AMBITO V.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR. No. 12737
February, 13, 2009

FACTS:
On several occasions in 1979, the spouses Ambito transacted business with Pacific Star, Inc.
whereby they purchased spare parts. They made down payments in their purchases either in cash, in
check or in certificates of time deposit issued by Rural Bank of Banete, Inc. and the community Rural
Bank of Leon Inc.

However, when presented in Manila Banking Corporation, the checks from the Spouse were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. There are total of 23 checks are found to be
falsified/dishonored. The banks of the spouse became insolvent and was placed under receivership
and Liquidation. They are charged of violating B.P. 22.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of violating B.P. 22.

HELD:
Yes, the absence of notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. There is nothing in the records that would indicate that co-petitioner
Basilio Ambito was given notice of dishonor by PSI, or by Manila Bank the drawee bank, when the
subject checks were issued and dishonored for insufficiency of funds upon presentment for payment.
However, there being no proof that Basilio was given any written notice informing him of the fact
that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds has no application in the case.

VACA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 43596
October 31, 1936

FACTS:
Eduardo Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International while Fernando Nieto,
Vaca’s son-in-law, is the firm’s purchasing manager. They issued a check for P10,000 to the General
Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection and Security (GARDS) and drawn against China Bank. When
deposited with PCIBank, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. GARDS sent a demand
letter but the drawers failed to pay within the time given (7 days from notice). A few days later,
however, Vaca issued a check to GARDS for P19,866.16, drawn against Associated Bank, replacing
the dishonored check. GARDS did not return the dishonored check. Later on, GARDS Acting
Operations Manager filed a criminal suit against Vaca and Nieto for violation of BP 22. The trial court
sentenced each to 1 year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and costs.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the drawers had knowledge of insufficient funds in issuing the check.
2. Whether the absence of damages incurred by the payee absolves the drawers from liability.

HELD:
1. Section 2 of BP 22 provides a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds if the
drawer fails to maintain sufficient funds within 90 days after the date of the check, or to make
arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such check within 5 days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. Herein, the second check supposedly
replacing the dishonored check is actually the payment of two separate bills, and was issued
15 days after notice. Such “replacement” cannot negate the presumption that the drawers
knew of the insufficiency of funds.

2. The claim — that the case was simply a result of a misunderstanding between GARDS and
the drawers and that the security agency did not suffer any damage from the dishonor of the
check — is flimsy. Even if the payee suffered no damage as a result of the issuance of the
bouncing check, the damage to the integrity of the banking system cannot be denied. Damage
to the payee is not an element of the crime punished in BP 22.

Note: In this case, the Court recognized the contribution of Filipino entrepreneurs to the national
economy; and that to serve the ends of criminal justice, instead of the 1 year imprisonment, a fine of
double the amount of the check involved was imposed as penalty. This was made to redeem valuable
human material and prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with
due regard to the protection of the social order.

VICTOR TING v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 140665
November 13, 2000

FACTS:
From 1991 to 1992, Ting obtained loans in aggregate amount of Php. 2,750,000 from private
complainant Josefina K. Tagle for use of furniture business. As payment thereof, Juiliet issued 11
postdated checks, which upon maturity were dishonored for reasons of Closed Account or Drawn
against Insufficient Funds. Juliet was subsequently prosecuted for violation of B.P. bilang 22.

Then due to the plan of the petitioners to take over the burdens of Juliet, including the
obligations thereafter. The former issued 19 checks in replacement of the 11 checks earlier
dishonored. However the planned take never materialized, so, Juliet again replaced the 19 checks of
the petitioner with 23 Far East Bank checks in favor of Tagle, but instead of returning the checks by
Tagle, Tagle deposited them which resulted to its dishonor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner are guilty of violating B.P. bilang 22
HELD:
For B.P. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. In the case, the prosecution did not
present proof that the demand letter was sent through registered mail, relying as it did only on the
registry return receipt of mail, and the prosecution failed to present the testimony, or at least the
affidavit of the person mailing, that indeed the demand letter was sent. And due to the denial by the
petitioners of receiving the demand letter, the prosecution has the burden of proof that the same
was received by the petitioners. Therefore, their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

SIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 102970
May 13, 1990

FACTS:
Plaintiff Luzon Sia rented a safety deposit box of Security Bank and Trust Co. (Security Bank)
at its Binondo Branch wherein he placed his collection of stamps. The said safety deposit box leased
by the plaintiff was at the bottom or at the lowest level of the safety deposit boxes of the defendant
bank. During the floods that took place in 1985 and 1986, floodwater entered into the defendant
bank’s premises, seeped into the safety deposit box leased by the plaintiff and caused, according
damage to his stamps collection. Security Bank rejected the plaintiff’s claim for compensation for his
damaged stamps collection.

