2. G.R. No.

L-14303 March 24, 1960

REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION,
plaintiff-appellant vs.

ALTO SURETY and INSURANCECOMPANY, INC.,

oppositor-appellee.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, sitting as a land registration
court (in Special Proceeding No. 781
—
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 14837) denying appellant's petition nunder Section 112 of Act No. 496 for cancellation
of the annotation of appellee's second mortgage on appellant's transfer certificate of title No. 1155 of the
Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur.

FACTS: Eustaquio Palma is an owner of a parcel of land in Camarines Sur. He used such land in executing a
first mortgage to secure a loan of P20, 000.00, in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC),
and subsequently, with the consent of the RFC, a second mortgage over the same property, in favor of
Alto Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. (Alto). Both mortgages were duly registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds and annotated. Upon failure of the mortgagor to settle the P20, 000.00 loan on its
maturity, RFC foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially under Act 3135 as authorized in the deed of
mortgage and the property was sold in public auction under the direction of the Provincial Sheriff in favor
of mortgagee RFC as the highest bidder. Six months later, mortgagor Palma, transferred and conveyed all
his rights, title and interest in the mortgaged property to the spouses Anacleto Trinidad and Rosa S. de
Trinidad, the assignees assuming the obligation of paying the repurchase price of the auctioned property.
Within the year of redemption, the assignee-spouses and the RFC executed a "Deed of Resale" whereby
the mortgaged property was resold and reconveyed in favor of the "redemptioners, their heirs, assignees
and successors in interest". However, instead of paying the whole redemption price, only P5,500 was paid
on hand and the sum ofP21,505.11, balance of the total indebtedness including 6% interest was agreed
to be paid in ten annual amortizations. Alto, as junior encumbrancer, wrote the RFC inquiring as to the
actual status of the property subject to redemption. RFC advised Alto that the auctioned property had
already been sold to the Trinidad spouses "under a deed of redemption on the installment plan". This
notwithstanding, the RFC executed an affidavit consolidating ownership on the purchased property,
stating therein that the period of redemption had expired without the debtor or any lien-holder thereon
exercising said right of redemption or repurchase. This affidavit, together with the deed of sale evidencing
its (RFC's) purchase of the property at public auction which RFC was able to secure the cancellation of
Palma’s TCT, and the issuance of a new title in its name (T.C.T. No. 1155). The second mortgage in favor of
Alto, however, was carried and annotated at the back of the new title. RFC sought to cancel the annotation
alleging that with the consolidation and transfer to it as the first mortgagee of the mortgagee's rights on
the property, the junior encumbrancer's lien on the same property had ceased. Alto opposed the petition
contending that with the execution of the Deed of Resale between RFC and the spouses Anacleto Trinidad
and Rosa S. de Trinidad, assignees of the mortgagor, the mortgaged property had been completely
released from the first mortgage and the second mortgage had been automatically transformed into a
first lien on the property. RTC denied the petition for cancellation. RFC appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The case reached to SCvia certiorari and pure questions of law are raised.
ISSUE: W/N the annotation of the second mortgage in favor of the oppositor on the back of TTCT No. 1155
wasmade in accordance with law
RULING: YES. The court a quo acted correctly in denying the petition to cancel the annotation of the second
mortgage at the back of the title.SC held that the relief afforded by Section 112 of the Land Registration
Act may only be allowed if "there is a unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes controversial and should be
threshed out in an ordinary case.

Section 112 authorizes only alterations which do not impair rights recorded in the decree, or alterations
which, if they do prejudice such rights, are consented to by all parties concerned or alterations to correct
obvious mistakes. The proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act being summary in nature, they
are inadequate for the litigation of issues properly pertaining to ordinary civil actions, thus, questions
involving ownership of or title to a real property, or relating to the validity or cancellation or discharge of
a mortgage should properly be ventilated in an ordinary proceeding."

