04 PARTIES

Real Party in Interest

 Party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. (Rule 3, Sec. 2)
 Indispensable Party
 Party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. (Rule 3, Sec. 7)
 Necessary party
 One who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be
accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim
subject of the action. (Rule 3, Sec. 8)

Rule 3 Parties to Civil Actions

Section 2. Parties in Interest
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Section 3. Representatives as parties

Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a
party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed
principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging
to the principal.

Rules on Representatives as Parties

GR: Beneficiary/Principal shall be deemed to be the real party in interest and included in the title
 Ex: Trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator
EXC: Undisclosed principal → Agent will be included in the title but is not a real party in interest
EXC: Contract under dispute involves things belonging to the principal

Rule 3 Parties to Civil Actions

Section 4. Spouses as parties
Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.

Exception to Rule 3 Section 4.

Family Code Article 111
A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otheriwse dispose of his or her exclusive property,
without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same.

Rules on Spouses
GR: Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly
EXC: When the suit filed pertains to the spouse's exclusive property
Rule 3 Parties to Civil Actions
Section 11 Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such
terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.

Section 13. Alternative defendants

Where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons he is entitled to relief, he may join any or all of
them as defendants in the alternative, although a right to relief against one may be inconsistent with a right of
relief against the other.

Section. 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant

Whenever the indentity or name of a defendant is unknown, he may be sued as the unknown owner, heir,
devisee, or by such other designation as the case may require; when his identity or true name is discovered, the
pleading must be amended accordingly.

Section 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant

When two or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they
may be sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly known by.

In the answer of such defendant, the names and addresses of the persons composing said entity must be
revealed.

Section 18. Incompetency or incapacity

If a party becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the court, upon motion with notice, may allow the action to be
continued by or against the incompetent or incapacitated person assisted by his legal guardian or guardian ad
litem.

Section 19. Transfer of interest

In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court
upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with
the original party.

Section 21. Indigent party

A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte
application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available
for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of
stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful
fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial
court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with
sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the
clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment
thereof, without prejudice to such other sanction as the court may impose.
Rules on Misjoinder and Non-Joinder of Parties
GR: Court may order the that parties be dropped or added upon the motion of any party or motu propio at
any stage of the proceedings
GR: Claims against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.

Rule 6 Kinds of Pleadings

Section 5 Defenses—May either be negative or affirmative
(b) An affirmative defnese is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material
allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative
defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former
recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance.

Corporation Code
Section 21. Corporation by estoppel
All persons who assume to act as a corporation knowing it to be without authority to do so shall be liable as
general partners for all debts, liabilities and damages incurred or arising as a result thereof: Provided, however,
That when any such ostensible corporation is sued on any transaction entered by it as a corporation or on any
tort committed by it as such, it shall not be allowed to use as a defense its lack of corporate personality.

On who assumes an obligation to an ostensible corporation as such, cannot resist performance thereof on the
ground that there was in fact no corporation. (n)

Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases
When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such
public respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court;
and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in
behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such
proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the judge,
court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or
respondents.

Revised Penal Code

Article 102 Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations
shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses
from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within
the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may
have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.chan
robles virtual law library

Article 103 Subsidiary civil liability of other persons

The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Rule on Requirements to be a Party to a Case
GR: [1] Must have legal personality (either natural or juridical) and consequently legal capacity and
[2] must be a real party in interest
EXC: To 1st Requirement of Legal Personality
Entity is authorized by law or by the Rules
Ex: Estate of the deceased, Entity without juridical personality as defendant (Rule 3, Sec. 15), the State
and its subdivisions, Corporation by Estoppel (Corp. Code Sec. 21), unborn (Opposa v. Factoran)
EXC: To 2nd Requirement of Real Party in Interest
Ex: Nominal parties, Persons with subsidiary liability (RPC 102-103)

Rule when a suit is not brought in the name of or against a real party in interest
GR: A motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action (under
which the ground of the suit not brought in the name of or against a real party in interest is subsumed)
◦ The dismissal on this ground entails an examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are
interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether all persons interested in such
outcome are actually pleaded. The latter query is relevant in discussions concerning
indispensable and necessary parties, but not in discussions concerning real parties in interest.
Both indispensable and necessary parties are considered as real parties in interest, since both
classes of parties stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.

