property is entitled to its jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
possession.—“Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion
must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to reivindicatoria.
file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; Jurisdictional Facts That Appeals.
Must Be Alleged and Sufficiently Established in a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer.—In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
facts must be alleged and
Romeo J. Balili for petitioner.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION. Steve R. Siclot for respondents.

678 REYES, J.:


sufficiently established: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was
by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2 rendered
became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession _______________
of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) 1 Rollo, pp. 10-19.
within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 2 Penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, with Associate Justices
Francisco P. Acosta and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; id., at pp. 21-28.
Same; Accion Publiciana; Accion Reivindicatoria; When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does 679
not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.—This
76

on March 19, 2009 and Resolution3 issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489. The CA granted the Petition for Review4 8 A 957-square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-5922.
filed by Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and Marilou Emboy-Delantar
(Marilou) (respondents), seeking to reverse the decisions of the Regional Trial 9 Rollo, pp. 30-31.
Court (RTC), Branch 12,5 and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3,6
of Cebu City, rendered on February 26, 2008 in Civil Case No. CEB-33328,7 and 680
on September 25, 2006 in Civil Case No. R-49832, respectively. The RTC affirmed
the MTCC in upholding the claims of Carmencita Suarez (Carmencita) in her
complaint for unlawful detainer instituted against the respondents.

Antecedents A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the
subject lot. The respondents claim that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the
At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated as subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share in Lot
Lot No. 1907-A-2 (subject lot) of the subdivision plan Psd-165686, situated in No. 1907-A. They had thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades after
Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her own parents,
T-174880 issued in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot Carlos and Asuncion.11
used to be a part of Lot No. 1907-A,8 which was partitioned in the following
manner among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the
(Asuncion):9 Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a
landlocked portion sans a right of way. They refused to comply insisting that
_______________ Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.12
3 Id., at p. 40.
Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel, Atty.
4 Id., at pp. 65-95. Jufelenito R. Pareja (Atty. Pareja), a demand letter, dated February 23, 2004,
requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed that Carmencita
5 With Presiding Judge Estela Alma A. Singco. had already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the for-

6 With Presiding Judge Gil R. Acosta. _______________


10 Sometimes referred to in the records as “Veronida.”
7 Entitled “Carmencita Suarez v. Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Marilou Emboy-
Delantare and Veronica P. Garcia.” 11 Rollo, p. 22.
77

12 Id. 14 Rollo, p. 22.

681 15 Vicente’s spouse.


mer’s relatives. However, the respondents did not heed the demand. Instead,
they examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered possible 16 Rollo, p. 23.
anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the execution of a series of
deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907-A. On August 13, 2004, they filed 17 Id.
before the RTC of Cebu City a complaint13 for nullification of the partition and
for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs’ respective portions of Lot No. 18 Id.
1907-A.14
19 Id., at pp. 65-95.
On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the
respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer, the origin of the instant petition. 682
She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the
and Dionesia,15 the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the concept of owners for several decades. Carmencita, on the other hand, was a
respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their successor-in- buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the notice of lis
interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the pendens clearly annotated on the subject lot’s title. Even her complaint for
right to demand from the respondents to vacate the same.16 unlawful detainer was filed on December 8, 2004 subsequent to the
respondents’ institution on August 13, 2004 of a petition for nullification of the
The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its decision rendered on September 25, partition. Citing Sarmiento v. CA,20 the respondents emphasized that “even if
2006. The respondents were ordered to vacate the subject lot and remove at one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested
their expense all the improvements they had built thereon. They were likewise from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same
made solidarily liable to pay Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.17 for more than one year by resorting to a summary action of ejectment.”21 The
respondents also invoked the doctrine enunciated in Amagan v. Marayag22 that
In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the the pendency of another action anchored on the issue of ownership justifies the
MTCC ruling.18 suspension of an ejectment suit involving the same real property. The foregoing
is especially true in the case at bar where the issue of possession is so
The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a Petition for interwoven with that of ownership. Besides, the resolution of the question of
Review19 filed before the CA. ownership would necessarily result in the disposition of the issue of possession.

_______________ The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004, which
13 Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-30548. was attached to the complaint for unlawful detainer, bore tell-tale signs of being
78

spurious. First, Atty. Pareja’s demand letter sent to the respondents instead
referred to a deed of sale dated February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita, who now The respondents also averred that Carmencita’s complaint lacked a cause of
lives in Luzon and has been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s, was a action. The certification to file an action was issued by the officials of Barangay
signatory in the deed of sale. Thirdly, a certain Veronida Padilla, a fictitious Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencita’s brother, who had no real
person, also signed the deed of sale as among the vendors, but she, too, was rights or interests over the subject lot. Further, while Carmencita based her
impleaded as a co-defendant in the ejectment suit. Fourthly, the deed was only claim over the subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed on April 1, 2004,
registered the following year after its supposed execution. no demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after that date. The
absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally defective, as the date of
_______________ its service should be the reckoning point of the one-year period within which the
20 320 Phil. 146; 250 SCRA 108 (1995). suit can be filed.

21 Id., at p. 156; p. 117; Rollo, p. 76. In support of the respondents’ prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, they
argued that their loss would be irreparable. Moreover, the resolution of the
22 383 Phil. 486; 326 SCRA 581 (2000). respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which
Carmencita was likewise impleaded as a defendant, would be rendered useless
in the event that the latter’s complaint for

683 _______________
23 Rollo, p. 121.
The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the
subject lot to Carmencita, had never physically occupied the same. Hence, there 684
was no basis at all for Carmencita’s claim that the respondents’ possession of the unlawful detainer would be granted and the former’s ancestral house
subject lot was by mere tolerance of the alleged owners. demolished.

The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence,


which they found in an old wooden chest in their ancestral home. A duly
notarized document captioned as an “Agreement,”23 dated February 23, 1957, The Ruling of the CA
showed that Vicente and his spouse, Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights
to Lot No. 1907-A. The document stated that Vicente obtained a loan from the On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing the
Philippine National Bank using Lot No. 1907-A as a collateral. The loan was paid disquisitions of the courts a quo and dismissing Carmencita’s complaint for
by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must have been executed in order to be unlawful detainer. The CA explained:
fair to Vicente’s siblings. Prescinding from the above, the Heirs of Vicente no
longer had ownership rights over the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.
79

and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides: continue in possession.

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the
any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of
or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right unlawful detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the
to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal last demand.
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person,
may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or A close perusal of [Carmencita’s] complaint a quo reveals that the action was
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court neither one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involved an
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, issue of ownership which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. It did not
or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such characterize [the respondents’] alleged entry into the land: whether the same
possession, together with damages and costs. was legal or illegal. It did not state how [the respondents] entered the land and
constructed a house thereon. It was also silent on whether [the respondents’]
The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly possession became legal before [Carmencita] demanded from them to vacate
explained in Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals: the land. The complaint merely averred that their relatives previously owned the
lot [the respondents] were occupying and that after [Carmencita] purchased it[,]
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in she, as its new owner, demanded [for the respondents] to vacate the
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. [In] forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical pos- 686
land. Moreover, it is undisputed that [the respondents] and their ancestors have
685 been occupying the land for several decades already. There was no averment as
session of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or to how or when [Carmencita’s] predecessors tolerated [the respondents’]
stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after possession of the land. Consequently, there was no contract to speak of,
the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, whether express or implied, between [the respondents], on one hand, and
express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning [Carmencita] or her predecessors, on the other, as would qualify [the
and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In respondents’] possession of the land as a case of unlawful detainer. Neither was
unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by it alleged that [the respondents] took possession of the land through force,
the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible entry. In
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession any event, [Carmencita] cannot legally assert that [the respondents’] possession
of the land was by mere tolerance. This is because [Carmencita’s] predecessors-
80

in-interest did not yet own the property when [Claudia] took possession thereof. accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.24 (Citations omitted and
Take note that [Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest merely stepped into the underscoring supplied)
shoes of their parents who were also co-heirs of [Claudia]. Finally, to categorize a
cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s supposed acts
of tolerance must have been present from the start of the possession which he
later seek[s] to recover. This is clearly wanting in the case at bar. In Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration25 filed before the CA, she alleged
that the case of Sarmiento cited by the respondents is not applicable to the
Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or present controversy since it involves a boundary dispute, which is properly the
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and subject of an accion reivindicatoria and over which the MTCC has no jurisdiction.
when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be She claimed that Rivera v. Rivera26 finds more relevance in the case at bar. In
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If Rivera, the contending parties were each other’s relatives and the Court ruled
[Carmencita] is truly the owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully that in an unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by the complainant is
deprived of the real right of possession or ownership thereof, she should present not necessary.27 Instead, what is required is a better right of possession.
her claim before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and Further, the MTCC cannot be divested of jurisdiction just because the
not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful defendants assert ownership over the disputed property.
detainer or forcible entry.
_______________
Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated: 24 Id., at pp. 24-27.

For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from 25 Id., at pp. 29-38.
another who had been in possession thereof for more
26 453 Phil. 404; 405 SCRA 466 (2003).
687
than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment. Although 27 Id., at p. 410; p. 470.
admittedly[,] petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of
title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior 688
actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless
of actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied Carmencita’s
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a Motion for Reconsideration.
party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against
the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:
has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on
the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
81

I 689
two are not based on the same cause of action and are seeking different
Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had sufficiently reliefs.29
alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
II CA30 that the registered owner of a property is entitled to its possession. In
Arcal v. CA,31 the Court also explained that the occupation of a property not by
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for nullification of its registered owner but by others depends on the former’s tolerance, and the
partition of Lot No. 1907-A and for the issuance of new certificates of title can occupants are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing at
abate Carmencita’s ejectment suit. which, a suit for ejectment would be proper.32

Carmencita’s Allegations The Respondents’ Arguments

In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the subject In their Comment33 to the instant petition, the respondents stress that
lot from the Heirs of Vicente, who were then the registered owners thereof. At Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally inadequate.
the time of the sale, respondents Felix and Marilou were occupying the subject There was practically no specific averment as to when and how possession by
lot. Thus, Atty. Pareja, in Carmencita’s behalf, demanded that they vacate the tolerance of the respondents began. In the complaint, Carmencita made a
property. The respondents’ refusal to comply with the demand turned them into general claim that the respondents possessed “the property by mere tolerance
deforciants unlawfully withholding the possession of the subject lot from ‘with the understanding that they would voluntarily vacate the premises and
Carmencita, the new owner, whose recourse was to file a complaint for unlawful remove their house(s) thereon upon demand by the owners.’”34 In Spouses
detainer. Valdez, Jr. v. CA,35 the Court ruled that the failure of the complainants to allege
key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal and deprives the
Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a MTCC of jurisdiction over the action.
collateral attack28 and the issue of ownership cannot be resolved in an action
for unlawful detainer. A pending suit involving the question of ownership of a _______________
piece of real property will not abate an ejectment complaint as the 29 Citing Punio v. Judge Go, 357 Phil. 1, 6; 296 SCRA 1, 6 (1998), and Silverio v.
Court of Appeals, 454 Phil. 750, 758; 407 SCRA 240, 246 (2003).
_______________
28 Citing Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or The Property Registration 30 424 Phil. 544; 373 SCRA 513 (2002).
Decree.
82

31 348 Phil. 813; 285 SCRA 34 (1998). whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must
resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he
32 Id., at p. 825; p. 35; Rollo, p. 140. is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.”37

33 Rollo, pp. 55-64. In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions
available to recover possession of real property, viz.:
34 Id., at p. 59.
(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.
35 523 Phil. 39; 489 SCRA 369 (2006).
_______________
36 Rollo, pp. 144-151.

690 37 Corpuz v. Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 350, 361,
In their rejoinder,36 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of possession citing Carbonilla v. Abiera, G.R. No. 177637, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 461.
and ownership are inseparably linked in the case at bar. Carmencita’s complaint
for ejectment was based solely on her spurious title, which is already the subject 38 Supra note 35.
of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A.

691
Our Disquisition
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
The instant petition lacks merit. (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is
deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation,
Carmencita had not amply alleged strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds
and proven that all the requisites possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
for unlawful detainer are present under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each
in the case at bar. other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the
beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while
in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
“Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from
83

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the
proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.40
forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.
The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession. In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent.
Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it.41 Carmencita was
should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has likewise conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted the
lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about.42
better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual
the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since substantiation, that (a) the respondents’ initial occupation of the subject lot was
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents
become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s possession after
but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to Carmencita, as purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the
recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary former to vacate the property.43 It is worth noting that the absence of the first
civil proceeding.39 (Citations omitted) requisite assumes even more importance in

_______________ _______________
39 Id., at pp. 45-46; pp. 376-377. 40 Supra note 37, at p. 363; see also Delos Reyes v. Odones, G.R. No. 178096,
March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334-335.
692
41 Rollo, pp. 25-26.
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must
be alleged and sufficiently established: 42 Id.

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by 43 Please see Petition, id., at pp. 12-13; Reply, id., at pp. 138-139.
tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to


defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; 693
the light of the respondents’ claim that for decades, they have been occupying
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and the subject lot as owners thereof.
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
84

Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the 44 Jose v. Alfuerto, G.R. No. 169380, November 26, 2012, 686 SCRA 323, 341,
ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the citing Serdoncillo v. Spouses Benolirao, 358 Phil. 83, 95; 297 SCRA 448, 459
complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party (1998).
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without
resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, 694
the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the
where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession pending civil action. One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein
started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion the Court declared:
reivindicatoria.44
“x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished
from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises
is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable
As an exception to the general rule, and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession,
the respondents’ petition for nulli- with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the
fication of the partition of Lot No. issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to
1907-A can abate Carmencita’s suit restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects
for unlawful detainer. of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final
judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership.
In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that: It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the
right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be
same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. “The found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage
underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without
Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few resorting to the courts.”
occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay
disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the xxxx
former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and
there resolved.” Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the
demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of
_______________ reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment
proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent’s suit is one of
85

unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of not merely physical possession but ownership as well that is involved in this
petitioners would mean a demolition of their case.[”]

695 _______________
house, a matter that is likely to create the “confusion, disturbance, 45 Supra note 22, at pp. 495-499; p. 594.
inconveniences and expenses” mentioned in the said exceptional case.

Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to
go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the 696
petitioners from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937.
(Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.) “TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners
Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and filed an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private
effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1682 of the Regional Trial Court,
the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably irreparable. Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this action.
Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative of who is entitled
We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is based not on to the possession of the premises in question.[”]
an expired or a violated contract of lease, but allegedly on “mere tolerance.”
Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem “THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case
it judicious under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the will include the removal of the petitioners’ house [from] the lot in question.[”]
ejectment case.45 (Citations omitted)
“To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of
petitioners’ house prior to the determination of the question of ownership [of]
The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision dated the lot on which it stands.”46 (Citation omitted)
July 8, 1997, penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in CA-G.R. No.
43611-SP, from which the Amagan case sprang:
We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the instant
“ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful petition for reasons discussed hereunder.
detainer on the theory that petitioners’ possession of the property in question
was by mere tolerance. However, in answer to his demand letter dated April 13, Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition
1996 x x x, petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with him, that the respondents have been in possession of the subject lot by mere
verbal or written, asserting that they are ‘owners of the premises we are tolerance of the owners. The respondents, on the other hand, raise the defense
occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite.’ In other words, it is of ownership of the subject lot and point to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-
30548, a petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which
86

Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the respondents’ house, which has been
standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The Notes.—Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
foregoing circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the instant petition from possession; To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy
the purview of the general rule. and once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper. (Carbonilla vs. Abiera, 625 SCRA 461
All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing [2010])
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer. As
Unlawful detainer involves the person’s withholding from another of the
_______________ possession of the real property which the latter is entitled after the expiration or
46 Id., at pp. 498-499; pp. 592-593. termination of the former’s right to hold possession under the contract either
expressed or implied. (Id.)

——o0o—— Suarez vs. Emboy, Jr., 718 SCRA 677, G.R. No. 187944 March 12,
697 2014
discussed above, the jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance
of the owners had not been amply alleged and proven. Moreover, circumstances
exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment proceedings. Carmencita can
ventilate her ownership claims in an action more suited for the purpose. The
respondents, on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of having their
house demolished pending the resolution of their petition for nullification of the
partition of Lot No. 1907-A, where ownership over the subject lot is likewise
presented as an issue.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision


rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
87

G.R. No. 167554. February 26, 2008.* property. “When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ROMEO ASIS, OSCAR ASIS and EDUARDO ASIS, petitioners, vs. CONSUELO ASIS ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
VDA. DE GUEVARRA, respondent. of possession.”
Ejectments; Jurisdictions; Ownerships; The Chua Peng Hian v. Court of Appeals
(133 SCRA 572 [1984]) doctrine should be taken in light of Section 16, Rule 70 of Same; Same; Same; Same; Guidelines in Relation to Exercise of Jurisdiction Over
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is categorical—the issue of ownership Issues of Ownership in Ejectment Proceedings.—To ensure that the above policy
raised as a defense will would be maintained, Refugia also laid down the following guidelines to be
observed in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction over issues of ownership in
_______________ ejectment proceedings: 1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that
of possession, and that ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the
* FIRST DIVISION. issue of ownership may be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the
issue of possession. Thus, as earlier stated, the legal provision under
581 consideration applies only where the inferior court believes and the
not oust the MeTC of its jurisdiction over an ejectment case, as the court can preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of possession is
rule on the issue of ownership provisionally to determine who has right to dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership. 2. It must
possess the disputed property.—Petitioners cannot negate the jurisdiction of the sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the plaintiff
MeTC by invoking the Chua Peng Hian case. As correctly pointed out by the CA, really and primarily
the RTC erred when it was applied to the case at bar. What was filed therein was 582
an action for specific performance [with the then Court of First Instance], and it seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently, where the allegations of
was the defendant there who raised the issue that the Court of First Instance the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case for the
had no jurisdiction, implying that the case was really an issue of possession. recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of possession de
Thus, it was in this context that this Court held that the Court of First Instance facto, or where the averments plead the claim of material possession as a mere
had jurisdiction over the case, not only because the issues raised do not only elemental attribute of such claim for ownership, or where the issue of ownership
involve the possession of the land, but also the rights of the parties to the is the principal question to be resolved, the action is not one for forcible entry
building constructed thereon. This portion of the Chua Peng Hian decision but one for title to real property. 3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the
therefore was taken out of context by the RTC when it quoted the same to nature of ownership where the relationship of lessor and lessee has been
justify its ruling that the MeTC had no jurisdiction in the instant case. Moreover, sufficiently established in the ejectment case, unless it is sufficiently established
the Chua Peng Hian doctrine enunciated in the 1984 case should be taken in light that there has been a subsequent change in or termination of that relationship
of Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is categorical. between the parties. This is because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of
The issue of ownership raised as a defense will not oust the MeTC of its Court, the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of
jurisdiction over an ejectment case, as the court can rule on the issue of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. 4. The
ownership provisionally to determine who has right to possess the disputed rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is that a party
88

who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and PUNO, C.J.:
whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor
priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property In an action for unlawful detainer, the municipal or metropolitan trial court has
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right through an accion jurisdiction when the plaintiff really and primarily seeks the restoration of
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Corollarily, if prior possession may be possession; even if there is a need to resolve the ownership of the disputed
ascertained in some other way, then the inferior court cannot dwell upon or property to determine who has prior possession. As long as the issue of
intrude into the issue of ownership. 5. Where the question of who has prior ownership is to be ascertained ONLY for the purpose of determining the issue of
possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the disputed portion possession, then the court can make a declaration who among the contending
is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration parties is the real owner of the property. Any such pronouncement is to be
as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same vein, regarded merely as provisional, and will not bar nor prejudice an action between
where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the the same parties involving title to the disputed property.1
validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on
which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass The Case
upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such
pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, filed under Rule 45 of the Revised
regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
between the same parties involving title to the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule dated November 26, 2004 issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 76187, and the Resolution
70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an dated March 18, 2005 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to
the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the The facts of the case are simple, and substantially culled from the CA’s account.2
land or building.

583
_______________
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals. 1 See Sps. Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 982; 258 SCRA 347 (1996).

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. 2 CA Decision dated November 26, 2004, CA-G.R. SP No. 76187. See Rollo, pp.
40-43.
Cesar T. Verano for petitioners.
584
Celso O. Escobido for respondent.
89

Respondent Consuelo Asis Vda. de Guevarra, claiming to be the owner of the 6 Id.
apartment units located at 1495, 1497 and 1499 7th Street, Fabie Subdivision,
Paco, Manila, filed separate ejectment cases with the Metropolitan Trial Court of 7 Id.
Manila (MeTC) against her brothers Romeo, Oscar and Eduardo, all surnamed
Asis, the petitioners herein.3 In her complaint, respondent admits that the land 8 Id.
on which the apartment units were built are owned in common by her and her
siblings, including petitioners,4 but alleges that she alone owns the apartment 9 In compliance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
units, having paid for the construction of the same, and that the name of
petitioners had only been included in the title of the property at the instance 585
and benevolence of respondent.5 She then alleges that petitioners, as lessees of Philippine National Bank in 1964.10 They each claimed that they have never paid
the apartment units, had been paying her for several years monthly rentals of any rental for the occupation of the apartment units to respondent.11 Petitioner
P500.00, P1,000.00 and P2,000.00 respectively, for their occupation of the Eduardo added that any money he may have given to respondent was in the
apartment units.6 All of a sudden, and she states that for no justifiable reason, form of abuloy (alms), since respondent was their eldest sister, and a widow
petitioners stopped paying rent.7 Despite repeated demands, they failed and without children.12 In their petition with this Court, they admit to having
refused to pay.8 When the matter could not be settled by the Barangay Lupon,9 previously paid the exact amounts specified by respondent monthly, but averred
a “Certification to File Action” was issued. The cases against petitioners were that these were not rentals but contributions for the upkeep and maintenance
then consolidated, as they involved common issues and questions of fact and of the premises.13
law.
The records show that petitioners’ claim of co-ownership over the apartment
In their respective Answers, petitioners claim that they are co-owners not only of units is solely based on the principle of accession. They argue that since they can
the lot but also of the apartment units, by virtue of inheritance, because it was establish possession of the apartment units during the lifetime of their parents—
their parents—the original owners of the land—who had constructed the who were then owners of the parcel of land and the buildings/improvements
apartment units by way of loan and mortgage of the land with the situated thereon,14 then their inheritance as compulsory heirs must necessarily
include ownership not only of the land but also of the improvements.
_______________
The MeTC ruled for respondent, finding sufficient basis for the valid ejectment of
3 Id., at pp. 52-67. She filed three ejectment cases, docketed as Civil Case Nos. petitioners thus:
161644-CV, 161645-CV and 161646-CV.
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 52, 57 and 62.
10 Rollo, p. 68. The record also shows that petitioner Romeo Asis alleged in his
5 Id. answer that respondent was no longer a co-owner or heir of the lot or the
apartment as of February 14, 1988, when their parents during their lifetime sold
90

the lot in question for P5,000.00 to their five siblings (Oscar, Cesar, Linda, Alfred
and Ramon), and then on the same date, siblings Romeo, Helen and respondent [Petitioners] could not also convince this Court that what they were paying to
herself sold their 1/5 share to their brothers Ruben and Eduardo for P5,000.00, the [respondent] were not rents but contribution to the upkeep and
through a Deed of Sale. Id., at pp. 68-69. A review of the attached deed of sale maintenance of the premises as well as aid to the [respondent] who is their elder
revealed, however, that the sale involved the excess share of the siblings, so as sister. On the face of this gratuitous allegation[s], [respondent] has presented
to effect a 1/5 ownership of each of the siblings over the lot. Id., at p. 123. several receipts to establish that defendants were paying rental but stopped
doing so[,] prompting her to file the instant case for ejectment. [Petitioners]
11 Id., at pp. 67, 72, and 79. submitted no evidence to disprove their authenticity.15

12 Id., at p. 79. The MeTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent, as follows:

13 Id., at p. 13. Civil Case No. 161644-CV:

14 Id., at p. 21. 1. Ordering [petitioner] Romeo Asis and all person[s] claiming rights under him
to vacate Apartment No. 1497 located at 7th Street, Fabie Subdivision, Paco,
586 Manila;

“On the issue of whether or not [respondent] could validly eject the [petitioners] 2. Ordering [petitioner Romeo Asis] to pay [respondent] the sum of TEN
from the apartment [units], the Court find[s] basis to sustain the [respondent]. THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing his rental arrearages from July
1998 up to February, 2000 and the amount of P500.00 a month from March,
[Petitioners] claim that they, together with the [respondent] are co-owners not 2000 and every month
only of the lot but also of the apartment [units]. They posit this claim by their
mere argument that the accessory follows the principal. But this issue should not _______________
be resolved by a blinded adherence to such legal principle when evidence shows
otherwise. 15 Id., at p. 100.

