PREVIOUS CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE relationship falls under the exceptions to the principle of res inter
alios acta as to make such admission binding upon respondents.
TAN SIOK1 KUAN AND PUTE CHING v. FELICISIMO "BOY" HO
G.R. No. 175085, June 01, 2016
Petitioners, claiming that they have been leasing portions of a
property they own to the respondents since 1972, filed an unlawful
detainer case against the latter. On the other hand, respondents
maintained that they have been in possession of the subject
premises for 37 years without any rentals being paid to any
landlord, and that there are no existing lease contracts between
them. In fact, in separate letters to petitioners, respondents
categorically denied renting the subject premises,. Respondents
also asserted that they have started possessing said property in
1966 and that they have been in continuous possession since then.
ISSUE: WON there is a lessor-lessee relationship between
petitioners and defendants.
HELD: NONE.
Except for petitioners' bare claims, they have not shown any
evidence of a lease between them and respondents. There was no
mention of how and when the alleged contract of lease started,
there was no proof of prior payment of rentals or any prior demand
for such payment considering petitioners' allegation that
respondents failed to pay rentals since 1997 and that the case was
instituted only in 2003.
In the present case, petitioners failed to establish that the
defendants' alleged implied admission of a lessor-lessee
RICHARD A. CAMBE v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ET AL
G.R. Nos. 212014-15, December 06, 2016
Sen. Ramon Revilla, Jr. seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint
Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman
finding probable cause against him for the illegal pillaging of public
funds sourced from his PDAF for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total
amount of P517,000,000.00.Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the
Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and
further contends that in the absence of other competent testimony,
the Ombudsman cannot consider the whistle blowers' testimonies
who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam,
pursuant to the res inter alias acta rule.
ISSUE: WON the testimonies of the whistleblowers are admissible in
evidence.
HELD: YES.
The testimonies of the whistleblowers are, in fact, the most integral
evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account
on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was
directly involved.
In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alias
acta were to apply during preliminary investigation, the treatment
of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by the
exception on independently relevant statements. Under such
doctrine, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant.
The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible
as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a
fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
such a fact. Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are
independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and
his co-accused in the present controversy, considering their
respective participations in the entire PDAF scam.
HEARSAY EVIDENCE
GR No. 210445, Dec 07, 2015
NILO B. ROSIT v. DAVAO DOCTORS HOSPITAL
Following a faulty jaw operation done on him by Dr. Gestuvo which
made it necessary for him to travel to Cebu and undergo another
one, Nilo Rosit filed a civil action against Dr. Gestuvo and the DDH,
seeking for reimbursement of the cost of the operation and the
expenses Rosit incurred in Cebu amounting to P140,000, as well as
for the P50,000 that he would have to spend for the removal of the
plate and screws that Dr. Pangan, the doctor who operated him in
Cebu, installed. Rosit then adduced as evidence an affidavit
executed by Dr. Pangan.
ISSUE: WON Dr. Pangan's Affidavit is admissible.
HELD:
The appellate court's Decision absolving Dr. Gestuvo of negligence
was also anchored on a letter signed by Dr. Pangan who stated the
opinion that Dr. Gestuvo did not commit gross negligence in his
emergency management of Mr. Rosit's fractured mandible.[18]
Clearly, the appellate court overlooked the elementary principle
against hearsay evidence.
In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,[19] the Court reiterated the oft-
repeated rule that "an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its
affiant/maker did not take the witness stand." Here, Dr. Pangan
never took the witness stand to affirm the contents of his affidavit.
Thus, the affidavit is inadmissible and cannot be given any weight.
The CA, therefore, erred when it considered the affidavit of Dr.
Pangan, mpreso for considering the same as expert testimony.
Moreover, even if such affidavit is considered as admissible and the
testimony of an expert witness, the Court is not bound by such
testimony. As ruled in Ilao-Quianay v. Mapile:[20]
Indeed, courts are not bound by expert testimonies. They may place
whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance
with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of
expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court
to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his
actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias
in favor of the side for whom he testifies, and any other matters
which serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of an expert
should be considered by the court in view of all the facts and
circumstances of the case. The problem of the evaluation of expert
testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not revicwable in the absence of an abuse of that
discretion.
Thus, the belief of Dr. Pangan whether Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of
negligence or not will not bind the Court. The Court must weigh and
examine such testimony and decide for itself the merits thereof.
As discussed above, Dr. Gestuvo's negligence is clearly
demonstrable by the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and informed
consent.
Lim v PEOPLE
DYING DECLARATIONS
G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNABE P.
PALANAS ALIAS "ABE", Accused-Appellant.
