LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3

1. Director of Lands - Idel Monfort 39. Ortigas v Velasco - Sarcaoga

2. Sala v CFI - Shei Pascual-Pranada 40. Alabang Development v Valenzuela - Siang
3. TIpon v IAC - Tanya Perez 41. Tahanan v Valenzuela - Tiongco
4. Republic v Mina - Patrixia Santos 42. Dordas v CA - Valdez
5. Republic v Abrille - Ronald Sarcaoga 43. Metropolitan v Sison - Abdon
6. Agne v Director of Lands - Jet Siang 44. Republic v Marasigan - Abdullah
7. Obanana v Boncaros – Tiongco 45. Republic v CA - Buenaventura
8. Benin v Tuason - Aaron Valdez 46. Allama v Republic - Domingo
9. Ponce de Leon v RFC - Reinier Jeffrey Abdon 47. Republic v CA - Fullecido
10. PNB v CA – Maya Abdullah 48. New Durawood v CA - Hernandez
11. Solid State v CA - Victoria Buenaventura 49. Averia v Caguioa - Hernandez
12. Villanueva v CA - Calvin Patrick Domingo 50. Ligon v CA - Mambuay
13. Avila v Tapucar - John Raymund Fullecido 51. San Lorenzo v CA - Manalo
14. Vda de Recinto v Inciong - Carlos S. Hernandez Jr. 52. Pagaduan v Estanislao - Monfort
15. Foja v CA - Kevin Hernandez 53. NHA v Basa - Pascual
16. Albiendo v CA - Ayesha Alonto Mambuay 54. Pacete v Asotigue - Perez
17. National Grains Authority v IAC - Lawi Manalo 55. Abalos v Darapa - Santos
18. Penullar v PNB - Monfort 56. Vda de Gualberto v Go - Sarcaoga
19. Bornales v IAC - Pascual 57. Cabacungan v Laigo - Siang
20. Arguelles v Timbancaya - Perez 58. INC v Ponferrada - Tiongco
21. River v CA - Santos 59. Republic v Mangotara - Valdez
22. Umbay v Alecha - Sarcaoga 60. Luna v Luna – Abdon
23. Jimenez v Fernandez - Siang
24. Sotto v Teves - Tiongco
25. Lacamen v Laruan - Valdez Director of Lands - Idel Monfort
26. Cimafranca v IAC - Abdon
27. Natalia Realty Corp v Vallez - Abdullah Abad Santos | Mar. 18, 1985 | In division
28. Toyota v CA - Buenaventura
Doctrine: The issue on the validity of title can only be raised in an action expressly
29. DBP v CA - Domingo
instituted for that purpose.
30. Realty Sales Enterprise v IAC - Fullecido
31. Rodolfo Coronel v IAC - Hernandez Graciano Neri applied for judicial confirmation of their title to a piece of land in a
32. Locsin v Hizon - Hernandez land registration case before the CFI of Misamis Oriental. The application was later
33. Peralta v Abalon - Mambuay amended by adding the addresses of the two persons who were said to be legal
34. Pinote v Dulay - Manalo occupants of the land in the concept of tenants. In an order, the CFI dismissed the
35. Bunagan v CFI - Monfort opposition saying the oppositors’ only ground was that the land was public and that
the Bureau of Lands did not file any opposition. The CFI later decidedto adjudicate
36. Republic v CA - Pascual
the land to Neri, among others. The Commissioner of Land Registration issued a
37. Register of Deeds v RTC - Perez decree and the Register of Deed issued an OCT. Neri and other registered owners
38. Zuniga v Vicencio - Santos later filed a motion praying for writs of possession and demolition as they alleged

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that squatters built shacks before the decree was issued. The CFI granted the
motion and the writs were later issued.
Petronilo Bullecer as president of the Taguanao Settlers Association asked for a 90-
day stay in the enforcement of the writ. The Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor
General also asked that the execution of the writ "be stayed or held in abeyance
pending the result of the Annulment proceedings which this Office is filing with the
proper court." The motions to stay execution were opposed by the registered
owners. The CFI denied the motions.
In the meantime, the Director of Lands filed a civil case in the CFI for annulment of
OCT and reversion against Neri et al. The Director also later filed this petition for
certiorari. Both case and petition prayed to nullify the CFI adjudication and the OCF
and asked for the REVERSION of the land to the State. The cause of action in both
is that the land registration court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate title to the land in
question for lack of notices to the person affected; and compliance with other legal
requirements.
SC denied the petition. The OCT was issued on Sept. 20, 1976, it cannot be
collaterally attacked in a petition filed on Nov. 19, 1981. The SC also said that the
issue in respect of the validity of OCT has been previously and directly raised in the
civil case which is the proper action. Resolution of the same issue in the SC will
displace a tribunal which can best ascertain the veracity of the factual allegations
and which first acquired jurisdiction over an action which exclusively pertains to it.
There should be no multiplicity of suits.
Sala v CFI - Shei Pascual-Pranada
FACTS
 Daniel Junco was granted by the President homestead patent no. 255492 over
a parcel of land known as lot nos. 4 and 5 of the cadastral survey of Basay
Negros Oriental, with a total area of 72,941 sq.m.
 Without knowing said issuance, he conveyed by way of a deed of sale dated 16
June 1967, 7,500 sq.m.of the lots to Crispin Salveron.
 In 1968, he received information of the issuance. He registered the patent only
on Dec. 19, 1968, and he was issued by the Register of Deeds of the province,
OCT No. 7936 covering the same lots.
 Salveron on the other hand, registered the deed of sale but he was never
issued any title thereto. His grandfather, however, paid the real estate taxes of
the portion sold to him up to 1974.
 On Feb. 24, 1974, the entire lots were sold at a public auction held by the
provincial sheriff. The latter on that same day, executed in favor of petitioner
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Juan Sala as judgment creditor and being the highest bidder thereat, a
certificate of sale and subsequently, OCT No. 7936 was cancelled and TCT No.
1300 was issued to petitioner.
 Since he bought the lots, petitioner had been in possession thereof except the
portion sold to private respondent. Petitioner made demands from private
respondent for the surrender of the portion sold to him but he refused.
 Petitioner Sala then filed with the CFI of Negros Oriental an action for recovery
of possession against private respondent Salveron.
 Petitioner's evidence consisted mainly of TCT No. FV-1300 issued to him by the
Registry of Deeds and the testimony of his daughter Lourdes Sala Napigkit who
declared that they have advised private respondent to vacate the area sold to
him but he refused and that they have never harvested the fruits from the 130
coconut trees thereon. Petitioner alleged that the sale made by Daniel Junco to
private respondent is void by reason of Sec. 118 of CA 141, as amended and so
private respondent never acquired any right over the land subject thereof, and
that Sec. 118 does not exempt patentees and their purported transferees who
had no knowledge of the issuance of the patent from the prohibition against
alienation.
 For private respondent, his evidence was the deed of sale executed in his favor
by Daniel Junco.
 the trial court rendered a decision dismissing petitioner's complaint. In so
ruling, the trial court relied on the decision in Dagupan Trading vs. Macam. It
considered private respondent a buyer in good faith. In this regard, it said that
the auction sale where petitioner was buyer was on Feb? 21, 1974 while the
sale to the private respondent by Daniel Junco was on June 26, 1967. It
reasoned out that the patent was issued on Apr. 15, 1967 and the prohibition
to alienate or encumber under Section 118 of CA 141 is within 5 years from the
date of issuance of the patent but the above section of CA 141 makes no
"reference to a buyer in good faith like the defendant who has no knowledge
as to when his seller was granted a patent upon whom devolves the strict
observance of said section, hence, concluded that "the sale by Daniel Junco to
defendant Crispin Salveron is VALID.
ISSUE: whether or not a judgment creditor who bought at a public auction,
a land covered by a free patent, can recover possession thereof from
another buyer to whom the same was conveyed by the grantee and
judgment debtor, in violation of Sec. 118 of CA 141, as amended. - NO
HELD:
 The prohibition has the avowed purpose of giving the homesteader or patentee
every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had
gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it.
 Prohibition to alienate commences to run from the date the application is
approved which may be a date earlier than the date of issuance of the patent.
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The period of 5 years within which the alienation or encumbrance of a
homestead is restricted, starts to be computed from the latter date.
 In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the sale made by the grantee, Daniel
Junco to private respondent, of the 7,500 sq.m. portion of lots 4 and 5, was
made barely one month and eleven days from the issuance of the patent to
him. The sale was, therefore, null and void and without effect because it was in
violation of the above provision of law. The nullity of the sale of only a portion
of the lots, extended to the entire lots. The sale produced the effect of
annulment and cancellation of the title issued to Daniel Junco and causes the
reversion of the lots and its improvements to the State (Sec. 124, CA 141, as
amended). Although the sheriff's sale was conducted after five years from the
issuance of the patent and that petitioner, although in good faith, was
subsequently issued title over lots 4 and 5, the proceedings had did not cure
the nullity of the first sale. The provision against alienation is mandatory. Thus,
where a grantee is found not entitled to hold and possess in fee simple the
land, by reason of his having violated Sec. 118 of the Public Land Law, the
Court may properly order its reconveyance to the grantor, although the
property has already been brought under the operation of the Torrens System.
And, this right of the government to bring an appropriate action for
reconveyance (or reversion) is not barred by the lapse of time; the Statute of
Limitations does not run against the State.
 The principle of conclusiveness of title as applied to lands registered under the
Land Registration Act through judicial proceedings, cannot defeat the express
policy of the State prohibiting the alienation or encumbrance of lands of the
public domain acquired under the provision of the Public Land Act within five
years from and after the date of the patent.
 The reliance placed by respondent court on the case of Dagupan Trading Co.,
v. Macam is erroneous.1âwphi1 The land involved therein is not covered by a
free patent.
The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed the
complaint for recovery of possession.
Tipon v IAC - Tanya Perez
Tipon v IAC
27 February 1987
Yap, J.
Facts:
1. The lot was part of the Laguna Settlement Project belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines. The Project is administered by the National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration, later transferred to DAR.
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2. Petitioner Renato Tipon acquired the lot from the government by virtue of
a Deed of Sale, stating the following conditions:
a. The land shall not be sold or transferred within 10 years wxcept
in favor of relatives within the third civil degree.
b. That the violation shall be a ground for the cancellation of the
deed of sale.
3. On the day the Deed of Sale was executed in his favor, Tipon filed a
request with the DAR for permission to transfer his rights to Respondent
Atty. Umiral Matic. The request was granted.
4. Tipon filed a complaint to allow him to redeem the land from Matic,
invoking the provisions of Administrative Order No. 4 which gives the
vendor 5 years to redeem.
CFI: dismissed complaint and ordered Tipon to reimburse Matic for attorney’s fees
and costs of the proceedings. (Reason for dismissal not discussed.)
CA: affirmed CFI. (Reason for dismissal not discussed.)
Issue: WON Tipon shall be allowed to redeem. NO.
Ratio: There is a clause in the Deed of Sale in favor of Tipon restricting the
transferability of the land. We should not allow either party to reap any benefit from
the illegal transaction and make a mockery of the government’s laudable program
of providing land to the landless.
The transfer of land both to Tipon and to Matic is annulled. The Register of Deeds is
ordered to issue a Certificate of Title in the name of the Republic.
Republic v Mina - Patrixia Santos
Republic v Abrille - Ronald Sarcaoga
Topic: Reversion suits
Suit: Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title
Subject land - 525,652 sqm land in City of Davao subdivided by Luisa Abrille to two
lots (30Ksqm and 577Ksqm). The second lot is 82K sqm larger than the original
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because it included an area that was formerly a portion of the Davao River (now
dried up by reason of a change of course of the river).
Abrille filed a Petition for Approval of Subdivision Plan (Psdd-79322) to include the
dried riverbed portion in her TCT (approved by CFI and LRC and registered by RoD
of Davao City).
This reversion suit (Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title) was
filed by the Republic represented by the Director of Lands with the CFI of Davao
City.
Republic's arguments:
1. Land is public domain (formerly river bed)
2. Registration by Register of Deeds not in accordance with law (lack of notice and
publication). Director of Lands, especially, was not notified of the addition.
Abrille's answer:
1. Increase in land area acceded to and concurred by the Land Registration
Commission and was approved by the CFI of Davao (TCTs were even issued)
2. Possession for a long time since that area of the river dried up (area added was
planted with coconuts, bananas, and the coconuts were fruit bearing).
CFI Ruling against Abrille and against the inclusion
1. Petition for Approval of Subdivision Plan not the proper remedy for including the
dried riverbed portion. Section 44 of Act 496 does not authorize the inclusion of
land not embraced in the title or in excess of what is stated in the title.
2. Lack of notice to persons interested (especially Director of Lands) and lack of
publication before petition was heard.
CFI said: Heirs of Abrille may have acquired registrable title to the land (they may
allege possession for more than 30 years under a claim of ownership (applicable at
that time), or that the land was accretion) BUT the remedy they used was
improper. They should have filed a petition for registration.
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Heirs of Abrille appealed to the CA which certified this case to the SC as one
involving purely questions of law.
Supreme Court affirmed the CFI (against Abrille)
Abrille arguments:
Similar to CFI arguments (that LRC and RoD abetted in the registration and they
honestly believed that the petition for approval of subdivision plan was enough the
proper remedy).
Republic – similar to CFI arguments.
SC (similar to CFI ruling):
1. Improper remedy, should have filed petition for registration instead of an
ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
2. Section 44 of Act 496 allows subdivision only to the extent of the area of the
original TCT. The 82K sqm lot was not under the Torrens System thus it could not
have been in the original TCT.
3. Lack of notice and publication fatal (esp with the improper remedy).
Disposition: cancel TCT's issued which included the 82K sqm lot.
Agne, et. al. vs. Director of Lands and Spouses Gascon - SIANG
Regalado, J.
Facts:
 Spouses Gascon filed a case for recovery of possession and damages
against petitioners. Their complaint states that they are the registered
owner under a transfer certificate of title of the parcel of land which is now
under the possession of petitioners.
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 During the Japanese occupation, petitioners took possession of said land CFI Decision on the case filed by Petitioners: granted the motion to dismiss
by means of fraud, stealth, strategy and intimidation. filed by the Director of lands and the spouses. An action to annul a free patent
many years after it had become final and indefeasible states no cause of action.
Claim of Spouses Gascon:

The land which is the subject matter of this case was originally covered by Free
Patent No. 23263 in the name of Herminigildo Agpoon. Pursuant to the said patent, Issue: Who, as between the riparian owner presently in possession and the
OCT No. 2370 was issued. Private Respondent Presentacion Agpoon-Gascon registered owner by virtue of a free patent, has a better right over the abandoned
inherited the said parcel of land upon the death of her father, Herminigildo. A river bed in dispute. The riparian owner.
transfer certificate of title was issued in her name.
That the petitioners were riparian owners was a stipulated fact between the parties.
Claim of Petitioners: The claim of ownership of herein petitioners is based on the old Civil Code, the law
then in force. The law states that once the river bed has been abandoned, the
The land in question was formerly a part of the river bed of the Agno-Chico River.
riparian owners become the owners of the abandoned bed to the extent provided
In the year 1920, a big flood occurred which caused the said river to change its
by this article. The acquisition of ownership is automatic. There need be no act on
course and abandon its original bed. That by virtue of the provisions of Article 370
the part of the riparian owners to subject the accession to their ownership, as it is
of the Spanish Civil Code which was then the law in force, petitioners, by operation
subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes
of law, became the owners by accession or accretion. Since 1920, they and their
evident, without the need of any formal act of acquisition.
predecessors in interest occupied and exercised dominion openly and adversely
over said portion of the abandoned river bed The land in question was and is of private ownership and, therefore, beyond the
jurisdiction of the Director of Lands. Private ownership of land is not affected by the
 In their joint stipulation of facts, they agreed that:
issuance of a free patent over the same land because the Public Land Act applies
o The defendants are the riparian owners of the area in question
and further admit that the defendants are in possession of the only to lands of the public domain.
land.
o A Free Patent No. 23263 in the name of Herminigildo Agpoon The free patent and subsequent title issued pursuant thereto are null and void.
covering the area in question was issued and subsequently a Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued pursuant to a patent
transfer certificate of title in the of private respondent was issued. may be invoked only when the land involved originally formed part of the public
domain. If it was a private land, the patent and certificate of title issued upon the
 While the case filed by the Spouses Gascon was still pending, petitioners patent are a nullity. A free patent which purports to convey land to which the
filed a case against the Director and the spouses for annulment of title, Government did not have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title
reconveyance of and/or action to clear title to a parcel of land. They claim in the patentee as against the true owner.
that the patent issued to Spouses Gascon’s predecessor-in-interest and the
subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto are null and void since the said
land, an abandoned river bed, is of private ownership and, therefore, Obanana v Boncaros – Tiongco
cannot be the subject of a public land grant.
Topic: action for reconveyance
CFI Decision on the case filed by Spouses Gascon: Found for the spouses and
ordered petitioners to surrender the physical possession of the land in question.
Facts:
IAC: Affirmed in toto.

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 Celestino Lantao was petitioner’s grandfather and possessed a parcel of private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
unregistered land with a nipa swamp containing an area of approximately jurisdiction. 2 The land covered thereby assumes the character of
2944 sq.ms. situated at Caranoche, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, known registered property in accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of the
as Lot No. 73. Land Registration Act and the remedy of the party who has been injured
 According to petitioners’ Complaint, since their grandfather’s death, they by fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance. 3 The relief that
possessed the western portion of subject property, while private petitioners seek is the enforcement of a constructive trust in order to
respondent occupied the eastern part; obtain a judgment for reconveyance of the land, relying on Article 1456 of
 Petitioner and respondent went to the Bureau of Lands to have their the Civil Code.
respective properties titled but they discovered that the area possessed  As such, petitioners’ cause of action is incapable of administrative
and cultivated by private respondent was inadvertently included in resolution.chanrobles law library : red
petitioners’ Tax Declaration.
 In view of this discrepancy, they decided to partition the lot into two.,
petitioner Patrocinia executed a Deed of Quitclaim whereby she "quit my
claim over one-half (1/2) of said parcel of land . . . in favor of my uncle Benin v Tuason - Victoria Buenaventura
Zoilo Lantao", and likewise "quit my claim over one-fourth (1/4) share of
said parcel of land . . . in favor of my brother Emilio Obañana" SC reversed and set aside the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
 One day, petitioners went to their lot to harvest the nipa palms on the (Quezon City Branch) in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, appealed from.
eastern portion but to their surprise, they were stopped by private
respondent who threatened them with bodily harm
It held that (defendant’s arguments also):
 Petitioners discovered that private respondent, without their knowledge
and consent, had surreptitiously and fraudulently applied for a homestead
(1) cases barred by prior judgment and res judicata in view of the judgment of the
patent.
 Petitioners thus filed Complaint below for reconveyance of the eastern Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-156 which the Supreme Court
portion premised on breach of constructive trust by private Respondent. affirmed in toto the order of the lower court dismissing the case;
 Private respondent answered the Complaint alleging that subject property
is his share in his father’s estate. (2) xx
 Judge dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action due to
petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies on the ground that it (3) that the plaintiffs' action had prescribed;
is the director of lands which has jurisdiction over the controversy, and
that the granting of the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs in their complaint
will result in setting aside a decision of an administrative official without
giving him an opportunity to correct whatever error he may have (4) that J M Tuason et al a buyer in good faith and for valuable consideration
committed.
 As petitioners had failed to obtain reconsideration, this Petition for review TOPICAL ISSUE (other issues at bottom)
was filed.
 ISSUE: WON administrative remedies must first be exhausted before a 2. The lower court erred when it declared OCT No. 735 null and void upon the
petition for reconveyance? Not always. ground that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the Registration Book
 RATIO: in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496.
 The doctrine requiring prior exhaustion of administrative remedies before
recourse to Courts may be had is confined to public lands. It is inapplicable
TC:
to private lands. A free patent application having been granted in the case
at bar and a for corresponding certificate of title having been issued, a
"During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of Title was brought to the Court.
subject property ceased to be part of the public domain and became
The Court had occasion to see and examine the `ENTRY' made in the Registration

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Book. The Court found that the Face of the Title which, under ordinary
circumstances, should be Page 1 is found as Page 2. The sheet containing the
technical description which should be page 2 is Page 1. The FACE of the Title, which
should have been Page 1, contained the last portion of the description of the land
described in the decree. The sheet containing the bulk of the description of the
lands decreed should have been Page 2. The so-called Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 found on Page 138, Book A-7 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal is, therefore,
null and void because the provisions of Section 41 of the Land Registration Law
have not been complied with. Said Section requires that the entry in the
Registration Book must be a transcription of the Decree and the paging should
consist of a leaf or leaves in consecutive order .... “
SC: The formal defect in the transcription of Decree of Registration No. 17431 in
the Registration Book did not render null and void Original Certificate of Title No.
735. The two parcels of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are
properly registered under the Torrens System of registration.
Section 41 of Act 496:
SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the registration of
any property, the clerk shall send a certified copy of such decision to the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office, who shall prepare the decree in accordance
with section forty of Act numbered 496, and he shall forward a certified copy of said
decree to the register of deeds of the province or city in which the property is
situated. The register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the
"Registration Book" in which a leaf, or leaves in consecutive order, shall be devoted
exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in
each case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and
sealed with the seal of his office....
Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been
registered in the office of the register of deeds, as provided in Section forty-one,
the property included in said decree shall become registered land under the Act.
Section 42 of Act 496 provides that the certificate shall take effect upon the date of
the transcription of the decree.
As defined in Section 41 of Act 496, the certificate of title is the transcript of the
decree of registration made by the register of deeds in the registry.
On the face, or on the first page, of defendant’s title:
there is the certification of the Chief of the Land Registration Office that the decree
of registration was registered in Manila on July 6, 1914 at 7:41 a.m.;
and the certification of the Register of Deeds of Rizal that the decree was received
for transcription in his office on July 8, 1914 at 3:30 P.M.
that it was entered pursuant to Decree No. 17431 of the Court of Land Registration,
dated at Manila on the 7th day of March 1914, in Case No. 7681 of said court.
The names of the declared owners, their civil status, their spouses if married, and
their respective interest or share in the lands covered by the title are stated on the
face of this title. The technical descriptions of the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered
by the title are copied on the sheets constituting the title.
What the lower court found, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do
not begin on the face, or on the first page, of this title, as a technical description is
ordinarily copied on the certificate of title. What appears on the face of this title is
the last part of the technical description of Parcel 2. The technical descriptions of
Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the second page and end on the first page.

Section 40 of Act 496: ————

SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and Facts
minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the clerk. It shall state whether the
owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife. If 1955 - three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing
the owner is under disability, it shall state the nature of the disability, and if a substantially the same allegations.
minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a description of the land as finally
determined by the court , . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for The plaintiffs alleged that
transcription upon the certificates of title hereinafter mentioned.

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1 they were the owners of agri land in La Loma in Caloocan (1) barred by prior judgment and res judicata in view of the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-156 which the Supreme Court
2 that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor affirmed in toto the order of the lower court dismissing the case;

3 that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of (2) xx
land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed
the fruits harvested therefrom; (3) that the plaintiffs' action had prescribed;

4 that their grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed in 1894, that during the
cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933
their ancestor and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; (4) that it is a buyer in good faith and for valuable consideration

(5) xx

5 that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 1965 - lower court decision against the Defendants, declaring its titles null and void.

6 that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and SC: the conclusions of the trial court are not supported by the evidence
subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having
Factual findings of SC:
secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid
monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
1911-defendants filed with the Court of Land Registration applications for the
registration of their title over five parcels of land.
The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged
The application and the notice of hearing, containing the technical descriptions of
that in 1951 the defendants illegally entered and started demolishing and
the two parcels of land applied for, were published in the Official Gazette
destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs’ lessees
The Court of Land Registration issued an order of general default against the whole
that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in
world and an order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh.
1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their
23).
respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct
or constructive fraud, in what appears as Santa Mesa Estate in OCT No. 735 of the
1913 the applicants and the Government entered into an agreement whereby the
Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of defendants
Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the application for registration of
title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman.
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.’s motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court.
the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration submitted a report
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.’s answer:
which stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land
specifically denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case. that had not been previously included in the original plan.

special and affirmative defenses The Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued OCT No. 735 in the names of
the applicants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.

