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Republic of the Philippines of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine
Islands,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE
MANILA, defendant-appellant.
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for
appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the
treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the
Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the
earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June
3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of that year, a
central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of
Spain, to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed.
After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief
board allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in
its resolution, dated September 22, 1866, and, by order of the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these
allotments, together with the names of those entitled thereto,
was published in the Official Gazette of Manila dated April 7,
1870. There was later distributed, inaccordance with the
above-mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65, leaving
a balance of S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition
Government in its rights, as regards an important sum of
February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated
the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer to turn over to
the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in
installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were received
on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and
June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte de
Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons, and
heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were
made by the central relief board for the payment of those
amounts, the Philippine Islands to bring suit against
the Monte de Piedad a recover, "through the
Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of
the Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with interest, for
the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list
of names published in the Official Gazette instituted on May
3, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine Islands,
represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial,
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
$80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together
with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of
the cause. The defendant appealed and makes the following
assignment of errors:
1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand
dollars ($80,000), give to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de
Ahorros, were so given as a donation subject to one condition,
to wit: the return of such sum of money to the Spanish
Government of these Islands, within eight days following the
day when claimed, in case the Supreme Government of Spain
should not approve the action taken by the former
government.
2. The court erred in not having decreed that this
donation had been cleared; said eighty thousand dollars
($80,000) being at present the exclusive property of the
appellant the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros.
3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of
the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish
money resulting from a national subscription opened by
reason of the earthquake of June 3, 1863, in these Island.
4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act
Numbered 2109, passed by the Philippine Legislature on
January 30, 1912, is unconstitutional.
5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there
is no title for the prescription of this suit brought by the
Insular Government against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de
Ahorros for the reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars
($80,000) given to it by the late Spanish Government of these
Islands.
6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad
y Caja de Ahorros to reimburse the Philippine Government in
the sum of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or the
equivalent thereof in the present legal tender currency in
circulation, with legal interest thereon from February 28th,
1912, and the costs of this suit.
In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was directed to
inform the home Government in what manner the indemnity
might be paid to which, by virtue of the resolutions of the
relief board, the persons who suffered damage by the
earthquake might be entitled, in order to perform the sacred
obligation which the Government of Spain had assumed
toward the donors.
The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's
petition, dated February 1, 1883, addressed to the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, which reads:
Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila
Presidencia.
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Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de
Piedad y Caja de Ahorros of Manila informs your Excellency,
First: That the funds which it has up to the present been able
to dispose of have been exhausted in loans on jewelry, and
there only remains the sum of one thousand and odd pesos,
which will be expended between to-day and day after
tomorrow. Second: That, to maintain the credit of the
establishment, which would be greatly injured were its
operations suspended, it is necessary to procure money. Third:
That your Excellency has proposed to His Majesty's
Government to apply to the funds of the Monte de Piedad a
part of the funds held in the treasury derived form the national
subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the
earthquake of 1863. Fourth: That in the public treasury there
is held at the disposal of the central earthquake relief board
over $1090,000 which was deposited in the said treasury by
order of your general Government, it having been transferred
thereto from the Spanish-Filipino Bank where it had been
held. fifth: That in the straightened circumstances of the
moment, your Excellency can, to avert impending disaster to
the Monte de Piedad, order that, out of that sum of one
hundred thousand pesos held in the Treasury at the disposal of
the central relief board, there be transferred to the Monte de
Piedad the sum of $80,000, there to be held under the same
conditions as at present in the Treasury, to wit, at the disposal
of the Relief Board. Sixth: That should this transfer not be
approved for any reason, either because of the failure of His
Majesty's Government to approve the proposal made by your
Excellency relative to the application to the needs of
the Monte de Piedad of a pat of the subscription intended to
believe the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, or for
any other reason, the board of directors of the Monte de
Piedad obligates itself to return any sums which it may have
received on account of the eighty thousand pesos, or the
whole thereof, should it have received the same, by securing a
loan from whichever bank or banks may lend it the money at
the cheapest rate upon the security of pawned jewelry. —
This is an urgent measure to save the Monte de Piedad in the
present crisis and the board of directors trusts to secure your
Excellency's entire cooperation and that of the other officials
who have take part in the transaction.
The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing
petition is as follows:
GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
MANILA, February 1, 1883.
In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the
board of directors of the Monte de Piedad of this city, in
which it is stated that the funds which the said institution
counted upon are nearly all invested in loans on jewelry and
that the small account remaining will scarcely suffice to cover
the transactions of the next two days, for which reason it
entreats the general Government that, in pursuance of its
telegraphic advice to H. M. Government, the latter direct that
there be turned over to said Monte de Piedad $80,000 out of
the funds in the public treasury obtained from the national
subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the
earthquake of 1863, said board obligating itself to return this
sum should H. M. Government, for any reason, not approve
the said proposal, and for this purpose it will procure funds by
means of loans raised on pawned jewelry; it stated further that
if the aid so solicited is not furnished, it will be compelled to
suspend operations, which would seriously injure the credit of
so beneficient an institution; and in view of the report upon
the matter made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda; and
considering the fact that the public treasury has on hand a
much greater sum from the source mentioned than that
solicited; and considering that this general Government has
submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that the
balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained
from the subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus
should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a
donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the
institution, believing that in so doing the wishes of the donors
would be faithfully interpreted inasmuch as those wishes were
no other than to relieve distress, an act of charity which is
exercised in the highest degree by the Monte de Piedad, for it
liberates needy person from the pernicious effects of usury;
and
Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about
the creation of the pious institution referred to would be
frustrated, and that the great and laudable work of its
establishment, and that the great and laudable and valuable if
the aid it urgently seeks is not granted, since the suspension of
its operations would seriously and regrettably damage the
ever-growing credit of the Monte de Piedad; and
Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause
deep distress in the public mind, it might be said that at the
present juncture it would assume the nature of a disturbance
of public order because of the extreme poverty of the poorer
classes resulting from the late calamities, and because it is the
only institution which can mitigate the effects of such poverty;
and
Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to
granting the request herein contained, for the funds in
question are sufficiently secured in the unlikely event that H>
M. Government does not approve the recommendation
mentioned, this general Government, in the exercise of the
extraordinary powers conferred upon it and in conformity
with the report of the Intendencia de Hacienda, resolves as
follows:
First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte
de Piedad, out of the sum held in the public treasury of these
Islands obtained from the national subscription opened by
reason of the earthquakes of 1863, amounts up to the sum
$80,000, as its needs may require, in installments of $20,000.
Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is
solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the
sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not
approve this resolution.
Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall
forthwith, and in preference to all other work, proceed to
prepare the necessary papers so that with the least possible
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delay the payment referred to may be made and the danger
that menaces the Monte de Piedad of having to suspend its
operations may be averted.
H. M. Government shall be advised hereof.lawphi1.net
(Signed) P. DE RIVERA.
By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was ordered to
"inform this ministerio what is the total sum available at the
present time, taking into consideration the sums delivered to
the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your
general Government on February 1, 1883," and after the
rights of the claimants, whose names were published in the
Official Gazette of Manila on April 7, 1870, and their heirs
had been established, as therein provided, as such persons
"have an unquestionable right to be paid the donations
assigned to them therein, your general Government shall
convoke them all within a reasonable period and shall pay
their shares to such as shall identify themselves, without
regard to their financial status," and finally "that when all the
proceedings and operations herein mentioned have been
concluded and the Government can consider itself free from
all kinds of claims on the part of those interested in the
distribution of the funds deposited in the vaults of the
Treasury, such action may be taken as the circumstances shall
require, after first consulting the relief board and your general
Government and taking account of what sums have been
delivered to the Monte de Piedad and those that were
expended in 1888 to relieve public calamities," and "in order
that all the points in connection with the proceedings had as a
result of the earthquake be clearly understood, it is
indispensable that the offices hereinbefore mentioned comply
with the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
royal order of June 25, 1879." On receipt of this Finance
order by the Governor-General, the Department of Finance
was called upon for a report in reference to the $80,000
turned over to the defendant, and that Department's report to
the Governor-General dated June 28, 1893, reads:
Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General
Treasury of the Philippines) — Excellency. — By Royal
Order No. 1044 of December 3, last, it is provided that the
persons who sustained losses by the earthquakes that occurred
in your capital in the year 1863 shall be paid the amounts
allotted to them out of the sums sent from Spain for this
purpose, with observance of the rules specified in the said
royal order, one of them being that before making the
payment to the interested parties the assets shall be reduced to
money. These assets, during the long period of time that has
elapsed since they were turned over to the Treasury of the
Philippine Islands, were used to cover the general needs of
the appropriation, a part besides being invested in the relief of
charitable institutions and another part to meet pressing needs
occasioned by public calamities. On January 30, last, your
Excellency was please to order the fulfillment of that
sovereign mandate and referred the same to
this Intendencia for its information and the purposes desired
(that is, for compliance with its directions and, as aforesaid,
one of these being the liquidation, recovery, and deposit with
the Treasury of the sums paid out of that fund and which were
expended in a different way from that intended by the donors)
and this Intendencia believed the moment had arrived to
claim from the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad y
Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80,000 pesos which, by decree of
your general Government of the date of February 1, 1883,
was loaned to it out of the said funds, the (Monte de Piedad)
obligating itself to return the same within the period of eight
days if H. M. Government did not approve the delivery. On
this Intendencia's demanding from the Monte de Piedad the
eighty thousand pesos, thus complying with the provisions of
the Royal Order, it was to be supposed that no objection to its
return would be made by the Monte de Piedad for, when it
received the loan, it formally engaged itself to return it; and,
besides, it was indisputable that the moment to do so had
arrived, inasmuch as H. M. Government, in ordering that the
assets of the earthquake relief fund should he collected,
makes express mention of the 80,000 pesos loaned to
the Monte de Piedad, without doubt considering as sufficient
the period of ten years during which it has been using this
large sum which lawfully belongs to their persons.