[Respondent] never denied that the lot upon which the apartment [units were] 587
erected is owned in common by her and her siblings. She claims ownership only thereafter until he finally vacates the premises, as reasonable compensation for
on the apartment [units]. She support[s] this with the records of her real the use and occupancy of the premises.
property loan with the [Social Security Systems] and the Tax Declaration which
are solely in her name. [Petitioners] have nothing to refute the authenticity of Civil Case No. 161645-CV:
the said documents other than their naked claim and stubborn insistence of co-
ownership.
91

1. Ordering [petitioner] Oscar Asis and all person[s] claiming rights under him _______________
to vacate Apartment No. 1495 located at 7th Street, Fabie Subdivision, Paco,
Manila; 16 Id., at pp. 100-101.

2. Ordering [petitioner Oscar Asis] to pay [respondent] the sum of TWENTY 17 Branch 17, Manila.
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P22,000.00) representing his rental arrearages from
May, 1998 up to February 2000 and the amount of P1,000.00 a month from 588
March, 2000 and every month thereafter until he finally vacates the premises, as building constructed thereon. Relying heavily on the case of Chua Peng Hian v.
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises. CA,18 the RTC ruled:

Civil Case No. 161646-CV: “On hindsight, and yes, what escaped the attention of the [MeTC] was the
averments of the initiatory pleading, the [petitioners’] formal reaction thereto,
1. Ordering [petitioner] Eduardo Asis and all person[s] claiming rights under and papers subsequent to the preliminary conference of November 16, 1999,
him to vacate Apartment No. 1499 located at 7th Street, Fabie Subdivision, Paco, with respect to the controversy as to the matter of exclusive dominion over the
Manila; apartment units vis-à-vis the acknowledged co-ownership of the lot. Indeed,
there was no unanimity of thought as to ownership of the lot and building
2. Ordering [petitioner Eduardo Asis] to pay [respondent] the sum of THIRTY thereon which thus constrained this Court to equate the casus belli at hand to
EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P38,000.00) representing his rental arrearage from the scenario portrayed by Mr. Justice Aquino in [Chua Peng Hian vs. Court of
August, 1998 up to February, 2000 and the amount of P2,000.00 a month from Appeals] (133 SCRA 572, 575 [1984]; cited [in] 1 Regalado, Remedial Law
March, 2000 and every month thereafter until he finally vacates the premises, as Compendium, 8th Revised Edition, 2002, at page 801) which may well apply
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises. herein, thusly.

Ordering all [petitioners] to pay [respondent], jointly and severally the sum of We hold that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case. Where
P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and to pay the costs of suit. the issues raised before the inferior court do not only involve possession of the
lot but also the rights of the parties to the building constructed thereon, the
[Petitioners’] counterclaim[s] are hereby dismissed. Court of First Instance and not the municipal or city court has jurisdiction over
the case. (citations and emphasis omitted)
SO ORDERED.16
Even then, and mindful of the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 of the
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)17 reversed the Consolidated Decision 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellate court can hardly render a categorical
of the MeTC on the ground that the latter had no jurisdiction over the case since disposition based on the entire record in accordance with Section 7 thereof,
it involved not only possession of the lot but of the rights of the parties on the relative to the nagging query as to the rights of the parties over the building,
inasmuch as the proviso under Section 8 of the same Rule was conditional upon
92

‘. . . reception of evidence on which the judgment of the lower court was based. . original jurisdiction] of the Court of First Instance.” Evidently, the ruling in that
.’ peculiar to a ‘. . . a trial on the merits by the lower court. . .’, which case is not applicable to the case at bar.”21
circumstances are anathema to a civil suit envisioned by the 1991 Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure.” (citations omitted)19 Further, the CA sustained the jurisdiction of the MeTC to rule on the issue of
ownership for the purpose of determining who had the right of possession,
The RTC ruling was likewise reversed and set aside by the CA,20 and the decision based on the explicit grant in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus:
of the MeTC was reinstated. The CA
Furthermore, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
_______________
“Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.—When the defendant raises the
18 218 Phil. 544; 133 SCRA 572 (1984). defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
19 Rollo, pp. 106-107. resolved only to determine the issue of possession.”

20 In the petition for review filed by respondent, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. We should emphasize that the only issue involved in ejectment proceedings is
76187. See CA Decision dated November 26, 2004, id., at pp. 40-43. who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises, that is,
possession de facto and not possession de jure. Moreover, Batas Pambansa Blg.
589 129 provides that in ejectment proceedings where the question of possession
ruled that the Chua Peng Hian case relied upon by the RTC was not applicable to cannot be resolved
the case at bar, since the action there was for specific performance of the
stipulations in a lease contract which was filed with the RTC, whereas the _______________
present case is for eviction of tenants through an unlawful detainer action. The
CA thus explained: 21 Id., at p. 45.

“x x x However, it must be stressed that the Chua Peng Hian case involves the 590
recovery of possession of a leased lot where the lessee bound himself to transfer without deciding the issue of ownership, inferior courts have the power to
to the lessor the building which he erected thereon. It was an action for specific resolve the issue of ownership but only to determine the issue of possession.
performance. On the other hand, in the case at bar, [respondent] sought the This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Aznar Brothers Realty vs. Court of
eviction of her tenants from her apartment units in an action for unlawful Appeals, 327 SCRA 359, where the Supreme Court held that, “In an action for
detainer. The Supreme Court further explained in the case of Chua Peng Hian ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de facto. However, when the
that, “the action was for specific performance of the stipulations of a lease issue of possession cannot be decided without resolving the issue, the court may
contract. It was not capable of pecuniary estimation. It was within the [exclusive receive evidence upon the question of title to property but solely for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession.”
93

591
It is therefore clear from the foregoing that the [MeTC] has original and exclusive really an issue of possession. Thus, it was in this context that this Court held that
jurisdiction over the instant case. Even if [petitioners] raised the issue of the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case, not only because the
ownership, the [MeTC] can still determine the validity of their claim on which issues raised do not only involve the possession of the land, but also the rights of
they justify their right to possess. “The MeTC acts correctly if it receives evidence the parties to the building constructed thereon.
on ownership where the question of possession could not be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership” Paz vs. Reyes, 327 SCRA 605. It is now a well- This portion of the Chua Peng Hian decision therefore was taken out of context
settled rule that inferior courts are not divested of jurisdiction over ejectment by the RTC when it quoted the same to justify its ruling that the MeTC had no
cases just because the defendants assert ownership over the litigated property jurisdiction in the instant case. Moreover, the Chua Peng Hian doctrine
(Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 714).”22 enunciated in the 1984 case should be taken in light of Section 16, Rule 70 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is categorical. The issue of ownership raised
Petitioners now come before this Court arguing that a grave reversible error was as a defense will not oust the MeTC of its jurisdiction over an ejectment case, as
committed by the CA in overturning the decision of the RTC, on the grounds that the court can rule on the issue of ownership provisionally to determine who has
(a) Chua Peng Hian23 applies to the instant case because the complaint filed by right to possess the disputed property. “When the defendant raises the defense
respondent at the MeTC did not make out an action of ejectment; and (b) of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
petitioners could not be ejected because they are co-owners of the apartment without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
units. only to determine the issue of possession.”24

The petition must fail. Moreover, petitioners’ objections to the MeTC jurisdiction all rest on the
supposed “exception” to the jurisdiction over ejectment cases, anchored on the
Petitioners cannot negate the jurisdiction of the MeTC by invoking the Chua proposition that “when the issue of ownership is so necessarily involved with the
Peng Hian case. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the RTC erred when it was issue of physical possession that it cannot be determined without resolving the
applied to the case at bar. What was filed therein was an action for specific issue of ownership, the court loses its jurisdiction.”25
performance [with the then Court of First Instance], and it was the defendant
there who raised the issue that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction, Unfortunately for petitioners, the cases cited in support of this “exception” were
implying that the case was all decided prior to Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129. And this “exception” to the
MeTC jurisdiction was removed, and the rule modified by B.P. Blg. 129, which
_______________ provides that in ejectment proceedings where the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, all inferior courts have the
22 Id., at pp. 45-46. power to

23 Supra note 18. _______________


94

24 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 70, Sec. 16. in issue, or where the principal and main issue raised in the allegations of the
complaint as well as the relief prayed for make out not a case for ejectment but
25 Rollo, p. 107. one for recovery of ownership.”

592 _______________
resolve the issue of ownership but only to determine the issue of possession
(Sec. 33 [2], changing the rule in Sec. 3 [c], R.A. No. 5967, which was then 26 Florenz D. Regalado, I Remedial Law Compendium 782-783 (8th revised ed.
applicable to City Courts).26 Even more so after the promulgation of the 1997 2002).
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, with its clear grant of power under Section 16,
Rule 70. It is for this reason that petitioners are unable to cite jurisprudence to 27 Supra note 1, at p. 1002; pp. 362-363.
support their cause after the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 129.
593
Did the passage of these amendments mean that courts having jurisdiction over To ensure that the above policy would be maintained, Refugia also laid down the
ejectment cases can never be ousted of such jurisdiction? This was explained in following guidelines to be observed in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction over
Sps. Refugia v. CA,27 where this Court, speaking through J. Regalado, held: issues of ownership in ejectment proceedings:

“x x x [I]t is clear that prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the 1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and
jurisdiction of inferior courts was confined to receiving evidence of ownership in that ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership
order to determine only the nature and extent of possession, by reason of which may be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
such jurisdiction was lost the moment it became apparent that the issue of Thus, as earlier stated, the legal provision under consideration applies only
possession was intricately interwoven with that of ownership. The law, as where the inferior court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows that
revised, now provides instead that when the question of possession cannot be a resolution of the issue of possession is dependent upon the resolution of the
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be question of ownership.
resolved only to determine the issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on
Summary Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction of the 2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what
inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the issue of ownership. the plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession.
This does not mean, however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of Consequently, where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs
ownership in ejectment suits has been thus conferred on the inferior courts. prayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not merely
one for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the averments plead the
At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of this particular issue claim of material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim for
concerns and applies only to forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where ownership, or where the issue of ownership is the principal question to be
the issue of possession is intimately intertwined with the issue of ownership. It resolved, the action is not one for forcible entry but one for title to real property.
finds no proper application where it is otherwise, that is, where ownership is not
95

3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership where the
relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently established in the From the foregoing, it is clear that unless petitioners are able to show that the
ejectment case, unless it is sufficiently established that there has been a real purpose of the action for ejectment is to recover title to the property, or
subsequent change in or termination of that relationship between the parties. otherwise show that the issue of ownership is the principal question to be
This is because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the tenant is resolved, then the municipal or metropolitan trial court retains jurisdiction. This
not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement the petitioners failed to prove.
of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
Finally, a careful evaluation of the records of this case also convinces us that the
4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is that findings of the MeTC are in order, insofar as to the validity of the grant of
a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against eviction. Again, we stress that the decision of the MeTC finding respondent as
the owner himself. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the owner of the apartment units is merely to determine the right of possession.
and whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor It will not bar any of the parties from filing a suit with the proper court to
priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property determine conclusively the title to the disputed property.
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right through an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Corollarily, if prior possession may be IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Consolidated
ascertained in some other way, then the Decision dated March 7, 2000, ren-
594
inferior court cannot dwell upon or intrude into the issue of ownership. _______________

5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of 28 Id., at pp. 1004-1006; pp. 365-366. Asis vs. Asis Vda. de Guevarra, 546 SCRA
who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the 580, G.R. No. 167554 February 26, 2008
issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending
parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of
possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the
document of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is
premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is because,
and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting
ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional,
hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving
title to the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.”28
96

judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction;
and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under
Rule 45. “The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on
G.R. No. 194880. June 20, 2012.* questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, both is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
represented by the PRIVATIZATION MANAGEMENT OFFICE, petitioners, vs. law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on
SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent. questions of law.”

Civil Procedure; Appeals; In Republic v. Malabanan, 632 SCRA 338, the Court Same; Summary Procedure; Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari
clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Court petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a
(RTC), to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading.—Under the Rules on Summary
whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order
exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading. The
whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.
The RTC should have dismissed outright respondent Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition,
_______________ considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the
RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of the certiorari
* SECOND DIVISION. Petition. Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition, but even
proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the merits.
321
Unlawful Detainer; Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold
possession may—by virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one
321 year after the unlawful deprivation—bring an action in the municipal trial court
against the person unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation possession with damages and costs.—Under the Rules of Court, lessors against
whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the right to hold possession may—by virtue of any express or implied contract, and
Supreme Court under Rule 45.—In Republic v. Malabanan, 632 SCRA 338 (2010), within one year after the unlawful deprivation—bring an action in the municipal
the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: trial court against the person
(1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby
judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of 322
its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby
97

322 This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for unlawful
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED detainer filed by petitioners herein with the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power
Corporation (NPC) are registered co-owners of several parcels of land located
unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages along Pasong Tamo Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City, and covered by four
and costs. Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence Transfer
only after a demand to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to
vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is 323
served upon the person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply
therewith within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings. VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012

Same; Elements of a Cause of Action for Unlawful Detainer.—Hence, a complaint 323


sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the
following elements: 1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff. 2. Eventually, the
possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the defendant of the Certificates of Title (TCTs).1 The main subject matter of the instant Petition is
termination of the latter’s right of possession. 3. Thereafter, the defendant one of these four parcels of land covered by TCT No. 458365, with an area of
remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the latter’s approximately 22,294 square meters (hereinafter, the subject property). Eighty
enjoyment. 4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the percent (80%) of the subject property is owned by petitioner Republic, while the
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to petitioner NPC.2 Petitioners are
ejectment. being represented in this case by the Privatization Management Office (PMO),
which is the agency tasked with the administration and disposal of government
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of assets.3 Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
Makati City, Br. 134. (Sunvar) occupied the subject property by virtue of sublease agreements, which
had in the meantime expired.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26 December 1977,4
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioners. petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including the subject property, to the
Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years
SERENO, J.: beginning 01 January 1978 and ending on 31 December 2002.5 Under the
98

Contract of Lease (the main lease contract), petitioners granted TRCFI the right sublease agreements).7 Although these agreements commenced on different
to sublease any portion of the four parcels of land.6 dates, all of them contained common provisions on the terms of the sublease
and were altogether set to expire on 31 December 2002, the expiration date of
_______________ TRCFI’s main lease contract with petitioners, but subject to renewal at the
option of respondent:8
1 TCT Nos. 458364, 458365, 458366 and 458367.
“The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years and
2 Petitioner Republic owns approximately 17,574 square meters of the subject [variable] months commencing on [variable], renewable for another twenty-five
property, while petitioner NPC owns 5,350 square meters. (NPC Resolution No. (25) years at SUNVAR’s exclusive option.”9
2009-13 dated 09 March 2009; Rollo,
p. 73) According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar
agreed “to return or surrender the subleased land, without any delay
3 Executive Order No. 323 dated 06 December 2000, Art. III, Sec. 2. whatsoever upon the termination or expiration of the sublease contract or any
renewal or extension thereof.”10
4 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, pp. 3-4, para. 4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.
_______________
5 Contract of Lease between petitioners Republic and NPC with TRCFI; Rollo, pp.
492-502. 7 The entire subject property was subleased by TRCFI to respondent Sunvar in
five agreements: (a) Agreement dated 18 August 1980 (Rollo, pp. 503-519); (b)
6 “The LESSEE [TRCFI] shall have the right, upon notice to the LESSORS Sub-Lease Agreement dated 28 February 1982 (Rollo, pp. 523-536); (c) 1983 Sub-
[petitioners Republic and NPC], to sublease the whole or part of the leased Lease Agreement with illegible exact date (Rollo, pp. 537-545); (d) Sub Lease
land.” (Contract of Lease, Sec. VI, p. 6; Rollo, p. 497) Agreement dated 28 August 1983 (Rollo, pp. 546-554); and (e) the remaining
portions were also subleased by Sunvar, according to petitioners (Complaint
324 dated 26 May 2009, p. 6, para. 9; Rollo, p. 80)

324 8 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 6, para. 10; Rollo, p. 80.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 9 (a) Agreement dated 18 August 1980, p. 9; Rollo, p. 511 (22 years and 5
months from 31 July 1980); (b) Sub-Lease Agreement dated 28 February 1982, p.
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation 3; Rollo, p. 526 (20 years and 10 months from 28 February 1982); (c) 1983 Sub-
Lease Agreement with illegible exact date, p. 2; Rollo, p. 538 (19 years and 9
Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject months from March 1983); and (d) Sub Lease Agreement dated 28 August 1983,
property to respondent Sunvar through several sublease agreements (the p. 2; Rollo, p. 547 (19 years and 3 months from September 1984).
99

_______________
10 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 6, para. 11; Rollo, p. 80.
11 Among these commercial buildings are what are known today as Premier
325 Cinema, Mile Long Arcade, Makati Creekside Building, The Gallery Building and
Sunvar Plaza. (Complaint dated 26 May 2009, pp. 6-7, para. 12; Rollo, pp. 80-81)
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012
12 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, pp. 6-7, para. 12; Rollo,
325 pp. 80-81.

Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation 13 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 7, para. 13; Rollo, p. 81.

During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful 14 Respondent Sunvar’s Letter dated 26 April 2002 to PDAF; Rollo, pp. 714-715.
improvements, consisting of several commercial buildings, and leased out the
spaces therein.11 It also profitably utilized the other open spaces on the subject 15 Respondent Sunvar’s Letter dated 26 April 2002 to the Office of the
property as parking areas for customers and guests.12 President, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and petitioner NPC; Rollo, pp. 712-713.
In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was dissolved. In its
stead, the Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF) was created, 16 PDAF’s letter dated 10 May 2002; Rollo, p. 716.
assuming the functions previously performed by TRCFI.13
326
On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main lease
contract and the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as 326
successor of TRCFI. Respondent expressed its desire to exercise the option to
renew the sublease over the subject property and proposed an increased rental SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
rate and a renewal period of another 25 years.14 On even date, it also wrote to
the Office of the President, Department of Environment and Natural Resources Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
and petitioner NPC. The letters expressed the same desire to renew the lease
over the subject property under the new rental rate and renewal period.15 plained that the proposal of respondent for the renewal of the sublease could
not yet be acted upon, and neither could the proposed rental payments be
On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal of the accepted.17 Respondent acknowledged receipt of the letter and requested PDAF
lease had already been sent to petitioners, but that it had yet to receive a to apprise the former of any specific actions undertaken with respect to the said
response.16 It further ex- lease arrangement over the subject property.18
100

On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to expire,
petitioner NPC—through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and General 327
Counsel—notified PDAF of the former’s decision not to renew the contract of
lease.19 In turn, PDAF notified respondent of NPC’s decision.20 VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012

On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy Executive 327
Secretary Waldo Q. Flores likewise notified PDAF of the former’s decision not to
renew the lease con- Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation

_______________ tract.21 The Republic reasoned that the parties had earlier agreed to shorten the
corporate life of PDAF and to transfer the latter’s assets to the former for the
17 “We wish to inform you that as of this date, our office has not received any purpose of selling them to raise funds.22 On 25 June 2002, PDAF duly informed
response from the NG [petitioner Republic] nor the NPC. Consequently, since the respondent Sunvar of petitioner Republic’s decision not to renew the lease and
renewal of our Sublease Contract is dependent on our Foundation’s own quoted the Memorandum of Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Flores.23
renewal of our Contract of Lease with the NG and the NPC, we cannot yet act on
your letter or give favorable consideration on your desire to renew our Sublease On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as its sublease
Contract, notwithstanding the provisions thereof. agreements with respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence, petitioners recovered
from PDAF all the rights over the subject property and the three other parcels of
“In view hereof, we likewise cannot accept any proposed rental payments from land. Thereafter, petitioner Republic transferred the subject property to the
your office for the renewal term until such time that we already have an PMO for disposition. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the
indication of the terms and conditions of any renewal acceptable to the NG and property.
the NPC and, hence, our decision to return the check you sent to us.” (PDAF’s
letter dated 10 May 2002; Rollo, p. 716) On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired,
petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised
18 Respondent Sunvar’s Letter dated 27 May 2002; Rollo, respondent Sunvar to completely vacate the subject property within thirty (30)
p. 717. days.24 The latter duly received the Notice from the OSG

19 “We wish to inform you that in its last meeting on May 29, 2002, the NPC _______________
Board of Directors decided not to renew the contract of lease which is set to
expire on December 31, 2002 …” (NPC Letter dated 03 June 2010 [Rollo, p. 555]; 21 “You are hereby given by this Office notice that subject lease should no
see also Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 7, para. 14 [Rollo, p. 81]) longer be renewed/extended.

20 PDAF’s Letter dated 14 June 2002; Rollo, p. 718.


101

The Lease should end by January 2003, so that Notice of Non Renewal/ Non On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to
Extension should be given to Lessor not less than 6 months from said date given determine the fair rental value of the subject property and petitioners’ lost
PDAF is now in the process of dissolution.” (Memorandum dated 13 June 2002; income—a loss arising from the refusal of respondent Sunvar to vacate the
Rollo, p. 556) property after the expiration of the main lease contract and sublease
agreements.28 Using the market comparison approach, the PMO determined
22 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 7, para. 15; Rollo, p. 81. that the fair rental value of the subject property was P10,364,000 per month,
and that respondent Sunvar owed petitioners a total of P630,123,700 from 01
23 PDAF Letter dated 25 June 2002; Rollo, p. 557. January 2002 to 31 March 2009.29

24 “As you very well know, this property is owned by the National Government _______________
of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Power Corporation, both of
which has not extended or renewed, either expressly or impliedly, any lease receipt of this letter.” (OSG Letter dated 22 February 2008; Rollo,
[contract] involving the same in favor of any party, private or public. This being p. 558)
the case, your sublease agreement with the Philippine Development Alternative
Foundation (PDAF) which expired on December 31, 2002 could not possibly have 25 Registry Receipt No. 2826; Rollo, p. 559.
been renewed or extended. We hereby advise you to completely vacate said
property within THIRTY (30) DAYS from 26 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 9, para. 20; Rollo, p. 83.