 Alternative defendants
Named
 Defendants whose identities are unknown
Real Party in Interest
 The whole world in actions in rem
Not Named
 Private plaintiff in civil liability ex delicto
 Nominal parties such as judges whose
orders are the subject of a certiorari
 Agents of undisclosed principals
Not Real Party in Named  Public action suits
Interest  Trustee in an express trust
 Guardian
 Executor or administrator
Not Named  Those with subsidiary liability

Tuzon v Cloribel-Purugganan
26 Nov 2001, Pardo, J.
Summary:
An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Cloribel-Purugganan for illegal practice of law,
gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct, evident bias and partiality, knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment and wilful violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case stemmed from a petition for certiorari
filed by Tuzon with the CA assailing the order of Judge Cloribel-Purugganan. The CA ordered the counsel of the
adverse party, Atty. Catral, to comment why the prayer of Tuzon should not be granted. In compliance with such
order, Judge Cloribel-Purugganan filed the comment for Atty. Catral and affixed her name and signature on the
said comment. Tuzon filed said administrative complaint due to the interference of the judge and alleged that
respondent judge antedated her decision in the subject civil case.
The Court ruled in that respondent judge was guilty of illegal practice of law in violation of the Revised
Rules of Court and Code of Judicial Conduct and ordered her to pay a fine of P10,000 and suspended her for 3
months without pay.
Doctrine:
Rule 65, Sec. 5 provides that public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the
petition or any pleading in the court where the petition is pending as they are merely nominal parties. They can
only be allowed to do so if they are specifically directed by the court where the same petition is pending.
Judges whose order is challenged in an appellate court need not file any answer or take an active part in
the proceeding unless expressly directed by order of the Court.

Premium Marble v CA
1996, Torres, Jr., J.
Summary:
A complaint for damages was filed by Atty. Dumagdag in behalf of his clients, the alleged incumbent
board of directors of Premium Marble against International Corporate Bank. The case arose from the irregular
deposit of 3 cross-checked cheques issued to Premium Marble by Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation. Said cheques were deposited to Intervest, a conduit corporation of Saturnino Belen, Jr., a former
officer of Premium Marble. International Corporate Bank filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Premium
Marble had no capacity to sue in this instance. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court to dismiss the case.
The Court held that Premium Marble, as represented by the clients of Atty. Dumagdag, had no legal
capacity to sue as the general information sheet filed with the SEC did not indicate that the clients of Atty.
Dumagdag were the incumbent officers of the company. Atty. Dumagdag and his clients failed to substantiate
their claim that the latter has the capacity to sue and bind Premium Marble.

Doctrine:
The power of the corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that
exercises its corporate powers. In cases where the issue of authority and the invalidity of a stockholder’s
subscription is still pending, any pending suit by said stockholder whose shares qualify him as a board of
director, is within the sound judgment of the SEC.
In the absence of an authority from the board of directors, no person, not even the officers of the
corporation, can validly bind the corporation.

Heirs of Paez v Torres

2 Feb 2000, Purisima, J.
Summary:
The heirs of Paez filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the reconstituted titles of the heirs of
Osmena, alleging that the same were reconstituted through fraud. The latter filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint does not state a cause of action as they could not be bound by the acts of their
predecessors with respect to the lots in question as they were still unborn and/or minors at the time of the act or
omission complained of. Further, petitioners are now barred from claiming any right or title thereto for having
failed to assert their rights for almost 50 years. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to allege a
sufficient cause of action.
The SC ruled for the heirs of Paez and held that a hearing should have proceeded to thresh out whether
there was a sufficient cause of action considering the affirmative defenses raised by the heirs of Osmena.

Doctrine:
A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the
court for resolution is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and
not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint.’ The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not,
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
of the complaint.’ (Garcon vs. Redemptorist Fathers, 17 SCRA 341) If the allegations of the complaint are
sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to
deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity
of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.
Unlike a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, which may be
resolved solely on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, a motion to dismiss raising an affirmative
defense that there is no cause of action as against the defendants poses a question of fact that should be resolved
after due hearing.

Pacana-Contreras v Rovila Water Supply, Inc.

2 Dec 2013, Brion, J.
Summary:
Petitioners, children of spouses Lourdes and Luciano Pana, filed the present case against the respondents
for accounting and damages. They allege that Lilia was a trusted employee who sabotaged their family business
and registered it as her own. The petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was
authorized by Lourdes through an SPA. Lourdes and Luciano later died and so the respondents filed a motion to
dismiss claiming that the petitioners are not real parties in interest. The RTC denied the motion but the CA
reversed the RTC and ruled that it had acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The SC discussed that the petitioners are indeed real parties in interest as heirs of their parents.
Furthermore, the non-joinder of other indispensable parties is a mere technical defect that should be remedied by
amending the complaint rather than outright dismissal. When the parties refuse to implead indispensable parties
despite the court order, that is when the complaint should merit a dismissal.

Doctrine:
Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties may be added by order of the court on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, then the court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s
failure to comply with a lawful court order.

Magallanes v Palmer Asia, Inc.

18 Jul 2014, Carpio, J.
Summary:
Andrews International Products, Inc. is a corporation that manufactures and sells fire extinguishers.
Magallanes, one of its sales agents, negotiated with three prospective buyers whose cheques bounced. In order to
obtain his commission and at the advice of Andrews’ president, Magallanes issued 5 cheuqes to cover the
amount to be paid. Andrews later entered into an agreement with Palmer Asia that the latter would handle all the
business of the former, under the latter’s name. Andrews demanded payment of the value of the checks from
Magallanes, but Magallanes failed to pay, so they filed several complaints for violation of BP 22 against him
before the MeTC. Counsel of Andrews entered its appearance as counsel for Palmer, and the president of
Andrews explained to the court that Andrews transferred its assets to Palmer, making Palmer the real party-in-
interest.
The MeTC found Magallanes civilly liable, but the RTC found him not civilly liable. Andrews did not
file an MOR, but Palmer did before the CA, which found in its favor. The SC found that since Palmer was not a
real party-in-interest, the appeal before the CA should have been dismissed.