This Intendencia also supposed that the Monte de Piedad no
longer needed the amount of that loan, inasmuch as, far from
investing it in beneficient transactions, it had turned the whole
amount into the voluntary deposit funds bearing 5 per cent
interests, the result of this operation being that the debtor
loaned to the creditor on interest what the former had
gratuitously received. But the Monte de Piedad, instead of
fulfilling the promise it made on receiving the sum, after
repeated demands refused to return the money on the ground
that only your Excellency, and not the Intendencia (Treasury),
is entitled to order the reimbursement, taking no account of
the fact that this Intendencia was acting in the discharge of a
sovereign command, the fulfillment of which your Excellency
was pleased to order; and on the further ground that the sum
of 80,000 pesos which it received from the fund intended for
the earthquake victims was not received as a loan, but as a
donation, this in the opinion of this Intendencia, erroneously
interpreting both the last royal order which directed the
apportionment of the amount of the subscription raised in the
year 1863 and the superior decree which granted the loan,
inasmuch as in this letter no donation is made to the Monte de
Piedad of the 80,000 pesos, but simply a loan; besides, no
donation whatever could be made of funds derived from a
private subscription raised for a specific purpose, which funds
are already distributed and the names of the beneficiaries have
been published in the Gaceta, there being lacking only the
mere material act of the delivery, which has been unduly
delayed. In view of the unexpected reply made by the Monte
de Piedad, and believing it useless to insist further in the
matter of the claim for the aforementioned loan, or to argue in
support thereof, this Intendencia believes the intervention of
your Excellency necessary in this matter, if the royal Order
No. 1044 of December 3, last, is to be complied with, and for
this purpose I beg your Excellency kindly to order the Monte
de Piedad to reimburse within the period of eight days the
80,000 which it owes, and that you give this Intendencia
power to carry out the provisions of the said royal order. I
must call to the attention of your Excellency that the said
pious establishment, during the last few days and after
demand was made upon it, has endorsed to the
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Spanish-Filipino Bank nearly the whole of the sum which it
had on deposit in the general deposit funds.
The record in the case under consideration fails to
disclose any further definite action taken by either the
Philippine Government or the Spanish Government in regard
to the $80,000 turned over to the Monte de Piedad.
In the defendant's general ledger the following entries
appear: "Public Treasury: February 15, 1883, $20,000; March
12, 1883, $20,000; April 14, 1883, $20,000; June 2, 1883,
$20,000, total $80,000." The book entry for this total is as
follows: "To the public Treasury derived from the
subscription for the earthquake of 1863, $80,000 received
from general Treasury as a returnable loan, and without
interest." The account was carried in this manner until
January 1, 1899, when it was closed by transferring the
amount to an account called "Sagrada Mitra," which latter
account was a loan of $15,000 made to the defendant by the
Archbishop of Manila, without interest, thereby placing the
"Sagrada Mitra" account at $95,000 instead of $15,000. The
above-mentioned journal entry for January 1, 1899, reads:
"Sagrada Mitra and subscription, balance of these two
account which on this date are united in accordance with an
order of the Exmo. Sr. Presidente of the Council transmitted
verbally to the Presidente Gerente of these institutions,
$95,000."
On March 16, 1902, the Philippine government called
upon the defendant for information concerning the status of
the $80,000 and received the following reply:
MANILA, March 31, 1902.
To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of
the Philippine Islands.
SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in
which you request information from this office as to when
and for what purpose the Spanish Government delivered to
the Monte de Piedad eighty thousand pesos obtained from the
subscription opened in connection with the earthquake of
1863, as well as any other information that might be useful
for the report which your office is called upon to furnish, I
must state to your department that the books kept in these
Pious Institutions, and which have been consulted for the
purpose, show that on the 15th of February, 1883, they
received as a reimbursable loan and without interest, twenty
thousand pesos, which they deposited with their own funds.
On the same account and on each of the dates of March 12,
April 14 and June 2 of the said year, 1883, they also received
and turned into their funds a like sum of twenty thousand
pesos, making a total of eighty thousand pesos. — (Signed)
Emilio Moreta.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that
found in the letter book No. 2 of those Pious Institutions.
Manila, November 19, 1913
(Sgd.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI,
Secretary
(Sgd.) O. K. EMILIO MORETA,
Managing Director.
The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of
the transactions which took place between the Government of
Spain and the Philippine Government on the one side and
the Monte de Piedad on the other, concerning the $80,000.
The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the
Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute
necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum
of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, at
the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to
it the sum of $80,000 to be held under the same conditions, to
wit, "at the disposal of the relief board." The Monte de
Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be
approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be
returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to
it as a donation. The Governor-General, after reciting the
substance of the petition, stated that "this general Government
has submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that
the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds
obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a
surplus, should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as
a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the
institution," and "considering that no reasonable objection can
be made to granting the request herein contained," directed
the transfer of the $80,000 to be made with the understanding
that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is
solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the
sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not
approve this resolution." It will be noted that the first and only
time the word "donation" was used in connection with the
$80,000 appears in this resolution of the Governor-General. It
may be inferred from the royal orders that the Madrid
Government did tacitly approve of the transfer of the $80,000
to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without interest, but that
Government certainly did not approve such transfer as a
donation for the reason that the Governor-General was
directed by the royal order of December 3, 1892, to inform
the Madrid Government of the total available sum of the
earthquake fund, "taking into consideration the sums
delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree
issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883."
This language, nothing else appearing, might admit of the
interpretation that the Madrid Government did not intend that
the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands should include
the $80,000 in the total available sum, but when considered in
connection with the report of the Department of Finance there
can be no doubt that it was so intended. That report refers
expressly to the royal order of December 3d, and sets forth in
detail the action taken in order to secure the return of the
$80,000. The Department of Finance, acting under the orders
of the Governor-General, understood that the $80,000 was
transferred to the Monte de Piedad well knew that it received
this sum as a loan interest." The amount was thus carried in
its books until January, 1899, when it was transferred to the
account of the "Sagrada Mitra" and was thereafter known as
the "Sagrada Mitra and subscription account." Furthermore,
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the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as
March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a returnable
loan, and without interest." Therefore, there cannot be the
slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received the
$80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not as a donation.
Consequently, the first alleged error is entirely without
foundation.
Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third
assignment of error, say in their principal brief that:
The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and
its King enjoyed the distinction of being deputy ex officio of
the Holy See and Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies, and
as such it was his duty to protect all pious works and
charitable institutions in his kingdoms, especially those of the
Indies; among the latter was the Monte de Piedad of the
Philippines, of which said King and his deputy the
Governor-General of the Philippines, as royal vice-patron,
were, in a special and peculiar manner, the protectors; the
latter, as a result of the cession of the Philippine Islands,
Implicitly renounced this high office and tacitly returned it to
the Holy See, now represented by the Archbishop of Manila;
the national subscription in question was a kind of foundation
or pious work, for a charitable purpose in these Islands; and
the entire subscription not being needed for its original
purpose, the royal vice-patron, with the consent of the King,
gave the surplus thereof to an analogous purpose; the
fulfillment of all these things involved, in the majority, if not
in all cases, faithful compliance with the duty imposed upon
him by the Holy See, when it conferred upon him the royal
patronage of the Indies, a thing that touched him very closely
in his conscience and religion; the cessionary Government
though Christian, was not Roman Catholic and prided itself
on its policy of non-interference in religious matters, and
inveterately maintained a complete separation between the
ecclesiastical and civil powers.
In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that,
even without the express provisions of the Treaty of Paris,
which apparently expressly exclude such an idea, it did not
befit the honor of either of the contracting parties to subrogate
to the American Government in lieu of the Spanish
Government anything respecting the disposition of the funds
delivered by the latter to the Monte de Piedad. The same
reasons that induced the Spanish Government to take over
such things would result in great inconvenience to the
American Government in attempting to do so. The question
was such a delicate one, for the reason that it affected the
conscience, deeply religious, of the King of Spain, that it
cannot be believed that it was ever his intention to confide the
exercise thereof to a Government like the American. (U.
S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.)
It is thus seen that the American Government did not
subrogate the Spanish Government or rather, the King of
Spain, in this regard; and as the condition annexed to the
donation was lawful and possible of fulfillment at the time the
contract was made, but became impossible of fulfillment by
the cession made by the Spanish Government in these Islands,
compliance therewith is excused and the contract has been
cleared thereof.
The contention of counsel, as thus stated, in untenable
for two reason, (1) because such contention is based upon the
erroneous theory that the sum in question was a donation to
the Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2) because the
charity founded by the donations for the earthquake sufferers
is not and never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious
work. The first proposition has already been decided
adversely to the defendant's contention. As to the second, the
record shows clearly that the fund was given by the donors
for a specific and definite purpose — the relief of the
earthquake sufferers — and for no other purpose. The money
was turned over to the Spanish Government to be devoted to
that purpose. The Spanish Government remitted the money to
the Philippine Government to be distributed among the
suffers. All officials, including the King of Spain and the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, who took part in
the disposal of the fund, acted in their purely civil, official
capacity, and the fact that they might have belonged to a
certain church had nothing to do with their acts in this matter.
The church, as such, had nothing to do with the fund in any
way whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of
the Monte de Piedad (an institution under the control of the
church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity in question had
been founded as an ecclesiastical pious work, the King of
Spain and the Governor-General, in their capacities as
vicar-general of the Indies and as royal vice-patron,
respectively, would have disposed of the fund as such and not
in their civil capacities, and such functions could not have
been transferred to the present Philippine Government,
because the right to so act would have arisen out of the
special agreement between the Government of Spain and the
Holy See, based on the union of the church and state which
was completely separated with the change of sovereignty.
And in their supplemental brief counsel say:
By the conceded facts the money in question is part of
a charitable subscription. The donors were persons in Spain,
the trustee was the Spanish Government, the donees,
the cestuis que trustent, were certain persons in the Philippine
Islands. The whole matter is one of trusteeship. This is
undisputed and indisputable. It follows that the Spanish
Government at no time was the owner of the fund. Not being
the owner of the fund it could not transfer the ownership.
