Appendix Volume 2

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_______________________________________________________
APPEAL NO. 17-11888

APPEAL NO. 17-12134
APPEAL NO. 17-12376
_________________________________________________________
NAUSHEEN ZAINULABEDDIN
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
v.
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, BOARD OF TRUSTEES

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
_________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA (TAMPA DIVISON)
CASE NO. 8:16-cv-00637 (Hon. James S. Moody)
____________________________________________________
PLAINTIFF APPENDIX
VOLUME II OF XII: DOCKET 6 to 23-1 (cont.)
(Pages A-210 TO A-409)
___________________________
APPELLANT
Nausheen Zainulabeddin
4730 South Woodlawn Ave. Apt 3D
Chicago, IL 60615
nausheenkhawaja@gmail.com
Pro Se
INDEX
VOL. Tab Date Title Page

numbers
A-
I 2 1/22/16 Complaint filed in the Circuit 1-58
Court of the 13th Judicial
Circuit in and for Hillsborough
County, Florida
I 2-1 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit A 59-64
I 2-2 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit B 65-167

I 2-3 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit C 168-169
I 2-4 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit D 170-171
I 2-5 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit E 172-175
I 2-6 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit F 176-178
I 2-7 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit G 179-180
I 1 3/17/16 Defendant Notice of Removal 181-186
I 1-1 3/17/16 Dkt. 1 Exhibit B: Summons 187-190
I 1-2 3/17/16 Dkt. 1 Exhibit C: Notice of 191-193
Appearance
I 1-3 3/17/16 Dkt. 1 Exhibit D: Designation 194-196
of E-mail Addresses
I 1-4 3/17/16 Dkt. 1 Exhibit F: Civil Cover 1971-198
Sheet
I 4 3/24/16 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 199-209
and for more Definite
Statement and Supporting
Memorandum of Law
II 6 3/30/16 Plaintiff’s Response in 210-222
Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss and for
more Definite statement, with
i
Incorporated Memorandum of
Law
II 6-1 3/30/16 Dkt. 6 Exhibit A 223-228
II 9 4/06/16 Case Management and 229-231
Scheduling Order
II 10 4/13/16 Order: Denial of Dkt. 4 232-240
II 11 4/27/16 Defendant’s Answer, Defenses, 241-272
and Affirmative Defenses
II 12 09/08/16 Unopposed Motion to 273-275
Withdraw and for Substitution
of Counsel
II 14 11/09/16 Order Referring Case to 276-280
Mediation and Directing
Selection of a Mediator
II 15 11/29/16 Joint Motion for Enlargement 281-284
of the Discovery and
Dispositive Motion Deadlines
II 17 12/09/16 Notice of Mediator Selection 285-286
and Scheduling of Mediation
II 18 12/13/16 Order Appointing Mediator and 287-288
Scheduling Mediation
II 19 02/01/17 Plaintiff Partially Opposed 289-294
Motion to take Deposition of
Dr. Joanne Valeriano-Mercent
Subsequent to close of
discovery with incorporated
statement of good cause
wherefore
II 19-1 02/01/17 Dkt. 19 Exhibit A: Plaintiff’s 295-297
Notice of Taking Deposition of
Dr. Joanne Valeriano-Marcet
II 20 02/02/17 Granted Order of Dkt. 19 298-299
II 21 02/03/17 Joint Motion to Extend 300-302
Mediation Deadline
ii
II 22 02/04/17 Defendant’s Motion for 303-326
Summary of Judgement
II 23 02/04/17 Defendant’s Notice of Filing 327-328
Deposition Transcripts In
Support of Its Motion for
II & III 23-1 02/04/17 Dkt. 23 Exhibit A, Volume I: 329-448
Plaintiff’s Deposition
Transcript and Exhibits
III 23-2 02/04/17 Dkt. 23 Exhibit A, Volume II: 449-563
Plaintiff’s Deposition
Transcript and Exhibits
III & IV 23-3 02/04/17 Dkt. 23 Exhibit B Deposition 564-650
Transcript of Dr. Deborah Roth
and Exhibits
IV 23-4 02/04/17 Dkt. 23 Exhibit C: Deposition 651-737
Transcript of Dr. Ambuj Kumar
and Exhibits
IV 23-5 02/04/17 Dkt. 23 Exhibit D: Deposition 738-810
Transcript of Dr. Saundra Stock
and Exhibits
IV &V 23-6 02/04/16 Dkt. 23 Exhibit D: Additional 811-871
documents
V 25 02/09/16 Notice of Withdrawal of 872-873
Plaintiff’s Motion to Take
Deposition of Dr. Joanne
Valeriano-Mercet
V 26 02/19/17 Plaintiff’s Statement of 874-885
Disputed Material Facts
V 26-1 02/19/17 Dkt. 26 Exhibit A 886-893
V 26-2 02/19/17 Dkt. 26 Exhibit B 894-898
V 26-3 02/19/17 Dkt. 26 Exhibit C 899-907
V 27 02/19/17 Plaintiff’s Response in 908-927
iii
Motion for Summary
Judgement
V 28 02/19/17 Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing 928-929
Affidavit in Support of
Plaintiff’s Response in
Motion for Summary
Judgement
V 28-1 02/19/17 Dkt. 28 Affidavit of Plaintiff 930-956
V 28-2 02/19/17 Dkt. 28 Exhibit A, B, C, D, 957-972
V 28-3 02/19/17 Dkt. 28 Exhibit E 973-980
V 28-4 02/19/17 Dkt. 28 Exhibit F, G, H, 981-995
V 28-5 02/19/17 Dkt. 28 Exhibit I, J, K, L 996-1018
V 29 02/19/17 Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing 1019-1020
Deposition of Steven Specter in
support of Plaintiff’s Response
in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary
Judgement
V & VI 29-1 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Deposition of Steven 1021-1203
Specter, Ph.D
VI 29-2 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Plaintiff’s Amended 1204-1209
Notice of Taking Deposition of
Dr. Steven Specter
VI 29-3 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 2 1210
VI 29-4 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 3 1212
VI 29-5 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 4 1214
VI 29-6 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 5 1215
VI 29-7 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 6 1216
VI 29-8 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 7 1221
VI 29-9 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 8 1222
VI 29-10 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 9 1223
VI 29-11 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 10 1225
iv
VI & 29-12 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 11 1242
VII
VII 29-13 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 12 1243
VII 29-14 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 13 1244
VII 29-15 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 14 1251
VII 29-16 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 15 1260
VII 29-17 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 16 1269
VII 29-18 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 17 1270
VII 29-19 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 18 1276
VII 29-20 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 19 1284
VII 29-21 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 20 1285
VII 29-22 02/19/17 Dkt. 29 Exhibit 21 1287
VII 30 02/19/17 Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing 1288
Complete Deposition
Transcript of Dr. Ambuj Kumar
in Support of Plaintiff’s
Response in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for
VII 30-1 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Deposition 1290-1362
VII 30-2 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 1 1363
VII 30-3 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 2 1364-1365
VII 30-4 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 3 1366-1371
VII 30-5 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 4 1372-1377
VII 30-6 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 5 1378-1396
VII 30-7 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 6 1397
VII 30-8 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 7 1399
VII 30-9 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 8 1401
VII 30-10 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 9 1402
VII 30-11 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 10 1403
VII 30-12 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 11 1405
VII 30-13 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 12 1406
VII 30-14 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 13 1407
v
VII 30-15 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 14 1408
VII 30-16 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 15 1409
VII 30-17 02/19/17 Dkt. 30 Exhibit 16 1410
VII 31 02/27/17 Joint Motion to Extend 1418
Mediation Deadline
VII 33 03/01/17 Defendant’s Motion for Leave 1421
to reply to Plaintiff’s Response
to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgement
VII 35 03/07/17 Unopposed Motion to 1424
Withdraw and for Substitution
of Counsel
VII 36 03/08/17 Order Granting Dkt. 35 1427
VII 37 03/15/17 Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s 1428
VIII 38 03/18/17 Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to 1437
File Surreply to Defendant’s
Reply Memorandum to
Plaintiff’s Response in
Motion for Summary
Judgement
VIII 40 03/22/17 Mediation Report 1440
VIII 41 03/24/17 Plaintiff’s Surreply to 1442
Defendant’s Reply
Memorandum to Plaintiff’s
Summary Judgement
VIII 41-1 03/24/17 Dkt. 41 Exhibit A 1447
VIII 41-2 03/24/17 Dkt. 41 Exhibit B 1451
vi
VIII 42 04/19/17 Order Granting Summary of 1455-1484
Judgement in Favor of
Defendant
VIII 43 04/20/17 Judgement in Civil Case signed 1485-1486
by Deputy Clerk
VIII 44 04/26/17 Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal to 1487-1488
USCA 11th circuit for Dkt. 42
VIII 46 04/27/17 Transfer of Appeal to USCA 1489-1552
11th Circuit (Dkt. 44).
VIII 47 04/27/17 Application for Leave to 1553-1555
Withdraw as Counsel
VIII 48 05/01/17 Motion for Reconsideration 1556-1581
VIII 48-1 05/01/17 Dkt. 48 Exhibit 1 to Exhibit 14 1582-1641
IX 48-2 05/01/17 Dkt. 48 Exhibit 15 to 32 1642-1720
IX 48-3 05/01/17 Dkt. 48 Exhibit 33 to 43 1721-1806
IX & X 48-4 05/01/17 Dkt. 48 Exhibit 44 to 47 1807-1841
X 48-5 05/01/17 Dkt. 48 Exhibit 48 to 57 1842-1935
X 49 05/01/17 Dkt. 48 Affidavit 1936-1948
X 50 05/01/17 Motion For Recusal 1949
X 50-1 05/01/17 Dkt. 50 Exhibit A to Exhibit I 1973-2042
X 51 05/01/17 Pro Se Motion of Continuance 2043-2046
XI 54 05/03/17 Order Denying Motion for 2047-2049
Reconsideration (Dkt. 48)
XI 55 05/03/17 Defendant’s Motion to Tax 2050-2055
Costs with Verified Bill of
Costs
XI 55-1 05/03/17 Dkt. 55 Exhibit A 2056-2081
XI 56 05/03/17 Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay 2082-2097
District Court Administrative
Proceedings of
(1) Pro Se Motion of
Continuance
(2) Motion for
Reconsideration
vii
(3) Motion of Recusal,
Pending Appeal
XI 56-1 05/03/17 Plaintiff’s Responses and 2098
Objections to Defendant’s First
Set of Interrogatories to
Plaintiff. + Exhibits
XI 59 05/08/17 Directions to Clerk for Notice 2164
of Appeal dated April 26, 2017
XI 59-1 05/08/17 Dkt. 59 Exhibit A 2166
XI 60 05/10/17 Notice of Appeal for Dkt. 57; 2178
dated May 10, 2017
XI 61 05/10/17 IFP of USCA FC 2180
XI 64 05/17/17 Plaintiff Opposition to 2185
Defendant’s Bill of Costs
XI 64-1 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit A to E 2199

XI & 64-2 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit F 2214
XII
XII 64-3 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit G 2300
XII 64-4 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit H 2345
XII 64-5 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit 2400
XII 64-6 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit 2304
XII 66 05/19/17 Order granting Dkt. 64 in favor 2405
of Defendant
XII 67 05/22/17 Bill of Costs 2412
XII 69 05/22/17 Direction to Clerk for Notice of 2413
Appeal dated May 10, 2017
XII 70 05/22/17 Notice of Appeal to USCA FC 2429
and Petition of Review
XII 71 05/22/17 Notice of Appeal for Dkt. 66 2431
dated May 22, 2017
XII 74 05/23/17 Directions to the Clerk; 2433
Transfer Error
viii
9/2/2017 Zainulabeddin v. University of South Florida Board of Trustees (8:16-cv-00637), Florida Middle District Court
Zainulabeddin v. University of South Florida Board of Trustees

Dashboard
Florida Middle District Court

Judge: James S Moody, Jr
Referred: Thomas G Wilson
Case #: 8:16-cv-00637
Nature of Suit 440 Civil Rights - Other Civil Rights
Cause 29:0794 Job Discrimination (Handicap)
Case Filed: Mar 17, 2016
Terminated: Apr 20, 2017
Docket Parties (2) Related Cases (4) News
Last checked: Tuesday Sep 13, 2016 5:04 AM EDT Update Parties
Defendant
Represented By
University of South Florida Board of Trustees
John F. Dickinson
Constangy, Brooks, Smith, & Prophete, LLP
jdickinson@constangy.com
John Sikes Gibbs

egibbs@constangy.com
J. Ray Poole, Jr.

rpoole@constangy.com
Plaintiff
Represented By
Stanley Robert Apps
Stanley R. Apps, P.A.
stan.apps@gmail.com
0:17-prici-11888 - Nausheen Zainulabeddin v. University of South Florida Bo 04/27/2017
https://www.pacermonitor.com/case/11005379/Zainulabeddin_v_University_of_South_Florida_Board_of_Trustees 1/15
0:17-cvpri-02083 - Zainulabeddin v. USF Board of Trustees 05/25/2017
Navigation Edit Alert
Docket last updated: 09/01/2017 11:59 PM EDT Update Now
Friday, July 28, 2017
82 appeal USCA Mandate Fri 12:08 PM

MANDATE of USCA for the Federal Circuit terminating appeal as to70 Notice of appeal filed by Nausheen
Zainulabeddin Issued as Mandate: 7/27/17 USCA number: 17-2083 ML. (JNB)
81 appeal USCA order Fri 12:07 PM

ORDER of USCA for the Federal Circuit:. The motion to acknowledge Ms. Zainulabeddin's filing as timely31 is
granted. The petition for panel rehearing30 is denied. All other pending motions28 3233 are denied as moot.
No further motions will be docketed or considered as to70 Notice of appeal filed by Nausheen Zainulabeddin.
EOD: 7/27/17; USCA number: 17-2083 ML. (JNB)
Tuesday, June 20, 2017
80 3 pgs appeal USCA order Tue 11:57 AM
ORDER of USCA filed terminating appeal; denying as moot motion to allow efiling19 filed by Appellant
Nausheen Zainulabeddin; denying as moot motion for other relief15 filed by Appellant Nausheen
Zainulabeddin, denying as moot motion for other relief11 filed by Appellant Nausheen Zainulabeddin; denying
as moot motion to correct document14 filed by Appellant Nausheen Zainulabeddin; denying as moot motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis7 filed by Appellant Nausheen Zainulabeddin; denying as moot motion
to correct or supplement record on appeal4 filed by Appellant Nausheen Zainulabeddin. Each side shall bear
its own costs as to70 Notice of appeal filed by Nausheen Zainulabeddin. EOD: 6/20/17; USCA number: 17-
2083 ML. (JNB)
Thursday, June 08, 2017

79 appeal Designation of Record on Appeal Fri 2:55 PM
DESIGNATION of Record on Appeal (Directions to the Clerk) by Nausheen Zainulabeddin re71 Notice of
appeal.(AG)
Att: 1 Mailing Envelope
Monday, June 05, 2017
78 4 pgs notice Notice (Other) Tue 3:49 PM
NOTICE to the clerk of corrections needed of docketing errors - May 10, 2017 thru Mary 31, 2017 by
Nausheen Zainulabeddin.(AG)
Att: 1 Exhibit,
Att: 2 Exhibit,
Att: 3 Mailing Envelope
77 2 pgs order Order on motion to supplement Mon 9:12 AM
ORDER denying 63 Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal. Signed by Judge James S.
Moody, Jr. on 6/5/2017. (LN)
Wednesday, May 31, 2017

appeal Transmittal to USCA Wed 8:43 AM
TRANSMITTAL to USCA forwarding Order granting appeal in forma pauperis re71 Notice of appeal,60 Notice
of appeal USCA number: 17-11888 G and 17-12134 C. (BSN)
Tuesday, May 30, 2017

76 order Order on motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis/affidavit of indigency Tue 5:37 PM
ORDER granting 72 Motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis/affidavit of indigency. Signed by Magistrate
Judge Thomas G. Wilson on 5/30/2017. (Wilson, Thomas)
75 5 pgs respm Response in Opposition to Motion Tue 5:01 PM
RESPONSE in Opposition re63 MOTION to supplement Record on Appeal and support for Motion and
Declaration for leave to proceed In Forma Pauperis (issues on appeal, Dkt. 61) to Magistrate Judge filed by
University of South Florida Board of Trustees. (Mans, Lori)
appeal Transmittal to USCA Tue 10:21 AM

TRANSMITTAL to USCA forwarding Order granting In Forma Pauperis re60 Notice of appeal USCA number:
17-12134 C. (BSN)

73 56 pgs appeal Transmittal of initial appeal package Wed 3:18 PM
TRANSMITTAL of initial appeal package to USCA consisting of copies of notice of appeal, docket sheet,
order/judgment being appealed, and motion, if applicable to USCA re70 Notice of appeal,71 Notice of appeal.
(KMM)
appeal Transmittal to USCA Wed 2:47 PM

TRANSMITTAL to USCA forwarding Order granting appeal in forma pauperis re44 Notice of appeal USCA
number: 17-11888 G. (BSN)
74 4 pgs notice Notice (Other) Wed 3:23 PM
DIRECTIONS TO THE CLERK by Nausheen Zainulabeddin. (BSN)
68 order Order on motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis/affidavit of indigency Tue 6:02 PM
Monday, May 22, 2017

72 motion Appeal in forma pauperis/affidavit of indigency Wed 3:10 PM
MOTION for leave to appeal in forma pauperis/affidavit of indigency by Nausheen Zainulabeddin. (KMM)
71 2 pgs appeal Notice of appeal Wed 3:09 PM
NOTICE OF APPEAL to USCA as to66 Order on Motion for Taxation of Costs by Nausheen Zainulabeddin.
Filing fee not paid. (KMM)
70 2 pgs appeal Notice of appeal Wed 3:07 PM
NOTICE OF APPEAL to Federal Circuit as to42 Order on motion for summary judgment,54 Order on Motion for
ReconsiderationOrder on motion for recusal by Nausheen Zainulabeddin. Filing fee not paid.(KMM)
Att: 1 2 pgs Petition for Review
69 16 pgs notice Notice (Other) Wed 3:03 PM
Directions to the Clerk, by Nausheen Zainulabeddin (KMM)
67 1 pgs misc Bill of costs Mon 8:30 AM
BILL OF COSTS taxed against Plaintiff in the amount of $5,382.15. Signed by Deputy Clerk. (AD)
Friday, May 19, 2017

66 7 pgs order Order on Motion for Taxation of Costs Fri 10:56 AM
ORDER: Defendant's Motion to Tax Costs 55 is granted in part and denied in part as explained herein.
Defendant is entitled to $5,382.15 in costs. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a Bill of Costs in the amount
of $5,382.15 in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 5/19/2017.
(LN)

65 misc Certificate of interested persons and corporate disclosure statement Thu 10:05 AM
CERTIFICATE of interested persons and corporate disclosure statement re3 Related case order and track 2
notice by Nausheen Zainulabeddin. (BSN)
64 14 pgs respm Response in Opposition to Motion Thu 10:03 AM
RESPONSE in Opposition re55 MOTION for Taxation of Costs with Verified Bill of Costs and Supporting
Memorandum of Law filed by Nausheen Zainulabeddin.(BSN)
Att: 1 19 pgs Exhibit A-E,
Att: 2 99 pgs Exhibit F,
Att: 3 45 pgs Exhibit G,
Att: 4 55 pgs Exhibit H,