Doctrine:
A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party in
interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.

Siguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) v Chionlo-Sia

3 Feb 2016, Jardeleza, J.
Summary:
SRMO is the counsel of Remedios Rodriquez in her action for the intestate settlement of the estate of her
deceased husband with the RTC. During the pendency of the case, she asked for her widow’s allowance. Before
this was granted, she executed a Deed of Sale of Inheritance wherein she transferred all her rights in the estate to
Gerardo. Remedios executed a SPA in favor of Gerardo to act in her behalf in receiving payables due her.
Gerardo then executed a document designating SRMO as substitute attorney pursuant to the power of
substitution granted to him in the earlier SPA. CA eventually granted the widow’s allowance which the Estate
remitted to SRMO.
Remedios then questioned such order with the RTC and demanded that the amount received be returned.
SRMO was ordered to return the amount. It then appealed with the CA, who dismissed the case stating that
SRMO is not a real party in interest since it was only acting in behalf of its client. The SC disagreed. It said that
SRMO became involved in its own capacity when the RTC ordered it to return the money that it received on
behalf of its client.

Doctrine:
A person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the
CA or the SC to have the order or decision of the trial court reviewed.

NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

Indispensable party
 Party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. (Rule 3, Sec. 7)

Necessary party
 One who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded
as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action. (Rule 3, Sec. 8)

Rule 3 Parties to Civil Actions

Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties
Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants.

Section 8. Necessary party

A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to
be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete detemrination of settlement of the claim subject of the
action.

Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded

Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth
his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission
unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be
obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the
claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prven the court from proceeding in the action, and the
judgement rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.

Section 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff

If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant
and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complain.

New Civil Code

Title III Co-ownership
Article 487
Any one of the co-owners may bring an action of ejectment.

Section 4. Joint and Solidary Obligations

Article 1207
The concurrence of 2 or more creditors or of 2 or more debtors in one and the same obligaiton does not imply
that each one of th eformer has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire
compliance with the presetations. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or
when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.

Article 1208
If from the law, or the nature or the wording of the obligations to which the preceding article refers the contrary
does not appear, the credit or debt shall eb presumed to be divided into as many equal shares as there are
creditors and debtors, the credits or debts being considered distinct from one another, suject to the Rules of
Court governing the multiplicity of suit.

Article 1209
If the division is impossible, th eright of the creditors may be prejudiced only by their collective acts, and the
debt can be enforced only by proceeding against all the debtors. If one of the latter should be insolvent, the
others shall not be liable for his share.

Arcelona v CA
1997
Summary:
Petitioners are natural-born Filipinos who are now naturalized Americans residing in USA. Together
with Olanday, et al (who resided in the PH), they co-owned an undivided fish pen which they leased to a certain
Cipriano Tandoc for 3 years, and subsequently renewed for another two. Tandoc appointed private respondent
Moises Farnacio as caretaker-tenant of the same fishpond. Three days after the expiration of the lease, Farnacio
instituted a Civil Case for “peaceful possession, maintenance of security of tenure, and damages” against
Olanday, et al, in order to remain as the tenant of the fishpond (Civil Case D-7240). The RTC ruled in favor of
Farnacio, which was upheld by the CA and SC.
Petitioners (the co-owners who resided in the PH) then filed a case for annulment of judgment (for Civil
Case D-7240) in the CA, claiming that the judgement was void. They argue that since they were co-owners of
the undivided property, they were indispensable parties that should have been impleaded in Civil Case D-7240.
Because they were never impleaded and they were never sent summons, the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction
over their persons and they were denied due process. CA, however, dismissed their case because only extrinsic
fraud can be a ground to annul judgment.
The SC explains that the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Petitioners are coowners of a fishpond and the fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific
portion of the property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion belongs to petitioners. Petitioners should
have been properly impleaded as indispensable parties. The failure to implead petitioners barred the lower court
from making a final adjudication. The want of jurisdiction of the trial court in rendering its decision in Civil
Case No. D7240 is not patent on the face of said judgment. However, there were glaring documentary and
testimonial pieces of evidence referred to by the trial court in its decision which should have prompted it to
inquire further whether there were other indispensable parties who were not impleaded. The nullity of a decision
arising from lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the case, not necessarily from the face of
the judgment only. It was obvious from the different testimonial and documentary evidence that the trial court
should have inquired further on the other co-owners of the fish pond. The SC ruled that the RTC decision in
Civil Case No. D2740 was null and void.