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OTHER HOLDINGS:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the Court of Land Registration had no
jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the registration
proceedings, after the original application and notice of hearing had been duly
published, the plan of Parcel 1 was amended and no publication regarding the
amended plan was made.
The area claimed by the plaintiffs is only 2% of the aggregate area b ut the
decision of the trial court nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 785, without any
qualification.
Section 23 of Act 496 - the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of
the application for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is
necessary and proper. if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of
the area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously
published, a new publication is not necessary.
The difference in area is only 27.10 square meters,too minimal to be of decisive
consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No.
735.
Only in cases where the original survey plan is amended during the registration
proceedings by the addition of lands not previously included in the original plan
should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the
registration of the area that was added after the publication of the original plan.
If it is later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands not
included in the original application as published, then the registration proceedings
and the decree of registration must be declared null and void in so far — but only in
so far — as the land not included in the publication is concerned.
The decision of the lower court would prejudice the rights of persons who are not
parties in the present cases, who have purchased lots in the subdivisions developed
by defendants
TC: The Decree of Registration No. 17431 is null and void; the description of Parcel
1 in the decree of registration is different from the description of the same parcel in
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the notice of hearing of the original application for registration as published in the
Official Gazette.
SC: In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 and in Decree of Registration No.
17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of Parcel 1 are stated; on the northern, eastern,
and western sides, as they appear in the notice of hearing that was published and
in Decree of Registration No. 17431, are the same. as indicated in the notice of
hearing that was published in the Official Gazette, are the same lands that are
indicated in the decree of registration as the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its
southwestern boundary. There is simply a change in the names of the owners or in
the designations, of the lands.
Under Section 40 of Act 496
the decree of registration "shall contain a description of the land as finally
determined by the court." Evidently, the Court of Land Registration acted in
consonance with this provision of the law when, in its decision in LRC 7681, it took
into consideration the actual description of Parcel 1 as shown in the amended
survey plan, and when it disregarded the recommendation of the Chief of the
Survey Division, dated March 27, 1914, that the decision of the court of March 7,
1914 "be based upon the original plans, as published, and not upon the amended
plan." It may well be said that Decree of Registration N. 17431 simply contains the
correct area of Parcel 1 and the correct names of the owners of the lands that
bound Parcel 1 in LRC No. 1681 as of the time when the decision of the land
registration court was rendered.
Domingo vs. Ongsiako:
We may further observe that underlying the contention of the plaintiffs is the idea
that errors in the plans nullify the decrees of registration. This is erroneous. It is the
land and not the plan which is registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875,
practically all plans for land registration were defective especially in regard to errors
of closures and areas, but so far no such errors have been permitted to affect the
validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the land registered can be determined,
the technical description in the certificate of title may be corrected without
cancelling the decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by approved
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
surveys which embrace all of the land here in question. To nullify and cancel final
decrees merely by reason of faulty technical descriptions would lead to chaos.
TC: finding that the only boundary of Parcel 1 on the western side is "A. Bonifacio
road" and then declared that the lands situated west of the A. Bonifacio road were
never the subject of the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681.
SC: TC erred. As published in the Official Gazette and the decree of registration No.
17431 wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West are:
(1) a road, (2) Cementerio del Norte and (3) Roman Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-6,
UU, and Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20). But the lower court considered the A. Bonifacio
road as the only boundary on the West, and ignored the two other boundaries on
the West that are mentioned both in the notice of hearing as published and in the
decree of registration.
3. TC: Original Certificate of Title No. 735 ... is null and void from the very
beginning and of no effect whatsoever.
SC: The lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 void and
of no effect. We have held that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a
result of the registration proceedings in LRC No, 7681 which was regular and that
said certificate of title is valid and effective. The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in
rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered in said
registration case bound the lands covered by the decree and quieted title thereto,
and is conclusive upon and against all persons.
The lower court erred in declaring that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was
a purchaser in bad faith. We do not see anything wrong if some incorporators of
the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. are also incorporators of the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired the land (Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of
Title No. 735) from the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the receiver of the properties
of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was authorized, and subsequently
approved, by the court.
TC: when said appellant bought Parcel 1 originally covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 it was aware of the fact that the appellees or their predecessors in
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interest were in possession of, and were cultivating, the six parcels of land that they
now claim in these cases.
SC: It could happen that certain relatives or ancestors of appellees had been
squatting on some portions of the land and claimed certain areas as their own, to
the extent of having the areas claimed by them declared for taxation purposes in
their names.
The possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at all, would be unavailing
against title holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the parcels Of lands now
in question.
It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the Heirs
of D. Tuason, Inc. when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No.34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had relied on the title of the
Mayorasgo Tuason (Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.) when it bought the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997.
The fact, that the predecessors in interest of the appellees — or any person, for
that matter — had not filed a petition for the review of the decree of registration in
LRC No. 7681 within a period of one year from July 8, 1914 when the decree of
registration was issued, is a circumstance that had forever foreclosed any
proceeding for the review of said decree.
4. In Jose Alcantara, et al., versus Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, et al. (G.R. No. L-
4998, Mar. 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 796), this Court declared that Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 is incontrovertible and is conclusive against all persons claiming, either
by themselves or by their predecessors in interest, rights over the lands covered by
said certificate of title.
In its motion to dismiss J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. contended that the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs in Civil
Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the Court of the First Instance of Rizal.
In our examination of the records and the evidence, We find that there is identity of
subject matter and identity of cause of action.
The judgment in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs who are
the heirs of Elias Benin in Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No. 26127), of plaintiff Jose
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
Alcantara in Civil Case No. 3622 (G.R. No. 26128), and of plaintiff Pascual Pili in Civil
Case No. 3623 (G. R. No. 26129) under the doctrine of res adjudicata. We are
likewise of the considered view that the decision in the Alcantara case would serve
to rule out the action of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623
under the doctrine of stare decisis.
In the three Civil Cases the original plaintiffs were substituted by such that as of the
time Civil Case No. 3623 was decided, the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Diego Pili;
(2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the heirs of Luisa Pili, and (4) Pascual Pili.
The doctrine of bar by a previous judgment or res adjudicata squarely applies to
Elias Benin, or to his heirs and successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3621; to Jose
Alcantara and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3622; and to
Pascual Pili and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. and should apply
also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases.
We believe that the appellees had filed their complaints in the honest, but mistaken,
belief that they have a good cause of action against the appellant corporation and
not because they meant to embarrass or humiliate the persons who are identified or
connected with the appellant.
Ponce de Leon v RFC - Reinier Jeffrey Abdon
GR No. L-24571 18 Dec 1970 C.J. Concepcion
FACTS:
In August 1945, Jose Ponce de Leon and Francisco Soriano applied for a loan with
PNB, mortgaging a parcel of land covered by an OCT in Parañaque, in the name of
"Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez."
In 1951 de Leon obtained another loan from Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC), again mortgaging the said land, among others. Soriano signed the
mortgaged deed after it was translated by the notary public to him in Tagalog. At
that time, his spouse Tomasa Rodriguez was already dead.
RFC foreclosed the mortgages after de Leon failed to pay and acquired the
properties on the sheriff's sale. Soriano offered to repurchase the lot prior to the
expiration of the one-year period for redemption but it was rejected, and RFC said
that Soriano should just participate in the public sale (RFC apparently publicly
auctions off properties it acquires through foreclosure).
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Ponce de Leon filed with the CFI to restrain RFC from conducting the public sale,
contending that there was a delay in release of the loan and a typhoon extinguished
the amortization in his obligations for two months (weird), among others.
Soriano tried to get back his property by writing a letter to the President, thus RFC
gave him an offer to redeem the property for its appraised value payable 20%
down and the balance in ten years. Soriano did not redeem the lot under these
conditions, but it then filed a third party complaint against RFC and de Leon,
contending that the mortgage lacked Soriano's consent (he was allegedly infirm at
that time), and also (relevant issue) the property was conjugal so one-half of the
lot not belonged to the Soriano heirs and not to RFC.
The lower court decided that: the sheriff's sales were valid, and the property was
conjugal, among others, applying the presumption in the civil code, thus the
mortgage and foreclosure sale is void as to the 1/2 thereof which was already
transmitted to the heirs when Tomasa died.
Everyone appealed. Digest is on relevant issue, w/n the Parañaque property is
conjugal. The lower court ruled that yes, it was conjugal,
HELD:
It is not conjugal. The title to the property was an original certificate of title, not a
TCT. Thus the OCT does not establish the time of acquisition of the Parañaque
property by the registered owner thereof.
The lower court applied Art. 160 of the CC, which says that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. The SC has previously held
that
"the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition
during coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in
favor of conjugal partnership."
The Soriano heirs have not proved that the Parañaque property was acquired
during the marriage of their parents. Evidence points to the contrary. Gregorio
Soriano, Francisco's cousin, testified that Francisco acquired the property from his
parents long before he was married. (there was a discussion on Gregorio's granchild
being accused for estafa but this was irrelevant).
This was also corroborated by testimony of Rosalina Soriano, one of the third party
plaintiffs.
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If the property was acquired during the marriage, it would have been registered in
the name of spouses Francisco Soriano and Tomasa Rodriguez, NOT
Francisco Soriano, married to Tomasa Rodriguez.
The Sorianos also knew of the mortgage since 1951 (when they received sums of
money from de Leon) , but did not contest its validity until 1957. They also tried to
redeem the property from RFC and even sought help from the President.
PNB v CA – Maya Abdullah
G.R. No. L-57757– 31 August 1987 – Gancayco
FACTS
- Clodualdo Vitug had 3 children with his first wife Gervacia Flores and 8
children with his second wife Donata Montemayor. Clodualdo died intestate
on May 20, 1929, and his estate was settled and distributed in a special
proceeding wherein Donata was the administratrix.
- Two duly registered mortgages are in question in this case:
o November 28, 1952 – Donata, through her son Salvador,
mortgaged to PNB several parcels of land covered by TCT No.
2289 to guarantee a loan to Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani.
o December 1, 1963 – Donata also mortgaged certain properties
covered by TCT No. 2887 and 2888 to guarantee payment of a
loan by her son Salvador.
- Both loans were not paid, and the properties were sold at public auction
(on separate occasions) to PNB as the highest bidder. The titles to these
properties were consolidated in the name of PNB.
- September 2, 1969 – PNB sold the properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887
and 2888 to Jesus M. Vitug, Anunciacion V. de Guzman, Prudencia V.
Fajardo, Salvador Vitug and Aurora V. Gutierrez in those names the
corresponding titles were issued.
- Earlier, on May 12, 1958, Donata executed a contract of lease of Lot No.
24 [covered by TCT No. 2887-R] in favor of two of her eight children with
Clodualdo: Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug.
- Pragmacio and Maximo filed an action for partition and reconveyance with
damages against Marcelo Mendiola, special administrator of the intestate
estate of Donata, and Donata’s heirs.
o The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land that they claim to
be conjugal property of the spouses Donata and Clodualdo, of
which they claim a share of 2/11 of ½ thereof.
o They assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of
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the properties as null and void.
o They invoked the case of Vitug vs. Montemayor, decided by the
SC on Oct. 20, 1953, which is an action for partition and
liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land, wherein the properties
were found to be conjugal in nature.
- The lower court dismissed the complaint.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and ruled that the sale at
public auction of the parcels of land be considerd valid with respect to
the ½ thereof.
- PNB filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
- W/N the fact that the properties were registered exclusively in Donata’s name was
conclusive of her ownership of the said properties - YES
HELD/RATIO
- In processing the loan applications of Donata MonteMayor, PNB had the
right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title and no
more. On its face, the properties are owned by Donata Montemayor, a
widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question the status of said
registered owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are no liens
and encumbrances covering the same.
The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a
registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate
of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the
party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man make such inquiry. A Torrens title
concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by a final
degree of registration.
- Article 160 of the Civil Code [note: now Article 93 of the Family Code]: All
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife.
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the
husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title
that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when
she was already a widow. When the property is registered in the
name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that
the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the
title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third
parties are involved.
- As to Vitug vs. Montemayor, in the dispositive part of the decision of the
trial court it made the observation that "but from the conduct of Clodualdo
Vitug and Donata Montemayor during the existence of their marital life, the
inference is clear that Clodualdo had the unequivocal intention of
transmitting the full ownership of the 30 parcels of land to his
wife Donata Montemayor, thus considering the 1/2 of the funds
of the conjugal property so advanced for the purchase of said
parcels of land as reimbursible to the estate of Clodualdo Vitug on
his death. That must be the reason why the property was registered in
the name of Donata Montemayor as widow after the death of Clodualdo
Vitug.
- At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and for partition
are real actions, however, they are actions in personam that bind
only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB
not being a party in said cases is not bound by the said decisions.
Nor does it appear that the PNB was aware of the said decisions
when it extended the above describe mortgage loans. Indeed, if the
PNB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have
approved the mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata
Montemayor without requiring the consent of all the other heirs or co-
owners thereof. Moreover, when said properties were sold at public
auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith. So its right
thereto is beyond question.
Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are now estopped from questioning the title of Donata
Montemayor to the said properties. They never raised the conjugal nature of the
property nor took issue as to the ownership of their mother, Donata Montemayor,
over the same. Indeed private respondents were among the defendants in two
cases [both titled Vitug vs. Montemayor, the first one an action for recovery of
possession of a share in the parcels of land and the second one the mentioned
partition case] wherein in their answers to the complaint they asserted that
the properties in question are paraphernal properties belonging
exclusively to Donata Montemayor and are not conjugal in nature. Thus
they leased the properties from their mother Donata Montemayor for many years
knowing her to be the owner. They were in possession of the property for a long
time and they knew that the same were mortgaged by their mother to the PNB and
thereafter were sold at public auction, but they did not do anything. It is only
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after 17 years that they remembered to assert their rights. Certainly, they
are guilty of laches.
Solid State v CA - Victoria Buenaventura
Facts
September 28, 1982 - Solid State filed an action for quieting of title against the
respondent estate of Virata alleging that:
1. it is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Imus, Cavite
2. that Virata, during his lifetime thru the use of fraud, caused the issuance of
Certificate of Title No. T-11520 RT 1660 on September 1, 1959 thru an
administrative reconstitution of a nonexistent original title covering the same parcel
of land
Virata denied the allegations in the complaint and presented his evidence.
The appellate court and trial court made the following findings (also evidence for
respondent):
March 20, 1943 - the Director of Lands gave authority to sell at public auction Lot
No. 7449. Mabini Legaspi (appellee Virata's predecessor-in-interest) won the bid
and was even issued Bureau of Lands Official Receipt. The instalment payments
were also evidenced by Official Receipts. The Register of Deeds of Cavite issued
TCT No. A-2188 to Legaspi December 6, 1957 - Legaspi sold the land thru a Deed
of Sale to Virata. December 10, 1957 - the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 11520
to Virata. June 7, 1959 - the Provincial Capitol building of Cavite which housed the
Registry of Deeds was burned, destroying land records and titles in the registry
September 1, 1959 - the Registry of Deeds administratively reconstituted the
original of TCT No. T-11520 based on owner's duplicate certificate
1978 - NBI investigated the conflicting claims and took the sworn testimony of
Mabini Legaspi who declared that she acquired Lot 7449 during the Japanese
occupation and presented:
the carbon or duplicate original of the notice of public auction and the letters dated
December 12, 1944 of Vicente Tordesillas of the Bureau of Lands to the Register of
Deeds requesting the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini Legaspi the
originals of the receipts of payment she made to the Bureau of Lands, She (Mabini)
also testified on the sale of the lot in favor of Antenor Virata on December 6, 1957,
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
presenting as proof thereof, the duplicate or carbon original of the Absolute Deed of
Sale of Agricultural Land
Mabini Legaspi testified that the originals of the first got lost. She denied having
sold the land to Julian Peñaranda, nor having waived her right over the land in his
favor).
RTC found for Virata:
"b. Recognizing that defendant Virata is the true and lawful owner;
c. Declaring that Transfer Certificate of Title in the name Solid State null and void
and ordered cancelled"
CA affirmed (No discussion)
SC reversed.
Solid State does not question the factual findings but does not accept the legal
conclusion that the registered title of private respondent to the land should prevail
over its own title.
1. Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act provides the procedure for
the sale and disposition of the friar lands to private persons; that pursuant thereto,
the acquisition by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest Julian Peñaranda of the
disputed Lot 7449, which was formerly part of the friar lands estate, was in
compliance with all legal requisites laid down in Act No. 1120, for the validity of the
sale by the government in favor of Peñaranda of such friar lands. 2. The sale of Lot
No. 7449 to respondent's predecessor, Legaspi, and the issuance of a certificate of
title in her favor was in violation of the Friar Lands Act as there was no required
approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Applicable Laws
The land involved in this case is a friar land, the laws which are applicable are Act
No. 1120, know as the Friar Lands Act and Commonwealth Act No. 32 .
Sec. 12 of Act No. 1120:
. . . the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant
a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to
such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him at the price so fixed
payable as provided in this Act at the Office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands . . . and that upon the payment of the final installment together with all
accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said
land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and
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become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty two of
the Land Registration Act.
Sec. 18 of the same Act provides:
No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
Sec. 2 of C.A. No. 32, as amended by C.A. No. 316:
. . . The persons who, at the time of the subdivision survey are actual and bona fide
occupants of any portion of the Friar Lands Estates, not exceeding ten hectares,
shall be given preference to purchase the portion occupied at a private sale and at a
price to be fixed in such case, by the Director of Lands, subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, after taking into consideration its
location, quality, and any other circumstances as may affect its value, the provisions
of section twelve of Act Numbered Eleven hundred and twenty, as amended, to the
contrary, . . .
Procedure
The friar lands were purchased by the government for sale to actual settlers and
occupants. The Bureau of Lands shall first issue a certificate stating therein that the
government has agreed to sell the land to such settler or occupant. The latter then
shall accept the certificate and agree to pay the purchase price so fixed and in the
installments and at the interest specified in the certificate.
The conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so called
certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property. The purchaser
becomes the owner upon the issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor.
Upon the payment of the final installment, the government shall then issue a final
deed of conveyance in favor of the purchaser. The approval by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale.
ICAB
1. Julian Peñaranda was the actual occupant of Lot 7449 when he filed his
application to purchase the said lot on November 22, 1968; On December 16, 1989,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved the sale of the lot
without auction to Peñaranda 2. A sales contract was executed between the
Director of Lands and Peñaranda on February 28, 1969 3. Upon the full payment of
the price, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued the final
deed of conveyance of Lot No. 7449 in favor of Peñaranda. 4. The Register of
Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. 39631 in the name of Peñaranda, when the latter
sold the land to petitioner, TCT No. 39631 was cancelled and TCT No. T-80889 was
issued in favor of the latter.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
Solid State has better title than Virata.
The purchase of the friar land made by Peñaranda was in compliance with law:
1. The execution of the sales contract vested the right of ownership in Peñaranda
over the land. The said sale was valid as it was approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the sale made by Peñaranda in favor of
the petitioner transferred the ownership of the land in favor of Solid State resulting
in the proper issuance of TCT No. T-80889 in its name. 2. Legaspi did not acquire
ownership over the land despite the sale of the lot having occurred much earlier:
nowhere in the evidence for the respondent or in the records shows that a
certificate of sale was ever issued by the Bureau of Lands, which would vest
ownership and title over the land in favor of Mabini Legaspi. The existence of the
official receipts showing payment of the price of the land by Legaspi does not prove
that the land was legally conveyed to her without any contract of sale having been
executed by the government in her favor. 3. The acquisition of the lot by Legaspi
was highly irregular and void, and not in compliance with the procedure mandated
by law for the sale of friar lands. Legaspi allegedly purchased the land in a sale at
public auction, which procedure is nowhere provided in Act No. 1120 or in C.A. 32.
The laws expressly state that an actual occupant of the land shall purchase the lot
occupied by him at a private sale and not in a sale at public auction (Sec. 2, C.A. 32
as amended). Neither was there any deed of conveyance issued to Legaspi by the
government after the full payment of the installments on the disputed lot.
There was neither allegation nor proof that the sale was with the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. The absence of such approval made the
supposed sale null and void ab initio. Without the certificate of sale and without the
required approval of the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
Legaspi did not in any manner acquire ownership over the land in 1943. The
ownership or title over the friar land remained in the government until Peñaranda
lawfully acquired ownership over the same lot by virtue of a sales contract executed
in his favor.
Villanueva v CA - Calvin Patrick Domingo
Facts:
- Catalina Sanchez, claiming to be the widow of Roberto Sanchez, averred that her
husband was the owner of a 275 sq. meter parcel of land located at Rosario,
Cavite, which was registered without her knowledge in the name of the herein
petitioners on the strength of an alleged deed of sale executed in their favor by
her late husband on February 7, 1968.
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- Involving the report of a handwriting expert from the Philippine Constabulary
Criminal Investigation Service, who found that the signature on the document
was written by another person, she prayed that the deed of sale be annulled,
that the registration of the lot in the name of the petitioners be cancelled, and
that the lot be reconveyed to her.
- In their answer, the petitioners questioned the personality of the private
respondent to file the complaint, contending that the late Roberto Sanchez was
never married but had a common-law wife by whom he had two children. On the
merits, they claimed that Roberto Sanchez had deeded over the lot to them in
1968 for the sum of P500.00 in partial settlement of a judgment they had
obtained against him. They had sued him after he had failed to pay a P1,300.00
loan they had secured for him and which they had been forced to settle
themselves to prevent foreclosure of the mortgage on their property
- On June 25, 1986, Judge Alejandro C. Silapan rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioners.
- In his decision, the trial judge rejected the testimony of the handwriting
experts from the PC and the NBI, who had both testified that the standard
signature of the late Roberto Sanchez and the one written on the alleged
deed of sale "were written by two different people." He cited Go Fay v. Bank
of the Philippine Islands in support of his action. Explaining the supposed
differences between the signatures, he said that Roberto Sanchez was "under
serious emotional stress and intensely angry" when he reluctantly signed the
document after he had lost the case to them, "with the added fact that they
only wanted to accept his lot for P500.00 and not for the settlement of the
entire obligation of P1,300.00."
- The decision also noted that Roberto Sanchez did not take any step to annul
the deed of sale although he had knowledge thereof as early as 1968. He
thus allowed his action to prescribe under Article 1431 of the Civil Code.
- As for the contract of a marriage submitted by the private respondent, this
should also be rejected because although the document was dated
September 21, 1964, the Torrens certificate issued to Roberto Sanchez over
the subject land on August 25, 1965, described his civil status as "single."
- CA reversed.
Issue:
- WON the CA was correct in reversing the Trial Court.
Held:
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
- Yes. Firstly, the Court notes at the outset that Catalina Sanchez has proved her
status as the widow of Roberto Sanchez with her submission of the marriage
contract denominated as Exhibit "A."
- Coming now to the questioned signature, we find it significant that the
examination by the NBI was requested by the petitioners themselves but in the
end it was the private respondent who presented the NBI handwriting expert as
her own witness. The explanation is obvious. The petitioners hoped to refute the
findings of the PC handwriting expert with the findings of the NBI handwriting
expert, but as it turned out the findings of the two witnesses coincided.
- The case invoked by the petitioners is not applicable because the differences in
the signatures compared in the case at bar were, as the trial judge found,
caused not by time but by the tension gripping Roberto Sanchez when he signed
the deed of sale. Incidentally, the petitioners have not sufficiently established the
reason for such tension, which appears to be a mere conjecture of the trial
judge.
- The deed of sale being a forgery, it was totally void or inexistent and so could be
challenged at any time, the action for its nullification being imprescriptible. The
private respondent, as the widow of Roberto Sanchez, has the capacity to sue
for the recovery of the land in question and is not estopped from doing so.
Avila v Tapucar - John Raymund Fullecido
Facts:
 In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a parcel of
land situated at Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte
 Such was covered by Tax Declaration No. 5461
 In 1965, said property was inherited by private respondents Julito Bahan,
Cristina Bahan-Panis, Lucita Carters, Boy Cartera and Candelaria Bahan-
Mendoza as successors-in-interest.
 On October 11, 1960, petitioner Magdalena Avila bought a parcel of land
situated at Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte Luis Cabalan and
his wife under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land and under
Tax Declaration No. 3055.
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 On November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito
Bahan filed Free Patent Application No.
 Deputy Public Land Inspector Francisco C. Baylen stated that the heirs of
Pedro Bahan represented by Julito Bahan, have cultivated only 2.2500
hectares of land applied for and consequently, he did not recommend the
issuance of the patent. Said report was erroneously forwarded to the
Bureau of Lands by then Acting Assistant District Land Officer of Butuan
City dated December 23, 1971, recommending the issuance of patent
therefor.
 Private respondent Julito Bahan together with ten persons who were
alleged to be members of the Free Farmers Federation, gathered coconuts
from the land purchased by petitioner Magdalena Avila but was intercepted
by the Chief of Police of Tubay, Agusan del Norte.
 Private respondents Bahans filed an action for quieting of title and
damages with the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan
City
o he discovered that the northwestern portion of said land
containing an area of about 1/3 of a hectare was already in the
possession of the Avilas; and the latter were harvesting the fruits
of about 40 coconut trees found therein.
 the petitioners Avilas raised the defense that on October 11, 1960,
Magdalena Avila purchased a parcel of land situated at Tabangao, Victory,
Tubay, Agusan del Norte, containing an area of 4,371 square meters more
or less from Luis Cabalan and from then on has been in open, continuous,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the same
 In the meantime, private respondents Bahans' application for free patent
was approved for 6.9027 hectares and Free Patent No. 552571 was issued
on December 6, 1973. Original certificate of title No. P-8424 was issued in
the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan on the
same date.
 Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. granted Avilas' motion for writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining and ordering the Bahans to refrain and desist from
gathering or continue harvesting
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
 Avilas then filed an administrative protest against the Bahans before the
Bureau of Lands in relation for having erroneously included their land
under the issued free patent and Original Certificate of Title, which protest
was filed 11 months after the issuance of the patent and 7 months and 3
days after the registration of the Certificate of Title
 On February 8, 1977 Judge Lauro L. Tapucar dissolve the writ of
preliminary injunction.
 In due time Inciong filed an action for recovery of possession of the portion held by
Issue: WoN the dissolution of the preliminary injunction is proper? No
- The Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued for the purpose of enjoining
the Bahans to cease and desist from harvesting the fruits on the land
possessed by the Avilas until the final determination of the suit for quieting
of title between the parties.
- The subsequent erroneous approval of the application for free patent for
6.9027 hectares in favor of the Bahans the issuance of Free Patent No.
552571 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-8424 in favor of the Bahans
during the pendency of the case does not call for the dissolution of the
Writ. since the property in the possession of the Avilas would be placed in
the hands of the Bahans, pending final outcome of the action between
them.
- The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can
be heard.
- The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status which
preceded the controversy.
- It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that "while land registration is a
proceeding in rem and binds the whole world, the simple possession of a
certificate of title under the Torrens Systems does not necessarily make
the holder a true owner of all the property described therein.
- If a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by
mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the
system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the
owner of the lands illegally included
Vda de Recinto v Inciong - Carlos S. Hernandez Jr.
17 of 68
FACTS: Ruperto Inciong is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Barrio
Santol, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, with an area of 34,263 sq.m. covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title of the Register of Deeds of Batangas. He acquired this
land in 1946 by purchase from Matias Amurao.
In 1961, after a relocation survey of the land was effected it was discovered that its
southern boundary covering an area of 8,591 square meters was in the possession
of petitioner, Consuelo Malaluan Vda. de Recinto.
the Recinto. In her Answer, Recinto claimed to be the owner of the area in question
and as counter-claim demanded its reconveyance from Inciong.
RTC: Ruled in favor of Recinto and declared her to be the owner of the land in
questin. Ordered Inciong to execute deed of reconveyance.
CA: Reversed RTC. Ordered Recinto to return that portion of 8,591sq.m. of the land
in question to Inciong. MR denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed portion of land was erroneously included in the
transfer certificate title of Inciong
HELD: Yes. The disputed portion of land was erroneously included in the tile of
Inciong.
RATIO:
1. The inclusion of said area in the title of Lot No. 8151 is void and of no effect
for a land registration court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to persons who have
put no claim in it and who have never asserted any right of ownership over it.
The area in question has been erroneously included in the cadastral survey of Lot
No. 8151 and in the original certificate of title without the knowledge of the, parties
concerned. As a result, the same description in the original certificate of title was
carried over into the succeeding transfer certificates of title of the subsequent
owners covering the same parcel of land.
This is confirmed by the fact that Inciong’s predecessors-in-interest and later,
himself, have all along treated the area in question as belonging Recinto. What
seemed to have prompted Inciong to get interested over the disputed area was
when he came to learn after the relocation survey in 1961 that said disputed area
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3

was included in his title. Inciong could not have acquired an area more than what
was actually conveyed to him by Matias Amurao which extended only as far as the
dividing fence on the south thereof.
2. (Relevant Ratio) The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens
system does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property
described therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the
owner of the land illegally included.
3. The remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the
decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible
and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of
justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, for damages.
4. But since Inciong is a purchaser in bad faith (he acknowledged as the true
boundary between his land and the disputed portion by not raising any question
about it and not disturbing the possession of the petitioner over the area in dispute
for almost 15 years, and therefore had knowledge of the defect in his title), the
Supreme Court ordered him to return to Recinto the disputed portion of the land
covering an area of 8,591 square meters and to pay damages.
2. latter previously purchased said land from Loida Baterbonia, who in
turn had bought it from Galicano Ontua, the primitive owner thereof
3. having acquired the land in 1968, respondents occupied and cultivated
the same, and paid the taxes sometime in 1973, petitioner Albienda,
claiming ownership over the adjoining land, took possession not only
of said lot, but also usurped a portion of 8 hectares of lot belonging to
respondents
4. despite repeated demands, refused to vacate said portion and to
restore possession thereof to respondents.
 Petitioner averred that the lot containing an area of 196,848 sqm,
originally belonged to Enesaria Goma, in whose name the same was
registered under the Torrens System on July 23, 1958
1. 1959, Enesaria Goma sold the land to Gliceria Senerpida who
possessed it continuously and peacefully until November 21, 1972,
when petitioner acquired the same for value in good faith
2. upon registration of the deed of sale executed in favor of petitioner,
the latter was issued TCTwith an area of 196,848 sqm, which is the
same area stated in the certificates of title of petitioner's aforenamed
predecessors-in-interest