An Information4 was filed before the RTC charging Palanas of the
murder of SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio (SPO2 Borre), viz.:
On or about March 26, 2006, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused [Palanas], acting in
conspiracy with one male person who is at-large, whose true
identity and whereabout[s] are still unknown acted as co-principal
in the killing of one SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio, committed as
follows: said male person, armed with a gun, with intent to kill and
with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shot one SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio
on his head and different parts of his body which directly caused his
death, and thereafter, took the firearm of the said victim, boarded a
motorcycle driven by the accused who thereafter, drove the
motorcycle away from the scene of the crime.
The prosecution presents the following version of the facts:
At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took
his five (5)-month-old grandson outside his residence at Block 14,
Kenneth Street corner Eusebio Avenue, Pasig City. PO3 Leopoldo
Zapanta (PO3 Zapanta), who slept at SPO2 Borre's residence, was
watching television when four (4) successive gunshots rang out. PO3
Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2 Borre's house and
saw two (2) men armed with .38 caliber revolvers standing a meter
away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to
SPO2 Borre, but he could not identify the other shooter. Thereafter,
the two (2) assailants fled on a motorcycle.6
PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre's stepson Ramil Ranola
(Ramil), brought SPO2 Borre to the Pasig City General Hospital. On
the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told Ramil and PO3 Zapanta
that it was "Abe," "Aspog," or "Abe Palanas" - referring to his
neighbor, Palanas -who shot him. This statement was repeated to
his wife, Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion), who followed him at
the hospital. At around 11 o'clock in the morning of even date, SPO2
Borre died due to gunshot wounds on his head and trunk.7
For his part, Palanas interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He
claimed that on March 25, 2006 he was in Parafiaque City attending
to the needs of his sick father. The next day, he went to a baptism in
Tondo, Manila and stayed there from morning until 9 o'clock in the
evening, after which he returned to his father in Parafiaque City. He
maintained that he was not aware of the death of SPO2 Borre until
he was informed by a neighbor that Resurreccion was accusing him
of killing her husband. He also denied any knowledge why
Resurreccion would blame him for SPO2 Borre's death. Both RTC
and CA convicted the accused.
HELD:
The CA is also correct in admitting SPO2 Borre's statements on his
way to the hospital as evidence, both as a dying declaration and as
part of the res gestae.
For a dying declaration24 to constitute an exception to the hearsay
evidence rule,25 four (4) conditions must concur: (a) the declaration
must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made,
the declarant is conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant
was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a
criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the
declarant is the victim.26 On the other hand, a statement to be
deemed to form part of the res gestae,27 and thus, constitute
another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.28
In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying
declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and
circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the
number and severity of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed
that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death
was already imminent.29 This declaration is considered evidence of
the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no
person aware of his impending death would make a careless and
false accusation.30 Verily, because the declaration was made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every
motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most
powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a
situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that
which is imposed by an oath administered in court.31
In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may likewise be deemed
to form part of the res gestae. "Res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main
fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as
a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration,
or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a
part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony."32 In this
case, SPO2 Borre's statements refer to a startling occurrence, i. e.,
him being shot by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to
the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification
of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and
only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such
statement is relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the
authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2 Borre,
perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
PEOPLE vs. VILLAVIEZ
G.R. No. 178110, January 12, 2016
AYALA LAND, INC. AND CAPITOL CITIFARMS, INC., Petitioners, v.
SIMEONA CASTILLO
HELD:
Respondents argue that they raised the issue regarding the Notice
of Acquisition in their Petition for Revocation, particularly in
paragraph 5 thereof, which states:
That the subsequent application for conversion filed by respondents
was a mere ploy to cover up the said illegal transaction and to
evade the coverage of the property under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Respondents cannot gloss over the fatal defect of its claim from the
nonexistence of the Notice of Acquisition just by reducing the issue
to "CARP coverage." As stated above, they are contending that
petitioners' application for conversion was a ploy to cover up the
illegality of the Deed of Absolute Sale and Partial Redemption
between CCFI and ALL What they repeatedly claimed was that ALI
fraudulently concealed the sale agreement from the DAR. Three
DAR Secretaries, including Secretary Garilao who issued the
Conversion Order, rightly found these allegations baseless. This
point was also raised and judiciously passed upon in the OP Order
dated 26 September 2003. In contrast, the Notice of Acquisition is a
separate issue altogether which has never been raised in the
proceedings below.
The grounds relied upon by respondents in their Petition for
Revocation are as follows:
3. That the respondents[29] grossly violated the Conversion Order
because instead of developing the land within five years from the
issuance of the Order, it sold said land to the present possessor,
Ayala Land, Inc.