328 27 “This is in reiteration of our first letter dated February 22, 2008 demanding
that you vacate the property covered by your sublease agreements with the
328 Philippine Development Alternative Foundation (PDAF) which expired on
December 31, 2002, or more specifically, the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED (458365) S-77242 located between De la Rosa and Arnaiz streets and parallel to
Amorsolo street in Legaspi Village, Makati City.”
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
“Once again, we demand that you completely vacate said property within
through registered mail,25 but failed to vacate and remained on the property.26 FIFTEEN (15) days from receipt of this letter, or we will be constrained to file the
necessary legal action against you before the proper court.” (OSG Final Notice to
On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final Vacate dated 26 January 2009; Rollo, p. 560)
notice to vacate within 15 days.27 When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar
again refused to vacate the property and continued to occupy it. 28 Inspection and Appraisal Report dated 02 April 2009; Rollo, pp. 563-566.
102

29 “As per instruction, please see attached copy of Inspection and Appraisal improvements, are completely vacated and peacefully surrendered to the
Report dated April 2, 2009 indicating a Fair Rental Value of Php 10,364,000 per plaintiffs or to their authorized representative.”30
month and an Income Loss of
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the
329 allegations of petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action for
unlawful detainer, since no privity of contract existed between them.31 In the
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 alternative, it also argued that petitioners’ cause of action was more prop-

329 _______________

Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation Php 630,123,700, respectively.” (PMO letter dated 02 April 2009; Rollo, p. 562)

On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for unlawful 30 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 11; Rollo, p. 85.
detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City. Petitioners
prayed that respondent Sunvar be ordered to vacate the subject property and to 31 Motion to Dismiss (for Lack of Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter) dated 07
pay damages for the illegal use and lost income owing to them: August 2009; Rollo, pp. 90-102.

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that after 330


proper proceedings, judgment be rendered:
330
1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and all
persons, natural and juridical, claiming rights under it, to vacate the subject SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
property and peacefully surrender the same, with the useful improvements
therein, to the plaintiffs or to their authorized representative; and Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation

2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to pay erly an accion publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and not
plaintiffs damages in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION ONE the MeTC, considering that the petitioners’ supposed dispossession of the
HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS subject property by respondent had already lasted for more than one year.
(P630,123,700.00) for the illegal and unauthorized use and occupation of the
subject property from January 1, 2003 to March 31, 2009, and the amount of In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss
TEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P10,364,000.00) and directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners’ Complaint.32
per month from April 1, 2008 until the subject property, together with its The lower court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration33 filed by
respondent.34 Respondent later on filed its Answer35 to the Complaint.36
103

38 Petitioners’ Comment (In Compliance with the Honorable Court’s Order


Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment, Issued in Open Court on February 12, 2010) dated 18 February 2010; Rollo, pp.
respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati 255-272.
City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.37
331
In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in issue the
jurisdiction of the RTC and reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012
expressly prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against the interlocutory
orders of the MeTC.38 Hence, they prayed for the outright dismissal of the 331
certiorari Petition of respondent Sunvar.
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
_______________
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary
32 MeTC Order dated 16 September 2009, docketed as Civil Case No. 98708; circumstances called for an exception to the general rule on summary
Rollo, pp. 116-117. proceedings.39 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 which was
subsequently denied by the RTC.41 Hence, the hearing on the certiorari Petition
33 Respondent Sunvar’s Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration (of the Order of respondent proceeded, and the parties filed their respective Memoranda.42
dated 16 September 2009); and (2) to Hold in Abeyance the Period to File an
Answer dated 02 October 2009; Rollo, pp. 118-141. In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the merits of
the certiorari Petition, the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the
34 MeTC Order dated 08 December 2009; Rollo, pp. 162-163. MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction.43
The RTC reasoned that the one-year period for the filing of an unlawful detainer
35 Respondent Sunvar’s Verified Answer ad Cautelam dated 18 December 2009; case was reckoned from the expiration of the main lease contract and the
Rollo, pp. 678-711. sublease agreements on 31 December 2002. Petitioners should have then filed
an accion publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful detainer suit.
36 Thereafter, MeTC Judge Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag voluntarily inhibited
himself, and petitioners’ unlawful detainer suit was re-raffled to Judge Roberto Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.44
P. Buenaventura.
_______________
37 Petition for Certiorari dated 22 January 2010; Rollo, pp. 164-208.
39 “Thus, in view of the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in the present
petition, the Court resolves to relax the application of the rules and to proceed
with the hearing on the petitioners’ application for TRO/Injunction on March 12,
104

2010 at 2:00 in the afternoon.” (RTC Order dated 08 March 2010; Rollo, pp. 273- Rule 65 Petition instead, since the RTC Decision was an order of dismissal of the
275) Complaint, from which no appeal can be taken except by a certiorari petition.

40 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated 16 March 2010; Rollo, pp. 276- The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and holds that
295. the resort by petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly within the
bounds of our procedural rules.
41 RTC Order dated 29 April 2010; Rollo, pp. 296-297.
As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order of the
42 Respondent Sunvar’s Memorandum dated 10 June 2010 (Rollo, pp. 805-843); RTC dismissing an action without prejudice,45 but the aggrieved party may file a
Petitioners’ Memorandum dated 11 June 2010 (Rollo, pp. 844-868). certiorari petition under Rule 65.46 Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any
of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions
43 RTC Decision dated 01 December 2010; Rollo, pp. 62-72. of law are raised or involved.47 This latter situation was one that petitioners
found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions
44 Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14 February 2011; Rollo, pp. 25-61. of law.

332 _______________

332 45 Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 1 (g).

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 46 “In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65.” (Rules of Court, Rule 41,
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation Sec. 1)

I 47 “Appeal by Certiorari—In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
Petitioners’ Resort to a Rule 45 Petition certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.” (Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 2 [c]).

Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are 333
procedural issues that merit preliminary attention.
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012
Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners’ resort to a Rule 45 Petition for
Review on Certiorari before this Court is an improper mode of review of the 333
assailed RTC Decision. Allegedly, petitioners should have availed themselves of a
105

Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation 826; 258 SCRA 186, 199 (1996), citing Arroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo
Rosario de Molo, 132 Phil. 9; 23 SCRA 525 (1968).
In Republic v. Malabanan,48 the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error 51 Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. v. Booc, G.R. No. 143331, 05 October 2007, 535
under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by SCRA 28.
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review
under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its 334
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. “The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of 334
Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second
mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme
Court only on questions of law.”49 (Emphasis supplied.) Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the cedure; or, more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the cognizance and granted the certiorari petition against the denial by the MeTC of
facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a question of
jurisprudence on the matter.50 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on law that involves the proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary Procedure.
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.51 Therefore, the instant Rule 45 Petition has been properly lodged with this Court.

In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the II
jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed against the
interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary
present case is the correct application of the Rules on Summary Pro-
Proceedings
_______________
Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds that it
48 G.R. No. 169067, 06 October 2010, 632 SCRA 338. was erroneous for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of
respondent Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibit
49 Id., at pp. 344-345. this relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Consequently, the
assailed RTC Decision is annulled.
50 Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas v. Limbaco, G.R. No. 175291, 27 July 2011, 654
SCRA 643, citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA, 327 Phil. 810, 825-
106

Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 circumstances that justified the filing of the mentioned prohibited pleadings
against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure—conditions that are not
prohibited pleading.52 The prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition availing in the case of respondent Sunvar.
is unnecessary verbiage.53 The RTC should have dismissed outright respondent
Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment case against Alberto
dismissal of the certiorari Petition.54 Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss the Magdato, an agricultural tenant-lessee who had built a house over his property.
certiorari Petition,55 but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the When Magdato, an illiterate farmer, received the Summons from the MCTC to
merits. file his answer within 10 days, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis and
was able to consult a lawyer in San Jose, Antique only after the reglementary
_______________ period. Hence, when the Answer of Magdato was filed three days after the lapse
of the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that it could no longer take cognizance of
52 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Sec. 19 (g). his Answer and, hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayog’s land. When his
house was demolished in January 1994, Magdato filed a Petition for Relief with
53 Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr., G.R. No. 142676 & 146718, 06 June 2011, 650 SCRA 344. the RTC-San Jose, Antique, claiming that he was a duly instituted tenant in the
agricultural property, and that he was deprived of due process. Bayog, the
54 Petitioners’ Comment (In Compliance with the Honorable Court’s Order landowner, moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on
Issued in Open Court on February 12, 2010) dated 18 February 2010; Rollo, pp. the part of the RTC, since a petition for relief from judgment covering a summary
255-272. proceeding was a prohibited pleading. The RTC, however, denied his Motion to
Dismiss and remanded the case to the MCTC for proper disposal.
55 RTC Order dated 08 March 2010; Rollo, pp. 273-275.
In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief from
335 judgment was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, the Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice,
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012
_______________
335
56 327 Phil. 1019; 258 SCRA 378 (1996).
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
57 358 Phil. 214; 297 SCRA 574 (1998).
Respondent Sunvar’s reliance on Bayog v. Natino56 and Go v. Court of
Appeals57 to justify a certiorari review by the RTC owing to “extraordinary 336
circumstances” is misplaced. In both cases, there were peculiar and specific
107

336 the circumstances alleged therein and the justification pleaded worked in favor
of MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 was without
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED merit. xxx”58 (Emphasis supplied.)

Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation _______________

since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury: 58 327 Phil. 1019, 1040-1041; 258 SCRA 378, 397 (1996).

“We disagree with the RTC’s holding that a petition for relief from judgment 337
(Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule on VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012
Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment, or a petition for
certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by 337
the court, it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for
relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus, Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
or prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable
by Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with a
Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on procedural void in the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the
Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, resort to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that case, the preliminary conference in
the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief from judgment nor a the subject ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the Municipal Trial Court in
special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City until after the case for specific performance involving
covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior the same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC. The affected party
court. This is but consistent with the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to appealed the suspension order to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory order in a
summary procedure. summary proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the
Motion to Dismiss and subsequently directed the MTCC to proceed with the
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this case, hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was upheld by the appellate court.
unless some form of relief is made available to MAGDATO, the grave injustice
and irreparable injury that visited him through no fault or negligence on his part In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed the
will only be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment which he filing of a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order in an ejectment
filed may be allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either as an exception to the rule, suit, considering that the affected party was deprived of any recourse to the
or a regular appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the order (decision) of MTCC’s erroneous suspension of a summary proceeding. Retired Chief Justice
the MCTC of 20 September 1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held that Artemio V. Panganiban eloquently explained the procedural void in this wise:
108

“Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for “it does not As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, “the purpose of the Rules on
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the trial court on Summary Procedure is ‘to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination
the merits of the case.” It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be of cases without regard to technical rules.’ (Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129)”
challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that “the proper remedy in such Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for certiorari, like a
cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to
incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. expedite the disposition of cases. In this case, however, private respondent
Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result in the ‘sorry spectacle’ challenged the MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the
of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from the mischief envisioned by the Rules.
appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any
of its interlocutory rulings. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary proceeding is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.” may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary circumstances in this case, a
338 petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on Summary
Procedure. A contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and
338 negate the rationale of the said Rules.”59 (Emphasis supplied.)

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in
these two cases are not comparable with respondents’ situation, and our rulings
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation therein are inapplicable to its cause of action in the present suit. As this Court
explained in Bayog, the general rule is that no special civil action for certiorari
Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But may be filed with a superior court from
neither can it file a petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19(g) of which considers petitions _______________
for certiorari prohibited pleadings:
59 358 Phil. 214, 223-225; 297 SCRA 574, 581-583 (1998).
xxx xxx xxx
339
Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught “between Scylla
and Charybdis” in the procedural void observed by the Court of Appeals and the VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012
RTC. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Court is constrained to
provide it with a remedy consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of 339
cases.
109

Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation


340
cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent Sunvar
filed a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit pending before the MeTC. Worse, SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the subject matter of the Petition was the denial of respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss, which was necessarily an interlocutory order, which is generally not the Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
subject of an appeal. No circumstances similar to the situation of the agricultural
tenant-lessee in Bayog are present to support the relaxation of the general rule lower court and completely dispensing with the goal of summary proceedings in
in the instant case. Respondent cannot claim to have been deprived of forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits.
reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary judicial proceeding.
III
Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of Appeals
that would justify respondent’s resort to a certiorari Petition before the RTC. Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful
When confronted with the MeTC’s adverse denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the
ejectment case, the expeditious and proper remedy for respondent should have Detainer Cases
been to proceed with the summary hearings and to file its answer. Indeed, its
resort to a certiorari Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory order in a We now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition—whether
summary ejectment proceeding was not only prohibited. The certiorari Petition the Complaint filed by petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer
was already a superfluity on account of respondent’s having already taken within the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion publiciana lodged with the RTC.
advantage of a speedy and available remedy by filing an Answer with the MeTC. At the heart of the controversy is the reckoning period of the one-year
requirement for unlawful detainer suits.
Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary
circumstances that would constrain this Court to apply the exceptions obtaining Whether or not petitioners’ action for unlawful detainer was brought within one
in Bayog and Go. The Court hesitates to liberally dispense the benefits of these year after the unlawful withholding of possession will determine whether it was
two judicial precedents to litigants in summary proceedings, lest these properly filed with the MeTC. If, as petitioners argue, the one-year period should
exceptions be regularly abused and freely availed of to defeat the very goal of an be counted from respondent Sunvar’s receipt on 03 February 2009 of the Final
expeditious and inexpensive determination of an unlawful detainer suit. If the Notice to Vacate, then their Complaint was timely filed within the one-year
Court were to relax the interpretation of the prohibition against the filing of period and appropriately taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the
certiorari petitions under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the RTCs reckoning period is pegged from the expiration of the main lease contract and/or
may be inundated with similar prayers from adversely affected parties sublease agreement, then petitioners’ proper remedy should have been an
questioning every order of the accion publiciana to be filed with the RTC.

340
110

The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for court. The action must be brought up within one year from the date of last
unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC. demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to physical possession.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may—by Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful states the following elements:
deprivation—bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person
unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution 1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.
341
2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession.

341 3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and


deprived the plaintiff of the latter’s enjoyment.
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
_______________
of possession with damages and costs.60 Unless otherwise stipulated, the action
of the lessor shall commence only after a demand to pay or to comply with the 60 Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 1.
conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written
notice of that demand is served upon the person found on the premises, and the 61 Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 2.
lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days in
the case of buildings.61 62 G.R. No. 178096, 23 March 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334, citing Valdez, Jr. v. CA,
523 Phil. 39, 46; 489 SCRA 369, 376 (2006).
In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odones,62 the Court recently defined the nature and
scope of an unlawful detainer suit, as follows: 342

“Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one 342
who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right
to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession by the SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial
111

4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to 64 Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, 25 September 2009, 601 SCRA 147, 157.
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for ejectment.63
343
“On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right
of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding
to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In 343
other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or
illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.”64 erty. What is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer
suit.
There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites
for an action for unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that
to possess the subject property from its sublease agreements with TRCFI and the one-year period should be counted from the final demand made on 03
later on with PDAF. However, with the expiration of the lease agreements on 31 February 2009.
December 2002, respondent lost possessory rights over the subject property.
Nevertheless, it continued occupying the property for almost seven years Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,65 the one-year period to file an unlawful
thereafter. It was only on 03 February 2009 that petitioners made a final detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease contract on 31
demand upon respondent Sunvar to turn over the prop- December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the
reckoning period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful
_______________ detainer. “Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s
last demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the
63 Macaslang v. Spouses Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, 30 May 2011, 649 SCRA 92, lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.”66
104, citing Cabrera v. Getaruela, 586 SCRA 129, 136-137 (2009); see also Corpuz
v. Spouses Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, 18 January 2012 and Delos Reyes v. In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the
Spouses Odones, G.R. No. 178096, 23 March 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334-335, date of the last demand.67 In Leonin v. Court of Appeals,68 the Court, speaking
Iglesia Evangelica Metodista en Las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF), Inc. v. Juane, G.R. through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file
Nos. 172447 & 179404, 18 September 2009, 600 SCRA 555, 562-563; Parsicha, v. the
Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 136409, 14 March 2008, 548 SCRA 273, 288;
Fernando v. Spouses Lim, G.R. No. 176282, 22 August 2008, 563 SCRA 147, 159- _______________
160.
112

65 “Hence, in the present petition, upon the expiration of the term of the “Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-square
sublease on December 31, 2002, the private respondents (petitioners Republic meter property located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City whereon was
and NPC) have one year to file an unlawful detainer case. The complaint having constructed a two-storey house and a three-door apartment identified as No. 1-
been filed beyond the prescribed one year period it cannot properly qualify as an A, B, and C.
action for unlawful detainer over which the lower court can exercise jurisdiction
as it is an accion publiciana.” (RTC Decision dated 01 December 2010, p. 10; Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to occupy
Rollo, p. 71) Apartment C without paying any rentals.

66 Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, 07 April 2009, 584 xxx xxx xxx
SCRA 81, 90, citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146, 154; 250 SCRA
108, 116 (1995); Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA Petitioners further contend that respondent’s remedy is accion publiciana
535, 542; Varona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124148, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA because their possession is not de facto, they having been authorized by the true
577, 583-584. and lawful owners of the property; and that one year had elapsed from
respondent’s demand given on “July 3, 1995” when the unlawful detainer
67 Labastida v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 162; 287 SCRA 662 (1998), citing Sy complaint was filed.
Oh v. Garcia, 28 SCRA 735 (1969) and Calubayan v. Pascual, 128 Phil. 160; 21
SCRA 146 (1967). The petition fails.

68 G.R. No. 141418, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 423. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the allegations in the complaint make out a
case for unlawful detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia, that she is the
344 registered owner of the property and that petitioners, who are tenants by
tolerance, refused to vacate the premises despite the notice to vacate sent to
344 them.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Likewise, contrary to petitioners’ contention, the one-year period for filing a
complaint for unlawful detainer is reckoned from the date of the last demand, in
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation this case October 24, 1996, the reason being that the lessor has the right to
waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain
unlawful detainer Complaint—filed on 25 February 1997—from the latest meanwhile in the premises. Thus, the filing of the complaint on February 25,
demand letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier demand letter 1997 was well within the one year reglementary period.”69 (Emphasis supplied.)
dated 03 July 1995:
113

From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired (01 right of action against respondent Sunvar and continued to tolerate its
January 2003), respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the occupation of the subject property. That they sent a final Notice to Vacate
subject property. almost a year later gave respondent another opportunity to comply with their
implied promise as occupants by mere tolerance. Consequently, the one-year
_______________ period for filing a summary action for unlawful detainer with the MeTC must be
reckoned from the latest demand to vacate.
69 Id., at pp. 424-428.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the
345 nature of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-
year period within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 period will

345 _______________

Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation 70 Spouses Beltran v. Nieves, G.R. No. 175561, 20 October 2010, 634 SCRA 242,
249, citing Calubayan v. Pascual, 128 Phil. 160, 163; 21 SCRA 146, 148 (1967).
Absent any express contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any
separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best, was allowed to 346
do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners—petitioners herein. Thus,
respondent Sunvar’s possession became unlawful upon service of the final 346
notice on 03 February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of
petitioners, and without any contract between them, respondent is “necessarily SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
bound by an implied promise” that it “will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.”70 Upon Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
service of the final notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should have vacated
the property and, consequently, petitioners had one year or until 02 February still be reckoned from the date of the original demand.71 If the subsequent
2010 in which to resort to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand, the
instant case, their Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was one-year period to commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the first
well within the one-year period. demand.72 However, respondent failed to raise in any of the proceedings below
this question of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on 22 is now too late in the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to
February 2008, which could have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing an Vacate was a mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to Vacate. In any
unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can be deemed to have waived their
114

event, this factual determination is beyond the scope of the present Rule 45 which are represented here by the Privatization Management Office. The
Petition, which is limited to resolving questions of law. assailed Decision dated 01 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 134, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial
The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is DIRECTED to proceed with the summary
property since the expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual proceedings for the unlawful detainer case in Civil Case No. 98708.
issue of whether respondent has paid rentals to petitioners from the expiration
of the sublease to the present was never raised or sufficiently argued before this SO ORDERED.
Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Court’s attention that almost a
decade has passed without any resolution of this controversy regarding Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
respondent’s possession of the subject property, contrary to the aim of
expeditious proceedings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
the grant of the instant Petition and the remand of the case to the MeTC for
continued hearing, the Court emphasizes the duty of the lower court to speedily Notes.—The Rule on Summary Procedure, by way of exception, permits only a
resolve this matter once and for all, especially since this case involves a prime motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
property of the government located in the country’s business district and the but it does not mention the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
various opportunities for petitioners to gain public revenues from the property. (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 622 SCRA 131 [2010])

_______________ An action is for unlawful detainer if the complaint sufficiently alleges the
following: (1) initially, the defendant has possession of property by contract with
71 Racaza v. Gozum, 523 Phil. 694; 490 SCRA 302, 315 (2006), citing Desbarats v. or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, however, such possession became
Laureano, 124 Phil. 704; 18 SCRA 116 (1966). illegal upon plaintiff’s notice to defendant, terminating the latter’s right of
possession; (3) still, the defendant remains in possession, depriving the plaintiff
72 Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Torres, 374 Phil. 529; 316 SCRA 193 (1999), citing of the enjoyment of his property; and (4) within a year from plaintiff’s last
Pacis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102676, 03 February 1992, min. res., cited in demand that defendant vacate the property, the plaintiff files a complaint for
Summary of 1992 Supreme Court Rulings, Part III, by Atty. Daniel T. Martinez, p. defendant’s ejectment. (Dionisio vs. Linsangan, 644 SCRA 424 [2011])
1847; Desbarats v. de Laureano, supra.
——o0o——
347
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Republic vs.
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 674 SCRA 320, G.R. No. 194880 June
20, 2012
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14
February 2011, filed by petitioners Republic and National Power Corporation,
115

G.R. No. 141614. August 14, 2002.* year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the
lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file
TERESITA BONGATO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SEVERO A. MALVAR and TRINIDAD either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of
MALVAR, respondents.
Remedial Law; Ejectment; In forcible entry, one employs force, intimidation, _______________
threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of land or
building; Plaintiff must prove and allege prior physical possession of the property * THIRD DIVISION.
in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant; Ejectment cases proceed
independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove
prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.—Before tackling the 328
issue directly, it is worthwhile to restate three basic legal principles. In forcible
entry, one employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive
another of physical possession of land or building. Thus, the plaintiff must allege 328
and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived
thereof by the defendant. This requirement implies that the possession of the SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
disputed land by the latter was unlawful from the beginning. The sole question
for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession (possession de facto) Bongato vs. Malvar
of the property. Neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor
an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly prevent the court possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership
from taking cognizance of the case. Ejectment cases proceed independently of as well as possession.
any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession
de facto and undue deprivation thereof. Same; Evidence; Generally courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings even if these have been tried or are pending in
Same; Same; The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible the same court or before the same judge, exceptions.—As a general rule, courts
entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land; After the do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even
lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
either an accion publiciana which is a plenary action to recover the right of judge. There are exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily, an appellate court cannot
possession or an accion reivindicatoria which is an action to recover ownership refer to the record in another case to ascertain a fact not shown in the record of
as well as possession.—It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting the case before it, yet, it has been held that it may consult decisions in other
process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the proceedings, in order to look for the law that is determinative of or applicable to
summary nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to the case under review. In some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice
bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in
entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-
116

controversy. These cases “may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly


interdependent, as to invoke” a rule of judicial notice. Bongato vs. Malvar

Same; Same; Factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the Same; Same; A court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be
Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court, exceptions.—Factual waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express
findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are consent.—A court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived
binding on the Supreme Court. Indeed, the review of such findings is not a by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A
function that this Court normally undertakes. However, this Rule is not absolute; party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the
it admits of exceptions, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on proceedings and even on appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of a
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court’s inference from its motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has
factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is been belatedly filed.
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of
the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts Appeals.
which—if properly considered—will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there
is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised
on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record. Jesus Chavez for petitioner.