Foja v CA - Kevin Hernandez

 Petitioner’s special defense: even granting arguendo that the technical
description appearing in her certificate of title was erroneous, the action
Albiendo v CA - Ayesha Alonto Mambuay
for correction thereof and for reconveyance of the disputed property was
unavailable, as more than 1 year had elapsed since the issuance of the
Facts:
OCT in 1958.
 respondent- spouses Ruben Sumampao and Angeles Sumampao, were
applicants for a free patent over a piece of land, situated in San Francisco,
 Respondent’s reply: admitted all of petitioner’s allegations, even that that
Agusan del Sur.
petitioner was issued OCT but claimed - that "the technical description in
 In 1977, Respondents instituted in CFI Agusan del Sur an action against
the title is spurious in origin because it does not tally or conform to the
Albienda for correction of the latter's certificate of title and for
technical description in the survey return submitted by the Bureau of
recovery of possession of said portion, with damages.
Lands surveyors who conducted the survey of the said land; MOVED for
1. alleged that respondents acquired the lot under a deed of sale dated
summary judgment
November 11, 1968 executed in their favor by Antonio Baldonase

18 of 68
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
 1958, Loida Baterbonia, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, wrote the
Director of Lands requesting a recomputation of the respective areas; chief
of survey party stationed in San Francisco, Agusan, to whom said letter
was referred, issued an indorsement stating that "it is believed that there
has been a mistake in the computation of the technical description of Lot
1550 . . . inasmuch as at the time the said computation was done in
Manila the plan was not yet available as it was still in this [the Agusan]
office." It appears that thereafter no further action was taken on
Baterbonia's letter.
 CFI in favor of respondents Sumampaos, correction is proper; affirmed by
CA
Issue: WoN the description of land in the petitioner's certificate of title may be
corrected to conform with the technical description appearing in the "survey return"
on file in the Bureau of Lands, notwithstanding the lapse of more than 1 year since
the issuance of said certificate of title (NO)
Held:
 Section 38 of the Land Registration Act categorically declares that "upon
the expiration of the said term of one [1] year every decree or certificate
of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible."
 The OCT was issued on July 23, 1958 in favor of Enesaria Goma. The fact
that sometime in October 1958 Loida Baterbonia (one of the subsequent
Complaint filed:
- Complaint praying for (1) respondents to be declared the owners of the
property in question and entitled to continue in possession of the same, and (2)
if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said property, then, to order it to
reconvey or transfer the ownership to respondents.
Petitioner's arguments:
- It was never a privy to any transaction between the private respondents and
the spouses Vivas
- It is a purchaser in good faith and for value of the property
19 of 68
owners) had written the Director of Lands for a recomputation of the area
set forth in the certificate of the said land is of no moment, for up until the
sale of the lot to petitioner in 1972, no action had been brought before a
court of competent jurisdiction to correct the error, if indeed there was
such error.
 The instant action to correct the certificate of title in question was filed 19
years after the issuance of said certificate of title. The period allowed by
law for setting aside the decree of registration of a certificate of title-had
long elapsed, the OCT issued in the name of petitioner's predecessor-in-
interest had become indefeasible. The TCT derived therefrom is likewise
unassailable, for under Section 39 of Act 496, "every person receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for
value in good faith shall hold the same be free of all encumbrance except
those noted on said certificate."
 Every person dealing with registered land may rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige
them to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the
property.
National Grains Authority v IAC - Lawi Manalo
- The title is now indefeasible (by virtue of the TCT), hence, private respondents'
cause of action has' already prescribed.
Respondent's arguments:
- The Conditional Sale, later changed to a deed of Absolute Sale which although
unregistered under the Torrens System allegedly transferred to them the
ownership and the possession of the property in question.
- They have been and are still in possession of the same openly, continuously,
publicly under a claim of ownership adverse to all other claims since the
purchase on December 2, 1971.
RTC's ruling with ratio:
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
- In favor of petitioners (no ratio in case).
CA's ruling with ratio:
- In favor of respondents (no ratio in case).
SC's ruling with ratio:
- In favor of petitioners
FACTS:
On December 12, 1971, Spouses Vivas sold to private respondents a parcel of land
measuring ~105,710 square meters for P300,000 as evidenced by a Kasulatan Ng
Bilihang Mabiling Muli. This sale with right to repurchase was duly recorded with the
register of deeds.
On January 31, 1972, the sale was made absolute by the Spouses Vivas in favor of
the respondents for the sum of P90,000: P50,000 to be paid upon the execution of
the instrument Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan and the remaining P40,000 to be paid
upon issuance of the certificate of title.
From the execution of the said Kasulatan, private respondents have remained in
peaceful, adverse and open possession of subject property.
On February 26, 1975, an OCT covering the property in question was issued in the
name of the Spouses Vivas without the knowledge of private respondents . On April
30, 1975, the Spouses Vivas executed an SPA in favor of one Irenea Ramirez
authorizing her to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National Grains
Authority.
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed
by Irenea Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others, the property, for
unpaid indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.
On May 31, 1974, the Provincial Sheriff caused the issuance of the notice of sale of
the property in question, scheduling the public auction sale on June 28, 1974. The
petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was
issued in its favor on the same date by the Provincial Sheriff.
20 of 68
- Conditional sale with right to repurchase not binding to third persons with
better rights. Petitioner has better right because (1) it is a registered owner
with a TCT and (2) deed of absolute sale was not registered.
- Emphasis on the nature of the Torrens Title.
- Petitioner was an honest purchaser in good faith. It was not aware of the
suspensive condition in the sale between the respondents and spouses Vivas.
The SPA, OCT, and auction sale were all regular
-
On July 10, 1974, the petitioner in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor
sold the subject real property in favor of itself. By virtue of the deed of absolute
sale, a TCT covering the property was issued in the name of the petitioner on July
16, 1974.
It was only in July 1974, that private respondents learned that a title in the name of
the Spouses Vivas had been issued covering the property in question and that the
same property had been mortgaged in favor of the petitioner. Private respondents
then offered to pay the petitioner NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the
balance of the amount due the spouses Vivas under the terms of the absolute deed
of sale but the petitioner refused to accept the payment.
On July 31, 1974, counsel for private respondents made a formal demand on the
spouses Vivas to comply with their obligation under the terms of the absolute deed
of sale; and soon after reiterated to the petitioner, the offer to pay the balance of
P40,000.00 due under the absolute deed of sale. On August 13, 1974 petitioner in
its reply informed counsel of private respondents that petitioner is now the owner of
the property in question and has no intention of disposing of the same.
The private respondents, who as previously stated, are in possession of subject
property were asked by petitioner to vacate it but the former refused. Petitioner
filed a suit for ejectment against private respondents but the case was dismissed.
On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the CFI against the
petitioner and the spouses Vivas, praying that (1) they be declared the owners of
the property in question and entitled to continue in possession of the same, and (2)
if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said property, then, to order it to
reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under such terms and conditions as the
court may find just, fair and equitable under the premises.
Private respondents claim a better right to the property in question by virtue of the
Conditional Sale, later changed to a deed of Absolute Sale which although
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
unregistered under the Torrens System allegedly transferred to them the ownership
and the possession of the property in question. In fact, they argue that they have
been and are still in possession of the same openly, continuously, publicly under a
claim of ownership adverse to all other claims since the purchase on December 2,
1971. It is stressed that not until the month of July, 1974 did the plaintiff learn that
a title had been issued covering the property in question.
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner maintained that it was never a privy to
any transaction between the private respondents (plaintiffs therein) and the
spouses Vivas and that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value of the property;
and that the title is now indefeasible, hence, private respondents' cause of action
has' already prescribed.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners (no ratio). CA reversed and ruled in favor or
respondents (no ratio).
ISSUE:
W/N violation of the terms of the agreement between the spouses Vivas and private
respondents to deliver the certificate of title upon its issuance, constitutes a breach
of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by petitioner NGA, an
innocent purchaser for value. NO
RATIO:
It is undisputed that: (1) there are two deeds of sale of the same land in favor of
private respondents, namely: (a) the conditional sale with right to repurchase or the
'Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabibiling Muli" which was registered under Act 3344 and
(b) the deed of absolute sale or "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" which was not
registered; (2) the condition that the Certificate of Title will be delivered to the
buyers upon its issuance and upon payment of the balance of P40,000.00 is
contained in the deed of absolute sale; and (3) the land in question at the time of
the execution of both sales was not yet covered by the Torrens System of
registration.
While the registration of the conditional sale with right of repurchase may be
binding on third persons, it is by provision of law "understood to be without
prejudice to third party who has better right" (Section 194 of the Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3344). In this case, it will be noted that the petitioner
21 of 68
as a third party, is a registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously
a better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale with the
suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the spouses
Vivas and private respondents.
Proceedings for the registration of title to land under the Torrens System is an
action in rem not in personam, hence, personal notice to all claimants of the res is
not necessary in order that the court may have jurisdiction to deal with and dispose
of the res. Neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree
or title issued in a registration proceeding. It is thus evident that respondents' right
over the property was barred by res judicata when the decree of registration was
issued to spouses Vivas. It does not matter that they may have had some right
even the right of ownership, BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title.
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate
of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of
the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said
provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by law as
existing, against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by
such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole
world, including the government. Under said ruling, if the purchaser is the only
party who appears in the deeds and the registration of titles in the property
registry, no one except such purchaser may be deemed by law to be the owner of
the properties in question. Moreover, no title to registered land in derogation to that
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the exceptions
provided for under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which can be enforced against petitioner
herein.
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a
land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true
owner. He is then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to
transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
It will be noted that the spouses Vivas and Lizardo never committed any fraud in
procuring the registration of the property in question. On the contrary, their
application for registration which resulted in the issuance of their OCT was with
complete knowledge and implied authority of private respondents who retained a
portion of the consideration until the issuance to said spouses of a certificate of title
applied for under the Torrens Act and the corresponding delivery of said title to
them. The question therefore, is not about the validity of the OCT but in the breach
of contract between private respondents and the Vivas spouses. Petitioner was
never a privy to this transaction. Neither was it shown that it had any knowledge at
the time of the execution of the mortgage, of the existence of the suspensive
condition in the deed of absolute sale much less of its violation. Nothing appeared
to excite suspicion. The Special Power of Attorney was regular on its face; the OCT
was in the name of the mortgagor and the NGA was the highest bidder in the public
auction. Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an innocent purchaser for value, first
as an innocent mortgagee under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as innocent
purchaser for value in the public auction sale.
As to private respondents' alternative prayer that the declared owner be ordered to
reconvey or transfer the ownership of the property in their favor, it is clear that
there is absolutely no reason why petitioner, an innocent purchaser for value,
should reconvey the land to the private respondents.
Penullar v PNB – Monfort
Gutierrez | Jan. 27, 1983 | In division
Genoveva Miguel, claiming that she was the absolute owner, filed a civil case in the
CFI against Praxedes Moya et al., predecessors of plaintiff Cristina Penullar, for
declaration of ownership over 3 portions of agricultural land. Miguel alleged that
Moya et al. were pretending to have an interest in the property and had intruded.
While the case was pending, Miguel applied for registration of her title in a land
case; Moya opposed. During the pendency of both cases, Moya obtained a free
patent over the property was an OCT was issued and on another parcel also was
issued a free patent in the name of Josefa Sison also one of plaintiff's predecessors
and unto her was issued an OCT. The judge suspended proceedings so Miguel could
22 of 68
seek the cancellation of the free patents. But nothing happened with the
cancellation, so the judge dismissed the case.
Miguel instead prosecuted the registration case, heard in the absence of Moya et.
al., and the Registration Court ordered the inscription of the properties in the name
of Miguel's heirs as she had died in the meantime. Miguel’s successors in interest
applied for a writ of possession which was granted and it was executed by the
sheriff but the plaintiff successor in interest of Moya vehemently objected to the
possession.
Penullar filed the present civil case for annulment of the registration proceeding
specifically the decision and the titles issued in the name of the heirs of Miguel, as
well as the incumbrance by way of mortgage in favor of the PNB, on the ground
that the lands having already been registered, although by way of free patent, the
titles of Moya and Sison, became an absolute bar against posterior registration.
PNB’s special defense was that it was an innocent mortgagee for value. The judge
held for Penullar and annulled the titles. The CA modified the decision to the effect
that the mortgages are valid.
WON CA, even as it sustained the TC’s finding that the titles covering the disputed
parcels of land are null and void, could still declare that the mortgages annotated
on those titles are valid
SC: Yes, CA affirmed
The petitioner considers the CA ruling inconsistent because according to her no
valid lien could emanate from a void title.
The CA explained why the mortgages annotated in the void torrens titles should be
considered valid. PNB relied upon regular Torrens Titles issued pursuant to a
regular judgment of the registration Court: there is no showing that PNB was made
specifically aware that the property already covered by the free patents were only
afterwards adjudicated to and Torrens Titles issued in the name of the heirs of
Miguel. Also, the declaration of nullity of the titles of the heirs of Miguel came in
only much later and as of the time when the mortgages were accepted by PNB,
there was as yet no decision declaring the titles of the mortgagors null and void.
PNB was made to rely and had the right to rely upon regular certificates of title first
presented to it by the mortgagors. PNB was not duty bound to further investigate
the validity and/or invalidity of the torrens title.
We agree with the invocation by the Court of Appeals of the principle of equity,
invoking the principle that where one of two innocent parties must have to suffer
due to the act of a third person, he whose negligence had caused the damage
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
should be made to bear the loss. The successors of Moya let the decision in the
registration case gain the status of finality. It was their negligence that permitted
adjudicatees in the said registration case to apply for and secure mortgages from
PNB.
The petitioner argues that neither she nor her predecessors could have appealed
the decision in the land registration proceedings. But the SC said that the records
show that Moya was fully aware of the registration proceedings. As successor-in-
interest, Penullar did not only succeed to the rights and interests of her predecessor
but she was also bound to recognize the liens and/or encumbrances attached.
Bornales v IAC – Pascual
FACTS
 The subject matter of this controversy is a parcel of land (Lot 1318) situated in
Barrio Indayagan Pontevedra (Maayon), Capiz with an area of 74,397 sq.m.
The land was originally awarded by Decree No. 29015 dated Sept 21, 1927 in
the name of Sixto Dumolong, married to Isabel Marquez, to whom OCT 6161
was issued.
 Sixto and Isabel whose marriage was not blessed with any child lived
separately since 1920. Subsequently, Sixto cohabited extramaritally with
Placida Dumolong with whom he had a son by the name of Renito Dumolong
and other children.
 In Nov 1977, representing herself as having hereditary interest in Lot 1318,
Placida filed with the CFI Capiz a petition for reconstitution of title over said lot.
Reconstitution was granted in a decision dated Nov. 18, 1977 and OCT RO-
6161 was issued in the name of "Sixto Dumolong married to Isabel Marquez".
 On Mar 15, 1978, a "Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real
Property", which was purportedly a settlement of the conjugal estate of Sixto
Dumolong and Isabel Marquez Dumolong, involving Lot 1318, and the sale of
said lot for P6K to spouses Carlito Patanao and Minda Dumolong and to
spouses Bernardo Decrepito and Loreta Dumolong, was executed by Renito
Dumolong and by Isabel Marquez Dumolong whose supposed thumbmark
appeared in the document.
 The deed was registered on Nov 10, 1978, and pursuant thereto, TCT T-15856
was issued the abovenamed spouses on the same date. About 3 months later,
or on Feb. 21, 1979, the spouses sold Lot 1318 for P40K to petitioner-spouses
Antonio Bornales and Florenda Diaz Bornales through a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Petitioners eventually secured TCT 15596 for Lot 1318 in their names.
23 of 68
 Alleging forgery of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real
Property", private respondent Isabel Marquez filed on Mar 11, 1980 an action
for reconveyance and damages against Placida Dumolong, Renito Dumolong,
spouses Carlito Patanao and Minda Dumolong, spouses Bernardo Decrepito and
Loreto Dumolong, and spouses Antonio Bornales and Florenda Diaz. Only the
spouses Bornales answered; the other defendants were declared in default.
 After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff
and against all the defendants including the petitioners herein who were
expressly declared purchasers in bad faith. The subject land was held to be the
conjugal property of Sixto Dumolong and plaintiff Isabel Marquez and that the
Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property was a forgery
through the machinations of the defaulted defendants.
 The sps Bornales filed their appeal with the respondent court, the appellate
court affirmed the appealed decision in favor of private respondent and against
the petitioners but with modifications for the appellate court found that the
land was the exclusive property of S Dumolong who had other illegitimate
children surviving with Renito Dumolong.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioners are purchasers in bad faith - yes
HELD:
 The chain of events starting from the reconstitution of the original certificates
of title to the execution of the deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners
reveals a clear scheme to dispossess the private respondent of her share in the
property subject of this controversy.
 The finding of the CA that the land was sold barely (3) months after the
execution of the deed of extra-judicial settlement and the deed of sale is
supported by evidence on record. The date appearing on the deed of sale (Mar .
15, 1978) indicates a time span of 8 months to the subsequent execution of
the deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners. However, when the time is
reckoned from the date of registration of the deed with the Register of Deeds,
it appears that only 3 months had lapsed when the sale of the subject land to
the petitioners took place. The land was registered in the names of the spouses
Carlito Patanao and Minda Dumolong and spouses Bernardo Decrepito and
Loreta Dumolong on Nov. 10, 1978. Three months later or on Feb. 21, 1979,
the spouses sold the land to the petitioners.
 Petitioners also deny having knowledge of the abnormal increase in the
consideration of the sale from P6K to P40K. They claim that contrary to the
findings of the CA, the transfer certificate of title which their lawyer examined
contained no annotation of the P6K purchase price. The fact, however, that
petitioners have been the tenants/lessees of the land even during Sixto
Dumolong's lifetime belies any alleged lack of knowledge. Having been the
cultivators of the land, it is unimaginable that the petitioners would have been
unaware of the transactions affecting the land. It appears that petitioners were
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3

aware that the private respondent was the legal wife of Sixto Dumolong and 2. Contrary to the agreement, Guilermo Timbancaya had the OCT cancelled
was a rightful heir to the properties of the latter. In fact, the trial court and a new Certificate of Title issued in his name.
conclusively found that the petitioners themselves went to see the private 3. Even before the Special Proceedings, Caridad has been in actual, open an
respondent sometime in 1980 to secure her signature and conformity to the continuous possession of ½ of the property.
Extra-Judicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property. 4. Caridad filed for reconveyance of the ½.
 Thus, even without the circumstances enumerated by the CA to demonstrate
the petitioners' lack of good faith, the fact alone that they purchased the Guillermo: Caridad has no right to the property because she is not an heir to the
property with full knowledge of the flaws and defect in the title of their vendors estate. The TCT issued to Guillermo has already become indefeasible since 4 years
is enough proof of their bad faith. In the case of Gatioan v. Gaffud, this Court
has lapsed already. Act 496, Section 38 provides for the reopening of the
held that one who purchases real property with knowledge of a defect in the
decree of title, on the ground of fraud, within 1 year from its issuance.
title of his vendor cannot claim that he acquired title thereto in good faith as
against the owner or of an interest therein.
 The petitioners claim that they were not aware of any defect in the title of their CFI: ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the exclusive name of Guillermo (No
vendors because the certificate of title in the name of their predecessors-in- discussion on the reason.)
interest which their lawyer examined contained nothing to put them on guard.
The fact however remains that the petitioners knew and were parties to the CA: This was a direct appeal to the SC from CFI, on questions of law.
fraud committed against the private respondent. Having bought the land
registered under the Torrens system from their vendors who procured title
Issue: WON the TCT in the name of Guillermo is indefeasible. NO.
thereto by means of fraud, petitioners cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a
certificate of title against the private respondent to the extent of her interest
therein. The Torrens system of land registration should not be used as a means Ratio: The TCT was issued on the basis of the misrepresentation in the affifavit of
to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Registration, to Guillermo filed with the Register of Deeds of Palawan that he and his brother are
be effective, must be made in good faith. Thus, it is a settled rule that the the exclusive owners of the property. This representation is contrary to the
defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title does not extend to a transferee admission of Guillermo that they are not the legitimate children of the deceased
who takes it with notice of the flaws in his transferor's title. If at all, the
Spouses Jose Arguelles and Rufina de los Reyes, but the sons of Rufina with her
petitioners only acquire the right which their vendors then had.
first husband, and inconsistent with his admission in the Compromise Agreement.
[The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED ]
The action to annul the title or the action for reconveyance has its basis in Act
496, Sec. 55 which provides that “in all cases of registration procured by
fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against
the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however to the rights of any
Arguelles v Timbancaya – Perez innocent holder. This is a remedy available as long as the property has
not passed to an innocent third person for value. This is independent and
Arguelles v Timbancaya
distinct from Section 38.
30 July 1976
Antonio, J.
Guillermo, having secured thru his misrepresentation a TCT in his
exclusive name, the TCT must be cancelled. Public policy demands that a
Facts:
person guilty of fraud should not be allowed to use a Torrens title as a
1. Caridad Arguelles filed for Special Proceedings for Intestate Estate of Jose
shield against his wrongdoing.
Arguelles. He court rendered a decision in accordance with a compromise
agreement: ½ of land for Caridad Arguelles, ½ to Guillermo and Alberto
Timbancaya.

24 of 68
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3

1. Action of heirs of Enanoria to recover does not prescribe and cannot be

River v CA - Santos barred by laches because it is covered by a Torrens title. Section 46 of the
Land Registration Law, now section 47 of the Property Registration Decree
(PD No. 1529 effective June 11, 1978), provides that "no title to registered
land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession"
2. Prescription also cannot apply to hereditary successors because they only
Umbay v Alecha – Sarcaoga step into the shoes of the decedent who has a Torrens title.
3. Legarda v. Saleeby quoted: real purpose of Torrens title is to quiet title to
Topic: Registered land not subject to prescription land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. "Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
Suit: (not named, guessed from context) Petition for recovery of Possession the portals of the court, or sitting in the ‘mirador de su casa’, to avoid the
possibility of losing his land."
Subject land: 500 sqm portion of the 2265 sqm lot in Carcar, Cebu with OCT issued 4. Title to land can no longer be acquired by prescription after a Torrens title
in Natalio Enanoria’s name (died 1924). has been issued for it (Dimson v. Rural Progress Administration)
5. The right to recover possession of registered land is imprescriptible
In 1963, when when Enanoria’s heirs (Umbays) asked a surveyor to relocate the lot, because possession is a mere consequence of ownership (Atun v. Nuñez)
6. In this case, the petitioners’ action to recover the 500 square meters
they discovered that a 500sqm portion was occupied by Placido Alecha, the
cannot be barred by the equitable defense of laches or delay because they
adjoinng owner of the lot (southeastern boundary). because aware of the encroachment only after they hired a surveyor in
1963 to ascertain the true area and boundaries of Lot No. 5280.
Alecha refused to vacate the disputed portion. He removed the concrete 7. Laches presupposes waiver of one’s right. There was no waiver in this
monuments . case. The petitioners, poor, ignorant rustics, never intended to renounce
their right to the 500 square meters.

The heirs sued Alecha. (suit wasn’t named but probably petition for recovery of
possession)

Another surveyor from the Bureau of Lands confirmed the 500sqm usurpation. Jimenez vs Fernandez, Grado - SIANG

Trial court ruling Paras, J.

Ordered Alecha and wife to vacate lot. (no ratio stated in case) Facts:

CA ruling  The whole tract of land in this case formerly belonged

to Fermin Jimenez who had two sons named Fortunato
Reversed the RTC. (no ratio stated in case – most probably because of prescription and Carlos Jimenez. Fortunato predeceased his father,
and laches)
he had a daughter, Sulpicia Jimenez which is the
SC ruling (CA reversed, RTC ruling reinstated, 500sqm may be recovered) petitioner in this case.