6. That the respondents likewise committed gross
misrepresentation of the fact in that they made it appear before the
DAR that the landholding in question has been duly reclassified
from agricultural uses such as residential, commercial and
industrial, when in truth and in fact, the Municipality of Silang does
not have an approved town plan/zoning ordinance as of 24 October
1997 as per Certification issued by CAROLINA A, CASAJE, Officer-In-
Charge, Board Secretariat of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB).
8. That the respondents likewise failed to comply with the
undertaking to pay/effect complete payment of the disturbance
compensation of tenant-farmers in the subject landholding xxx[32]
While the Decision has extensively discussed the error committed
by the CA in passing upon and ruling on a new issue on appeal, we
did not grant the Petition for Review on this technical ground alone.
We went over the records and found no admissible proof presented
to support respondents' claim that a Notice of Acquisition had been
issued. What was attached to the Petition for Review filed before
the CA was a mere photocopy of the Notice of Coverage. The
purported Notice of Acquisition was never offered in evidence
before the DAR and never became part of the records even at the
proceedings a quo. Hence, we found that the CA committed
reversible error when it gave credence to a mere assertion of the
tenant-farmers.
As a prelude to our ruling that new issues cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, we contemplated the scenario in which the
farmers had submitted the proper document to the CA. We then
said, assuming arguendo they did, the appellate court could not
have reversed the OP Decision based on nothing more than this
submission, as the issue of the Notice of Acquisition had never been
raised before the administrative agency concerned.
As contended by the OSG and as exhaustively discussed in our
Decision, the CA decided an issue raised for the first time on appeal.
It held that the DAR had issued a Notice of Acquisition, which served
as a perpetual ban on the conversion of the subject lands. However,
respondents never attached a copy, certified or otherwise, to their
1) Petition for Revocation, 2) Motions for Reconsideration in the
proceedings a quo, or 3) Appeal Memorandum to the OP. This is
because they never raised the purpose of the notice as an issue in
their Petition for Revocation of the Conversion Order or in their
Motion for Reconsideration before the OP. What they repeatedly
argued was that fraud had been perpetrated by CCFI and ALL
Respondents expressed their agreement with the point made by
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. in his Dissenting Opinion that the
coverage of the land under CARL was confirmed by the following
documents:
(1) the stipulation/condition in the Deed of Partial Redemption and
Deed of Absolute Sale, both dated August 25, 1995, in which CCFI
undertook to obtain DAR approval for CARP exemption or
conversion to non-agricultural use;
(2) CCFI's letter-request dated May 7, 1996 addressed to the DAR
Regional Director for the lifting of the Notice of Acquisition;
(3) BSP's request in 1995 made in behalf of MBC for exemption of
the subject property from CARL coverage, and the letter-denial of
DAR Secretary who directed the distribution of the land to qualified
farmer beneficiaries;
(4) the Decision dated October 11, 1996 of Executive Secretary
Ruben D. Torres on the appeal of BSP from the DAR Secretary's
denial of its request for exemption, in which the DAR was directed
to defer proceeding with the distribution of lands already covered
by CARL and petitioner was granted the opportunity to present
proof that the lands are qualified for exemption or conversion; and
(5) MBC's request for DAR clearance in October 1997 to sell its
landholdings placed under CARL coverage, which includes the
subject property.
With the exception of item 2, there was no reference to a Notice of
Acquisition in any of these documents. According to the Dissent of
Justice Villarama, considering the attendant circumstances, the
letter-request of CCFI for the lifting of the Notice of Acquisition
constituted an admission against interest of the fact that the notice
was issued.
The concept of admissions against interest is governed by Section
26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of
a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

The above rule considers admissions against interest as admissible

evidence, but does not dispense with the requirement that the
admission be offered in evidence. In this case, precisely because
respondents did not raise the issue at all, petitioners did not have
any opportunity to inspect or question the authenticity and due
execution of the documents. It would be offensive to the basic rules
of fair play, justice, and due process to suddenly reverse the
decisions of three DAR Secretaries and the Office of the President
based on an alleged document - especially if that document has not
been presented, authenticated, or offered in evidence — without
giving the other party any opportunity to contradict the purported
admission.

CCFI, much less ALI, cannot be bound to whatever inference is being

made only now on the purported CCFI letter requesting the lifting of
the Notice of Acquisition. They had never been apprised throughout
the administrative proceedings of its alleged existence, nor of the
inference sought to be drawn therefrom. They were never given the
chance to inspect the document as any piece of evidence should be
so subjected.