Sia, thereafter, instituted an action for damages against the defendant bank. Security Bank
contended that its contract with the Sia over safety deposit box was one of lease and not of deposit
and, therefore, governed by the lease agreement which should be the applicable law; the destruction
of the plaintiff’s stamps collection was due to a calamity beyond obligation on its part to notify the
plaintiff about the floodwaters that inundated its premises at Binondo branch which allegedly seeped
into the safety deposit box leased to the plaintiff. The trial court rendered in favor of plaintiff Sia and
ordered Sia to pay damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bank is liable for negligence.

HELD:
Contract of the use of a safety deposit box of a bank is not a deposit but a lease. Section 72 of
the General Banking Act [R.A. 337, as amended] pertinently provides: In addition to the operations
specifically authorized elsewhere in this Act, banking institutions other than building and loan
associations may perform the following services (a) Receive in custody funds, documents, and valuable
objects, and rent safety deposit boxes for the safequarding of such effects.

As correctly held by the trial court, Security Bank was guilty of negligence. The bank’s
negligence aggravated the injury or damage to the stamp collection. SBTC was aware of the floods of
1985 and 1986; it also knew that the floodwaters inundated the room where the safe deposit box was
located. In view thereof, it should have lost no time in notifying the petitioner in order that the box
could have been opened to retrieve the stamps, thus saving the same from further deterioration and
loss. In this respect, it failed to exercise the reasonable care and prudence expected of a good father
of a family, thereby becoming a party to the aggravation of the injury or loss. Accordingly, the
aforementioned fourth characteristic of a fortuitous event is absent. Article 1170 of the Civil Code,
which reads “Those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages” is applicable.
Hence, the petition was granted.

The provisions contended by Security Bank in the lease agreement which are meant to exempt
SBTC from any liability for damage, loss or destruction of the contents of the safety deposit box
which may arise from its own agents’ fraud, negligence or delay must be stricken down for being
contrary to law and public policy

JOSEF v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 146424
November 18, 2005

FACTS:
From June to August 1991, petitioner, a Marikina based manufacturer and seller of shoes,
purchased materials from respondent Agustin Alarilla, a seller of leather products from Meycauayan,
Bulacan for which the former issued a total of 26 postdated checks against his account with the
Assoiciated Bank and Far East Bank and Trust company. When they were presented for encashment,
they were dishonored because it were drawn against insufficient funds. Private respondent informed
petitioner of the dishonor and demanded payment of the value. Then petitioner issued new postdated
checks to the respondents which was also dishonored by the drawee bank. As a result, the private
respondent filed complaints against the petitioner for violation of B.P. 22 for the original 26 postdated
checks.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of B.P. bilang 22

HELD:
Petitioner categorically admits the fact that the issuance of the checks and their dishonor, the
first and third elements. He has likewise failed to rebut the statutory presumption of knowledge of
insufficient funds the 2nd element, which attaches if the check is presented and dishonored within 90
days from its issuances. While petitioner alleges to have paid private respondents the amount of the
checks, he failed to specify if he had done so within five banking days from receiving notice of the
checks dishonored and to present any evidence of suchpayment. In addition, his unsubstantial claim
of cash payments contradicts his earlier defense that he had replaced the checks. Therefore, he is guilty
as charged.

LEE v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 145498
January 17, 2005

FACTS:
On July 24 of 1993 in Quezon City, Philippines, Benjamin Lee made or draw and issue to one
Rogelio G. Bergado to apply on account or for the value United Coconut Planters Bank check no.
168341 dated July 24, 1993 payable to the order of Rogelio G. Bergado in the amount of Php.
98,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue they did not have insufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for presentment, which check when presented for payment was
dishonored by reason of Account Closed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private complainant, at the time of issuance had knowledge that the checks
had n sufficient funds.

HELD:
We have held that knowledge of the payee that the drawer did not have sufficient funds with
the drawee bank at the time the check was issued is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of
the offense under B.P. bilang 22. This is because the gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad
check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof are inconsequential.

ARTURO ROMERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 151978
July 14, 2004

FACTS:
Arturo Romera and his friends were heading to Biasong to play volleyball. On their way
there, One of them, Franklin Generol made fun of Bebing Zuluetas. The victim, Roy Mangaya-ay
sided with Zuluetas and scolded Generol. Romera who sided with Generol threatened the others
then left.