Same; Rule on Summary Procedure; A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of Angeles & Associates and Felino M. Ganal for private respondents.
jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited
pleadings.—Pursuant to Section 36 of B.P. 129, the Court on June 16, 1983, PANGANIBAN, J.:
promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases. Under this Rule, a
motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991 Revised An action for forcible entry is a quieting process that is summary in nature. It is
Rule on Summary Procedure, however, a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack designed to recover physical possession in speedy proceedings that are
of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited restrictive in nature, scope and time limits. The one-year bar within which to
pleadings. bring the suit is prescribed to complement its summary nature. Thus, after the
one-year period has lapsed, plaintiffs can no longer avail themselves of the
329 summary proceedings in the municipal trial court but must litigate, in the normal
course, in the regional trial court in an ordinary action to recover possession, or
VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002 to recover both ownership and possession.

329 Statement of the Case


117

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of upon order of the Honorable Rosarito F. Dabalos (Record, p. 42, Folio II) can now
Court, assailing the December 16, 1998 Decision1 and the September 1, 1999 be served on the defendant.”4
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 34204. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads: The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals as
_______________ follows:

1 Rollo, pp. 14-18. Penned by Justice (later Presiding Justice) Jesus M. Elbinias “The spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry
(Division chairman) and concurred in by Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Marina against petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that petitioner Bongato unlawfully
L. Buzon (members). entered a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-16200 belonging to the said
spouses and erected thereon a house of light materials. The petitioner filed a
2 Rollo, p. 19-A. motion for extension of time to file an answer which the MTCC denied; it being
proscribed under the Rule on Summary Procedure, and likewise containing no
330 notice of hearing. With a new counsel, Atty. Viador C. Viajar, petitioner filed an
answer which the MTCC disregarded, the same having been filed beyond the
330 ten-day reglementary period. Later, with still another counsel, Atty. Jesus G.
Chavez of the Public Attorney’s Office, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss which
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the MTCC denied as being contrary to the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Bongato vs. Malvar “Thereafter, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to vacate the
land in question, and to pay rentals, attorney’s fees, and the costs of the suit.
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against The decision was affirmed by respondent RTC judge. Petitioner filed a motion for
petitioner.”3 reconsideration.

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. “On March 4, 1994, respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion for
reconsideration ‘only insofar as to determine the location of the
The CA sustained the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City
(Branch 4), which had disposed thus: _______________

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby affirms the decision 3 CA Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 17.
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2 penned by the Honorable Santos
Rod. Cedro and the Writ of Execution issued on the 24th day of August 1993 4 RTC Decision, p. 7; CA Rollo, p. 15; penned by Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr.
118

331 passed upon the issue of ownership of the property merely to determine
possession—an action that did not oust the latter of its jurisdiction.7
VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002
Unsatisfied with the CA Decision, petitioner lodged this Petition.8
331
_______________
Bongato vs. Malvar
5 Assailed Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 14-15.
houses involved in this civil case so that the Court will know whether they are
located on one and the same lot or a lot different from that involved in the 6 CA Decision, p. 3; id., p. 16.
criminal case for Anti-Squatting.’ In the same order, respondent Judge
disallowed any extension and warned that if the survey is not made, the court 7 Id., pp. 4 & 17.
might consider the same abandoned and the writ of execution would be issued.
8 The case was deemed submitted for decision on July 24, 2001, upon the
“The criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim. Case No. 4659) was filed by private Court’s receipt of respondents’ Comment/Opposition to Motion for Restraining
respondents Malvar against petitioner Bongato. The case is still pending with the Order. Respondents’ Memorandum, submitted earlier on June 15, 2001, was
Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City. signed by Attys. Manuel B. Beaniza, Jr. and Aceray C. Pacheco. Petitioner’s
Memorandum, filed on March 15, 2001, was signed by Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of
“On March 28, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for extension of the March 29, the Public Attorney’s Office, Butuan City.
1994 deadline for the submission of the relocation survey and to move the
deadline to April 15, 1994, as the engineer concerned, Engr. Lumarda, could not 332
conduct his survey during the Holy Week, he being a lay minister and parish
council member. 332

“On April 7, 1994, respondent Judge noted that no survey report was submitted SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and ordered the record of the case returned to the court of origin for disposal.”5
(Citations omitted) Bongato vs. Malvar

Ruling of the Court of Appeals Issues


The CA held that the lot referred to in the present controversy was different In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s
from that involved in the anti-squatting case.6 It further ruled that the Municipal consideration:
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) had jurisdiction, and that it did not err in rejecting
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. The appellate court reasoned that the MTCC had I
119

withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court


“Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in not finding against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction since the Complaint was filed beyond the or any person or per
one-year period from date of alleged entry;
333
II
VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002
“Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
the Motion to Dismiss was a prohibited pleading.”9 333

This Court’s Ruling Bongato vs. Malvar


The Petition is meritorious.
She avers that in Criminal Case No. 4659 for anti-squatting, Respondent Severo
First Issue: Malvar alleged in his Sworn Statement that petitioner had illegally entered his
MTCC Jurisdiction land “sometime in the first week of January 1987.”11
Petitioner claims that the MTCC had no jurisdiction, because the Complaint for
forcible entry was filed only in 1992 or beyond the one-year period provided On the other hand, respondents contend that the subject of the anti-squatting
under the Rules of Civil Procedure.10 case is different from the parcel of land involved here.12

_______________ Before tackling the issue directly, it is worthwhile to restate three basic legal
principles. First, in forcible entry, one employs force, intimidation, threat,
9 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 5; Rollo, p. 145; original in upper case. strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of land or
building.13 Thus, the plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical possession of
10 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides: the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant.14 This
requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by the latter was
“SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the unlawful from the beginning.15 The sole question for resolution hinges on the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property. Neither a
any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land ownership16 by the defendant can outrightly prevent the court from taking
or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right cognizance of the case.17 Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim
to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied or the legal of ownership, and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, and undue deprivation thereof.18
may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
120

Second, as a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence Bongato vs. Malvar
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge.19 There are exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily, an appellate court cannot
refer to the record in another case to ascertain a fact not shown in the record of
_______________ the case before it,20 yet, it has been held that it may consult decisions in other
proceedings, in order to look for the law that is determinative of or applicable to
sons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with the case under review.21 In some instances, courts have also taken judicial
damages and costs.” notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in
controversy.22 These cases “may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly
11 Annex “A”; Rollo, p. 153. interdependent, as to invoke” a rule of judicial notice.23

12 Respondents’ Memorandum, p. 16; Rollo, p. 179. Third, factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. Indeed, the review of such findings
13 Benitez v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 242, January 16, 1997. is not a function that this Court normally undertakes.24 However, this Rule is not
absolute; it admits of exceptions, such as (1) when the findings are grounded
14 Spouses Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143173, March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court’s
691. inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when
15 Gener v. De Leon, G.R. No. 130730, October 19, 2001, 367 SCRA 631. the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary
to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant
16 Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, facts which—if properly considered—will justify a different conclusion; (5) when
254 SCRA 220, March 4, 1996. there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised
17 Diu v. Ibajan, 322 SCRA 452, January 19, 2000. on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.25

18 Gachon v. Devera, Jr., 274 SCRA 540, June 20, 1997. _______________

334 19 Occidental Land Transportation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 167,
March 19, 1993; Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650, May 6, 1991.
334
20 Francisco, Basic Evidence, 2nd edition, 1999, p. 26.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
21 Ibid.
121

772; or the Decision32 dated November 26, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 5734 for
22 Figueras v. Serrano, 52 Phil. 28, September 3, 1928. violation of P.D. 1096. The property involved in these two criminal cases and in
the instant case for forcible entry is one and the same—petitioner’s house.
23 Francisco, Basic Evidence, supra, citing 31 CJS 623-624, 1964.
The allegation of petitioner that there is only one house involved in these three
24 Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc, 306 SCRA cases has not been controverted by respondents. Neither was there evidence
762, May 5, 1999; Inland Trailways, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 178, presented to prove that, indeed, she had constructed one house on Lot 1 and
March 18, 1996. another on Lot 10-A. On the contrary, she correctly points out that the house
involved in these three cases is found on one and the same location. Verily, in
25 Halili v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465, March 12, 1998; Fuentes v. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997; Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, 224 _______________
SCRA 494, July 5, 1993; Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals, 262
SCRA 486, September 26, 1996; Verendia v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 417,
335 June 22, 1993.

VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002 26 Penalizing Squatting and other similar acts, August 20, 1975.

335 27 See MTCC Decision, pp. 1-4; Rollo, pp. 155-158, penned by Judge Santos Rod.
Cedro.
Bongato vs. Malvar
28 Adopting a National Building Code of the Philippines Thereby Revising
Respondents in the present Petition filed three cases against petitioner: (1) Republic Act Numbered Sixty-Five Hundred Forty-One, February 19, 1977.
Criminal Case No. 4659 for violation of P.D. No. 77226 (filed on October 2, 1991),
in which petitioner was acquitted on the ground of good faith; (2) Civil Case No. 29 Annex “1”; Rollo, p. 186.
5681 for forcible entry (filed on July 10, 1992) which was resolved by the MTCC
on October 26, 1992.27 (3) Criminal Case No. 5734 for Violation of P.D. No. 30 Annex “2”; ibid., p. 187.
109628 (filed on July 15, 1993), wherein petitioner was again acquitted.
31 RTC Decision, Criminal Case No. 4659, pp. 1-14; Rollo, pp. 52-65, penned by
We agree with respondents that Lot 10-A, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr.
(TCT) No. RT-1620029 and registered under the name of Severo Malvar, is
different from Lot 1 which is covered by TCT No. RT-1599330 and registered 32 RTC Decision, Criminal Case No. 5734, pp. 1-15; id., pp. 78-92, penned by
under the name of Severo Malvar also. However, we cannot ignore the Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen.
Decision31 dated April 30, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 4659 for violation of P.D.
122

336
Second, according to the Decision in Criminal Case No. 4659, petitioner’s house
336 is actually located on Lot 1, the parcel of land previously covered by TCT No. RT-
15993 and subject of the anti-squatting case. The RTC Judge in said case ruled:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
Bongato vs. Malvar
33 Petitioner’s Memorandum, Annex “A”; Rollo, p. 153.
his Sworn Statement33 submitted in Criminal Case No. 4659, Respondent Severo
Malvar stated that petitioner’s house was “located in front of the Museum and 34 Records, p. 1.
just behind the City Hall.” On the other hand, in the Complaint34 for forcible
entry, the subject property was said to be “located along Doongan Road and 35 RTC Decision, Criminal Case No. 5734, p. 2; Rollo, p. 79.
right in front of the Regional National Museum and not far behind the City Hall
of Butuan City.” Lastly, the Decision35 in Criminal Case No. 5734 stated that the 36 Rollo, p. 116.
building inspector, Engineer Margarita Burias, had “responded to a verbal
complaint involving a structure built near the Museum in Upper Doongan, 37 Records, p. 129.
Butuan City.”
337
Based on these factual antecedents, there is cogent basis for petitioner’s
contention that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction in this case. VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002

First, respondents allege that the subject house was built by petitioner on Lot 337
10-A covered by TCT No. 16200. This allegation is belied by the sketch plan36
dated June 16, 1994, submitted by Engineer Regino A. Lomarda, Jr. To recall, in Bongato vs. Malvar
an Order37 dated March 4, 1994, the RTC had required petitioner to submit a
relocation survey of Lot 10-A to determine the location of the house and to “The lot on which accused’s house is standing was formerly covered by Transfer
ascertain if it was the same house involved in Criminal Case No. 4659 for anti- Certificate of Title No. RT-15993 dated January 24, 1983 in the name of Severo
squatting. However, because of the Holy Week, petitioner failed to submit the Malvar, and superseded by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-24589 dated
relocation survey within the period provided by the RTC. In the said sketch plan December 3, 1991 in the name of Butuan Land Developers Group, Inc.”38
that was offered in evidence as Exhibit “5” in the anti-squatting case, Engineer
Lomarda, Jr. certified that “the hut of Teresita Bongato is not within Lot 10-A as Third, petitioner’s house had actually been in existence prior to February 1992,
shown in this plan as relocated by the undersigned based [o]n TCT No. RT-1576 the alleged date of illegal entry. Thus, in Criminal Case No. 5734 for violation of
of Benjamin Eva, et al. and [o]n TCT No. RT-16200 of Lot 10-A of Severo Malvar.” P.D. 1096, the RTC Judge opined as follows:
123

“Firstly, the prosecution has not proven that the accused had constructed or for 39 RTC Decision, Criminal Case No. 5734, p. 11; Rollo, p. 88.
that matter was constructing the questioned house in February of 1992, since it
was never stated that when the complaint was lodged with the City Engineer’s 40 Id., pp. 14 & 91.
Office, that the house occupied by the accused was under construction or under
renovation. The fact that Engr. Burias even admitted that she had no knowledge 338
of when the structure was built implicitly indicates that the same was completely
erected or constructed before Engr. Burias’ visit, or even for that matter, before 338
the complaint was filed.”39
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
That the house of petitioner had been constructed by her father and that she
had merely continued to reside therein was upheld by the Decision, which we Bongato vs. Malvar
quote:

“Suffice it to state, however, that We are convinced, given the testimonial


evidence offered that the house in question was not built by the accused, but by ing your property consisting of 348 square meters. What did you do upon
her father, Jacinto Bongato sometime in 1935; that accused merely lived in the discovering that the accused already occupied a portion of your property
house as a member of Jacinto Bongato’s family until the death of her parents, without your knowledge?
whereupon, she continued to reside in the said house and now claims to be its
owner.”40 A

Fourth, Respondent Severo Malvar admitted in Criminal Case No. 4659 that he I want to demolish her house. I told her that I am the owner of the land and she
had knowledge of petitioner’s house since January 1987. We quote from his is looking for the 1/4 hectare that was not sold by her father to me.
testimony:
“Q
“Q
And upon being informed by Teresita Bongato that they were looking for the 1/4
Earlier, Judge Malvar, you told this Honorable Court that you discovered hectare lot which was not sold to you by her father, what did you say to her?
sometime in January 1987, the accused was occupy
A
_______________

38 RTC Decision, Criminal Case No. 4659, pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 60-61.
124

I told her to remove her house. Then after that, I was so busy with the squatters
along Satorre Street of the Malvar Village that kept me so busy. It was only last 45 Ibid.
year that we were able to attend to this.”41
339
It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the
restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002
process.42 Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. 339
However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is
counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it.43 After the lapse of the Bongato vs. Malvar
one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an
accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or one (1) year.46 Respondents should have presented their suit before the RTC in
an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in
possession.44 summary proceedings for forcible entry.47 Their cause of action for forcible
entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible and decide it.48
entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint
for ejectment on July 10, 1992.45 Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the Second Issue:
owner of the land, possession thereof cannot be wrested through a summary Motion to Dismiss
action for ejectment of petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than Petitioner further argues that a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter is not a prohibited pleading, but is allowed under Sec. 19
_______________ (a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.49 We agree.

41 TSN, June 23, 1992, p. 18. The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to achieve “an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.”50 The speedy resolution
42 De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 728, April 18, 1997. of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy,51 and the Rule should
equally apply with full force to forcible entry cases, in which possession of the
43 Spouses Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143173, March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA premises is already illegal from the start.52 For this reason, the Rule frowns
691. upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for extension of time.
Consistently, Section 6 was added to give the trial court the power to render
44 Gener v. De Leon, G.R. No. 130730, October 19, 2001, 367 SCRA 631; judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer
Serdoncillo v. Benolirao, 297 SCRA 448, October 8, 1998; De Leon v. Court of within the reglementary period.53 However, as forcible entry and detainer cases
Appeals (Special Second Division), 245 SCRA 166, June 19, 1995. are summary in nature and involve disturbances of the social order, procedural
125

technicalities should be carefully avoided54 and should not be allowed to Pursuant to Section 3656 of B.P. 129,57 the Court on June 16, 1983,
override substantial justice.55 promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases.58 Under this
Rule, a motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991
_______________ Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however,59 a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the rule
46 Muñoz v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 216, September 23, 1992. on prohibited pleadings:

47 Ibid. “SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions.—The following pleadings, motions,
or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
48 Gener v. De Leon, supra.
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information
49 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 9; Rollo, p. 149. except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to
comply with the preceding section;
50 Section 36, BP 129; Rule on Summary Procedure.
xxx xxx x x x”
51 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Generoso, 249 SCRA 477, October 25, 1995.
Further, a court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived
52 Gachon v. Devera, Jr., 274 SCRA 540, June 20, 1997. by the parties or cured by their silence, acquies-

53 Ibid. _______________

54 Salvador v. Salamanca, 144 SCRA 276, September 24, 1986. 56 SEC. 36. Summary procedure in special cases.—In Metropolitan Trial Courts
and Municipal Trial Courts with at least two branches, the Supreme Court may
55 Dakudao v. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877, June 24, 1983. designate one or more branches thereof to try exclusively forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, those involving violations of traffic laws, rules and
340 regulations, violations of the rental law, and such other cases requiring summary
disposition as the Supreme Court may determine. The Supreme Court shall
340 adopt special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED rules. Such simplified procedures may provide that affidavits and counter-
affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the periods of filing
Bongato vs. Malvar pleadings shall be non-extendible.”
126

57 Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) thereof, x x
x.”
58 Resolution of the Court En Banc Providing for the Rule on Summary
Procedure in Special Cases Before Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue of
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts as Amended. Effectivity, August 1, jurisdiction, instead of erroneously holding that it was a prohibited pleading
1983. under the Rule on Summary Procedure.63 Because the Complaint for forcible
entry was filed on July 10, 1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
59 Court En Banc Resolution dated October 15, 1991, “Providing for the Revised was applicable.
Rule on Summary Procedure for Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.” Effectivity, Finally, the MTCC should have taken into account petitioner’s Answer,64 in
November 15, 1991. which she averred that she had been “in constant occupation on said land in
question since birth on March 17, 1941 up to the present, being an heir of the
341 late Emiliana Eva-Bongato, who inherited said property from her father
Raymundo Eva with considerable improvements thereon.” It should have heard
VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002 and received the evidence adduced by the parties for the precise purpose of
determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter.65
341 And after such hearing, it could have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.66 In this way, the long,
Bongato vs. Malvar
_______________
cence or even express consent.60 A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court
over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal.61 That the 60 Duero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002, 373 SCRA 11;
MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453, May 31, 1978.
jurisdiction, even if an answer has been belatedly filed we likewise held in Bayog
v. Natino:62 61 De Leon v. Court of Appeals (Special Second Division), supra.

“The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not 62 258 SCRA 378, July 5, 1996; per Davide, C.J.
provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged
from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default 63 Ibid.
if a defendant fails to answer. It must likewise be pointed out that MAGDATO’s
defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even been raised in a motion to dismiss 64 Answer, p. 1; Records, p. 15.
as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on
65 Bayog v. Natino, supra.
127

66 Ibid.

342

342

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Pastrana

drawn out proceedings that took place in this case could have been avoided.67

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The Complaint for forcible entry is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno (Chairman) and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On leave.

Petition granted, judgment annulled and set aside.