25 of 68
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
 After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of
land was registered in the name of Carlos Jimenez and
Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-
indiviso (1933).
 Carlos Jimenez died in 1936 and his illegitimate
daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia
Jimenez, took possession of a portion of the property
consisting of 436 square meters. In 1944, Melecia sold
the said portion to Teodora Grado, one of the
respondents.
 In 1969, Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit
adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property
appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that
she is the only heir of her deceased uncle. A transfer
certificate of title was issued in her name.
 In 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez instituted the present action
for the recovery of the eastern portion of the property
consisting of 436 square meters against Grado and her
son Fernandez who were occupying said land.
CFI: dismissed the complaint and found Teodora Grado to be the
absolute owner of the land in question.
CA: affirmed in toto.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error. YES, Sulpicia Jimenez is the absolute owner of the
land.
26 of 68
First, Melecia Jimenez failed to present concrete evidence to prove
that she was really the daughter of Carlos Jimenez. She had no right
over the property in question. Assuming for the sake of argument
that Melecia Cayabyab was the illegitimate daughter of Carlos
Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no
right to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez. Under the old civil
code, Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child and not
entitled to any successional rights in so far as the estate of Carlos
Jimenez was concerned.
Second, the CA erred when it made applicable to the case at bar
the ruling in Arcuino, et al., v. Aparis and Puray, which states thus:
. . . it is true that the lands registered under the
Torrens System may not be acquired by
prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the
registered owners. They merely claim to have
acquired by succession, their alleged title or
interest in lot No. 355. At any rate plaintiffs herein
are guilty of laches.
The respondent court relying on the Arcuino case, concluded that
respondents had acquired the property under litigation by
prescription. We cannot agree with such conclusion, because there
is one very marked and important difference between the case at
bar and that of the Arcuino case, and that is, that since 1933
petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the property then
being registered in her and her uncle Carlos Jimenez' name. Melecia
Cayabyab's possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be
unavailing against the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was the
holder pro-indiviso with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of
Title.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by
said certificate of titles, could defeat the title of the registered owner
of the land covered by the certificate of title. Sulpicia's ownership
over her one-half of the land and which is the land in dispute was
always covered by a Torrens title, and therefore, no amount of
possession thereof by the respondents, could ever defeat her
proprietary rights thereon
Sotto v Teves - Tiongco
Lacamen v Laruan - Buenaventura
Cimafranca v IAC – Abdon
No. L-68687 / 31 Jan. 1987 / J. Paras
FACTS:
Property (Lot 86) of 1,589 square meters in Zamboanga del Norte was part of
several lots registered under OCT RO-1708 in the name of several owners, including
Pedro Gurdiel.
Gurdiel sold a portion of the land in 1917 to Perfecto Jalosjos, who then took
possession of that portion and constructed a residential house. In 1919 as per tax
declaration he declared his occupied portion as 1,023 square meters.
In 1958 Gurdiel and his other co-owners executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
which finally adjudicated to Gurdiel Lot 86. In the same deed, Gurdiel confirmed
and ratified the sale of "one-fourth interest in Lot No. 86" to Jalosjos. The OCT was
canceled and TCT-4659 for Lot 86 was issued in the name of Gurdiel, 3/4 share,
and Jalosjos, 1/4.
In 1970 the heirs of Pedor Gurdiel executed an extrajudicial settlement over the
land (lot 86), referencing the 3/4 share under but when the land was surveyed in
1971, it was found that the heirs of Jalosjos occupied an area of 1,109 sq.m. while
those of Gurdiel only 487 square meter.
27 of 68
Petitioners filed a complaint for partition and damages seeking the partition of the
property and reconveyance of the alleged excess portion that the Jalosjos heirs
were occupying.
Respondents filed their answer praying for cancellation of TCT - 4659 and damages.
Trial court decided in favor of respondents Jalosjos and declared TCT - 4659 void,
because the extrajudicial partition was without the knowledge and participation of
the respondents, in fraud of their rights and interests. It also said that the right of
the petitioners is barred by laches.
IAC affirmed in toto.
ISSUE / HELD
W/N TCT - 4659 is void. NO, IAC decision reversed, property ordered to be
partitioned according to TCT-4659
RATIO:
This lot is covered by a Torrens title which specifically states that petitioners have
3/4. respondents only have 1/4. They are not covered by laches as the claim was
only made after the survey in 1971.
It is the respondents who are in estoppel or are barred by prescription and laches
from questioning the validity of the TCT. Besides a Torrens title cannot be
attacked collaterally. The issue on its validity can be raised only in action
expressly instituted for that purpose.
Natalia Realty Corp v Vallez – Maya Abdullah
G.R. No. 78290-94 – 23 May 1989 – Gancayco
FACTS
- Natalia Realty filed five civil cases against Protacio Ranchu
Vallez, Ceferino Martinez, Pablo Espemeda, Augusta Arizola,
and Ceriaco Bandoc, alleging that they unlawfully occupied
portions of the parcels of land belonging to it and registered
in its name.
- The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
lack of jurisdiction, but it was denied.
- Natalia moved for a summary judgment, claiming that the
only issue for resolution is strictly legal and that there is no
genuine issue or issues as to any material fact averred in
the complaint and that defendants in their common answer
have put up sham defenses and counterclaims, all of which
are mere pretended denials and flimsy defenses.
- An opposition was filed by defendants.
- The trial court rendered a summary judgment upon finding
that no valid issue was raised by defendants but only the
conclusion that “because they have been in actual
possession for over 30 years of their respective farm
lots they are entitled to be respected of (sic) such
occupancy and as such the complaints should be
dismissed, that the titles of plaintiff are null and void
ab initio and should be cancelled and in lieu thereof
issued new certificates of titles (sic) to the
defendants in accordance with the land reform
program under P.D. No. 2.”
- Judgment was rendered ordering the defendants to vacate
the land, remove all improvements, and pay rentals until
they have vacated the premises.
- In a joint notice of appeal, the defendants sought review in
the then Intermediate Appellate Court. The case was
certified to the Supreme Court on the IAC’s finding that no
question of fact had been raised.
ISSUES
- W/N the lower court acted correctly in rendering a summary judgment in
the aforesaid cases - YES
HELD/RATIO
- It is settled that a summary judgment under Rule 34 of the Rules
of Court is proper only if there is no genuine issue as to the
existence of any material fact.
28 of 68
- The rendition of the questioned summary judgment by the trial
court is proper and valid. Tested against the statutory and
jurisprudential rules, the very allegations of the defendants prove
that no valid issue has been tendered by them. They relied mainly
on two points, the alleged invalidity of the title of the plaintiff and
their supposed acquisition of the properties by adverse possession.
Defendants' theses are obviously puerile but they are entitled to
the benefit of clarification.
- We note with approval the lower court's patient explanation that,
inter alia, the certificates of title issued in the name of the plaintiff
in accordance with the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) is
indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the
decree of registration. Under Section 38 thereof, a petition for
review of the decree must be presented within one year after its
entry as described and defined in Section 40 of the same. After the
lapse of one year, the decree of registration becomes
incontrovertible and is binding upon and conclusive against all
persons whether or not they were notified of or participated in the
registration proceedings. The certificates of title of appellee
corporation were issued more than thirty years ago: Title No.
31527 was issued on September 11, 1953, while Title No. 31528
(now N-67845) was issued on February 19, 1952.
- Even assuming arguendo that said titles may still be challenged,
the present case does not provide the vehicle for that remedy since
the judicial action required is a direct, and not a collateral,
attack. In fact, under the existing law, Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree expressly provides that a certificate of title
cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified
or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
- Appellants' claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise
baseless. Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered
land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, proof of
possession by the defendants is both immaterial and
inconsequential.
Toyota v CA - Buenaventura
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
A boundary dispute between Toyota Motor Phil. Corporation (Toyota) and Sun
Valley Manufacturing and Development Corporation (Sun Valley).
Both Toyota and Sun Valley are the registered owners of two (2) adjoining parcels
of land situated in La Huerta, Parañaque which they purchased from the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT).
The properties in question formerly belonged to Delta Motors Corporation (DMC)
foreclosed by PNB.
APT divided the property into Delta I, Delta II, and Delta III.
Part of Delta I property (Lot 2) was sold to Toyota. Toyota constructed a concrete
hollow block (CHB) perimeter fence around its alleged property.
October 5, 1990, another part of Delta I (Lot 1) was purchased by Sun Valley.
Relying upon the title description of its property and the surveys it had
commissioned, Sun Valley claimed that Toyota's perimeter fence overlaps Sun
Valley's property for a total of 723 square meters.
Negotiations between the two (2) corporations for a possible settlement of the
dispute bogged down. Toyota and Sun Valley filed separate actions.
TOYOTA CASE (Civil Case No. 91-2504)
Toyota filed an action for reformation on September 11, 1991, before Judge
Tensuan alleging that the true intentions of the parties were not expressed in the
instrument (Art. 1359 Civil Code). The instrument sought to be reformed is the
deed of sale executed by APT in favor of Toyota. Toyota alleges that there was a
mistake in the designation of the real properties subject matter of the contract. Sun
Valley was impleaded in order to obtain complete relief since it was the owner of
the adjacent lot.
Toyota alleges that the discrepancy came about because of the serious flaw in the
classification/cataloguing of properties bidded out for sale by APT. Toyota sought
the resurvey of the property to correct this error in the title. Sun Valley was
impleaded.
SUN VALLEY CASE (Civil Case No. 91-2550)
Sun Valley argues that the complaint for reformation states no cause of action
against it since an action for reformation is basically one strictly between the parties
to the contract itself. Third persons who are not parties to the contract cannot and
should not be involved. Thus, Sun Valley contends that it should not have been
impleaded as a defendant.Protesting the admission of the amended complaint,
Toyota went to CA on certiorari on October 1, 1991.
29 of 68
CA denied due course to the Toyota petition on the finding that the amendment of
Sun Valley's complaint was a valid one as Sun Valley's action was not for unlawful
detainer but an accion publiciana.
Issues:
1) the matter of jurisdiction, who as between Judge Tensuan or Judge Gorospe has
jurisdiction over the dispute - Judge Gorospe
2) who as between the parties has the rightful possession of the land. - Sun Valley
contract of sale executed between APT and Toyota provides an arbitration clause:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In case of disagreement or conflict arising out of this Contract, the parties hereby
undertake to submit the matter for determination by a committee of experts, acting
as arbitrators.
As this concerns the parties APT and Toyota themselves, the arbitration committee
is the proper and convenient forum to settle the matter as clearly provided in the
deed of sale. Judge Tensuan should have not taken cognizance of the case.
The complaint for reformation amounts to a collateral attack on Sun Valley's title.
It is disputed that Sun Valley has a Torrens title registered in its name by virtue of
its purchase of the land from APT.
Toyota contends that the 723 square meters strip of land which it understood to be
included in its purchase from APT was erroneously included in Sun Valley's title.
This is the reason why reformation was sought to correct the mistake.
Well-settled is the rule that a certificate of title can not be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law (Section 48, P.D. No.
1529).
Domingo v. Santos Ongsiako, Lim y Sia:
. . . The fact should not be overlooked that we are here confronted with what is
really a collateral attack upon a Torrens title. The circumstance that the action was
directly brought to recover a parcel of land does not alter the truth that the
proceeding involves a collateral attack upon a Torrens title, because as we have
found, the land in controversy lies within the boundaries determined by that title.
The Land Registration Law defines the methods under which a wrongful
adjudication of title to land under the Torrens system may be corrected . . .
While reformation may often be had to correct mistakes in defining the boundary of
lands conveyed so as to identify the lands, it may not be used to pass other lands
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
from those intended to be bought and sold, notwithstanding a mistake in pointing
out the lines, since reformation under these circumstances would be inequitable and
unjust.
Assuming that Toyota is afforded the relief prayed for in the Tensuan court, the
latter can not validly order the contested portion to be taken out from the Sun
Valley's TCT and award it in favor of Toyota.
An action for reformation is in personam, not in rem even when real estate is
involved. It is merely an equitable relief granted to the parties where through
mistake or fraud, the instrument failed to express the real agreement or intention of
the parties. While it is a recognized remedy afforded by courts of equity it may not
be applied if it is contrary to well-settled principles or rules. It is a long standing
principle that equity follows the law. It is applied in the abscence of and never
against statutory law. Courts are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary
discretion to disregard them. ) Courts of equity must proceed with utmost caution
especially when rights of third parties may intervene. Thus in the instant case, vis-
a-vis well-settled principles or rules in land registration, the equitable relief of
reformation may not come into play in order to transfer or appropriate a piece of
land that one claims to own but which is titled in the name of a third party.
With the finding that Toyota's action for reformation is dismissable as it is in effect a
collateral attack on Sun Valley's title, Sun Valley's action for recovery of possession
filed before Judge Gorospe now stands to be the proper forum where the following
dispute may be tried or heard.
Toyota's claim over the disputed property is anchored on the fact of its purchase of
the property from APT, that from the circumstances of the purchase and the
intention of the parties, the property including the disputed area was sold to it.
Sun Valley, on the other hand has TCT No. 49019 of the Registry of Deeds of
Parañaque embracing the aforesaid property in its name, having been validly
acquired also from APT by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed in its favor on
December 5, 1990.
There are other circumstances in the case which militate against Toyota's claim for
legal possession over the disputed area.
The fact that Toyota has filed a suit for reformation seeking the inclusion of the 723
square meters strip of land is sufficient to deduce that it is not entitled to take over
the piece of property it now attempts to appropriate for itself.
As early as September, 1988 prior to the construction of the perimeter fence,
Toyota was already aware of the discrepancies in the property's description in the
title and the actual survey. This is based on letters exchanged between itself and its
surveyor company.
30 of 68
Sun Valley's TCT gives it that right to possession. On the other hand, Toyota has
not established its right over the said property except for the assertion that there
was a mistake in an instrument which purportedly should have included the
questioned strip of land.
DISMISSED
———
In case sir asks:
A discussion on differences between (1) the summary action for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer; (2) the accion publiciana; and (3) the accion de reivindicacion.
Banayos v. Susana Realty, Inc.:
xxx xxx xxx
The action for forcible entry may be brought where dispossession of real property
had taken place by any of the means provided for in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and in the case of unlawful detainer, where the possession
is withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract express or implied. These two actions must be filed within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession with the
municipal or city court. These actions in their essence are mere quieting processes
by virtue of which a party in possession of land may not be, by force, dispossessed
of that land, the law restoring to him such possession in a summary manner, until
the right of ownership can be tried in due course of law. They are, therefore,
intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to
possession of property.
The aforesaid Rule 70 does not, however, cover all of the cases of dispossession of
lands. Thus, "whenever the owner is dispossessed by any other means than those
mentioned he may maintain his action in the Court of First Instance, and it is not
necessary for him to wait until the expiration of twelve months before commencing
an action to be repossessed or declared to be owner of land.”
Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real
property illegally detained, together with rents due and damages, even though one
(1) year has not expired from the beginning of such illegal detention, provided the
question of ownership of such property is also involved. In other words, if the party
illegal dispossessed desires to raise the question of illegal dispossession as well as
that of the ownership over the property, he may commence such action in the Court
of First Instance immediately or at any time after such illegal dispossession. If he
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
decides to raise the question of illegal dispossession only, and the action is filed
more than one (1) year after such deprivation or withholding of possession, then
the Court of First Instance will have original jurisdiction over the case. The former is
an accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership as well as
possession, while the latter refers to an accion publiciana, which is the recovery of
the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary proceeding in the Court
of First Instance.
DBP v CA – Domingo
Facts:
- The land in dispute, consisting of 19.4 hectares located in San Miguel, Province
of Bohol, was originally owned by Ulpiano Mumar, whose ownership since 1917
was evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 3840. In 1950, Mumar sold the land to
private respondent who was issued Tax Declaration No. R-1475 that same year.
The tax declaration was later superseded by Tax Declaration Nos. R-799 issued
in 1961 and D-2247 issued in 1974. Private respondent occupied and cultivated
the said land, planting cassava and camote in certain portions of the land.
- In 1969, unknown to private respondent, Jose Alvarez succeeded in obtaining
the registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,512,468.00 square meters,
in his name for which he was issued OCT No. 546 on June 16, 1969. The parcel
of land included the 19.4 hectares occupied by private respondent. Alvarez never
occupied nor introduced improvements on said land.
- In 1972, Alvarez sold the land to the spouses Gaudencio and Rosario Beduya to
whom TCT No. 10101 was issued. That same year, the spouses Beduya obtained
a loan from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines for P526,000.00 and,
as security, mortgaged the land covered by TCT No. 10101 to the bank. In 1978,
the SAAD Investment Corp., and the SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc., represented by
Gaudencio Beduya, and the spouses Beduya personally executed another
mortgage over the land in favor of petitioner to secure a loan of P1,430,000.00.
- The spouses Beduya later failed to pay their loans, as a result of which, the
mortgage on the property was foreclosed. In the resulting foreclosure sale held
on January 31, 1985, petitioner was the highest bidder. As the spouses Beduya
failed to redeem the property, petitioner consolidated its ownership.
- It appears that private respondent had also applied for a loan from petitioner in
1978, offering his 19.4 hectare property under Tax Declaration No. D-2247 as
security for the loan. As part of the processing of the application, a
representative of petitioner, Patton R. Olano, inspected the land and appraised
its value.
31 of 68
- Private respondents loan application was later approved by petitioner. However
after releasing the amount of the loan to private respondent, petitioner found
that the land mortgaged by private respondent was included in the land covered
by TCT No. 10101 in the name of the spouses Beduya. Petitioner, therefore,
cancelled the loan and demanded immediate payment of the amount. Private
respondent paid the loan to petitioner for which the former was issued a
Cancellation of Mortgage, dated March 18, 1981, releasing the property in
question from encumbrance.
- Sometime in April of 1986, more than a year after the foreclosure sale, a re-
appraisal of the property covered by TCT No. 10101 was conducted by
petitioners representatives. It was then discovered that private respondent was
occupying a portion of said land. Private respondent was informed that petitioner
had become the owner of the land he was occupying, and he was asked to
vacate the property. As private respondent refused to do so, petitioner filed a
complaint for recovery of possession with damages against him. The case was
assigned to Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, which after
trial, rendered a decision, dated August 22, 1989, declaring petitioner the lawful
owner of the entire land covered by TCT No. 10101 on the ground that the
decree of registration was binding upon the land.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and gave judgment for private
respondent, declaring him the owner of the 19.4 hectares of land erroneously
included in TCT No. 10101.
- Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied in a resolution
dated April 23, 1997. Hence this petition.
Issue:
- WON the CA erred in reversing the Trial Court.
Held:
- No. In the present case, private respondent has been in actual, open, peaceful
and continuous possession of the property since 1950. This fact was
corroborated by the testimony of Eleuterio Cambangay who personally knew that
Ulpiano Mumar transferred the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 3840 in
favor of private respondent in 1950. Private respondents claim based on actual
occupation of the land is bolstered by Tax Declaration Nos. R-1475, R- 799 and
D-2247 which were issued in his name in 1950, 1961 and 1974, respectively.
Together with his actual possession of the land, these tax declarations constitute
strong evidence of ownership of the land occupied by him.
- More importantly, it was established that private respondent, having been in
possession of the land since 1950, was the owner of the property when it was
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
registered by Jose Alvarez in 1969, his possession tacked to that of his
predecessor-in-interest, Ulpiano Mumar, which dates back to 1917. Clearly, more
than 30 years had elapsed before a decree of registration was issued in favor of
Jose Alvarez. This uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for more than 30
years could only ripen into ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription
which is a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable
property. Prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse
possession of the property in the concept of an owner for ten (10) years, in case
the possession is in good faith and with a just title. Such prescription is called
ordinary prescription, as distinguished from extraordinary prescription which
requires possession for 30 years in case possession is without just title or is not
in good faith.
- A decree of registration cut off or extinguished a right acquired by a person
when such right refers to a lien or encumbrance on the land not to the right of
ownership thereof which was not annotated on the certificate of title issued
thereon.
- The doctrine is that the fact that a party was able to secure a title in his favor
did not operate to vest ownership upon her of the property.
-
Realty Sales Enterprise v IAC – Fullecido
Facts:
 Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., situated in the vicinity
of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes Parañaque are covered by
three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles
 On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and
TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.,
Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration
32 of 68
 The complaint alleged that the court that issued TCT No. 20408 as well as
OCT No. 1609 was issued by a court not sitting as a land registration
court, but as a court of ordinary jurisdiction.
 It was further alleged that the original records of LRC Case No. 657, GLRO
Record No. 29882 which was the basis for the issuance of said order of
May 21, 1958, were lost and/or destroyed during World War II and were
still pending reconstitution; hence, the Reyes Court had no authority to
order the issuance of a certificate of title.
 In the answer of the defendant, alleged in their answer that the Reyes
Court was acting as a court of land registration and in issuing the order of
May 21, 1958, was actually performing a purely ministerial duty for the
registration court in Case No. 657 with which said case had been jointly
tried and decided) which on August 19, 1935 had rendered a decision
adjudicating the two (2) lots in question to Estanislao Mayuga which was
subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals.
o It was alleged that it is the title of Carpo which is null and void,
having been issued over a parcel of land previously registered
under the Torrens System in favor of another.
 With leave of court, Realty and Macondray filed a third-party complaint
against the Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation and the
Commissioner of Land Registration alleging that TCTs Nos. 333982 and
333985 in the name of QCDFC also covered the same parcels of land
subject of the dispute between Carpo and the two corporations, Realty and
Macondray.
 In its answer to the third-party complaint, QCDFC asserted the validity of
its own title alleging that it is the title in the name of Realty which is null
and void. QCDFC also filed a fourth-party complaint against Carmelino
Alvendia, Esperanza Alvendia, Felicisimo Alvendia, Josefina Alvendia,
Jacinto G. Miranda, Rosa G. Miranda, Isabel G. Miranda, and Feliciano G.
Miranda, alleging that it bought said parcels of land from them.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
 After hearing, the Vera Court rendered judgment on January 20, 1981,
sustaining the title of Morris G. Carpo to the two (2) lots in question and
declaring the titles of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and QCDFC null and
void.
 Realty filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R. No. L-
56471 questioning the decision of the lower court
 the Court of Appealsset aside the decision of the trial court and rendered a
new one upholding the validity of the title in the name of Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc. and declaring null and void the titles in the name of Carpo
and QCDFC.
Issue: WoN the court has authority to issue order directing the issuance of a decree
of registration in favor of Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, as it was not
sitting as a land registration court and also because the original records of LRC Case
No. 657, Record No. N-29882 were lost and/or destroyed during World War II and
were still pending reconstitution? Yes
- Under Act No. 496, Land Registration Act, (1902) as amended by Act No.
2347 (1914), jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to and
was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance of the respective provinces
in which the land sought to be registered is situated.
- Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired
upon the filing in court of the application for registration, and is retained
up to the end of the litigation.
- The issuance of a decree of registration is but a step in the entire land
registration process; and as such, does not constitute a separate
proceeding.
- In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of
Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally filed
on June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657,
GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to confirm
his title over parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035.
(Lots 2 and 3 the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, RRealty
and QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC
Case No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC
Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the
33 of 68
three cases involved Identical parcels of land, and Identical
applicants/oppositors.
- On August 19, 1935 the CFI-Rizal acting as a land registration court issued
a consolidated decision on the three cases.
- On May 13, 1958 Dominador Mayuga, son of Estanislao, filed a petition
with the Reyes Court docketed as Case No. 2689 alleging that he was the
only heir of the deceased Estanislao Mayuga and praying for the issuance
of a decree of registration over the property adjudicated in favor of
Estanislao. At this point, it cannot be overemphasized that the
petition filed by Dominador is NOT a distinct and separate
proceeding from, but a continuation of, the original land
registration proceedings initiated by Estanislao Mayuga,
Florentino Baltazar and Eduardo Guico. In the same vein, the
Reyes Court, as Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
was continuing in the exercise of jurisdiction over the case, which
jurisdiction was vested in the CFI-Rizal upon filing of the original
applications.
- Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No. 657,
the parties thereto did not have to commence a new action but
only had to go back to the preceding stage where records are
available. The land registration case itself re. mained pending and
the Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction
over it.
Rodolfo Coronel v IAC – Hernandez
FACTS: Rodolfo Coronel filed a complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of
land registered under his name in the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite.
The complaint was filed against the private respondents Elias Merlan, Brigido
Merlan, Jose Merlan, Teodorico Nostrates, Severo Jeciel Santiago Fernan and
Fortunato Ocampo before CFI Cavite.
Coronel alleged in his complaint that at the time he purchased the subject parcel of
land, the defendants were already occupying a portion thereof as "tenants at will"
and that despite demands to vacate the premises, the defendants failed and
refused to move out from the land.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
In their Answer with Counterclaim and With Third-Party Complaint, the
defendants Merlan:
1. alleged that the lots occupied by them form part of a 1/3 undivided share of
brothers Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan which they inherited from their deceased
father Gabriel Merla. Such portion of land was never sold.
2. that it was actually their other co-heirs who sold their undivided portions
In their Third-Party Complaint, defendants Merlan charged that the third-party
defendants (Novelo, Anuat, Cailao) owners of the 2/3 remaining portion of Lot No.
1950-A defrauded them when they sold the entire parcel.
Third-Party Defendants Marcelo Novelo, Paz Anuat Daniel Anuat and Rosario Cailao
the defendants' co-owners of Lot No. 1950-A denied that they had something to do
with the fraudulent acts or illegal machinations which deprived the defendants of
their share in the subject parcel of land, and that what they sold was only their 2/3
undivided shares in said parcel. They also filed a cross-claim against their co-
defendant Mariano Manalo whom they charged might have connived with others
Including the plaintiff to deprive the defendants and their co-heirs of their share in
the subject parcel of land.
RTC: Ruled in favor of respondents Merlan
CA: Affirmed RTC; modified the RTC decision by declaring the respondents
Merlan owners of the 1/3 portion of the land
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Coronel is entitled to the 1/3 portion of land occupied by
the respondents
HELD: No. Coronel is not entitled to the 1/3 portion of respondents Merlan. The
respiondents are the owners of the 1/3 portion of the land.
1. Private respondents never sold their 1/3 share over Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic
Estate; that what their co-owners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 share of the
same lot; and that Ignacio Manalo sold only the 2/3 share to third-party
defendant Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Rodolfo
Coronel.
2. There was a mistake when Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41175 was issued to
Mariano Manalo covering the whole area of Lot No. 1950-A. Unfortunately,
Mariano Manalo who was included as third-party defendant as well as the
subject of a cross- claim filed by the other third-party defendants, and
34 of 68
who could have shed light on this controversy was at the time residing
abroad and was not served with the third-party complaint.
ISSUE 2: Has action for reconveyance prescribed? HELD: No.
The counterclaim of the private respondents which was in effect a reconveyance to
them of their 1/3 undivided share over lot No. 1950-A has not prescribed. As lawful
possessors and owners of the lot in question their cause of action falls within the
settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property-in one's possession is
imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession over a period of more than 25 years
gave them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect of his own title.
If at all, the private respondents' right, to quiet title, to seek reconveyance and to
annul Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75543 accrued only in 1975 when they were
made aware of a claim adverse to their own. It was only at that time that, the
statutory period of prescription may be said to have commenced to run against
them.
No reversible error on the part of the lower courts in recognizing the ownership of
the private respondents over 1/3 of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate. Petitioner
Coronel is bound to recognize the lien in favor of the private respondents which was
mistakenly excluded and therefore not inscribed in the torrens title of the land of his
predecessors-in-interest.
DISPOSITIVE: The Registrar of Deeds of Cavite is ordered to segregate the 1/3
portion of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate (4,063 square meters) from the entire
portion embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75543 and issue a new
certificate of title in favor of the heirs of Gabriel Merlan over the disputed one-third
portion and another new certificate of title over the remaining two-thirds portion of
the land in favor of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel after cancelling Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-75543.
NOTE: The syllabus topic is about “not collateral attack”. The case did not directly
discuss whether or not there was a collateral attack. I think the case illustrates that
respondents to an action for recovery of possession can “attack” the title of a third
party defendant (defendant in a third party complaint) through an ANSWER with
third party complaint. In this case, the respondents Merlan attacked the title of
third-Party defendants Marcelo Novelo, Paz Anuat Daniel Anuat and Rosario Cailao
the defendants' co-owners of Lot No. 1950-A who allegedly sold the 1/3 portion of
the land which the latter did not own. The trial court just dismissed the complaint of
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
Coronel. But on appeal, the CA did not just affirm the trial court but even went on
to declare respondents Merlan as the owners of the said 1/3 portion of the land.
Locsin v Hizon - Hernandez
Sept. 17, 2014
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
 Petitioner was the registered owner of a 760-sq. m. lot
in Don Antonio Heights Subd., Brgy. Holy Spirit, QC.
 In 1992, she filed an ejectment case against Billy
Aceron before the MTC to recover possession over the
land. Eventually, the two entered into a compromise
agreement, which the MTC approved in 1993.
 Petitioner went to the US without knowing whether
Aceron has complied with the agreement. Despite this,
she continued paying for the real property taxes on the
subject lot.
 Locsin filed a petition for administrative reconstruction
when she discovered in 1994 that her copy of the TCT
was missing.
 In 2002, she requested her counsel to check the status
of the property and discovered the following:
o Bolos had Locsin’s TCT cancelled and secured a
new one in her favor by registering a Deed of
Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Locsin with
the Registry of Deeds;
o Bolos then sold the lot to Bernardo for P1.5M,
but it was titled under the latter’s son, Carlos;
o Bernardo, claiming to be the owner of the lot,
filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
35 of 68
for the enforcement of the court-approved
compromise agreement (above-mentioned);
o The lot was already occupied and up for sale.
 Locsin sent Carlos a letter requesting the return of the
property since her signature in the purported deed of
sale in favor of Bolos was a forgery. Carlos set up the
defense of innocent purchaser for value and good faith.
 Locsin then learned that Carlos had already sold the
property for P1.5M to his sister and her husband, the
Guevaras. The latter then mortgaged the lot to secure a
P2.5M loan with Damar Credit Corp. (DCC), which was
subsequently denied.
 Locsin filed an action for reconveyance with the RTC.
The latter dismissed the complaint, holding that:
o There is insufficient evidence to show that
Locsin’s signature was a forgery;
o The deed of sale was a public document, having
been notarized; thus, there is presumption of
regularity;
o Locsin cannot simply rely on the apparent
difference of the signatures in the deed of sale
and in the documents she presented to prove
forgery;
o The transfers of title from Bolos to Carlos and
from Carlos to the Guevaras were valid and
regular;
o Bernardo, Carlos, and the Guevaras are all
buyers in good faith.
 Upon appeal to the CA, it ruled that it was an error for
the RTC to hold that Locsin failed to prove that her
signature was forged. CA found that Locsin’s signature
in the deed of absolute sale differs from her signatures
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
in the other documents offered as evidence. CA,
however, affirmed RTC’s ruling that respondents are
innocent purchasers for value. They need not go
beyond the certificate of title, having dealt with property
registered under the Torrens System. Any notice of
defect or flaw in the title of the vendor should
encompass facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the
title of the property in order to amount to bad faith.
Locsin can no longer recover the lot.
Petitioner’s arguments:
o Bernardo was aware that when he purchased the
lot, there was a possible defect in Bolo’s title
since the former knew that Aceron was
occupying the land. Bernardo even moved for the
execution of the compromise agreement between
Locsin and Aceron. Thus, Bernardo should have
acted as a reasonably diligent buyer in verifying
the authenticity of Bolo’s title.
o Transfer from Carlos to the Guevaras was only
simulated and intended to keep the property out
of petitioner’s reach base on their admissions and
testimonies.
Respondents’ arguments:
o They had the right to rely solely upon the face of
Bolo’s clean title considering it was free from any
lien or encumberance.
o Knowledge of Aceron’s possession cannot be the
basis for an allegation of bad faith, for the
property was purchased on an as-is where-is
36 of 68
basis.
ISSUE:
WON respondents are innocent purchasers for value. NO.
RATIO:
 An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a
full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before
receiving any notice of another person’s claim. As such,
a defective title–– or one the procurement of which is
tainted with fraud and misrepresentation––may be the
source of a completely legal and valid title, provided
that the buyer is an innocent third person who, in good
faith, relied on the correctness of the certificate of title,
or an innocent purchaser for value.
 Complementing this is the mirror doctrine which echoes
the doctrinal rule that every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way
obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property. The recognized exceptions to
this rule are stated as follows:
o A person dealing with registered land has a right
to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further
except when the party has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or
when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or
the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts
to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire
into the status of the title of the property in
litigation. The presence of anything which excites
or arouses suspicion should then prompt the
vendee to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on
the face of said certificate. One who falls within
the exception can neither be denominated an
innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in
good faith and, hence, does not merit the
protection of the law.
 In Domingo Realty, Inc. v. CA, the court emphasized
the need for prospective parties to a contract involving
titled lands to exercise the diligence of a reasonably
prudent person in ensuring the legality of the title, and
the accuracy of the metes and bounds of the lot
embraced therein, by undertaking precautionary
measures, such as:
1. Verifying the origin, history, authenticity, and
validity of the title with the Office of the Register
of Deeds and the Land Registration Authority;
2. Engaging the services of a competent and
reliable geodetic engineer to verify the boundary,
metes, and bounds of the lot subject of said title
based on the technical description in the said title
and the approved survey plan in the Land
Management Bureau;
37 of 68
3. Conducting an actual ocular inspection of the
lot;
4. Inquiring from the owners and possessors of
adjoining lots with respect to the true and legal
ownership of the lot in question;
5. Putting up of signs that said lot is being
purchased, leased, or encumbered; and
6. Undertaking such other measures to make the
general public aware that said lot will be subject
to alienation, lease, or encumbrance by the
parties.
 Bolos’ certificate of title was concededly free from liens and
encumbrances on its face. However, the failure of Carlos
and the spouses Guevara to exercise the necessary level of
caution in light of the factual milieu surrounding the
sequence of transfers from Bolos to respondents bars the
application of the mirror doctrine and inspires the Court’s
concurrence with petitioner’s proposition.
Carlos is not an innocent purchaser for value
 The Court is of the view that Bernardo negotiated with
Bolos for the property as Carlos’ agent. This is bolstered by
the fact that he was the one who arranged for the sale and
eventual registration of the property in Carlos’ favor (based
on Carlos’ testimony).
 Consistent with the rule that the principal is chargeable and
bound by the knowledge of, or notice to, his agent received
in that capacity, any information available and known to
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
Bernardo is deemed similarly available and known to
Carlos, including the following:
1. Bernardo knew that Bolos, from whom he
purchased the subject property, never acquired
possession over the lot. As a matter of fact, in his
March 11, 2009 direct testimony, Bernardo
admitted having knowledge of Aceron’s lot
possession as well as the compromise agreement
between petitioner and Aceron.
2. Bolos’ purported Deed of Sale was executed
on November 3, 1979 but the ejectment case
commenced by Locsin against Aceron was in
1992, or thirteen (13) years after the property
was supposedly transferred to Bolos.
3. The August 6, 1993 Judgment, issued by the
MTC on the compromise agreement between
Locsin and Aceron, clearly stated therein that
"[o]n August 2, 1993,the parties [Aceron and
Locsin] submitted to [the MTC] for approval a
Compromise Agreement dated July 28, 1993." It
further indicated that "[Aceron] acknowledges
[Locsin’s] right of possessionto [the subject
property], being the registered owner thereof.
 Having knowledge of the foregoing facts, Bernardo and
Carlos should have been impelled to investigate the
reason behind the arrangement. They should have been
pressed to inquire into the status of the title of the
property in litigation in order to protect Carlos’ interest.
It should have struck them as odd that it was Locsin,
38 of 68
not Bolos, who sought the recovery of possession by
commencing an ejectment case against Aceron, and
even entered into a compromiseagreement with the
latter years afterthe purported sale in Bolos’ favor.
Instead, Bernardo and Carlos took inconsistent positions
when they argued for the validity of the transfer of the
property in favor of Bolos, but in the same breath
prayed for the enforcement of the compromise
agreement entered into by Locsin.
 Entering into a compromise agreement is an act of strict
dominion. If Bolos already acquired ownership of the
property as early as 1979, it should have been her who
entered into a compromise agreement with Aceron in
1993, not her predecessor-in-interest, Locsin, who,
theoretically, had already divested herself of ownership
thereof.
The spouses Guevara are not innocent purchasers for
value
 As regards the transfer of the property from Carlos to
the spouses Guevara, the court finds the existence of
the sale highly suspicious. For one, there is a dearth of
evidence to support the respondent spouses’ position
that the sale was a bona fide transaction. Evenif we
repeatedly sift through the evidence on record, still we
cannot find any document, contract, or deed evidencing
the sale in favor of the spouses Guevara. The same
goes for the purported payment of the purchase price of
the property in the amount of PhP 1.5 million in favor of
Carlos.
 To bridge the gap in their documentary evidence,
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
respondents proffer their own testimonies explaining
the circumstances surrounding the alleged sale.
However, basic is the rule that bare and self-serving
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof under the Rules. As such, we cannot
give credence to their representations that the sale
between them actually transpired.
 Furthermore, and noticeably enough, the transfer from
Carlos to the spouses Guevara was effected only fifteen
(15) days after Locsin demanded the surrender of the
property from Carlos.
 When Bernardo met with Locsin’s counsel on June 13,
2002, and personally made a commitment to come up
with a win-win situation for his son and Locsin, he knew
fully well, too, that the property had already been
purportedly transferred to his daughter and son-in-law,
the spouses Guevara, for he, no less, facilitated the
same. This, to us, is glaring evidence of bad faith and
an apparent intention to mislead Locsin into believing
that she could no longer recover the subject property.
 Also, the fact that Lourdes Guevara and Carlos are
siblings, and that Carlos’ agent in his dealings
concerning the property is his own father, renders
incredible the argument thatLourdes had no knowledge
whatsoever of Locsin’s claim of ownership atthe time of
the purported sale.
 Indeed, the fact that the spouses Guevara never
intended to be the owner in good faith and for value of
39 of 68
the lot is further made manifest by their lack of interest
in protecting themselvesin the case. It does not even
appear in their testimonies that they, at the very least,
intended to vigilantly protect their claim over the
property and prevent Locsin take it away from them.
What they did was to simply appoint Bernardo as their
attorney-in-fact to handle the situation and never
bothered acquainting themselves with the developments
in the case.28 To be sure, respondent Jose Manuel
Guevara was not even presented asa witness in the
case.
 There is also strong reason to believe that even the
mortgage in favor of DCC was a mere ploy to make it
appear that the Sps. Guevara exercised acts of
dominion over the subject property. This is so
considering the proximity between the property’s
registration in their names and its being subjected to
the mortgage. Most telling is that the credit line secured
by the mortgage was never used by the spouses,
resulting in the mortgage’s cancellation and the
exclusion of DCC as a party in Civil Case No. Q-02-
47925.
 These circumstances, taken altogether, strongly indicate
that Carlos and the spouses Guevara failed to exercise
the necessary level of caution expected of a bona fide
buyer and even performed acts that are highly suspect.
Consequently, this Court could not give respondents the
protection accorded to innocent purchasers in good
faith and for value.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
Peralta v Abalon – Mambuay
Pinote v Dulay – Manalo
Complaint filed:
- Petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel the CFI to grant due course to
the appeal from the order granting reconstitution.
Petitioner's arguments: Pedro and not Petra was the name appearing in the petition
and notice.
Respondent's arguments: N/A
RTC's ruling with ratio:
- Appeal invalid because pro forma and filed out of time.
CA's ruling with ratio:
SC's ruling with ratio:
- In favor of petitioners
- Appeal was seasonably filed
- CFI had no jurisdiction in issuing order in favor of PETRA as the petition and
notices did not contain the name of PETRA. It is limited only to the four corners
of the petition. The petition alleged the name of PEDRO, and not PETRA.
FACTS:
On September 30, 1978, Francisco P. Otto, representing his mother Petra Pinote,
filed in the CFI of Cebu, a verified petition for reconstitution of the original
certificate of title to Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, which, was supposedly
adjudicated to Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, PEDRO, and Petronilo, all surnamed
Pinote,. The petition alleged that the original, as well as owner's duplicate certificate
of title, were burned in the Opon municipal building during World War II, and the
same could not be located despite diligent search; that there were no annotations
or liens and encumbrances on the title affecting the same; that no deed or
instrument affecting the property had been presented for registration; and the
technical description with the metes and bounds of the property.
By an order dated November 6, 1978, the court set the case for hearing. A copy of
the notice of hearing was ordered to be published in the Official Gazette, furnished
40 of 68
to all the adjoining owners, and posted at the main entrances of the Provincial
Capitol Building, the City Hall, and the Public Market of Lapu-Lapu City. The court
also ordered copies of the notice and order to be sent to the Registers of Deeds of
Lapu-Lapu City and Cebu, the Director of Lands, and the Commissioner of Land
Registration, directing them to show cause, if any, why the petition may not be
granted.
It does not appear, however, that notices were sent to each of the registered co-
owners — Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, PEDRO and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, or
their heirs, so that they could have been heard on the petition.
As there was no opposition to the petition when it was called for hearing, the lower
court commissioned its Clerk of Court to receive the evidence.
The Commissioner’s Report reads as follows:
Lote No. 2381. — A favor de cada uno de los cinco hermanos Pinote,
llamados Saturnino, casado con Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, PETRA y
Petronilo, solteros y de 20 y 17 años respectivamente, los dos ultimos.
The CFI then issued an order directing the Register of Deeds to reconstitute the title
in the names of Saturnino Pinote, married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irenio, PETRA and
Petronillo, all surnamed Pinote.
Pursuant to this order, the Register of Deeds issued the title in the names of the
alleged brothers and sisters, Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo,
PETRA and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote.
On October 1, 1979, Atty. Ellescas, alleged counsel of the heirs of Pedro, Juana,
and Saturnino filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order seeking the
reopening of the proceedings and the rectification of the order arguing that while
the original petition stated the title decreed in the name of PEDRO, etc., the Court
order ordered reconstitution in the name of PETRA, etc.
A copy of the motion for reconsideration was received by Attorney Ramon Codilla,
Otto's counsel. The hearing of the motion was set. Because of a conflict in his trial
calendar, Atty. Ellescas informed the court that he would not be able to attend the
hearing. Only Atty. Codilla appeared at the hearing on Nov. 14, 1979. He was
ordered by the court to submit a photocopy of OCT No. RO-2355 (the reconstituted
title) which he complied with.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
The CFI denied the MR on the ground that during the hearing of this petition, no
opposition was registered thereto and the evidence adduced by the petitioner
shows clearly that an original certificate of title covering subject lot was issued in
favor of Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Petra, and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, co-
owners and brothers and sisters; that the original, as well as the owners' duplicate,
was burned in the Opon municipal building during the last war; that there were no
annotations on this title affecting the same; that the so-called index of decree
showing that Pedro Pinote is one of the co-owners is erroneous and it should
instead read as "Petra" since they are the brothers and sisters; and that this fact is
also reflected in the extract of the decision of the cadastral court
On January 2, 1980, the heirs of PEDRO filed a notice of appeal. On January 4,
1980, they filed an urgent ex parte motion for extension of time to file record on
appeal. The record on appeal was filed on January 9, 1980, and a copy was sent to
the private respondent by registered mail on the same date.
On May 10, 1980, the court denied due course to the appeal on the ground of
tardiness as the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, which the court declared to
be pro forma, did not suspend the finality of the court's June 7, 1979 order.
ISSUE:
W/N the appeal was pro forma and filed out of time? NO
W/N the rectification is proper? YES.
RATIO:
Their motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 7, 1979 was not pro
forma. It invited the court's attention to a substantial variance between the petition
for reconstitution and the court's order of reconstitution (Pedro vs Petra). The
movants prayed that an order be issued for the reopening of the reconstitution
proceeding and that the court's order of June 7, 1979 be rectified to change the
name of Petra to that of Pedro Pinote.
The error adverted to in the motion for reconsideration is substantial for it affects
the participation and interest of Pedro Pinote (or his heirs) in Lot No. 2381, an
interest that appeared in the petition for reconstitution and in the notice of hearing
issued by the court, but which disappeared from the court's order of reconstitution
dated June 7, 1979, having been replaced by "Petra Pinote" instead. The trial court
41 of 68
issued a three page-single-spaced order, disposing of the motion for
reconsideration. That so much argument was lavished on the denial of the motion
proves that it was not pro forma or merely dilatory.
The motion for reconsideration was timely. The petitioners had not been separately
notified of the reconstitution proceedings except by constructive notice through the
published notice of hearing. They discovered the assailed order dated June 7, 1979
on September 27, 1979, through Atty. Ellescas. They had up to October 27, 1979 to
either file a motion for reconsideration or appeal. They filed a motion for
reconsideration on October 1, 1979 after only 4 days of the 30-day appeal period
had elapsed, so, they had 26 days left to appeal. On December 11, 1979, they
received the court's order denying their motion for reconsideration. They filed a
notice of appeal, cash appeal bond and a motion for extension of time to file a
record on appeal on January 4, 1980 or 24 days later, with 2 more days of the
appeal period to spare. Their record on appeal was actually filed on January 8,
1980, within the 10-day extension which they sought from the court. Clearly, their
appeal was seasonably filed.
Apart from the question of whether their appeal was timely or not, the more
important issue is the validity of the order of reconstitution. As the petition for
reconstitution of title was a proceeding in rem, compliance with the requirements of
R.A. 26 is a condition sine qua non for the conferment of jurisdiction on the court
taking cognizance of the petition. Considering that both the petition and the court's
notice of hearing, referred to the reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381 in the names
of the registered co-owners, Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo,
Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the cadastral court had jurisdiction only to
grant or deny the prayer of the petition as published in the notice of hearing. The
court could not receive evidence proving that Petra Pinote, instead of Pedro, is a
registered co-owner of Lot 2381.
The reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and within the
meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the instrument which is
supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The
purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same
reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they
were when the loss or destruction occurred.
The jurisdiction of the cadastral court is hedged in by the four walls of the petition
and the published notice of hearing which define the subject matter of the petition.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
If the court oversteps those borders, it acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
the case.
Reconstitution has been misused as a means of divesting a property owner of the
title to his property. Through fraudulent reconstitution proceedings, he wakes up
one day to discover that his certificate of title has been cancelled and replaced by a
reconstituted title in someone else's name. Courts, therefore, should not only
require strict compliance with the requirements of R.A. 26 but, in addition, should
ascertain the identity of every person who files a petition for reconstitution of title
to land. If the petition is filed by someone other than the registered owner, the
court should spare no effort to assure itself of the authenticity and due execution of
the petitioner's authority to institute the proceeding.
It does not appear that the above precautions had been taken in this case as found
by the SC because:
(1) The registered owners (or their heirs) had not been individually notified of the
filing of Otto's petition for reconstitution.
(2) His authority, if any, and that of Atty. Ramon Codilla, to represent all the
registered co-owners of Lot 2381 in the reconstitution proceeding, does not appear
to have been investigated by the court.
(3) It does not appear that the court verified Atty. Porfirio Ellescas' authority to
appear as counsel for the movants-intervenors, Pedro, Juana and Saturnino Pinote
(who are also supposed to be represented by Atty. Codilla), and their heirs.
(4) Neither did it ascertain the identities of the heirs of Pedro, Saturnino and Juana
who filed the motion to reopen the reconstitution proceedings.
(5) We are intrigued why the heirs of Juana and Saturnino Pinote, through Atty.
Ellescas, asked for reconsideration of the court's order dated June 7, 1979 since
their interests in Lot 2381 were not adversely affected by the court's order dated
June 7, 1979.
(6) It does not appear that the court carefully ascertained the genuineness of the
abstract of the decision of the cadastral court (which the petitioners alleged to be
uncertified).
(7) Ascertaining which is correct or wrong: the abstract of the decree, or, the
Municipal Index of Decrees — calls for the reopening of the reconstitution
proceeding and the careful examination of all available evidence as to who are the
true registered co-owners of Lot 2381, for the Court may have unknowingly
changed the ownership of Lot 2381 by vesting title in a stranger or impostor.
42 of 68
Bunagan v CFI – Monfort
Concepcion | Apr. 18, 1980 | In division
Dionisia Icong and her children filed with the CFI a petition for the
RECONSTITUTION of an OCT in the name of "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong,
spouses," and once reconstituted, to cancel the same and another one issued in the
name of the petitioners. Espiritu Bunagan opposed upon the ground that he is the
owner of the lot, having bought the same from legitimate heirs of the late Antonio
Ompad; and that Dionisia is merely a trustee of the lot. Petitioners moved to
dismiss, contending that the opposition constitutes an adverse claim against the
rights of Antonio and Dionisia which cannot be entertained by the cadastral court.
The CFI ruled that it could not entertain the claim of the oppositor which should be
ventilated in an ordinary civil action. The CFI issued an order to the Register of
Deeds to reconstitute the OCT in the names of the original owners — SPOUSES
Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong, which was later issued. Bunagan moved to
correct the order and the OCT, by substituting, as the registered owners "Antonio
Ompad and Dionisia Incong" instead of "spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia
Icong" upon the ground that upon the evidence presented (plan and technical
description and the certificate of the Clerk of Court) the lot was adjudicated to the
two not as spouses. The CFI denied the motion saying it cannot entertain the
motion for the same reason it did not entertain his claim as oppositor. Bunagan filed
a petition for certiorari to annul the CFI order.
WON CFI erred in reconstituting OTC under “spouses Antonio and Dionisia” instead
of “Antonio and Dionisia” only
SC: modified the orders in the sense that the petition for reconstitution is granted
only insofar as it orders the reconstitution of the OCT in the name of "Antonio
Ompad and Dionisia Icong"
Under RA 26, the reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title denotes
restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in
its original form and condition. If the certificate of title was decreed in the form of
"Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong," as in this case, the reconstituted certificate of
title should likewise be in the name of the owners as they appeared in the lost or
destroyed certificate of title sought to be reconstituted.
Dionisia wanted the correction of the name of the owners of the lot from "Antonio
Ompad and Dionisia Icong" to "spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong" which
involves a material change in the certificate of title, a change which, not being