Granting arguendo that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by the RFC is proper
and justified, since the junior encumbrancer was admittedly not notified thereof, the foreclosure of
the first mortgage cannot be considered to have terminated or extinguished the rights of said junior
encumbrancer over the property. An interest in the mortgaged property acquired subsequent to
the (first) mortgage may be divested or barred only by making the holder thereof a party to the
proceedings to foreclose. While as a general rule, the junior encumbrancer is not a necessary party to a
suit to foreclose by a senior mortgagee, it is always proper and prudent to join him as a defendant, both
to give an opportunity to defend and to extinguish his right of redemption. When a senior mortgagee
forecloses and becomes the purchaser at his own foreclosure sale, but the holder of a subsequent
mortgage or other subordinate interest has not been joined or has been eliminated from the proceeding,
equity will keep the senior mortgage alive against the subsequent encumbrance and the senior mortgagee
will be entitled to an action de novo to reforeclose the mortgage as to the omitted persons. In view of the
foregoing, the decision appealed from denying the first mortgagee's petition to cancel the annotation of
the second mortgage at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1155, is hereby affirmed, without
prejudice to the proper adjudication, in an appropriate ordinary action, of the respective rights of the
parties herein as a result of the execution of the Deed of Resale, Exhibit J. The petitioner-appellant shall
pay the costs. It is so ordered

3. UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., v. ALEXANDER M. CRUZ

GR No. 171456

09 August 2007

Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does
not arise out of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon,
the complain may be brought before other venues.
Uniwide Holdings, Inc. entered into a franchise agreement with Alexander M. Cruz
granting the latter a five-year franchise to adopt and use the ―Uniwide Family Store
System‖ for the establishment and operation of a ―Uniwide Family Store‖ in
Marikina City.

The contract stipulated that Cruz will pay a monthly service fee of P50,000.00 or three
percent of gross monthly purchases, whichever is higher to UHI, payable within five days
after the end of each month without need of formal billing or demand from UHI. In case
of any delay in the payment of the monthly service fee, Cruz would, under Article 10.3 of
the agreement, be liable to pay an interest charge of three percent per month. Cruz
thereafter purchased goods from UHI’s affiliated companies First
Paragon Corporation (FPC) and Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. (USWCI).

FPC and USWCI subsequently executed Deeds of Assignment in favor of UHI assigning
all their rights and interests over Cruz‘s accounts payable to them. Cruz had outstanding
obligations with UHI, FPC and USWCI in the amount of P1, 358, 531.89.00. UHI sent a
letter demanding for the payment of such amount but it was not settled.

Thus, UHI filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court
of Parañaque against Cruz praying for payment of service fee, accounts payable to FPC
and USWCI and attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses.

Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. He invokes Article 27.5
of the agreement which provides that exclusive jurisdiction is vested with the courts f
Quezon City. The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a case based on several causes of action is dismissible on the ground of
improper venue where only one of the causes of action arises from a contract with
exclusive venue stipulation

HELD:

In this case, UHI contended that nowhere in the agreement is there a mention of FPC and
USWCI, and neither are the two parties thereto, hence, they cannot be bound to the
stipulation on ―exclusive venue.‖ The Court found merit in this contention.

The Supreme Court cited Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which provides that all
other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.

The forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue of an action does not, however,
exclude parties from bringing a case to other venues.
Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does
not arise out of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the
complaint, as in the one at bar, may be brought before other venues provided that such
other cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein.

It bears emphasis that the causes of action on the assigned accounts are not based on
a breach of the agreement between UHI and Cruz. They are based on separate, distinct
and independent contracts-deeds of assignment in which UHI is the assignee of Cruz‘s
obligations to the assignors FPC and USWCI. Thus, any action arising from the deeds of
assignment cannot be subjected to the exclusive venuestipulation embodied in the
agreement.