Doctrine:
Basic considerations of due process, however, impel a similar holding in cases involving jurisdiction
over the persons of indispensable parties which a court must acquire before it can validly pronounce judgments
personal to said defendants. Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint. On
the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is assured upon the service of summons in the
manner required by law or otherwise by his voluntary appearance. As a rule, if a defendant has not been
summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a personal judgment rendered against such
defendant is null and void.
A decision that is null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is not a decision in
the contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become final and executory. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court, defines indispensable parties as partiesininterest without whom there can be no final
determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

Baloloy v Hular
9 Sept 2004
Summary:
Spouses Lino and Victoriana Estopin were the original owners of a parcel of land located in Barangay
Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon ( Lot No. 3347 ) of the Juban Cadastre. A major portion of the property was
agricultural, while the rest was residential. November 11 and 25, 1961: When Lino Estopin died intestate, his
widow, Victoriana Lagata, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale on over the agricultural portion of Lot No. 3347,
( 15,906 sqm) and the residential portion of the property (287 sqm) to Astrologo Hular.
In 1961 or thereabouts: Iluminado asked Hular’s permission to construct a house on a portion of
Lot No. 3347 near the road, and the latter agreed. Iluminado Baloloy in 1945 acquired a coconut land (north of
the residential portion of Lot 3347 Lot No. 3353 (9302 sqm) and registered the same. Iluminado constructed his
house on a portion of Lot No. 3353. He and his family, including his children, forthwith resided in said house.
In 1979, respondent Hular had his house constructed near the trail (road) on Lot No. 3347, which,
however, occupied a big portion of Lot No. 3353. Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow
and their children continued residing in the property, while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy, one of Iluminado’s
children, later constructed his house near that of his deceased father. When Astrologo died, he was survived by
his children, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the respondent, among others, who continued to
reside in their house.
Sometime in l991 the respondent had Lot No. 3353 surveyed and discovered that the residential area
deeded by Lagata to Astrologo Hular had an area of 1,405 square meters, instead of 287 square meters only.
Respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of title of real property against the children and heirs of
Iluminado Baloloy, namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo and Adelina, all surnamed Baloloy. He
prayed among others that he be declared the absolute owner of the property in question. The SC dismissed the
complaint.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property
and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co- owners had waived
their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of
the case in the trial court.

Doctrine:
If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the
possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable
parties.
Adlawan v Adlawan
2006
Summary:
Petitioner claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who died without any
other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226
and the house built thereon. Out of respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he
granted their plea to occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the
property arise. He verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed instead
an action for quieting of title with the RTC. Finally, upon respondents refusal to heed the last demand letter to
vacate dated petitioner filed the instant case.
The issue in this case is WON petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment. The SC held
that petitioner is not the sole owner of the lot. Petitioner therefore had no authority to institute the instant action.
It is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit
to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed
property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does
not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father,
Dominador.

Doctrine:
A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however,
that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the
possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed

Carandang v Heirs of de Guzman

29 Nov 2006; Chico-Nazario, J.
Summary:
Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are stockholders aswell as corporate officers of
Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS), withequities at fifty four percent (54%) and forty six percent (46%)
respectively. The capital stock of MBS was increased, from P50ok to P1.5m and P345k of this increase was
subscribed by the spouses Carandang. A second increase in the capital stock of MBS took place where the
spouses again subscribed to the same in the amount of P93,750. De Guzman claimed that part of the payment of
these subscriptions were paid by him (i.e. on the first, he paid P293,250 and on the second, P43,1255).
Thus, de Guzman demanded the reimbursement of the payments made for the total amount but the
spouses refused and contended that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang
and de Guzman, whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of the former without cost, in
consideration for Arcadio Carandang's technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment, and his skill in
repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment and thus there is no indebtedness.
The trial court ruled in favour of de Guzman. The spouses elevated the case and assailed the trial court's
decision as being void for the following reasons:
 Failure to comply with Rule 3, Sec. 16 of the RoC.
 The case should have been dismissed as Milagros de Guzman being an indispensable party but was not
impleaded as a party-plaintiff.
 Plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of the loan
 That the liability of the spouses is not solidary.
SC ruled in favour of de Guzman and found the spouses liable and held that the spouses gave an express
waiver as regards the jurisdiction of the trial court over their persons. In addition, the petitioners erroneously
interchange the term indispensable party and real party in interest. While Milagros, as the wife of Quirino, was a
real party in interest, she is not an indispensable party as the Civil Code and Family Code provide that the
husband alone may institute an action for recovery for a sum of money.
The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower courts with modification that the same is chargeable against
their conjugal partnership property.
Doctrine:
Jurisdiction over the person
Jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case may be waived either expressly or impliedly--
comes in the form of either voluntary appearance or failure to object. Thus, lack of jurisdiction over the person,
being subject to a waiver, is a personal defense which can be asserted only by the party who can thereby waive it
by silence.
The decision of the trial court, despite failure to comply with Rule 3, Sec. 16, is valid due to such
express waiver to the jurisdiction over their persons and that before the promulgation of the RTC decision, no
further proceedings required the appearance of de Guzman's counsel.