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
consented to by the herein petitioners whose interests are affected thereby, cannot
be authorized under the summary proceedings for reconstitution prescribed in RA
26.
Republic v CA - Pascual
FACTS
 On Feb 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, filed an application
for confirmation of title to 4 parcels of land. Three of said parcels, denominated
as Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio Masin,
Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcel under plan PSU-
112592 is located in Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province. As
basis for the application, the applicant claimed title to the various properties
through either purchase or donation dating as far back as 1928.
 The legal requirements of publication and posting were duly complied with, as
was the service of copies of notice of initial hearing on the proper government
officials.
 In behalf of the Dir. of Lands and the Dir. of the Bureau of Forest
Development, the SolGen filed an Opposition, alleging therein among others,
that the applicant did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the
parcel of land being applied for.
 At the initial hearing held on Nov 13, 1979, only the Provincial Fiscal in
representation of the SolGe appeared to interpose personal objection to the
application. Hence, an Order of General Default against the whole world was
issued by the Court a quo except for the Dir. of Lands and the Dir. of the
Bureau of Forest Development.
 The applicant then introduced its proofs in support of the petition:
o Lot 1 was acquired by the Roman Catholic Church thru Rev. Father
Raymundo Esquenet by purchase from the spouses Atanacio Yranso
and Maria Coronado on Oct. 20, 1928, portion of Lot 2 also by
purchase thru Rev. Father Raymundo Esquenet from the spouses
Benito Maramot and Venancia Descaller on May 22, 1969, while the
remaining portion of Lot 2 and Lot 3 were already owned and
possessed by the Roman Catholic Church even prior to the survey of
the said three lots in 1928.
o Records of burial of the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon
showed that even as early as Nov. 1918, Lot 3 has already been
utilized by the Roman Catholic Church as its cemetery.re||anº•1àw>
o These 3 lots presently constituted the Roman Catholic Church
cemetery in Candelaria, Quezon.
43 of 68
o Lots 1, 2 and 3 are declared for taxation purposes in the name of the
Roman Catholic Church under Tax Declaration Nos. 22-19-02-079, 22-
19-02-077 and 22-19-02-082 as 'cemetery site'.
o With respect to Lot 4: This parcel of land with an area of 3,221
square meters was formerly owned and possessed by the spouses
Paulo G. Macasaet, and Gabriela V. de Macasaet. Said spouses, on Feb
26, 1941, donated this lot to the Roman Catholic Church represented
by Reverend Father Raymundo Esquenet . It was surveyed for the
Roman Catholic Church on Aug. 16, 1940 as church site and the
corresponding survey plan approved on Jan. 15, 1941. Previously
erected on this Lot was an old chapel which was demolished and new
chapel now stands in its place on the same site.
 For his part, the Fiscal in a Manifestation dated July 22, 1980, said 'the State
will not adduce evidence in support of its opposition and will submit the instant
case for decision.
 Evaluating the applicant's submitted proofs, the court a quo concluded, on the
basis of acquisitive prescription at the very least, that the former had
adequately shown title to the parcels of land being claimed. Since the
acquisition of these four (4) lots by the applicant, it has been in continuous
possession and enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together with its
predecessors-in interest, have been open, public, continuous, peaceful, adverse
against the whole world, and in the concept of owner. Accordingly, the court
ordered the registration of the four parcels together with the improvements
thereon "in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, INC., a
religious corporation sole.
 The Solicitor General filed a MR on the following grounds: 1. Article XIV,
Section 11 of the New Constitution (1973) disqualifies a private corporation
from acquiring alienable lands for the public domain, 2. the application was
filed after the effectivity on the New Constitution on Ja. 17, 1973.
 MR was denied by the lower court for lack of merit.
 Still insisting of the alleged unconstitutionality of the registration, the Republic
elevated this appeal.
 the first Civil Cases Division of the IAC affirmed the judgment a quo.
 A reconsideration of the Decision was sought by Republic of the Philippines, but
its MR was denied.
ISSUE: whether the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole
is qualified to apply for confirmation of its title to the 4 parcels of land - yes
HELD:
 The parties herein do not dispute that since the acquisition of the four (4) lots
by the applicant, it has been in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof,
and such possession, together with its predecessors-in-interest, covering a
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
period of more than 52 years (at least from the date of survey in 1928) with
respect to lots 1 and 2, about 62 years with respect to lot 3, all of plan PSU-
65686; and more than 39 years with respect to the fourth parcel described in
plan PSU-11 2592 (at least from the date of the survey in 1940) have been
open, public, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world, and in the
concept of owner.
 Being disputed before this Court is the matter of the applicability of Art. XIV
Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution to the case at bar. Petitioner argues that
considering such constitutional prohibition, private respondent is disqualified to
own and register its title to the lots in question. Further, it argues that since
the application for registration was filed only on Feb. 2, 1979, long after the
1973 Constitution took effect, the application for registration and confirmation
of title is ineffectual because at the time it was filed, private corporation had
been declared ineligible to acquire alienable lands of the public domain
pursuant to Art. XIV, Sec. 11.
 The question has been settled in the case of DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court , this Court stated that a determination of the
character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings
must be made. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be
answered in the negative.
 If they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporation or association obviously does not apply. this
Court developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and w/o the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. (DIR OF LANDS vs. IAC).
 Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the state than the dictim of
the statute itself; that the possessor "... shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissable to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time, and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not ORIGINALLY convert the land from public to private
land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was
so well put in Carino, "... There are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
44 of 68
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law. (DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC).
 The open, continuous and exclusive possession of the four lots by private
respondent can clearly be gleaned from the following facts on record: Lot 1 and
portion of Lot 2 was acquired by purchase in 1928 and 1929, respectively. The
remaining portion of lots 2 and 3 was already owned and possessed by private
respondent even prior to the survey of said lots in 1928. In fact, records of
burial of the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon showed that as
early as 1919, Lot 3 has already been utilized by the Roman Catholic Church as
its cemetery. That at present, said three lots are utilized as the Roman Catholic
Church of Candelaria, Quezon. That said lots are declared for taxation purposes
in the name of the Roman Catholic Church. The fourth parcel of land was
acquired by donation in 1941 and same lot is utilized as church site.
 It must be emphasized that the Court is not here saying that a corporation sole
should be treated like an ordinary private corporation. There is no doubt that a
corporation sole by the nature of its Incorporation is vested with the right to
purchase and hold real estate and personal property. It need not therefore be
treated as an ordinary private corporation because whether or not it be so
treated as such, the Constitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not
applicable.
 In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court
in Director of Lands vs. IAC, the lands subject of this petition were already
private property at the time the application for confirmation of title was filed in
1979. There is therefore no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
appellate court.
Register of Deeds v RTC - Perez
Zuniga v Vicencio - Santos
Ortigas v Velasco - Sarcaoga
Alabang Development Corporation vs Hon. Manuel Valenzuela, Pascual
et.al. - Siang
Teehankee, J.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
Facts:
 A reconstitution case was filed by private respondents to reconstitute a lost
certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy which was allegedly
lost or destroyed over 30 years earlier in World War II.
 The land in question is in Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, now Barrio
Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal.The title sought to be reconstituted overlap the
parcels of land owned by petitioners.
 Petitioners in this case are registered owners of the tracts of land in
litigation as evidenced by certain Transfer Certificates of Title.
o The said parcels of land surrounded by a high perimeter wall on
their boundaries were sold to innocent purchasers in good faith
for valuable consideration.
o These innocent purchasers for value have been in open, actual,
adverse, continuous, notorious and uninterrupted possession of
their respective lands.
 The petitioner for reconstitution of title was granted by the CFI. Petitioners
filed this petition of certiorari alleging that:
o petitioners being actual possessors and registered owners were
not served with notice of the hearing of the petition for
reconstitution in violation of Republic Act 26 such that the court a
quo acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Issue: W/N the lower court had jurisdiction to act on the petition for reconstitution.
NO.
Section 12 and 13 of Republic Act 26 entitled "An Act Providing a Special Procedure
for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Titles Lost or Destroyed," provides
requisites in the petition and the notice to affected parties.
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources
enumerated in section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(e),
and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court
of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or
any person having an interest in the property. The petition
45 of 68
shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a)
that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been
lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's, mortgagee's or
lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been
issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the
location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the
nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if
any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the
names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or
improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the
owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who
may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed
description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the
property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other
instruments affecting the property have been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has
not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or
authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence
in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached
thereto and filed with the same; Provided, That in case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources
enumerated in section 2 (f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition
shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical
description of the property duly approved by the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy
of the description taken from a prior certificate of title
covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed
under the preceding section, to be published, at the
expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of
the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the
provincial building and of the municipal building at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall
likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered
mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
person named therein whose address is known, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall
state, among other things, the number of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the
registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining
properties and all other interested parties, the location, area
and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all
persons having any interest therein must appear and file
their claim or objections to the petition.ït¢@lFº The
petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the
publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by
the court.
Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court notes that
some essential data required in section 12 and section 13 of Republic Act 26 have
been omitted: the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, which
do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the
owners of such buildings or improvements, and the names and addresses of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining
properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property.
Neither do these data appear in the Notice of Hearing such that no adjoining owner,
occupant or possessor was ever served a copy thereof by registered mail or
otherwise. As mentioned in the case of Director of Lands vs CA:
said defects have not invested the Court with the authority
or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner
or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the
statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed,
thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void. We
hold that the mere Notice that 'all interested parties are
hereby cited to appear and show cause if any they have
why said petition should not be granted' is not sufficient for
the law must be interpreted strictly
The lower court’s decision suffers from jurisdictional infirmity, fatal to the petition
for reconstitution since said petition and the notice thereof lacked essential data
mandatorily required by the law, and, just as importantly, the decision was invalidly
46 of 68
issued without actual and personal notice having been served upon possessors,
actual occupants and adjoining owners of the property involved who are
indispensable parties in interest and without whom a valid judgment cannot be
rendered.
Tahanan v Valenzuela - Tiongco
Dordas v CA – Valdez
March 21, 1997 | J. Hermosisima Jr.
FACTS: Rafael Dizon sold a lot with an area of 6,097 square meters in Maayon,
Capiz, to a Contreras, who sold it to private respondents, who, since 1957, have
been in actual possession of the lot and have been paying real property taxes
thereon.
The heirs of Dizon and Federico Dordas filed a petition for reconstitution of the lot
under RA 26, which the court granted after petitioners submitted only the tracing
cloth and the blueprint plan, documents not recognized by RA 26. Dordas also failed
to serve notice of the reconstitution proceedings on private respondents who were
actual possessors of the lot.
Private respondents filed a petition for reconveyance but the trial court dismissed
the action on the ground that prescription had set in, since the Borreses filed the
action on March 27, 1962.
Complaint filed: Petition for judicial reconstitution (petitioners); petition for
reconveyance (private respondents)
RTC's ruling with ratio: DISMISSED the petition for reconveyance filed by the
private respondents.
1. The document ceding title to the Contrerases was a pacto de retro, which
was not registered within the reglementary period provided by Act No.
496, which provided that title to the property cannot pass if the deed of
conveyance was not registered, said registration being the operative act
conveying and affecting the land.
2. After the expiration of the four-year repurchase period, Act 190 applies.
The cause of action accrued in February 9, 1931.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
3. The applicable law is the law applicable prior to the passage of the New
Civil Code. Sec. 40 of Act 190 provides that the action (based on fraud or
on implied or constructive trusts) prescribes in 10 years. Action was filed
more than 30 years, so cause of action has prescribed.
CA's ruling with ratio: REVERSED the RTC decision; reconstituted title was null
and void
1. Cause of action did not accrue on February 9, 1931 or after the expiration
of the period of repurchase in the Deed of Sale. The pacto de retro period
is the personal prerogative of Rafael Dizon and is not applicable to the
Borreses who acquired the lot from Contreras.
Petitioner's argument: The reconstituted title was null and void because it was
issued out of illegal reconstitution proceedings.
Respondent's argument: Reconstitution was done in accordance with the law.
SC's ruling with ratio: Reconstituted title NULL and VOID
1. Sec. 3 of RA 26 provides specific sources where reconstituted titles may be
sourced from. Among these are:
a. Owner’s duplicate of the OCT
b. Co-owner’s, mortagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate certificate of title
c. Certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
RD or a legal custodian thereof
d. Deed of transfer or other document on file in the RD, containing a
description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof,
showing original had been registered, and pursuant to which the
lost or destroyed title was issued
e. A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the
property, the description of which is given in said documents, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of
said document showing that its original had been registered
f. Any other documents which, in the judgment of the court, is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost destroyed
certificate of title
2. The law mandates using the phrase "in the following order" and the
enumerated items become the only sources whereby a title may be
reconstituted. Petitioners submitted none of the abovementioned
documents.
3. The two (2) pieces of documents plan and technical description, are mere
additional requirements of the law in case reconstitution is to be made
from sources in Section 2F or 3F of the act, that is, any other document,
which in the judgment of the court is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title (Sec. 12. RA 26). In
themselves, such plan and technical description of the lot are not
47 of 68
recognized sources for reconstitution of title under Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 26.
4. With regards to notices, Republic Act No. 26 requires that the petition be
posted on the entrance of the provincial building and/or the municipal
building of the municipality in which the land is situated, at least thirty (30)
days prior to the date of hearing.
a. Notices were posted at the municipal hall of Ponteverde, Capiz
when the property is already part of and located at the
Municipality of Maayon, Capiz; and the certificate of posting was
issued by the Chief of Police of Ponteverde, Capiz when it should
have been the Chief of Police of Maayon, Capiz.
5. The law also proscribes that copy of the notice sent by registered mail or
otherwise at the expense of the petitioner which notice must state, among
other things, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property.
a. A lame excuse given by Dordas in his amended answer in the
case was he did not know that Diosdado Borres has a house on
the lot because he was a full-time employee of Pila, Pres. Roxas,
Capiz, or that, he had not in any way participated in the wrong
posting of notices of the reconstitution proceedings prove the
nullity, illegality and questionable character of the reconstitution
proceedings. It established his bad faith in filing the reconstitution
proceedings.
6. If prescription must commence to run then it must be counted, at the very
least, from the issuance of the order of reconstitution
a. Case was filed barely a year from the order granting the
reconstitution.
Metropolitan v Sison – Abdon
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Sison
GR No. L-40309 / 31 Aug 1983 / J. Escolin
FACTS:
In February 1970, the heirs of Don Mariano de San Pedro, Domingo Cecilia and
Urban Agro Products Inc. (respondents) filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for
reconstitution of the TCTs covering Lot Nos 946, 947 and 948 of the Tala Estate,
Caloocan City, which were allegedly lost during WWII.
The judge issued an order setting the petition for hearing and directed the
publication of the order in the Manila Daily Bulletin, a newspaper of general
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
circulation in the City of Manila and the Province of Rizal once a week for 3
consecutive weeks, with copies of the order posted in the municipal building of
Caloocan and the Rizal provincial capitol in Pasig. The order was then duly
published. The special counsel in the OSG appeared for the Director of Lands, but
then filed a written manifestation that the DoL had no opposition to the petition.
Hence, the TC granted the petition for reconstitution in April 1970. Pursuant to said
order, the RD of Caloocan issued on March 1971 TCTs covering the said lots in the
names of those parties.
In 1973 Isabela Cultural Corp (formerly known as the Mission de la Compania de
Jesus en Filipinas) filed a motion to set aside the order, alleging that it was void for
lack of jurisdiction. Isabela said that since the order setting the petition for hearing
was published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and not in the Official Gazette, as
prescribed under Sec. 13 of RA 26, the order granting the petition for reconstitution
was a patent nullity. Also, the order was issued without actual and personal notice
upon Isabela, the actual possessor and registered owner of the said lots,
evidenced by TCTs.
MWSS filed a motion for intervention on the same case, also arguing for the
invalidity of the 1970 order of reconstitution, based on the same argument.
TC decided in favor of Isabela and MWSS and set aside the 1970 order. As
respondent heirs filed for reconsideration, they were joined by other private
respondents who claim to have legal interest as the purchasers for value and
holders of TCTs derived from the reconstituted titles.
TC reversed itself twice again, finally deciding in favor of respondent heirs and the
last intervenors, holding that the TCTs were valid and the 1970 order was also
valid.
ISSUE / HELD:
W/N the 1970 order and the TCTs issued pursuant to it is valid. NO.
RATIO:
The TC lacked jurisdiction when the order setting the case for hearing was not
published in the Official Gazette. Under Sec. 13 of RA 26, publication of the notice
of hearing in proceedings or judicial reconstitution of lost certificates of title should
be made in the OG. It does not provide for any alternative medium or manner of
publication.
Sec. 1 of RA 4569, which respondents raise, is inapplicable. Sec. 1 of RA 4659
provides that judicial notices are to be published in a newspaper of general
circulation, but this only applies to judicial notices.
48 of 68
The publication of the petition in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, the
service of the notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the
land, as well as the posting of the notices in the main entrances of the provincial
and municipal buildings where the property lies at least 30 days prior to the date of
the hearing, as prescribed by Section 13 of the law, are mandatory and
jurisdictional requisites.
Other note: the Court cited a case that basically said that courts must exercise the
greatest caution in entertaining petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost
certificates of title, particularly when filed after a delay of more than two decades.
Republic v Marasigan - Abdullah
Republic v CA - Buenaventura
Allama v Republic – Domingo
Facts:
- This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Sulu ordering
the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-784, registered in the
names of Adjap Allama and Hativ Sali Mahaddi.
- On March 20, 1980, they filed a verified petition for judicial reconstitution of their
transfer certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26. They alleged that both the
original and duplicate copies of Certificate of Title No. 784 were burned when the
town of Jolo was attacked by rebels on February 7, 1974.
- On the same date, the trial court set the hearing of the petition on June 27,
1980.
- The notice of hearing was published in the Official Gazette (Exhibit D). Copies of
the notice of hearing were also posted by the Deputy Sheriff of Jolo in four
conspicuous places in Jolo (Exhibit C). Copies of the said notice were also served
on the Provincial Fiscal of Jolo on April 1, 1980 (Exhibit C). On April 2, 1980,
copies of the notice were sent by registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor
General, to the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission, and to the
Director of Lands (Exhibit C.).
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
- On October 24, 1980, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Provincial
Fiscal of Sulu, opposed the petition on the ground that it was not in accordance
with the requirements prescribed by law and prayed for its dismissal.
- On September 29, 1980, the court below granted the petition for reconstitution.
- On November 11, 1981, the Republic of the Philippines filed a notice of appeal.
- The appellant contends that the lower court did not acquire authority to hear,
determine and decide the reconstitution case because the specific requirements
and mode of procedures provided in Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26 were not
complied with. The appellant contends that these requirements are mandatory
and jurisdictional, and must, therefore, be strictly complied with.
Issue:
- Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over this case.
Held:
- No. In the instant case, the trial court, after issuing an order setting the petition
for hearing, issued the mandatory notice of hearing.
- However, the notice of hearing failed to state: (a) the name of Adjap Allama, the
other registered owner; (b) the names of the occupants or persons in possession
of the property; (c) the owner of the adjoining properties and all other interested
parties; and (d) the location, area and boundaries of the property.
- The non-compliance with these requirements provided for under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 26 as regards the notice of hearing is fatal and the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution.
- In view of this defective notice of hearing, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case, as well as lacked authority over the whole case and
all its aspects. All the proceedings held by the court including its order granting
the petition for reconstitution are, therefore, considered null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
Republic v CA – Fullecido
49 of 68
New Durawood v CA – Hernandez
FACTS:
On February 14, 1990, a Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Lost Owners
Duplicate Certificates of TCT Nos. 140486; 156454 and 140485 was filed in the RTC
Antipolo, Rizal by New Durawood Co. represented by its Branch Manager, Wilson M.
Gaw.
Attached to said petition was an Affidavit of Loss of respondent Orlando S. Bongat,
one of the stockholders of petitioner-corporation.
RTC declared the said alleged lost TCTs null and void and of no further force and
effect, and in lieu thereof ordered and directed that new copy of the said titles be
issued. (CA would later on affirm RTC.)
Sometime in May, 1991, New Durawood Co. discovered that the original TCT Nos.
N-140485, N-140486 and 156454 on file with the Register of Deeds of Rizal had
been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and 200102 had
been issued in the name of respondent Durawood Construction and Lumber Supply,
Inc.
Surprised by this cancellation, petitioner - after investigation - found out about the
reconstitution proceeding in the respondent trial court.
So, on July 17, 1991, petitioner filed suit in the CA praying for the annulment of the
assailed order. It also prayed for the cancellation of the new certificates (TCT Nos.
200100, 200101 and 200102).
CA affirmed RTC and dismissed the petition of New Durawood Co.
Arguments of petitioner New Durawood:
1. A reconstitution proceeding is one in rem and thus jurisdiction can be
acquired only through publication and notice sent pursuant to Section 13,
Republic Act No. 26. (apparently this was not done)
2. Fraud is manifest (1) from the insufficient allegations of the petition filed
before the trial court, as it (the petition) does not mention the names of
adjoining land owners and interested persons, as well as (2) from the
affidavit of loss attached to the petition.
3. (In its Reply) IMPORTANT! The owners’ duplicate copies of the
TCTs were all along in the custody of Dy Quim Pong, whom
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
private respondents should have sued to compel him to surrender
the same in order that the alleged deed of sale in favor of private
respondent could be registered.
4. (In its Reply) Respondent Wilson Gaw had no authority to institute the
petition for reconstitution in the trial court because the board resolution
(authorizing Gaw) was passed without the required quorum.
Arguments of respondents:
1. The certificates of title were lost.
2. The applicable law is Section 109 of R.A. No. 496, as amended by P.D.
1529, and not Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26, and that fraud, in order to serve as
basis for the annulment of a judgment must be extrinsic or collateral in
character, which is not the case in the action before the court a quo.
ISSUE 1: Which law is applicable
HELD: Section 109 of P.D. 1529
Section 109 of P.D. 15291 is the law applicable in petitions for issuance of
new owners duplicate certificates of title which are lost or stolen or destroyed.
1 to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds, and not a petition for
Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. - In case of loss or theft of an
owners duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in
his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft
is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying
for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of
the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and
registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after
notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a
memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects
be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for
all purposes of this decree.
50 of 68
On the other hand, R.A. 262 (An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the
Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title Lost or Destroyed) applies only in
cases of reconstitution of lost or destroyed original certificates on file with the
Register of Deeds.
ISSUE 2 (Topical): Whether or not RTC Antipolo had jurisdiction to order the
issuance of new title certificates
HELD: No. It has no jurisdiction. The newly issued duplicates are null and void
RATIO:
1.The owners duplicate certificates of title were in the possession of Dy Quim Pong,
the petitioner’s chairman of the board and whose family controls the petitioner-
corporation. Since said certificates were not in fact lost or destroyed, there was no
necessity for the petition filed in the trial court for the Issuance of New Owners
Duplicate Certificates of Title.
2. Therefore, RTC Antipolo never acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of new
certificates. Hence, the newly issued duplicates are themselves null and void.
3. Section 109 of said law provides, inter alia, that due notice under oath of the loss
or theft of the owners duplicate shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his
behalf to the Register of Deeds. In this case, while an affidavit of loss was attached
to the petition in the lower court, no such notice was sent to the Register of Deeds.
4. In case of the refusal or failure of the holder - in this case, the petitioner - to
surrender the owners duplicate certificate of title, the remedy is a petition in court
reconstitution.
Averia v Caguioa - Hernandez
2
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be
published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of theOfficial Gazette, and to be
posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality
or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall
likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the
petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of
title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in. possession of
the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and
boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear
and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the
publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
Dec. 29, 1986
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
 Private respondent Padillo initiated registration
proceedings in the CFI of Lucena. Petitioner refused to
participate in the hearing, claiming that the CFI had no
competence to act upon the said case under Sec. 112 of
the Land Registration Act.
 CFI held the hearing ex parte and rendered a decision
ordering the registration on the basis of the evidence
presented by Padillo.
 Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
Petitioner’s argument:
 Lower court had no competence to act on the
registration sought because of the absence of unanimity
among the parties as required under Sec. 112 of the
Land Registration Act. He cites Fojas v. Grey:
“In a long line of decisions dealing with
proceedings under Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act, it has been held that summary
relief under Section 112 of Land Registration Act
can only be granted if there is unanimity among
the parties, or there is no adverse claim or
serious objection on the part of any party in
interest; otherwise, the case becomes
contentious and controversial which should be
threshed out in an ordinary action or in any case
where the incident properly belongs.”
51 of 68
ISSUE:
WON the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a
deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent
contract to sell. NO.
RATIO:
 While what the petitioner cited was a correct
interpretation of the said provision, the same is,
however, not applicable to the instant case. The reason
is that this case arose in 1982, after the Land
Registration Act had been superseded by the Property
Registration Decree (P.D. 1529), which became
effective on June 11, 1979.
 Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided
that:
SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings;
jurisdiction of courts.-Judicial proceedings for the
registration of lands throughout the Philippines
shall be in rem and shall be based on the
generally accepted principles underlying the
Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original
registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, and over all
petitions filed after original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine a questions
arising upon such applications or petitions. The
court through its clerk of court shall furnish the
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
Land Registration Commission with two certified
copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and
decisions filed or issued in applications or
petitions for land registration, with the exception
of stenographic notes, within five days from the
filing or issuance thereof.
 The above provision has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional
trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it
by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral
court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change
has simplified registration proceedings by conferring
upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not
only on applications for "original registration" but also
"over all petitions filed after original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications or petitions."
 Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section
112 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 108 of
P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by its
former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant
relief only in cases where there was "unanimity among
the parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim
or serious objection." Under the amended law, the court
is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-
controversial cases but even this contentious and
substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which
were beyond its competence before.
 However, respondent court proceeded to hear the case
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below notwithstanding the manifestation by the
petitioner of his intention to elevate to the SC the
question of jurisdiction he had raised. The trial court
should have given him the opportunity to do so in the
interest of due process, pending a categorical ruling on
the issue. As it happened, it arrived at its decision after
considering only the evidence of the private respondent
and without regard to the evidence of the petitioner.
New trial ordered.
Ligon v CA – Mambuay
 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with RTC QC a complaint for
specific performance with damages against the Islamic Directorate of the
Philippines (IDP)
 Respondent INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an Absolute Deed
of Sale dated 20 April 1989 IDP sold to it 2 parcels of land located at
Tandang Sora, QC both of which IDP is the registered owner. Stipulated
that IDP shall undertake to evict all illegal occupants within 45 days from
the execution but IDP failed to do so. INK prayed that the trial court order
IDP to comply with its obligation and to pay damages.
 IDP: it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the payment of the
purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and
revoked.
 INK filed a motion for partial summary judgment
 RTC rendered an amended partial judgment granting the reliefs prayed for
by INK except damages.
 INK filed a motion praying that petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in
possession of the certificates of title as mortgagee of IDP, be directed to
surrender the certificates to the QC Register of Deeds (QC RD) for the
registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
 Petitioner Ligon opposed: IDP was not served copy of the motion, and
ownership of INK was still in issue since rescission was sought by the IDP
as a counterclaim. Later, she filed a Supplemental Opposition questioning
RTC jurisdiction because the motion involved the registrability of the
document of sale, and she was not made a party to the main case.
 RTC granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner to surrender to INK
the owner's copy in open court for the registration of Deed in the latter's
name and the annotation of the mortgage on the new TCTs to be issued to
INK.
o On motion of petitioner, RTC reconsidered by directing her to
deliver the certificates to the QC RD.
 Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with CA; CA affirmed RTC
Issue: WoN RTC/CA order for petitioner to surrender owner’s copy is erroneous
(NO) CA affirmed!
Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered
by the Register of Deeds unless the owner's duplicate certificate is
presented together with such instrument, except in some cases or upon order
of the court for cause shown. In case the person in possession of the duplicate
certificates refuses or fails to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a
voluntary document may be registered and a new certificate issued, as clearly
provided in Sec. 107, of PD 1529, the “ court may order the annulment of the same
as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. ”
Under Sec. 2 of PD 1529, it is now provided that " CFI (now RTCs) shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of titles to lands,
including improvements and interest therein and over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon
such applications or petitions." This has eliminated the distinction between the
Complaint filed:
- Babasanta: Specific performance with damages. SLDC intervened alleging it
has better rights.
SLDC’s arguments:
- It was never a buyer in good faith.
53 of 68
general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court, aimed
at avoiding multiplicity of suits.
The principal action filed by INK was for specific performance with damages which
was well within the exclusive jurisdictions of the RTC. When IDP, the defendant in
the trial court, did not question the genuineness and validity of said deed, the
summary judgment was also an exercise of its general jurisdiction.
Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the same court to
compel the holder of the duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same, the
motion was a necessary incident to the main case. Since RTCs are courts of
general jurisdiction, they may therefore take cognizance of this case.
Even while Sec. 107 of PD 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by one who
wants to compel another to surrender the certificates of title to the Register of
Deeds, this does not preclude a party to a pending case to include as
incident therein the relief stated under Sec. 107, especially if the subject
certificates of title to be surrendered are intimately connected with the subject
matter of the principal action.
The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of petitioner
appears in the certificates of title. Hence, the order of the trial court directing
the surrender of the certificates to the Register of Deeds in order that the
deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered, cannot in any way prejudice her
rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any lien annotated on the
previous certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated in or carried over
to the new transfer certificates of title. Mortgage until discharged follows the
property.
San Lorenzo v CA – Manalo
- It immediately exercised ownership over the lands.
Babasanta’s arguments:
- Sale to SLDC invalid as the land was already conveyed to him.
- SLDC buyer in bad faith because of annotation of lis pendens prior to
SLDC’s registration
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
RTC's ruling with ratio:
- In favor of SLDC. Double sale. SLDC was the first to acquire possession
- CA's ruling with ratio:
- In favor of Babasanta. SLDC a buyer in bad faith. Contract between
Babasanta and Lu is valid and subsisting.
SC's ruling with ratio:
- In favor of SLDC
Facts:
On 20 August 1986, Spouses Lu purportedly sold two parcels of land collectively
measuring 15,808 sqm to respondent Babasanta for the price of P15 per square
meter. Babasanta made a downpayment of P50,000.00 as evidenced by a
memorandum receipt issued by Pacita Lu of the same date. Several other payments
totaling P200,000.00 were made by Babasanta
Sometime in May 1989, Babasanta wrote a letter to Pacita Lu to demand the
execution of a final deed of sale in his favor so that he could effect full payment of
the purchase price. In the same letter, Babasanta notified the spouses about having
received information that the spouses sold the same property to another without his
knowledge and consent. He demanded that the second sale be cancelled and that a
final deed of sale be issued in his favor.
In response, Pacita Lu wrote a letter to Babasanta wherein she acknowledged
having agreed to sell the property to him at P15.00 per square meter. She,
however, reminded Babasanta that when the balance of the purchase price became
due, he requested for a reduction of the price and when she refused, Babasanta
backed out of the sale. Pacita added that she returned the sum of P50,000.00 to
Babasanta through Eugenio Oya.
On 2 June 1989, respondent Babasanta, as plaintiff, filed before the RTC,a
Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against the Spouses Lu.
Babasanta alleged that the lands had been sold to him by the spouses at P15.00
per square meter. Despite his repeated demands for the execution of a final deed of
sale in his favor, the Spouses Lu allegedly refused.
In their Answer, the Spouses Lu alleged that Pacita Lu obtained loans from
Babasanta and when the total advances of Pacita reached P50,000.00, the latter
and Babasanta, without the knowledge and consent of Miguel Lu, had verbally
agreed to transform the transaction into a contract to sell the two parcels of land to
54 of 68
- Not a double sale
- Babasanta: Contract to sell. Although not specified, it can be gleaned from
subsequent acts that title will only transfer upon payment of full purchase
price.
- SLDC: Contract of sale. Better right. No double sale, although it still has better
right under rules on double sale as it is a buyer in good faith who first took
possession of the land.
Babasanta with the P50,000.00 to be considered as the downpayment for the
property and the balance to be paid on or before 31 December 1987. Respondents
Lu added that as of November 1987, total payments made by Babasanta amounted
to only P200,000.00 and the latter allegedly failed to pay the balance of
P260,000.00 despite repeated demands. Babasanta had purportedly asked Pacita
for a reduction of the price from P15.00 to twelve pesos P12.00 per square meter
and when the Spouses Lu refused to grant Babasanta’s request, the latter rescinded
the contract to sell and declared that the original loan transaction just be carried
out in that the spouses would be indebted to him in the amount of P200,000.00.
Accordingly, on 6 July 1989, they purchased Interbank Manager’s Check No.
05020269 in the amount of P200,000.00 in the name of Babasanta to show that she
was able and willing to pay the balance of her loan obligation.
Babasanta later filed an Amended Complaint dated 17 January 19903 wherein he
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with temporary
restraining order and the inclusion of the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna as
party defendant. He contended that the issuance of a preliminary injunction was
necessary to restrain the transfer or conveyance by the Spouses Lu of the subject
property to other persons.
The Spouses Lu filed their Opposition to the amended complaint contending that it
raised new matters which seriously affect their substantive rights under the original
complaint. However, the trial court in its Order dated 17 January 19905 admitted
the amended complaint.
On 19 January 1990, herein petitioner San Lorenzo Development Corporation
(SLDC) filed a Motion for Intervention before the trial court. SLDC alleged that it
had legal interest in the subject matter under litigation because on 3 May 1989, the
two parcels of land involved had been sold to it in a Deed of Absolute Sale with
Mortgage. It alleged that it was a buyer in good faith and for value and therefore it
had a better right over the property in litigation.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
In his Opposition to SLDC’s motion for intervention, respondent Babasanta
demurred and argued that the latter had no legal interest in the case because the
two parcels of land involved herein had already been conveyed to him by the
Spouses Lu and hence, the vendors were without legal capacity to transfer or
dispose of the two parcels of land to the intervenor.
Meanwhile, the trial court allowed SLDC to intervene. SLDC filed its Complaint-in-
Intervention on 19 April 1990. Respondent Babasanta’s motion for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction was likewise granted by the trial court.
SLDC in its Complaint-in-Intervention alleged that on 11 February 1989, the
Spouses Lu executed in its favor an Option to Buy the lots subject of the complaint.
Accordingly, it paid an option money in the amount of P316,160.00 out of the total
consideration for the purchase of the two lots of P1,264,640.00. After the Spouses
Lu received a total amount of P632,320.00 they executed on 3 May 1989 a Deed of
Absolute Sale with Mortgage in its favor. SLDC added that the certificates of title
over the property were delivered to it by the spouses clean and free from any
adverse claims and/or notice of lis pendens. SLDC further alleged that it only
learned of the filing of the complaint sometime in the early part of January 1990
which prompted it to file the motion to intervene without delay. Claiming that it was
a buyer in good faith, SLDC argued that it had no obligation to look beyond the
titles submitted to it by the Spouses Lu particularly because Babasanta’s claims
were not annotated on the certificates of title at the time the lands were sold to it.
The RTC ruled in favor of SLDC holding that since both Babasanta and SLDC did not
register the respective sales in their favor, ownership of the property should pertain
to the buyer who first acquired possession of the property, applying NCC 1544
(double sale). The trial court equated the execution of a public instrument in favor
of SLDC as sufficient delivery of the property to the latter. It concluded that
symbolic possession could be considered to have been first transferred to SLDC and
consequently ownership of the property pertained to SLDC who purchased the
property in good faith.
The CA set aside the RTC decision holding that the sale between the Spouses Lu
and Babasanta as valid and subsisting. It also held SLDC a buyer in bad faith and
the Absolute Sale with Mortgage between Spouses Lu and SLDC as null and void
SLDC contended that the appellate court erred in concluding that it had prior notice
of Babasanta’s claim over the property merely on the basis of its having advanced
55 of 68
the amount of P200,000.00 to Pacita Lu upon the latter’s representation that she
needed the money to pay her obligation to Babasanta. It argued that it had no
reason to suspect that Pacita was not telling the truth that the money would be
used to pay her indebtedness to Babasanta. At any rate, SLDC averred that the
amount of P200,000.00 which it advanced to Pacita Lu would be deducted from the
balance of the purchase price still due from it and should not be construed as notice
of the prior sale of the land to Babasanta. It added that at no instance did Pacita Lu
inform it that the lands had been previously sold to Babasanta.
Moreover, SLDC stressed that after the execution of the sale in its favor it
immediately took possession of the property and asserted its rights as new owner
as opposed to Babasanta who has never exercised acts of ownership. Since the
titles bore no adverse claim, encumbrance, or lien at the time it was sold to it, SLDC
argued that it had every reason to rely on the correctness of the certificate of title
and it was not obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property. Invoking the presumption of good faith, it added that the burden rests on
Babasanta to prove that it was aware of the prior sale to him but the latter failed to
do so. SLDC pointed out that the notice of lis pendens was annotated only on 2
June 1989 long after the sale of the property to it was consummated on 3 May
1989.
On the other hand, respondent Babasanta argued that SLDC could not have
acquired ownership of the property because it failed to comply with the requirement
of registration of the sale in good faith. He emphasized that at the time SLDC
registered the sale in its favor on 30 June 1990, there was already a notice of lis
pendens annotated on the titles of the property made as early as 2 June 1989.
Hence, petitioner’s registration of the sale did not confer upon it any right.
Babasanta further asserted that petitioner’s bad faith in the acquisition of the
property is evident from the fact that it failed to make necessary inquiry regarding
the purpose of the issuance of the P200,000.00 manager’s check in his favor.
To prove the perfection of the contract of sale in his favor, Babasanta presented a
document signed by Pacita Lu acknowledging receipt of the sum of P50,000.0 as
partial payment for 3.6 hectares of farm lot. While the receipt signed by Pacita did
not mention the price for which the property was being sold, this deficiency was
supplied by Pacita Lu’s letter dated 29 May 1989 wherein she admitted that she
agreed to sell the 3.6 hectares of land to Babasanta for P15.00 per square meter.
Issue: Who between SLDC and Babasanta is entitled to the lands in question? SLDC
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
Ratio:
Basically, SLDC has better right because the contract between
itself and the spouses is a contract of sale. The contract between
Babasanta and the Spouses Lu is only a contract to sell.
The contract with Babasanta could not have produced the effect
of a valid sale (no delivery) because:
a. No constructive delivery may be had because it was not in a
public instrument
b. Babasanta did not take possession or exercise other acts of
dominion
SLDC paid purchase price and immediately took possession of the
land. Inasmuch as it registered the land after the annotation of lis
pendens, it is still a purchaser in good faith because at the time
the sale was executed, he had no knowledge of such claims. The
SC, however, held that rules on double sale do not apply as there
was only 1 sale in this case.
Relevant to syllabus topic, registration must be done in good
faith. That is the registrant must have no knowledge of the defect
or lack of title of his vendor or must not have been aware of facts
which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as
might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of
his vendor. Sec 52 on constructive notice does not apply to the
case because the reckoning point is the date of annotation –
which as applied in the case was done long after the sale with
SLDC was consummated.
An analysis of the facts obtaining in this case, as well as the evidence presented by
the parties, irresistibly leads to the conclusion that the agreement between
Babasanta and the Spouses Lu is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale.
The receipt signed by Pacita Lu merely states that she accepted the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) from Babasanta as partial payment of 3.6 hectares of
farm lot. While there is no stipulation that the seller reserves the ownership of the
property until full payment of the price which is a distinguishing feature of a
contract to sell, the subsequent acts of the parties convince us that the Spouses Lu
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never intended to transfer ownership to Babasanta except upon full payment of the
purchase price.
Babasanta’s letter dated 22 May 1989 was quite telling. He stated therein that
despite his repeated requests for the execution of the final deed of sale in his favor
so that he could effect full payment of the price, Pacita Lu allegedly refused to do
so. In effect, Babasanta himself recognized that ownership of the property would
not be transferred to him until such time as he shall have effected full payment of
the price. Doubtlessly, the receipt signed by Pacita Lu should legally be considered
as a perfected contract to sell.
The perfected contract to sell imposed upon Babasanta the obligation to pay the
balance of the purchase price. There being an obligation to pay the price,
Babasanta should have made the proper tender of payment and consignation of the
price in court as required by law. Glaringly absent from the records is any
indication that Babasanta even attempted to make the proper consignation of the
amounts due, thus, the obligation on the part of the sellers to convey title never
acquired obligatory force.
DISCUSSION ON DOUBLE SALE
Admittedly, SLDC registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds after it had
acquired knowledge of Babasanta’s claim. Babasanta, however, strongly argues that
the registration of the sale by SLDC was not sufficient to confer upon the latter any
title to the property since the registration was attended by bad faith. Specifically, he
points out that at the time SLDC registered the sale on 30 June 1990, there was
already a notice of lis pendens on the file with the Register of Deeds, the same
having been filed one year before on 2 June 1989.
The registration of the sale after the annotation of the notice of lis pendens did not
obliterate the effects of delivery and possession in good faith which admittedly had
occurred prior to SLDC’s knowledge of the transaction in favor of Babasanta?
It must be stressed that as early as 11 February 1989, the Spouses Lu executed the
Option to Buy in favor of SLDC upon receiving P316,160.00 as option money from
SLDC. After SLDC had paid more than one half of the agreed purchase price of
P1,264,640.00, the Spouses Lu subsequently executed on 3 May 1989 a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor or SLDC. At the time both deeds were executed, SLDC had no
knowledge of the prior transaction of the Spouses Lu with Babasanta. Simply
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
stated, from the time of execution of the first deed up to the moment of transfer
and delivery of possession of the lands to SLDC, it had acted in good faith and the
subsequent annotation of lis pendens has no effect at all on the consummated sale
between SLDC and the Spouses Lu.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and
fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of some other person in the property.
In assailing knowledge of the transaction between him and the Spouses Lu,
Babasanta apparently relies on the principle of constructive notice incorporated in
Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) which reads, thus:
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. – Every conveyance, mortgage,
lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered
land shall, if registered, filed, or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for
the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to
all persons from the time of such registering, filing, or entering.
Double Sales
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. (1473)
57 of 68
However, the constructive notice operates as such by the express wording of
Section 52 from the time of the registration of the notice of lis pendens which in
this case was effected only on 2 June 1989, at which time the sale in favor of SLDC
had long been consummated insofar as the obligation of the Spouses Lu to transfer
ownership over the property to SLDC is concerned.
The law speaks not only of one criterion. The first criterion is priority of entry in the
registry of property; there being no priority of such entry, the second is priority of
possession; and, in the absence of the two priorities, the third priority is of the date
of title, with good faith as the common critical element. Since SLDC acquired
possession of the property in good faith in contrast to Babasanta, who neither
registered nor possessed the property at any time, SLDC’s right is definitely superior
to that of Babasanta’s.
There was no double sale in this case because the contract in favor of Babasanta
was a mere contract to sell; hence, Art. 1544 is not applicable. There was neither
actual nor constructive delivery as his title is based on a mere receipt. Based on this
alone, the right of SLDC must be preferred.
Rules on Double Sale (taken from a UP reviewer [in case he asks]). Again, these
rules were not applied in this case because there was only 1 sale.
If the same thing should have been sold by the owner to different buyers, the
question as to who of the latter acquired ownership depends on the nature of the
thing sold.
a) General Rule – Prior tempore, prior jure3
3
CARBONELL V CA: Jose Poncio sold his lot to Carbonell on 27 Jan 1955 and 4 days later sold the same
property to Infante. A formal deed of sale was executed in favor of Infante. Carbonell, upon seeing Infante building a wall
around the lot, registered an adverse claim on the property. The deed of sale in favor of Infante was later registered and the
latter was thereafter in possession of the lot. Held: The second sale was not valid. As there in inscription, prior registration in
good faith is pre-condition to a superior title. Carbonell registered her adverse claim four days before the registration of the
property by Infante.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
b) sale of movables4
Art. 1544 (1). If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
c) sale of immovables
Art. 1544 (2). Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
 To be entitled to priority, the second buyer must not only show prior
recording of his deed but must have acted in good faith, without
knowledge of the existence of another alienation by the vendor to another
 POSSESSOR IN GOOD FAITH: one who is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it
o good faith is always presumed; burden of proof is on
person alleging bad faith
o good faith of second buyer must continue until his
contract ripens into ownership by tradition or recording
o as to Torrens title: it is enough that purchaser examines
the latest certificate of title issued in the name of his vendor and he
need not trace its origin to prior certificates of title
d) Sale by virtue of execution or attachment
1. GENERAL RULE: Article 1544 not applicable to execution sales because the
purchaser at such sales is substituted to or acquires whatever rights, title or
interests the judgment debtor may have over the property as of the time of
levy. [It is the duty of the purchaser, before bidding, to ascertain the rights of
the judgment debtor over the property.]
2. EXCEPTION: Attachment or execution cannot prejudice prior unrecorded sales
made by the judgment debtor, and is preferred only over claims contracted
subsequent to its recording
3. EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: Above rule does not apply to lands registered
under Act 496 which provides that registration of instruments shall be the
4
RIVERA V ONG: Ong Che has a better title to the property (over which he and Rivera had overlapping claims). He was a
purchaser of the articles in good faith, acquired possession by virtue of his purchase, and therefore has a better title than the
first purchaser.
58 of 68
“operative act to convey and affect the land”; hence, prior unrecorded sale
cannot prejudice execution sales if no third-party claim was presented before
the execution sale took place. [Third persons are not required to go beyond the
register and determine the condition of the property.]
e) Unregistered land
P.D. 1529, Sec. 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered lands. - No
deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting land
not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the
parties thereto, unless such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner
herein prescribed in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land lies.
(a) The Register of Deeds for each province or city shall keep a Primary Entry Book
and a Registration Book. The Primary Entry Book shall contain, among other
particulars, the entry number, the names of the parties, the nature of the
document, the date, hour and minute it was presented and received. The recording
of the deed and other instruments relating to unregistered lands shall be effected
by any of annotation on the space provided therefor in the Registration Book, after
the same shall have been entered in the Primary Entry Book.
(b) If, on the face of the instrument, it appears that it is sufficient in law, the
Register of Deeds shall forthwith record the instrument in the manner provided
herein. In case the Register of Deeds refuses its administration to record, said
official shall advise the party in interest in writing of the ground or grounds for his
refusal, and the latter may appeal the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration in accordance with the provisions of Section 117 of this Decree. It shall
be understood that any recording made under this section shall be without
prejudice to a third party with a better right.
(c) After recording on the Record Book, the Register of Deeds shall endorse among
other things, upon the original of the recorded instruments, the file number and the
date as well as the hour and minute when the document was received for recording
as shown in the Primary Entry Book, returning to the registrant or person in interest
the duplicate of the instrument, with appropriate annotation, certifying that he has
recorded the instrument after reserving one copy thereof to be furnished the
provincial or city assessor as required by existing law.
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3