Att: 5 3 pgs Exhibit,

Att: 7 2 pgs Exhibit
63 19 pgs motion Supplement Tue 3:55 PM
MOTION to supplement Record on Appeal and support for Motion and Declaration for leave to proceed In
Forma Pauperis (issues on appeal, Dkt. 61) to Magistrate Judge by Nausheen Zainulabeddin.(BSN)
Att: 1 38 pgs Exhibit A,

Att: 2 101 pgs Exhibit 1,




Att: 13 139 pgs Exhibit 12

62 15 pgs appeal Transmittal of initial appeal package Thu 10:52 AM
order/judgment being appealed, and motion, if applicable to USCA re60 Notice of appeal. (BSN)
61 5 pgs motion Appeal in forma pauperis/affidavit of indigency Thu 10:44 AM
MOTION for leave to appeal in forma pauperis/affidavit of indigency by Nausheen Zainulabeddin.(BSN)

Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Thomas G. Wilson.
60 2 pgs appeal Notice of appeal Thu 10:43 AM
NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 57 Order on motion to stay,54 Order on Motion for Reconsideration Order on
motion for recusal by Nausheen Zainulabeddin. Filing fee not paid. (BSN)
59 2 pgs appeal Designation of Record on Appeal Tue 4:58 PM
DESIGNATION (Directions to the Clerk) of Record on Appeal by Nausheen Zainulabeddin re44 Notice of
appeal(AG)
Att: 1 12 pgs Exhibit A
Friday, May 05, 2017

appeal Transmittal to USCA Fri 8:11 AM
TRANSMITTAL to USCA forwarding ORDER granting Motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis/affidavit of
indigency re44 Notice of appeal USCA number: 17-11888 G. (KMM)
Thursday, May 04, 2017

58 order Order on motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis/affidavit of indigency Thu 4:21 PM
57 order Order on motion to stay Thu 1:57 PM

ENDORSED ORDER denying as moot 56 motion to stay. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 5/4/2017.
(LN)
56 16 pgs motion Stay Thu 10:57 AM
MOTION to stay documents re48 ,49 ,50 and51 pending appeal by Nausheen Zainulabeddin.(BSN)
55 6 pgs motion Taxation of Costs Wed 5:26 PM
MOTION for Taxation of Costs with Verified Bill of Costs and Supporting Memorandum of Law by University of
South Florida Board of Trustees.(Mans, Lori) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Thomas G. Wilson.
Att: 1 26 pgs Exhibit Motion to Tax Costs Exhibit A
54 3 pgs order Order on Motion for Reconsideration Order on motion for recusal Wed 1:04 PM
ORDER denying 48 Motion for Reconsideration; denying 50 Motion for Recusal. Signed by Judge James S.
Moody, Jr. on 5/3/2017. (LN)
53 order Order on Motion to Continue Wed 11:18 AM

ENDORSED ORDER denying 51 Motion to Continue. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 5/3/2017. (LN)
52 order Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney Wed 11:17 AM

ENDORSED ORDER granting 47 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Stanley Robert Apps terminated.
Pro se Plaintiff's address of record is 4409 W. Varn Avenue, Tampa, FL 33616. Signed by Judge James S.
Moody, Jr on 5/3/2017. (LN)
51 4 pgs motion Continue Wed 10:49 AM
MOTION to Continue by Nausheen Zainulabeddin. (BSN)
50 23 pgs motion Recusal Tue 12:48 PM
MOTION for Recusal by Nausheen Zainulabeddin.(BSN)
Att: 1 70 pgs Exhibit A-F
49 13 pgs misc Affidavit Tue 12:47 PM
AFFIDAVIT of Nausheen Zainulabeddin re:48 MOTION for Reconsideration re43 Judgment by Nausheen
Zainulabeddin. (BSN)
48 26 pgs motion Reconsideration Tue 12:46 PM
MOTION for Reconsideration re43 Judgment by Nausheen Zainulabeddin.(BSN)
Att: 1 60 pgs Exhibit 1-14,

Att: 4 129 pgs Exhibit 44-57
Thursday, April 27, 2017
47 3 pgs motion Withdraw as Attorney Thu 7:58 PM
MOTION for Stanley R. Apps to withdraw as attorney for the Plaintiff, Nausheen Zainulabeddin, based upon
her election to proceed pro se by Stanley Robert Apps. (Apps, Stanley) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge
Thomas G. Wilson.
46 64 pgs appeal Transmittal of initial appeal package Thu 9:41 AM
order/judgment being appealed, and motion, if applicable to USCA re44 Notice of appeal. (BSN)
Wednesday, April 26, 2017
45 5 pgs motion Appeal in forma pauperis/affidavit of indigency Thu 9:14 AM

MOTION for leave to appeal in forma pauperis/affidavit of indigency by Nausheen Zainulabeddin.(BSN)
Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Thomas G. Wilson.
44 2 pgs appeal Notice of appeal Thu 9:13 AM
NOTICE OF APPEAL as to42 Order on motion for summary judgment by Nausheen Zainulabeddin. Filing fee
not paid. (BSN)
Thursday, April 20, 2017

43 2 pgs misc Judgment Thu 9:07 AM
JUDGMENT in favor of University of South Florida Board of Trustees against Nausheen Zainulabeddin (Signed
by Deputy Clerk) (BSN)
42 30+ pgs order Order on motion for summary judgment Wed 4:07 PM
ORDER: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 22) is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to
enter final judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. After entry of final judgment, the Clerk of Court
is directed to close this case and terminate any pending motions as moot. Signed by Judge James S. Moody,
Jr. on 4/19/2017. (AD)
Friday, March 24, 2017
41 5 pgs respm Memorandum in opposition Fri 12:18 PM
MEMORANDUM in opposition re37 Reply to Response to Motion Plaintiff's Surreply to Defendant's Reply to
Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Nausheen
Zainulabeddin.(Apps, Stanley)
Att: 2 4 pgs Exhibit B
Wednesday, March 22, 2017
40 2 pgs adr Mediation report Wed 3:04 PM
MEDIATION report Hearing held on 3/22/2017. Hearing outcome: IMPASSE. (Shulman, Christopher)
Tuesday, March 21, 2017
39 order Order on Motion for Leave to File Tue 1:14 PM

ENDORSED ORDER granting 38 Motion for Leave to File Surreply. Surreply shall be filed within seven (7) days
of the date of this Order. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 3/21/2017. (LN)
Saturday, March 18, 2017
38 3 pgs motion Leave to File Document Sat 2:57 AM
MOTION for leave to file Surreply of no more than 5 pages to Defendant's Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff's
Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment by Nausheen Zainulabeddin. (Apps,
Stanley)
37 9 pgs respm Reply to Response to Motion Wed 2:00 PM
REPLY to Response to Motion re22 MOTION for summary judgment filed by University of South Florida Board
of Trustees. (Mans, Lori)
36 1 pgs order Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney Thu 5:27 PM
ORDER granting 35 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney and for Substitution of Counsel. Attorney J. Ray Poole,
Jr., terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Thomas G. Wilson on 3/8/2017. (DMS)
Tuesday, March 07, 2017
35 3 pgs motion Withdraw as Attorney Tue 5:00 PM
MOTION for J. Ray Poole to withdraw as attorney and for Substitution of Counsel and Supporting
Memorandum of Law by University of South Florida Board of Trustees. (Dickinson, John)
34 order Order on Motion for Leave to File Wed 3:43 PM

ENDORSED ORDER granting 33 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Reply is limited to 10 pages and shall be filed
within 14 days. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 3/1/2017. (LN)
33 3 pgs motion Leave to File Document Wed 2:28 PM
MOTION for leave to file Reply to Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment by University of South Florida Board of Trustees. (Poole, J.)
Tuesday, February 28, 2017
32 order Order on motion to extend time Tue 9:16 AM

ENDORSED ORDER granting 31 Joint Motion to extend time to conduct Mediation until MARCH 22, 2017.
Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 2/28/2017. (LN)
Monday, February 27, 2017
31 3 pgs motion Extend time Mon 4:23 PM
Joint MOTION to extend time to conduct Mediation until March 22, 2017 by Nausheen Zainulabeddin. (Apps,
Stanley)
Sunday, February 19, 2017
30 2 pgs notice Notice (Other) Sun 6:40 PM
NOTICE by Nausheen Zainulabeddin re27 Response in Opposition to Motion,23 Notice (Other) Notice of Filing
COMPLETE Deposition Transcript of Dr. Ambuj Kumar, M.D., including Exhibit omitted by Defendant(Apps,
Stanley)
Att: 1 86 pgs Exhibit Deposition of Ambuj Kumar, MD,



NOTICE by Nausheen Zainulabeddin re27 Response in Opposition to Motion Notice of Filing Deposition
Transcript of Dr. Steven Specter, Ph.D.(Apps, Stanley)
Att: 1 182 pgs Exhibit Deposition of Steven Specter,




NOTICE by Nausheen Zainulabeddin re27 Response in Opposition to Motion Notice of Filing Affidavit of the
Plaintiff in support of Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment(Apps, Stanley)
Att: 1 27 pgs Affidavit of Nausheen Zainulabeddin,

27 20 pgs respm Response in Opposition to Motion Sun 4:13 PM
RESPONSE in Opposition re22 MOTION for summary judgment with supporting Memorandum of Law filed by
Nausheen Zainulabeddin. (Apps, Stanley)
26 12 pgs misc Statement of undisputed facts Sun 4:11 PM
STATEMENT of undisputed facts re:22 MOTION for summary judgment Statement of DISPUTED MATERIAL
FACTS, precluding entry of summary judgment by Nausheen Zainulabeddin..(Apps, Stanley)
Att: 2 5 pgs Exhibit B,
Att: 3 9 pgs Exhibit C
Thursday, February 09, 2017
25 2 pgs misc Notice of withdrawal of motion Thu 4:00 PM
NOTICE of withdrawal of motion by Nausheen Zainulabeddin re19 MOTION to Take Deposition from Dr.
Joanne Valeriano-Marcet Subsequent to Close of Discovery, with Incorporated Statement of Good Cause
Wherefore filed by Nausheen Zainulabeddin (Apps, Stanley)
Monday, February 06, 2017
24 order Order on motion to extend time Mon 9:49 AM

ENDORSED ORDER granting 21 Joint Motion to extend time to conduct mediation. Extension granted through
MARCH 1, 2017. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 2/6/2017. (LN)
Saturday, February 04, 2017
23 2 pgs notice Notice (Other) Sat 5:03 PM
NOTICE by University of South Florida Board of Trustees re22 MOTION for summary judgment (Poole, J.)
Att: 1 120 pgs Exhibit Deposition of Nausheen Zainulabeddin,
Att: 2 115 pgs Exhibit Deposition of Nausheen Zainulabeddin Part 2,
Att: 3 87 pgs Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Deborah Roth and Exhibits Thereto,
Att: 4 87 pgs Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Ambuj Kumar and Exhibits Thereto,
Att: 5 73 pgs Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Saundra Stock,

Att: 6 61 pgs Exhibit Deposition of Dr. Saundra Stock and Exhibits Thereto Part 2
22 25 pgs motion Summary judgment Sat 3:49 PM
MOTION for summary judgment by University of South Florida Board of Trustees. (Poole, J.)
Friday, February 03, 2017
21 3 pgs motion Extend time Fri 8:45 PM
Joint MOTION to extend time to Complete Mediation by University of South Florida Board of Trustees. (Poole,
J.)
Thursday, February 02, 2017
20 2 pgs order Order on Motion to Take Deposition Thu 5:30 PM
ORDER granting 19 Motion to Take Deposition of Dr. Joanne Valeriano-Marcet on February 3, 2017. See Order
for further details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Thomas G. Wilson on 2/2/2017. (DMS)
Wednesday, February 01, 2017
19 6 pgs motion Take Deposition Wed 4:43 PM
MOTION to Take Deposition from Dr. Joanne Valeriano-Marcet Subsequent to Close of Discovery, with
Incorporated Statement of Good Cause Wherefore by Nausheen Zainulabeddin.(Apps, Stanley)
Tuesday, December 13, 2016
18 2 pgs order Order appointing mediator/scheduling mediation Tue 9:39 AM
ORDER appointing Christopher M. Shulman as mediator in this action. Mediation Conference set for
FEBRUARY 10, 2017. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 12/13/2016. (LN)
Friday, December 09, 2016
17 2 pgs adr Notice of selection of mediator Fri 10:32 PM
NOTICE OF SELECTION of Christopher M. Shulman as mediator by University of South Florida Board of

Trustees. (Poole, J.)
Wednesday, November 30, 2016
16 order Order on Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Wed 9:53 AM
ENDORSED ORDER granting 15 the Parties' Joint Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery.
Discovery shall be completed by February 1, 2017. Dispositive Motions are now due February 4, 2017. All
other dates in the Case Management Order remain unchanged. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on
11/30/2016. (RWL)
Tuesday, November 29, 2016
15 4 pgs motion Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Tue 3:53 PM
Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by University of South Florida Board of Trustees.
(Poole, J.)
Wednesday, November 09, 2016
14 5 pgs order Order referring case to mediation Wed 1:55 PM
ORDER referring case to mediation and directing selection of a mediator on or before 12/9/2016. Mediation
shall be conducted on or before 3/1/2017. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 11/9/2016. (LN)
Friday, September 09, 2016

13 order Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney Fri 9:34 AM
ENDORSED ORDER granting 12 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney John Sikes Gibbs terminated.
Attorney John F. Dickinson is directed to file a Notice of Appearance in this case. Signed by Judge James S.
Moody, Jr on 9/9/2016. (LN)
Thursday, September 08, 2016
12 3 pgs motion Withdraw as Attorney Thu 3:57 PM
Unopposed MOTION for Gibbs to withdraw as attorney by University of South Florida Board of Trustees.
(Poole, J.)
11 32 pgs answer Answer to Complaint Wed 1:48 PM
ANSWER and affirmative defenses to Complaint by University of South Florida Board of Trustees.(Gibbs, John)
10 9 pgs order Order on motion to dismiss Wed 11:18 AM
ORDER: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and For More Definite Statement 4 is DENIED. Defendant shall file an
answer within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this order. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 4/13/2016.
(LN)
9 3 pgs order Case management and scheduling order Wed 10:23 AM
CASE MANAGEMENT AND SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 1/3/2017, Dispositive motions due by
2/1/2017, Pretrial Conference set for TUESDAY, MAY 2, 2017 at 9:15 AM in Tampa Courtroom 17 before Judge
James S. Moody Jr., Jury Trial set for JUNE 2017 trial term in Tampa Courtroom 17 before Judge James S.
Moody Jr. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 4/6/2016. (AR)
Monday, April 04, 2016
8 misc Case Management Report Mon 2:02 PM

CASE MANAGEMENT REPORT. (Gibbs, John)

7 notice Notice of pendency of related cases Wed 5:23 PM
NOTICE of pendency of related cases re3 Related case order and track 2 notice per Local Rule 1.04(d) by
Nausheen Zainulabeddin. Related case(s): yes (Apps, Stanley)
6 13 pgs respm Response in Opposition to Motion Wed 4:46 PM
RESPONSE in Opposition re4 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and For More Definite Statement and
Supporting Memorandum of Law filed by Nausheen Zainulabeddin.(Apps, Stanley)
Friday, March 25, 2016
5 notice Notice of pendency of related cases Fri 1:15 PM

NOTICE of pendency of related cases per Local Rule 1.04(d) by University of South Florida Board of Trustees.
Related case(s): No (Gibbs, John)
Thursday, March 24, 2016
4 11 pgs motion Dismiss Thu 2:15 PM
MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and For More Definite Statement and Supporting Memorandum of
Law by University of South Florida Board of Trustees. (Gibbs, John)
Monday, March 21, 2016

3 order Related case order and track 2 notice Mon 4:27 PM
RELATED CASE ORDER AND NOTICE of designation under Local Rule 3.05 - track 2. Issued by Deputy Clerk
on 3/21/2016. (AR)
Thursday, March 17, 2016

2 cmp Complaint Fri 12:03 PM
COMPLAINT against University of South Florida Board of Trustees with Jury Demand filed by Nausheen
Zainulabeddin . Originally filed in state court on 1/22/16.(BSN) Modified on 3/18/2016 (BSN)
Att: 1 Exhibit
1 6 pgs notice Notice of Removal Fri 12:01 PM
NOTICE OF REMOVAL from 13th Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County, Florida, case number 16-CA-
000669 filed in State Court on 1/22/16. Filing fee $ 400, receipt number tpa 035597 filed by University of
South Florida Board of Trustees.(BSN)

Att: 4 2 pgs Civil Cover Sheet
Showing All
Last viewed: Sep 02, 2017 2:22 AM EDT
Support • Privacy • Terms • About

PacerMonitor, LLC © 2016. Made in NYC
Case 8:16-cv-00637-JSM-TGW Document 6 Filed 03/30/16 Page 1 of 13 PageID 214
A-210
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
NAUSHEEN ZAINULABEDDIN,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 8-16-cv-00637-JSM-TGW
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
______________________________________/
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT,
WITH INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW
The Plaintiff, Nausheen Zainulabeddin (“Zainulabeddin”), by and
through her undersigned counsel, hereby responds in opposition to Defendant,
University of South Florida Board of Trustees (“USF”)’s Motion to Dismiss and
for More Definite Statement (hereinafter the “Motion” or “Motion to Dismiss”).
In support of her Opposition, Zainulabeddin states as follows:
I. RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS COUNTS I AND II (STATE TORT CLAIMS)
USF argues that Zainulabeddin’s state law tort causes of action, stated in
Counts I and II of her Complaint, are untimely because Zainulabeddin’s letter
of claim dated May 12, 2016 was not sent within three years of accrual of her
claims, as required by Florida law. USF supports this argument by construing
! 1!
A-211
certain allegations of Zainulabeddin’s Complaint in the manner most favorable
to USF. This is improper, for the reasons shown below.
A. Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss

Based on Statute of Limitations
“The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and the burden of
proving an affirmative defense is on the defendant.” Lesti v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 2013 WL 1137482, at *1 (M.D. Fla. March 19, 2013) (citing Tello v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 358 F.3d 840,845 (11th Cir. 2004)). As a result, a motion to dismiss
on statute of limitations grounds should not be granted, when resolution of
such a motion depends on facts not yet in evidence or on construing factual
allegations of the Complaint in a manner that favors the Defendant. Omar ex
rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2003); Lesti at *1.
B. USF’s Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations as to Counts I and II

