GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC.

V COURT Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a In the case of Jacinto vs. Director of Lands (1926) 49 Phil. 853,
OF APPEALS forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not the Supreme Court held that the acused friar lands, to which
in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never the government of the Philippines holds title, are not public
FACTS:
determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, lands but private or patrimonial property of the government.
Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA only actual possession. It is undisputed that private
En Banc, Ostrand (J): 7 concur
are owners of the land situated in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, respondents were in possession of the property and not the
Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have Facts: During the period from 1911 to 1913, sales certificates
spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing a valid claim over ownership this does not in any way justify were issued by the Bureau of Lands to Frank W. Carpenter for
petitioner German Management Services to develop their their act of ―forcible entry It must be stated that regardless of more than 100 lots of the Tala and Piedad Friar Lands states
property. They have already acquired the proper permits to do the actual condition of the title to the property the party in located in Novaliches, Caloocan, Rizal including the lots 670,
so but they discovered that the land was occupied by the peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong 690, 691, 695, 696, 697 698, 699, 700, 701, 950, 951, 952, 953,
respondent with 20 other farmers (members of the Concerned hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior 954, 955, 956, 957, and 1050. The total area of the land
of Farmer’s Association.) These farmers have occupied the land possession can recover such possession even against the covered by the sales certificates being over 1,490 hectares and
for the last twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his the purchase price amounting to about P56,600, of which
permits and they already have their crops all over the possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the amount Carpenter up to the year 1923, had paid in
property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land. security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is installments the sum of P16,272. Under a judgment rendered
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion against Carpenter in the CFI of Manila (Civil Case 24607),
Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self help, execution was levied upon all of his right, title and interest in
demolish and bulldoze their crops and property. The which the petitioners were using to justify their actions, are the lots purchased together with the improvements thereon,
respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of their not applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at and on 16 November 1923, the sheriff of Rizal sold the
property without due process of law by trespassing, the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent property to Nicanor Jacinto. The sheriff’s sale was registered in
demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property situated in the case at bar (in fact they are the ones who are the Bureau of Lands, assignments of the Bureau of Lands’ sales
in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed the decision. threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.)
certificates were duly recorded, and certificates of assignment
Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in CA but were denied Article 536 basically tells us that the owner or a person who were issued and delivered to Nicanor Jacinto in September
thus this appeal has a better right over the land must resort to judicial means 1924.
ISSUE: to recover the property from another person who possesses
the land. On 31 March 1925, the Metropolitan Water District instituted
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a proceedings in the CFI Rizal for the condemnation of certain
forcible entry case against petitioner? When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort parcels of land situated in the municipality of Caloocan for the
to judicial process for the recovery of property. As clearly construction of an earth dam and a first-class highway 3
RULING: stated in Article 536- ―In no case may possession be acquired kilometers long, in connection with the so-called Angat Water
YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor Works Project, and on the same date the CFI Rizal issued an
respondents were in actual possession of the property at the who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or order authorizing the Metropolitan Water District to take
time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke possession of said parcels of land upon deposit with the
respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to provincial treasurer of the sum of P3,000 as the provisional
entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. deliver the thing. value, fixed by the court, of the parcels so to be condemned.
By virtue of this order, the Metropolitan Water District entered
JACINTO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS [G.R. NO. 26374. DECEMBER
into occupation of the land and began the construction of
31, 1926.]
permanent improvements thereon. Copies of the complaint as
well as of the order of 31 March 1925, were filed with the
register of deeds of the Province of Rizal on 11 February 1926,
to be recorded as notices of lis pendens. The lots enumerated
above were included in the land sought to be expropriated and
Nicanor Jacinto was made a party defendant in the
proceedings. He admitted the existence of the right of
condemnation and the necessity for the expropriation, but
demanded the sum of P64,839.33 as indemnity for the
expropriation. As the actual purchase price to be paid by the
purchaser from the Government only amounts to P13,725,
including interest, the Metropolitan Water District considered
Jacinto’s demand excessive and declined to pay the claim.
In the month of July 1926, the applicant tendered payment to
the Director of Lands of the sum of P4,650 to cover the
remaining balance of the sales price of the lots in question and
demanded a corresponding deed of conveyance for said lots.
The Director of Lands, upon the advice of the Attorney-
General, rejected the tender and refused to execute and
deliver the instrument of conveyance demanded from him.
Applicant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the
Director of Lands to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of
the applicant for the lots enumerated belonging to the Tala
Friar Lands Estate in Novaliches.
The Supreme Court ordered the Director of Lands to receive
the balance of the purchase money for any or all of the lots in
question if and when payment thereof is tendered by Jacinto,
and denied the petition as to the execution of deeds of
conveyance; without costs.
1. Proprietary rights, except that of occupation, not affected
by condemnation proceedings
The proprietary rights, except the right of occupation, are not
affected by the condemnation proceedings until the title has
passed to the plaintiff and that does not occur until the award
of compensation or damages has been satisfied.