(d) Tax sale, attachment and levy, notice of lis pendens, adverse claim and other 2. “Older title” means any document showing acquisition of the land in good faith,
instruments in the nature of involuntary dealings with respect to unregistered lands, like a deed of sale or a receipt for the price;
3. Public document is not included as there is delivery thru a public instrument,
if made in the form sufficient in law, shall likewise be admissible to record under
unless the contrary can be clearly inferred therefrom
this section.

(e) For the services to be rendered by the Register of Deeds under this section, he
shall collect the same amount of fees prescribed for similar services for the Pagaduan v Estanislao – Monfort
registration of deeds or instruments concerning registered lands.
Pagaduan v. Sps. Ocuma
 Registration requirement is understood to be without prejudice to third party Tinga | May 8, 2009 | In division
with a better right5
 Mere registration of sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land: Nicolas Cleto owned a parcel of land that was subject to 2 lines of dispositions.
o if the vendor was not the owner of the land FIRST: Cleto sold to Cereso, who sold to Antipolo sibilings, who sold to Pagaduan,
o if the vendor has already parted with his ownership before such sale in father of petitioners. The dispositions were not registered and did not result in the
favor of third party who had previously taken possession of the land, even issuance of new certificates of title. SECOND: After Cleto’s death, his widow sold the
though the prior sale was unrecorded same to Eugenia Reyes, which resulted in the issuance of a TCT.
 A person having a “better right” would be one who had previously acquired
ownership thereof through the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Reyes sold the northern portion to Spouses Ocuma and the southern portion to
Code: tradition as a result of sale, donation, succession and prescription 6 Pagaduan. Later, Reyes sold the entire parcel, including the southern portion, in
f) First in possession in good faith favor of the Ocumas. The TCT was cancelled and another was issued in the name
of the Ocumas, who later subdivided the land into two lots, resulting in the issuance
If neither vendee registered the sale in his favor or registration was done in bad of 2 new TCTs.
faith, the vendee who was first in possession in good faith acquired ownership of
Pagaduan’s children instituted a complaint for reconveyance of the southern portion
the land7
before the RTC, which decided in their favor. The RTC said a constructive trust was
created in their favor. Ocumas appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC
g) Oldest title decision, ruling that while the registration of the southern portion in the name of
the Ocumas had created an implied trust in favor of Pagaduan, petitioners, failed to
1. If neither of the vendees registered their deeds of sale nor acquired possession show that they had taken possession of the portion. The CA concluded that
of the land sold, the one who can present the oldest title provided there is good prescription had set in, precluding recovery.
faith, has the better right.
The Pagaduans filed this petition for review, asserting that the Civil Code provision
on double sale is controlling. They also said that since they are in possession of the
5
NAAWAN RURAL BANK V. CA: It is a well-known rule in this jurisdiction that persons dealing with registered land have southern portion, the 10-year prescriptive period for actions for reconveyance
the legal right to rely on the face of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need to inquire further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to should not apply to them.
make such inquiry.
6
HANOPOL V PILAPIL: A better right which is unrecorded and which would prevail over a recorded sale is one which was WON action has prescribed
gained independently of the sale, as title by prescription.
7
SANCHEZ V RAMOS: Delivery may be actual or constructive. Thus, if the first sale is evidenced in a public instrument,
there is delivery of the thing sold, if the contrary does not appear in the deed.
SC: CA must be reversed.
QUIMSON V ROSETE: Possession includes not only material but also symbolic possession which is acquired
through the execution of a public instrument. As the land was considered delivered by the execution of the public instrument,
the vendor remained in possession by mere tolerance of the first vendee. Hence, when the land was sold again to defendant,
An action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible
the vendor did not transmit anything to him, and the possession of the latter was a mere detainer. The first vendee acquired but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
ownership by delivery thru the execution of a public instrument.