Real party in interest

 Party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.
 If a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be
filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action.
o However, what dismissal on this ground entails is an examination of whether the parties
presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether all persons
interested in such outcome are actually pleaded.
 The latter query is relevant in discussions concerning indispensable and necessary
parties, but not in discussions concerning real parties in interest.
 Both indispensable and necessary parties are considered as real parties in interest, since
both classes of parties and to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.
Indispensable party
 Party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action.
Necessary party
 One who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded
as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action.
Impleading spouses
 When the spouses are sued for the enforcement of the obligation entered into by them, they are being
impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent
debtors.
 Hence, either of them may be sued for the whole amount, similar to that of a solidary liability, although
the amount is chargeable against their conjugal partnership property.

Pacana-Contreras v Rovila Water Supply, Inc.

2 Dec 2013, Brion, J.
Summary:
Petitioners, children of spouses Lourdes and Luciano Pana, filed the present case against the respondents
for accounting and damages. They allege that Lilia was a trusted employee who sabotaged their family business
and registered it as her own. The petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was
authorized by Lourdes through an SPA. Lourdes and Luciano later died and so the respondents filed a motion to
dismiss claiming that the petitioners are not real parties in interest. The RTC denied the motion but the CA
reversed the RTC and ruled that it had acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The SC discussed that the petitioners are indeed real parties in interest as heirs of their parents.
Furthermore, the non-joinder of other indispensable parties is a mere technical defect that should be remedied by
amending the complaint rather than outright dismissal. When the parties refuse to implead indispensable parties
despite the court order that is when the complaint should merit a dismissal.
Doctrine:
Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties may be added by order of the court on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, then the court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s
failure to comply with a lawful court order.

Land Bank of the Philippines v Cacayuran

22 Apr 2015
Summary:
The Municipality of Agoo entered into 2 loans with LBP in order to finance a Redevelopment Plan of the
Agoo Public Plaza. The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality authorized the mayor Eriquel to enter into a
P4M loan with LBP for the plaza and again for the amount of P28M to construct a commercial center called
Agoo People’s Center within the plaza’s premises. The Municipality used as collateral a parcel of land at the
south-eastern portion of the Plaza. Cacayuran and other residents opposed the redevelopment of the plaza as well
as the means of funding. They claim that these are highly irregular, violative of the law, and detrimental to public
interest resulting in the desecration of the public plaza. Cacayuran’s request for the documents relating to the
plaza’s redevelopment was not granted. Cacayuran invokes his taxpayer right and files a complaint against LBP
and officers of the municipality but does not include the municipality itself as party-defendant.
The municipal officers moved for the dismissal but were denied. LBP asserted that Cacayuran did not
have any cause of action because he was not privy to the loan agreements. SC ruled that the subject motions
were partly granted and the RTC and Cacayuran is DIRECTED to implead all indispensable parties.

Doctrine:
Sec 7, Rule 3 mandates that all indispensable parties are to be joined in a suit as it is the party whose
interest will be affected by the court’s action and without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
His legal presence is an absolute necessity. Absence of the indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void for want of authority to act.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be had The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action; The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

Pamplona Plantation v Tingbil

3 Feb 2005, Panganiban, J.
Summary:
Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc.(Pamplona for brevity) is engaged in the operation of coconut and sugar
plantation in Hacienda Pamplona, Negros Oriental. While, Pamplona Plantation Leisure Company (Leisure for
brevity) was established for the purpose of rendering entertainment and leisure facilities and services. Tinghil
and his other co-respondents are the members of union which Pamplona hired during harvest season of the
coconut and sugar cane. Thereafter, the said union conducted a meeting. A certain Luis Bondoc, manager of
Pamplona, upon learning that a meeting of union was held, did not allow the respondents work. Respondents
filed a complaint against Pamplona before the NLRC for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and other claims.
Meanwhile before the judgment of the NLRC, Tinghil amended the comnplaint to implead Pamplona.
The NLRC however ruled that only Tinghil may be considered as a real party and his other co-respondents failed
to implead Pamplona Plantation Leisure Co. an indispensable party, thus no employer-employee relationship.
When the case was appealed in the CA after the denial of MR of the respondents, the former ruled that
the dismissal by Pamplona to respondents is illegal.