The victim and his friends arrived in Balaguan, a kilometer away from Antonio Mangaya-ay's
house, Romera was seen carrying a bolo waiting for them. Romera chased them and the victim, who
slipped, was stabbed. The victim woke up at the provincial hospital after surgery.

Romera's testimony was as follows: The victim, who was drunk, went to Romera's house and
disturbed his family. When Romera opened the door, the victim thrust him bolo at him and telling
him he would kill Romera. Romera went outside and prevented the victim from entering. Outside,
the victim tried to hacked Romera again in which he deflected the blow and then stabbed the victim.

Romera contends that the victim provoked him to a fit of anger when the latter woke him
up and thrust a bolo at him without warning as he opened the door. Moreover, by hacking and
destroying the bamboo wall of his house, and endangering the lives of his children, the victim also
obfuscated his thinking and reasoning processes.

The trial court discounted petitioners story of self-defense. It found that when petitioner got
hold of the bolo, there was no more danger to his life.

Romera was convicted of frustrated homicide.

 The CA affirmed the trial court's decision and reiterated that the unlawful aggression ceased
to exist when petitioner took possession of the bolo from the victim. Absent unlawful aggression,
the justifying circumstance of self-defense becomes unavailing.

ISSUE:
Whether the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation present in
this case

HELD:

Yes. Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls
of his house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate
his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger. Romera stabbed the
victim as a result of those provocations and while he was still in a fit of rage.

The Court also stressed that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate
mitigating circumstances. They should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance.

ELSA MAGTIRA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 170964
March 7, 2012

FACTS:
On 2000, at Makati City, Metro Manila, the accused received in trust and for administration
from private complaint as contribution to a Palwagan in the unsaid amount under the safekeeping of
accused Elsa Magtira with the express and legal obligation on the part of the accused to return and
or account for the same, but the accused far from complying with her obligation with intent to gain,
abuse of confidence and to defraud complainant misapply and convert to her personal use and
benefit the said contribution and or proceeds thereof and despite repeated demands, accused fails
and refuses fund the account.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of Estafa

HELD:
About her criminal liability, the evidence shows that the amount of money remitted by the
private complainants to the petitioner all exceeded the amount of Php. 22,000.00. In this regard, the
first paragraph of Article 315 of the RPC, as amended provides the appropriate penalty if the value
of a thing or the amount defrauded exceeds Php. 22,000.00 which provides that the maximum
indeterminate offense/penalty is prision mayor in its minimum period or anywhere within the range
of six years and one day to eight years, plus one year every Php. 10,000.00 in excess of Php. 22,000.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CONTE
GR No. 113513-14
August 23, 1995

FACTS:
The accused-appellant Jimmy Conte was working as a farm helper to Bernardo Crisostomo
in brgy. Jolo, Roxas, Palawan. Only Bernardo’s wife, Gloria, and two daughters were left in their
residence. On September 17, 1990, at around 11pm, Jimmy went to the house of the Crisostomo’s,
went into the room where Gloria and her children were sleeping, and poked a homemade gun close
to Gloria’s mouth. He forcibly stripped off Gloria’s clothes, laid on top of her and consummated
her lustful desires. Jimmy then took Sarah and threatened to kill her should Gloria refuses to go with
him. They went to Puerto Princessa City, and there Jimmy sexually abused Gloria every day. Gloria
managed to send a letter to her husband for help and finally rescued them and arrested Jimmy as
well.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty for the crime of rape.

HELD:
Yes. The trial court correctly found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape on eleven counts and correctly sentenced him to eleven times of reclusion perpetua.
The service of the said petitioners shall not however, exceed forty years pursuant to Article 70 of the
RPC, as amended by CA No. 217, and ordered to indemnify the complainant in the sum of Php,
40,000.00 in each of the eleven counts of rape.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARTIN SIMON

GR No. 93028
July 29, 1994

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Martin Simon was charged on November 10, 1988 with a violation of
Section 4, Article II of RA No. 6425 under an indictment alleging that on or about October 22, 1988
at brgy. Sto. Cristo Gagua, Pampanga. He sold four tea bags to a Narcotics command (NARCOM)
poseur-buyer, in consideration of the sum of Php. 40,000.00 which tea bags when subjected to a
laboratory examination where found positive for marijuana. On December 4, 1989 the trial court
rendered judgment convicting appellant and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.
HELD:
Yes. Drug offenses are not included in, nor has appellant committed any act which would
put him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion
perpetua to death. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a Legal and a Social measure of compassion,
and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSELITO NOQUE