Note.—In forcible entry or ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership set forth by any of the party litigants. (Ceremonia vs. Court of
Appeals, 314 SCRA 731 [1999])

——o0o—— Bongato vs. Malvar, 387 SCRA 327, G.R. No. 141614 August 14,
2002
128

the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such
G.R. No. 116192. November 16, 1995.* action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is
the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.
EUFEMIA SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GENEROSA S.
CRUZ, respondents. _________________
Actions; Jurisdiction; Pleadings and Practice; Ejectment; Jurisdiction of the court,
as well as the nature of the action, is determined by the averments in the * SECOND DVISION.
complaint.—The chief issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of
origin had jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Well-settled is the rule that the 109
jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by
the averments in the complaint. Accordingly, the issue in the instant case can VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995
only be properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in
the complaint in Civil Case No. 899 of said trial court. 109

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the facts averred in the complaint reveals that Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially
involves a boundary dispute, the same must be resolved in an accion Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What determines the cause of action—
reivindicatoria.—A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by whether for forcible entry or unlawful detainer—is the nature of defendant’s
herein private respondent reveals that the action is neither one of forcible entry entry into the land.—What determines the cause of action is the nature of
nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary dispute which must defendant’s entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may
be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on
disputed 71 square meters involved. the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal,
the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Forcible Entry” and “Unlawful the date of the last demand.
Detainer,”Distinguished.—Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two
distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.—To give the court jurisdiction to
his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary
entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party
on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as
was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on
129

its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the protect the person who in fact has actual possession, and in case of a
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as controverted proprietary right, the law requires the parties to preserve the
where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession status quo until one or the other sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of
started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership.
or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if one is the owner of the property, the
possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting
to a summary action for ejectment.—If private respondent is indeed the owner De Guzman, Florentino, Celis, Moncupa & Torio for petitioner.
of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real
right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim David C. Paguio for private respondent.
before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding REGALADO, J.:
of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the
property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been The judgment promulgated on February 28, 1994 by respondent Court of
in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 1 reversing the decision of the regional trial
resorting to a summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his court, as well as its resolution of June 29, 1994 denying herein petitioner’s
possession thereof was not obtained through the means or held under the motion for reconsideration, are assailed in this petition for review on certiorari.
circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.
This case originated from a complaint for ejectment with damages filed by
110 herein private respondent Generosa S. Cruz, as plaintiff, against herein
petitioner Eufemia Sarmiento, as defendant, in the Municipal Trial Court of
110 Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan as Civil Case No. 899, which complaint alleges
these material facts:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
xxx
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
2. That the plaintiff acquired by purchase a parcel of land known as Lot No. 2-A
Same; Same; Same; Same; In giving recognition to the action for forcible entry of the subd. plan, Psd-03-0345 being a portion of Lot 2, covered by TCT No. T-
and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in 147219, located at Bo. Mabuco, Hermosa,
fact has actual possession.—We have held that in giving recognition to the ________________
130

futile, as evidenced by a certification to file action issued by the Lupon secretary


1 Penned by Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, with Justices Eduardo G. and attested by the Lupon Chairman, copy of the certification to file action is
Montenegro and Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros concurring. hereto attached as Annex “D” hereof;
8. Plaintiff as much as possible would like to avoid court litigation because she is
111 poor but nevertheless she consulted the undersigned counsel and a demand
letter was sent to the defendant for conference and/or settlement but the
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 defendant stood pat that she will not allow the removal of the fence, thus
depriving the plaintiff of the use and possession of the said portion of her lot (71
111 square meters) which is being occupied by the defendant for several years, xerox
copy of the demand letter is hereto attached as Annex “E” of this complaint;
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals 9. That by virtue of the willful refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiff to
have the fence dismantled and/or to be removed, the plaintiff is deprived of the
Bataan, containing an area of 280 square meters, xerox copy of the title is hereto possession and she was forced to hire the services of counsel for which she
attached as Annex “A” hereof and for taxation purposes, the same is declared in contracted to pay the sum of P2,000.00 plus acceptance of P1,000.00 until the
the name of the plaintiff, xerox copy of the tax declaration is hereto attached as termination of this case before
Annex “B” of this complaint; 112
3. That the adjacent lot of plaintiff is still owned by the family of Atty. Gonzalo
Nuguid but the same is being used and occupied by the defendant where a 112
house was constructed thereon;
4. That when the plaintiff caused the relocation of her lot herein mentioned, it SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
was found out by the Geodetic Engineer that the defendant is encroaching on
her lot for about 71 square meters, copy of the relocation sketch by said Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
surveyor is hereto attached as Annex “C” hereof;
5. That when the plaintiff talked to the defendant that she would like to remove this Honorable Court.2
the old fence so that she could construct a new fence which will cover the true
area of her property, the defendant vehemently refused to let the plaintiff xxx
remov(e) the said fence and menacingly alleged that if plaintiff remove(d) the
said fence to construct a new one, she would take action against the plaintiff On January 21, 1993, the trial court, on motion, issued an order giving the
legally or otherwise; defendant therein an extension of five days within which to file her answer to
6. For fear that plaintiff may be charged in court should she insist on removing the complaint.3 This was opposed by the plaintiff therein on the ground that
the fence encroaching on her property, plaintiff now seeks judicial relief; Section 15(e) of the Rule on Summary Procedure does not allow the filing of
7. That plaintiff refer(red) this matter to the Katarungang Pambarangay of motions for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other papers.4
Mabuco for settlement, however, the efforts of the Lupon Tagapamayapa turned Nonetheless, defendant filed on January 29, 1993 her “Answer with Motion to
131

Dismiss.”5 Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion reiterating her contention that the 7 Ibid., 69.
filing by defendant of her aforesaid answer with motion was barred for the
reason that her preceding motion for extension of time to file an answer is a 8 Ibid., 70-71.
prohibited pleading.6 On February 4, 1993, the trial court, finding merit in
plaintiff’s ex parte motion, ordered that defendant’s answer be stricken from the 113
records for having been filed out of time.7 The case was then submitted for
decision. VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995

On February 18, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision, with the following 113
decretal portion:
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant, ordering the latter: Defendant filed a motion for the reconsideration of said judgment, but the same
was denied by the trial court for lack of merit in its order dated March 2, 1993.9
1. To vacate the area being encroached (upon) by the defendant and allowing
the plaintiff to remove the old fence permanently and (to) make the necessary On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil
enclosure of the area pertaining to the herein plaintiff containing an area of 280 Case No. DH-121-93, defendant assailed the jurisdiction of the court a quo. On
square meters, more or less; June 21, 1993, said lower appellate court rendered judgment, stating in part as
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,500.00 as attorney’s follows:
fees. No pronouncement as to damages;
3. To pay the cost(s) of this suit.8 (Corrections in parentheses supplied.) A perusal of the records of the case and the memorandum of appeal of the
______________ adversaries led this court to the opinion that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the instant appealed case based on (the)
2 Rollo, 55-57. reason that the said case should be one of question of ownership or accion
rei(vin)dicatoria rather than that of forcible entry as the(re) was no allegation of
3 Ibid., 58. prior possession by the plaintiff (of) the disputed lot as required by law and
jurisprudence. Absence of allegations and proof by the plaintiff in forcible entry
4 Ibid., 59-60. case of prior possession of the disputed lot (sic) cannot be said that defendant
dispossesses her of the same, thus, the legal remedy sought by the plaintiff is
5 Ibid., 61-67. not the proper one as it should have been accion publiciana or accion
rei(vin)dicatoria, as the case may be, and the forum of which is the Regional Trial
6 Ibid., 68. Court.
132

This Court declines to venture into other issues raised by the The chief issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of origin had
defendant/appellant considering that the resolution on jurisdiction renders the jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction
same moot and academic.”10 (Corrections in parentheses ours.) of the court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by the
averments in the complaint.14 Accordingly, the issue in the instant case can only
Therein plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration having been denied in said lower be properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the
court’s order dated August 12, 1993,11she elevated the case to the Supreme complaint in Civil Case No. 899 of said trial court.
Court through a petition for review on certiorari, purportedly on pure questions
of law. This Court, treating the petition as a special civil action for certiorari, A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein private
referred the case to respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and respondent reveals that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of
disposition pursuant to Section 9(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.12 unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary dispute which must be
resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the disputed
________________ 71 square meters involved.

9 Ibid., 72. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of
10 Ibid., 98. physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession
11 Ibid., 115. thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from
12 Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 32263, 79. the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de
facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became
114 unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue
of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual
114 possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the
defendant’s right to continue in possession.15
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
________________
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
13 Ibid., id., 130-139.
On February 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No.
32263 13 reversing the decision of the regional trial court and reinstating that of 14 Ganadin vs. Ramos, et al., L-23547, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 613; Del
the municipal circuit trial court, hence the present petition. Castillo vs. Aguinaldo, et al., G.R. No. 57127, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 169;
133

Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA that petitioner is allegedly encroaching on the lot of the former. Consequently,
372. there is here no contract, express or implied, between petitioner and private
respondent as would qualify it as a case of unlawful detainer. Neither was it
15 Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, et al., ante. alleged that the possession of the disputed portion of said lot was acquired by
petitioner through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a
115 case of forcible entry.

VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 Private respondent cannot now belatedly claim that petitioner’s possession of
the controverted portion was by mere tolerance since that fact was never
115 alleged in the former’s basic complaint, and this argument was raised in her later
pleadings more as an afterthought. Also, it would be absurd to argue that private
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals respondent tolerated a state of affairs of which she was not even then aware.
Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the
land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the _______________
intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the
entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of 16 Sarona, et al. vs. Villegas, et al., L-22984, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1257.
unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last
demand.16 116

In the case at bar, the complaint does not characterize herein petitioner’s 116
alleged entry into the land, that is, whether the same was legal or illegal. It does
not state how petitioner entered upon the land and constructed the house and SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the fence thereon. It is also silent on whether petitioner’s possession became
legal before private respondent made a demand on her to remove the fence. Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
The complaint merely avers that the lot being occupied by petitioner is owned
by a third person, not a party to the case, and that said lot is enclosed by a fence constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must
which private respondent claims is an encroachment on the adjacent lot have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to
belonging to her. be recovered.17

Furthermore, it is also alleged and admitted in the complaint that the said fence Indeed, and this was definitely not the situation that obtained in and gave rise to
was already in existence on that lot at the time private respondent bought her the ejectment suit, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine, for
own lot and it was only after a relocation survey was made that it was found out two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right
134

of the lawful possessor, the violation of which right authorizes the speedy
redress in the inferior court provided for in the Rules. If a period of one year 117
from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy
ceases to be speedy and the aggrieved possessor is deemed to have waived his VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995
right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second.If a forcible entry action in the
inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may 117
well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long
such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
bring suit in the inferior court—upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription
from setting in—and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
unreasonable, especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana
action.18 or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.21

To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion
the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.19 publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in
The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is
without resort to parol testimony.20 the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from
another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for
________________ more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment. This is
especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained through the
17 Muñoz, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 102693, September 23, means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary
1992, 214 SCRA 216. ejectment.

18 Sarona, et al. vs. Villegas, et al., supra, citing Monteblanco vs. The Hinigaran We have held that in giving recognition to the action for forcible entry and
Sugar Plantation, Inc., et al., 63 Phil. 797 (1936). unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact
has actual possession, and in case of a controverted proprietary right, the law
19 36A C.J.S., Forcible Entry & Detainer, Sec. 39, p. 1002. requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit to
invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of
20 Ind—Boxley vs. Collins, 4 Blackf. 320; Me.—Treat vs. Brent, 51 Me. 478. ownership.22
135

Francisco, J., On leave.


On the foregoing premises and with these conclusions, it is unnecessary to pass
upon the other issues raised in the petition at bar. Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the Court Notes.—The only issue for resolution in ejectment cases is who is entitled to the
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership. (Somodio vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 307 [1994])
_______________
The subsequent acquisition of ownership over the property by the defendants in
21 Sarona, et al. vs. Villegas, et al.; Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra. an unlawful detainer case is not a supervening event that will bar the execution
of the judgment in said case. (Oblea vs. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 101 [1995])
22 Dizon vs. Concina, et al., L-23756, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 897;
Manlapaz, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 39430, December 3, 1990, ——o0o—— Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 108, G.R. No. 116192
191 SCRA 795. November 16, 1995

118

118

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. De Guzman

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. DH-121-93 is REINSTATED,
without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.


136

G.R. No. 169380. November 26, 2012.* the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
FIORELLO R. JOSE, petitioner, vs. ROBERTO ALFUERTO, ERNESTO BACAY, contract, express or implied.—Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the
ILUMINADO BACAY, MANUEL BANTACULO, LETTY BARCELO, JING BERMEJO, recovery of possession of real property. This action may be filed by a lessor,
MILNA BERMEJO, PABLO BERMEJO, JHONNY BORJA, BERNADETTE BUENAFE, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
ALFREDO CALAGOS, ROSAURO CALAGOS, ALEX CHACON, AIDA CONSULTA, building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
CARMEN CORPUZ, RODOLFO DE VERA, ANA DELA ROSA, RUDY DING, JOSE hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. In unlawful
ESCASINAS, GORGONIO ESPADERO, DEMETRIO ESTRERA, ROGELIO ESTRERA, detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession
EDUARDO EVARDONE, ANTONIO GABALEÑO, ARSENIA GARING, NARCING was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract
GUARDA, NILA LEBATO, ANDRADE LIGAYA, HELEN LOPEZ, RAMON MACAIRAN, between them. However, the defendant’s possession became illegal when the
DOMINGO NOLASCO, JR., FLORANTE NOLASCO, REGINA OPERARIO, CARDING plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property due to the
ORCULLO, FELICISIMO PACATE, CONRADO PAMINDALAN, JUN PARIL, RENE expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the
SANTOS, defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be
instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of possession.
_______________
Same; Same; Same; In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s possession
* SECOND DIVISION. becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the defendant to vacate the
property and the defendant’s subsequent refusal.—In this case, paragraph 7
324 makes it clear that the respondents’ occupancy was unlawful from the start and
was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the
324 defendant’s possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the
defendant to vacate the property and the defendant’s subsequent refusal. In the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED present case, paragraph 8 characterizes the defendant’s occupancy as unlawful
even before the formal demand letters were written by the petitioner’s counsel.
Jose vs. Alfuerto Under these allegations, the unlawful withholding of possession should not be
based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged unlawful act had
DOMINADOR SELVELYEJO, ROSARIO UBALDO, SERGIO VILLAR, JOHN DOE, JANE taken place at an earlier unspecified date.
DOE and Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San 325
Dionisio, Parañaque City, respondents.
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012
Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Unlawful Detainer; Words and Phrases;
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real 325
property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after Jose vs. Alfuerto
137

Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Theory of the Case; Cause of Action; A party
Same; Same; Same; A case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. Points of
definitely establish its existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a case law, theories, issues and arguments not
for forcible entry can mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it
to be filed beyond the required one-year prescription period from the time of 326
forcible entry.—As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., 22 SCRA
1257 (1968), we already ruled that a complaint which fails to positively aver any 326
overt act on the plaintiff’s part indicative of permission to occupy the land, or
any showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful detainer. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
As the Court then explained, a case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must
definitely establish its existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a case Jose vs. Alfuerto
for forcible entry can mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it
to be filed beyond the required one-year prescription period from the time of brought to the attention of the lower court will not be considered by the
forcible entry: A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word reviewing court.—It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory of the
“tolerance” confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be case or his cause of action on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court will not be considered
a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer—not of forcible entry. Indeed, to by the reviewing court. The defenses not pleaded in the answer cannot, on
hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. To do so would
Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. be unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present evidence in
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress—in the inferior court— connection with the new theory; this would offend the basic rules of due process
provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse and fair play.
before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is
deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a Sales; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; An action for forcible entry cannot be
forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number treated as an accion publiciana; The cause of action in ejectment is different
of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really from that in an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.—In Regis, Jr. v. Court
prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff of Appeals, 528 SCRA 611 (2007), we ruled that an action for forcible entry
will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court—upon plea of cannot be treated as an accion publiciana and summarized the reasons therefor.
tolerance to prevent prescription to set in—and summarily throw him out of the We find these same reasons also applicable to an unlawful detainer case which
land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the bears the same relevant characteristics: On the issue of whether or not an action
postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary for forcible entry can be treated as accion publiciana, we rule in the negative.
in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the Forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. First, forcible entry should be
summary nature of the action. filed within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real property, while
accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the real
138

property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to the entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary proceedings is to provide
physical possession of the real property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of for a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal
litigation is the better right to possession over the real property. Third, an action possessor of property from unjustly taking and continuing his possession during
for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court and is a summary action, the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue of possession de jure
while accion publiciana is a plenary action in the RTC. [italics supplied] The cause or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the
of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion publiciana or accion community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might take the
reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior court to law in his hands and seize the property by force and violence. An ejectment case
recover physical possession only or possession de facto, not possession de jure. cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of determining rights
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are not processes to determine actual of possession or ownership.
title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of ownership is made only
to resolve the issue of possession, and is therefore inconclusive. PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Same; Same; Same; Ejectment; The purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
peaceful, speedy and expeditious
Fiorello R. Jose for petitioner.
327
Luisito Lopez for respondents.
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012
BRION, J.:
327
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Jose vs. Alfuerto Court assailing the decision1 dated March

means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking _______________
and continuing his possession during the long period it would take to properly
resolve the issue of possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the 1 Rollo, pp. 21-34; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, and
maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Estela M. Perlas-
deprived of possession might take the law in his hands and seize the property by Bernabe (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court).
force and violence.—Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto,
ejectment actions are summary in nature, while accion publiciana (for the 328
recovery of possession) and accion reivindicatoria (for the recovery of
ownership) are plenary actions. The purpose of allowing actions for forcible 328
139

_______________
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2 Id., at pp. 36-37.
Jose vs. Alfuerto
3 Id., at pp. 180-181.
14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80166. The Court of Appeals’
decision reversed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque 4 Id., at pp. 178-179.
City, Branch 257, and of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City,
Branch 77, by dismissing petitioner Fiorello R. Jose’s complaint for ejectment 329
against Roberto Alfuerto, Ernesto Bacay, Iluminado Bacay, Manuel Bantaculo,
Letty Barcelo, Jing Bermejo, Milna Bermejo, Pablo Bermejo, Jhonny Borja, VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012
Bernadette Buenafe, Alfredo Calagos, Rosauro Calagos, Alex Chacon, Aida
Consulta, Carmen Corpuz, Rodolfo De Vera, Ana Dela Rosa, Rudy Ding, Jose 329
Escasinas, Gorgonio Espadero, Demetrio Estrera, Rogelio Estrera, Eduardo
Evardone, Antonio Gabaleño, Arsenia Garing, Narcing Guarda, Nila Lebato, Jose vs. Alfuerto
Andrade Ligaya, Helen Lopez, Ramon Macairan, Domingo Nolasco, Jr., Florante
Nolasco, Regina Operario, Carding Orcullo, Felicisimo Pacate, Conrado That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and renewable for the same
Pamindalan, Jun Paril, Rene Santos, Dominador Selvelyejo, Rosario Ubaldo, period upon mutual agreement of the parties to commence upon the total
Sergio Villar, John Doe, Jane Doe and Unknown Occupants of Olivares eviction of any occupant or occupants. The LESSOR hereby transfers all its rights
Compound, Phase II, Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City (respondents), on and prerogative to evict said occupants in favor of the LESSEE which shall be
the ground that the petitioner’s cause of action was not for unlawful detainer responsible for all expenses that may be incurred without reimbursement from
but for recovery of possession. The appellate court affirmed this decision in its the LESSOR. It is understood however that the LESSOR is hereby waiving, in favor
resolution of August 22, 2005.2 of the LESSEE any and all damages that [may be] recovered from the
occupants[.]5 (Underscore ours)
The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo Chua Sing
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52594,3 with an area of 1919 square Significantly, the respondents already occupied the property even before the
meters, located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Chua Sing purchased lease contract was executed.
the land in 1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua Sing leased the property to the
petitioner. Their contract of lease was neither notarized nor registered with the On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the petitioner signed the lease
Parañaque City Registry of Deeds.4 contract, the petitioner demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the
property within 30 days and that they pay a monthly rental of P1,000.00 until
The lease contract provided that: they fully vacate the property.6
140

The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. On October 20, 1999, the on March 1, 2000.9 Jose was then able to file an amended complaint,
petitioner filed an ejectment case against the respondents before Branch 77 of incorporating the proceedings before the barangay before the summons and
the Parañaque City MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 11344.7 In this complaint, copies of the complaint were served upon the named defendants.10
no mention was made of any proceedings before the barangay. Jose then
brought the dispute before the barangay for conciliation.8 The barangay issued a In the Amended Complaint11 dated March 17, 2000, the petitioner claimed that
Certification to File Action as lessee of the subject property, he had the right to eject the respondents who
unlawfully occupy the land. He alleged that:
_______________
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the
5 Id., at p. 56. subject lot, have defiantly erected their houses thereat without benefit of any
contract or law whatsoever, much less any building permit as sanctioned by law,
6 Id., at pp. 182-228. but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful and registered owner, plaintiff’s
lessor.12
7 Id., at p. 163.
The petitioner also stated that despite his written demand, the respondents
8 CA Rollo, pp. 162-184, 209. The records do not state when the conciliation failed to vacate the property without legal justification. He prayed that the court
meeting occurred. Nevertheless, the respondents did not dispute that the order the respondents; (1) to vacate the premises; (2) to pay him not less than
conciliation meeting took place during the MeTC proceedings, nor appear to P41,000.00 a month from May 30, 1999 until they vacate the premises; and (3)
have raised this as a ground for dismissal in their Amended Answer. However, in to pay him attorney’s fees of no less than P50,000.00, and the costs of suit.13
their Memorandum before the Court of Appeals, they stated that a conciliation
meeting between the proper parties did not take place; it is unclear whether In their Answer, the respondents likewise pointed out that they have been in
they were saying that no meeting between Chua Sing and the respondents took possession of the land long before Chua Sing acquired the property in 1991, and
place or that no conciliation meeting between the petitioner and the that the lease contract between the petitioner and Chua Sing does not affect
respondents occurred. The CA did not resolve this their right to possess the land. The respondents also pre-

330 _______________

330 issue, and no petition was filed before the Supreme Court by either party raising
this issue, even if the respondents again raise it in their Memorandum before
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the Court.

Jose vs. Alfuerto 9 CA Rollo, pp. 162-184.


141

10 Motion to Admit Amended Complaint dated March 22, 2000. Records, case because of the respondents’ assertion of ownership of the property. On
volume I, p. 93. these premises, the MeTC ordered the respondents to vacate the premises and
to remove all structures introduced on the land; to each pay P500.00 per month
11 Rollo, pp. 227-230. from the date of filing of this case until they vacate the premises; and to pay
Jose, jointly and severally, the costs of suit and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
12 Id., at p. 175.
On appeal before the RTC, the respondents raised the issue, among others, that
13 Id., at p. 176. no legal basis exists for the petitioner’s claim that their occupation was by
tolerance, “where the possession of the defendants was illegal at the inception
331 as alleged in the complaint[,] there can be no tolerance.”16

VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 _______________

331 14 Id., at pp. 232-239.

Jose vs. Alfuerto 15 Id., at pp. 137-141.

sented a Deed of Assignment,14 dated February 13, 2000, issued by David R. 16 Id., at p. 44.
Dulfo in their favor. They argued that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case
as the issue deals with ownership of the land, and sought the dismissal of the 332
complaint for lack of cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction. They also filed a
counterclaim for actual and moral damages for the filing of a baseless and 332
malicious suit.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
After the required position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence were
submitted, the MeTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor. In its decision15 Jose vs. Alfuerto
of January 27, 2003, the MeTC held that the respondents had no right to possess
the land and that their occupation was merely by the owner’s tolerance. It The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision of January 27, 2003. It issued its decision17
further noted that the respondents could no longer raise the issue of ownership, on October 8, 2003, reiterating the MeTC’s ruling that a case for ejectment was
as this issue had already been settled: the respondents previously filed a case for proper. The petitioner, as lessee, had the right to file the ejectment complaint;
the annulment/cancellation of Chua Sing’s title before the RTC, Branch 260, of the respondents occupied the land by mere tolerance and their possession
Parañaque City, which ruled that the registered owner’s title was genuine and became unlawful upon the petitioner’s demand to vacate on April 28, 1999. The
valid. Moreover, the MeTC held that it is not divested of jurisdiction over the RTC, moreover, noted that the complaint for ejectment was filed on October 20,
142

1999, or within one year after the unlawful deprivation took place. It cited
Pangilinan, et al. v. Hon. Aguilar, etc., et al.18 and Yu v. Lara, et al.19 to support VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012
its ruling that a case for unlawful detainer was appropriate.
333
On March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and MeTC
decisions.20 It ruled that the respondents’ possession of the land was not by the Jose vs. Alfuerto
petitioner or his lessor’s tolerance. It defined tolerance not merely as the silence
or inaction of a lawful possessor when another occupies his land; tolerance accion publiciana: he asserts his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract of
entailed permission from the owner by reason of familiarity or neighborliness. lease he contracted after the respondents had occupied the land. The dispositive
The petitioner, however, alleged that the respondents unlawfully entered the part of the decision reads:
property; thus, tolerance (or authorized entry into the property) was not alleged
and there could be no case for unlawful detainer. The respondents’ allegation WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 8,
that they had been in possession of the land before the petitioner’s lessor had 2003 of the RTC, Branch 257, Parañaque City, in Civil Case No. 03-0127, is
acquired it in 1991 supports this finding. Having been in possession of the land REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the amended complaint for ejectment is
for more than a year, the respondents should not be evicted through an DISMISSED.21
ejectment case.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,22 which the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases are summary denied in its resolution23 of August 22, 2005. In the present appeal, the
proceedings where the only issue to be resolved is who has a better right to the petitioner raises before us the following issues:
physical possession of a property. The petitioner’s claim, on the other hand, is
based on an I

_______________ WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE
OF ACTION OF THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT IS NOT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER BUT
17 Id., at pp. 126-136. FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND THEREFORE DISMISSIBLE.