Must Be Rejected at the Motion to Dismiss Phase,
Because USF Has Not Met its Burden of Proving This Defense
USF’s Motion to Dismiss assumes that Zainulabeddin’s tort claims
accrued on February 6, 2012, the date when Zainulabeddin first obtained a copy
of the complete neuropsychological report that USF voluntarily undertook to
provide for her. See Plaintiff’s Compl., Dkt. 2, ¶¶s 31; 33-35; 53-59; 129-130; 136;
138-140; 143; 146-47; 150-53; 155-57. USF’s assumption that the tort claims
accrued on this specific date is based on construing Zainulabeddin’s Complaint
in a manner that favors USF.
Notably, Zainulabeddin construes her Complaint quite differently. Even
! 2!
A-212
after February 6, 2012, USF continued to behave in a manner calculated to
dissuade Zainulabeddin from asserting her legal rights, such as by permitting
Zainulabeddin to re-enroll in medical school and granting her reasonable
accommodations of disability. Plaintiff’s Compl., Dkt. 2, ¶¶s 60-65; 81-82.
Zainulabeddin relied on these actions by USF as demonstrating USF’s
intention to rectify the harm to her caused by USF’s earlier negligent
misrepresentations and fiduciary violations. Zainulabeddin did not learn until
months later that USF would refuse to rectify all the harm done by USF’s
misconduct. She did not learn this until July 30, 2013, when USF refused to
reimburse Zainulabeddin for the full amount of tuition she paid for the 2011-
2012 academic year, in which her performance was compromised due to USF’s
fiduciary violations and negligence. Plaintiff’s Compl., Dkt. 2, ¶¶s 73-74; 77-80.
Indeed, it was on July 30, 2013 that Zainulabeddin learned for the first
time that USF, through its agent Dr. Steven Specter, would oppose her
attempts to rectify in full the harm to Zainulabeddin from USF’s earlier
negligence and fiduciary violations. Plaintiff’s Compl., Dkt. 2, ¶¶s 78-79. Until
that date, USF and Specter had lulled Zainulabeddin into inactivity through
ongoing assurances that she would be treated fairly and that the University
would correct the harmful consequences of its errors. It is only on July 30, 2013
that Zainulabeddin was put on notice that USF, by and through Specter, would
misrepresent facts pertaining to Zainulabeddin in order to avoid refunding her
! 3!
A-213
tuition payments for periods when USF’s errors denied her the value of
educational services. Specifically, Specter misrepresented Zainulabeddin’s
activity in the 2011-2012 academic year to the USF Registrar on that date. Id.
From February 6, 2012 until July 30, 2013, USF behaved in a manner
calculated to cause Zainulabeddin to believe that USF took responsibility for
the harm she suffered due to the University’s errors and that USF would take
appropriate actions to rectify the harm done. Zainulabeddin reasonably relied
on USF’s conduct during this period and thereby changed her position for the
worse, by foregoing legal action aimed at seeking remedy for her earlier harm.
Under Florida law, USF’s actions in this period and Zainulabeddin’s reliance
may give rise to equitable estoppel in Zainulabeddin’s favor. Florida Dept. of
Health and Rehabilitative Services v. S.A.P., 835 So.2d 1091 (Fla. 2002); Major
League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1076-77 (Fla. 2001) (“Equitable
estoppel presupposes a legal shortcoming in an opposing party’s case that is
directly attributable to the opposing party’s misconduct. The doctrine bars the
wrongdoer from asserting that shortcoming and profiting from his or her own
misconduct.”)
USF may argue that USF’s efforts to partially rectify harm to
Zainulabeddin do not constitute misconduct. However, even apparently
beneficial acts can give rise to equitable estoppel when a purpose of such acts is
to lull another person into declining to exercise legal rights. Morsani, 790 So.2d
! 4!
A-214
at 1076, citing State ex rel. Watson v. Gray, 48 So.2d 84, 87-88 (Fla. 1950)
(equitable estoppel is applicable “in all cases where one, by word, act or
conduct, willfully caused another to believe in a certain state of things, and
thereby induces him to act on this belief injuriously to himself.”); Miami Nat.
Bank v. Greenfield, 488 S.2d 559, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (“Where the
words or conduct of one party causes another to forbear to his detriment,
equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent harm to the innocent party.”)
At the motion to dismiss phase, neither Zainulabeddin nor USF have
had an opportunity to present proof of their factual assertions. Zainulabeddin
has not yet had an opportunity to show her entitlement to equitable estoppel,
nor has USF had a chance to prove its entitlement to prevail on its statute of
limitations defense. Because of this, it would be premature for the Court to rule
in either party’s favor on this issue at this phase. Omar, 334 F.3d at 1251-52 (it is
premature to dismiss a Complaint for non-compliance with the statute of
limitations where the parties set forth fact-intensive reasons why the motion to
dismiss based on statute of limitations should be granted or denied).
The standard of review prevents the Court from resolving the statutes of
limitations issues based on either party’s unproven representations as to facts
that are not yet in evidence. Id. Similarly, the Court may not resolve statutes of
limitations issues based on a defendant’s self-serving construal of the
allegations of the Complaint. Id. Therefore, the Court must deny USF’s Motion
! 5!
A-215
to Dismiss as to Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s Complaint, since Defendant’s fact-
intensive arguments regarding the statute of limitations are presented
prematurely and are better suited for consideration in the context of a Motion
for Summary Judgment.
II. RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS COUNT III (CONTRACT CLAIM)
USF asserts that Zainulabeddin’s contract claim, stated in Count III of
her Complaint, must be dismissed because Zainulabeddin “cannot identify a
valid, written contract that was breached.” Dkt. 4 at 4. Again, USF seeks
dismissal on grounds that are better suited for a Motion for Summary
Judgment. Indeed, USF relies on authorities wherein the Court granted
summary judgment for Defendant, as justification for its Motion to Dismiss.
See Dkt. 4 at 4-5, citing Carr v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 249 F.App’x
146, 150-51 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming summary judgment on contract claim based
on failure to prove existence of a valid contract); Williams v. Florida State Univ.,
2014 WL 340562 at *7 (granting summary judgment on contract claim based on
plaintiff’s failure to prove existence of a valid, written contract that was
breached).
The authorities relied on by USF presuppose that a Plaintiff will have a
fair opportunity to present evidence of the existence of the contract on which
! 6!
A-216
her claim is based. For this reason, USF’s Motion to Dismiss on these grounds
cannot be granted at the Motion to Dismiss phase.
In addition, USF appears to misunderstand the nature of
Zainulabeddin’s contract claim. Zainulabeddin recognizes that USF’s College
of Medicine Medical Student Handbook (“Handbook” or “Medical Student
Handbook”) is not itself a contract between Zainulabeddin and the University.
Rather, Zainulabeddin asserts that she had a contractual relationship with USF
and that certain terms of the Handbook are incorporated by reference in her
contract with the University. See Plaintiff’s Compl., Dkt. 2, ¶¶s 68-70.
Zainulabeddin is no longer in possession of all of the communications
with USF that constitute her contract with USF, such as offer letters, letters of
admission, letters of readmission, letters of acceptance and similar. As such,
Zainulabeddin intends to use the discovery process to obtain appropriate proof
of her contract with USF and of the contract terms, including proof that her
contract incorporates by reference Handbook terms pertaining to tuition
payment and refunds. The authorities cited by USF indicate that
Zainulabeddin must be afforded a fair opportunity to do this.
Lastly, Zainulabeddin notes that USF’s Motion to Dismiss her contract
claim improperly relies on controverting factual allegations of her Complaint,
by asserting that there is no contractual relationship between Zainulabeddin,
when her Complaint clearly alleged the opposite. USF’s reliance on
! 7!
A-217
controverting Zainulabeddin’s factual allegations, in support of a Motion to
Dismiss, emphasizes the improper character of USF’s Motion.
For these reasons, as set forth more fully below, USF’s Motion to
Dismiss Count III of Zainulabeddin’s Complaint must be denied.
a. Standard of Review for a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
Dismissal of a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) is only justified when
“on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual
allegations will support the cause of action.” Marshall Cnty. Bd. Of Educ. v.
Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1992). Dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) may be appropriate where plaintiff’s entitlement to relief “turns purely
on the law” and does not require the Court to draw conclusions as to matters of
fact. Id. The Court must interpret Plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations in
the manner most favorable to Plaintiff when resolving a Motion to Dismiss.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007.)
b. USF’s Motion to Dismiss Zainulabeddin’s Contract Claim is Improper,

as it is Plainly Based on Controverting Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations
and Assumes Facts Not in Evidence
This Court cannot grant USF’s Motion to Dismiss Zainulabeddin’s
contract claim, because the Motion assumes that there is no contractual
relationship between Zainulabeddin and USF, which is contrary to the
allegations of her Complaint. Zainulabeddin plainly alleged that she had a
contractual relationship with USF, governing her relationship to USF as a
! 8!
A-218
Medical Student, and that her contractual relationship with USF was
substantially similar to USF’s contractual relationship with every other medical
student. Plaintiff’s Compl., Dkt. 2, ¶ 68. She also plainly alleged that some, but
not all, portions of the Medical Student Handbook, including portions of the
Handbook pertaining to tuition payment and reimbursement, are incorporated
by reference in her contract with the University. Id. at ¶¶s 69-71.
Zainulabeddin should be given a fair opportunity to prove the existence
and contents of her contract with USF. After the close of discovery, if she is
unable to prove the existence and terms of her contract with USF, then
summary judgment on her contract claim will be appropriate, as shown by Carr
and Williams.
Because USF’s Motion to Dismiss Count III would require the Court to
draw conclusions as to contested matters of fact (such as a factual conclusion
that Zainulabeddin and USF lacked any contractual relationship), USF’s
Motion is improper and cannot be granted. Marshall Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 992
F.2d at 1174.
III. RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS COUNT IV (UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM)
USF asserts that Zainulabeddin’s unjust enrichment claim, stated as
Count IV of her Complaint, is barred by USF’s sovereign immunity as an
agency of the State of Florida. However, USF’s assertion is overreaching and
incorrect.
! 9!
A-219
In fact, as this Court has recently concluded, Florida law creates “an
implied waiver of sovereign immunity for breach of contract claims [that]
applies to claims for breach of the express and implied conditions of a written
contract, but does not apply to claims totally outside the terms of a written
contract.” Llorca v. Rambosk, No. 2:15-cv-00017-FtM-29CM (M.D.Fla. May 5, 2015)
at 2-3 (citations omitted), attached hereto as Exhibit A. Here, the issue of
whether Zainulabeddin’s unjust enrichment claim is “totally outside the terms
of a written contract” is a contested matter of fact that is not ripe for resolution
at the Motion to Dismiss phase. Zainulabeddin alleges that she had a
contractual relationship with USF and her unjust enrichment claim pertains to
implied conditions of that written contract. For these reasons, as set forth more
fully below, USF’s Motion to Dismiss Count IV of Zainulabeddin’s Complaint
must be denied.
a. USF’s Motion to Dismiss Zainulabeddin’s Unjust Enrichment Claim

Inaccurately Represents Florida Law on Sovereign Immunity
in the Context of Contract Claims
USF incorrectly asserts that all implied contract claims against Florida
state agencies are barred by sovereign immunity. Dkt. 4 at 7. This is not the law.
The law is correctly stated in this Court’s recent Llorca decision, as follows:
“Florida courts have held that sovereign immunity has been waived for claims
that a state entity breached the express or implied covenants of a written
contract.” Id. at 4. As noted above, Zainulabeddin does allege a written contract
! 10!
A-220
between herself and USF and her unjust enrichment claim stated as Count IV
relies on implied covenants thereof. Therefore, USF has failed to set forth any
valid basis for its Motion to Dismiss Count IV.
IV. RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
Plaintiff disagrees with USF’s assertion that her Complaint is a “shotgun
pleading” that violates Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Zainulabeddin’s Complaint is somewhat lengthy because it covers a long period
of time (from 2009 to 2013) in which USF first committed negligence and
fiduciary violations as to Zainulabeddin (Counts I and II) and later
discriminated against her on the basis of her disability (Counts V and VI).
Furthermore, although Zainulabeddin’s Complaint contains multiple
Counts, each Count does not incorporate by reference the allegations of the
preceding Counts, as is characteristic of the “quintessential shotgun pleading.”
See Strategic Income Fund, LLC v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293,
1295 (11th Cir. 2002).
Zainulabeddin recognizes that her Complaint is not a perfect document.
Indeed, looking back at it, her counsel wishes he had been more selective and
precise when re-incorporating earlier factual allegations into each of the six
Counts. However, the Complaint’s imperfections do not rise to the level to
justify a Motion under Rule 12(e). Every factual allegation set forth in the
Complaint is germane to one or more of Zainulabeddin’s six causes of action
! 11!
A-221
and there are no “rambling recitations” or irrelevant factual allegations, such as
would appear in a “shotgun pleading.” Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1517-18
(11th Cir. 1991).
For these reasons, Zainulabeddin respectfully states that USF’s Motion
for More Definite Statement should be denied.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Zainulabeddin respectfully asks that
USF’s Motion to Dismiss and for More Definite Statement should be denied in
its entirety.
In the alternative, to the extent the Court grants USF’s Motion to
Dismiss as to any Count of Zainulabeddin’s Complaint, she asks that any
dismissal be without prejudice and with leave to amend.
Respectfully submitted on this 30th day of March, 2016.
/s/ Stanley R. Apps
Stanley R. Apps, Esq.

FL Bar. No. 0108868
1950 Elkhorn Ct., Unit 147
San Mateo, CA 94403
(310) 709-3966
stan.apps@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
! 12!
A-222
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 30, 2016, I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will
send a Notice of Electronic Filing to all counsel of record herein.
/s/ Stanley R. Apps
! 13!
Case 8:16-cv-00637-JSM-TGW Document 6-1 Filed 03/30/16 Page 1 of 6 PageID 227
A-223
Exhibit A
Llorca v. Rambosk Doc. 29
A-224
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
CARLO LLORCA, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 2:15-cv-17-FtM-29CM
KEVIN RAMBOSK, as the duly

elected Sheriff of Collier
County, Florida,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Count IV of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc.
#22) filed on March 11, 2015. Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc.
#23) on March 13, 2015. For the reasons stated below, the motion
is granted.
I.
Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint1 (Doc. #15), against
Defendant Kevin Rambosk in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Collier County, Florida. Plaintiff, a former employee of the
Collier County Sheriff’s Office, alleges that he performed off-
the-clock work for which he was not compensated. Plaintiff further
1
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint (Doc. #15) on March 1,
2015. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count III of
Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. #11) and Defendant’s Amended Motion to
Dismiss Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. #14), filed on
February 17 and February 18, 2015, will be denied as moot.
Dockets.Justia.com
A-225
alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for objecting to the
failure to provide full compensation. According to Plaintiff,
Defendant’s conduct constitutes unjust enrichment and violates the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Florida Minimum Wage Act
(FMWA). Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s unjust
enrichment cause of action (Count IV) on the basis of Florida state
law sovereign immunity. Plaintiff responds that the State of
Florida has waived sovereign immunity under the circumstances
giving rise to his unjust enrichment claim.
II.
“Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to
be sued without its consent.” Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v.
Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1637 (2011). “In Florida, sovereign
immunity is the rule, rather than the exception,” Pan-Am Tobacco
Corp. v. Dep't of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984) (citing Fla.
Const. art. X, § 13). Thus, absent a waiver, Florida sovereign
immunity bars suit against the state or one of its political
subdivisions. Id.
Florida’s legislature has explicitly waived sovereign
immunity for liability in torts involving personal injury,
wrongful death, and loss or injury of property. Fla. Stat. §
768.28. Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court has found an
implied waiver of sovereign immunity for breach of contract claims.
Pan-Am, 471 So. 2d at 5-6. That waiver applies to claims for
breach of the express and implied conditions of a written contract,
2
A-226
but does not apply to claims totally outside the terms of a written
contract. County of Brevard v. Miorelli Eng'g, 703 So. 2d 1049,
1051 (Fla. 1997) (absent a written change order, sovereign immunity
barred breach of contract claim against city for extra work beyond
that described in construction contract); see also Champagne-
Webber, Inc. v. Ft. Lauderdale, 519 So. 2d 696, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA
1988) (sovereign immunity waived for claim that city violated
implied covenant not to interfere with performance of written
construction contract by misrepresenting soil conditions).
Here, Plaintiff brings his unjust enrichment claim against
Kevin Rambosk in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Collier
County, Florida. A claim against a Florida county sheriff in his
official capacity is considered a claim against the county he
represents. Cook v. Sheriff of Monroe County, 402 F.3d 1092, 1115
(11th Cir. 2005) (“When, as here, the defendant is the county
sheriff, the suit is effectively an action against the governmental
entity he represents—in this case, Monroe County.”); Abusaid v.
Hillsborough Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“Florida's constitution labels sheriffs county
officers.”) (quoting Fla. Const. art. VII, § 1(d)). Under Florida
law, counties are political subdivisions entitled to sovereign
immunity to the same extent as the state. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(2).
Thus, the Court must determine whether the state has waived
sovereign immunity for the unjust enrichment claim at issue here.
3
A-227
“A claim for unjust enrichment is an equitable claim, based
on a legal fiction created by courts to imply a ‘contract’ as a
matter of law.” Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT Utensili, SRL, 198 F.3d
802, 805 (11th Cir. 1999). Because unjust enrichment claims are
not torts, Florida’s legislature has not waived sovereign immunity
pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.28. Plaintiff argues, however, that
his unjust enrichment claim falls within the waiver of sovereign
immunity articulated in Pan-Am and Miorelli because his oral
employment contract with the Sheriff’s Office included the express
(or implied) covenant that he would be compensated for all work
performed at the Sheriff’s direction. Defendant responds that the
terms of Plaintiff’s alleged oral employment contract are
immaterial because there can be no waiver of sovereign immunity
absent a written contract. The Court agrees with Defendant.
As explained above, Florida courts have held that sovereign
immunity has been waived for claims that a state entity breached
the express or implied covenants of a written contract. However,
as explicitly stated by the Florida Supreme Court in Pan-Am, a
duly-authorized written contract is a prerequisite to finding that
sovereign immunity has been waived. 471 So. 2d at 6 (“We would
also emphasize that our holding here is applicable only to suits
on express, written contracts into which the state agency has
statutory authority to enter.”); see also Fin. Healthcare Assocs.,
Inc. v. Pub. Health Trust, 488 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1236 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (“Clearly, the implied contract alleged in Count II is not
4
A-228
an express written contract and therefore it fails to escape the
sovereign immunity bar as articulated in Pan–Am.”).
Here, Plaintiff concedes that he does not have a written
contract with the Collier County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. #23, pp.
4-7.) Thus, the waiver of sovereign immunity articulated by the
Florida Supreme Court in Pan-Am and Miorelli is inapplicable and
Defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity from Plaintiff’s claim
for unjust enrichment.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count III of Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Doc. #11) and Defendant’s Amended Motion to Dismiss
Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. #14) are DENIED as moot.
2. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count IV of Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint (Doc. #22) is GRANTED and Count IV of the Amended
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 5th day of
May, 2015.
Copies: Counsel of record
5
A-229
TAMPA DIVISION
Plaintiff(s),
v. Case No: 8:16-cv-00637-T-30TGW
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA,
Defendant(s).
___________________________________/
CASE MANAGEMENT AND SCHEDULING ORDER
This cause came on for consideration concerning completion of discovery and the
scheduling of pretrial procedures and trial. The Court has considered the positions of the
parties as set forth in their Case Management Report, and hereby enters the following
scheduling and case management requirements whose provisions are very precise and shall
be strictly adhered to. Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. The parties are directed to meet the agreed upon terms and time limits set forth
in their Case Management Report, as noted below (including any exceptions deemed
appropriate by the Court):
Third-Party Joinder Cut-Off: May 2, 2016

Plaintiff(s) Expert Disclosure: September 6, 2016
Defendant(s) Expert Disclosure: October 3, 2016
Discovery Deadline: January 3, 2017
Dispositive Motion Deadline: February 1, 2017
2. Parties shall take heed that motions to amend any pleading or a motion for
continuance of any pretrial conference, hearing or trial filed after issuance of this Case
Management and Scheduling Order are disfavored. See Local Rules 3.05(c)(2)(E) and
3.05(c)(3)(D). If evidence arises during fact discovery that would support a motion to amend
a pleading, the moving party shall file a motion to amend within fourteen (14) days of
Page 1 of 3
A-230
learning of the evidence. Motions to amend after that fourteen (14) day window will be
governed by a good cause standard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).
3. A Pre-Trial Conference will be held before the Honorable James S. Moody,