Whether or not it could transfer its trusteeship it certainly
never has expressly done so and the general terms of property
transfer in the Treaty of Paris are wholly insufficient for such
a purpose even could Spain have transferred its trusteeship
without the consent of the donors and even could the United
States, as a Government, have accepted such a trust under any
power granted to it by the thirteen original States in the
Constitution, which is more than doubtful. It follows further
that this Government is not a proper party to the action. The
only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment
to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis
que trustent, and this Government is neither.
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If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being
true that the Spanish Government could not, as counsel say,
transfer the ownership of the fund to the Monte de Piedad, the
question arises, who may sue to recover this loan? It needs no
argument to show that the Spanish or Philippine Government,
as trustee, could maintain an action for this purpose had there
been no change of sovereignty and if the right of action has
not prescribed. But those governments were something more
than mere common law trustees of the fund. In order to
determine their exact status with reference to this fund, it is
necessary to examine the law in force at the time there
transactions took place, which are the law of June 20, 1894,
the royal decree of April 27. 1875, and the instructions
promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were
applicable to the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la
Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34)
The funds collected as a result of the national
subscription opened in Spain by royal order of the Spanish
Government and which were remitted to the Philippine
Government to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers
by the Central Relief Board constituted, under article 1 of the
law of June 20, 1894, and article 2 of the instructions of April
27, 1875, a special charity of a temporary nature as
distinguished from a permanent public charitable institution.
As the Spanish Government initiated the creation of the fund
and as the donors turned their contributions over to that
Government, it became the duty of the latter, under article 7
of the instructions, to exercise supervision and control over
the moneys thus collected to the end that the will of the
donors should be carried out. The relief board had no power
whatever to dispose of the funds confided to its charge for
other purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers,
because paragraph 3 of article 11 of the instructions conferred
the power upon the secretary of the interior of Spain, and no
other, to dispose of the surplus funds, should there be any, by
assigning them to some other charitable purpose or institution.
The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this
manner so long as they were necessary for the specific
purpose for which they were contributed. The secretary had
the power, under the law above mentioned to appoint and
totally or partially change the personnel of the relief board
and to authorize the board to defend the rights of the charity
in the courts. The authority of the board consisted only in
carrying out the will of the donors as directed by the
Government whose duty it was to watch over the acts of the
board and to see that the funds were applied to the purposes
for which they were contributed .The secretary of the interior,
as the representative of His Majesty's Government, exercised
these powers and duties through the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain and of the
Philippine Islands in complying with their duties conferred
upon them by law, acted in their governmental capacities in
attempting to carry out the intention of the contributors. It
will this be seen that those governments were something more,
as we have said, than mere trustees of the fund.
It is further contended that the obligation on the part of
the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government,
even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of
sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine
Government cannot maintain this action for that reason. This
contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid
law," as it cannot rest upon any title to the fund in the Monte
de Piedad acquired prior to such change. While the obligation
to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still
pending, war between the United States and Spain ensued.
Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the
Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to
the United States, the latter agreeing to pay Spain the sum of
$20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article,
Spain relinquished to the United States "all buildings,
wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and
other immovable property which, in conformity with law,
belonged to the public domain, and as such belonged to the
crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included therein, it
is said that the right to recover this amount did not, therefore,
pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not
follow as a necessary consequence, as the right to recover
does not rest upon the proposition that the $80,000 must be
"other immovable property" mentioned in article 8 of the
treaty, but upon contractual obligations incurred before the
Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. We will
not inquire what effect his cession had upon the law of June
20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the
instructions promulgated on the latter date. In Vilas vs.Manila
(220 U. S., 345), the court said:
That there is a total abrogation of the former political
relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious.
That all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with
the political character, constitution, or institutions of the
substituted sovereign, lose their force, is also plain. (Alvarez
y Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U. S., 167.) But it is equally
settled in the same public law that the great body of municipal
law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in
force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.
If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict
with the political character, constitution or institutions of the
new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their force
upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States,
but if they are among "that great body of municipal law which
regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force
and are still in force unless they have been repealed by the
present Government. That they fall within the latter class is
clear from their very nature and character. They are laws
which are not political in any sense of the word. They
conferred upon the Spanish Government the right and duty to
supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and
charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting
"provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are
in the nature of charitable institutions, from taxation, placed
such institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are
concerned, under the general supervision of the Insular
Treasurer (paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189; see
also Act No. 701).
Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands
the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved upon he
United States. In Magill vs. Brown (16 Fed. Cas., 408),
6
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quoted with approval in Mormon Charch vs. United States
(136 U. S.,1, 57), the court said:
The Revolution devolved on the State all the
transcendent power of Parliament, and the prerogative of the
crown, and gave their Acts the same force and effect.
In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 Hw., 369, 384), Mr. Justice
McLean, delivering the opinion of the court in a charity case,
said:
When this country achieved its independence, the
prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the
States. And this power still remains with them except so fact
as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal
Government. The sovereign will is made known to us by
legislative enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens
patriae.
Chancelor Kent says:
In this country, the legislature or government of the State,
as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of
public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority
over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted
with it. (4 Kent Com., 508, note.)
The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon
Church vs. United States, supra, after approving also the last
quotations, said:
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged
in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to
those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people
and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a
most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be
exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention
of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
The court in the same case, after quoting from
Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3 Cush., 483, 497),
wherein the latter court held that it is deemed indispensible
that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the
same of the estates of in facts, idiots, insane persons, and
persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act for
themselves, said:
These remarks in reference to in facts, insane persons
and person not known, or not in being, apply to the
beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of
vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the
sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that
this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the
change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that
it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called
into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice
and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases
of charities as in any other cases whatever.
In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged
that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest; that the
Attorney-General had no power to institute the action; and
that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct right of
the people as a whole, as distinguished from the rights of
individuals, before an action could be brought by the
Attorney-General in the name of the people. The court, in
overruling these contentions, held that it was not only the
right but the duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute the
action, which related to charities, and approved the following
quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1 Younge &
C. C., 417):
Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is
in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust, it is the
privilege of the public that the crown should be entitled to
intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting, on behalf
on the public generally, the public interest and the public right,
which, probably, no individual could be found effectually to
assert, even if the interest were such as to allow it. (2 Knet's
Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 732.)
It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only
persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to
the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis
que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently,
the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action." The
earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great
number of small contributions. The names of the contributors
do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown.
They parted with the title to their respective contributions.
The beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their
heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite numerous
also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers
have died, leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for
them to institute an action or actions either individually or
collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course that can
be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again
assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for
which it was originally destined.
The impracticability of pursuing a different course,
however, is not the true ground upon which the right of the
Government to maintain the action rests. The true ground is
that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure,
public property, only applicable, it is true, to the specific
purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but within
those limits consecrated to the public use, and became part of
the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare
of the Philippine Government. (Mormon Church vs. U.
S., supra.) To deny the Government's right to maintain this
action would be contrary to sound public policy, as tending to
discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity
and Christian benevolence in like instances in the future.
As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of
error relating to the constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little
7
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need be said for the reason that we have just held that the
present Philippine Government is the proper party to the
action. The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the
Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it
undoubtedly had. The Act is not, as contended by counsel, in
conflict with the fifth section of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, because it does not take property without due process
of law. In fact, the defendant is not the owner of the $80,000,
but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the central
relief board. Therefor, there can be nothing in the Act which
transcends the power of the Philippine Legislature.
In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of
the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the
Philippine Islands to the United States by the Treaty of Paris
of December 10, 1898. The action was brought upon the
theory that the city, under its present charter from the
Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic
person, and liable upon the obligations of the old city. This
court held that the present municipality is a totally different
corporate entity and in no way liable for the debts of the
Spanish municipality. The Supreme Court of the United
States, in reversing this judgment and in holding the city
liable for the old debt, said:
The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no
wise affected, and, in law, the present city is, in every legal
sense, the successor of the old. As such it is entitled to the
property and property rights of the predecessor corporation,
and is, in law, subject to all of its liabilities.
In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the
defendant argue that as the Monte de Piedad declined to
return the $80,000 when ordered to do so by the Department
of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had
prescribed at the time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912,
citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969 of the
Civil Code. While on the other hand, the Attorney-General
contends that the right of action had not prescribed (a)
because the defense of prescription cannot be set up against
the Philippine Government, (b) because the right of action to
recover a deposit or trust funds does not prescribe, and (c)
even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against
the Government and if the action had, in fact, prescribed, the
same was revived by Act No. 2109.
The material facts relating to this question are these:
The Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 in 1883 "to be
held under the same conditions as at present in the treasury, to
wit, at the disposal of the relief board." In compliance with
the provisions of the royal order of December 3, 1892, the
Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedadin
June, 1893, to return the $80,000. The Monte declined to
comply with this order upon the ground that only the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the
Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement. The amount was carried on the books of the
Monte as a returnable loan until January 1, 1899, when it was
transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra." On March
31, 1902, the Monte, through its legal representative, stated in
writing that the amount in question was received as a
reimbursable loan, without interest. Act No. 2109 became
effective January 30, 1912, and the action was instituted on
May 3rd of that year.
Counsel for the defendant treat the question of
prescription as if the action was one between individuals or
corporations wherein the plaintiff is seeking to recover an
ordinary loan. Upon this theory June, 1893, cannot be taken
as the date when the statute of limitations began to run, for
the reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on
March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were received as a loan,
thereby in effect admitting that it still owed the amount.
(Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure.) But if counsels' theory
is the correct one the action may have prescribed on May 3,
1912, because more than ten full years had elapsed after
March 31, 1902. (Sections 38 and 43, Code of Civil
Procedure.)
Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of
limitations? The Supreme Court of the United States in U.
S. vs. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. (118
U. S., 120, 125), said:
It is settled beyond doubt or controversy — upon the
foundation of the great principle of public policy, applicable
to all governments alike, which forbids that the public
interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the
officers or agents to whose care they are confided — that the
United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign
government, is not bound by any statute of limitations, unless
Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be
so bound. (Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet. 666; U. S. vs. Knight, 14
Pet., 301; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92; U.
S. vs. Thompson, 98 U. S., 486; Fink vs. O'Neil, 106 U. S.,
272, 281.)