Doctrine:
The SC ruled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a
party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable
 CHAPTERS 1&2 OF THE TALENT CODE

Introduction
 Clarissa, Clarinet, The Girl Who Did a Month's Worth of Practice in 6 Minutes
 Gary McPherson and James Renwick, Australia
 Golden Wedding 1941 Woody Herman
 The Blue Danube
 Myelin: Neural insulator
 Skill: Created by chains of nerve fibers carrying a tiny electrical impulse
 Deep practice, ignition and master coaching

Chapter 1 Deep Practice

You will become clever through your mistakes~German Proverb
 Talent: The possession of repeatable skills that don't depend on physical size

Chicken-wire Harvards
 Brunio 11 Sao Paolo, Brazil, Elastico: a ball-handling maneuver in which he nudges the ball with the
outside of his foot, then quickly swings his foot around the ball to flick it the opposite direction with his
instep
 Jennie 24 Dallas vocal studio, Running Out of Time
 Brazil, Pele, Garrincha, Vava; Hungary; World Cup in Sweden
 Deep practice: Struggling in certain targeted ways. Operating at the edges of your ability, where you
make mistakes, makes you smarter; Expriences where you're forced to slow down, make errors, and
correct them end up making you swift and graceful without your realizing it
 Strange concept: Cuts against our intuition about talent-Practice might be the way to forge the blade
itself; it takes events that we normally strive to avoid, make mistakes and turn them into skills

Edwin Link's Unusual Device

 President Franklin Roosevelt, 1934 US Army Air Corps, Airmail Fiasco, General Benjamin Foulois
 Birmingham, NY; Syndney Chaplin; Link Aviation Trainer; Casey Jones; The Blue Box

Brazil's Secret WEapon

 Simon Clifford, Leeds; Futebol de Salao: Soccer in the Room (Portuguese)/Futsal; Vicente Figueiredo;
Alex Bellos Incubator of the Brazilian soul; Dr. Emilio Miranda; National laboratory for improvisation;
no time + no space = better skills
 Compress essential skills into a small box, place in deep practice zone, making and correcting errors and
constantly generating solutions to vivid problems

Chapter 2 The Deep Practice Cell

I have always maintained that excepting fools, men did not differ much in intellect, only in zeal and hard
work~Charles Darwin

Installing Natural Broadband

 Dr. Douglas Fields, 54, National Institutes of Health; the key to talking, reading, learning skills, being
human
 Every human movement, thought/feeling is a precisely timed electric signal traveling through a chain of
neurons; Myelin is the insulation that wraps these nerve fibers and increases signal strength, speed and
accuracy; the more we fire a particular circuit, the more myelin optimizes that circuit, and the stronger,
faster and more fluent our movements and thoughts become
 Skill: Myelin insulation that wraps neural circuits and that grows according to cetain signals
 Struggle is not an option: it's a biological requirement. The best way to build a good circuit is to fire it,
attend to mistakes, then fire it again, over and over
  Passion and persistence are key ingredients of talent because wrapping myelin around a big circuit
requires immense energy and time. If you don't love it, you'll never work hard enough to be great.
 All actions are really the result of electrical impulses sent along chains of nerve fibers; the more we
develop a skill circuit, the less we're aware that we're using it
 Automaticity: Make skills automatic and to stash them in our unconcscious mind
 White matter: supporter cells of myelin
 Greater time = complexity of skill; University of Illinois Bill Greenough
 Brain plasticity: the brain has critical developmental windows, during which its growth responds to its
environment
 Diffusion tensor imaging: Led to focus on myelin
 Fredrik Ullen; directly proportional relationship between hours of practice and white matter
 Torkel Klingberg: Reading skill to white matter increases
 Jesus Pujol vocabulary development
 Oligodendrocytes: Supporter cells which sense the nerve firing and respond by wrapping more myelin
on the fiber that fires. Produces myelin.
 Myelination: Brain's way of controlling speed to make sure it arrives at the right time
 Practice makes myelin, and myelin makes perfect.
 Firing of the circuit is paramount (attainment of a primal state, on where we are attentive, hungry, and
focused, even desperate); Myelin is universal. It is meritocratic. It cares what you do; Myelin wraps and
it doesn't unwrap. Once a skill circuit is insulated, you can't un-insulate it exc: age/disease; Age matters:
Lasts into 30s. Ability to build myelin changes.
 Try harder in the right way--practicing more deeply and earning more skill

Anders Ericsson's Big Adventure

 Stockholm, Sweden; Sven Anders Hedin
 Cognitive Revolution: Human mind operated like a computer that had been designed by evolution, and
that it obeyed certain universal rules.
 Herbert Simon, Nobel Prize in Economics, Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh
 Short term memory: Innate and fixed quality; George Miller (Magical Number 7 pieces of independent
information: Channel Capacity)
 Memory wasn't like shoe size--it could be improved through training. Biological system that can
construct itself
 Deliberate practice: working on technique, seeking constant critical feedback, and focusing ruthlessly on
shoring up weakenesses
 All skills are built using the same fundamental mechanism, which involves physiological limits from
which no one is exempt
 Genius Explained, Dr. Michael Howe, Exeter University, There's no cell type that geniuses have that the
rest of us don't
 Rage to master: Obsessive desire to improve
 Deep practice x 10,000 hours = world-class skill
CLASS SUITS
Rule 3 Parties to Civil Actions
Sec. 12 Class Suit
When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous
that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous
and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any
party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.

Mathay v Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.