2. Petition for a writ of mandamus not proper remedy to
compel a conveyance
Mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce purely
contract rights, such as that in the present case sought to be
enforced. (18 R. C. L., 121; Quiogue vs. Romualdez, 46 Phil.,
337.)
3. Land is patrimonial property of the Government; Duty to
execute deeds of conveyance devolved upon the Governor-
General
The writ cannot issue in the present case unless it appears that
the Director of Lands “unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station.”
(Section 222, Code of Civil Procedure.) The land in question is
private or patrimonial property of the Philippine Government
and we can find no law specially enjoining upon the Director of
Lands the duty to execute deeds of conveyance to purchasers
of such lands; on the contrary, that duty, under section 567 of
the
Administrative Code, appears to devolve upon the Governor-
General.
4. Director of Land has duty to receive purchase money
payable under Act 1120
By section 14 of Act No. 1120 the Director of Lands is charged
with the duty of receiving the purchase money payable under
that Act and may therefore be compelled by mandamus to
receive, as a purely ministerial act, such purchase money when
tendered.
ANECO REALTY VERSUS LANDEX
THIS is a simple case of a neighbor seeking to restrain the ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows
landowner from fencing his own property. The right to fence
flows from the right of ownership. Absent a clear legal and
enforceable right, Will not unduly restrain the landowner from
exercising an inherent proprietary right.
Facts
Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original
owner of a tract of land in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon
City. FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine (39) lots.[3] It
later sold twenty-two (22) lots to petitioner Aneco and the
remaining seventeen (17) lots to respondent Landex.[4]
The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a
concrete wall on one of its lots. To restrain construction of the
wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction[5] with the RTC in
Quezon City. Aneco later filed two (2) supplemental
complaints seeking to demolish the newly-built wall and to
hold Landex liable for two million pesos in damages.[6]
Landex filed its Answer[7] alleging, among others, that
Aneco was not deprived access to its lots due to the
construction of the concrete wall. Landex claimed that Aneco
has its own entrance to its property along Miller Street,
Resthaven Street, and San Francisco del Monte Street. The
Resthaven access, however, was rendered inaccessible when
Aneco constructed a building on said street. Landex also
claimed that FHDI sold ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to
Aneco based on the express stipulation in the deed of sale that
FHDI was not interested in pursuing its own subdivision
project.
Issue: Whether or not Aneco may enjoin Landex from
constructing a concrete wall on its own property.
Held: The petition is without merit.
Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to
enclose or fence his land or tenement by means of walls,
from the right of ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may
fence his property subject only to the limitations and
restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal and
enforceable right, as here, No interference with the exercise of of Epifanio De Los Santos Elementary School.6.Defendants
an essential attribute of ownership.
Aneco failed to prove any clear legal right to prevent, much
less restrain, Landex from fencing its own property.
Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old
subdivision project of FHDI because it knew at the time of the
sale that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, from
FHDI. This is clear from the deed of sale between FHDI and
Aneco where FHDI manifested that it was no longer interested
in pursuing its own subdivision project. If Aneco wants to
transform its own lots into a subdivision project, it must make
its own provision for road lots. It certainly cannot piggy back
on the road lot of the defunct subdivision project of FHDI to
the detriment of the new owner Landex. The RTC and the CA
correctly dismissed the complaint for injunction of Aneco for
lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed
Decision AFFIRMED.
CITY OF MANILA VS. GERARDO GARCIA ET.AL
FACTS:
1.Plaintiff is the owner of certain parcels of land. Without the
knowledge and consent of plaintiff, defendants occupied the
property and built their houses.2.Having discovered, plaintiff
through its mayor gave each defendant written permits, each
labeled as “lease contract” to occupy specific areas. For their
occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.3.After
sometime, plaintiff, through its treasurer, demanded payment
of their rentals and vacate the premises for the Epifanio de los
Santos Elementary School’s expansion.4.Despite the demand,
defendants refused to vacate the said property. Hence, this
case was filed for recovery of possession.5.The trial court ruled
in favor of plaintiff taking judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 –
appropriating P100k for the construction of additional building
appealed.
ISSUE: WoN the trial court properly found that the city needs
the premises for school purposes
HELD: YES The trial court ruled out the admissibility of the
documentary evidence presented by plaintiff
– Certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
of the Municipal Board which recites the amount of P100k had
been set aside in Ordinance 4566 for the construction of
additional building of the said school.
But then the decision under review, the trial court revised his
views. He then declared that there was a need for defendants
to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very
document. Because of the court’s contradictory stance,
defendants brought this case on appeal. However, the
elimination of the certification as evidence would not profit
defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could
well have taken — because he was duty bound to take —
judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 . The reason being that the
city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take
judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board
of Manila.
And, Ordinance4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid
that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the
“construction of additional building” of the Epifanio de los
Santos Elementary School.
Further defendants’ entry to the said property is illegal. Their
constructions are as illegal, without permits. The city mayor
doesn’t have the authority to issue permits. The permits issued
are null and void.