18 150 Phil. 166; 43 SCRA 136 (1972). II

19 116 Phil. 1105; 6 SCRA 785 (1962). WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE BASED
ON RESPONDENTS’ MATERIAL CHANGE OF THEORY WHICH IS COMPLETELY
20 Supra note 1. INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR DEFENSES INVOKED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT.
333
143

III
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real
WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY DECIDE THIS CASE ON THE property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
MERITS TO AVOID CIRCUITOUS PROCEDURE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after
JUSTICE.24 the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the possession of the
_______________ defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff
on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, the
21 Id., at p. 33. defendant’s possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the
defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of
22 CA Rollo, pp. 258-264. the right to possess under the contract, and the defendant refused to heed such
demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the
23 Rollo, pp. 36-37. unlawful withholding of possession.25

24 Id., at p. 7. The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of the court. The complaint must specifically allege the facts
334 constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these allegations of facts, an
action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial
334 court or the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case.26

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED _______________

Jose vs. Alfuerto 25 Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, April 7, 2009, 584
SCRA 81, 89-90.
The Court’s Ruling
26 Id., at p. 90; Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA
We find the petition unmeritorious. 147, 156.

Unlawful detainer is not the proper 335


remedy for the present case.
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012
The key issue in this case is whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper
remedy. 335
144

possession of the defendant was originally legal and his possession was
Jose vs. Alfuerto permitted by the owner through an express or implied contract.

In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the following allegations in In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the respondents’ occupancy was
support of his unlawful detainer complaint: unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In an
unlawful detainer case, the
3. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy Chuasing, that parcel
of lot owned and registered in [the] lessor’s name, covering the area occupied by _______________
the defendants.
27 Rollo, pp. 80-81.
xxxx
336
6. Plaintiff’s lessor had acquired the subject property as early as 1991 through
sale, thereafter the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title was subsequently 336
registered under his name.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the
subject lot, have defiantly erected their houses thereat without benefit of any Jose vs. Alfuerto
contract or law whatsoever, much less any building permit as sanctioned by law,
but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor. defendant’s possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the
defendant to vacate the property and the defendant’s subsequent refusal. In the
8. By reason of defendants’ continued unlawful occupancy of the subject present case, paragraph 8 characterizes the defendant’s occupancy as unlawful
premises, plaintiff referred the matter to his lawyer who immediately sent a even before the formal demand letters were written by the petitioner’s counsel.
formal demand upon each of the defendants to vacate the premises. Copies of Under these allegations, the unlawful withholding of possession should not be
the demand letter dated 28 April 1999 are xxx hereto attached as annexes “C” to based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged unlawful act had
“QQ[.]” taken place at an earlier unspecified date.

9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and refused and continues to fail The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the respondents
and refuse to vacate the premises without valid or legal justification.27 occupied the premises by mere tolerance of the owner. No allegation in the
(emphasis ours) complaint nor any supporting evidence on record, however, shows when the
respondents entered the property or who had granted them permission to
The petitioner’s allegations in the amended complaint run counter to the enter. Without these allegations and evidence, the bare claim regarding
requirements for unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, the “tolerance” cannot be upheld.
145

In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,28 the Court cited Prof. Arturo M. Tolentino’s The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or permission must
definition and characterizes “tolerance” in the following manner: have been present at the beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not be the proper remedy
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are “those which and should be dismissed.29
by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his
neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory statements in a
particular services or benefits which one’s property can give to another without complaint for unlawful detainer as a basis for dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of
material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or Urban,30 the claim that the defendant’s possession was merely tolerated was
courtesy.” He adds that: “[t]hey are acts of little disturbances which a person, in contradicted by the complainant’s allegation that the entry to the subject
the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do on his property was unlawful from the very beginning. The Court then ruled that the
property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some unlawful detainer action should fail.
water from a well.” And, Tolentino continues, even though “this is continued for
a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription.” Further expounding on The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed suspicious
the concept, Tolentino writes: “There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts when a complaint is silent regarding the factual circumstances surrounding the
which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on alleged tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty Corporation v. Cruz,31 the complaint
the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of simply stated that: “(1) [defendant] immediately occupied the subject property
tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by [the plaintiff]; and (2) [the
respondent’s] allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere
_______________ tolerance.” The Court expressed its qualms over these averments of fact as they
did not contain anything substantiating the claim that the plaintiff tolerated or
28 131 Phil. 365, 372; 22 SCRA 1257, 1264-1265 (1968). permitted the occupation of the property by the defendant:

337 These allegations contradict, rather than support, [plaintiff’s] theory that its
cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012
_______________
337
29 Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation v. Cruz, 457 Phil. 603, 610;
Jose vs. Alfuerto 410 SCRA 484, 490 (2003); and Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 185; 362
SCRA 755, 767 (2001).
acts of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the
existence or non-existence of the permission. [citations omitted; italics supplied] 30 499 Phil. 64, 70; 460 SCRA 68, 72 (2005).
146

because the evidence was “totally wanting as to when and under what
31 Supra note 29, at p. 611. circumstances xxx the alleged tolerance came about.” It stated that:

338 Judging from the respondent’s Answer, the petitioners were never at all in
physical possession of the premises from the time he started occupying it and
338 continuously up to the present. For sure, the petitioners merely derived their
alleged prior physical possession only on the basis of their Transfer Certificate of
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Title (TCT), arguing that the issuance of said title presupposes their having been
in possession of the property at one time or another.35
Jose vs. Alfuerto
_______________
arguments advance the view that [defendant’s] occupation of the property was
unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in 32 Ibid.
unlawful detainer cases that [plaintiff’s] supposed act of sufferance or tolerance
must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be 33 Supra note 29, at p. 186; p. 767.
recovered.
34 532 Phil. 714, 721; 501 SCRA 278, 286-287 (2006).
As the bare allegation of [plaintiff’s] tolerance of [defendant’s] occupation of the
premises has not been proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from the 35 Ibid.
beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have
been for forcible entry—an action that had already prescribed, however, when 339
the Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive period of one year for
forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of [defendant’s] actual entry into VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012
the land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.32
339
Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court considered the owner’s lack
of knowledge of the defendant’s entry of the land to be inconsistent with the Jose vs. Alfuerto
allegation that there had been tolerance.
Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply anchor their
In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required allegations regarding the claims on the validity of the owner’s title. Possession de facto must also be
grant of permission, but proof as well. It noted that the plaintiffs alleged the proved.
existence of tolerance, but ordered the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case
147

As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,36 we already ruled that a 340
complaint which fails to positively aver any overt act on the plaintiff’s part
indicative of permission to occupy the land, or any showing of such fact during SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful detainer. As the Court then explained, a
case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must definitely establish its Jose vs. Alfuerto
existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible entry can
mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary
the required one-year prescription period from the time of forcible entry: nature of the action.37 (italics supplied)

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us to deprive the
our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from respondents of possession over a property that they have held for at least eight
the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as years before the case was filed in 1999, by means of a summary proceeding,
one of unlawful detainer—not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would simply because the petitioner used the word “tolerance” without sufficient
espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the allegations or evidence to support it.
land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right
authorizes the speedy redress—in the inferior court—provided for in the rules. If There was no change in the respon-
one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the dents’ theory during the appeal that
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his would amount to a deprivation of the
right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the petitioner’s right to due process.
inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may
well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long The petitioner alleges that the respondents had never questioned before the
such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, MeTC the fact that their occupancy was by tolerance. The only issues the
bring suit in the inferior court—upon plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to respondents allegedly raised were: (1) the title to the property is spurious; (2)
set in—and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is the petitioner’s predecessor is not the true owner of the property in question;
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of (3) the petitioner’s lease contract was not legally enforceable; (4) the petitioner
forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, was not the real party-in-interest; (5) the petitioner’s predecessor never had
prior physical possession of the property; and (6) the respondents’ right of
_______________ possession was based on the “Deed of Assignment of Real Property” executed by
Dulfo. The respondents raised the issue of tolerance merely on appeal before
36 Supra note 28, at pp. 371-372; p. 1264. the RTC. They argue that this constitutes a change of theory, which is disallowed
on appeal.38
340
148

It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the
of action on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
the attention of the lower court will not be considered by the reviewing court. complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
The defenses not pleaded in the answer cannot, on appeal, change where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion
_______________ reivindicatoria. (emphasis ours; italics supplied)

37 Id., at p. 373; p. 1265. Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents, the petitioner was
required to properly allege and prove when the respondents entered the
38 Rollo, pp. 11-14. property and that it was the petitioner or his predecessors, not any other
persons, who granted the respondents permission to enter and occupy the
341 property. Furthermore, it was not the respondents’ defense that proved fatal to
the case but the petitioner’s contradictory statements
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012
_______________
341
39 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, 535 Phil.
Jose vs. Alfuerto 481, 489-490; 504 SCRA 484, 495 (2006); Philippine Ports Authority v. City of
Iloilo, 453 Phil. 927, 934-935; 406 SCRA 88, 96 (2003); and Olympia Housing, Inc.
fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. To do so would be unfair to v. Panasiatic Travel Corporation, 443 Phil. 385, 399-400; 395 SCRA 298, 309
the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present evidence in connection (2003).
with the new theory; this would offend the basic rules of due process and fair
play.39 40 358 Phil. 83, 95; 297 SCRA 448, 459 (1998).

While this Court has frowned upon changes of theory on appeal, this rule is not 342
applicable to the present case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the action due
the petitioner’s failure to allege and prove the essential requirements of an 342
unlawful detainer case. In Serdoncillo v. Spouses Benolirao,40 we held that:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must Jose vs. Alfuerto
sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within
the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to in his amended complaint which he even reiterated in his other pleadings.41
149

Although the respondents did not use the word “tolerance” before the MeTC, 343
they have always questioned the existence of the petitioner’s tolerance. In their
Answer to Amended Complaint, the respondents negated the possibility of their VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012
possession of the property under the petitioner and his lessor’s tolerance when
the respondents alleged to have occupied the premises even before the lessor 343
acquired the property in 1991. They said as much in their Position Paper:
Jose vs. Alfuerto
RODOLFO CHUA SING never had actual physical possession of his supposed
property, as when he became an owner of the 1,919 square meters property We note that even after the issue of tolerance had been directly raised by the
described in TCT No. 52594, the property had already been occupied by herein respondents before the RTC, the petitioner still failed to address it before the
DEFENDANTS since late 1970. Therefore, DEFENDANTS were already RTC, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court.43 At best, he belatedly states
occupants/possessors of the property from where they are being ejected by for the first time in his Memorandum44 before this Court that his lessor had
FIORELLO JOSE, a supposed LESSEE of a property with a dubious title. The main tolerated the respondents’ occupancy of the lot, without addressing the
thing to be proven in the case at bar is prior possession and that the same was respondents’ allegation that they had occupied the lot in 1970, before the
lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves petitioner’s lessor became the owner of the property in 1991, and without
the court to restore possession regardless of title or even ownership xxx. In the providing any other details. His pleadings continued to insist on the existence of
case at bar, neither RODOLFO CHUA SING nor herein PLAINTIFF ever had any tolerance without providing the factual basis for this conclusion. Thus, we
actual physical possession of the property where DEFENDANTS have already cannot declare that the Court of Appeals had in anyway deprived the petitioner
possessed for more than ten (10) years in 1991 when RODOLFO CHUA SING got of due process or had unfairly treated him when it resolved the case based on
his fake title to the property[.]42 (citation omitted) the issue of tolerance.

In addition, whether or not it was credible, the respondent’s claim that their The Court cannot treat an eject-
possession was based on the Deed of Assignment executed by Dulfo, in behalf of ment case as an accion publiciana
the estate of Domingo de Ocampo, shows that they considered the petitioner or accion reivindicatoria.
and his lessor as strangers to any of their transactions on the property, and could
not have stayed there upon the latter’s permission. The petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed as an
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, this Court should still resolve the
_______________ case, as requiring him to properly refile the case serves no other ends than to
comply with technicalities.45
41 Rollo, pp. 5, 95, 163.
The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before the MeTC in an
42 CA Rollo, p. 147. ejectment case and decide it as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
150

These cases are not interchangeable and their differences constitute far more concerned with the issue of the right to the physical possession of the real
than mere technicalities. property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better right to
possession over the real property. Third, an action for forcible entry is filed in the
In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action for forcible entry municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a
cannot be treated as an accion publiciana plenary action in the RTC. [italics supplied]

_______________ The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior
43 Rollo, pp. 3-17, 88-92, 173-177. court to recover physical possession only or possession de facto, not possession
de jure. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are not processes to
44 Id., at pp. 95-111. determine actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of
ownership is made only to resolve the issue of possession, and is therefore
45 Id., at p. 16. inconclusive.47

46 G.R. No. 153914, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA 611, 620. Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto, ejectment actions are
summary in nature, while accion publiciana (for the recovery of possession) and
344 accion reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are plenary actions.48 The
purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be
344 decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy and
expeditious means of preventing an
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
Jose vs. Alfuerto
47 A. Francisco Realty and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358
and summarized the reasons therefor. We find these same reasons also Phil. 833, 841-842; 298 SCRA 349, 356 (1998); and Spouses Refugia v. Court of
applicable to an unlawful detainer case which bears the same relevant Appeals, 327 Phil. 982, 1004; 258 SCRA 347, 363 (1996).
characteristics:
48 Custodio v. Corrado, 479 Phil. 415, 427; 435 SCRA 500, 510 (2004).
On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry can be treated as
accion publiciana, we rule in the negative. Forcible entry is distinct from accion 345
publiciana. First, forcible entry should be filed within one year from the unlawful
dispossession of the real property, while accion publiciana is filed a year after VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012
the unlawful dispossession of the real property. Second, forcible entry is
151

345
_______________
Jose vs. Alfuerto
49 Spouses Refugia v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47, at p. 1007; p. 367.
alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking and continuing his
possession during the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue of 50 37 Phil. 752, 761 (1918).
possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace
and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession 51 G.R. No. 130841, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 532, 540-541.
might take the law in his hands and seize the property by force and violence.49
An ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of 346
determining rights of possession or ownership. Citing Mediran v. Villanueva,50
the Court in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals51 describes in detail how these two 346
remedies should be used:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of
the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of Jose vs. Alfuerto
controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or
the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent instead of plenary actions. Courts would then decide in summary proceedings
jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person cases which the rules intend to be resolved through full-blown trials. Because
who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending [the] these “summary” proceedings will have to tackle complicated issues requiring
decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty extensive proof, they would no longer be expeditious and would no longer serve
warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject of dispute. To the purpose for which they were created. Indeed, we cannot see how the
permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to resulting congestion of cases, the hastily and incorrectly decided cases, and the
social order. Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a utter lack of system would assist the courts in protecting and preserving
piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party property rights.
actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end
in a court of competent jurisdiction; and he [cannot] be permitted, by invading WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals’ decision
the property and excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the latter the dated March 14, 2005 and resolution dated August 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
burden of instituting an [action] to try the property right. [italics supplied] 80166.

Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later consider them as an SO ORDERED.
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, we would encourage parties to simply
file ejectment cases Sereno (C.J.),** Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
152

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.—Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Section 3 of


Republic Act No. 7691, as well as Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, clearly
provides that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. (Estel vs. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., 663 SCRA
17 [2012])

When a party adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and decided upon
that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on
appeal. (Duty Free Philippines Services, Inc. vs. Tria, 675 SCRA 222 [2012])

——o0o—— Jose vs. Alfuerto, 686 SCRA 323, G.R. No. 169380 November 26,
2012
153

G.R. No. 157536. May 16, 2005.*


_______________
MELCHOR CARO, petitioner, vs. SUSANA SUCALDITO, respondent.
Actions; Land Registration; Reconveyance and Reversion; Words and Phrases; * SECOND DIVISION.
The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the
property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another 596
person’s name, to its right-ful owner or to one with a better right.—The Court
notes that the petitioner’s complaint before the RTC prays for the annulment of
the free patent issued in the respondent’s favor. Considering that the ultimate 596
relief sought is for the respondent to “return” the subject property to him, it is in
reality an action for reconveyance. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
held that “[t]he essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the Caro vs. Sucaldito
transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.” the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
Indeed, in an action for reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected
does not go back to the State. by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental
interest in the question involved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief
sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian Same; Same; Same; Parties; Free Patents; A mere applicant for a free patent,
doctrine.—Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief hence not the owner of the disputed property, cannot be considered as a party-
sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.—A suit filed by
Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this case, the petitioner,
government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free
patent, cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file
Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; “Legal Standing” and “In-terest,” Explained; an action for reconveyance. The Court, citing several of its holdings, expounded
Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in- on this doctrine in Tankiko v. Cezar as follows: . . . Thus, in Lucas v. Durian [102
interest, or one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the Phil. 1157 (1957)], the Court affirmed the dismissal of a Complaint filed by a
suit.”—Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be party who alleged that the patent was obtained by fraudulent means and,
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one “who consequently, prayed for the annulment of said patent and the cancellation of a
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.” Corollarily, legal certificate of title. The Court declared that the proper party to bring the action
standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in was the government, to which the property would revert. Likewise affirming the
154

dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the Court in PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio [104 Phil. 126 (1958)] noted that the plaintiff, being a Appeals.
mere homestead applicant, was not the real party-in-interest to institute an
action for reconveyance. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his Rey G. Canindo for petitioner.
stead may bring the action for reversion.—This provision was applied and
discussed in Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., a Manuel S. Gemarino for respondent.
case on all fours with the present one, as follows: Under Section 101 of the
above reproduced, only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead CALLEJO, SR., J.:
may bring the action for reversion. Consequently, Sumail may not bring such
action or any action which would have the effect of cancelling a free patent and This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, with the result assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 45503,
that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. affirming the dismissal of Civil Case No. 15529 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Furthermore, there is another reason for withholding legal personality from of Iloilo City, Branch 39, as well as the resolution denying the motion for
Sumail. He does not claim the land to be his private property. In fact, by his reconsideration thereof.
application for a free patent, he had formally acknowledged and recognized the
land to be a part of the public domain; this, aside from the declaration made by The antecedent facts are as follows:
the cadastral court that lot 3633 was public land. Consequently, even if
Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessor’s Lot No. 160 from
597 Ruperto Gepilano as evidenced by a Deed of Sale2 dated October 21, 1953. The
said lot was situated in Sitio Bangyan, Barrio Calaya, Municipality of Nueva
Valencia, Iloilo City, consisting more or less of 17.9849 hectares. Thereafter,
VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005 Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot to his son Melchor Caro, consisting of
70,124 square meters, and now identified as Lot No. 4512 of the Cadastral
597 survey of Nueva Valencia, Pls-775. Father and son executed a Deed of Definite
Sale3 dated January 31, 1973 covering Lot No. 4512.
Caro vs. Sucaldito
On August 1, 1974, Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of
the parcel were declared reverted to the public domain, Sumail does not Lands, District Land Office No. 6-1,
automatically become the owner thereof. He is a mere public land applicant like
others who may apply for the same. _______________
155

1 Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios, with Associate Justices description and physical identity of Lot No. 160 is basically different and distinct
Bienvenido L. Reyes and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring. from Lot No. 4512, the land in question. This could be clearly seen in the
Certified True Copy of the Sketch Plan from the Assessor’s Office of Assessor’s
2 Records, p. 301. Lot No. 160 and the Sketch Plan marked as Exhibit “9” of the Respondent-
Applicant. It has been established that Assessor’s Lot No. 160 corresponds to Lot
3 Id., at p. 302. No. 4511 and not Lot No. 4512 claimed by the protestant. Moreover, Ruperto
Cepellano (sic) in his affidavit testified that what he sold to Gregorio Caro is a
598 land distinct and different from the land in question.

598 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING FINDINGS, it is ordered that the F.P.A. No. (VI-
1)8548 of applicant-respondent Melchor Caro be, as hereby it is, cancelled.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Protestant Deogracias de la Cruz if qualified, is given one hundred twenty (120)
days from the finality of this decision to file an appropriate public land
Caro vs. Sucaldito application otherwise he shall lose his preferential right thereto.

covering the said area of the property which he bought from his father. The SO ORDERED.”5
application was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On November 6,
1980, the Regional Director rendered a Decision4 canceling the said application, _______________
thusly:
4 Id., at p. 432.
“This is a claim of Deogracias de la Cruz to Lot No. 4512, Pls-775 of Calaya, Nueva
Valencia, Guimaras, covered by the above-noted application of Melchor Caro. 5 Records, p. 432.