GR No. 175319
January15, 2010

FACTS:
Accused Joselito Noque was caught in a buy-bust operation conducted by SPO4 Norberto
Murillo on January 30, 2001. Two Informations were filed before the RTC of Manila docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 01-189458 and 01-189459 charging of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of a regulated drug. The trial court convicted the accused on both charges. The trial court
held that while the Informations alleged methamphetamine hydrochloride as the drug seized from
the appellant, the drug actually confiscated which was ephedrine, which by means of chemical
reaction could change into methamphetamine. Thus, the trial court ruled that the appellant can be
convicted of the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes proved. The CA affirmed the
trial court’s decision. The CA held that the designations and allegations in the informations are for
the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs. Hence, the accused appealed the
case before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
was not violated.

HELD:
The appeal is bereft of merit.

As correctly observed by CA, the offenses designated in the Informations are for violations
of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, which define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and
possession of regulated drugs. The allegations in the Informations for the unauthorized sale and
possession of “shabu” or methamphetamine hydrochloride are immediately followed by the
qualifying phrase “which is a regulated drug”. Thus, it is clear that the designations and allegations in
the Informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs.
Ephedrine has been classified as a regulated drug by the Dangerous Drugs Board in Board
Resolution No. 2, Series of 1988.

The CA correctly ruled that Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, can be applied by
analogy in convicting the appellant of the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes proved.
Under these provisions, an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. At any
rate, a minor variance between the information and the evidence does not alter the nature of the
offense, nor does it determine or qualify the crime or penalty, so that even if a discrepancy exists,
this cannot be pleaded as a ground for acquittal. In other words, his right to be informed of the
charges against him has not been violated because where an accused is charged with a specific crime,
he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included
therein.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELO

GR No. 140385
April 14, 2004

FACTS:
On or about the 11th day of June 1998, in Brgy. Sua, Municipality of Masantol, Province of
Pampanga, the above named accused, with intent to kill armed with a bladed weapon, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack assault,
and stab Rodel Madalang, thereby inflicting upon the latter stabbed wounds on the different parts of
his body which where the direct and immediate cause of his death. That it all started during
Christopher Sunga’s birthday drinking spree and after sometime, a commotion happened. As the
appellant sneaked from behind Manalang and stabbed him at the back while they are on their way
home.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty for the appellant should be death.

HELD:
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, murder is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. Without any generic or special aggravating circumstances, the penalty
imposable on the appellant should be lower penalty which is reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMEDIOS TANCHANCO

GR No. 177761
April 18, 2001

FACTS:
From October 2000 to May 8, 2001 at Las Pinas, Remedios, employed as Legal Secretary
and Liason Officer of complainant Atty. Rebecca Manuel y Azanza, take, steal and carry away cash
money amounting to Php. 417,922.90 from said complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter. That the appellant gave to appellant money to be paid to her clients to which she pocketed all
of it including the payment for processing of 15 titles. Rebecca also spent Php. 650,000.00 for the
incidental expenses which transpired over time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper penalty for qualified theft is reclusion perpetua.

HELD:
Article 310 of the RPC provides that the crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified under Art. 309. Here, the
amount stolen by appellant is Php. 248,447.75. Since the said amount exceeds Php. 22,000.00 the
basic penalty is prision mayor or reclusion temporal in its minimum period and medium period to be
imposed in the maximum period. To determine the additional years of imprisonment, Php.
22,000.00 must be declared from the said amount and the difference should then be divided by Php.
10,000.00 disregarding any amount less than Php. 10,000.00. But as the penalty for qualified theft is
two degrees higher, the proper penalty as correctly imposed is reclusion perpetua.

ROMUALDEZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 152259
July 29, 2004

FACTS:
The People of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) filed an information before the anti-graft court on July 12, 1989 charging Romualdez with
violation of Sec. 5, Republic Act No. 3019 as amended.

The information states that on or about and during the period from July 16 to July 29, 1975,
Romualdez, brother-in-law of President Marcos, former president of the Philippines, did then and
there willfully and unlawfully, and with evident of bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-
interest and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National
Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and the
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority of stocks
of which is owned by former Pres. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to
the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including
structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets,
located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some equipment and
machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship
repair program for the amount of P 5, 000, 000.00.