59 of 68
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who
claim to have a better right.
Contrary to the positions of both the appellate and trial courts, no trust was created
under Article 1456 of the new Civil Code which provides that “if property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.” Simply, the property did not come from the petitioners. Moreover, Art.
1456 refers to actual or constructive fraud, which does not exist in this case. But
this lack of a trust relationship does not inure to the benefit of the respondents. A
certificate of title is indefeasible, but it merely confirms or records title already
existing and vested.
This is a case of double sale under Art. 1544 of the Civil Code, where ownerhisp of
an immovable property subject of a double sale, shall be transferred: (1) to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property;
(2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and
(3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith. The requirement is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and registration in
good faith.
There was a first sale by Reyes to Pagaduan and a second sale by Reyes to the
Ocumas. For the second buyer to invoke the Ar. 1544, it must possess good faith
from the time of the sale in its favor until the registration of the same. They failed
to meet this requirement of good faith since they had actual knowledge of the prior
sale. In the same deed of sale that Eugenia sold them the northern portion, Eugenia
also sold the southern portion. The registration of the deed of sale by the Ocumas
was ineffectual and vested upon them no preferential rights in derogation of the
rights of the petitioners.
The issuance of a TCT, to the extent that it affects the Pagaduans portion,
conferred no better right than the registration which was the source of the authority
to issue the said title. Good faith must concur with the registration. Because the
registration was in bad faith, it amounted to no registration at all. Thus, petitioners
are the rightful owners, having established that their successor-in-interest had
purchased the property from Reyes and in fact took possession. The action to
recover the immovable is not barred by prescription, as it was filed a little over 27
years after the title was registered in bad faith by the Ocumas as per Art. 1141 of
the Civil Code, which provides that real actions over immovables prescribe after 30
years.
60 of 68
NHA v Basa – Pascual
FACTS
 Spouses Augusto and Luz Basa loaned from NHA the amount of P556,827
secured by a real estate mortgage over their properties covered by TCTs Nos.
287008 and 285413, located in San Francisco del Monte, QC. Sps Basa did not
pay the loan. To collect its credit, the NHA, on Aug 9, 1990, filed a verified
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage before the Sheriffs Office
in QC.
 After notice and publication, the properties were sold at public auction where
NHA emerged as the highest bidder. On April 16, 1991, the sheriffs certificate
of sale was registered and annotated only on the owners duplicate copies of
the titles in the hands of the respondents, since the titles in the custody of the
Register of Deeds were among those burned down when a fire gutted the City
Hall of Quezon City in 1988.
 On April 16, 1992, the redemption period expired without respondents having
redeemed the properties. On April 24, 1992, NHA executed an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership over the foreclosed properties, and the same was
inscribed by the RD on the certificates of title in the hand of NHA.
 NHA filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession. The said petition
was granted by RTC.
 A Writ of Possession was issued on March 9, 1993 by the RTC, ordering Sps.
Basa to vacate the subject lots. The writ, however, remained unserved. This
compelled NHA to move for the issuance of an alias writ of possession.
 Before the RTC could resolve the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
possession, respondents spouses Basa and Eduardo Basa filed a Motion for
Leave to Intervene and Petition in Intervention (with Prayer for TRO and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction). Respondents anchored said petition on Sec.
8 of Act No. 3135 which gives the debtor/mortgagor the remedy to petition
that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession be cancelled.
Respondents averred that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject
properties was a nullity since notices were not posted and published, written
notices of foreclosure were not given to them, and notices of sale were not
tendered to the occupants of the sold properties, thereby denying them the
opportunity to ventilate their rights. Respondents likewise insisted that even
assuming arguendo that the foreclosure sale were valid, they were still entitled
to redeem the same since the one-year redemption period from the registration
of the sheriffs certificate of foreclosure sale had not yet
prescribed. Citing Bernardez v. Reyes and Bass v. De la Rama, respondents
theorized that the instrument is deemed registered only upon actual inscription
on the certificate of title in the custody of the civil registrar. Since the sheriffs
 LTD DIGESTS BATCH 3
certificate was only inscribed on the owners duplicate certificate of title, and
not on the certificate of title in the possession of the Register of Deeds, then
there was no effective registration and the 1-year redemption period had not
even begun to run. Respondents asked the RTC, among others, to declare the
foreclosure sale null and void, to allow the respondents to redeem the
mortgaged properties, and to cancel the Writ of Possession.
 NHA opposed respondents petition for intervention. It countered that the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale was conducted validly and made in accordance
with Act No. 3135 as evidenced by the publication of the Notice of
Sheriffs Sale in the Manila Times. NHA also said that respondents had been
furnished with a copy of the Notice of Sheriffs Sale as shown at the bottom
portion of said notice. NHA maintained that respondents right of redemption
had long expired on April 15, 1992 since the certificate of sale was inscribed on
their TCT Nos. 285413 and 287008 a year earlier, or on April 16, 1991. It
pointed out that the RTC had already ruled that respondent’s right of
redemption was already gone without them exercising said right. Since said
order had already attained finality, the ruling therein could no longer be
disturbed.
 RTC issued the assailed Order: 1) granting the issuance of the alias writ of
possession; 2) admitting the Petition in Intervention and treating the same as
the petition to set aside sale; and 3) granting the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in favor of respondents that ordered NHA to refrain from
disposing of the properties.
 NHA filed a MR assailing the RTCs Order insofar as it admitted respondents
motion for intervention and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. NHA argued
that respondents should have assailed the foreclosure sale during the hearing
in the petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, and not during the
hearing in the petition for the issuance of an alias writ of possession since the
petition referred to in Sec. 8 of Act No. 3135 pertains to the original petition for
the issuance of the Writ of Possession and not the Motion for the Issuance of
an Alias Writ of Possession. NHA stressed the finality of the Order Declaring
respondents right of redemption barred by prescription. Lastly, NHA asserted
that the writ of possession was issued as a matter of course upon filing of the
proper motion and thereby, the court was bereft of discretion.
 RTC denied NHA’s MR. NHA filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA.
 CA rendered a Decision in favor of the NHA. It declared null and void the
assailed orders of the RTC to the extent that the said orders admitted the
petition in intervention and granted the issuance of the preliminary injunction;
but it upheld the grant of the alias writ of possession. The CA defended its
affirmation of the RTC’s grant of the alias writ of possession in NHAs favor by
saying that it was a necessary consequence after the earlier writ was left
unserved to the party. It further explained that NHA was entitled to the writ of
possession as a matter of course after the lapse of the redemption period.
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 As to the RTCs admission of respondents petition for intervention, the CA
opined that it was improperly and erroneously made. The CA believed that the
only recourse available to a mortgagor in a foreclosure sale is to question the
validity of the sale through a petition to set aside the sale and to cancel the
writ of possession, a summary procedure provided for under Sec. 112 of the
Land Registration Act. Also the grant of the preliminary injunction by the RTC
was uncalled for as it would effectively defeat the right of NHA to possession,
the latter having been entitled by virtue of the grant of the alias writ of
possession.
 Respondents filed a MR. They alleged that since they raised the issue that their
right of redemption had not prescribed, then the issuance of a writ of
possession ceased to be summary in nature and was no longer
ministerial. Respondents then concluded that their right to redeem the
properties against NHAs right to the writ of possession must be threshed out in
a hearing of the case on its merits.
 CA in its Amended Decision, reconsidered its earlier stance. It declared that the
period of redemption had not expired as the certificate of sale had not been
registered or annotated in the original copies of the titles supposedly kept with
the RD since said titles were earlier razed by fire. Taking its cue from Bass v.
De la Rama where the Court purportedly made a ruling that entry of a
document, such as sale of real property, in the entry book is insufficient to
treat such document as registered, unless the same had been annotated on the
TCT; the CA went on to say that the entry of the certificate of sale in the
owners duplicate of the titles could not have been sufficient to register the
same since anyone who would wish to check with the RD would not see any
annotation. Entry made on the owners duplicate of the titles cannot be
considered notice that would bind the whole world. Having been deprived of
their right of redemption, the CA allowed respondents to intervene.
 NHA filed a MR which the CA denied.
ISSUE: whether or not a entry in the day book of a deed of sale, payment
of the fees, and presentation of the owners duplicate certificate of title
constitute a complete act of registration – yes
HELD:
 Jurisprudence is replete with analogous cases. Of foremost importance is DBP
v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija where the Court listed cases where
the transaction or instrument was annotated not on the original certificate but
somewhere else.
 In the recent case of Autocorp Group v. CA, the Court held that the TRO and
the preliminary injunction had already become moot and academic by the
earlier entry of the certificate of sale in the primary entry book which was
tantamount to registration, thus: petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction, to prevent the RD from registering the subject certificate of sale,
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had been rendered moot and academic by the valid entry of the
instrument in the primary entry book. Such entry is equivalent to
registration. Injunction would not lie anymore, as the act sought to be
enjoined had already become a fait accompli or an accomplished act.
 In fine, the prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once the
registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of him for purposes of entry and
annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished lies solely on the register of
deeds. The Court thus once held: Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry
alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction entered is a
voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has complied with all
that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more
remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the register of deeds.
 In the case under consideration, NHA presented the sheriffs certificate of sale
to the RD and the same was entered as Entry No. 2873 and said entry was
further annotated in the owners transfer certificate of title. A year later and
after the mortgagors did not redeem the said properties, respondents filed with
the Register of Deeds an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership after which
the same instrument was presumably entered into in the day book as the same
was annotated in the owners duplicate copy. NHA followed the procedure in
order to have its sheriffs certificate of sale annotated in the transfer certificates
of title. It was not NHAs fault that the certificate of sale was not annotated on
the transfer certificates of title which were supposed to be in the custody of the
Registrar, since the same were burned. Neither could NHA be blamed for the
fact that there were no reconstituted titles available during the time of
inscription as it had taken the necessary steps in having the same reconstituted
as early as July 15, 1988. NHA did everything within its power to assert its
right.
 Since entry of the certificate of sale was validly registered, the redemption
period accruing to respondents commenced therefrom, since the 1-year period
of redemption is reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of
sale. It must be noted that on Apr 16, 1991, the sheriffs certificate of sale was
registered and annotated only on the owners duplicate copies of the titles and
on Apr. 16, 1992, the redemption period expired, without respondents having
redeemed the properties. In fact, on Apr. 24, 1992, NHA executed an Affidavit
of Consolidation of Ownership. Clearly, respondents have lost their opportunity
to redeem the properties.
 As regards respondents allegation on the defect in the publication and notice
requirements of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, the same is unavailing. The
rule is that it is the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite who has the
burden of establishing such fact. This is so because foreclosure proceedings
have in their favor the presumption of regularity and the burden of evidence to
rebut the same is on the party who questions it. Here, except for their bare
allegations, respondents failed to present any evidence to support them. In
addition, NHA stated in its Comment to Motion for Leave of Court to
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Intervene that it had complied with the publication of the Notice of
Sheriffs Sale in the Manila Times in the its issues dated July 14, 21 and 28,
1990. NHA also said that respondents had been furnished with a copy of the
Notice of Sheriffs Sale as shown at the bottom portion of said notice. From all
these, it would tend to show that respondents aspersion of non-compliance
with the requirements of foreclosure sale is a futile attempt to salvage its
statutory right to redeem their foreclosed properties, which right had long been
lost by inaction.
 Considering that the foreclosure sale and its subsequent registration with the
Register of Deeds were done validly, there is no reason for the non-issuance of
the writ of possession. A writ of possession is an order directing the sheriff to
place a person in possession of a real or personal property, such as when a
property is extrajudicially foreclosed. Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135 provides for the
rule in the issuance of the writ of possession involving extrajudicial foreclosure
sales of real estate mortgage. This provision of law authorizes the purchaser in
a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption
period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose in the
corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property
with Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the
order for a writ of possession.
 The time-honored precept is that after the consolidation of titles in the buyers
name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes
a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is
merely a ministerial function. The writ of possession issues as a matter of
course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond. The judge issuing the writ following these express
provisions of law neither exercises his official discretion nor judgment. To
accentuate the writs ministerial character, the Court disallowed injunction to
prohibit its issuance despite a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the
foreclosure itself.
 In fine, this Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in ruling that
the annotation of NHAs sheriffs certificate of sale on the duplicate certificates
of title was not effective registration and in holding that respondents
redemption period had not expired.
The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE.
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Pacete v Asotigue - Perez
Abalos v Darapa – Santos
Vda de Gualberto v Go – Sarcaoga
CONSUELO N. VDA. DE GUALBERTO, FE GUALBERTO-CHAVEZ, AMADOR
GUALBERTO, CESAR GUALBERTO, RODOLFO GUALBERTO, LUZVIMINDA
GUALBERTO MIRANA, and VIRGINIA GUALBERTO,petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO H.
GO, RAYMUNDO J. GO, MIRIAM J. GO, MIRIAM G. SON, VICENTE J. GO, BELEN GO,
and ROSA JAVIER GO,respondents.
Suit: Conveyance, Accion Publiciana, and Quieting of title filed by
Gualbertos (result: denied by SC)
Subject land: 169.65 sqm lot in Siniloan, Laguna originally in the name of
the late Generoso Gualberto. Petitioners Gualbertos are his heirs.
The sale by Generoso and wife Consuelo (Petitioner) to Go S. Kiang and
wife Rosa
Generoso and wife (Consuelo, petitioner) Alegedly sold the lot to respondents'
father Go S. Kiang for 9,000 pesos as evidenced by a notarized deed (Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Tuluyan dated 1965). In 1973, Consuelo even axecuted an affidavit
attesting to the sale to enable the Gos to secure new taxdec in their names.
Demetria Garcia's Unlawful Detainer case (unrelated I think)
December, 1973 – a certain Demetria Garcia filed an Unlawful Detainer case against
the Gualbertos but the Gualbertos alleged that Garcia is not a real party in interest
and thus has no capacity nor cause of action against them; that the real parties in
interest of the lot and residential apartment in question are Generoso and Go S.
Kiang as shown in the TCT.
Go et al's Forcible Entry ccase against Petitioner Gualbertos (this shows
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(2005, Garcia J)
Topic: Action for reconveyance; prescriptive period
Doctrine: Action for reconveyance based on implied trust (fraud or mistake) of real
property prescribes in 10 years but prescription does not apply (thus
imprescriptible) if the owner is in actual possession of the property – reason: he can
wait until his possession is disturbed before going to court.
that Gos are in possession of lot – important later in SC ruling)
Gos filed a forcible entry case against Gualbertos before MCTC of Siniloan which
ruled in favor of the Gos. RTC affirmed. CA affirmed. (no ratios in the case)
Rosa Javier G's Free Patent and OCT based thereon
In the meantime, on June 14, 1978 – OCT was issued in the name of Go S. Kiang's
wife, Rosa Javier Go (basis – free patent)
Gualberto's case (this case – Conveyance, Accion Publiciana, and Quieting
of title with Damages
1995 – Gualbertos sued Gos. RTC dismissed the suit. CA affirmed the dismissal
minus the award of damages (no ratios in the case).
Based on SC ruling, it seemed the RTC and CA said that the action for
conveyance has already prescribed (10 years) – see ratio of SC ruling.
Note, OCT was issued in 1978 and case was filed in 1995 so 17 years have passed
since registration.
Supreme Court Issues (SC denies Gualbertos petition)
I. WHETHER OR NOT A TITLED PROPERTY CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF A FREE
PATENT TITLE. (No, because this issue was raised for the first time in the SC and
wrong suit filed – should have been petition for annulment)
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The first issue raised by petitioners attacks the validity of respondent Rosa Javier constructive trust – 10 years counted from the issuance of Torrens title over the
Gos free patent title. This cannot be done in the present recourse for two (2) property.
basic reasons: first, the validity of a torrens title cannot be assailed
NCC 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it
collaterally; and second, the issue is being raised for the first time before
is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
this Court.
person from whom the property comes.
Under the Land Registration Act, title to the property covered by a Torrens
This case: New Civil Code applies (old cases cited used Old Civil Code provisions
certificate becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of
thats why the court says there were “discrepancies” in some of the SC's rulings.
the decree of registration. Such decree of registration is incontrovertible and is
binding on all persons whether or not they were notified of or participated in the Exception to the 10 year prescription: if the plaintiff is in actual, continuous, and
registration proceedings. peaceful possession of the property involved. The reason for this is is that one who
is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait
If such title is to be challenged, it may not be done collaterally, as in the present
until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
case, because the judicial action required is a direct attack. Section 48 of the
vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession
Property Registration Decree expressly provides that a certificate of title cannot be
gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own
proceeding in accordance with law.
title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
The action filed by petitioners is one for Conveyance, Accion Publiciana, and
In this case, it was never established that Gualbertos were in possession of the
Quieting of Title With Damages, and not an action for annulment of OCT No. 1388
property after their father's sale. In fact, the lower courts concluded that Gos had
issued to Rosa Javier Go. We, therefore, cannot entertain the issue in the present
actual possession since then and the SC must respect the conclusions of facts of the
petition for review oncertiorari.
trial court.
Besides, as it may readily be noted, petitioners never raised this issue before any of
the two (2) courts below. This issue is raised for the first time before the SC and to
entertain it is to violate due process. Disposition: Petition denied. Gualbertos lose.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT OF A REGISTERED OWNER TO DEMAND THE