Jr., United States Courthouse, 801 North Florida Avenue, Courtroom 17, Tampa, Florida
33602, on TUESDAY, MAY 2, 2017 AT 9:15 A.M. (Pre-trial conferences generally
last fifteen minutes.)
4. The parties shall comply with Local Rule 3.06 with respect to their joint Pre-
Trial Statement, which is due no later than seven (7) days before the date of the Pre-Trial
Conference.
5. The Pre-Trial Conference shall be attended by counsel who will act as lead
trial counsel in the case and who is vested with full authority to make and solicit disclosure
and agreements touching all matters pertaining to the trial.
6. This case is set for JURY TRIAL in Courtroom 17 of the United States
Courthouse, 801 N. Florida Avenue, Tampa, Florida, during the JUNE 2017, trial term
before the Honorable James S. Moody, Jr. (Trial terms run a calendar month.)
7. Any motions in limine shall be filed with the Clerk of Court no later than three
(3) weeks before the date of the Pre-Trial Conference. The parties are limited to filing only
one (1) motion in limine that includes each ground for the exclusion of evidence.
8. NO LATER than two (2) business days prior to the first day of trial, counsel
shall electronically file proposed voir dire, jury instructions, and verdict forms, serve copies
on opposing counsel, and provide the courtroom deputy with a copy for use by the Judge.
Counsel shall e-mail proposed jury instructions and verdict forms in either Word or Word
Perfect format to: chambers_flmd_moody@flmd.uscourts.gov.
(a) Trial Brief: The Court does not require Trial Briefs or Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
(b) If case is a JURY trial, the following shall be provided no later than
two (2) business days prior to the date on which trial is set to
commence:
(1) A concise (one paragraph preferably) joint or stipulated

statement of the nature of the action to be used in providing a
basic explanation of the case to the jury venire;
Page 2 of 3
A-231
(2) Proposed Voir Dire (the Court will conduct the voir dire and, in
addition to the usual more general questions, will without
initiation by counsel ask more particular questions suggested by
the nature of the case; counsel should, therefore, be selective in
the jury questions submitted to the Court for consideration);
(3) A complete set of all written Proposed Jury Instructions

(which shall bear a cover sheet with the complete style of the
case and appropriate heading designating the submitting party;
there shall be no more than one instruction per page and contain,
at the end of each such instruction, citation of authorities, if
any); they shall be sequentially numbered and party-identified
(e.g., Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 1); and
(4) Proposed Verdict Form
(c) If case is a NON-JURY trial, Proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law are required only if the Judge requests them. If
they are requested, each shall be separately stated in numbered
paragraphs; Findings of Fact shall contain a detailed listing of the
relevant material facts the party intends to prove, in a simple, narrative
form; Conclusions of Law shall contain a full exposition of the legal
theories relied upon by counsel. At the end of trial, Counsel shall e-
mail the parties' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in
Word or WordPerfect format to Chambers at:
chambers_flmd_moody@flmd.uscourts.gov.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on April 6, 2016.
Copies furnished to:

Counsel/Parties of Record
S:\Odd\2016\16-cv-637.CSO.order.wpd
Page 3 of 3
A-232
TAMPA DIVISION
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 8:16-cv-637-T-30TGW

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and for More
Definite Statement (Dkt. 4), and Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (Dkt. 6). The Court has
reviewed the pleadings, the complaint and its attachments, and the applicable law. As
specified below, the Court concludes that the motion should be denied.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2009, Plaintiff Nausheen Zainulabeddin enrolled in the Doctor of Medicine
Program at the University of South Florida in the hopes of becoming a medical doctor. Her
student tenure, however, was short-lived. According to allegations in Zainulabeddin’s
complaint, she failed her first-year final exams and was placed on academic probation; she
later failed two more courses, after which, in January 2012, she was dismissed from the
university for poor academic performance; she appealed her dismissal and lost. (Dkt. 2, pp.
8-13).
A-233
Zainulabeddin’s complaint also alleges that, long before dismissing her, the
university had misread a disability diagnosis found in a neuropsychological exam
performed on Zainulabeddin and consequently failed to inform her of that disability—
specifically, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)—even though the exam
and the diagnosis were performed by a USF medical provider at the university’s behest.
Zainulabeddin also alleges that the university failed to provide her reasonable disability
accommodations; that USF, by failing to provide these accommodations, wrongfully
dismissed her from the medical school; that although USF readmitted her upon learning of
its failure to recognize her ADHD diagnosis, the university did not refund tuition that it
was contractually obligated to refund; and that USF wrongfully readmitted Zainulabeddin
in an “academic probation” status. (Dkt. 2, pp. 12-15).
Finally, Zainulabeddin’s complaint alleges that, after she was readmitted, USF
subjected her to disparate treatment and retaliation for her disability and for her being on
academic probation and a “readmitted” student. (Dkt. 2, pp. 19-20).
Zainulabeddin later received failing grades in two courses—Doctoring II and
Evidence Based Clinical Reasoning II. Because of these failures, on March 14, 2013, she
was again dismissed from the medical school. On May 28, 2013, she lost her appeal, and
USF issued a final notice of dismissal. (Dkt. 2, pp. 26-27).
On May 12, 2015, Zainulabeddin’s counsel wrote to the dean of the medical school,
outlining Zainulabeddin’s grievances against the university and providing the university
with pre-suit notice of a claim against it, as required by Florida Statutes Section 786.28(6).
(Dkt. 2-1, pp. 2-6). That letter referred to a university official’s negligent representation to
2
A-234
Zainulabeddin that she was not in fact diagnosed with ADHD, which resulted in her
January 2012 dismissal. Zainulabeddin learned of this misrepresentation, the letter alleged,
in February 2012. (Id.)
Zainulabeddin filed this lawsuit in March 2016. The complaint contains six counts.
The first four are state law claims: Count 1 for breach of fiduciary duties; Count 2 for
negligent misrepresentation; Count 3 for breach of contract; and Count 4 for unjust
enrichment. Counts 5 and 6 are alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
794 et seq. Count 5 alleges disparate treatment on the basis of a disability and Count 6
alleges that USF retaliated against Zainulabeddin for her having that disability.
DISCUSSION
Now USF moves to dismiss, with prejudice, Counts 1 through 4, and seeks a more
definite statement on Counts 5 and 6. USF argues that Counts 1 and 2 are time-barred by
Florida’s sovereign immunity statute, which states that lawsuits against a state agency are
only permitted if “the claimant presents the claim in writing to the appropriate agency . . .
within 3 years after such claim accrues.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6)(a). USF argues that Counts
3 and 4 must be dismissed because Zainulabeddin cannot identify a contract between her
and USF, and, without one, those Counts must fail.
As discussed below, these arguments lack the benefit of discovery and are thus
premature. For this reason, the Court rejects them. The Court also rejects USF’s arguments
for a more definite statement and therefore will not order Zainulabeddin to supply one.
3
A-235
Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a complaint to be dismissed for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. When reviewing a motion to dismiss,
courts must limit their consideration to the well-pleaded allegations, documents central to
or referred to in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed. La Grasta v. First Union
Securities, Inc., 358 F. 3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, they must accept all factual allegations contained in the complaint as true,
and view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93-94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007).
Legal conclusions, however, “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). In fact,
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d
1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must instead
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This
plausibility standard is met when the plaintiff pleads enough factual content to allow the
court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
I. Statute of Limitations
USF argues that Counts 1 and 2 must be dismissed because, according to
Zainulabeddin’s complaint and its attachments, she learned of USF’s breach of its fiduciary
4
A-236
duties and its negligent misrepresentation in February 2012 but did not provide notice to
USF until May 2015, months after Florida’s agency-notice requirement had expired. (Dkt.
4, p. 3). Citing the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that this requirement is a condition
precedent to a lawsuit and must be “strictly construed,” Menendez v. N. Broward Hosp.
Dist., 537 So. 2d 89, 91 (Fla. 1988), USF argues that dismissal with prejudice is the
appropriate remedy. See id.
In related cases against other Florida state agencies, Florida courts and courts in this
district have agreed. See, e.g., Infante v. Whidden, No. 2:12-cv-41-FtM-29UAM, 2013 WL
5476022, *5-6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2013); Noell v. White, No. 8:04-CV-2142-T-24TBM,
2005 WL 1126560, *7 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2005); Doe ex rel. Doe’s Mother v. Sinrod, 90
So. 3d 852, 856-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
On the other hand, a statute of limitations bar is generally “an affirmative defense,
and . . . plaintiff[s] [are] not required to negate an affirmative defense in [their] complaint.”
La Grasta v. First Union Securities, Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). At the motion to dismiss stage, a dismissal on
statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the
complaint that the claim is time-barred. Id. (citing Carmichael v. Nissan Motor Acceptance
Corp., 291 F.3d 1278, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002). Courts dismissing actions under Florida’s
three-year agency-notice requirement do so on a finding that notice was not provided, and
clearly could not have been provided, in the allotted time. See, e.g., Infante, 2013 WL
5476022, at *7; Noell, 2005 WL 1126560, at *7 (“the Court notes that this defect cannot
be cured . . . .”).
5
A-237
Here, Zainulabeddin’s complaint and her response to USF’s motion contain
allegations that raise the spectre of equitable estoppel. Specifically, Zainulabeddin refers
to USF’s decision to readmit Zainulabeddin after it had breached its fiduciary duty and
negligently misread her disability diagnosis. This decision, Zainulabeddin argues, caused
Zainulabeddin to forego legal action, which, in turn, precludes USF from invoking the
statute of limitations as a basis for dismissal.
Zainulabeddin’s argument prevails—for now at least. According to the Florida
Supreme Court, “[t]he preclusive effect of the statutes of limitation can be deflected by
various legal theories, including the doctrine of equitable estoppel.” Fla. Dept. of Health
and Rehabilitative Serv.’s v. S.A.P., 835 So. 2d 1091, 1096 (Fla. 2002). And “[t]he doctrine
of estoppel is applicable in all cases where one, by word, act or conduct, willfully caused
another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and thereby induces him to
act on this belief injuriously to himself, or to alter his own previous condition to his injury.”
Id. at 1097 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). Read in the light most
favorable to her, Zainulabeddin’s complaint makes plausible the conclusion that, by
readmitting her upon discovering her ADHD diagnosis, USF acted in a way to induce
Zainulabeddin to believe that USF would consider Zainulabeddin’s ADHD a
Rehabilitation Act-protected disability and treat her accordingly under the law. Her
complaint also makes plausible the conclusion that USF did not so act. This plausibility
prevents dismissal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
6
A-238
Whether facts ultimately support Zainulabeddin’s argument is a different question,
one appropriate for the summary judgment stage. On Counts 1 and 2, the motion to dismiss
will be denied.
II. Stating a Claim for Breach of Contract
To state a claim for a breach of contract, a plaintiff must plead three elements, which
are (1) a valid contract, (2) a material breach, and (3) damages. Beck v. Lazard Freres &
Co., LLC, 175 F.3d 913, 914 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Florida law). Counts 3 and 4 allege
that USF breached a contract with Zainulabeddin when it failed to fully refund tuition
Zainulabeddin paid for courses she failed or from which she withdrew.
USF seeks dismissal on the grounds that Zainulabeddin cannot identify a valid
written contract, but only a student handbook, which is not a contract under Florida law.
This argument, however, is only half correct. It is true that Florida law only waives
sovereign immunity for written, not implied contracts, Pan–Am Tobacco v. Dep’t of Corr.,
471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984), and that student handbooks generally do not, standing alone,
constitute written contracts. See Jallali v. Nova Southeastern University, Inc., 992 So. 2d
338, 342 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
But at this stage of the proceeding, Zainulabeddin does not need to identify a written
contract, but merely allege one. This she has plainly done. The complaint alleges that
“Zainulabeddin entered into a contractual relationship with the University of South
Florida,” one in which “[s]ome terms . . . [were] contained within the University of South
Florida College of Medicine Medical Student Handbook.” (Dkt. 2, p. 37). This factual
pleading is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Whether the allegation will be
7
A-239
supported by evidence is a question for summary judgment. On Counts 3 and 4, USF’s
motion will be denied.
Motion For More Definite Statement
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) permits district courts to order a more definite
statement when a pleading “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably
prepare a response.” Such orders are appropriate for “shotgun” complaints, those multi-
count complaints that re-allege every allegation for every count, and by doing so, make “it
[] impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for
relief.” Anderson v. District Bd. Of Trustees of Cent. Florida Community College, 77 F.3d
364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996).
Here, Zainulabeddin’s complaint is far from a model of efficiency, and Counts 5
and 6 do take the condemned tack of re-alleging all previous 125 allegations, many of
which bear no relation to those counts. Compare Dkt. 1, pp. 45, 50; with Cosby v. Lee
Cnty., 55 F. Supp. 1393, 1398 (M.D. Fla. 2014). (The Court further advises that the margins
in the complaint are needlessly large; one inch is sufficient.)
This does not make hers a shotgun complaint. Zainulabeddin saves Counts 5 and 6
by pleading additional allegations (some of which are redundancies) specifically germane
to those counts. Count 5, for example, contains an additional thirteen numbered paragraphs
and eight lettered sub-paragraphs, all of which address the essence of that count—disparate
treatment. Count 6 contains eighteen numbered paragraphs specific to that count—
retaliation. These allegations sufficiently direct USF to the allegations that are intended to
support those counts. Cf. Cosby, 55 F. Supp. at 1399.
8
A-240
Indeed, while USF’s motion challenges the form and length of the complaint, and
cites cases generally condemning similar forms and lengths, it makes no argument for how
the complaint as pled would confuse USF’s answer; rather, it only notes that the complaint
presents “obvious difficulties.” (Dkt. 4, p. 9). So do all complaints, among them the
requirement of an answer. To grant a motion for a more definite statement in the absence
of genuine confusion would frustrate the very goals Rule 12(e) seeks to promote. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(e); see also Anderson, 77 F. 3d at 367 (citing docket management as among
the goals underlying Rule 12(e)). Accordingly, USF’s motion for a more definite statement
will be denied.
It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and For More Definite Statement (Dkt. 4) is
DENIED.
2. Defendant shall file an answer within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this
order.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 13th day of April, 2016.