Romualdez argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a high-
ranking naval officer ----- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp – of former President Marcos. He relies
on Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which states that:
“The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie
for official acts done by him or by other pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not pursuant to Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution, Romualdez is immune
from criminal prosecution.

HELD:
No. As aptly pointed out by Sandiganbayan, the provision in Sec. 17, Art Vii of 1973
Constitution is not applicable to Romualdez because the immunity amendment became effective only
in 1981 while the alleged crime happened in 1975.

In Estrada vs Desierto, the SC explained that executive immunity applied only during the
incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution
for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. Romualdez’s reasoning fails since he derives his
immunity from one who is no longer sitting as president. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials
and their close relatives “are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.”

PEREZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 150743
January 20, 2006

FACTS:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses Sylvia Perez of the crime of estafa, penalized
under Article 315, par. (b) of the Revised Penal Code, that sometime and during the period in
Otober 1990 to September 1993 Pasig City, the accused, being then employed as accounts receivable
and recording clerk of Storck Products Inc. and as such having received in cash the amount of Php.
148,160.35 as collection from the company’s salesman, with the express obligation on the part of the
accused to immediately turn over and remit said amount, and the accused, once in possession of the
said amount, with intent to defraud said Storck Products Inc., with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence misappropriate, misapply, and convert the same to her personal use and benefit, and
despite demands to turn over, she failed and refuses to the damage and prejudice of the private
complainant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing penalty on Perez.

HELD:
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed 22,000 should not be
considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so
taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence. Hence, the maximum penalty should be within 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years, plus 1 year for each additional Php. 10,000.00. Thus, the trial court correctly
 imposed on Perez the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision
correctional to 12 years 8 months and 21 days of Reclusion Temporal.

YU OH v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 12597
June 06, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner purchased pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders, Inc. Due to her
failure to pay the purchase price, the company filed civil cases against her for specific performance
before the RTC of Pasig. On September 17, 1990, petitioner and Solid Gold through it general
manager, Joaquin Novales III entered into a compromise agreement to settle said civil cases. It was
approved by the trial court provided that petitioner shall issue a total of ninety-nine post-dated checks
in the amount of PHP 50,000.00 each, dated every 15th and 30th of the month starting October 1, 1990
and the balance of over PHP 1million to be paid in lump sum on November 16, 1994 (the due date
of the 99th post dated check). Petitioner then issued ten checks at Php 50,000.00 each for a total of
Php 500,000.00 drawn against her account at the Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC). Novales then
deposited each of the ten checks on their respective due dates to the company bank account. However,
said checks were dishonored by the EBC for the reason “Account Closed”. Dishonor slips were issued
for each check that was returned to Novales. On October 5, 1992, Novales filed 10 separate
informations before the RTC of Quezon City charging the petitioner with violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

Nonetheless, RTC convicted her of ten counts of violation of BP 22. CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not appellate court was mistaken in not granting retroactive effect to RA 7691 in view
of Art 22 of the RPC.
2. Whether or not “notice of dishonor” is indispensable in this case.
 HELD:

1. No. RA 7691 is not a penal law and therefore, Art 22 of the RPC does not apply in the present case.
A penal law is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts and establishes penalties for its
violations. It also defines crime, treats of their nature and provides for its punishment. RA 7691 is a
law that vests additional jurisdiction on courts, thus, it is substantive. The court further held that it
cannot be given retroactive effect.

2. Yes. It is necessary that a “notice of dishonor” be received by the issuer and the prosecution has the
burden of proving the fact of service. It thus stated in section 2 of BP 22. It is essential for the drawer
to be notified of the dishonor of her checks so she could make arrangements for its payment within
the period prescribed by law (5 days).

Hence, SC reversed the decision of the CA and acquits the petioner.

PALANA VS. PEOPLE

GR No. 149995,
September 28, 2007

FACTS:
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information
which reads as follows: That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos to
apply on account or for the value the check in the amount of P590,000.00.

Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987, petitioner and
his wife borrowed money from him in the amount of P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the
loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount in favor of the complainant. However,
when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds.
Subsequent demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the said dishonored check.

Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an investment by
the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the subject check was not issued in September
1987 to guarantee the payment of a loan since his checking account was opened only on December 1,
1987. He claimed that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor allegedly to be
shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership with the necessary raw materials.
Petitioner alleged that when the check was issued sometime in February 1988, complainant knew that
the same was not funded.
 After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23, 1997 a Decision
finding petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:

ISSUE:
WON petitioner was guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. WON the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
On the first issue, after a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioner’s
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are
as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the
accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at
the time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for payment of such check. Consequently, when the check was presented for
payment, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he received
demand letters to pay the amount of the check from private complainant but he did not comply with
it. The issue as to whether the amount of the subject check represents the amount of the money loaned
by private complainant to petitioner or as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question
involving the credibility of witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the appellate court will not
generally disturb the findings of the lower court considering that it is in a better position to settle that
issue since it had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct during the trial,
which circumstances carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In the present case, we see no
reason to reverse the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the amount of
the subject check was a loan and not an investment.
On the second issue, petitioner’s argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and
not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is
without merit. It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and not during the arraignment
of the accused. The Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed
on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg.
129 which provides “Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory
or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, that in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.”

Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but
not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the
Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Metropolitan Trial
Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only
for offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691
contains retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that have not yet
reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be
construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided
by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.

VILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 125834
December 6, 1999

FACTS:
That on or about the 4th day of May 1991, in the municipality of Guiginto, Province of
Bulacan, the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously possess two sticks of marijuana cigarettes which is a prohibited drug, and fourteen decks
of methamphetamine hydrochloride(shabu); a regulated drug, without authority of law. Petitioner
was also convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to suffer a penalty of
imprisonment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision of RA 7659 be given retroactive effect in this case.

HELD:
Although RA 6425 was enacted as a special law, it has long been settled that by force Article
10 of the Revised Penal Code the beneficent provisions of Article 22 thereby applies to and shall be
given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws. The exception in said article would not
apply to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the
third time or oftener of the crimes of robbery, theft, estafa or swindling, falsification, serious or less
serious physical injuries.

PEOPLE VS. WALPAN LADJAALAM Y MILAPIL

GR No. 136149-51
September 19, 2000

FACTS:
The trial court found the appelant guilty of maintaining a drug den, an offense for which was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Appelant’s guilt was established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness
, who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including
the time of the raid. The former’s testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who
testified before the court. That appelant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent
credence to the prosecution’s story.
The trial court also convicted appellant of direct assault with multiple counts of attempted homicide. It
found that “[t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to
enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x” constituted such complex crime. Aside from finding
appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him also
of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and
sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant can be convicted separately of illegal possession of firearms after
using said firearm in the commission of another crime.

HELD:
NO. The appealed Decision was affirmed with modifications. Appellant is found guilty only
of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon and (2)
maintaining a drug den.

The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided
that “no other crime was committed by the person arrested.” If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the
third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should [the courts].
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14
rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty
for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade
conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter
offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto
menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is
not subject to the Court’s review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should
be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached
from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. [The Court’s] task is constitutionally
confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and [this Court] have done
so in this case.

PEOPLE VS. ALMAZAN

GR No. 133442
March 23, 2004

FACTS:
The appellant was charged with murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which
reads as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of May 1989, at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning, at Barangay
Calaba, in the municipality of Bangued, province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, and while armed with a firearm (unrecovered), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shoot one LORETO APOLINAR several times, hitting him on the head and other
parts of his body, which caused his death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the victim.
The trial court convicted the appellant as charged but sentenced him to an indeterminate
penalty.

ISSUE:
WON a mitigating or an aggravating circumstance was attendant to the crime.

HELD:
There is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant to the crime

We agree with the trial court and the CA that under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
the appellant is guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The crime was committed before the effectivity
of Republic Act No. 7659; hence, the crime was punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Further, under Republic Act No. 8294
amending Presidential Decree No. 1866, the use of an unlicensed firearm to commit homicide or
murder is a special aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime. The Information merely
alleged that the appellant used a firearm to kill the victim. It did not allege that the same was unlicensed.
Neither was it proved by the prosecution that the appellant had no license to possess the firearm. The
appellant’s lack of license to possess the firearm is an essential element of the circumstance. Unless it
is alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution, the use by the appellant of an unlicensed
firearm to commit murder is not aggravating. Besides, the crime was committed before the effectivity
of the Revised Rules of Court and Rep. Act No. 8294. Hence, the aggravating circumstance should
not be appreciated against the appellant.
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant to the crime, the medium
period of the penalty imposed by the law for the crime, namely, reclusion perpetua, shall be imposed on
the appellant. In this case, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On the civil liability of the appellant, he should be ordered to pay exemplary damages to the
heirs of the victim conformably to current jurisprudence.