RETURN OF HIS PROPERTY CAN BE LOST BY PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES. (Yes, 10
Cabacungan vs Laigo - SIANG
years but imprescriptible if in actual possession)

III. WHETHER AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY BASED ON A Peralta, J.

NULLITY OF TITLE PRESCRIBES. (same in II)
Facts:
The two issues are related and boils down to WON registered owners have the right
to assail the validity of Go's title and WON such right prescribes.  Margarita Cabacungan (Margarita) owned three parcels of unregistered
land in La Union.
Prescription under Section 43, Old Civil Code: recovery of real property -within 4
years (ground fraud – not accrued until discovery of the fraud).  In 1968, Margarita’s son, Roberto Laigo, Jr. applied for a non-immigrant
visa to the United States, and to support his application, he allegedly asked
New Civil Code – NCC 1144 – if action for reconveyance based on implied or Margarita to transfer the tax declarations of the properties in his name.

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 Margarita executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property whereby the
subject properties were transferred by donation to Roberto. Roberto’s visa
was approved and he was able to travel to the US.
 In 1990, Roberto sold the 3 properties to herein repondents – Spouses
Campos and his adopted children Pedro Laigo and Marilou Laigo.
 It was only in Roberto’s wake in 1995 that Margarita found out about the
sale from Pedro.
 In 1996, Margarita instituted the instant complaint for the annulment of
said sales and for the recovery of ownership and possession.
Margarita’s argument: The arrangement was only for the specific purpose of
supporting his U.S. visa application and she never intended to divest herself of
ownership. She imputed bad faith to the vendees as they supposedly knew all along
that Roberto was not the rightful owner of the properties.
Laigos’ argument: They were buyers in good faith and for value. Margaritas
cause of action had already been barred by laches. Prescription had also set in as
the cause of action had accrued way back in 1968 upon the execution of the
affidavit of transfer by virtue of which an implied trust had been created. The
prescriptive period for an action based on an implied trust is 10 years.
RTC: Found for respondent Laigos. The 1968 Affidavit of Transfer operated as a
simple transfer and it found no express trust created between Roberto and
Margarita. There was no evidence of another document showing Roberto’s
undertaking to return the subject properties. Although it made a finding of the
existence of an implied trust, this was already extinguished by prescription because
the period started to run from 1968. Margarita was also guilty of laches as the
transfer was made in 1968 and she made no effort to recover until 1996.
CA: affirmed the trial courts disposition. The appellate court dismissed petitioners
claim that Roberto was merely a trustee as there was no evidence on record
supportive of the allegation that Roberto merely borrowed the properties from
Margarita. Further, it hypothesized that granting the existence of an implied trust,
still Margaritas action thereunder had already been circumscribed by laches
Issue: Whether or not Margarita’s action has prescribed? NO.
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First, fundamental is the rule in land registration law that the issue of whether the
buyer of realty is in good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale
is registered land. Since the properties in question are unregistered lands,
respondents purchased the same at their own peril.Their claim of having bought the
properties in good faith, i.e., without notice that there is some other person with a
right to or interest therein, would not protect them.
Second, prescription and laches hardly can impair petitioner’s cause of action.
As to prescription: there are 2 kinds of trusts – express and implied. There are in
turn 2 kinds of implies trusts - resulting and constructive.
In accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code, an action for reconveyance to
enforce an implied trust in ones favor prescribes in ten (10) years.
 Assuming that this was a resulting trust, prescription does not apply. It
starts to run from the time the trustee performs unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust which are made
known to the latter. It was the 1992 sale of the properties to respondents
that comprised the act of repudiation which, however, was made known to
Margarita only in 1995 but nevertheless impelled her to institute the action
in 1996 still well within the prescriptive period.
 Assuming arguendo that this was a constructive trust prescription still does
not apply. An action for reconveyance under a constructive implied trust in
accordance with Article 1456 does not prescribe unless and until the land
is registered. In the present case, however, the lands involved are
concededly unregistered lands. There is no way by which Margarita, during
her lifetime, could be notified of the sales made in 1992 by Roberto except
by actual notice from Pedro himself in August 1995. Hence, it is from that
date that prescription began to toll.
As to laches: being rooted in equity, is not always to be applied strictly in a way
that would obliterate an otherwise valid claim especially between blood relatives.
The existence of a confidential relationship based upon consanguinity is an
important circumstance for consideration; hence, the doctrine is not to be applied
mechanically as between near relatives.
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INC v Ponferrada - Tiongco

Republic v Mangotara – Valdez

REPUBLIC v. MANGOTARA
J. Leonardo-De Castro | G.R. No. 170
(The case is a consolidation of seven [7] total cases. I only included the case pertinent to the syllabus topic [“Quieting of Title {Imprescriptible if Plaintiff is
in Possession}]; case is literally worth the length of seven regular cases and I sincerely apologize if sir asks about the six other cases as I did not include
them here)

FACTS: The petition for review under Rules 45 and 65 is a consolidation of seven total cases finding roots in the 1914 case of Cacho v. Gov’t of the US and the 1997 case of
Cacho v. CA.

Cacho v. Gov’t of the US

In the early 1900’s, Doa Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land, in Iligan, Moro Province. She acquired the smaller parcel by purchase from Gabriel
Salzos (Datto Dorondon and wife, Alanga  Salzos, via sale). She also acquired the other lot via purchase from Datto Bunglay, who inherited the parcel from his uncle Datto
Anandog. The US Gov’t opposed the application for the reason that these properties were part of a military reservation and were US property.

The land registration record elaborated its findings through the following GLRO Records:
No. 6908: That the parcel of land be adjudicated to Cacho upon presentation of a deed renouncing all his rights in the parcel of land in favor of Cacho;
No. 6909: That a small parcel of the land was cultivated by Datto Anandog, and that it was not shown whether Datto Bunglay owned the rest of the parcel. The LRC thereafter
ordered a new survey to be made on the aforesaid parcel.

Cacho appealed the decision to the SC which affirmed the LRC’s findings. Eighty-three years later, the Court decided on the matter in Cacho v. CA

Cacho v. CA
Teofilo Cacho (“Teofilo”) claimed to be Doa Demetria Cacho’s (“DDC”) grandson and filed a petition for reconstitution of the titles, which was dismissed by the court, ordering
him to refile it as a reconstitution of decree. The Republic and the National Steel Corporation opposed claiming Teofilo was not the real party-in-interest, that Teofilo was guilty
of caches, and that DDC was not the owner of the lands subject of the decrees sought to be reconstituted.

The RTC granted the petition which the CA reversed on the ground that a reconstitution could not be done by virtue of GLRO Record No. 6909, that an heir of a registered owner
may lose his right to recover possession of a property by laches, and that Teofilo failed to establish his identity and existence as the grandson of DDC, thereby making him NOT
a real party-in-interest. Upon appeal to the SC, the CA decision was reversed on the ff grounds:
(a) The decrees had attained finality, as certified by several officers of the Land Registration Committee (NALTDRA);
(b) Laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree;
(c) Teofilo’s affidavit of adjudication as DDC’s sole heir before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago, publication of DDC’s adjudication in the Times Journal, and his
appearance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago to execute an SPA in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to represent him in the case are
all sufficient to consider him a real party-in-interest

Present Quieting of Title Case

Demetria Vidal and Azimuth filed a petition for quieting of title against Teofilo, Atty. Cabildo, and the RD of Iligan City on November 18, 1998. She claimed she was the
granddaughter of DDC, not Teofilo, as the daughter of Francisco Cacho Vidal and Fidela Arellano Confesor. Francisco was the only child of Don Dionisio Vidal and Demetria. She
claims she is entitled to the parcels of land as the only heir. Azimuth filed the petition as successor-in-interest of Demetria via a Deed of Conditional Conveyance executed by
Vidal in her favor.

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The following interposed their oppositions:

(a) Teofilo:
a. There was no cause of action because there was no title being disturbed or in danger of being lost due to the claim of a third party;
b. Vidal had neither legal nor beneficial ownership of the parcels of land in question;
c. The matters had been tried, heard, and decided by the Iligan RTC;
d. Petition was barred by the Statute of Limitations and by laches.
(b) Landtrade
a. It is the owner of a portion of the parcels of land, which it acquired from Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo;
Vidal and Azimuth presented evidence; Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo did not.

RTC Ruling: IN favor of Vidal and Azimuth (not discussed)

CA Ruling: In favor of Vidal and Azimuth; affirmed in toto RTC ruling
1. The RTC did not err in resolving the issue on Vidal’s status, filiation, and hereditary rights as it is determinative on the issue of ownership of the subject properties;
2. Petition for Quieting of Title is within the jurisdiction of the Iligan RTC;
3. The 1997 Cacho case determined the validity and efficacy of the Affidavit of Execution that Teofilo executed before the Philippine Consul in the States; nowhere in the
said decision did it adjudicate the subject lands in favor of Teofilo

Teofilo then appealed to the SC to determine whether the CA erred in

(1) Upholding the RTC’s jurisdiction to resolve issues on Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirship in the action for quieting of title;
(2) Not holding Vidal and Azimuth have no cause of action;
(3) Finding the evidence was sufficient to establish Vidal’s status as DDC’s granddaughter
(4) Failing to find that Vidal’s cause of action has already prescribed since Landtrade has been in possession of the two parcels of land in question

Teofilo avers that Vidal’s cause of action has already prescribed since Landtrade has been in possession of the parcels of land. He claims the prescriptive period
for filing said action has lapsed in 1995, 10 years from the time Teofilo executed his affidavit of adjudication.

ISSUE (TOPICAL): Whether or not Vidal’s and Azimuth’s cause of action has already prescribed (NO)

1. The defense of prescription cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
2. Even if the Court ruled on the issue of prescription, it will rule against Teofilo and Landtrade on the following grounds:
a. A real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property. An action for quieting of title to real property is indubitably a real action.
b. Article 1141 of the Civil Code provides that real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
i. Doa Demetria died in 1974, transferring by succession, her title to the two parcels of land to her only heir, Vidal. Teofilo, through Atty. Cabildo, filed a
petition for reconstitution of the certificates of title covering said properties in 1978. This is the first palpable display of Teofilos adverse claim to
the same properties, supposedly, as Doa Demetrias only heir. When Vidal and AZIMUTH instituted Civil Case No. 4452 in 1998, only 20
years had passed, and the prescriptive period for filing an action for quieting of title had not yet prescribed.
c. Article 1411 of the Civil Code also clearly states that the 30-year prescriptive period for real actions over immovables is without prejudice to
what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. The Court must also look into the acquisitive
prescription periods of ownership and other real rights.
i. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary
ii. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. In the case of ownership and other
real rights over immovable property, they are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of 10 years.

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3. LANDTRADE cannot insist on the application of the 10-year ordinary acquisitive prescription period since it cannot be considered a possessor in good
faith. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and
could transmit his ownership.
a. LANDTRADE came to possession of the two parcels of land after purchasing the same from Teofilo. However, Teofilo is not the registered owner of the subject
properties as they were still registered in Doa Demetria’s name. The Affidavit of Adjudication is not even annotated on the OCTs.
b. Worse, LANDTRADE is not dealing directly with Teofilo, but only with the latters attorney-in-fact, Atty. Cabildo. It is axiomatic that one who buys from a person
who is not a registered owner is not a purchaser in good faith.
c. In its Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, LANDTRADE itself alleged that when it bought the two parcels of land from Teofilo,
portions thereof were already occupied by the Overton Sub-station and Agus Warehouse of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. This is another circumstance which should
have prompted LANDTRADE to investigate or inspect the property being sold to it.
d. It is expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the
occupants possess the land en concepto de dueo, in concept of owner.
e. As is the common practice in the real estate industry, an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes.
Should he find out that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who, as in this case, is not in actual possession, it would then
be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the extent of the occupant’s possessory rights. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps
would mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a purchaser in good faith.
4. Since the ordinary acquisitive prescription period of 10 years does not extraordinary acquisitive prescription period of 30 years set by Article 1137 of the Civil Code must be
looked at, which reads: “Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of
title or of good faith.”
a. LANDTRADE adversely possessed the subject properties no earlier than 1996, when it bought the same from Teofilo, and Civil Case No. 4452 was already instituted
two years later in 1998.
b. LANDTRADE cannot tack its adverse possession of the two parcels of land to that of Teofilo considering that there is no proof that the latter,
who is already residing in the U.S.A., adversely possessed the properties at all.

Luna v Luna - Abdon

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