In the investigation, respondent claims preferential rights over the land as he 599
acquired it through sale from his father Gregorio Caro who had likewise bought
the land from Ruperto Cepellano (sic) in 1953. On the other hand, protestant De VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005
la Cruz testified that the land in controversy was bought by him from Cipriano
Gallego in 1965; that he thereafter occupied, possessed and improved the land 599
by planting coconut trees; and that in 1968 he was forcibly driven out by
Gregorio Caro from the land in question. Caro vs. Sucaldito

Verification of the records disclosed that the land which was actually sold to Caro filed a notice of appeal before the Regional Land Office in Iloilo City,
Gregorio Caro by Ruperto Gepellano (sic) is Assessor’s Lot No. 160. The docketed as MNR Case No. 5207. However, the appeal was dismissed in an
156

Order6 dated June 29, 1982, on the ground of failure to file an appeal 9 Id., at pp. 461-463.
memorandum within the reglementary period therefor.
10 Records, pp. 1-4.
On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of Lot No. 4512, filed an
Application for a Free Patent7 covering the said lot, and was issued Free Patent 11 Id., at pp. 16-20.
No. 597599. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. F-27162 in her favor. Sucaldito then filed a Petition 600
for Writ of Possession8 before the RTC of Iloilo City, which was granted in an
Order9 dated May 7, 1984. 600

Thereafter, on February 20, 1984, Caro filed a Complaint10 against Sucaldito for SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“Annulment of Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of Ownership and/or
Possession with Damages” before the RTC of Iloilo City. He later filed an Caro vs. Sucaldito
amended complaint,11 alleging that he was the owner of the subject lot, and
had been in possession of the same “since 1953 and/or even prior thereto in the Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the subject
concept of owner, adversely, openly, continuously and notoriously.” He further lot in favor of Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had no right
alleged that the said lot had been declared for tax purposes in his name and that whatsoever over the subject lot. Hence, as a “trustee of a constructive trust,”
of his predecessors-in-interest, and that the corresponding land taxes had been she was obliged to return the same to him as the lawful owner. The complaint
paid therefor. He claimed that Assessor’s Lot No. 160 had actually been divided contained the following prayer:
into two lots, namely, Lot No. 4511 and Lot No. 4512; Sucaldito had actually
been claiming Lot No. 989 (Lot No. 4512), which was located two kilometers “WHEREFORE, it is prayed that judgment be rendered:
away. He lamented that despite the overwhelming evidence proving his
ownership and possession of the said property, the Bureau of Lands did not 1. Ordering the annulment and voiding of the decision of the Bureau of Lands,
award it to him. the free patent and the Original Certificate of Title No. F-27162 or in the
alternative;
_______________ 2. Ordering defendant to reconvey the ownership and in the event she wrests
possession from plaintiff then, also the possession of Lot 4512 PLS-775 of Nueva
6 Id., at pp. 447-449. Valencia, Guimaras Cadastre, back to plaintiff;
3. Declaring plaintiff as the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 4512 PLS-775 of
7 Id., at p. 452. Nueva Valencia, Guimaras Cadastre and ordering the issuance of a free patent or
a torrens title in favor of plaintiff;
8 Id., at pp. 458-460.
157

4. Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff P50,000.00 as moral damages, “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint filed by plaintiff is dismissed.
P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P2,000.00 as expenses on litigation plus The counterclaim of defendant which is merely the result of the filing of the
exemplary damages in an amount at the discretion of this Court. complaint, is likewise dismissed.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief just and equitable in the premises.”12
Costs against the plaintiff.
In her answer with counterclaim, Sucaldito interposed, as a special affirmative
defense, the fact that she intervened in the proceedings on Caro’s application SO ORDERED.”14
for a free patent over Lot No. 4512 before the Bureau of Lands having bought
the subject land from De la Cruz. Moreover, contrary to the allegations of the Citing the case of Maximo v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III,15 the trial
petitioner, Lot No. 989 and Lot No. 4512 were one and the same lot, as per the court ruled that Caro had no personality to file the action for the annulment of
findings of the Bureau of Lands. the free patent issued in favor of Sucaldito, which could only be brought by the
Solicitor General. It held that “an applicant for a free patent who is not the
The parties thereafter presented evidence to prove their respective claims. In a owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an action in court to recover the land, for
Decision13 dated December 7, 1993, the the court may not usurp the authority of the Director of Lands and the Secretary
of Agriculture to dispose lands of the public domain through administrative
_______________ proceedings under the Public Land Act,”16 or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended. The trial court further stressed that the remedy of a rival-applicant for
12 Records, p. 20. a free patent over the same land was through administrative channels, not
judicial, because even if the oppositor succeeds in annulling the title of the
13 Id., at pp. 523-533. applicant, the former does not thereby become the owner of the land in
dispute.17
601
The trial court also declared that contrary to Caro’s claims, the evidence clearly
VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005 showed that Lot No. 4512, with an area of 70,677 square meters, was not
included in Assessor’s Lot No. 160, thus:
601
Assessor’s Lot 160 is Cadastral Lot 4511, which has an original area of around 17
Caro vs. Sucaldito hectares, more or less, later on, increased to 21 hectares. If we add Lot 4512 to
Lot 4511 following the contention of
trial court ruled in favor of the respondent and dismissed the petitioner’s
complaint. The dispositive portion reads: _______________

14 Id., at p. 533.
158

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NO PERSONALITY TO


15 G.R. No. 61113, 21 February 1990, 182 SCRA 420. BRING THE ACTION;

16 CA Rollo, p. 32. II

17 Id., at p. 34. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE
PERSONALITY TO BRING THE ACTION STILL HE CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT IN
602 QUESTION, CAD. LOT NO. 4512;

602 III

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO RECONVEY THE LAND
IN QUESTION TO PLAINTIFF AND TO PAY DAMAGES.19
Caro vs. Sucaldito
The CA dismissed the petition in its Decision20 dated July 31, 2002. The
the plaintiff, then the area would be more than 28 hectares. Thus, belying the appellate court agreed with the ruling of the RTC that the petitioner had no
claim of plaintiff that Lot 4512 was formerly a part of Assessor’s Lot 160. personality to file the action under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
considering further that he was a mere applicant for a free patent. Citing
The contention of the plaintiff that the defendant is claiming Lot 989 which is
owned by Felix Galabo and located at Brgy. Olacon, is not well taken, because _______________
the identification of the lot as stated in the tax declaration is not binding and
conclusive. What is binding and conclusive is what is stated in the title of the 18 CA Rollo, pp. 35-36.
land and its technical description. In the technical description as found in the
title of the defendant [Sucaldito], it is clearly stated therein that the lot is Lot 19 Id., at p. 45.
4512 and is located at Brgy. Calaya and not Brgy. Olacon, Nueva Valencia,
Guimaras.18 20 Id., at pp. 80-87.

Aggrieved by the trial court’s ruling, Caro elevated the case to the CA on the 603
following grounds:
VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005
I
603
159

Caro vs. Sucaldito 21 Floralde v. Court of Appeals, 337 SCRA 371 (2000); Crusaders Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 332 SCRA 819 (2000);
several cases,21 the appellate court ruled that the findings of fact made by and Ocampo v. Commission on Elections, 325 SCRA 636. (Id., at p. 86).
administrative agencies which are supported by substantial evidence must be
respected, particularly where the question demands the exercise of sound 22 Ibid.
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge and experience.22
23 Rollo, pp. 55-56.
Caro filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate
court denied in a Resolution23 dated February 7, 2003. 24 Id., at p. 26.

Caro, now the petitioner, assails the ruling of the appellate court on the 604
following grounds:
604
THAT THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONER HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THIS ACTION; SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

THAT THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL Caro vs. Sucaldito
INTERPOSED BY PETITIONER ON THE GROUND THAT ONLY THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL CAN FILE AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY case. The petitioner cites Vital v. Anore, et al.25 to bolster his claim. The
PATENT.24 petitioner also cites Director of Lands v. Abanilla26 where the Court stressed
that any false statement in the application, which is an essential condition of the
The petitioner insists that contrary to the ruling of the CA, he has the legal patent or title under Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, “shall ipso facto
personality to bring and institute the present action against the respondent, produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted.”
considering that title issued on the basis of a patent is annullable on the ground
of fraud. Furthermore, the one-year period within which to file an action to In her comment, the respondent points out that the decision of the Bureau of
cancel a torrens title under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not Lands itself would show that the petitioner is not the true and lawful owner of
apply where the registered owner, or the successor-in-interest, knew that the the subject lot; as such, the argument that he has the legal personality to file the
property described in the title actually belongs to another, as in this action for annulment of patent based on constructive trust is untenable. The
respondent further contends that the CA did not err in upholding the ruling of
_______________ the RTC.

The petitioner merely reiterated his previous arguments in his Reply dated
December 30, 2003.
160

an action for reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property does not go
The Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC and the CA, and holds that the back to the State.29
petitioner has no personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject
property. Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to
revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering
The Court notes that the petitioner’s complaint before the RTC prays for the that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its
annulment of the free patent issued in the respondent’s favor. Considering that cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.30
the ultimate relief sought is for the respondent to “return” the subject property
to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance. In De Guzman v. Court of Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,31 every action must be prosecuted
Appeals,27 the Court held that “[t]he essence of an action for reconveyance is or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one “who stands to be
that the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.” Corollarily, legal standing has
sought instead is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the
erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to one party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.
with a better right.”28 Indeed, in Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act
or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question
_______________ involved.32

25 90 Phil. 855 (1952). Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed.
In this case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a
26 G.R. No. L-26324, 31 August 1983, 124 SCRA 358. mere applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered as a party-in-
interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.
27 442 Phil. 534; 394 SCRA 302 (2002).
_______________
28 Id., at p. 543. (Citations omitted).
29 Section 122 of the Land Registration Act; See also Republic of the Philippines
605 v. Heirs of Angeles, 439 Phil. 349; 390 SCRA 502 (2002).

VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005 30 De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, supra.

605 31 The provision reads in full:

Caro vs. Sucaldito Sec. 2. Parties in interest.—A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
161

law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of 1989]. In fact, a final judgment may be invalidated if the real parties-in-interest
the real party in interest. are not included. This was underscored by the Court in Arcelona v. CA [280 SCRA
20, October 2, 1997], in which a final judgment was nullified because
32 Tichangco v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 150629, 30 June 2004, 433 SCRA 324, citing indispensable parties were not impleaded.
Velarde v. Social Justice Society, 428 SCRA 283 (2004).
In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public
606 land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales
patents thereon, respondents have no personality to file the suit. Neither will
606 they be directly affected by the judgment in such suit.34

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED In De la Peña v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court, in dismissing the petitioner’s
imputation of fraud in securing a free patent and title over a parcel of land,
Caro vs. Sucaldito declared that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the
property alleged to be erroneously titled in another’s name.36 The Court further
The Court, citing several of its holdings, expounded on this doctrine in Tankiko v. expounded:
Cezar33 as follows:
_______________
. . . Thus, in Lucas v. Durian [102 Phil. 1157 (1957)], the Court affirmed the
dismissal of a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the patent was 33 G.R. No. 131277, 2 February 1999, 302 SCRA 559.
obtained by fraudulent means and, consequently, prayed for the annulment of
said patent and the cancellation of a certificate of title. The Court declared that 34 Id., at pp. 569-570.
the proper party to bring the action was the government, to which the property
would revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state 35 G.R. No. 81827, 28 March 1994, 231 SCRA 456.
a cause of action, the Court in Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio [104 Phil. 126 (1958)]
noted that the plaintiff, being a mere homestead applicant, was not the real 36 Id., at p. 461.
party-in-interest to institute an action for reconveyance. . . .
607
...
VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005
Verily, the Court stressed that “. . . [i]f the suit is not brought in the name of or
against the real party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground 607
that the complaint states no cause of action [Travel Wide v. CA, 199 SCRA 205,
209 (1991), per Cruz, J. See also Suguister v. Tamayo, 176 SCRA 579, August 21, Caro vs. Sucaldito
162

_______________
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles
legally issued by the State [Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 (1936)]. In such 37 Supra.
cases, the real party-in-interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the
property would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, 38 G.R. No. 121159, 16 December 2002, 394 SCRA 74.
that the free patent issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on
the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the 39 Id., at pp. 79-80. (Citations omitted).
law. Not being an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot ask for
reconveyance.37 608

In VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,38 where the private 608
respondents therein were mere lessees of the property in question, the Court
ruled that as mere lessees, they had “no present substantial and personal SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
interest with respect to issues involving ownership of the disputed property.”
The Court went on to declare: Caro vs. Sucaldito

. . . The only interest they have, in the event the petitioner’s title over the This provision was applied and discussed in Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First
subject property is cancelled and ownership reverts to the State, is the hope that Instance of Cotabato, et al.,40 a case on all fours with the present one, as
they become qualified buyers of the subject parcel of land. Undoubtedly, such follows:
interest is a mere expectancy. Even the private respondents themselves claim
that in case of reversion of ownership to the State, they only have “pre-emptive Under Section 101 of the above reproduced, only the Solicitor General or the
rights” to buy the subject property; that their real interest over the said property officer acting in his stead may bring the action for reversion. Consequently,
is contingent upon the government’s consideration of their application as buyers Sumail may not bring such action or any action which would have the effect of
of the same. It is settled that a suit filed by a person who is not a party-in- cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the
interest must be dismissed.39 basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will again form part
of the public domain. Furthermore, there is another reason for withholding legal
In fact, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 states— personality from Sumail. He does not claim the land to be his private property. In
fact, by his application for a free patent, he had formally acknowledged and
Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the recognized the land to be a part of the public domain; this, aside from the
public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor declaration made by the cadastral court that lot 3633 was public land.
General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Consequently, even if the parcel were declared reverted to the public domain,
Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines. Sumail does not automatically become the owner thereof. He is a mere public
land applicant like others who may apply for the same.
163

Notes.—The rightful application of the docrine highlighted in Heirs of Jose Olgiva


To reiterate, the petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for vs. C.A., 227 SCRA 330 (1993), that the right to seek reconveyance of property
reconveyance that would result in the reversion of the land to the actually in possession of the plaintiff is imprescriptible would only cover a
government.41 The petitioner has no personality to “recover” the property as he sitution where the possession is in the concept of an owner. (Tan vs. Court of
has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.42 Appeals, 295 SCRA 247 [1998])

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The It is only the State which may institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45503 and the Resolution the Public Land Act. (Urquiaga vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 738 [1999])
dated February 7, 2003 are AFFIRMED.
——o0o—— Caro vs. Sucaldito, 458 SCRA 595, G.R. No. 157536 May 16, 2005
SO ORDERED.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

_______________

40 96 Phil. 946 (1955).

41 Abejaron v. Nabasa, 411 Phil. 552; 359 SCRA 47 (2001).

42 De Ocampo v. Arlos, G.R. No. 135527, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 716.

609

VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005

609

Mayon Hotel & Restaurant vs. Adana

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.


164

G.R. No. 170189. September 1, 2010.* Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a
parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.
SPOUSES ELEGIO** CAÑEZO and DOLIA CAÑEZO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
APOLINARIO and CONSORCIA L. BAUTISTA, respondents. Same; Same; Same; In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper,
it is indispensable, in accordance with the precedents established by the courts,
Civil Law; Property; Accion Reivindicatoria; Accion reivindicatoria is an action that the party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of the
whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of thing claimed, but also the identity of the same.—In order that an action for the
its full possession.—The present case, while inaccurately captioned as an action recovery of title may prosper, it is indispensable, in accordance with the
for a “Writ of Demolition with Damages” is in reality an action to recover a precedents established by the courts, that the party who prosecutes it must fully
parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity of the
Article 434 of the Civil Code reads: “In an action to recover, the property must be same. However, although the identity of the thing that a party desires to recover
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the must be established, if the plaintiff has already proved his right of ownership
weakness of the defendant’s claim.” Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of over a tract of land, and the defendant is occupying without right any part of
ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper such tract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to establish the precise location and
regional trial court. extent of the portions occupied by the defendant within the plaintiff’s property.

_______________ PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

** Additional member per Special Order No. 879 dated August 13, 2010. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

* SECOND DIVISION. Marcelino P. Arias for petitioners.

** “Eligio” in some parts of the Records. Jesus B. Roldan for respondents.

581 CARPIO, J.:

VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 G.R. No. 170189 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on
17 October 2005 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CV No.
581 75685. The appellate court granted the appeal filed by the Spouses Apolinario
and Consorcia L. Bautista (spouses Bautista) and dismissed the complaint for the
Cañezo vs. Bautista issuance of a writ of demolition with dam-

_______________
165

31727. Both parcels of land are located at Coronado Heights, Barangka Ibaba,
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Mandaluyong City and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong
City. Appellants’ lot is adjacent to that of appellees [sic].
2 Rollo, pp. 50-54. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with
Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring. Sometime in 1995, appellees started the construction of a building on their lot.
During the construction, appellees discovered that their lot was encroached
582 upon by the structures built by appellants without appellees’ knowledge and
consent.
582
The three (3) surveys conducted confirmed the fact of encroachment. However,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED despite oral and written demands, appellants failed and refused to remove the
structures encroaching appellees’ lot.
Cañezo vs. Bautista
Attempts were made to settle their dispute with the barangay lupon, but to no
ages filed by the Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo (spouses Cañezo) without avail. Appellees initiated a complaint with the RTC for the issuance of a writ of
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action with the proper forum. In its demolition.
Decision3 on Civil Case No. MC-00-1069 dated 25 March 2002, Branch 213 of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City (trial court) rendered judgment in favor _______________
of the spouses Cañezo. The trial court also ordered the issuance of a writ of
demolition directing the removal of the structures built by the spouses Bautista 3 Id., at pp. 39-41. Penned by Judge Amalia F. Dy.
on the portion of the land belonging to the spouses Cañezo.
583
The Facts
VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010
The appellate court narrated the facts as follows:
583
“Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo (hereafter appellees) are the registered
owner[s] of a parcel of land with an area of One Hundred Eighty Six (186) square Cañezo vs. Bautista
meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 32911.
For failure to file an Answer within the extended period granted by the court,
Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia Bautista (hereafter appellants) are the appellants were declared in default. Appellees were allowed to present their
registered owners of a parcel of land, containing an area of One Hundred Eighty evidence ex parte before an appointed commissioner. Thereafter the RTC
One (181) square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. rendered the assailed decision in the terms earlier set forth.”4
166

The spouses Cañezo filed their complaint for the issuance of a writ of demolition 584
with damages on 13 April 2000. In an Order dated 15 August 2000, the trial court
declared the spouses Bautista in default for failure to answer within the SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
reglementary period. The Public Attorney’s Office, which represented the
spouses Bautista at the time, filed a Motion to Admit Answer dated 15 June Cañezo vs. Bautista
2000. The trial court denied the motion in its Decision.
1. the defendant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 (Philippine Currency) as and by
The Trial Court’s Ruling way of moral damages[; and]

On 25 March 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the 2. [t]he defendant is hereby ordered to pay P30,000.00 as and by way of
spouses Cañezo. The trial court found that the spouses Bautista built structures attorney’s fees.
encroaching on the land owned by the spouses Cañezo. The spouses Bautista
also refused to remove the structures and respect the boundaries as established SO ORDERED.”5
by the various surveyors. A referral to the Barangay Lupon failed to settle the
controversy amicably. The trial court thus ruled that the spouses Bautista are The spouses Bautista filed a notice of appeal dated 29 April 2002 before the
builders in bad faith, such that the spouses Cañezo are entitled to an issuance of appellate court.
a writ of demolition with damages.
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
On 17 October 2005, the appellate court rendered its Decision which reversed
“IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and the 25 March 2002 Decision of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that
against the defendants. Let a writ of demolition be accordingly issued directing since the last demand was made on 27 March 2000, or more than a year before
the removal/demolition of the structures built by the defendants upon the the filing of the complaint, the spouses Cañezo should have filed a suit for
portion of land belonging [to] the plaintiffs at the former’s expense. recovery of possession and not for the issuance of a writ of demolition. A writ of
demolition can be granted only as an effect of a final judgment or order, hence
Further, the spouses Cañezo’s complaint should be dismissed. The spouses Cañezo failed
to specify the assessed value of the encroached portion of their property.
_______________ Because of this failure, the complaint lacked sufficient basis to constitute a cause
of action. Finally, the appellate court ruled that should there be a finding of
4 Id., at pp. 51-52. encroachment in the action for recovery of possession and that the
encroachment was built in good faith, the market value of the encroached
584 portion should be proved to determine the appropriate indemnity.
167

The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads as follows: The petition has merit.

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The The present case, while inaccurately captioned as an action for a “Writ of
complaint filed by plaintiffs-appellees is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to Demolition with Damages” is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an
the filing of the appropriate action with the proper forum. accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. Article 434 of the Civil
Code reads: “In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the
_______________ plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim.” Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and
5 Id., at p. 41. includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial
court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership
585 over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.8

VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is indispensable,
in accordance with the precedents established by the courts, that the party who
585 prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed,

Cañezo vs. Bautista _______________

SO ORDERED.”6 6 Id., at p. 54.

Issues 7 Id., at p. 11.

The spouses Cañezo enumerated the following grounds to support their Petition: 8 See Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 48050, 10 October 1994, 237 SCRA 565.

I. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting the


petition of the [spouses Bautista] and reversing the Decision of the Court a quo;
[and] 586

II. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in stating that the 586
petitioners should have filed recovery of possession and not writ of demolition.7
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Court’s Ruling
168

Cañezo vs. Bautista


10 Arturo M. Tolentino, 2 Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
but also the identity of the same.9 However, although the identity of the thing the Philippines 72 (1998). Citations omitted.
that a party desires to recover must be established, if the plaintiff has already
proved his right of ownership over a tract of land, and the defendant is 11 Records, pp. 14-18.
occupying without right any part of such tract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to
establish the precise location and extent of the portions occupied by the 12 Id., at pp. 9-10.
defendant within the plaintiff’s property.10
13 Id., at p. 11.
The spouses Cañezo were able to establish their ownership of the encroached
property. Aside from testimonial evidence, the spouses Cañezo were also able to 587
present documentary and object evidence which consisted of photographs,11
transfer certificates of title,12 and a relocation survey plan.13 VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010

The relocation survey plan also corroborated Elegio Cañezo’s testimony on the 587
reason for the spouses Bautista’s attitude regarding the encroached property.
The relocation survey plan showed that the spouses Bautista’s property Cañezo vs. Bautista
encroached upon that of the spouses Cañezo by 0.97 centimeters, while the
spouses Bautista’s property was encroached upon by 1.01 centimeters by Q The witness, your Honor, is pointing to “Lot 13” indicated in the survey plan.
another landowner. Elegio Cañezo testified thus: How about the property of the defendants?

Q I am showing you a survey plan of lot 13. Can you please tell us what is this A The defendants’ property is this, sir.
survey plan?
Q The witness, your Honor, is pointing to “Lot 14” indicated in the survey plan.
A That is the survey plan of the surveyor whom we hired sir. Now, Mr. Witness, you said that the defendants wanted you to recover that
portion of your property encroached on from the property adjacent to theirs.
Q Can you please point to us where in this plan is your property indicated? Please illustrate to us by referring to this survey plan what the defendants
meant?
A This is our property, sir.
A The defendants want us to get the portion they had encroached on from “Lot
_______________ 15” because, according to them, Lot 15 also encroached on their lot, sir.

9 Salacup v. Rambac, 17 Phil. 22, 23 (1910).


169

Q The witness, your Honor, is pointing to “Lot 15” indicated in the plan. What A They refused our offer and insisted on their previous position that we get our
happened next? portion from Lot 15, sir.
588
A We told them that this is not possible because Lot 15 is not adjacent to our
property, sir. 588

Q What did the defendants do? SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

A The defendants still refused to remove their structure, sir. Cañezo vs. Bautista

Q So, what happened? Q What did the Barangay do after failing to settle the case?