9
A-241
TAMPA DIVISION
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 8:16-cv-00637-JSM-TGW

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
DEFENDANT’S ANSWER, DEFENSES, AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
COMES NOW Defendant, University of South Florida Board of Trustees, by and through
its undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rules 12 and 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
this Court’s Order dated April 13, 2016, and files its Answer, Defenses, and Affirmative Defenses,
stating as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 1 of Plaintiff’s
Complaint to the limited extent of acknowledging that Plaintiff is making the specific claims
alleged within Paragraph No. 1 of Plaintiff’s Complaint; Defendant, however, denies that Plaintiff
is entitled to any relief whatsoever.
Complaint to the limited extent that this is an action for damages; Defendant, however, denies that
Plaintiff is entitled to any relief whatsoever.
3. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 3 of Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
A-242
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint to the limited extent that Plaintiff attached a letter dated May 12, 2015, as Exhibit A to
her Complaint. Defendant denies all other allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 6 of her
Complaint.
THE PARTIES
7. Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to either admit or deny the
allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 7 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and, accordingly, denies same.
Complaint.
Complaint.
FACTS
Complaint.
Complaint.
2
A-243
13. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in the first sentence of Paragraph No. 13
of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to either admit or deny
the remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 13 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and, accordingly,
denies same.
Complaint.
Complaint to the limited extent that Dr. Fanous prescribed Plaintiff Adderall. Defendant presently
lacks sufficient information to either admit or deny the allegations set forth in the remaining
portions of Paragraph No. 17 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and, accordingly, denies same.
Complaint.
Complaint.
allegations set forth in the first sentence of Paragraph No. 20 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and,
accordingly, denies same. Defendant denies all other allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 20 of
her Complaint.
3
A-244
Complaint.
22. Defendant denies the opening clause of the first sentence of Paragraph No. 22 of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, which specifically states, “Based on Dr. Specter’s advice.”
Complaint.
of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendant denies all other allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 26 of
her Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint to the limited extent of acknowledging that Plaintiff accurately quoted from the
documents attached as Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendant denies all other allegations
set forth in Paragraph No. 28 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
4
A-245
30. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in the first sentence of Paragraph No. 30
of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendant admits the remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 30
of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint to the limited extent of acknowledging that Plaintiff underwent an examination by Dr.
Mike R. Schoenberg. Defendant denies all other allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 33 of
Plaintiff’s Complaint.
of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in the second sentence of
Paragraph No. 34 of Plaintiff’s Complaint to the limited extent that the results of Plaintiff’s
examination were provided to Dr. Specter. Defendant denies the remaining allegations set forth in
Paragraph No. 34 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
accordingly, denies same. Defendant denies the remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph No.
36 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
5
A-246
Complaint.
accordingly, denies same. Defendant admits the remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph No.
Complaint.
of Plaintiff’s Complaint to the limited extent that Plaintiff met with Dr. Specter and asked him if
he had received the results of Plaintiff’s testing; Defendant, however, presently lacks sufficient
information to either admit or deny the date of that meeting, and therefore denies Plaintiff’s alleged
date of same. Defendant denies the remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 40 of
Complaint to the limited extent of acknowledging that Dr. Schoenberg’s original report was dated
December 15, 2010. Defendant denies all remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 41 of
Complaint.
Complaint.
6
A-247
Complaint.
Complaint.
Plaintiff’s Complaint, which specifically states, “Based on the advice from Dr. Specter.”
Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to either admit or deny the remaining allegations
set forth in Paragraph No. 47 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and, accordingly, denies same.
Complaint.
7
A-248
Plaintiff’s Complaint, which specifically states, “Based on this interaction with Dr. Specter.”
Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to either admit or deny the remaining allegations
set forth in Paragraph No. 54 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and, accordingly, denies same.
55. Defendant denies the portion of Paragraph No. 55 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, which
specifically states, “Dr. Specter’s representations.” Defendant presently lacks sufficient
information to either admit or deny the remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 47 of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, and, accordingly, denies same.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
62. Defendant denies the allegation contained in the opening clause of Paragraph No.
62 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, which specifically states, “To correct his mistake.” Defendant admits
the remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 62 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
8
A-249
Complaint to the limited extent that on February 21, 2012, Defendant reversed its earlier decision
to dismiss Plaintiff from the College of Medicine. Defendant denies all other allegations set forth
in Paragraph No. 63 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint to the limited extent that Plaintiff claims, “[a]s of February 21, 2012,” to attended the
Doctor of Medicine program for “three years.” Defendant admits the remaining allegations of
Paragraph No. 66 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint to the limited extent of acknowledging that Plaintiff accurately quotes language from
9
A-250
the documents attached as Exhibit B to her Complaint. Defendant denies all other allegations set
forth in Paragraph No. 71 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint to the limited extent that the e-mail dated July 20, 2013 (attached as Exhibit E to
Plaintiff’s Complaint) did not necessarily constitute a final denial of Plaintiff’s request for
reimbursement. Defendant admits all other allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 77 of Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
10
A-251
Complaint.
82. Defendant’s denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 82 of Plaintiff’s Complaint
to the limited extent that Plaintiff sets forth a legal conclusion that she suffers from a disability.
Defendant admits the remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 82 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
11
A-252
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
12
A-253
Complaint.
Complaint.
of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendant denies the remaining allegations set forth in the Paragraph No.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
13
A-254
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint to the limited extent that Plaintiff received “U” grades in the Doctoring II and Evidence
Based Clinical Reasoning II courses. Defendant denies all other allegations set forth in Paragraph
No. 120 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
14
A-255
Complaint.
Complaint.
COUNT I: BREACH OF FIDUCIERY DUTIES
126. Defendant restates and incorporates by reference herein its specific responses to
Paragraph Nos. 1 through 125 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, as set forth above.
Complaint.
Complaint to the limited extent that Plaintiff failed her first year of medical school. Defendant
denies the remaining allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 128 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
132. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 132 (including
subparagraphs a. through d.) of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
15
A-256
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
141. Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief she seeks in the
“Wherefore” clause following Paragraph 140 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, including sections a.
through d.
COUNT II: NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
Complaint.
16
A-257
Complaint.
subparagraphs a. through d.) of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
17
A-258
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
through d.
COUNT III: BREACH OF CONTRACT
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
18
A-259
the documents attached as Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendant denies all other
allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 162 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
19
A-260
Complaint.
through c.
COUNT IV: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Paragraph Nos. 1 through 67, 72, and 74 through 125 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, as set forth above.
Complaint to the limited extent of acknowledging that Plaintiff is pleading Count IV in the
alternative to Count III; Defendant, however, denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief
whatsoever under Count III or IV of her Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
20
A-261
the documents attached as Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendant denies all other
allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 180 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
21
A-262
Complaint.
through d.
COUNT V: DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
subparagraphs a. through h.) of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
22
A-263
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
through d.
COUNT VI: RETALIATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY
Complaint.
23
A-264
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
24
A-265
Complaint.
Complaint.
Complaint.
through f.
229. Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff has made a demand for a jury trial. As to the
propriety of such demand, however, the demand set forth under the “Demand for Jury Trial”
section of Plaintiff’s Complaint is denied.
230. Defendant denies any and all claims set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint that have not
been specifically admitted above and demands strict proof thereof.
DEFENSES AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
In addition to the foregoing admissions and denials, Defendant asserts the following
defenses and affirmative defenses:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
To the extent that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the conditions precedent that are necessary
to maintain her claims and/or failed to fully exhaust her administrative remedies, all such claims
are barred.
25
A-266
THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Defendant and/or its agents did not owe Plaintiff a fiduciary duty, either express or implied.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant and/or its agents did owe Plaintiff any fiduciary
duties (a contention Defendant categorically denies), Defendant and/or its agents did not breach
any such fiduciary duties.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant and/or its agents did owe Plaintiff any fiduciary
duties (a contention Defendant categorically denies) and Defendant and/or its agents did breach
any such fiduciary duties (a contention Defendant categorically denies), any such breach did not
proximately cause any damages to Plaintiff.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
Defendant and/or its agents did not misrepresent any material facts to Plaintiff.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Even assuming, arguendo, that any material facts were misrepresented to Plaintiff (a
contention Defendant categorically denies), any such misrepresentation was not undertaken
knowingly or under circumstances in which the alleged misrepresentor should have or ought to
have known of the falsity of the information misrepresented.
26
A-267
NINTH DEFENSE
contention Defendant categorically denies), any such misrepresentation was not undertaken with
the intent to induce Plaintiff to act thereon.
TENTH DEFENSE
contention Defendant categorically denies), Plaintiff unjustifiably relied on such
misrepresentation.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
contention Defendant categorically denies), any such misrepresentation did not proximately cause
any damages to Plaintiff.
TENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails for lack of consideration.
TWELFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails because there was no meeting of the minds
between the parties, and Defendant’s student handbook specifically states that it is not a contract.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff had a contract with Defendant (a contention
Defendant categorically denies), Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails based on the statute of
frauds because there is no written agreement between the parties.
27
A-268
FOURTEENTH DEFENSE
Defendant categorically denies), Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails because Defendant fully
performed its obligations under any such contract.
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE
Defendant categorically denies), Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails because Defendant was
legally excused from performing its obligations.
SIXTEENTH DEFENSE
Defendant categorically denies), Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails because no alleged
breach by Defendant was material.
SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE
Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff had a contract with Defendant and that Defendant
breached such contract (both of which being contentions Defendant categorically denies), Plaintiff
suffered no damages as a result of any such breach.
EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim fails because Plaintiff conferred no benefit on
Defendant.
NINETEENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim fails because, even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff
conferred a benefit on Defendant, Defendant had no knowledge of any such benefit.
28
A-269
TWENTIETH DEFENSE
conferred a benefit on Defendant, Defendant did not accept or retain any such benefit.
TWENTY-FIRST DEFENSE
conferred a benefit on Defendant, it would not be inequitable for Defendant to retain any such
benefit.
TWENTY-SECOND DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.
TWENTY-THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is barred because Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
law.
TWENTY-FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
TWENTY-FIFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s claims are subject to the damages caps set forth in Section 768.28, Florida
Statutes.
TWENTY-SIXTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff failed to engage in any protected activity.
TWENTY-SEVENTH DEFENSE
Any and all actions taken by Defendant with respect to Plaintiff were undertaken in good
faith for legitimate business reasons wholly unrelated to Plaintiff’s alleged disability.
29
A-270
TWENTY-EIGHTH DEFENSE
Any and all actions taken by Defendant with respect to Plaintiff were undertaken in good
faith for legitimate business reasons wholly unrelated to Plaintiff’s alleged actual or perceived
disability or any alleged protected activity in which Plaintiff engaged.
TWENTY-NINTH DEFENSE
Even assuming, arguendo, that this Court were to conclude that Plaintiff’s actual or
perceived disability was a motivating factor in any adverse action Defendant took with respect to
Plaintiff (a contention Defendant categorically denies), Defendant would have taken the same
adverse action irrespective of any actual or perceived disability.
THIRTIETH DEFENSE
To the extent Plaintiff claims to have suffered any mental injuries (a contention Defendant
categorically denies), Plaintiff is not entitled to damages for any such injuries, as any such injuries
stem from causes and conditions unrelated to the actions of Defendant and/or its agents.
THIRTY-FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive, equitable, or declaratory relief, since Defendant’s
actions were premised upon legitimate non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons.
THIRTY-SECOND DEFENSE
Plaintiff’s claim for damages is barred in whole or in part to the extent that she has failed
to exercise reasonable diligence to mitigate her damages.
THIRTY-THIRD DEFENSE
Defendant had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged disability or allegedly protected activity.
30
A-271
THIRTY-FOURTH DEFENSE
Defendant reserves the right to plead other defenses and affirmative defenses that become
known during its continuing investigation and during discovery in this case.
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests:
(a) That Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed;
(b) That judgment be entered for Defendant;
(c) That Defendant be awarded its attorneys’ fees and costs; and,
(d) That Plaintiff take nothing.
DATED this 27th day of April 2016.

Respectfully submitted,
CONSTANGY, BROOKS,
SMITH & PROPHETE, LLP
200 W. Forsyth St.
Ste. 1700
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Telephone: (904) 356-8900
Facsimile: (904) 356-8200
By: /s/ John S. Gibbs III

J. Ray Poole
Florida Bar No.: 983470
RPoole@Constangy.com
John S. Gibbs III
EGibbs@Constangy.com
Attorneys for Defendant
31
A-272
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of April 2016 the undersigned electronically
filed the foregoing which will be electronically served via the CM/ECF system on the following:
Stanley R. Apps
1950 Elkhorn Court, Unit #147
San Mateo, CA 94403
Stan.Apps@Gmail.com
/s/ John S. Gibbs III

Attorney
32
A-273
TAMPA DIVISION
Plaintiff,

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
UNOPPOSED MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL

AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW
COMES NOW Defendant, University of South Florida Board of Trustees (hereinafter
“USFBOT”), by and through its undersigned counsel and pursuant to Middle District of Florida
Local Rule 2.03, moves this Court for entry of an Order substituting John F. Dickinson of the
law firm of Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, 200 West Forsyth Street, Suite 1700,
Jacksonville, Florida, 32202 (P.O. Box 41099, Jacksonville, Florida, 32203-1099), for John
Sikes Gibbs, and in support thereof states as follows:
1. Counsel for Defendant herein, J. Ray Poole and John Sikes Gibbs, are both with
the law firm of Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP.
2. On September 16, 2016, John Sikes Gibbs will be leaving the law firm of
Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP.
3. Accordingly, the undersigned request that John Sikes Gibbs be permitted to
withdraw as counsel of record in this cause, and that John F. Dickinson be permitted to serve as
substitute counsel herein.

A-274
4. John F. Dickinson is a member in good standing of The Florida Bar and is
admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
5. Pursuant to Local Rules 2.03(b) and 3.01(g), the undersigned have notified both
USFBOT and opposing counsel about the issue raised and relief sought in this Motion. Neither
USFBOT nor opposing counsel object to the relief sought herein.
LEGAL MEMORANDUM
The Local Rules for the Middle District of Florida state that no attorney shall withdraw as
counsel except by written leave of Court. See Local Rule 2.03(b), U.S. District Court, Middle
District of Fla. (2009). As such, USFBOT now requests that this Court enter an Order permitting
John Sikes Gibbs to withdraw and permitting John F. Dickinson to serve as substitute counsel
herein. No prejudice will result from such change.
Dated this 8th day of September, 2016.
CONSTANGY, BROOKS,
Post Office Box 41099
Telephone: (904) 356-8900
Telecopier: (904) 356-8200
By:__/s/J. Ray Poole__________
John F. Dickinson
Florida Bar No. 651634
J. Ray Poole
2
A-275
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of September, 2016, I electronically filed the
foregoing Defendant’s Unopposed Motion To Withdraw and For Substitution Of Counsel and
Supporting Memorandum Of Law by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a Notice of
Electronic Filing to all counsel of record herein.
/s/ J. Ray Poole

Attorney
3

TAMPA DIVISION
A-276
Plaintiff,

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
ORDER REFERRING CASE TO MEDIATION

AND DIRECTING SELECTION OF A MEDIATOR
Because of limited judicial resources available to try civil cases and given the nature of
this proceeding which suggests that mediation might be of benefit to the parties and the Court,
in accordance with the rules governing mediation set forth in Chapter Nine of the Rules of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, it is ORDERED that:
1. Designation of Lead Counsel: Stanley Robert Apps, Esquire, is designated as
Lead Counsel, and shall be responsible for working with the Mediator and all other counsel,
as well as any pro se parties if applicable, to schedule the mediation conference within the
window of time set forth herein. Lead Counsel shall also provide copies to the selected or
appointed Mediator of any pleadings or orders filed in the case that relate to or impact the
mediation process.
2. Referral to Mediation: This case is hereby referred to the Court-Annexed
Mediation program for a mediation conference in an attempt to achieve an equitable settlement
of the issues. The parties shall immediately select a Mediator from the Court's list of
A-277
Certified Mediators, 1 and Lead Counsel is directed to file with the Clerk of Court, on or
before DECEMBER 9, 2016, a Notice of Mediator Selection and Scheduling of Mediation
which: (a) identifies the selected Mediator and includes complete address, telephone
and facsimile (if available) information, and (b) sets forth the time, date and place of
the scheduling for the mediation conference. If the Court finds the selected Mediator
acceptable, the Court will issue an Order Appointing a Mediator.
If the parties are unable to agree on the selection of a mediator, Lead Counsel is directed
to immediately advise the Court of same and the Court will issue an Order appointing a
mediator.
3. Scheduling Mediation Conference: The mediation conference shall be
conducted any time on or before MARCH 1, 2017.
4. General Rules Governing the Mediation Conference: Although the
mediation process is defined in greater detail in Chapter Nine of the Local Rules of this Court,
the following additional guidelines are hereby imposed:
(a) Case Summaries: Not later than five (5) working days prior to the
scheduled mediation conference, each party shall mail (or transmit by facsimile)
directly to the Mediator, with copy to opposing counsel, a brief written summary
of the facts and issues of the case. Such summaries shall be treated as
confidential communications and shall not be incorporated into the public
records of the case.
(b) Identification of Corporate and/or Claims Representatives: As part

of the written case summaries, counsel for corporate parties and claims
professionals shall state the name and general job description of the employee
or agent of the corporation who will attend and participate on behalf of the
corporate party. Such representative must have full authority to settle the
case.
(c) Authority of the Mediator: The Mediator shall have authority to

consult and conduct conferences and private caucuses with counsel, individual
parties, corporate representatives and claims professionals so as to suggest
1
Counsel are directed to consult this Court's list of Certified Mediators, available through
the Court's website: www.flmd.uscourts.gov.
2
A-278
alternatives, analyze issues, question perceptions, use logic, stimulate

negotiations and keep order.
(d) Authority to Declare Impasse: While an average mediation

conference takes between three to five hours, participants shall be prepared to
spend as much time as necessary in a good faith effort to settle the case or until
an impasse is declared by the Mediator.
(e) Mediator's Report: In order avoid unnecessary expenditure of judicial

resources respecting pending motions, etc., within five (5) days following the
mediation conference, the Mediator shall file with the Clerk of Court a
"Mediation Report" setting forth the results thereof (a copy of which form is
included in the attachment hereto).
5. Compensation of the Mediator: The Mediator shall be compensated at a rate
up to $375.00 per hour, which shall be borne equally by all parties unless otherwise agreed to
by counsel, and shall be payable immediately upon the conclusion of mediation or as required
in advance by the mediator.
6. Failure to Comply: Should any of the parties fail to comply with the terms of
this Order, appropriate sanctions may be imposed.
The parties are urged to take full advantage of this opportunity to amicably resolve the
issues herein. However, the mediation process shall not serve as a basis for any motion to
continue the trial of the case. Should mediation prove unsuccessful, the case shall remain on
its present course for pretrial conference and trial.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 9th day of November, 2016.

Attachment:
Mediation Report
3

TAMPA DIVISION
A-279
Plaintiff,

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
MEDIATION REPORT
In accordance with the Court's mediation order(s), a mediation conference was held on
___________________________, 20_____, and the results of that conference are indicated
below:
(a) The following individuals, parties, corporate representatives, and/or claims

professionals attended and participated in the mediation conference, and each possessed the
requisite settlement authority:
_____ All individual parties and their respective trial counsel.
_____ Designated corporate representatives.
_____ Required claims professionals.
(b) The following individuals, parties, corporate representatives, and/or claims
professionals failed to appear and/or participate as ordered:
(c) The outcome of the mediation conference was:
_____ The case has been completely settled. In accordance with Local Rule
9.06(b), lead counsel will promptly notify the Court of settlement in
A-280
accordance with Local Rule 3.08 by the filing of a settlement agreement

signed by the parties and the mediator within ten (10) days of the mediation
conference.
_____ The case has been partially resolved and lead counsel has been
instructed to file a joint stipulation regarding those claims which have been
resolved within ten (10) days. The following issues remain for this Court
to resolve:
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
_____ The mediation has been continued to: (list date and time:)
___________________________________________________________
(Requires Court approval.)
_____ The parties have reached an impasse.
Done this __________ day of ______________________, 20_____.
_________________________________________
Signature of Mediator
_________________________________________
Name of Mediator
_________________________________________
Mailing Address
_________________________________________
City, State, and Zip Code
_________________________________________
Telephone Number

2
A-281
TAMPA DIVISION
Plaintiff,

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
JOINT MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF THE

DISCOVERY AND DISPOSITIVE MOTION DEADLINES
AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Plaintiff, NAUSHEEN ZAINULABEDDIN, and Defendant, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH
FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES, by and through their undersigned counsel, and pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) and Rule 3.01 of the Local Rules of the Middle District of
Florida, file this Joint Motion for Enlargement of the Discovery and Dispositive Motion
Deadlines and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, and in support state as follows:
1. The current discovery deadline herein is January 3, 2016, and the current deadline
for dispositive motions herein is February 1, 2016. This Motion is therefore brought before the
expiration of those deadlines.
2. The parties hereto have engaged in discovery, but additional time for the
completion of discovery is needed.
3. Due to the holidays, pressing matters in other cases, as well as scheduling
conflicts among the parties and counsel for the parties hereto, the parties have been unable to
schedule and take necessary depositions.

A-282
4. The parties hereto request a brief enlargement of the discovery deadline until
February 1, 2016,
5. The parties also request a three (3) day enlargement of the dispositive motion
deadline until February 4, 2016.
6. The enlargements of time sought herein would not necessitate a modification of
any other case management deadlines herein.
7. This request for an enlargement of the discovery and dispositive motion deadlines
has been made in good faith and not for any improper purpose. The parties hereto have not
previously sought an enlargement of any of the case management deadlines herein. Moreover,
the parties hereto submit that good cause exists for granting the relief requested herein, and that
the relief sought herein will not delay the trial of this action.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the

court may, for good cause, extend the time: (1) with or without
motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the
original time or its extension expires . . . .
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b). A district court has wide discretion to grant an enlargement of time when the
request is made prior to the expiration of the period originally prescribed. See Choi v. Chemical
Bank, 939 F.Supp. 304, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). An extension of time is “usually . . . granted
upon a showing of good cause, if timely made, . . . .” Creedon v. Taubman, 8 F.R.D. 268, 269
(N.D. Ohio 1947).
In the present case, the parties hereto have demonstrated good cause for their requested
enlargement of the discovery and dispositive motion deadlines. Moreover, the parties hereto
2
A-283
have not previously sought an enlargement of the discovery and dispositive motion deadlines
herein, and the relief sought herein will not delay the trial of this action.
WHEREFORE, for the forgoing reasons, the parties hereto respectfully request an
enlargement of the discovery deadline until February 1, 2016, and an enlargement of the
dispositive motion deadline until February 4, 2012.
DATED this 29rd day of February, 2016.
By: ___/s/ Stanley R. Apps_____

Stanley R. Apps
San Mateo, CA 94403
Telephone: (310) 709-3966
stan.apps@gmail.com
CONSTANGY, BROOKS, SMITH &

PROPHETE, LLP
Telephone: (904) 356-8900
Telecopier: (904) 356-8200
By:__J. Ray Poole__________
J. Ray Poole
3
A-284
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of November, 2016, the undersigned
electronically filed the foregoing which will be electronically served via the CM/ECF system on
all counsel of record.
/s/ J. Ray Poole

Attorney
4
A-285
TAMPA DIVISION
Plaintiff,

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
NOTICE OF MEDIATOR SELECTION AND SCHEDULING OF MEDIATION
FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES, by and through their undersigned counsel, pursuant to this
Court’s Order Referring Case to Mediation and Directing Selection of Mediator, hereby submit
this Notice of Mediator Selection and Scheduling of Mediation and state as follows:
1. The parties hereto have selected Christopher M. Shulman, Esquire, Shulman ADR
Law, P.A., 5111 Ehrlich Road, Suite 120, Tampa, Florida 33624, Telephone: (813) 935-9922,
Facsimile: (813) 333-7326, to serve as mediator.
2. The mediation is scheduled to begin at 9:00 a.m., on Friday, February 10, 2017,
at the offices of Christopher M. Shulman.

A-286
DATED this 9th day of December, 2016.

PROPHETE, LLP
Telephone: (904) 356-8900
Telecopier: (904) 356-8200
J. Ray Poole
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of December, 2016, the undersigned
/s/ J. Ray Poole

Attorney
2
A-287
TAMPA DIVISION
Plaintiff(s),
v. CASE NO. 8:16-CV-637-T-30TGW

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant(s).
/
ORDER APPOINTING MEDIATOR

AND SCHEDULING MEDIATION
Pursuant to the Court's Order referring this case to mediation and directing the parties to
select a Mediator, and in accordance with the rules governing mediation set forth in Chapter Nine
of the Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, it is ORDERED
that:
The following individual is hereby appointed by the Court to serve as Mediator in this
action:
Name of Mediator: Christopher M. Shulman

Address: 5111 Ehrlich Road, Suite #120
Tampa, FL 33624
Telephone Number: 813-935-9922 Fax: 813-333-7326
E-Mail: chris@shulmanadrlaw.com
Date/Time of Mediation: FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2017

AT 9:00 A.M.
Place of Mediation: Office of the Mediator

A-288
Counsel are reminded of their obligations to comply with the provisions in ¶¶ 4(a) an (b)
of the Order of Referral. The mediator is authorized to continue or reschedule the mediation.
The Mediator's attention is drawn to the importance that within five (5) days following the
mediation conference, the Mediator's Report as to the outcome of mediation be timely filed.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on December 13, 2016.