26 Aug 1974, Zaldivar, J.
Summary:
Samuel Mathay, et.al. were former stockholders of Consolidated Mines Inc (CMI). Petitioners filed a
case for a class suit against CMI containing six causes of action. Petitioners alleged that in violation of the Board
resolution, the defendants unlawfully acquired stockholdings in the defendant Bank in excess of what they were
lawfully entitled, hence depriving the petitioners of their right to subscribe at par value, in proportion to their
equities established under their respective "Pre-Incorporation Agreements to Subscribe" to the capital stock and
that the Articles of Incorporation were fraudulently amended by the defendants. The complaint was dismissed by
the Trial Court on the ground that the class suit could not be maintained because of the absence of a showing in
the complaint that the plaintiffs-appellants were sufficiently numerous and representative, and that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action. The CA affirmed the ruling, hence, the appeal. Court held that the action was not
a class suit.
The complaint in the instant case failed to state the number of said CMI subscribing stockholders that the
trial court could not infer nor make sure that the parties are indeed so numerous that they cannot practically
appear in court and that the plaintiffs are representative of the other stockholders. The statute also requires that
the subject-matter of the controversy be of common interest to numerous persons. In the instant case, the interest
that appellants, plaintiffs and intervenors, and the CMI stockholders had in the subject matter of this suit was
several, not common or general in the sense required by the statute. Each one of the appellants and the CMI
stockholders had determinable interest; each one had a right, if any, only to his respective portion of the stocks.
No one of them had any right to, or any interest in, the stock to which another was entitled.

Doctrine:
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly: (1) that the subject matter of
the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and (2) that such persons be so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring them all to the court. The statute requires that the complaint should allege
the existence of the necessary facts, the existence of a class and the number of members in the said class so as to
enable the court to determine whether the members of the said class are so numerous as to make it impractical to
bring them all to court.

Newsweek v IAC
1986
Summary:
Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental filed a case in
their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in theprovince against Newsweek Inc.
and two of their non-resident correspondents/reporters, Fred Bruning and Barry Came. The complaint alleged
that petitioner committed libel against them by the publication of thearticle "An Island of Fear" in their
magazine. The article supposedly portrayed the island as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane
planters who exploited the impoverished sugarcane laborers and brutalized and killed them with impunity. They
claim that the article showed a malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and misrepresentation of facts,
putting them in a bad light.
Petitioner argued that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because the
complainant made no allegation that anything contained in the article referred specifically to any one of them--
and libel can be committed only against individual reputation OR, if is claimed to be directed at a group, there is
defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific,
individual group member's reputation. Complaint was dismissed on the ground that private respondents failed to
state a cause of action since they made no allegation in the complaint that anything contained in the article
complained of specifically referred to any of them.

Doctrine:
A class suit for libel cannot hold where the plaintiffs have separate and distinct reputations in the
community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy. None of
them may sue for the benefit of all.

Liana's Supermarket v NLRC

31 May 1996; Bellosillo
Summary:

Doctrine:

MVRS Publciations v Islamic

28 Jan 2003, Vittug, J.
Summary:
Bulgar published an article allegedly libelous against Muslims as it talked of how pigs are the gods of
Muslims. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, a local federation of more than 70 Muslim organizations
filed a case against MVRS Publications, Inc. and others a class suit in behalf of Muslim members nationwide.
The defendants argued that the article was merely an opinion. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action as the persons allegedly defamed by the article
were not specifically identified and that the same referred to a larger collectivity of Muslims for which the
readers could not readily idenitify the personalities of the persons defamed.

Doctrine:
 Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the
statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.
 An individual plaintiff must have a cause of action in common with the class to which they belong in
order for a class suit to prosper.
 As the size of these groups increases, the chances for members of such groups to recover damages on
tortious libel become elusive. This principle is said to embrace two (2) important public policies: first,
where the group referred to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader would take the
statements as so literally applying to each individual member; and second, the limitation on liability
would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and expression, as well as of the press, effecting a
sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved in libel cases.
 A prime consideration is the public perception of the size of the group and whether a statement will be
interpreted to refer to every member. The more organized and cohesive a group, the easier it is to tar all
its members with the same brush and the more likely a court will permit a suit from an individual even if
the group includes more than twenty five (25) members. At some point, however, increasing size may be
seen to dilute the harm to individuals and any resulting injury will fall beneath the threshold for a viable
lawsuit.

Ching v Subic Bay Golf and Country Club

10 Sep 2014, De Castro, J.
Summary:

Doctrine:
Villamor, Jr. v Umale
24 Sep 2014
Summary:
Doctrine:
DECEASED PARTIES

Rule 3 Parties in Civil Actions

Sec. 16 Death of party; duty of counsel
Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the
duty of his counsel to inform the court within 30 days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name
and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a
ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of 30 days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall
fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to
procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring for such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

Sec. 17 Death or separation of a party who is a public officer

When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies,
resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his
successor if, within 30 days after the successor takes office, or such time as may be granted by the court, it is
satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it
and that the successor adopts or continues or thereatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor.
Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be
given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard.