A We filed a complaint against the defendants before the Office of the A The Barangay issued a Certification to File Action, sir.14
Barangay Captain of Barangay Barangka, Ibaba, sir.
Given the efforts made by the spouses Cañezo to settle the present issue prior to
Q What happened in the Barangay? the filing of a Complaint, the trial court was justified in ruling that the spouses
Bautista were in default and in not admitting their Answer. The Complaint was
A The Barangay council tried to settle the matter amicably between us. not the spouses Bautista’s first encounter with the present issue. Moreover, the
However, no settlement was reached, sir. spouses Bautista failed to file their Answer even after the expiry of the motion of
extension granted to them.15
Q While in the barangay, did you offer anything to the defendants in order to
settle the case? The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the spouses
Bautista were aware of the encroachment upon their lot by the owner of Lot 15
A Yes, sir. and thus they made a corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the spouses
Cañezo. This awareness of the two encroachments made the spouses Bautista
Q What was it? builders in bad faith. The spouses Cañezo are entitled to the issuance of a writ of
demolition in their favor and against the spouses Bautista, in accordance with
A We offered that if the defendants will remove the structures, we are willing Article 450 of the Civil Code.16
to shoulder half of the expenses for the removal.
We affirm the awards made by the trial court in its Decision:
Q What did the defendants say to this?
“x x x Considering the length of time when [the spouses Cañezo] were deprived
of beneficial use on the subject portion of land owned by them, the [spouses
170

Bautista] are likewise liable to pay P30,000.00 (Philippine Currency) in As regards the prayer for exemplary x x x damages, no sufficient evidence were
accordance with Article 451 of the Civil Code. adduced which would warrant and justify this court to award the same. The
prayer for attorney’s fees however, is found meritorious hence, the same is
_______________ hereby granted.”17

14 Id., at pp. 68-71. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 75685 promulgated on 17 October 2005 is SET ASIDE and the
15 Id., at p. 47. dispositive portion of the Decision of Branch 213, Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City promulgated on 25 March 2002 is AFFIRMED with
16 Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, MODIFICATION. A writ of demolition of the encroaching structures should be
planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that issued against and at the expense of Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L.
the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former Bautista upon the finality of this judgment. Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L.
condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may Bautista are further ordered to pay Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo P30,000 as
compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P30,000 as attorney’s fees. The
proper rent. interest rate of 12% per annum shall apply from the finality of judgment until the
total amount awarded is fully paid.
589
SO ORDERED.
VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010
Nachura, Bersamin,*** Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
589
_______________ Cañezo vs. Bautista, 629 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 170189
Cañezo vs. Bautista September 1, 2010

With respect to the prayer for the award of P50,000.00 (Philippine Currency) as
moral damages, the court decides to give due course to it in view of the fact that
the [spouses Cañezo] satisfactorily proved the existence of the factual basis of
the damages and its causal relation to [the spouses Bautista’s] acts. There was
bad faith on the part of the [spouses Bautista] when they built the structures
upon the land not belonging to them. This wrongful act is the proximate cause
which made the [spouses Cañezo] suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and
serious anxiety. The [spouses Cañezo] positively testified about these matters.
171

Emilia vs. Bado Same; Same; When not available; Reasons.—Where legal title is disputed and
the possessor asserts ownership over the land in controversy, no injunction can
No. L-23685. April 25, 1968. issue to dispossess him. Reason for this is that before the issue of ownership is
determined by evidence, justice and equity demand that the parties be
CIRILA EMILIA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EPIFANIO BADO (Alias Paño), ET AL., maintained in their status quo so that no advantage may be given to one to the
defendants-appellees. prejudice of the other.
184
Same; Same; Same; Exceptions.—There are recognized exceptions to the rule, as
184 where defendant is clearly a mere intruder, or where the action seeks to prevent
a purchaser at an auction sale from molesting the debtor’s co-owners whose
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED rights have not been affected by the sale.

Emilia vs. Bado Actions; Recovery of possession of real property; Kinds of actions.—There are
three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) the
Injunction; Recovery of possession of real property; Injunction as a remedy.— summary action for forcible entry (where preliminary mandatory injunction may
Injunctions are not available to take property out of possession or control of one be sought within ten days from the filing of the complaint under article 539 of
party and place it into that of another whose title has not clearly been the Civil Code) or illegal detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical
established. Where injunction was sought to recover possession of real property, possession only and is brought within one year in the municipal court; (b) the
the limited concept of injunction may not be availed of while the rights between accion publiciana, which is f or the recovery of the right to possess and is a
the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (c)
irreparable injury will be done which can not be compensated in damages. To accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership, which includes
hold otherwise, would be to render practically of no effect the various provisions the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, also brought in the Court of First Instance.
of the code touching many if not most of the ordinary actions, and the
enforcement of judgment in such actions. If a complainant could secure relief by APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance
injunction in every case where the defendant is doing or threatens or is about to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of 185
plaintiff’s rights and could enforce the judgment granting the injunction by the
summary contempt proceedings authorized in section 172 of the code to punish
violations of injunctions, he would seldom elect to enforce his rights in such VOL. 23, APRIL 25, 1968
cases by the ordinary remedies involving the difficult and oftimes fruitless labor
of enforcing judgment obtained therein by execution. (Citing Devesa v. Arbes, 13 185
Phil. 273).
Emilia, vs. Bado
172

being held by him. They averred, too, that the house did not encroach upon the
of Lanao del Norte. Pineda, J. boundaries of plaintiff’s adjoining property (Lot 1131).

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Obviously of the belief that procedural niceties should

Manuel Deaño for plaintiff-appellant. _____________

Irene D. Jurado for defendants-appellees. 1 Civil Case 751, Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, entitled “Cirila Emilia,
Plaintiff, vs. Epifanio Bado alias Paño), Roque Marianas, Simplicio Marianas and
SANCHEZ, J.: Mario Marianas, Primitivo Aranas, Eustiquio Sabihon, Alfredo Salim and Glicerio
Bado, Defendants.”
The relief prayed for but denied in an order of the court below, now the subject
of the present appeal, is that injunction issue to restrain defendants from 186
continuing with the construction of a house of light materials on a 48-square
meter area on the northern border of plaintiff’s land. 186

The suit started on December 12, 1963 with the complaint, as amended,1 that SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
on or about December 1,1962, defendants, confederating and helping one
another, entered plaintiff’s land and commenced the construction of a house of Emilia vs. Bado
light materials on the northern boundary of her Lot 1131 in Iligan City bordering
the bank of Salabao Creek, covered by her Torrens Title 0–267; that the not bar consideration of the equities of the case,2 the trial court, on the face of
continuance of such act against the will of plaintiff would cause great and the conflicting assertions of fact, called for a summary hearing.
irreparable damage and injury and injustice to her; and that there is no other
plan, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Whereupon, On February 27, 1964, the trial court came out with an order sustaining the
she prayed for preliminary and final injunction and damages. Preliminary motion to dismiss. The court gave credence to the testimony of surveyor
injunction was issued ex-parte. Flordelito Aragon (also a deputy public land surveyor) that the house under
construction was within Glicerio Bado’s Lot 2894 (Torrens Title 0–275) and not
Plaintiff’s said complaint was met by defendants’ motion to dismiss upon the on plaintiff’s Lot 1131 (Torrens Title 0–267). The trial court took the position that
ground of lack of cause of action. They attached to their motion the sketch of a to stop defendants from building a house within Glicerio Bado’s lot “would be
private land surveyor, Flordelito Aragon, and his affidavit, both of which were tantamount to depriving” the enjoyment of his lawful dominical rights; that even
intended to convey the alleged fact that the new house being constructed was on the assumption that defendant Glicerio Bado’s title to Lot 2894 was obtained
inside defendant Glicerio Bado’s Lot 2894 (covered by his Torrens Title 0–275) through fraud, as plaintiff avers, nonetheless, said title subsists until declared
null and void by a competent court; and that these circumstances would tie up
173

the hands of the court from granting the relief prayed for. Whereupon, the court
dissolved the preliminary injunction theretofore issued, and dismissed the the judicial proceedings leading to the issuance of the decree are valid.
complaint.
The pivotal facts that the record discloses may thus be summarized this way:
1. The procedural question presented asks of us a ruling as to whether injunction Plaintiff claims that the house being built is on her land; defendants, on the
is the proper remedy in the premises. other hand, say that that house is on the land of Glicerio Bado. Both hold
Torrens titles. The lower court, prima facie at least, believes that there is factual
Whether defendant Glicerio Bado’s lot is registrable or not, because, as plaintiff support for defendants’ averment.
avers, that land registered in the name of defendant Glicerio Bado is a creek—
Salabao Creek—is beside the point here. Unless and until plaintiff succeeds in The remedy of injunction has been the subject of numerous judicial
annulling the decree of registration in defendant’s favor which she has sought in pronouncements. The court cannot now afford to depart from the well-ingrained
the cadastral proceedings, that title subsists.3 It is to be presumed that precept that injunctions are not available to take property out of possession or
control of one party and place it into that of another whose title has not clearly
______________ been established. Instructive in this respect is the early 1909 decision in Devesa
vs. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273, where injunction was sought to recover possession of real
2 The procedural rule, it is to be recalled, is that where a motion to dismiss is property. Mr. Justice Carson there pithily summed up4 the limited concept of
grounded on lack of cause of action, resolution of said motion should be injunction which may not be availed of “while the rights between the parties are
determined on the basis only of the facts alleged in the complaint, and on no undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable
others. 1 Mo-ran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 429, citing Asejo injury will be done’, which cannot be compensated in damages.” To hold
vs. Leonoso, 78 Phil. 467. otherwise, Mr. Justice Carson continued to say, “would be to render practically
of no effect the various provisions of the code (of civil procedure) touching many
3 See: Plaintiff’s petition for review and/or to cancel Glicerio Bado’s Certificate if not most of the ordinary actions, and the enforcement of judgment in such
of Title No. 0–275 filed on November 21, 1963 in Cadastral Case N-4 (LRC actions; for it may well be supposed that if a complainant could secure relief by
Cadastral Record N-267), Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, and the injunction in every case where ‘the defendant is- doing or threatens or is about
answer thereto of defendant Glicerio Bado. Record on Appeal, pp. 55–60, 82–84. to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of
the plaintiff’s rights’ and could enforce the judgment granting the injunction by
187 the summary contempt proceedings authorized in section 172 of the code to
punish violations of injunctions, he would seldom elect to enforce his rights in
VOL. 23, APRIL 25, 1968 such cases by the ordinary remedies, involving as they do the difficult and
ofttimes fruitless labor of enforcing judgments obtained there-
187
_______________
Emilia vs. Bado
174

4 At p. 278. 5 At p. 279.

188 6 Gordillo vs. Del Rosario, 39 Phil. 829, 835, citing Devesa vs. Arbes, supra;
Golding vs. Balatbat, infra; Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225, 229. See also:
188 Asombra vs. Dorado, 36 Phil. 883, 885; Tiongson vs. Martinez, 36 Phil. 948, 952;
Rustia vs. Franco, 41 Phil. 280, 283; Santos vs. De Leon, 60 Phil. 573, 575.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
7 3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p, 68, citing Calo vs.
Emilia vs. Bado Ortega, L-4673 and L-4675, January 25, 1952.

in by execution.”5 8 Rustia vs. Franco, supra; Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, supra; De Garcia vs. Santos, 79
Phil. 365, 369–370; Barrameda vs. Gontang, L-24110, February 18, 1967.
Long divorced from doubt is the doctrine that where legal title is disputed and
the possessor asserts ownership over the land in controversy, no injunction can 9 Cabuhat vs. Ansay, 42 Phil. 170, 176.
issue to dispossess him.6 Reason for this is that before the issue of ownership is
determined by evidence, justice and equity demand that the parties be 10 Golding vs. Balatbat, 36 Phil. 941, 946; Liongson vs. Martinez, supra, at p. 952;
maintained in their status quo so that no advantage may be given to one to the De Leon vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 203, 205. Section 5, Rule 58, Rules of
prejudice of the other.7 Court, categorically provides that “[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted
without notice to the defendant unless it shall appear from facts shown by
Given the fact that there is the debatable question of where the house was affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or irreparable injury would
being erected, we say that adherence to the precept just enunciated is a result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice. x x x.”
forbidding obstacle to the grant of injunction.
189
2. To be sure, there are recognized exceptions to the rule, as where defendant is
clearly a mere intruder,8 or where the action seeks to prevent a purchaser at an VOL. 23, APRIL 25, 1968
auction sale from molesting the debtor’s coowners whose rights have not been
affected by the sale.9 But these, generally upon hearing and not upon ex parte 189
application for injunction.10
Emilia, vs. Bado
3. Upon well-entrenched jurisprudence, plaintiff’s prin-
cipal suit for injunction cannot, at bottom, prosper because there is an adequate
_____________ remedy in law open to her. It is elementary to the point of triteness that the
175

special remedy of injunction may not issue where there is a plain, speedy and Leon, supra, at pp. 574–575; Wagan vs. Sideco, 60 Phil. 685, 688; Coronado vs.
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Tan, 96 Phil. 129, 732.

It is in line with the principle just enunciated that in affirming Devesa vs. Arbes, 12 See: 3 Moran, op. cit., p. 272, citing cases.
supra, Palafox vs. Madamba, 19 Phil. 444, 446, declared in no uncertain terms
that injunction is not the appropriate remedy where “there exists the ordinary 190
remedy of action for property of possession, which may be either plenary or
summary, according to the method by which she may have been deprived of her 190
alleged possession.” A long line of cases has since then stabilized the principle.11
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Under the present state of the law, there are three kinds of actions available to
recover possession of real property: (a) the summary action for forcible entry JRS Business Corporation vs. Montesa
(where preliminary mandatory injunction may be sought within ten days from
the filing of the complaint under Article 539 of the Civil Code) or illegal detainer, other hand, also professes ownership over the same portion of land backed up,
which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one too, by a Torrens title in his name. From these two directly opposing positions, a
year in the municipal court; (b) the action publiciana, which is for the recovery of legitimate issue of ownership emerges. This guides us to no other conclusion
the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a than that plaintiff Cirila Emilia should have brought suit for ownership (acción de
Court of First Instance; and (c) acción de reivindicación, which seeks the recovery reivindicación). Correctly did the trial judge dissolve the preliminary injunction
of ownership, which includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, also brought in wrongfully issued and refuse the grant of a perpetual injunction sought by her.
the Court of First Instance.12
4. In a situation like the present, it was suggested in Devesa vs. Arbes, supra, that
Plaintiff Cirila Emilia claims ownership of a 48-square meter portion of land, it would not be improper if the record were to be returned to the court of origin
which she avers is covered by Torrens title in her name. Defendant Glicerio with instructions to further amend the complaint,13 such that the question of
Bado, on the ownership and possession (accion reivindicatoria) may bring about a head-on
contest between plaintiff and Glicerio Bado in the same injunction case. As we
______________ make an appraisal of the record before us, however, we are constrained to say
that confusion may arise because of the so many pleadings filed and court
11 Evangelista vs. Pedreños, 27 Phil. 648, 650–651; Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 29 Phil. actuations taken before this decision. With the voluminous record, difficulty may
542, 550–551; Asombra vs. Dorado, supra, at pp. 885–886; Golding vs. Balatbat, arise in pinpointing the exact issue between the parties. Administration of justice
supra, at pp. 945–947; Liongson vs. Martinez, supra, at pp. 951–953; Rustia vs. could suffer thereby. And then, there is the continued pendency of this case
Franco, supra; Kabankalan Sugar Co. vs. Rubin, 54 Phil. 645, 654; Piit vs. De Lara, which has been started since nearly five years ago. A final decision on the validity
58 Phil. 765, 767; De Leon vs. Director of Lands, supra, at p. 205; Santos vs. De of Glicerio Bado’s title in the cadastral proceeding could yet prevent further
controversy between the parties.
176

Upon the view we take of this case, we vote to affirm the order of February 27,
1964, dismissing the complaint. With costs against plaintiff-appellant. So
ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

Order affirmed.

______________ Emilia vs. Bado, 23 SCRA 183, No. L-23685 April 25, 1968
177

G.R. No. 132424. May 4, 2006.* hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are
distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the
SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ, petitioners, vs. defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and FRANCISCA FABELLA, prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant
respondents. is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
Actions; Possession; Ejectment; Jurisdictions; Three Kinds of Actions Available to right to possess. The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in
Recover Possession of Real Property; Accion interdictal comprises two distinct nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both
causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the
(desahuico), the jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of
lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.—Under unlawful detainer.The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to
recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; Same; Same; Same; Same; Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the
and (c) accion reivindicatoria. Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court
action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.—Accion publiciana is the
In forcible entry, plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the
proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one
_______________ year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession
of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the
* FIRST DIVISION. complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff
out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will
be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On
370 the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also
brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.

370 Same; Same; Same; Same; To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is
essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered—
such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals recovered to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer, not
forcible entry.—To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the
one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the
intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.
illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to
178

371 vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary
that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as
VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on
its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The jurisdictional
371 facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the
Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful proper regional trial court.
detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas, 22
SCRA 1257 (1968): But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance 372
of the owner, still, distinction should be made. If right at the incipiency
defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the 372
latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court
under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
vacate. x x x x A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word
“tolerance” confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize
a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer—not of forcible entry. PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land
which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
detainer.—It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines
the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry Aventino B. Claveria for petitioners.
is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry.
If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the Juan Moreno for respondents.
case is unlawful detainer.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Same; Same; Same; Same; To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment
of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which spouses Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez, seeks to nullify and set
the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.—To aside the 22 April 1997 decision1 and 30 January 1998 resolution of the Court of
179

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43492, which reversed the judgment, dated 8 January 4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to
1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to
3607, which, in turn, affirmed in toto the decision rendered by the Municipal vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied;
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2547. 5. That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still
refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully;
This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners 6. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the
Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca case amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the necessary
Fabella before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges Certification to File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the
these material facts: necessary cause of action be taken before the proper court, xerox copy of which
is hereto attached marked as Annex “C”;
“2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot 7. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of the
denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk. 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. defendants to vacate/surrender the premises in question, the herein plaintiffs
Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. were constrained to engage the professional services of counsel thus incurring
Sometime [i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is expenses amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing
hereto attached marked as Annex “A” and the xerox copy of the Torrens acceptance fee and additional ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per
Certificate of Title in her name marked as Annex “B”; appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal demand was likewise ignored,
_______________ (sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “D”;
8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to
1 Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña with Associate Justices Artemon vacate/surrender the said premises in question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious
D. Luna and Artemio G. Tuquero, concurring. anxiety, sleepless nights, mental torture and moral erosion; x x x”2
In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to
373 state that petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that they
were the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private respondents claimed
VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open, continuous,
and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by an
373 ocular inspection report from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
_______________
3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot
by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs 2 Rollo, pp. 88-90.
rightful possession thereof;
374
180

show that they had given the petitioners the right to occupy the premises, which
374 right has now [been] extinguished.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED x x x

Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial
Court before which the action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over
They also stressed that the complaint failed to comply with Supreme Court the case. Consequently, the dismissal thereof is in order.
Circular No. 28-91 regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.
375
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners,
ordering private respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006
and occupation of the same plus attorney’s fees.
375
Private respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The RTC, in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the decision Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
of the MTC. Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals on 10 March 1997 questioning the decision of the RTC. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and GRANTED. The
decision dated 08 January 1997 rendered by the respondent court is hereby
In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
the decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for
detainer because they failed to show that they had given the private lack of jurisdiction.”3
respondents the right to occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private
respondents’ possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution
detainer cases. It added that the allegations in petitioners’ complaint lack dated 30 January 1998.4
jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which requires an allegation of prior
material possession. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus: Hence, the instant petition.

“An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration:5
will support an action for ejectment are conspicuously lacking. In particular, an
allegation of prior material possession is mandatory in forcible entry, x x x and A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY MADE
the complaint is deficient in this respect. On the other hand, neither does there OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
appear to be a case of unlawful detainer, since the private respondents failed to
181

B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE COMPLAINT, THE Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT. publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.6
Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed together.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In forcible entry, one is
case for unlawful detainer having alleged that private respondents unlawfully deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation,
withheld from them the possession of the property in question, which allegation strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds
is sufficient to establish a case for unlawful detainer. They further contend that possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
the summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy available to the owner if under any contract, express or implied.8 The two are distinguished from each
another occupies the land at the former’s tolerance or permission without any other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the
contract between the two as the latter is bound by an implied promise to vacate beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while
the land upon demand by the owner. in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.9
_______________
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the
3 Id., p. 91. proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.10 Both actions must be
brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of
4 Id., pp. 152-155. forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.11
The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
5 Id., p. 146.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which
376 should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has
lasted for more than one
376
_______________
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6 Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-48050, 10 October 1994, 237 SCRA 565, 572-
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals 573.

The petition is not meritorious. 7 Id.

8 Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 184; 362 SCRA 755, 766 (2001).
182

If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we


9 Id. do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue
before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the
10 Javier v. Veridiano II, supra note 6, pp. 572-573. date of the demand to vacate.

11 Id., p. 572. x x x x

377 A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms
our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from
VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 the start of possession sought to be recov-

377 _______________

Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals 12 Id., p. 573.

year.12 It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of 13 Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 543.
possession of realty independently of title.13 In other words, if at the time of the
filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had 14 Javier v. Veridiano II, supra note 6, pp. 572-573.
turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal,
the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion 15 Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, 10
publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover September 2003, 410 SCRA 485, 490.
ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding.14 16 Id.

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s 17 131 Phil. 365; 22 SCRA 1257 (1968).
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered.15 Otherwise, if the possession 378
was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an
improper remedy.16 As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:17 378

“But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
distinction should be made.
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
183

18 Id., pp. 372-373; pp. 1264-1265.


ered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer—not of forcible
entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for 19 Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146, 156; 250 SCRA 108, 116 (1995).
two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right
of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress—in the 20 Id.
inferior court—provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is
allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and 379
the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior
court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006
lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible
entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical 379
possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court—
upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in—and summarily throw Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in
mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
the summary nature of the action.”18 (Italics supplied) where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.21 Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of
action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, Appeals,22 petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent
then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate
however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners
case is unlawful detainer. as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not
petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled:23
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings “Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property
the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by
remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.19 The complaint must private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after her death, by
show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on December,
testimony.20 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x

_______________ It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant
illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in
184

unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as
must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.”
sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners’ cause of action fails. The
appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz,24
alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer merely contained the bare
unsubstantiated. x x x allegations that (1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after
its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and (2) her allegedly
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance. The court, in finding
inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for unlawful detainer, held:
defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon
without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, their To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have
mother. x x x Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected clandestinely, been present at the beginning of the possession. x x x
without
x x x x
_______________
In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment
21 Id. of fact that would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or
tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz. The complaint
22 Supra note 8. contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent immediately occupied the
subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner;
23 Id., pp. 184-186; pp. 766-767. and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.

380 These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioner’s theory that its
cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view
380 that respondent’s occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception.
Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED petitioner’s supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from
the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.”25
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
_______________
the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by
stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz 24 Supra note 5.
vs. Court of Appeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from
185

25 Id., pp. 490-491. Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo,
Sr., JJ., concur.
381
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006
Notes.—Where the facts averred in the complaint reveals that the action is
381 neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a
boundary dispute, the
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
_______________
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment
of fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted or 26 Unida v. Heirs of Ambrosio Urban, G.R. No. 155432, 9 June 2005, 460 SCRA
tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint 68, 75.
contains only bare allegations that “respondents without any color of title
whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land 382
thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof.” Nothing has been said on
how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of
petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. vs. Yuipco
is fatal.26 Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a
valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction same must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. (Sarmiento vs. Court of
over the case.27 It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals Appeals, 250 SCRA 108 [1995])
correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the
complaint. In ejectment cases, the question is limited to which party among the litigants is
entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises, that is to say,
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of Appeals who should have possession de facto; In an ejectment case, the assertion by a
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the MTC Antipolo, Rizal for defendant of ownership over the disputed property does not serve to divest an
lack of jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED. inferior court of its jurisdiction. (Rural Bank of Sta. Ignacia, Inc. vs. Dimatulac,
401 SCRA 742 [2003])
No pronouncement as to costs.
——o0o—— Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 489 SCRA 369, G.R. No. 132424
SO ORDERED. May 4, 2006

You might also like