Mediator
F:\Docs\2016\16-cv-637 appt mediator.wpd
2
A-289
TAMPA DIVISION
Plaintiff,

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
______________________________________/
PLAINTIFF’S PARTIALLY OPPOSED MOTION TO TAKE DEPOSITION

OF DR. JOANNE VALERIANO-MERCET
SUBSEQUENT TO CLOSE OF DISCOVERY,
WITH INCORPORATED STATEMENT OF GOOD CAUSE WHEREFORE
Pursuant to Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Plaintiff, Nausheen Zainulabeddin (“Zainulabeddin”), by and through her
undersigned counsel, hereby files her Motion to Take Deposition of Dr. Joanne
Subsequent to Close of Discovery, with Incorporated Statement of Good Cause
Wherefore. In support of her Motion, Zainulabeddin states as follows:
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Zainulabeddin, by and through her counsel, first notified Defendant of
her need to depose Dr. Joanne Valeriano-Marcet (hereinafter “Dr.
Valeriano”) in November of 2016. At that time, Discovery in the instant
case was scheduled to conclude on January 3, 2017.
! 1!
A-290
2. Shortly thereafter, Defendant’s counsel notified Zainulabeddin that
multiple witnesses she desired to depose, including Dr. Valeriano, could
not be made available prior to close of discovery.
3. To provide Defendant with additional time to cooperate with Discovery,
the parties filed a Joint Motion for Extension of Time to Complete
Discovery [Dkt. 15] on November 29, 2017. Said Motion was granted by
this honorable Court on November 30, 2017, extending the time to
complete discovery through February 1, 2017. See Dkt. 16.
4. Since that time, Zainulabeddin’s counsel has repeatedly reminded
counsel for Defendant of her need to depose Dr. Valeriano. Dates on
which Zainulabeddin’s counsel raised this issue include but are not
limited to: December 1, 2016 and December 8, 2016.
5. Zainulabeddin served a Notice of Taking Deposition of Dr. Joanne
Valeriano-Marcet on December 14, 2016. Said Notice is attached hereto as
Exhibit A. Service of said Notice placed Defendant unequivocally on
Notice of Zainulabeddin’s intention to depose Valeriano.
6. Thereafter, Defendant’s counsel announced that Valeriano was not
available at the time specified in Plaintiff’s Notice of Taking Deposition.
7. Zainulabeddin raised the question of Valeriano’s availability to
Defendant’s counsel on at least four additional occasions in January of
2017.
! 2!
A-291
8. Finally Defendant’s counsel informed Zainulabeddin that Valeriano was
available for 1.5 hours on Tuesday, January 31, the penultimate day of the
Discovery period. However the offered availability was at a time when
Zainulabeddin’s counsel was not available, as well as being insufficient
in length. (Zainulabeddin has notified Defendant’s counsel that she will
need to depose Valeriano for approximately three hours).
9. Most recently, Defendant has offered to make Valeriano available for 1.5
hours on Friday, February 3—two days after the close of Discovery.
Again, the time slot offered by Defendant is too short to conduct the
entire deposition.
10. In response to the challenging behavior of Defendant and Dr. Valeriano,
Zainulabeddin now moves for leave to depose Valeriano subsequent to
the close of Discovery, for three hours during the month of February
2017.
11. An order authorizing such Deposition of Dr. Valeriano-Marcet will not
require modification of any other deadlines in the Case Management
Order [Dkt. 9].
12. Valeriano is a key witness because she was a Course Director of a course
called Doctoring II, which Zainulabeddin attended at the Morsani
College of Medicine in the 2012-13 Academic Year, and which she
allegedly failed. Zainulabeddin argues that her performance in said
! 3!
A-292
course, in light of the applicable policies of the College of Medicine, did
not justify failure of said course.
MOTION
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff, Nausheen Zainulabeddin, by and through
her counsel, humbly prays this Honorable Court for the following relief:
1. Issuance of an Order granting Zainulabeddin Leave to depose Dr.
Joanne Valeriano-Marcet for three hours during February 2017, as an
exception to the February 1, 2017 Discovery Deadline.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a party to
depose witnesses. The conduct of Defendant and Dr. Joanne Valeriano-Marcet,
in refusing to make her reasonably available for deposition, tends to frustrate
Zainulabeddin’s ability to depose her. In such a circumstance, this Court has
inherent power to allow an exception to the Discovery Deadline set forth in the
Case Management and Scheduling Order.
The Court should allow such exception in the interests of justice, so that
Zainulabeddin will not be unfairly denied an opportunity to depose an
important witness.
! 4!
A-293
RULE 3.01(g) CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Rule 3.01(g) of the Local Rules of the District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, Zainulabeddin has conferred with Defendant’s
counsel on multiple occasions, in person and by telephone, as to whether
Defendant opposes the relief sought by this Motion.
Defendant has informed Zainulabeddin that the Motion is partially
opposed. Defendant does not oppose allowing Zainulabeddin to depose
Valeriano-Marcet for 1.5 hours on February 3, 2017. However Defendant
opposes Zainulabeddin’s request to complete the deposition after February 3,
2017, as well as her request for Leave to depose Dr. Valeriano for three hours.
Respectfully submitted on this 1st day of February, 2017.
/s/ Stanley R. Apps

FL Bar. No. 0108868
San Mateo, CA 94403
(310) 709-3966
stan.apps@gmail.com
! 5!
A-294
I hereby certify that on February 1, 2016, I electronically filed the

foregoing with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will
send a Notice of Electronic Filing to all counsel of record herein.
/s/ Stanley R. Apps
! 6!
A-295
Exhibit A
A-296
TAMPA DIVISION
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 8-16-cv-00637-JSM-TGW

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
______________________________________/
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

OF DR. JOANNE VALERIANO-MARCET
To: Board of Trustees of the University of South Florida; Dr. Joanne

Valeriano-Marcet
c/o Ray Poole, Esq.
Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP
200 W. Forsyth St., Suite 1700
Jacksonville, FL 32202-4317
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that commencing at 1:00 p.m., on Wednesday,
January 25, 2017 at the offices of Sclafani Williams Court Reporters, 101 E.
Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1850, Tampa, Florida 33602, the Plaintiff Nausheen
Zainulabeddin, through her undersigned counsel, will take the deposition of
Dr. Joanne Valeriano-Marcet, on oral examination pursuant to Rule 30 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before Sclafani Williams Court Reporters,
officers authorized by law to administer oaths. This deposition will continue
from hour to hour and day to day until completed.
! 1!
A-297
Queries regarding accommodation of disabilities should be sent to
Stanley R. Apps, Esq., prior to the scheduled deposition date.
PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY.
DATED the 14th of December, 2016.
Respectfully Submitted for Stanley R. Apps, P.A.:
/s/ Stanley R. Apps

FL Bar. No. 0108868
1950 Elkhorn Ct., Unit # 147
San Mateo, CA 94403
(310) 709-3966
stan.apps@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs
I hereby certify that on December 14, 2016, I served the foregoing
electronically on Defendant’s counsel at the following addresses:
Ray Poole, Esq. John Dickinson, Esq.

rpoole@constangy.com jdickinson@constangy.com
/s/ Stanley R. Apps
! 2!
A-298
A-299
A-300
TAMPA DIVISION
Plaintiff,

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
JOINT MOTION TO EXTEND MEDIATION DEADLINE

AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW
FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES, by and through their undersigned counsel, and pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) and Rule 3.01 of the Local Rules of the Middle District of
Florida, file this Joint Motion to Extend Mediation Deadline and Incorporated Memorandum of
Law, and in support state as follows:
1. Mediation herein is currently scheduled to take place on Friday, February 10,
2017.
2. Due to unforeseen circumstances beyond the parties’ control, the parties are in
need of additional time in which to complete mediation herein.
3. Moreover, an extension of the mediation deadline would afford the parties
additional time in which to attempt to schedule and take the deposition of Dr. Valeriano prior to
the mediation.
A-301
4. The parties hereto request a brief enlargement of the mediation deadline until
March 1, 2017,
5. The enlargement of time sought herein would not necessitate a modification of
any other case management deadlines herein.
6. This request for an enlargement of the mediation deadline has been made in good
faith and not for any improper purpose.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the

court may, for good cause, extend the time: (1) with or without
motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the
original time or its extension expires . . . .
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b). A district court has wide discretion to grant an enlargement of time when the
request is made prior to the expiration of the period originally prescribed. See Choi v. Chemical
Bank, 939 F.Supp. 304, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). An extension of time is “usually . . . granted
upon a showing of good cause, if timely made, . . . .” Creedon v. Taubman, 8 F.R.D. 268, 269
(N.D. Ohio 1947).
WHEREFORE, for the forgoing reasons, the parties hereto respectfully request an
enlargement of the mediation deadline until March 1, 2017.
2
A-302
DATED this 3rd day of February, 2017.
By: ___/s/ Stanley R. Apps_____

Stanley R. Apps
San Mateo, CA 94403
Telephone: (310) 709-3966
stan.apps@gmail.com

PROPHETE, LLP
Telephone: (904) 356-8900
Telecopier: (904) 356-8200
J. Ray Poole
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of February, 2017, the undersigned
/s/ J. Ray Poole

Attorney
3
A-303
TAMPA DIVISION
Plaintiff,

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW
COMES NOW Defendant, the University of South Florida Board of Trustees (hereinafter
referred to as “Defendant” or “USF”), by and through its undersigned attorneys, pursuant to Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and files its Motion for Summary Judgment and
Supporting Memorandum of Law as follows:
I. Overview of Plaintiff’s Claims
At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was a medical student in the Doctor of
Medicine Program at USF’s Morsani College of Medicine (hereinafter “MCOM”). (Doc. 2, ¶ 18)
Plaintiff began her medical studies at MCOM during the 2009-2010 academic year. (Id.) Plaintiff
failed her first year of studies in medical school and had to repeat the first year of the Doctor of
Medicine Program during the 2010-2011 academic year. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-31) Plaintiff thereafter
continued to fail academic courses in the Doctor of Medicine Program and was dismissed from
the Program in January 2012. (Id. at ¶¶ 50, 56) However, Plaintiff’s dismissal was subsequently
reversed, and she was permitted to remain in the Program on academic probation. (Id. at ¶¶ 57-64)
A-304
At that point, although Plaintiff had been in the Doctor of Medicine Program for nearly three (3)
years, she had only successfully completed one (1) year. (Id. at ¶ 66) Plaintiff also did not
successfully complete the second year of the Doctor of Medicine Program and had to repeat it
during the 2012-2013 academic year. (Id. at ¶¶ 79-80) In short, although Plaintiff engaged in
medical studies at MCOM for four (4) academic years, she only successfully completed two (2)
years in the Doctor of Medicine Program. In March 2013, Plaintiff was dismissed from the Doctor
of Medicine Program for academic reasons. (Id. at ¶¶ 115-116)
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains six (6) counts. In Count I, Plaintiff contends that USF is
vicariously liable for a purported breach of fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff by USF’s Dean of
Student Affairs for the MCOM. In Count II, Plaintiff claims that USF is vicariously liable for
purported negligent misrepresentations made to Plaintiff by USF’s Dean of Student Affairs for the
MCOM. In Count III, Plaintiff contends that USF breached the terms of its “contractual
relationship” with her by failing to issue refunds to her of tuition that she paid for the two (2)
unsuccessful academic years that she spent at MCOM. In Count IV, Plaintiff contends that USF
was unjustly enriched when it failed to issue refunds to her of tuition that she paid for the two (2)
unsuccessful academic years that she spent at MCOM. In Count V, Plaintiff claims that USF
discriminated against her on the basis of a disability while she was a student at MCOM, in violation
of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Finally, in Count VI, Plaintiff claims that USF retaliated
against her while she was a student at MCOM, in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.
For the reasons set forth herein, USF respectfully submits that this Court should grant
summary judgment in its favor with respect to all of Plaintiff’s claims against it.
2
A-305
II. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
A. USF
USF is a state university. Section 1000.21(6)(d), Fla. Stat. The Board of Trustees of USF
is the legal entity with the power to sue and be sued in the name of USF. Section 1001.72, Fla.
Stat. Plaintiff admits that USF “is a state agency or subdivision of the State of Florida.” (Doc. 2, ¶
9)
B. Prior to Medical School
Between the Fall of 2007 and Summer of 2009, Plaintiff attended USF’s Master’s Program
in Medical Sciences. (Pl. Depo. p. 74, l. 3-18; Doc. 2, ¶ 11) On July 1, 2008, Plaintiff was
“informally” diagnosed as potentially having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (hereinafter
“ADHD”) and/or Generalized Anxiety Disorder. (Pl. Depo. p. 64, l. 23 – p. 68, l. 22; Doc. 2, ¶¶
13-15) Her physician initially prescribed the medication “Concerta,” but was subsequently
prescribed “Adderall” for her ADHD. (Pl. Depo. p. 63, l. 12-18 ; Doc. 2, ¶ 15) She was first
prescribed Adderall in July 2008, and her dosage was increased in May 2009. (Pl. Depo. p. 57, l.
1 – p. 62, l. 8; p. 73, l. 17 – p. 74, l. 2) She sought treatment because she was doing poorly in one
of her classes and was having difficulty with her studies. (Pl. Depo. p. 57, l. 1 – p. 62, l. 8; p. 74,
l. 19 – p. 75, l) Once Plaintiff began taking the Adderall, it seemed to help her in her studies in the
Master’s Program. (Pl. Depo. p. 74, l. 19 – p. 75, l. 24)
C. Plaintiff’s Participation In USF’s Doctor of Medicine Program
In August 2009, Plaintiff began her studies in the Doctor of Medicine Program at MCOM.
She did not tell anyone at MCOM about her “informal” ADHD diagnosis, and she did not indicate
that she needed any accommodations. (Pl. Depo. p. 83, l. 16 – p. 84, l. 23) Between August 2009
and April 2010, Plaintiff continued to take Adderall. (Pl. Depo. p. 81, l. 14 – p. 83, l. 3) Although
3
A-306
Plaintiff was taking Adderall, she nonetheless began having academic difficulties during her first
semester in medical school. (Pl. Depo. p. 83, l. 4-15)
On March 1, 2010, during Plaintiff’s second semester in medical school, she contacted Dr.
Steven Specter, the Associate Dean for Student Affairs at USF’s MCOM, spoke with him about
her academic difficulties in the Doctor of Medicine Program, and told him that she had previously
been “informally” diagnosed with ADHD. (Pl. Depo. p. 84, l. 24 – p. 89, l. 14) She went to Dr.
Specter because she believed that she had done poorly on a cardiology examination that she had
just taken. (Id.) She asked Dr. Specter whether she should take a leave of absence from the
Program, and Dr. Spector suggested that she not do so but instead try to successfully complete the
academic year. (Pl. Depo. p. 124, l. 18 – p. 126, l. 24; Doc. 2, ¶ 26) At that time, the student
handbook -- which was readily available to Plaintiff -- set forth the circumstances under which
such a leave of absence would be granted by MCOM. (Doc. 2 at ¶ 28; Doc. 2 Ex. B, p. 35) Thus,
Plaintiff did not need to rely upon Dr. Specter for advice concerning her eligibility for such leave.
Moreover, pursuant to the terms set forth in the handbook, the decision whether to place a student
on such a leave is absence could not have been made by Dr. Specter, but was instead to be made
by the Vice Dean for Educational Affairs. (Id.) Therefore, Plaintiff presumably knew -- or if she
had read the student handbook she should have known – that Dr. Specter did not have the authority
to decide whether a student could take such leave.
Despite taking Adderall, Plaintiff did not successfully complete her first year in medical
school. She failed all of her final examinations, with the exception of one. (Pl. Depo. p. 97, l. 5-
16) Thus, during the 2010-2011 academic year, Plaintiff was permitted to repeat her first year of
medical school during which time she was on academic probation. (Pl. Depo. p. 174, l. 19 – p.
176, l. 11)
4
A-307
During the 2011-2012 academic year, after Plaintiff had successfully repeated her first
year, she was taken off of academic probation and underwent her second year of medical school.
(Id.) Plaintiff again began having academic problems. She failed two (2) courses, so after engaging
in the proper administrative process and following the requisite internal procedures, the Academic
Performance Review Committee (“APRC”) decided in January 2012 to dismiss Plaintiff from the
Program for academic reasons. (Pl. Depo. p. 178, l. 12 – p. 179, l. 22)
The January 2012 decision to dismiss Plaintiff from the Program was subsequently
reversed, but Plaintiff ultimately failed and had to repeat her second year in the Program. (Doc. 2
at ¶¶ 79-80) When Plaintiff repeated her second year in the Program, which was during the 2012-
2013 academic year, she continued to have academic problems. (Pl. Depo. p. 194, l. 16 – p. 198,
l. 21; p. 204, l. 1-22) Thus, in March 2013, the APRC again engaged in the proper administrative
process and following the requisite internal procedures decided to terminate Plaintiff from USF’s
Doctor of Medicine Program. (Pl. Depo. p. 197, l. 17 – p. 198, l. 21)
D. Accommodations Provided to Plaintiff
Plaintiff admits that, while she was a student in USF’s Doctor of Medicine Program, she
was afforded the following opportunities to overcome her academic problems: (1) she was
permitted to repeat her first and second years in medical school after she failed both of those years
in their entirety on her first attempt; (2) examinations were repreatedly postponed (Pl. Depo. at p.
155, l. 16 – p. 159, l. 21; p. 192, l. 25 – p. 193, l. 19; p. 194, l. 16 – p. 196, l. 5; p. 209, l. 19 – p.
210, l. 10); (3) she had extra time to complete examinations (Pl. Depo. p. 191, l. 22 – p. 192, l. 24);
(4) she was permitted to take examinations in a distraction free environment (Pl. Depo. p. 191, l.
22 – p. 192, l. 24); and, (5) she was provided tutors (Pl. Depo. p. 113, l. 25 – p. 115, l. 20).
Plaintiff also admitted in her deposition that during the 2009-2010 and 2011-2012
5
A-308
academic years, no one held her to a different standard than other students. (Pl. Depo. p. 160, l. 5
– p. 161, l. 7) She also admitted that, when she repeated her first and second years in the program,
she was held to the same standard as other repeating students. (Pl. Depo. p. 161, l. 8 – p. 163, l. 9)
To illustrate, Plaintiff was provided extraordinary accommodations after she failed the
Evidence Based Clinical Reasoning II (“EBCR II”) course and was repeating it during the 2012-
2013 academic year. Dr. Roth, who was a co-director of the EBCR II course that year, gave an
assignment to Plaintiff and other repeating students that they each prepare a case study. (Roth
Depo. p. 56, l. 18-23) Each of the repeating students were given the same assignment, and each
was given a November 2 deadline to complete the assignment. (Roth Depo. p. 57, l. 16 – p. 58, l.
12; Roth Depo. Ex. 13) On November 10, eight (8) days after the assignment deadline, Plaintiff
forwarded an email to Dr. Roth about the assignment and that fact that it was not complete. (Roth
Depo. p.58, l. 16-23 and Ex. 13) On November 26, Dr. Roth sent an email to Plaintiff, wherein she
explained that the work Plaintiff had done on the assignment was inadequate, and Dr. Roth gave
her yet more time, until one week after the end of the course, to rework and submit the assignment.
(Roth Depo. p. 59, l. 15 – p. 60, l. 9) As of January 9, more than two (2) months after the original
due date, Plaintiff still had not completed and turned in her reworked assignment. (Roth Depo. p.
60, l. 10-19; Roth Depo. Ex. 14) Nonetheless, Dr. Roth did not penalize Plaintiff because of the
delinquency. (Roth Depo. p. 60, l. 20-23) Plaintiff was also given a two month extension of time
to take a final examination in the EBCR II course. (Roth Depo. p. 61, l. 5 – p. 63, l. 6; Roth Depo.
Ex. 17) Despite having received a lengthy extension of time to take the final examination, Plaintiff
still not pass it. (Roth Depo. p. 63, l. 12-17; Roth Depo. Ex. 6) Nonetheless, Plaintiff was afforded
the opportunity to re-take the examination, and she even received an extension of time in which to
do so. (Roth Depo. p. 63, l. 12 – p. 64, l. 7; Roth Depo. Ex. 6 and 18)
6
A-309
Dr. Kumar was the other co-director of the EBCR II course. (Kumar Depo. p. 5, l. 16 – p.
7, l. 3) He testified in deposition that on one occasion Plaintiff simply failed to show up to take a
test. Rather than give Plaintiff a failing grade on the test, however, Dr. Kumar gave her an
incomplete. (Kumar Depo. p. 29, l. 5-24) On another occasion, Plaintiff requested that she be given
twice as much time to complete an examination, which he granted. (Kumar Depo. p. 30, l. 14 – p.
31, l. 9) In all, Plaintiff was permitted to make up examinations many times over the years. (Kumar
Depo. p. 65, l. 24 – p. 67, l. 20) He also agreed to postpone one of her examinations. (Kumar Depo.
p. 36, l. 13 – p. 37, l. 11; Kumar Depo Ex. 9 and 10)
Plaintiff also had difficulties in her Doctoring II course. According to Dr. Stock, who taught
Doctoring II, Plaintiff asked that she be permitted to postpone the requirement that she participate
in pediatric rounds, there were times when Plaintiff was prepared for class, times when Plaintiff
delayed taking course tests, and times when she did not turn in assignments on time. (Stock Depo.
p. 106, l. 11 – p. 107, l. 24; p. 110, l. 11 – p. 112, l. 8) The “histories and physicals” (“H&Ps”) that
Plaintiff wrote up on patients that she saw in a clinical setting were inadequate, so she was
instructed to re-write them. (Stock Depo. p. 66, l. 9 – p. 67, l. 1)
III. Argument and Authority
A. The Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if there exists no genuine issue of material fact such that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
7
A-310
B. The Breach of Fiduciary Duties and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims Are Time-
Barred
Plaintiff’s claims for breach of fiduciary duties and negligent misrepresentation, as set forth
in Counts I and II of her Complaint, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Under
Florida law, claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duties are governed by
a four (4) year statute of limitations. Mayor's Jewelers, Inc. v. Meyrowitz, 2012 WL 2344609, at
*4 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (negligent misrepresentation); Davis v. Monahan, 832 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla.
2002) (breach of fiduciary duties). The “delayed discovery doctrine” does not operate to toll the
running of the statute of limitations for those claims. Davis, 832 So. 2d at 709; Reuss v. Orlando
Health, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1307 (M.D. Fla. 2015). Rather, the statute of limitations
“begins to run when the last element of the cause of action occurs.” Davis, 832 So. 2d at 709-710;
Reuss, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 1307. Although Florida statutes set forth limited circumstances under
which a statute of limitations may be tolled, none are applicable in the case at bar. See Section
95.051, Florida Statutes. Thus, the four (4) year statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims for
breach of fiduciary duties and negligent misrepresentation began to run once the last element of
those claims purportedly occurred.
Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duties is predicated upon two (2) events. First, she
claims that during February and March 2010, Dr. Steven Specter, then Associate Dean for Student
Affairs, made a poor recommendation that she attempt to successfully complete her first year of
medical school, rather than take a leave of absence from school and obtain a comprehensive
neuropsychological examination. Second, she claims that in October 2010, Dr. Specter provided
her with erroneous information about the results of a neuropsychological examination that she had
undergone the prior month. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 127, 131) Thus, the facts giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim for
8
A-311
breach of fiduciary duties arose in March and October 2010.
Plaintiff’s claim for negligent misrepresentation is likewise predicated upon the allegation
that in October 2010, Dr. Specter provided her with erroneous information about the results of a
neuropsychological examination that she had undergone the prior month. (Doc. 2, ¶ 142) Thus, the
facts giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim for negligent misrepresentation arose in October 2010.
Yet, Plaintiff did not initiate this action until January 22, 2016, when she filed her
Complaint in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in Hillsborough County, Florida.
(Doc. 2, pp. 1 and 55) At that point, the four (4) year statute of limitations for those claims had
long expired. As such, her claims for breach of fiduciary duties and negligent misrepresentation
are barred by the four (4) year statute of limitations.1
Plaintiff may attempt to avoid the statute of limitations bar by arguing that USF is equitably
estopped from asserting that defense. However, USF is not equitably estopped from asserting a
statute of limitations defense to Plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary
duties claims. First, equitable estoppel presupposes an act of wrongdoing, such as fraud and
concealment. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. S.A.P, 835 So. 2d 1091, 1097 (Fla. 2002).
Where misstatements are made without knowledge that they are false, are not made with the intent
to mislead, and are not made in bad faith, equitable estoppel does not apply. See United States v.
McCorkle, 321 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that in order to apply equitable estoppel
against the government, affirmative misconduct must be shown, and “[a]ffirmative misconduct
requires more than governmental negligence or inaction”); see also Hamilton v. Sec'y, DOC, 410
1
Plaintiff may attempt to argue that she did not discover that the advice and information provided
by Dr. Specter were erroneous until later and that the statute of limitations did not begun to run
until she had discovered the errors. However, as the Florida Supreme Court has made clear, the
“delayed discovery doctrine” does not toll the running of the statute of limitations for these claims.
Davis v. Monahan, 832 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla. 2002) (breach of fiduciary duties).
9
A-311
F. App'x 216, 220 (11th Cir. 2010). Second, equitable estoppel only applies to bar a statute of
limitations defense where the wrongdoer has induced the injured party to forbear from filing suit
during the limitations period. Rubio v. Archdiocese of Miami, Inc., 114 So. 3d 279, 281 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2013); Black Diamond Properties, Inc. v. Haines, 69 So. 3d 1090, 1093 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)
(“Stated another way, ‘[e]quitable estoppel arises where the parties recognize the basis for suit,
but the wrongdoer prevails upon the other to forego enforcing his right until the statutory time
has lapsed.’”). Equitable estoppel does not bar a statute of limitations defense where the injured
party is induced to delay filing suit, but where the inducement to delay filing suit ends prior to
expiration of the statute of limitations. See Delco Oil, Inc. v. Pannu, 856 So.2d 1070, 1073 (Fla.
5th DCA 2003) (“Unlike the plaintiffs in Morsani who had been lulled into complacency by the
defendants' conduct until a date after the statute of limitations had run on their tortious interference
claim, here Pannu had actual notice within one month of the date that the lease was signed that the
alleged breach had occurred and thus he had [four] years and [eleven] months within which to file
a timely breach of contract complaint against Delco. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly,
there is no evidence in the record that Delco engaged in any conduct indicating an intent to lull
Pannu into a disadvantageous legal position or preventing Pannu from filing his lawsuit within the
applicable five[-]year statute of limitations.”); Olean Med. Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Azima, 144 So.
3d 561, 565 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2014) (holding that association was not equitably estopped from raising
statute of limitations defense to owner's action arising from associations alleged wrongful failure
to make roof repairs; majority of time within which owner could have filed suit still remained after
owner learned that association would not pay for further repairs to roof.).
Plaintiff bears the burden of presenting facts to establish equitable estoppel. However, she
cannot present any evidence that USF engaged in any fraudulent activity, or that it made any
10
A-312
representations in bad faith with the intent to trick Plaintiff into foregoing suit until after expiration
of the statute of limitations. Absent such evidence, USF is not equitably estopped from asserting
a statute of limitations defense.
Plaintiff has previously argued to this Court that USF’s actions lulled her into a false sense
of security that her complaints would be rectified short of suit. (Doc. 6, pp. 2-6) Even assuming
that Plaintiff can present evidence that USF engaged in fraudulent activity, or made representations
in bad faith that delayed Plaintiff from filing suit, she cannot demonstrate that any such actions
delayed her from filing suit for the entire duration of the statute of limitations period. In her prior
submission to this Court, Plaintiff conceded that any such actions ceased by July 30, 2013, (Doc.
6, pp. 2-6), which was over one (1) year prior to expiration of the statute of limitations. Thus, even
assuming arguendo that fraudulent activity or misconduct took place -- which it did not -- Plaintiff
has conceded that it ceased well before expiration of the statute of limitations. Thus, the claims are
barred. Delco Oil, Inc. v. Pannu, 856 So.2d at 1073; Olean Med. Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Azima, 144
So. 3d at 565.
C. The Breach of Fiduciary Duties Claim Lacks Merit
Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duties claim lacks merit. As previously set forth herein,
Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duties is predicated upon two (2) events. First, she claims
that during February and March 2010, Dr. Steven Specter, then Associate Dean for Student Affairs,
made a poor recommendation that she attempt to successfully complete her first year of medical
school, rather than take a leave of absence from school and obtain a comprehensive
neuropsychological examination.2 Second, she claims that in October 2010, Dr. Specter provided
2
Notably, Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she did not even believe that she needed to take
a leave of absence at that time. (Pl. Depo. p. 107, l. 23 – p. 111, l. 10)
11
A-313
her with erroneous information about the results of a neuropsychological examination that she had
undergone the prior month. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 127, 131)
Under Florida law, the elements of a cause of action for a breach of a fiduciary duty are:
(1) the existence of a fiduciary duty, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) damages that are proximately
caused by the breach. Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 353 (Fla. 2002); Columbia Bank v.
Turbeville, 143 So. 3d 964, 970 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). As set forth below, Plaintiff’s breach of
fiduciary duties claim lacks merit.
First, Plaintiff cannot even establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship, much less
the existence of a specific fiduciary duty and breach thereof. A very recent decision by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida is instructive on this point. In Morrison v.
University of Miami, 2016 WL 3129490 (S.D. Fla. 2016), a Ph.D. student reported that one of her
professors had sexually harassed her. The student believed that she was making a formal sexual
harassment complaint when she reported it to the Executive Director and Associate Director of the
Office of Equality Administration (“EA”) at the University. The student requested that the EA
block all contact between her and the professor, remove the professor from any committees judging
the student’s academic progress, and protect the student from any retaliation by the professor.
Although the EA assured Plaintiff that they would follow through with her requests, it did not take
steps to protect the student from further discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. Thereafter, the
professor retaliated against the student in multiple ways. Id. at *1-4.
In Morrison, as in the case at bar, the student brought suit against the University of Miami
for breach of fiduciary duty. The University of Miami moved to dismiss the breach of fiduciary
duty claim and argued that “a college or university does not owe a fiduciary duty to its students.”
Id. at *7. The student countered that a “’special relationship’ arose from her ‘dependency’ on the
12
A-314
University to handle her complaints of discrimination and retaliation.” Id. The Court agreed with
the University, dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim, and reasoned as follows:
The greater weight of authority appears to support the University's position that a
fiduciary duty does not simply arise because of students' status, and this Court
agrees. See, e.g., Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., No. 5:11-cv-123, 2012 WL
4481470 (D. Vt. Sept. 28, 2012); Tunne v. Hendrick, No. 5:10CV-00181, 2012 WL
3644852 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 24, 2012); Valente v. Univ of Dayton, 438 Fed. Appx.
381, 387 (6th Cir. 2011); Bass ex rel. Bass v. Miss Porter's Sch., 738 F. Supp. 2d
307, 330 (D. Conn. 2010); Vurimindi v. Fuqua Sch. Of Bus., No. 10-234, 2010 WL
3419568, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2010); Lary v. Wesleyan Univ., No.
CV0055003943, 2009 WL 865679, at *12 (Conn. Super Ct. Mar. 10, 2009);
Manning v. Temple Univ., No. 03-4012, 2004 WL 3019230, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
30, 2014); Hendricks v. Clemson Univ., 578 S.E. 2d 711, 715-16 (S.C. 2003);
Shapiro v. Butterfield, 921 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). Plaintiff attempts
to circumvent this line of case law by arguing that a “special relationship” arose
from her “dependency” on the University to handle her complaints of
discrimination and retaliation.
Id. Other courts have drawn the same conclusion. See Gjeka v. Delaware Cty. Cmty. Coll., 2013
WL 2257727, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“the parties have not called to our attention any Pennsylvania
case which has ruled that a graduate school or its professors owe any fiduciary duties to graduate
students”); Eng v. Hargrave, 2012 WL 116560, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Yet a teacher ordinarily
does not owe his student a fiduciary duty, and a student presumably owes his teacher even less.”);
Manning v. Temple Univ., 2004 WL 3019230, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 2004), aff'd, 157 F. App'x 509 (3d
Cir. 2005) (“the parties have not called to our attention any Pennsylvania case which has ruled that
a graduate school or its professors owe any fiduciary duties to graduate students”); Knelman v.
Middlebury Coll., 570 F. App'x 66, 68–69 (2d Cir. 2014) (“While schools, colleges, and educators
assume the responsibility of educating their students, the law does not recognize the existence of
a special relationship for the purposes of a breach of fiduciary duty claim.”); Robinson v. Nevada
Sys. of Higher Educ., 2015 WL 8780244, at *3 (D. Nev. 2015) (“Robinson has not provided, and
the Court's own research has been unable to locate, a single case holding that a college professor
13
A-315
or university has a fiduciary duty to their students in the ordinary academic context. To the
contrary, several courts who have addressed this issue reached the same conclusion as the
Magistrate Judge—a fiduciary relationship does not exist in this context.”).
Second, Plaintiff was not reliant upon Dr. Specter with respect to whether she should or
could take a leave of absence during her first year and therefore was not reliant upon Dr. Specter
in that regard. On this point, it is important bear in mind that Plaintiff was not a child in grade
school, but an adult in medical school. She admitted in deposition that the MCOM student
handbook was readily available to her when she spoke with Dr. Specter about taking a leave of
absence. (Pl. Depo. p. 102, l. 22 – p. 107, l. 1) As pointed out in Plaintiff’s own Complaint, the
MCOM student handbook addresses leaves of absence. (Doc. 2, ¶ 28, Doc. 2, Ex. B) Thus, Plaintiff
should have been aware of her options and was not dependent upon Dr. Specter for that purpose.
Third, Plaintiff was not reliant upon Dr. Specter with respect to the results of her
neuropsychological evaluation and therefore was not reliant upon Dr. Specter in that regard.
Indeed, on September 2, 2010, the individual who performed the neuropsychological testing on
Plaintiff, Dr. Schoenberg, went over the results of that testing with her. (Doc. 2, ¶ 37) At that time,
Dr. Schoenberg informed Plaintiff that he did not find anything. (Pl. Depo. p. 217, l. 22 – p. 220,
l. 3) On or around September 2, 2010, Plaintiff asked Dr. Schoenberg for a copy of his report, but
it was not yet ready. (Id.) Plaintiff did not bother to contact Dr. Schoenberg after that to ask for a
copy of the report. (Id.)
D. The Negligent Misrepresentation Claim Is Barred By Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim is barred by sovereign immunity. Indeed,
Florida courts have repeatedly held that “sovereign immunity bars tort liability on the part of the
state or its agencies for state agents who negligently misinform members of the public.” Storm v.
14
A-316
Town of Ponce Inlet, 866 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); see also Friedberg v. Town of
Longboat Key, 504 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Hillsborough County v. Morris, 730 So.2d 367
(Fla. 2d DCA 1999); City of Tarpon Springs v. Garrigan, 510 So.2d 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
Under Florida law, “actions for negligent misrepresentation sound in fraud rather than
negligence.” Postel Indus., Inc. v. Abrams Group Constr., LLC, 2012 WL 419660 at *2 (M.D. Fla.
2012) (citing Morgan v. W.R. Grace & Co., 779 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Burton v.
Linotype, 556 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“negligent misrepresentation is considered
tantamount to actual fraud.”) (quoting Ostreyko v. B.C. Morton Org. Co., 310 So. 2d 316, 318
(Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (same). See also Lamm v. State Street Bank & Trust, 2014 WL 1410172 at
*9 (11th Cir. 2014) (“negligent misrepresentation sounds in fraud under Florida law.”); and McGee
v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 520 Fed. Appx. 829, 831 (11th Cir. 2013) (“negligent
misrepresentation sounds in fraud . . . .”). Moreover, in Florida, courts have ruled that “bad faith
must always be considered a necessary element of fraud.” Parker v. State of Fla. Bd. of Regents,
724 So. 2d 163, 168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (citing First Interstate Dev. Corp. v. Ablanedo, 511 So.
2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1987). Because Florida courts uniformly hold that negligent misrepresentation
claims sound in fraud rather than in negligence, and since Florida courts also hold that bad faith is
a necessary component of any fraud claim, a fortiori, Florida’s limited statutory waiver of
sovereign immunity does not extend to Plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim. See Section
768.28(9), Florida Statutes (“The state or its subdivisions shall not be liable in tort for acts or
omissions of an officer, employee, or agent committed while acting outside the course and scope
of her or his employment or committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard for human rights, safety, or property.”).
15
A-317
E. The Negligent Misrepresentation Claim Lacks Merit
The negligent misrepresentation claim lacks merit. In order to be actionable, a suit for
negligent misrepresentation must contain the following elements: (1) misrepresentation of a
material fact; (2) the representor must either know of the misrepresentation, must make the
representation without knowledge as to its truth or falsity, or must make the representation under
circumstances in which he ought to have known of its falsity; (3) the representor must intend that
the representation induce another to act on it; (4) injury must result to the party acting in justifiable
reliance on the misrepresentation. Atl. Nat. Bank of Florida v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328, 1331–32
(Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
As previously set forth herein, Plaintiff’s claim for negligent misrepresentation is based
upon the allegation that in October 2010, Dr. Specter provided her with erroneous information
about the results of a neuropsychological examination that she had undergone the prior month.
(Doc. 2, ¶ 142) However, Plaintiff cannot claim that she justifiably relied upon Dr. Specter
concerning this matter. To the contrary, on September 2, 2010, the individual who performed the
neuropsychological testing on Plaintiff went over the results of that testing with her. (Pl. Depo. p.
217, l. 22 – p. 220, l. 3)
F. The Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment Claims Are Barred By Sovereign
Immunity
The breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims are barred by sovereign immunity. It
is undisputed that USF is an agency of the State of Florida. See Dismuke v. University of South
Florida Board of Trustees, 2006 WL 166547 at *3 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (“In Florida, state universities
are agencies of the state and courts have specifically stated that public universities are arms of the
state. See Fla. Stat. § 1001.705(1)(a)(4) (2002)”). As a state agency, USF is entitled to sovereign
16
A-318
immunity from suit for breach of contract claims unless the contract that is allegedly being
breached is an express written contract. See e.g., Pan Am Tobacco v. Department of Corrections,
471 So. 2d 4, 5-6 (Fla. 1985) (waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity for breach of contract
claims only applies to express, written contracts); County of Brevard v. Miorelli Engineering, Inc.,
703 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 1997) (sovereign immunity not waived for claims of implied contract);
and City of Orlando v. West Orange Country Club, Inc., 9 So. 3d 1268, 1272-1273 (Fla. 5th DCA
2009).
USF acknowledges that there are cases in Florida holding that, in a private university
setting, rules and regulations contained in a university’s student handbook can give rise to an
implied contract claim. See e.g., McCawley v. Universidad Carlos Albizu, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1251,
1258 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (“Pursuant to Florida law, there is an implied contract between a student
and a private university that if the student fully complies with the rules and regulations of the
university, then the university will confer to him a degree.”); Sharick v. Southeastern University
of the Health Sciences, Inc., 780 So. 2d 136, 139 Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (“When a student is duly
admitted by a private university . . . there is an implied contract between the student and the
university that, if [the student complies with the terms prescribed by the university, [the student]
will obtain a degree.”) (quotes and brackets in the original); Jallali v. Nova Southeastern
University, Inc., 992 So. 2d 338, 342 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); University of Miami v. Militana, 184
So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); and John B. Stetson University v. Hunt, 102 So. 637, 640
(Fla. 1924). However, USF is entitled to sovereign immunity from a breach of contract claim that
is predicated upon an implied contract. See Miorelli Engineering, Inc., 703 So. 2d at 1050.
Although USF does not have sovereign immunity from a breach of contract claim based
upon an express, written contract, items such as student policy manuals do not constitute an
17
A-319
express, written contract between a student and a university. See Carr v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
Sys. of Ga., 249 F. App’x 146, 150–51 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming summary judgment in favor of
university on student’s breach of contract claim based on alleged breach of student policies);
Williams v. Florida State Univ., 2014 WL 340562 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (dismissing student’s breach
of contract claim); Abbas v. Woleben, 2013 WL 5295672, *4 (E.D. Va. 2013) (finding that
university handbooks and catalogs do not form a contract when the terms are not binding on the
university); Brown v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 2008 WL 1943956, *6 (W.D.
Va. 2008) (holding that a student handbook did not constitute a binding contract based on its
disclaimers).
Plaintiff has not, and cannot, point to an express, written contract upon which her claim for
breach of contract is based. Instead, she points to the Student Handbook. (Doc. 2, Ex. B) However,
page eight of the Student Handbook specifically states:
This handbook is not a contract between the University and you. Rather[,] it is
intended to provide up-to-date information which may be helpful to you. (emphasis
in original)
Thus, the handbook by its very terms disavows the notion that it is an express contract. While a
student handbook may give rise to an implied contract in the context of a private university, it does
not create an express contract and it cannot operate to waive USF’s sovereign immunity from
Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract.
Absent an express, written contract, USF is likewise entitled to sovereign immunity from
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Israel, 178 So. 3d 444, 448 (Fla.
4th DCA 2015); Brevard Cty. v. Morehead, 181 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015); Calderone
v. Scott, 2015 WL 1800315, *2 (M.D. Fla. 2015); Brandt v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade
Cnty., 2010 WL 4062798, *1 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
18
A-320
G. The Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment Claims Lack Merit
The breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims lack merit. As set forth above,
Plaintiff’s breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims are based solely upon the terms of the
USF MCOM’s student handbook. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 160-163) Even assuming arguendo that USF does
not have sovereign immunity from these claims -- which it does -- they are nonetheless without
merit. The sole provision relied upon by Plaintiff in support of these claims is found in the student
handbook and states in pertinent part as follows:
A student may be granted a refund of 100% of tuition paid if he or she withdraws

due to circumstances determined by the college to be exceptional and beyond the
control of the student. (emphasis added)
(Doc. 2, ¶ 163 and Doc. 2, Ex. B, p. 55) First, it is clear from the foregoing provision that
reimbursement is not mandatory but instead “may” be granted. Second, it is clear that USF has
discretion to determine whether it deems that the circumstances giving rise to a student’s
withdrawal from school are exceptional and beyond the control of the student. Third, the foregoing
provision only addresses instances in which a student has withdrawn from school. Plaintiff was
dismissed from USF’s MCOM in January 2012 and March 2013; she did not withdraw. (Pl. Depo.
p. 178, l. 12 –p. 179, l. 22; p. 197, l. 17 – p. 198, l. 21)
H. The Section 504 Disability Discrimination Claim Lacks Merit
The Section 504 disability discrimination claim lacks merit. First, Plaintiff is not an
“otherwise qualified individual” under the Rehabilitation Act. Less than one (1) year ago, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion to address a Section 504 discrimination claim
brought by a medical student who had been dismissed from the osteopathic medicine program at
Nova University. See J.A.M. v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc., 646 F. App'x 921 (11th Cir. 2016). In that
case, the student claimed that the medical school violated Section 504 and discriminated against
19
A-321
him on the basis of his disability -- major depressive disorder -- when it dismissed him from the
program. The Eleventh Circuit set forth the applicable law as follows:
The Rehabilitation Act provides the following protection for persons facing a
disability: No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States
... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . Discrimination claims under
the RA are governed by the same standards used in ADA cases. . . In order to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the RA or ADA, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that he (1) is disabled, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) was
subjected to unlawful discrimination because of his disability. . . An “otherwise
qualified” person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite
of his handicap. . . In the context of postsecondary education, an “otherwise
qualified” individual must be able to meet the academic and technical standards
requisite to admission or participation in the education program or activity, in spite
of his handicap. . . In certain circumstances, an educational institution's refusal to
accommodate the needs of a disabled person amounts to discrimination against that
person because of his disability. . . However, “[the RA] imposes no requirement
upon an educational institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications of
standards to accommodate a handicapped person.” . . . Where the purpose of an
educational program is to train persons to serve their profession in all customary
ways, an institution's refusal to make “major adjustments” to its program in order
to accommodate the disabled does not amount to disability-related discrimination.
Id. at 926–27. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the student’s claims failed, because he did not
allege facts demonstrating that he was dismissed from the program “solely” because of his
disability. More importantly, the Eleventh Circuit also concluded that the student was not an
“otherwise qualified individual” under the Rehabilitation Act. The Court reasoned that the student
was unable to complete a single full semester of medical school without suffering a relapse of his
major depressive disorder during the semester and had repeatedly relapsed and failed to meet the
medical school’s academic requirements. Id.
In the case at bar, as in J.A.M., Plaintiff is not an “otherwise qualified individual” for
purposes of Section 504. She failed the first year of the Doctor of Medicine Program despite having
taken Adderall for her ADHD during that year. She also failed the second year of the Program.
20
A-322
Upon repeating the second year of the Program, she continued to have academic difficulties even
though she was provided accommodations in the form of additional time to complete
examinations, an opportunity to take examinations in a quiet room by herself, and extensions of
time to take examinations, including even a three (3) month extensions of time. In short, it took
her four (4) years to complete two (2) years of the Program, and there did not appear to be any
reason to believe that her performance would improve over time.
Second, USF’s ultimate decision to terminate Plaintiff from the Program was for
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons: poor academic performance, as evidenced by the fact that
she failed -- not just two (2) courses, but two (2) entire years. USF’s determination that Plaintiff
did not satisfy its academic standards for the Program is entitled to deference. Wood v. President
& Trustees of Spring Hill Coll. in City of Mobile, 978 F.2d 1214, 1222–23 (11th Cir. 1992).
Moreover, USF was under no obligation to lower its academic standards in order to accommodate
Plaintiff. Id.; see also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413, 99 S.Ct.
2361, 2370 (1979) (educational institutions need not lower or substantially modify their standards
to accommodate a handicapped person). Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that her academic problems
were a pretext to mask unlawful discrimination, and she certainly cannot demonstrate that
discriminatory animus was the sole reason for her termination from the Program.
Third, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she was subject to disparate treatment on the basis
of her disability. To the contrary, Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that during the 2009-2010
and 2011-2012 academic years, no one held her to a different standard than other students. (Pl.
Depo. p. 160, l. 5 – p. 161, l. 7) She also admitted that, when she repeated her first and second
years in the program, she was held to the same standard as other repeating students. (Pl. Depo. p.
161, l. 8 – p. 163, l. 9)
21
A-323
I. The Section 504 Retaliation Claim Lacks Merit
The Section 504 retaliation claim is meritless. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation
under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show: “(1) he was engaged in statutorily protected
expression, (2) he suffered a materially adverse action, and (3) there was some causal relationship
between the two events.” Simpson v. State of Ala. Dept. of Human Res., 501 F. App'x. 951, 954
(11th Cir.2012); Kendall v. Shinseki, 2014 WL 6469433, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2014).
According to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals:
The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the anti-retaliation provision from § 12203(a)

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) . . . Under the ADA's anti-
retaliation provision, “[n]o person shall discriminate against an individual because
such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter.” . .
. This anti-retaliation provision is similar to Title VII's prohibition on retaliation. .
. . Accordingly, we assess retaliation claims pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act
under the framework we use in assessing Title VII retaliation claims.
Burgos-Stefanelli v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 410 F. App'x 243, 245 (11th Cir. 2011)
(internal citations omitted); see also Shannon v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S. Postal Serv., 335 F. App'x
21, 26 (11th Cir. 2009).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation fails because she did not engage in
protected activity under the Rehabilitation Act prior to her dismissal from the Doctor of Medicine
Program. Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she did not make any report or otherwise make
any internal complaint of discrimination while she was a student at USF’s MCOM. Although
Plaintiff realized that there was a complaint procedure she could follow involving USF’s Office of
Equal Opportunity, she did not do so because at the time she did not believe that she was being
discriminated against. (Pl. Depo. p, 215, l. 18 – p. 217, l. 3) Plaintiff admitted that she never made
any complaints of discrimination while she was a student at USF’s MCOM, whether to USF or to
any other governmental agency. Although she later made complaints to the United States
22
A-324
Department of Education, that was after she had been dismissed from the Doctor of Medicine
Program. (Id. at p. 204, l. 23 – p. 205, l. 12)
Plaintiff also cannot establish that her dismissal from the Doctor of Medicine Program was
motivated by, or resulted from, her complaint to the United States Department of Education. To
the contrary, as set forth above, Plaintiff admitted that she complained to the United States
Department of Education after she had been dismissed from the Doctor of Medicine Program.
Plaintiff’s claim of unlawful retaliation is leveled solely against Dr. Frazier Stevenson, who
was USF’s Associate Dean of Undergraduate Medical Education. In her deposition, Plaintiff
testified that on March 8, 2013, she informed Dr. Stevenson that she did not want to take the
Comprehensive Basic Science Exam (“CBSE”) without the accommodations that had been
approved by USF’s MCOM. Because she was dismissed from the Doctor of Medicine Program
several days later, she surmises that her dismissal was in retaliation for asking for accommodations
while taking the CBSE. (Pl. Depo. at p. 205, l. 13 – p. 208, l. 25) Plaintiff testified that she is not
aware of anyone else having retaliated against her. (Pl. Depo. at p. 213, l. 1 – p. 215, l. 17)
Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Dr. Stevenson orchestrated her dismissal from the Doctor
of Medicine Program. To the contrary, as Plaintiff acknowledged in her deposition, the decision
to dismiss her from the Program was made by the Academic Performance Review Committee
(“APRC”). (Pl. Depo. at p. 197, l. 17 – p. 198, l. 21; p. 211, l. 21 – p. 212, l. 11) Plaintiff further
admitted that she does not know who served on the APRC and made the decision to dismiss her
from the Program. (Pl. Depo. at p. 211, l. 12-20) In fact, Dr. Stevenson did not serve on the APRC
during the 2012-2013 academic year, so he did not participate in its decision to dismiss Plaintiff
from the Program. See USF’s Response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 12. Moreover, there is no
evidence to suggest that he forced or manipulated the APRC to decide to dismiss Plaintiff. As
23
A-325
previously set forth herein, Plaintiff’s dismissal was for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and
nonretaliatory reason: her poor academic record in the Program.
J. Plaintiff’s Section 504 Discrimination and Retaliation Claims Are Partially Barred
Plaintiff’s Section 504 discrimination and retaliation claims are time barred by the statute
of limitations insofar as those claims arose prior to January 22, 2012, which is four (4) years before
Plaintiff filed her Complaint. In Florida, the statute of limitations for claims under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act is four (4) years. Ealy v. GEO Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 3553141, at *1 (11th
Cir. 2016). Thus, applying the four (4) year statute of limitations to Plaintiff’s Section 504
discrimination and retaliation claims, those claims are time barred insofar as they rest upon any
discriminatory or retaliatory act that purportedly took place prior to January 22, 2012.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, USF respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion for
Summary Judgment with respect to all of Plaintiff’s claims herein.
24
A-326
DATED this 4th day of February, 2017.
CONSTANGY, BROOKS,
200 W. Forsyth St.
Ste. 1700
Telephone: (904) 356-8900
Facsimile: (904) 356-8200
By: /s/ J. Ray Poole

John F. Dickinson
J. Ray Poole
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of February, 2017 the undersigned electronically
filed the foregoing which will be electronically served via the CM/ECF to all counsel of record
herein.
/s/ J. Ray Poole

Attorney
25
A-327
TAMPA DIVISION
Plaintiff,

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF FILING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS

IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
COMES NOW Defendant, the University of South Florida Board of Trustees (hereinafter
referred to as “Defendant” or “USF”), by and through its undersigned attorneys, pursuant to Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and files the following deposition transcripts in support
of its Motion for Summary Judgment:
Exhibit “A” - Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript and Exhibits Thereto
Exhibit “B” - Deposition Transcript of Dr. Deborah Roth and Exhibits Thereto
Exhibit “C” - Deposition Transcript of Dr, Ambuj Kumar and Exhibits Thereto
Exhibit “D” - Deposition Transcript of Dr. Saundra Stock and Exhibits Thereto
A-328
DATED this 4th day of February, 2017.
CONSTANGY, BROOKS,
200 W. Forsyth St.
Ste. 1700
Telephone: (904) 356-8900
Facsimile: (904) 356-8200
By: /s/ J. Ray Poole

John F. Dickinson
J. Ray Poole
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of February, 2017 the undersigned electronically
filed the foregoing which will be electronically served via the CM/ECF to all counsel of record
herein.
/s/ J. Ray Poole

Attorney
2
A-329
A-330
A-331
A-332
A-333
A-334
A-335
A-336
A-337
A-338
A-339
A-340
A-341
A-342
A-343
A-344
A-345
A-346
A-347
A-348
A-349
A-350
A-351
A-352
A-353
A-354
A-355
A-356
A-357
A-358
A-359
A-360
A-361
A-362
A-363
A-364
A-365
A-366
A-367
A-368
A-369
A-370
A-371
A-372
A-373
A-374
A-375
A-376
A-377
A-378
A-379
A-380
A-381
A-382
A-383
A-384
A-385
A-386
A-387
A-388
A-389
A-390
A-391
A-392
A-393
A-394
A-395
A-396
A-397
A-398
A-399
A-400
A-401
A-402
A-403
A-404
A-405
A-406
A-407
A-408
A-40
A-409
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
vs. USF BOT Appeal No.
17-12134, 17-11888, 17-12376
FRAP 25(b) through (d) (see reverse) requires that at or before the time of filing a paper,
a party must serve a copy on the other parties to the appeal or review. In addition, the
person who made service must certify that the other parties have been served, indicating
the date and manner of service, the names of the persons served, and their addresses.
You may use this form to fulfill this requirement. Please type or print legibly.
I hereby certify that on (date) August 30, 2017 ,

APPELLANT APPENDICES OF VOLUMES I TO XI
a true and correct copy of the foregoing (title of filing) ,
with first class postage prepaid, has been (check one)
G deposited in the U.S. Mail G deposited in the prison’s

internal mailing system
and properly addressed to the persons whose names and addresses are listed below:
filed with the clerk of the USCA 11th circuit

and served a paper copy to attorneys on record
Ms. Lori Mans and Mr. John Dickinson
200 West Forsyth Street
Suite 1700 Jacksonville, FL 32202-4317
Your Name (please print) Your Signature
Please complete and attach this form to the original document and to any copies you are
filing with the court, and to all copies you are serving on other parties to the appeal.
ix

Appendix Volume 2

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Appendix Volume 2

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APPEAL NO. 17-11888

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, BOARD OF TRUSTEES

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

VOL. Tab Date Title Page

I 2-2 1/22/16 Dkt. 2 Exhibit B 65-167

XI 64-1 05/17/17 Dkt. 64 Exhibit A to E 2199

Zainulabeddin v. University of South Florida Board of Trustees

Florida Middle District Court

Docket Parties (2) Related Cases (4) News

John Sikes Gibbs

J. Ray Poole, Jr.

0:17-prici-11888 - Nausheen Zainulabeddin v. University of South Florida Bo 04/27/2017

0:17-prici-12134 - Nausheen Zainulabeddin v. University of South Florida Bo 05/11/2017

0:17-prici-12376 - Nausheen Zainulabeddin v. University of South Florida Bo 05/24/2017

0:17-cvpri-02083 - Zainulabeddin v. USF Board of Trustees 05/25/2017

Navigation Edit Alert

Docket last updated: 09/01/2017 11:59 PM EDT Update Now

Friday, July 28, 2017

82 appeal USCA Mandate Fri 12:08 PM

81 appeal USCA order Fri 12:07 PM

Tuesday, June 20, 2017

80 3 pgs appeal USCA order Tue 11:57 AM

Thursday, June 08, 2017

Att: 1 Mailing Envelope

Monday, June 05, 2017

78 4 pgs notice Notice (Other) Tue 3:49 PM

77 2 pgs order Order on motion to supplement Mon 9:12 AM

Wednesday, May 31, 2017

Tuesday, May 30, 2017

75 5 pgs respm Response in Opposition to Motion Tue 5:01 PM

appeal Transmittal to USCA Tue 10:21 AM

Wednesday, May 24, 2017

appeal Transmittal to USCA Wed 2:47 PM

Tuesday, May 23, 2017

74 4 pgs notice Notice (Other) Wed 3:23 PM

DIRECTIONS TO THE CLERK by Nausheen Zainulabeddin. (BSN)

Monday, May 22, 2017

71 2 pgs appeal Notice of appeal Wed 3:09 PM

70 2 pgs appeal Notice of appeal Wed 3:07 PM

Att: 1 2 pgs Petition for Review

69 16 pgs notice Notice (Other) Wed 3:03 PM

Directions to the Clerk, by Nausheen Zainulabeddin (KMM)

67 1 pgs misc Bill of costs Mon 8:30 AM

Friday, May 19, 2017

Wednesday, May 17, 2017

64 14 pgs respm Response in Opposition to Motion Thu 10:03 AM

Att: 1 19 pgs Exhibit A-E,

Att: 2 99 pgs Exhibit F,

Att: 3 45 pgs Exhibit G,

Att: 4 55 pgs Exhibit H,

Att: 6 3 pgs Exhibit,

Tuesday, May 16, 2017

63 19 pgs motion Supplement Tue 3:55 PM

Att: 1 38 pgs Exhibit A,

Att: 3 102 pgs Exhibit 2,

Att: 5 161 pgs Exhibit 4,

Att: 6 126 pgs Exhibit 5,

Att: 8 100 pgs Exhibit 7,

Att: 10 141 pgs Exhibit 9,

Att: 11 91 pgs Exhibit 10,

Att: 13 139 pgs Exhibit 12

Wednesday, May 10, 2017