In Gibson vs. Choteau, supra, the court said:
It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of
limitation do not run against the State. That no laches can be
imputed to the King, and that no time can bar his rights, was
the maxim of the common laws, and was founded on the
principle of public policy, that as he was occupied with the
cares of government he ought not to suffer from the
negligence of his officer and servants. The principle is
applicable to all governments, which must necessarily act
through numerous agents, and is essential to a preservation of
the interests and property of the public. It is upon this
principle that in this country the statutes of a State prescribing
periods within which rights must be prosecuted are not held to
embrace the State itself, unless it is expressly designated or
the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a nature that it must
necessarily be included. As legislation of a State can only
apply to persons and thing over which the State has
jurisdiction, the United States are also necessarily excluded
from the operation of such statutes.
8
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In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous
authorities, is stated as follows:
In the absence of express statutory provision to the
contrary, statute of limitations do not as a general rule run
against the sovereign or government, whether state or federal.
But the rule is otherwise where the mischiefs to be remedied
are of such a nature that the state must necessarily be included,
where the state goes into business in concert or in competition
with her citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his
private rights by suit in the name of the state or government,
so that the latter is only a nominal party.
In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a
mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting
this action, is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and
is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the
Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. The
United States having in 1852, purchased as trustee for the
Chickasaw Indians under treaty with that tribe, certain bonds
of the State of Tennessee, the right of action of the
Government on the coupons of such bonds could not be
barred by the statute of limitations of Tennessee, either while
it held them in trust for the Indians, or since it became the
owner of such coupons. (U. S. vs. Nashville, etc., R.
Co., supra.) So where lands are held in trust by the state and
the beneficiaries have no right to sue, a statute does not run
against the State's right of action for trespass on the trust
lands. (Greene Tp. vs. Campbell, 16 Ohio St., 11; see also
Atty.-Gen. vs. Midland R. Co., 3 Ont., 511 [following
Reg. vs. Williams, 39 U. C. Q. B., 397].)
These principles being based "upon the foundation of the
great principle of public policy" are, in the very nature of
things, applicable to the Philippine Government.
Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last
assignments of error do not question the amount of the
judgment nor do they question the correctness of the
judgment in so far as it allows interest, and directs its
payment in gold coin or in the equivalent in Philippine
currency.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., did not sign.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974
MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.
Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from
a lower court decision are the mother and the uncle of a minor
beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy issued on
the life of her deceased father. The dispute centers as to who
of them should be entitled to act as trustee thereof. The lower
court applying the appropriate Civil Code provisions decided
in favor of the mother, the plaintiff in this case. Defendant
uncle appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it did
following the specific mandate of the law. In addition, it must
have taken into account the principle that in cases of this
nature the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration.
It is not an unreasonable assumption that between a mother
and an uncle, the former is likely to lavish more care on and
pay greater attention to her. This is all the more likely
considering that the child is with the mother. There are no
circumstances then that did militate against what conforms to
the natural order of things, even if the language of the law
were not as clear. It is not to be lost sight of either that the
judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State
as parens patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity
under the present Constitution, did weigh in the balance the
opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the
welfare of the child called for the mother to be entrusted with
such responsibility. We have to affirm.
The appealed decision made clear: "There is no
controversy as to the facts. "1 The insured, Florentino Pilapil
had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the
plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time
the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant,
Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased
insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with
his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his
death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by
the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the
delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil
Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of
the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance
policy.2
After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May
10, 1965, rendered judgment ordering the defendant to deliver
the proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main
reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The
9
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former provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is
the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority. If the property is worth more than
two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond
subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance."3 The
latter states: "The property which the unemancipated child has
acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any
lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in
usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under
parental authority and whose company he lives; ... 4
Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in
this portion of the appealed decision: "The insurance proceeds
belong to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor under
the custody and parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother.
The said minor lives with plaintiff or lives in the company of
the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property by
lucrative title. Said property, therefore, belongs to the minor
child in ownership, and in usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother.
Since under our law the usufructuary is entitled to possession,
the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds.
The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted
provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however,
to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff
should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings,
Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to
the total amount of P5,000.00."5
It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that
unless the applicability of the two cited Civil Code provisions
can be disputed, the decision must stand. There is no
ambiguity in the language employed. The words are rather
clear. Their meaning is unequivocal. Time and time again,
this Court has left no doubt that where codal or statutory
norms are cast in categorical language, the task before it is not
one of interpretation but of application.6 So it must be in this
case. So it was in the appealed decision.
1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found
in the brief for the defendant-appellant7 to blunt the force of
legal commands that speak so plainly and so unqualifiedly.
Even if it were a question of policy, the conclusion will
remain unaltered. What is paramount, as mentioned at the
outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in consonance with
such primordial end that Articles 320 and 321 have been
worded. There is recognition in the law of the deep ties that
bind parent and child. In the event that there is less than full
measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is
supplied by the bond required. With the added circumstance
that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without
any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at
can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified
by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to
the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a
mother than in the case of an uncle. Manresa, commenting on
Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain, the source of Article
320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus "El derecho y la
obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los hijos es una
consecuencia natural y lógica de la patria potestad y de la
presunción de que nadie cuidará de los bienes de acquéllos
con mas cariño y solicitude que los padres. En nuestro
Derecho antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida de
una manera indirecta aquelia doctrina, y asi se desprende de la
sentencia del Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864,
que se refiere a la ley 24, tit. XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia
suerte aceptan en general dicho principio los Codigos
extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de que
trataremos mis adelante."8
2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent
consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept
that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting
as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of
litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his
best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that family
relations may press their respective claims. It would be more
in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the
tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. it could
have been different if the conflict were between father and
mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting
priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the
State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to
the validity of her plea. In a recent case,9 there is this
quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged
in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to
those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people
and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is
this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads:
"The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social
institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is
the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not
admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for
the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would
have led the lower court to decide as it did.
WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed.
Costs against defendant-appellant.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino,
JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
ELISEO F. SORIANO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
10
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Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW BRION, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a
AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, PERALTA, and minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang
ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, BERSAMIN, JJ. Tamang Daan.[3] Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a
JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the
YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. Promulgated: alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004
GAVINO, episode of Ang Dating Daan.[4]
Respondents. April 29, 2009
x-------------------------------------------x After a preliminary conference in which petitioner
ELISEO F. SORIANO, x------------------------------------------------------------------- appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004,
Petitioner, ----------------------x preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating
Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of
- versus - DECISION Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in
VELASCO, JR., J.: relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII
CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE, In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.[5] The same order also set
JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO,NOEL R. DEL PRADO, Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano seeks to nullify and set the case for preliminary investigation.
EMMANUEL BORLAZA, JOSE E. ROMERO IV, and aside an order and a decision of the Movie and Television
FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their capacity as members of Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of
the Hearing and Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB, with certain utterances he made in his television show, Ang the preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson
JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, Dating Daan. Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the
MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the
SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. Facts of the Case case.[6] Two days after, however, petitioner sought to
SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, in their capacity On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as withdraw[7] his motion for reconsideration, followed by the
as complainants before host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari and
the MTRCB, made the following remarks: prohibition,[8] docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the
Respondents. G.R. No. 164785 preventive suspension order thus issued.
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Present: On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa MTRCB issued a decision, disposing as follows:
PUNO, C.J., putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang
QUISUMBING, gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent
CARPIO, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months
CORONA, kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.[1] x x x suspension from his program, Ang Dating Daan.
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda
CHICO-NAZARIO, identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Cruz and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC,
VELASCO, JR., Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of are hereby exonerated for lack of evidence.
NACHURA, the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),[2] against petitioner in connection
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, SO ORDERED.[9]
11
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I REASON THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR

Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and THE PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF ITS
prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED PROVISIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR],
No. 165636. TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E.
In a Resolution dated April 4, 2005, the Court FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH, AND DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND
consolidated G.R. No. 164785 with G.R. No. 165636. EXPRESSION AS IT PARTAKES OF THE ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE
NATURE OF A SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS
In G.R. No. 164785, petitioner raises the following CURTAILING THE SAME; CONSEQUENTLY, APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH[11]
issues: THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND G.R. No. 164785
THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT
SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785,
RESPONDENT [MTRCB] DATED 16 AUGUST SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 regarding the assailed order of preventive suspension,
2004 AGAINST THE TELEVISION OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE although its implementability had already been overtaken and
PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x IS NULL CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN veritably been rendered moot by the equally assailed
AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE THE CASE AT BENCH; September 27, 2004 decision.
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION It is petitioners threshold posture that the preventive
suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR
(A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS II provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does
INVALID INSOFAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR THE not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive
ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED suspension.
ORDERS; TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON
(B) BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF DUE Petitioners contention is untenable.
HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH; PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION
(C) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL UNDER THE LAW; CONSEQUENTLY, THE Administrative agencies have powers and functions
PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW; [IRR], RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory,
(D) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as
FREEDOM OF RELIGION; AND I.E., DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. [12] They
(E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.[10] LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law.[13] And in
APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH; AND determining whether an agency has certain powers, the
In G.R. No. 165636, petitioner relies on the following inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as
grounds: III existing, the authority given should be liberally construed. [14]

SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, IS [PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF
PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND AND DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A SUFFICIENT
ENACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF STANDARD FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION
JURISDICTION x x x CONSIDERING THAT: THEREBY RESULTING IN AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY
A perusal of the MTRCBs basic mandate under PD 1986
reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit
impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive
suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is
12
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necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and
supervision.
Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:
Section 3. Powers and Functions.The BOARD
shall have the following functions, powers and
duties:
xxxx
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable
portions from and/or prohibit the x x x production, x
x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of the
motion pictures, television programs and publicity
materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which,
in the judgment of the board applying contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard, are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary
to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige
of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or
with a dangerous tendency to encourage the
commission of violence or of wrong or crime such
as but not limited to:
xxxx
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the
good name and reputation of any person, whether
living or dead;
xxxx
(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or
cancel, permits for the x x x production, copying,
distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or
television broadcast of all motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials, to the
end that no such pictures, programs and
materials as are determined by the BOARD to be
objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c)
hereof shall be x x x produced, copied, reproduced,
distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or
broadcast by television;
xxxx
k) To exercise such powers and functions as may
be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the
purposes and objectives of this Act x x x. (Emphasis
added.)
The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well
within the scope of the MTRCBs authority and functions
expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its
Sec. 3(d), as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to
supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the
x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion
pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the
end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are
determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance
with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or
broadcast by television.
Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms
part of the MTRCBs express regulatory and supervisory
statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary
authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any
other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise,
or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a
penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation.[15] And the power to discipline
and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to
investigate administrative complaints and, during such
investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of
the complaint.[16]
To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the
MTRCB springs from its powers conferred under PD 1986.
The MTRCB did not, as petitioner insinuates, empower itself
to impose preventive suspension through the medium of the
IRR of PD 1986. It is true that the matter of imposing
preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD
1986. Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR provides:
Sec. 3. PREVENTION SUSPENSION
ORDER.Any time during the pendency of the case,
and in order to prevent or stop further violations or
for the interest and welfare of the public, the
Chairman of the Board may issue a Preventive
Suspension Order mandating the preventive x x x
suspension of the permit/permits involved, and/or
closure of the x x x television network, cable TV
station x x x provided that the temporary/preventive
order thus issued shall have a life of not more than
twenty (20) days from the date of issuance.
But the mere absence of a provision on preventive
suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not work to
deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as
preventive suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly
empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television
programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among
others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions
for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as
it investigates. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the
aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor
extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by
imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive
suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law,
imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCBs duty of
regulating or supervising television programs, pending a
determination of whether or not there has actually been a
violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the
2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986
bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.
Sec. 3(c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the
present case, sufficient to authorize the MTRCBs assailed
action. Petitioners restrictive reading of PD 1986, limiting the
MTRCB to functions within the literal confines of the law,
would give the agency little leeway to operate, stifling and
rendering it inutile, when Sec. 3(k) of PD 1986 clearly intends
to grant the MTRCB a wide room for flexibility in its
operation. Sec. 3(k), we reiterate, provides, To exercise such
13
14
powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the
attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x
x. Indeed, the power to impose preventive suspension is one
of the implied powers of MTRCB. As distinguished from
express powers, implied powers are those that can be inferred
or are implicit in the wordings or conferred by necessary or
fair implication of the enabling act.[17] As we held in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, when a general grant of power is
conferred or a duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the
other is also conferred by necessary implication.[18] Clearly,
the power to impose preventive suspension pending
investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of
MTRCB.
We cannot agree with petitioners assertion that the
aforequoted IRR provision on preventive suspension is
applicable only to motion pictures and publicity
materials. The scope of the MTRCBs authority extends
beyond motion pictures. What the acronym MTRCB stands
for would suggest as much. And while the law makes specific
reference to the closure of a television network, the
suspension of a television program is a far less punitive
measure that can be undertaken, with the purpose of stopping
further violations of PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would
regretfully be rendered ineffective should it be subject to the
restrictions petitioner envisages.
Just as untenable is petitioners argument on the nullity of
the preventive suspension order on the ground of lack of
hearing. As it were, the MTRCB handed out the assailed
order after petitioner, in response to a written notice, appeared
before that Board for a hearing on private respondents
complaint. No less than petitioner admitted that the order was
issued after the adjournment of the hearing,[19] proving that he
had already appeared before the MTRCB. Under Sec. 3,
Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension
shall issue [a]ny time during the pendency of the case. In this
particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly apprised
petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986 [20] and of
administrative complaints that had been filed against him for
such violation.[21]
At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be
meted out even without a hearing.[22]
Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his
right to the equal protection of the law, arguing that, owing to
the preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the
criticisms coming from the INC ministers.
Petitioners position does not persuade. The equal
protection clause demands that all persons subject to
legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed.[23] It guards against undue favor and individual
privilege as well as hostile discrimination.[24] Surely,
petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the
same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing
administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another,
he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their TV
programs, use language similar to that which he used in his
own, necessitating the MTRCBs disciplinary action. If the
immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that
petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer
his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the equal
protection guarantee. The Court need not belabor the fact that
the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan,
on one hand, and the INC ministers, as hosts of Ang Tamang
Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this case,
simply too different to even consider whether or not there is
a prima facie indication of oppressive inequality.
Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom,
submitting that what he uttered was religious speech, adding
that words like putang babae were said in exercise of his
religious freedom.
The argument has no merit.
The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioners
utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. The
section reads as follows:
No law shall be made respecting the
establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the
complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing
furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he
came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition
program does not automatically accord them the character of
a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at
another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious
speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his words in
context show that he was moved by anger and the need to
seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim,
assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his
statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daanowed to a
TV station does not convert the foul language used in
retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that
petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation
and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or
refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious
group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to
the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse.
Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his
detractors, but opted for the low road.
Petitioner, as a final point in G.R. No. 164785, would
have the Court nullify the 20-day preventive suspension order,
being, as insisted, an unconstitutional abridgement of the
freedom of speech and expression and an impermissible prior
restraint. The main issue tendered respecting the adverted
violation and the arguments holding such issue dovetails with
those challenging the three-month suspension imposed under
the assailed September 27, 2004 MTRCB decision subject of
14
15
review under G.R. No. 165636. Both overlapping issues and
arguments shall be jointly addressed.
G.R. No. 165636
Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision
suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three
months on the main ground that the decision violates, apart
from his religious freedom, his freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of the
Constitution, which reads:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievance.
He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec.
3(c) in particular, unconstitutional for reasons articulated in
this petition.
We are not persuaded as shall be explained shortly. But
first, we restate certain general concepts and principles
underlying the freedom of speech and expression.
It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers,
radio, television, and motion pictures come within the broad
protection of the free speech and expression clause.[25]Each
method though, because of its dissimilar presence in the lives
of people and accessibility to children, tends to present its
own problems in the area of free speech protection,
with broadcast media, of all forms of communication,
enjoying a lesser degree of protection.[26] Just as settled is the
rule that restrictions, be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g.,
judicial injunction against publication or threat of cancellation
of license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel
and damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt
proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of
expression. Prior restraint means official government
restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination.[27] The
freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in
the Bill of Rights, is, however, not absolute. It may be
regulated to some extent to serve important public interests,
some forms of speech not being protected. As has been held,
the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the
expression touches upon matters of essentially private
concern.[28] In the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes,
the constitutional guarantee obviously was not intended to
give immunity for every possible use of
language.[29] From Lucas v. Royo comes this line: [T]he
freedom to express ones sentiments and belief does not grant
one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of
another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper
forum and with proper regard for the rights of others.[30]
Indeed, as noted in Chaplinsky v. State of New
Hampshire,[31] there are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech that are harmful, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problems. In net effect, some forms of speech
are not protected by the Constitution, meaning that
restrictions on unprotected speech may be decreed without
running afoul of the freedom of speech clause.[32] A speech
would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances
involved are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.[33] Being of little
or no value, there is, in dealing with or regulating them, no
imperative call for the application of the clear and present
danger rule or the balancing-of-interest test, they being
essentially modes of weighing competing values,[34] or, with
like effect, determining which of the clashing interests should
be advanced.
Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a
protected form of speech.
The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this
jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression
refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false
or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e.,
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security.
The Court finds that petitioners statement can be treated
as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence, it
is, in that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court
of Appeals, the Court expressed difficulty in formulating a
definition of obscenity that would apply to all cases, but
nonetheless stated the ensuing observations on the matter:
There is no perfect definition of obscenity but
the latest word is that of Miller v. California which
established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to
the average person, applying contemporary
standards would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. But, it would be a serious
misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of
facts has the unbridled discretion in determining
what is patently offensive. x x x What remains clear
is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial
determination and should be treated on a case to
case basis and on the judges sound discretion.[35]
Following the contextual lessons of the cited case
of Miller v. California,[36] a patently offensive utterance
would come within the pale of the term obscenity should it
appeal to the prurient interest of an average listener applying
contemporary standards.
A cursory examination of the utterances complained of
and the circumstances of the case reveal that to an average
adult, the utterances Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa
putang babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang
15
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doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas,
o di ba! may not constitute obscene but merely indecent
utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely
a play on words. In the context they were used, they may not
appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. The problem with
the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV
program that is rated G or for general viewership, and in a
time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of
children.
While adults may have understood that the terms thus
used were not to be taken literally, children could hardly be
expected to have the same discernment. Without parental
guidance, the unbridled use of such language as that of
petitioner in a television broadcast could corrupt
impressionable young minds. The term putang babae means a
female prostitute, a term wholly inappropriate for children,
who could look it up in a dictionary and just get the literal
meaning, missing the context within which it was
used. Petitioner further used the terms, ang gumagana lang
doon yung ibaba, making reference to the female sexual
organ and how a female prostitute uses it in her trade, then
stating that Sandoval was worse than that by using his mouth
in a similar manner. Children could be motivated by curiosity
and ask the meaning of what petitioner said, also without
placing the phrase in context. They may be inquisitive as to
why Sandoval is different from a female prostitute and the
reasons for the dissimilarity. And upon learning the meanings
of the words used, young minds, without the guidance of an
adult, may, from their end, view this kind of indecent speech
as obscene, if they take these words literally and use them in
their own speech or form their own ideas on the matter. In
this particular case, where children had the opportunity to
hear petitioners words, when speaking of the average person
in the test for obscenity, we are speaking of the average child,
not the average adult. The average child may not have the
adults grasp of figures of speech, and may lack the
understanding that language may be colorful, and words may
convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject
speech is very suggestive of a female sexual organ and its
function as such. In this sense, we find petitioners utterances
obscene and not entitled to protection under the umbrella of
freedom of speech.
Even if we concede that petitioners remarks are not
obscene but merely indecent speech, still the Court rules that
petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection
of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily
accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said
utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.
No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or
offensive utterances. But while a jurisprudential pattern
involving certain offensive utterances conveyed in different
mediums has emerged, this case is veritably one of first
impression, it being the first time that indecent speech
communicated via television and the applicable norm for its
regulation are, in this jurisdiction, made the focal
point. Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica Foundation,[37] a
1978 American landmark case cited inEastern Broadcasting
Corporation v. Dans, Jr.[38] and Chavez v. Gonzales,[39] is a
rich source of persuasive lessons. Foremost of these relates to
indecent speech without prurient appeal component coming
under the category of protected speech depending on the
context within which it was made, irresistibly suggesting that,
within a particular context, such indecent speech may validly
be categorized as unprotected, ergo, susceptible to restriction.
In FCC, seven of what were considered filthy
words[40] earlier recorded in a monologue by a satiric humorist
later aired in the afternoon over a radio station owned by
Pacifica Foundation. Upon the complaint of a man who heard
the pre-recorded monologue while driving with his son, FCC
declared the language used as patently
offensive and indecentunder a prohibiting law, though not
necessarily obscene. FCC added, however, that its declaratory
order was issued in a special factual context, referring, in gist,
to an afternoon radio broadcast when children were
undoubtedly in the audience. Acting on the question of
whether the FCC could regulate the subject utterance, the US
Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, owing to two special
features of the broadcast medium, to wit: (1) radio is a
pervasive medium and (2) broadcasting is uniquely accessible
to children. The US Court, however, hastened to add that the
monologue would be protected speech in other contexts,
albeit it did not expound and identify a compelling state
interest in putting FCCs content-based regulatory action
under scrutiny.
The Court in Chavez[41] elucidated on the distinction
between regulation or restriction of protected speech that is
content-based and that which is content-neutral. A
content-based restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the
expression, whereas a content-neutral restraint intends to
regulate the time, place, and manner of the expression under
well-defined standards tailored to serve a compelling state
interest, without restraint on the message of the expression.
Courts subject content-based restraint to strict scrutiny.
With the view we take of the case, the suspension
MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one perspective,
permissible restriction. We make this disposition against the
backdrop of the following interplaying factors: First, the
indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium
that, to borrow from Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak,[42]easily
reaches every home where there is a set [and where]
[c]hildren will likely be among the avid viewers of the
programs therein shown; second, the broadcast was aired at
the time of the day when there was a reasonable risk that
children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner
uttered his speech on a G or for general patronage rated
program.Under Sec. 2(A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the
MTRCB, a show for general patronage is [s]uitable for all
ages, meaning that the material for television x x x in the
judgment of the BOARD, does not contain anything
unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed
without adult guidance or supervision. The words petitioner
used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for
children. Where a language is categorized as indecent, as in
petitioners utterances on a general-patronage rated TV
program, it may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech.
16
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A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers
only to pornography,[43] false or misleading
advertisement,[44] advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
expression endangering national security. But this list is not,
as some members of the Court would submit, exclusive or
carved in stone. Without going into specifics, it may be stated
without fear of contradiction that US decisional law goes
beyond the aforesaid general exceptions. As the Court has
been impelled to recognize exceptions to the rule against
censorship in the past, this particular case constitutes yet
another exception, another instance of unprotected speech,
created by the necessity of protecting the welfare of our
children. As unprotected speech, petitioners utterances can be
subjected to restraint or regulation.
Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained
undisturbed since 1978, petitioner asserts that his utterances
must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a
substantive evil the State has a right and duty to prevent and
such danger must be grave and imminent.[45]
Petitioners invocation of the clear and present danger
doctrine, arguably the most permissive of speech tests, would
not avail him any relief, for the application of said test is
uncalled for under the premises. The doctrine, first formulated
by Justice Holmes, accords protection for utterances so that
the printed or spoken words may not be subject to prior
restraint or subsequent punishment unless its expression
creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a
substantial evil which the government has the power to
prohibit.[46] Under the doctrine, freedom of speech and of
press is susceptible of restriction when and only when
necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests
which the government may lawfully protect. As it were, said
doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions for rebellion
and other crimes involving the overthrow of government.[47] It
was originally designed to determine the latitude which
should be given to speech that espouses anti-government
action, or to have serious and substantial deleterious
consequences on the security and public order of the
community.[48] The clear and present danger rule has been
applied to this jurisdiction.[49] As a standard of limitation on
free speech and press, however, the clear and present danger
test is not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and
does away with analysis and judgment in the testing of the
legitimacy of claims to free speech and which compels a court
to release a defendant from liability the moment the doctrine
is invoked, absent proof of imminent catastrophic
disaster.[50] As we observed in Eastern Broadcasting
Corporation, the clear and present danger test does not lend
itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.[51]
To be sure, the clear and present danger doctrine is not
the only test which has been applied by the courts. Generally,
said doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of
the government and even other evils which do not clearly
undermine national security. Since not all evils can be
measured in terms of proximity and degree the Court,
however, in several casesAyer Productions v.
Capulong[52] and Gonzales v. COMELEC,[53] applied the
balancing of interests test. Former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, in Gonzales v. COMELEC, elucidated in his Separate
Opinion that where the legislation under constitutional attack
interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more
generalized way and where the effect of the speech and
assembly in terms of the probability of realization of a
specific danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic
calculation,[54] then the balancing of interests test can be
applied.
The Court explained also in Gonzales v. COMELEC the
balancing of interests test:
When particular conduct is regulated in the
interest of public order, and the regulation
results in an indirect, conditional, partial
abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is
to determine which of the two conflicting
interests demands the greater protection under
the particular circumstances presented. x x x
We must, therefore, undertake the delicate and
difficult task x x x to weigh the circumstances
and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons
advanced in support of the regulation of the free
enjoyment of rights x x x.
In enunciating standard premised on a
judicial balancing of the conflicting social
values and individual interests competing for
ascendancy in legislation which restricts
expression, the court in Douds laid the basis for
what has been called the balancing-of-interests
test which has found application in more recent
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Briefly
stated, the balancing test requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation.
xxxx
Although the urgency of the public interest
sought to be secured by Congressional power
restricting the individuals freedom, and the
social importance and value of the freedom so
restricted, are to be judged in the concrete, not
on the basis of abstractions, a wide range of
factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining
the point or line of equilibrium. Among these
are (a) the social value and importance of the
specific aspect of the particular freedom
restricted by the legislation; (b) the specific
thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the
restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not
the persons affected are few; (c) the value and
importance of the public interest sought to be
secured by the legislationthe reference here is
to the nature and gravity of the evil which
Congress seeks to prevent; (d) whether the
specific restriction decreed by Congress is
reasonably appropriate and necessary for the
protection of such public interest; and (e)
whether the necessary safeguarding of the
17
18
public interest involved may be achieved by
some other measure less restrictive of the
protected freedom.[55]
This balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor
Kauper,[56] rests on the theory that it is the courts function in a
case before it when it finds public interests served by
legislation, on the one hand, and the free expression clause
affected by it, on the other, to balance one against the other
and arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be
placed. If, on balance, it appears that the public interest served
by restrictive legislation is of such nature that it outweighs the
abridgment of freedom, then the court will find the legislation
valid. In short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on the
basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even
those stated in the free speech and expression clause, and that
they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and
important interests.[57] To the mind of the Court, the balancing
of interest doctrine is the more appropriate test to follow.
In the case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene
language and a three (3)-month suspension was slapped on
him for breach of MTRCB rules. In this setting, the assertion
by petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is
ranged against the duty of the government to protect and
promote the development and welfare of the youth.
After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the
arguments raised by petitioner in support of his claim to free
speech, the Court rules that the governments interest to
protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children
adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid
restraint on petitioners prayer to continue as program host
of Ang Dating Daan during the suspension period.
No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights
granted to citizens of a State is the freedom of speech or
expression, for without the enjoyment of such right, a free,
stable, effective, and progressive democratic state would be
difficult to attain. Arrayed against the freedom of speech is
the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual, and
social being which the State is constitutionally tasked to
promote and protect. Moreover, the State is also mandated to
recognize and support the vital role of the youth in nation
building as laid down in Sec. 13, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution.
The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred
obligation and responsibility on the State to provide
protection to the youth against illegal or improper activities
which may prejudice their general well-being. The Article on
youth, approved on second reading by the Constitutional
Commission, explained that the State shall extend social
protection to minors against all forms of neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, immorality, and practices which may foster
racial, religious or other forms of discrimination.[58]
Indisputably, the State has a compelling interest in
extending social protection to minors against all forms of
neglect, exploitation, and immorality which may pollute
innocent minds. It has a compelling interest in helping parents,
through regulatory mechanisms, protect their childrens minds
from exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting
experiences. The Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the
State, as earlier indicated, to promote and protect the physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being of the
youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the field of
nation-building.[59] In the same way, the State is mandated to
support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character.[60]
Petitioners offensive and obscene language uttered in a
television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to
the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the
welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and care
for them, as parens patriae,[61] constitute a substantial and
compelling government interest in regulating petitioners
utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
FCC explains the duty of the government to act
as parens patriae to protect the children who, because of age
or interest capacity, are susceptible of being corrupted or
prejudiced by offensive language, thus:
[B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children, even those too young to read. Although
Cohens written message, [Fuck the Draft], might
have been incomprehensible to a first
grader, Pacificas broadcast could have enlarged a
childs vocabulary in an instant. Other forms of
offensive expression may be withheld from the
young without restricting the expression at its
source.Bookstores and motion picture theaters, for
example, may be prohibited from making indecent
material available to children. We held in Ginsberg
v. New York that the governments interest in the
well-being of its youth and in supporting parents
claim to authority in their own household justified
the regulation of otherwise protected
expression. The ease with which children may
obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the
concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify
special treatment of indecent broadcasting.
Moreover, Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak likewise stressed
the duty of the State to attend to the welfare of the young:
x x x It is the consensus of this Court that
where television is concerned, a less liberal
approach calls for observance. This is so because
unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to
pay their way, television reaches every home where
there is a set. Children then will likely will be
among the avid viewers of the programs therein
shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the
concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies
of the adult population. It cannot be denied though
that the State as parens patriae is called upon to
manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the
young.[62]
18
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The compelling need to protect the young impels us to
sustain the regulatory action MTRCB took in the narrow
confines of the case. To reiterate, FCC justified the restraint
on the TV broadcast grounded on the following
considerations: (1) the use of television with its unique
accessibility to children, as a medium of broadcast of a
patently offensive speech; (2) the time of broadcast; and (3)
the G rating of the Ang Dating Daan program. And in
agreeing with MTRCB, the court takes stock of and cites with
approval the following excerpts from FCC:
It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize
the narrowness of our holding. This case does not
involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab
driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an
Elizabethan comedy. We have not decided that an
occasional expletive in either setting would justify
any sanction. x x x The [FFCs] decision rested
entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context
is all important. The concept requires consideration
of a host of variables. The time of day was
emphasized by the [FFC]. The content of the
program in which the language is used will affect
the composition of the audience x x x. As Mr.
Justice Sutherland wrote a nuisance may be merely a
right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard.We simply hold that
when the [FCC] finds that a pig has entered the
parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not
depend on proof that the pig is obscene. (Citation
omitted.)
There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question
petitioner uttered on prime-time television are blatantly
indecent if not outright obscene. It is the kind of speech that
PD 1986 proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of
statutory disciplinary powers. It is the kind of speech that the
State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate and
prevent should such action served and further compelling
state interests. One who utters indecent, insulting, or
offensive words on television when unsuspecting children are
in the audience is, in the graphic language of FCC, a pig in
the parlor. Public interest would be served if the pig is
reasonably restrained or even removed from the parlor.
Ergo, petitioners offensive and indecent language can be
subjected to prior restraint.
Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension
is either prior restraint or subsequent punishment that,
however, includes prior restraint, albeit indirectly.
After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what
MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an administrative sanction
or subsequent punishment for his offensive and obscene
language in Ang Dating Daan.
To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech
are generally illegal and presumed unconstitutional breaches
of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are
movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of
its access to numerous people, including the young who must
be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected
speech. PD 1986 was passed creating the Board of Review for
Motion Pictures and Television (now MTRCB) and which
requires prior permit or license before showing a motion
picture or broadcasting a TV program. The Board can classify
movies and television programs and can cancel permits for
exhibition of films or television broadcast.
The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some
prior restraint on radio and television shows, even religious
programs, was upheld in Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of
Appeals. Speaking through Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, the
Court wrote:
We thus reject petitioners postulate that its
religious program is per se beyond review by the
respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of
internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches
even the eyes and ears of children. The Court
iterates the rule that the exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will
bring about the clear and present danger of some
substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more
overriding interest of public health, public morals,
or public welfare. x x x
xxxx
While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we
are not ready to hold that [PD 1986] is
unconstitutional for Congress to grant an
administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview
and classify TV programs and enforce its decision
subject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921,
we upheld this setup in Sotto vs. Ruiz, viz:
The use of the mails by private persons is
in the nature of a privilege which can be
regulated in order to avoid its abuse. Persons
possess no absolute right to put into the mail
anything they please, regardless of its
character.[63]
Bernas adds:
Under the decree a movie classification board is
made the arbiter of what movies and television
programs or parts of either are fit for public
consumption. It decides what movies are immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs,
injurious to the prestige of the Republic of
the Philippines or its people, and what tend to incite
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition, or
tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in their government and/or duly constituted
authorities, etc. Moreover, its decisions are
executory unless stopped by a court.[64]
19
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Moreover, in MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation,[65] it was held that the power of review and prior
approval of MTRCB extends to all television programs and is
valid despite the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Constitution. Thus, all broadcast networks are regulated by
the MTRCB since they are required to get a permit before
they air their television programs. Consequently, their right to
enjoy their freedom of speech is subject to that
requirement. As lucidly explained by Justice Dante O. Tinga,
government regulations through the MTRCB became a
necessary evil with the government taking the role of
assigning bandwidth to individual broadcasters. The stations
explicitly agreed to this regulatory scheme; otherwise, chaos
would result in the television broadcast industry as competing
broadcasters will interfere or co-opt each others signals. In
this scheme, station owners and broadcasters in effect waived
their right to the full enjoyment of their right to freedom of
speech in radio and television programs and impliedly agreed
that said right may be subject to prior restraintdenial of permit
or subsequent punishment, like suspension or cancellation of
permit, among others.
The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a
prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the
broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued
to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. Rather, the suspension
is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or
subsequent punishment for the offensive and obscene remarks
he uttered on the evening of August 10, 2004 in his television
program, Ang Dating Daan. It is a sanction that the MTRCB
may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of
the free speech clause. And the imposition is separate and
distinct from the criminal action the Board may take pursuant
to Sec. 3(i) of PD 1986 and the remedies that may be availed
of by the aggrieved private party under the provisions on libel
or tort, if applicable. As FCC teaches, the imposition of
sanctions on broadcasters who indulge in profane or indecent
broadcasting does not constitute forbidden censorship. Lest it
be overlooked, the sanction imposed is not per se for
petitioners exercise of his freedom of speech via television,
but for the indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV
program.
More importantly, petitioner is deemed to have yielded
his right to his full enjoyment of his freedom of speech to
regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as television station
owners, program producers, and hosts have impliedly
accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the broadcast
industry.
Neither can petitioners virtual inability to speak in his
program during the period of suspension be plausibly treated
as prior restraint on future speech. For viewed in its proper
perspective, the suspension is in the nature of an intermediate
penalty for uttering an unprotected form of speech. It is
definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible
cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. In
fine, the suspension meted was simply part of the duties of the
MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the law
which it is tasked to implement. Viewed in its proper context,
the suspension sought to penalize past speech made on
prime-time G rated TV program; it does not bar future speech
of petitioner in other television programs; it is a permissible
subsequent administrative sanction; it should not be confused
with a prior restraint on speech. While not on all fours, the
Court, in MTRCB,[66] sustained the power of the MTRCB to
penalize a broadcast company for exhibiting/airing a
pre-taped TV episode without Board authorization in
violation of Sec. 7 of PD 1986.
Any simplistic suggestion, however, that the MTRCB
would be crossing the limits of its authority were it to regulate
and even restrain the prime-time television broadcast of
indecent or obscene speech in a G rated program is not
acceptable. As made clear in Eastern Broadcasting
Corporation, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting
is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspaper and print media. The MTRCB, as a regulatory
agency, must have the wherewithal to enforce its mandate,
which would not be effective if its punitive actions would be
limited to mere fines. Television broadcasts should be subject
to some form of regulation, considering the ease with which
they can be accessed, and violations of the regulations must
be met with appropriate and proportional disciplinary
action. The suspension of a violating television program
would be a sufficient punishment and serve as a deterrent for
those responsible. The prevention of the broadcast of
petitioners television program is justified, and does not
constitute prohibited prior restraint. It behooves the Court to
respond to the needs of the changing times, and craft
jurisprudence to reflect these times.
Petitioner, in questioning the three-month suspension,
also tags as unconstitutional the very law creating the
MTRCB, arguing that PD 1986, as applied to him, infringes
also upon his freedom of religion. The Court has earlier
adequately explained why petitioners undue reliance on the
religious freedom cannot lend justification, let alone an
exempting dimension to his licentious utterances in his
program. The Court sees no need to address anew the
repetitive arguments on religious freedom. As earlier
discussed in the disposition of the petition in G.R. No.
164785, what was uttered was in no way a religious
speech. Parenthetically, petitioners attempt to characterize his
speech as a legitimate defense of his religion fails
miserably. He tries to place his words in perspective, arguing
evidently as an afterthought that this was his method of
refuting the alleged distortion of his statements by the INC
hosts of Ang Tamang Daan. But on the night he uttered them
in his television program, the word simply came out as
profane language, without any warning or guidance for
undiscerning ears.
As to petitioners other argument about having been
denied due process and equal protection of the law, suffice it
to state that we have at length debunked similar arguments in
G.R. No. 164785. There is no need to further delve into the
fact that petitioner was afforded due process when he attended
the hearing of the MTRCB, and that he was unable to
demonstrate that he was unjustly discriminated against in the
MTRCB proceedings.
20
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Finally, petitioner argues that there has been undue
delegation of legislative power, as PD 1986 does not provide
for the range of imposable penalties that may be applied with
respect to violations of the provisions of the law.
The argument is without merit.
In Edu v. Ericta, the Court discussed the matter of undue
delegation of legislative power in the following wise:
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the
doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may
not delegate its legislative power to the two other
branches of the government, subject to the exception
that local governments may over local affairs
participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated
is the authority under the Constitution to make laws
and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. To determine whether or not there is an
undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry
must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the
measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate
its functions when it describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed
be the only way in which the legislative process can
go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made
between delegation of power to make laws which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, which constitutionally may not be done, and
delegation of authority or discretion as to its
execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law, to which no valid objection can be
made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as
denying the legislature the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there
must be a standard, which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication
may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply
it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the
criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance
of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental
rules and regulations.[67]
Based on the foregoing pronouncements and analyzing
the law in question, petitioners protestation about undue
delegation of legislative power for the sole reason that PD
1986 does not provide for a range of penalties for violation of
the law is untenable. His thesis is that MTRCB, in
promulgating the IRR of PD 1986, prescribing a schedule of
penalties for violation of the provisions of the decree, went
beyond the terms of the law.
Petitioners posture is flawed by the erroneous
assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being
that PD 1986 does not prescribe the imposition of, or
authorize the MTRCB to impose, penalties for violators of PD
1986. As earlier indicated, however, the MTRCB, by express
and direct conferment of power and functions, is charged with
supervising and regulating, granting, denying, or canceling
permits for the exhibition and/or television broadcast of all
motion pictures, television programs, and publicity materials
to the end that no such objectionable pictures, programs, and
materials shall be exhibited and/or broadcast by television.
Complementing this provision is Sec. 3(k) of the decree
authorizing the MTRCB to exercise such powers and
functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment
of the purpose and objectives of [the law]. As earlier
explained, the investiture of supervisory, regulatory, and
disciplinary power would surely be a meaningless grant if it
did not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised or
the regulated as may be proportionate to the offense
committed, charged, and proved. As the Court said in Chavez
v. National Housing Authority:
x x x [W]hen a general grant of power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred. x x x
[W]hen the statute does not specify the particular
method to be followed or used by a government
agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by
law, said agency has the authority to adopt any
reasonable method to carry out its function.[68]
Given the foregoing perspective, it stands to reason that
the power of the MTRCB to regulate and supervise the
exhibition of TV programs carries with it or necessarily
implies the authority to take effective punitive action for
violation of the law sought to be enforced. And would it not
be logical too to say that the power to deny or cancel a permit
for the exhibition of a TV program or broadcast necessarily
includes the lesser power to suspend?
The MTRCB promulgated the IRR of PD 1986 in
accordance with Sec. 3(a) which, for reference, provides that
agency with the power [to] promulgate such rules and
regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation
of this Act, and the accomplishment of its purposes and
objectives x x x. And Chapter XIII, Sec. 1 of the IRR
providing:
Section 1. VIOLATIONS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS.Without
prejudice to the immediate filing of the appropriate
criminal action and the immediate seizure of the
pertinent articles pursuant to Section 13, any
violation of PD 1986 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations governing motion pictures,
television programs, and related promotional
materials shall be penalized with suspension or
21
22
cancellation of permits and/or licenses issued by
the Board and/or with the imposition of fines and
other administrative penalty/penalties.The Board
recognizes the existing Table of Administrative
Penalties attached without prejudice to the power of
the Board to amend it when the need arises. In the
meantime the existing revised Table of
Administrative Penalties shall be enforced.
(Emphasis added.)
This is, in the final analysis, no more than a measure to
specifically implement the aforequoted provisions of Sec. 3(d)
and (k). Contrary to what petitioner implies, the IRR does not
expand the mandate of the MTRCB under the law or partake
of the nature of an unauthorized administrative legislation.
The MTRCB cannot shirk its responsibility to regulate the
public airwaves and employ such means as it can as a
guardian of the public.
In Sec. 3(c), one can already find the permissible actions
of the MTRCB, along with the standards to be applied to
determine whether there have been statutory breaches.The
MTRCB may evaluate motion pictures, television programs,
and publicity materials applying contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard, and, from there, determine
whether these audio and video materials are objectionable for
being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs,
[etc.] x x x and apply the sanctions it deems proper.The
lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in
the enforcement of a particular statute.[69] The grant of the
rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation
of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to
the non-delegation of legislative powers.[70] Administrative
regulations or subordinate legislation calculated to promote
the public interest are necessary because of the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects
of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the law.[71] Allowing the MTRCB some
reasonable elbow-room in its operations and, in the exercise
of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample
latitude in fixing, by way of an appropriate issuance,
administrative penalties with due regard for the severity of the restrains or regulates speech or expression is per
offense and attending mitigating or aggravating circumstances, se invalid. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms
as the case may be, would be consistent with its mandate to of speech and expression, and indicates the necessity to
effectively and efficiently regulate the movie and television carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech.
industry.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the MTRCB in Adm.
But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 is
review and impose sanctions for violations of PD 1986, its hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of limiting
decision to suspend petitioner must be modified, for nowhere the suspension to the program Ang Dating Daan. As thus
in that issuance, particularly the power-defining Sec. 3 nor in modified, the fallo of the MTRCB shall read as follows:
the MTRCB Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective
January 1, 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a
program host or even to prevent certain people from Decision is hereby rendered, imposing a penalty
appearing in television programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION on the
may prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or television program, Ang Dating Daan, subject of
cancel permits for exhibition, but it may not suspend the instant petition.
television personalities, for such would be beyond its
jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda
regulation beyond what the law provides. Only persons, Cruz, and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC,
offenses, and penalties clearly falling clearly within the letter are hereby exonerated for lack of evidence.
and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be within the
decrees penal or disciplinary operation. And when it exists,
the reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the person Costs against petitioner.
charged with violating the statute and for whom the penalty is SO ORDERED.
sought. Thus, the MTRCBs decision in Administrative Case
No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 and the subsequent SECOND DIVISION
order issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. The
suspension should cover only the television program on
which petitioner appeared and uttered the offensive and JENIE SAN JUAN DELA G.R. No. 177728
obscene language, which sanction is what the law and the CRUZ and minor
facts obtaining call for. CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ AQUINO, Present:
represented by JENIE SANJUAN DELA
In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an CRUZ, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
unrestricted speech paradigm in which absolute Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES,
permissiveness is the norm. Petitioners flawed belief that he CHICO-NAZARIO,
may simply utter gutter profanity on television without LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
adverse consequences, under the guise of free speech, does versus PERALTA,* JJ.
not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We repeat:
freedoms of speech and expression are not absolute
freedoms. To say any act that restrains speech should be RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his
greeted with furrowed brows is not to say that any act that capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo Promulgated:
22
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City, July 31, 2009 IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------
----------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner
Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old
Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
They resided in the house of Dominiques parents Domingo B.
Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa,
Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.[1] After almost
two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued
to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein
co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the
Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using
Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City
Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she
submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth,[2] Affidavit to
Use the Surname of the Father[3] (AUSF) which she had
executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgmentexecuted by Dominiques father Domingo
Butch Aquino.[4] Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that
during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously
acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had
never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a
document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY which Dominique,
during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the
pertinent portions of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20
THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE
AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY.
DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE
YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE
BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO.
TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHERS NAME IS
DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY
MOTHERS NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS
AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED
JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN
OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST
WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL
IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE
BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF
NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE
LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW.
THATS ALL.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil
Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia
(respondent), denied Jenies application for registration of the
childs name in this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9255 [An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname
of their Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article
176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known
as the Family Code of the Philippines]) provides
that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the
Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the
surname of the father if a public document is
executed by the father, either at the back of the
Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through
a private handwritten instrument, the child shall use
the surname of the father, provided the registration
is supported by the following documents:
a. AUSF[8]
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over
at the time of the filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following documents
showing clearly the paternity between the father and
the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any
organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
In summary, the child cannot use the surname
of his father because he was born out of wedlock
and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth
and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child (either through the back of
Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the
Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).
(Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint[9] for
injunction/registration of name against respondent before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA
Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof.
The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of
23
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registration of the childs name is a violation of his right to use
the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9255,[10] which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right
to institute an action before the regular courts to
prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of
the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by
Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a private
handwritten instrument within the contemplation of the
above-quoted provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite
service of summons, respondent was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She
testified on the circumstances of her common-law
relationship with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in
her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his
yet unborn child.[11] She offered Dominiques handwritten
Autobiography (Exhibit A) as her documentary
evidence-in-chief.[12] Dominiques lone brother, Joseph Butch
S.T. Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenies
declarations.[13]
By Decision[14] of April 25, 2007, the trial court
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action as the
Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2
(Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1,
Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines private
handwritten document through which a father may
acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument an
instrument executed in the handwriting of the father
and duly signed by him where he expressly
recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring
supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the
author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same does not
contain any express recognition of paternity.
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for
Review on Certiorari raising this purely legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED
HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE
DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN
DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A
RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A PRIVATE
HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE
CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE
FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255,
WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE
HIS FATHERS SURNAME.[15] (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code,
as amended, does not expressly require that the private
handwritten instrument containing the putative fathers
admission of paternity must be signed by him. They add that
the deceaseds handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned
by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted
paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that the
admission/recognition must be duly signed by the father is
void as it unduly expanded the earlier-quoted provision of
Article 176 of the Family Code.[16]
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not
finding that Dominiques handwritten Autobiography contains
a clear and unmistakable recognition of the childs
paternity.[17]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that respondents position, as affirmed by the trial
court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for the
dismissal of the petition. It further submits that Dominiques
Autobiography merely acknowledged Jenies pregnancy but
not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her
womb.[18]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A.
9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of
his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as
his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or through an admission made in a public or private
handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these
documents is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence, no separate
action for judicial approval is necessary.[19]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not,
indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument
acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the
putative father. This provision must, however, be read in
conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which
require that recognition by the father must bear his signature,
thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
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(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child
through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon
is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family
Code.Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of
2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not unduly
expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist
to hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though unsigned by
him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the
childs birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique,
correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence
Jenie proffered.[20] Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by
the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father
Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the
registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These
circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child
give life to his statements in his Autobiography that JENIE
DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH
EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR
THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.
In Herrera v. Alba,[21] the Court summarized the laws,
rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing
in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code
provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on
pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The
act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received
in evidence where it occurred before the controversy,
and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these
facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in
respect to the pedigree of any one of its members,
may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or
other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what
incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner
often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still
has to be resolved by such conventional evidence
as the relevant incriminating verbal and written
acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of
the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a
parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father
himself and the writing must be the writing of the
putative father. A notarial agreement to support a
child whose filiation is admitted by the putative
father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters
to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child
and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child
on various occasions, together with the certificate of
live birth, proved filiation. However, a student
permanent record, a written consent to a father's
operation, or a marriage contract where the putative
father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic
25
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writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of
baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to
establish filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier
quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have been
made and written by him. Taken together with the other
relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his
lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law
spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in
Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant
when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two
months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they
sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court
sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging
parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is
made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is
the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there
should be strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument
is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it
is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
paramount consideration in resolving questions affecting
him.[22] Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is
similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.[23] (Underscoring
supplied)
It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the
rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.[24]Too, (t)he
State as parens patriae affords special protection to children
from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to
their development.[25]
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father
bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor childs
best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now
deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City
Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to
immediately enter the surname of the late Christian
Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner
minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth,
and record the same in the Register of Births.
SO ORDERED.
26