4. CESAR V. AREZA v. EXPRESS SAVINGS BANK, GR No. 176697, 2014-09-10

Facts:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Petitioners Cesar V. Areza and Lolita B. Areza maintained two bank deposits with
respondent Express Savings Bank's Biñan branch
They were engaged in the business of "buy and sell" of brand new and second-hand motor
vehicles. On 2 May 2000, they received an order from a certain Gerry Mambuay
(Mambuay) for the purchase of a second-hand Mitsubishi Pajero and a brand-new Honda
CRV.
The buyer, Mambuay, paid petitioners with nine (9) Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
(PVAO) checks payable to different payees and drawn against the Philippine Veterans Bank
(drawee), each valued at Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) for a total of One
Million Eight
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,800,000.00).
About this occasion, petitioners claimed that Michael Potenciano (Potenciano), the branch
manager of respondent Express Savings Bank (the Bank) was present during the
transaction and immediately offered the services of the Bank for the processing and
eventual crediting of the... said checks to petitioners' account.
petitioners deposited the said checks in their savings account with the Bank. The Bank, in
turn, deposited the checks with its depositary bank, Equitable-PCI Bank, in Biñan, Laguna.
Equitable-PCI Bank presented the checks to the drawee, the Philippine
Veterans Bank, which honored the checks.
Potenciano informed petitioners that the checks they deposited with the Bank were
honored. He allegedly warned petitioners that the clearing of the checks pertained only to
the availability of funds and did not mean that the checks were not infirmed.
Sometime in July 2000, the subject checks were returned by PVAO to the drawee on the
ground that the amount on the face of the checks was altered from the original amount of
P4,000.00 to P200,000.00.
the Bank was informed by Equitable-PCI Bank that the drawee dishonored the checks on
the ground of material alterations.
The Bank insisted that they informed petitioners of said development in August 2000 by
furnishing them copies of the documents given by its depositary bank.[7] On the other
hand, petitioners maintained that the Bank never informed them of these... developments.
On 9 March 2001, petitioners issued a check in the amount of P500,000.00. Said check
was dishonored by the Bank for the reason "Deposit Under Hold.
According to petitioners, the Bank unilaterally and unlawfully put their account with the Bank
on hold
Acting on the alleged arbitrary and groundless dishonoring of their checks and the unlawful
and unilateral withdrawal from their savings account, petitioners filed a Complaint for Sum
of Money with Damages against the Bank and Potenciano
Invoking Article 1977 of the Civil Code, the trial court stated that the depositary cannot
make use of the thing deposited without the express permission of the depositor. The trial...
court also held that respondents should have observed the 24-hour clearing house rule that
checks should be returned within 24-hours after discovery of the forgery but in no event
beyond the period fixed by law for filing a legal action. In this case, petitioners deposited...
the checks in May 2000, and respondents notified them of the problems on the check three
months later or in August 2000. In sum, the trial court characterized said acts of
respondents as attended with bad faith when they debited the amount of P1,800,000.00
from the account... of petitioners.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration while petitioners filed a motion for execution
from the Decision of the RTC on the ground that respondents' motion for reconsideration
did not conform with Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court; hence, it was a mere scrap
of... paper that did not toll the running of the period to appeal.
RTC, through Pairing Judge Romeo C. De Leon granted the motion for reconsideration, set
aside the Pozas Decision, and dismissed the complaint. The trial court awarded
respondents their counterclaim of moral and exemplary damages of P100,000.00... each.
The trial court first applied the principle of liberality when it disregarded the alleged absence
of a notice of hearing in respondents' motion for reconsideration.
On the merits, the trial court considered the relationship of the Bank and petitioners with
respect to their... savings account deposits as a contract of loan with the bank as the debtor
and petitioners as creditors.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court but deleted the award
of damages.
Petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari raising both procedural and
substantive issues
Issues:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law and
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the legality and/or propriety of the Motion for
Reconsideration filed in violation of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules on Civil Procedure
Ruling:
Sections 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than
ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
Petitioners claim that the notice of hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to
the adverse party as the rules require. Petitioners add that the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration was scheduled beyond 10 days from the date of filing.
As held in Maturan v. Araula,[11] the rule requiring that the notice be addressed to the
adverse party has been substantially complied with when a copy of the motion for
reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party, coupled with... the fact
that the trial court acted on said notice of hearing and, as prayed for, issued an order[12]
setting the hearing of the motion on 26 March 2004.
We would reiterate later that there is substantial compliance with the foregoing Rule if a
copy of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse
party.
To recap, the drawee bank, Philippine Veterans Bank in this case, is only liable to the extent
of the check prior to alteration. Since Philippine Veterans Bank paid the altered amount of
the check, it may pass the liability back as it did, to Equitable-PCI Bank, the... collecting
bank. The collecting banks, Equitable-PCI Bank and the Bank, are ultimately liable for the
amount of the materially altered check. It cannot further pass the liability back to the
petitioners absent any showing in the negligence on the part of the... petitioners which
substantially contributed to the loss from alteration.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Pozas decision only insofar as it ordered respondents
to jointly and severally pay petitioners P1,800,000.00, representing the amount withdrawn
from the latter's account. We do not conform with said ruling regarding the finding... of bad
faith on the part of respondents, as well as its failure to observe the 24-hour clearing rule.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

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