Rule 86 Claims against Estate

Sec. 5 Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, bared; exceptions
All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed wihtin the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are
barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or
prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the
claims he has against the decedents, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided,
and mutual claims may be set off agianst each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of
the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the
claim had been preseneted directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.

Rule 39 Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments

Sec. 4 Judgments not stayed by appeal
Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now
or may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall
not be stayed by an appeal take therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the
appellate court in its discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the injunction,
receivership, accounting or award of support.

Rule 111 Prosecution of Civil Action

Sec. 4 Effect of Death on Civil Actions
The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall
extinguis the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under
Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of
obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or
against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of 30 days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially
provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims agains the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudiced ot any civil
action the offended party may file agianst the estate of the deceased.

Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v CA

Summary:
Doctrine:

Metrobank v Absolute Management Corp.

9 Jan 2013
Summary:
Doctrine:

Cabugao v People
30 Jul 2014
Summary:
Doctrine:

Ferreria v Vda. De Gonzales

17 Jul 1958
Summary:
Doctrine:
INDIGENT PARTIES

C1987A3S11 Bill of Rights

Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.

Rule 3 Parties in a Civil Action

Sec. 21 Indigent party
A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex
parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and
other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the
case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by
the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a
person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and
collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue
for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.

Rule 141 Legal Fees

Sec. 19 Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees
Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount
double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with A FAIR
MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION of more than P300,000 shall be
exempt from the payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant
unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income above-mentioned, and they do not own any real property with the
fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting ot the truth of the
litigant's affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of the litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the
complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability
may have been incurred.

OCA Circular No. 34-155

Keywords: Benefit granted to indigent parties; Reminders as to their observance
Laurel Laws
 Preference to criminal cases where parties are indigent (RA 6033)
 Providing transport and other allowance for indignets (RA 6034)
 Free stenographic notes to indigent and low income litigants (RA 6035)
 Bail not required for violations of ordinances (RA 6036)
 Exemption from payment of legal fees (Rule 141 Sec. 19)

OCA Circular No. 125-14

Keywords: PAO Acosta; Exemption for client's from payment of sheriff's expenses
Fees
  Charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain privileges and services
 Totality of legal fees imposed uner Rule 141: Includes docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of
provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff's fees, stenographer's fees and commissioner's fees
 Exacted for the services rendered by the court in connection with the action instituted before it

Sheriff's Fees
 Rule 141 Sec. 10 Sheriffs, process servers and other persons serving processes –Deposit of P1,000 to
defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-authorized persons in the
service of summons, subpoena and other court processes that would be issued relative to the trial of the
case. If P1,000 insufficient, plaintiff shall be required to make an additional deposit

Sheriff's Expenses
 Not considered legal fees
 Separate charges on top of the sheriff's fees

Authorized employees and officials of PAO to serve the summons, subpoenas and other court processes in
behalf of their clients. Amount of expenses from the same taken from the operating expenses of PAO, which in
turn may be reovered from the adversaries of the PAO's clients as costs of suit, attorney's fees or contingent fees
prior to the deposit thereof in the National Treasury.

Sps. Algura v City of Naga

20 Oct 2006, Velasco, Jr., J
Summary:
Spouses Algura filed a complaint for damages against the Naga City Government (NGC) for the illegal
demolition of their residence and boarding house. Simultaneous to the filing of such complaint, they filed an ex
parte motion to litigate as indigent litigants. The same was contested by the NGC and the trial court eventually
ruled for NGC, finding that the gross monthly income of the spouses did not meet the standard required to be an
indigent litigant.
The SC ruled in favour of the spouses. The SC held that while they were not able to satisfy the
requirements as indigent litigants, the trial court should have given application to Rule 3, Sec. 21, which called
for a hearing on the merits of whether or not the party so disqualified is one who has no money or property
sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. The case was thus
remanded to the trial court for determination of the spouses' qualifications under the said Rule.
Doctrine:
In cases where a party applies to litigate as an indigent, the following rules shall be followed:
1. Trial court should determine if the applicant complies with the following requirements
(Rule 141, Sec. 19):
 Applicant's gross income and that of his immediate family do not exceed an amount double the
monthly minimum wage of an employee; AND
 Applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of more than P300,000
2. If the applicant complies with the above-stated requirement, then authority to litigate as an indigent will
be granted as a matter of right.
3. If the applicant fails to meet such requirement, the trial court should set a hearing to enable the applicant
to prove that he has no money or property sufficient and available for food shelter and basic necessities
for himself and his family.
 The adverse party may likewise produce evidence to counter that of the applicants.
 Should the trial court find in favour of the applicant, the adverse party may still call into question the
qualifications of the applicant as an indigent during any stage of the proceeding before judgment is
rendered on the ground of new evidence.

Re: Query of Roger Prioreschi

2009
Summary:
Doctrine: