1 Municipality of San Narciso v.

Mendez AUTHOR: Gwen Garci

[G.R. No. 103702; December 6, 1994] NOTES:
TOPIC: Quo Warranto
PONENTE: Vitug, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto or any other credit proceeding
FACTS:
 8/20/1959 – President Garcia (di ko lolo), issued, pursuant to then section 68 and 2630 of the revised administrative code, EO
no 353 creating the municipality of San Andes, Quezon by segregating from municipality of San Narciso 6 barangays (San
Andres, Mangero, Alibjaban, Pansoy, Camflora, and Tala)
 EO 353 – was issued upon the request of the Municipal Council of San Narciso (Res. No. 8 – 5/24/1959)
 10/05/65 – Pres. Macapagal issued EO 174. The EO recognized the municipal district of San Andres to have gained the status
of a 5th class municipality.
 The same EO added “ the conversion of this municipal district into a municipality as proposed in House Bill no. 4864.
 6/05/1989 – The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC of Gumaca against the official of
San Andres praying for the following:
o Nullity of EO 353
o Officials of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their
respective office.
 Municipality of San Narciso claims that EO 353 was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
 And that San Andres had no rights to exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices (They belong to the officials
of San Narciso)
 San Andres claims the following:
o It was at the instance of the municipality of San Narciso that the municipality of San Andres was given live with the
issuance of EO 353 (estopped).
o That San Andres has existed since 1959 and San Narciso can no longer assailed its existence.
o San Narciso is not the proper party to assail the present case.
 TC: resolved to defer action on the motion to dismiss of San Andres.
 RA 7160 took effect on January 1, 1991 and San Andres claims that this made the case moot and academic
 TC: dismissed the case for lack of cause of action
 San Narciso filed a petition for certiorari (grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Quo Warranto was proper?

HELD: No.
RATIO:
 The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show by
what warrant he holds a public office or exercises public franchise.
 When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto or any other credit proceeding.
 It must be brought “in the name of the Republic of the Philippines” and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal
“when directed by the President of the Philippines…”
 The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can
be done when he claims to be “entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.”
 It must also be filed imperatively (it took them 30 years to assail).
Effect the enactment of Local Government Code
 The Local Government Code has cured San Andres’ existence.
 *** It had been in existence for 30 years, and has elected it municipal officers.

02 Tarrosa v. Singson and Hon. Enriquez III AUTHOR: SOLIS

G.R. No. 111243 | May 25, 1994 Notes:
TOPIC: Quo Warranto Super short case kaya I included almost everything
PONENTE: Quiason, J.
FACTS:
 Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition as a “taxpayer,” questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as
Governor of the BSP for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The petition seeks to enjoin Singson
from the performance of his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
 and respondent Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and
emoluments of Singson.
 Petitioner argues that Singson’s appointment is null and void since it was not submitted for confirmation to the Commission
on Appointments. The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. 78653, which established the BSP as the
Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines, to wit:
Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers and functions of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised by the
Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board, composed of seven (7) members
appointed by the President of the Philippines for a term of six (6) years.
The seven (7) members are:
(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman of the Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko
Sentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Whenever the Governor is unable to attend a meeting of the Board, he shall designate a Deputy Governor
to act as his alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary Board shall designate one of its members as acting
Chairman . . .
 In their comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment
to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing
Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of department, agencies, commissions, or boards . . .
 Respondents also aver that the Bangko Sentral has its own budget and accordingly, its budgetary requirements are not subject
to the provisions of the General Appropriations Act.
We dismiss the petition.
ISSUE(S): WON quo warranto proceeding will prosper in this case

HELD: No.

RATIO:
 The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges
that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral (Cf. Castro v. Del Rosario, 19
SCRA 196 [1967]). Such a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be
entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 66, Sec. 6; Acosta
v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18 [1905]).
 In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 637 (1992), we held that the petitioner therein, who did not aver that he was entitled
to the office of the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not bring the action for quo warranto to oust the respondent from
said office as a mere usurper.
 Likewise in Greene v. Knox, 175 N.Y. 432 (1903), 67 N.E. 910, it was held that the question of title to an office, which must be
resolved in a quo warranto proceeding, may not be determined in a suit to restrain the payment of salary to the person
holding such office, brought by someone who does not claim to be the one entitled to occupy the said office.
 It is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by petitioner. To uphold the action would encourage every
disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of
the governmental machinery (See Roosevelt v. Draper, 7 Abb. Pr. 108, 23 N.Y. 218).
 Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of petitioner collapses. Hence, there is no need to resolve the question of
whether the disbursement of public funds to pay the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson can be enjoined.
Likewise, the Court refrains from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the principle
that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination
of the case (Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489 [1992]).
 However for the information of all concerned, we call attention to our decision in Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992),
with Justice Isagani A. Cruz dissenting, where we ruled that Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
3. Flaviano Lota vs Court of Appeals, and Moises Sangalang AUTHOR: The Taliño
[G.R. No. L-14803; June 30, 1961] NOTES: This case was poorly written -_-
TOPIC: Quo Warranto
PONENTE: Natividad, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 The claim that the instant action is one of mandamus, not quo warranto, is devoid of basis. While quo
warranto and mandamus are often concurrent remedies, however, there exists a clear distinction between the two. The
authorities are agreed that quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or franchise and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment, while mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties, not to try disputed titles; that where here is usurpation or
intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the proper remedy, and that where the respondent, without claiming any right to an
Office, excludes the petitioner therefrom, the remedy is mandamus, not quo warranto.
 According to jurisprudence, any person claiming to be entitled to a public office may bring an action of quo warranto, without
the intervention of the Solicitor-General or the Fiscal; and that only the person who is in unlawful possession of the office,
and all who claim to be entitled to that office, may be made parties in order to determine their respective rights thereto in the
same action.
Emergency Recit: Moises Sangalang was the duly appointed caretaker of the municipal cemetery of Taal, Batangas. Mayor Lota
ousted him from such position and appointed Jose Sangalang as the replacement. Moises filed for quo warranto. The CFI ruled in
favour of Moises and ousted Jose from the position. Mayor Lota appealed to the CA, which was denied. Mayor Lota filed an
appeal by certiorari to the SC, alleging that the CA should have ruled that the proper remedy of Moises is mandamus, not quo
warranto, and that the CA erred in not dismissing the case for failure of Moises to join therein the Municipality of Taal, Batangas,
as the real party in interest. The SC ruled in favour of Moises and ruled that (refer above).
FACTS:
 Moises Sangalang [Apparently filed for quo warranto...di stated sa case ano finile niya eh. Inference lang based on what Lota
was alleging as the errors of the CA] alleges that, as a duly appointed caretaker of the municipal cemetery of Taal, Batangas,
he was unlawfully ousted from office by Flaviano Lota, the Mayor of Taal. Jose Sangalang, became the new appointee for the
position.
 Lota contends that Moises was unlawfully occupying the position of cemetery caretaker. Also, since Moises abandoned it
after all, Lota appointed Jose in his place in the interest of the public.
 CFI of Batangas:
o declared Moises Sangalang to be the legally appointed cemetery porter of Taal, Batangas;
o ousted the Jose Sangalang from the office in question and altogether excluded him therefrom;
 Lota appealed from the decision and claims that the CFI erred in not dismissing the complaint of Moises on the ground that:
o the real party in interest, which is the Municipality of Lipa was not made party-defendant.
o Moises was not validly appointed to the post of municipal cemetery of Taal.
o there is no question that Moises had been discharging the duties of cemetery caretaker, from 1951 until Lota
appointed Jose in his place on Feb. 13, 1956. On June 30, 1955, the local Health Officer, Dr. Gregorio M. Noche,
extended a new appointment to Moises under Sec. 2199 of the Revised Administrative Code to take effect on July 1,
1955 seemingly to enable him to receive the increase of his salary from Php 240 to Php 300 per annum. For reasons
which have not been explained, the appointment was not acted upon immediately by the corresponding authorities.
Having been received in the office of the Commissioner of Civil Service on Apr. 20, 1956, it was approved shortly
thereafter. For such appointment, the recommendation of the Municipal Mayor was required by the law and the
appointment extended to Moises Sangalang by Dr. Gregorio M. Noche failed to show in the beginning the
recommendation of the then incumbent Mayor, Dr. Ignacio Ilagan. His recommendation was secured only in March
of 1956 when he was no longer the municipal mayor. As to why the recommendation of the municipal mayor was
secured so late was explained by Dr. Noche in the sense that when his attention was called to the omission of such
legal requirement, he made inquiry as to who was the mayor whose recommendation was necessary. As a result, the
District Health Officer of Batangas opined that the recommendation of the incumbent mayor at the time of the
appointment was the one necessary.
 CA: Declared that Moises Sangalang is entitled to hold and continue in the office as cemetery caretaker.
 Lota contends that the CA erred in:
o holding that the present action is one of quo warranto;
o not dismissing the action for failure of Moises Sangalang to join therein the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, as party
defendant, under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Rufino Cabo Kho vs. Jose Rodriguez; and
o declaring that Moises Sangalang is entitled to hold, and continue in the office of caretaker of the municipal cemetery
of that municipality.
 It is also argued by Lota that:
o As the CA found that Moises Sangalang was the duly appointed caretaker of the municipal cemetery of Taal,
Batangas and he was "unlawfully ousted from office", the remedy available to Moises is mandamus, not quo
 warranto; and
o The CA should not have declared Moises entitled to hold, and continue in, the office of caretaker of the municipal
cemetery of said municipality, or he had been duly replaced in that office by Jose Sangalang.
ISSUE(S): WON the action is one of quo warranto

HELD: Yiz.
RATIO:
 We do not find merits in Lota’s contentions. The claim that the instant action is one of mandamus, not quo warranto, is
devoid of basis. While quo warranto and mandamus are often concurrent remedies, however, there exists a clear distinction
between the two. The authorities are agreed that quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or franchise and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties, not to try disputed titles; that
where here is usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the proper remedy, and that where the respondent,
without claiming any right to an Office, excludes the petitioner therefrom, the remedy is mandamus, not quo warranto.
 As we analyze the facts in the light of the above rules, the instant action is clearly one of quo warranto, although mandamus is
also invoked therein as an ancillary remedy. The facts, as found by the CA, show that Moises Sangalang "was holding the
position of cemetery caretaker from 1951 until he was extended a new appointment on July 1, 1955 by Dr. Noche"; that until
then he had not resigned nor intended to abandon the office"; that on Feb. 13, 1956, Lota appointed Jose Sangalang as
cemetery caretaker of Taal to take Moises Sangalang's place and that Jose Sangalang claims to be the duly appointed
caretaker of said municipal cemetery. It also appears that Moises Sangalang alleges in his complaint that he had the right to
the possession and enjoyment of said office to which he had legally been appointed, and asks that Jose Sangalang, who is
occupying it unlawfully, be ousted. The present action, therefore, is one whose purpose is to try the right or title to a public
office and oust he alleged unlawful holder from its enjoyment. Such proceeding and remedy could only be litigated in a quo
warranto action according to the authorities.
 We also find no merit in the claim that the action should have been dismissed by the CA for failure of Moises to implead the
municipality of Taal. According to jurisprudence, any person claiming to be entitled to a public office may bring an action
of quo warranto, without the intervention of the Solicitor-General or the Fiscal; and that only the person who is in unlawful
possession of the office, and all who claim to be entitled to that office, may be made parties in order to determine their
respective rights thereto in the same action.
 The municipality of Taal does not claim that it wanted and had the right to occupy and enjoy the office of caretaker of its own
municipal cemetery. Its pretension, as voiced by its mayor, is that Jose Sangalang is the party who had the right to occupy
said office. It is not necessary for that municipality to appropriate funds for the payment of Moises Sangalang's salary and
salary differentials; there already existed funds appropriated for the purpose, and what remained to be done was for the
municipal treasurer to disburse them in accordance with law. The municipality of Taal, therefore, is not an essential, nor even
a necessary party, to this action. The doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Rufino Cabo Kho vs. Rodriguez, invoked by
the petitioner, has no application in the instant action. Unlike the case at bar, that case was one of mandamus, and it
appeared that the City of Cebu had need of appropriating funds for the payment of the salary of the petitioner there-in, for
the party who in the meantime occupied the office involved in the case had been paid the corresponding salary. Hence, the
City of Cebu was a necessary party to that action.

04 CALLEJA v. PANDAY AUTHOR: TAN

G.R. No. 168696; Feb. 28, 2006 Notes: Did not include matters not relevant to the topic. The
TOPIC: QUO WARRANTO Court ultimately granted the petition for review on certiorari
PONENTE: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. and dismissed the quo warranto petition because RTC-Br. 58
had no jurisdiction over the case so it had no authority to
Sorry late. Kelangan ko mag siesta eh.  remand the case to RTC-Br. 23. What it should have done was to
dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Rule 66 is “limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or
franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated,”
while “[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation is governed by The
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Respodents filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC-BR. 58, alleging that they were members of the
BOD of St. John Hospital and that the petitioners, who are incorporators and stockholders of the same, usurped their powers. RTC-
Br. 58 held that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute over which it has no jurisdiction. However, it did not dismiss the case.
Rather, it remanded the case to RTC-Br. 23, the court specially designated by the SC to try and decide cases in involving intra-
corporate disputes. Petitioners filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. SC took cognizance of the case
despite Rule 45 being an improper remedy. It held that Rule 66 is “limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a
public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being
legally incorporated.” It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799
(Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being
questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John
Hospital, Incorporated. SC ultimately granted the petition for review and dismissed the quo warranto petition RTC-Br. 58 has no
authority to remand the case to RTC-Br. 23. It should have dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
 On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur Branch 58 (RTC-Br. 58)
for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order against herein petitioners.
 Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board
of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the
incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which
supposedly belonged to respondents.
 RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court in Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the
verified petition showed petitioners therein (herein respondents) to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides.
 However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating
that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.
 The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents below). Petitioner Tabora filed
his Answer dated June 8, 2005, raising therein the affirmative defenses of (1) improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3)
wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative
defenses.
 All the parties were then required to submit their respective memoranda.
 RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order.
1. It is undisputed that the plaintiffs’ cause of action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations,
between and among stockholders, members or associates of the St. John Hospital Inc. which originally under PD 902-
A was within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC.However, under RA 8799 (SRC), the Commission’s
jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in Section 5, Presidential Decree 902-A were transferred [“]to the Court of
general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso that the “Supreme Court in the exercise of
its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases.
Accordingly, in the Province of Camarines Sur, (Naga City) RTC Branch 23 presided by the Hon. Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr.
was designated as “special court” (Section 1, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC) Supplemental Administrative Circular No. 8-01
was then issued by the Supreme Court which directed that “all SEC cases originally assigned or transmitted to the
regular Regional Trial Court shall be transferred to branches of the Regional Trial Court specially designated to hear
such cases in accordance with A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC.
2. MTD was denied. (hindi ko alam kung saan galling to kasi wala naman sa facts na nag file ng MTD yung petitioners)
3. Case was remanded to the RTC-BR 23
 Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead, immediately elevated the case to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE(S): WON the case falls under Rule 66.

HELD: NO
RATIO:
 In this case, the basic issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC under Section 5,
Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. No. 902-A), and the propensity of the parties to resort to violence behoove the Court to
look beyond petitioners’ technical lapse of filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the proper court. Thus, the Court shall proceed to resolve the case on its merits.
 It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers and
functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intra-corporate controversy.
 Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose Y. Feria’s view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of
Appeals, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is “limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a
public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without
being legally incorporated,” while “[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a
corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No.
902-A as amended).”
 However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:
5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby
transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court
in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these
cases. x x x
 Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly cognizable by
the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this
does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against
persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals.—An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise
may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
xxxx
 As explained in the Unilongo case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase “or an office in a
corporation created by authority of law” which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions
of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and
associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799.
 It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules)
which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the
authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital,
Incorporated.

05 Garces vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SALVADOR AUTHOR: Adre

EMPEYNADO and CLAUDIO CONCEPCION Notes: Article III Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution
G.R. No. 114795; July 17, 1996 provides:
TOPIC: Quo Warranto All elective and appointive officials and employees under the
PONENTE: Franciso, J. 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such is made within a period of one year from
February 25, 1986.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Quo warranto tests the title to one’s office claimed by another and has as its object the ouster of the
holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus avails to enforce clear legal duties and not to try disputed titles.
ER: Garces was appointed as Election Registrar of Gutalac to replace Concepcion who was transferred to Liloy. But Concepcion
refused the post. Garces then was unable to assume office. Comelec en banc then cancelled the appointment of Concepcion to
Liloy since he continued occupying the Gutalac post. Garces filed with RTC a mandamus. Then COMELEC released a Resolution
which cancelled the appointment of Garces. RTC dismissed the mandamus, since QW was the proper remedy. CA affirmed. SC
ruled that considering that Concepcion continuously occupies the disputed position and exercises the corresponding functions,
the proper remedy should have been quo warranto and not mandamus.
FACTS:
 July 27, 1986: Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte.
 Garces was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte
 These were approved by the Civil Service Commission, and both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office
  Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it.
 Garces, on the other hand, was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she
was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado
(parang empanada or ensaymada hahaha) that prohibited her from assuming office in Gutalac as the same is not vacant.
 February 24, 1987: Empeynado directed Garces to defer her assumption of the Gutalac post
 April 15, 1987, Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover
for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte
which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order.
 BUUUUT… since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
 February 26, 1988: Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion, among others.
 COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated June 3, 1988, resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election
Registrar of Gutalac, and ordered that the appointments of Garces to Gutalac and of Concepcion to Liloy be cancelled (shems,
kawawa naman si Garces)
 Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and academic by the said
COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
 RTC: Dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds:
o (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy, and
o (2) that the cases or matters referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of
elections.
 On appeal, CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition.
 Garces’ contention: she has a clear legal right to the Gutalac post which was deemed vacated at the time of her appointment
and qualification. Garces insists that the vacancy was created by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution. (check
notes)
 Concepcion contention: He did not vacate his Gutalac post as he did not accept the transfer to Liloy.
ISSUE(S): WON Mandamus was proper? Held: No. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby DENIED
without prejudice to the filing of the proper action with the appropriate body. [She should have filed Quo Warranto]
RATIO:
 Mere appointment and qualification of the successor removes an incumbent from his post. Nevertheless, the government in
an act of auto-limitation and to prevent indiscriminate dismissal of government personnel issued on May 28, 1986, Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 17.
 This executive order, which applies in this case as it was passed prior to the issuance of Concepcion’s transfer order,
enumerates five grounds for separation or replacement of elective and appointive officials authorized under Article III, Section
2 of the Provisional Constitution, to wit:
1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2. Existence of the probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry
Head concerned;
3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.

 Not one of these grounds was alleged to exist, much less proven by petitioner when respondent Concepcion was transferred
from Gutalac to Liloy. More, Concepcion was transferred without his consent. A transfer requires a prior appointment.
 If the transfer was made without the consent of the official concerned, it is tantamount to removal without valid cause
contrary to the fundamental guarantee on non-removal except for cause. Concepcion’s transfer thus becomes legally infirm
and without effect for he was not validly terminated. His appointment to the Liloy post, in fact, was incomplete because he
did not accept it. Acceptance, it must be emphasized, is indispensable to complete an appointment.
 Concepcion’s post in Gutalac never became vacant. It is a basic precept in the law of public officers that no person, no
matter how qualified and eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. There can
be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment validly
terminated before one could be validly installed to succeed him. Further, Garces appointment was ordered to be deferred by
the COMELEC. The deferment order, we note, was not unequivocably lifted. Worse, her appointment to Gutalac was even
cancelled by the COMELEC en banc.
 These factors negate Garces claim for a well-defined, clear, certain legal right to the Gutalac post. [Kaya hindi pwede
mandamus] On the contrary, her right to the said office is manifestly doubtful and highly questionable.
 Mandamus, which petitioner filed below, will not lie as this remedy applies only where petitioners right is founded clearly
in law and not when it is doubtful. It will not issue to give him something to which he is not clearly and conclusively
 entitled.
 Considering that Concepcion continuously occupies the disputed position and exercises the corresponding functions
therefore, the proper remedy should have been quo warranto and not mandamus. Quo warranto tests the title to ones
office claimed by another and has as its object the ouster of the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus avails to
enforce clear legal duties and not to try disputed titles.
 Garces heavy reliance with the 1964 Tulawie case is misplaced for material and different factual considerations. Unlike in this
case, the disputed office of Assistant Provincial Agriculturist in the case of Tulawie is clearly vacant and petitioner Tulawie’s
appointment was confirmed by the higher authorities making his claim to the disputed position clear and certain. Tulawie’s
petition for mandamus, moreover, was against the Provincial Agriculturist who never claimed title to the contested office. In
this case, there was no vacancy in the Gutalac post and petitioner’s appointment to which she could base her claim was
revoked making her claim uncertain.

06 Mendoza v. Allas AUTHOR: Mendoza

[G.R. No.131977, February 4, 1999] NOTES:
TOPIC: Quo Warranto
PONENTE: Puno
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not
applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent’s successor in office, even
though such successor may trace his title to the same source.
 This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against
the person--to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function
of the office to which he lays claim.
FACTS:
 Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs on 1972. On 1988, he was appointed Customs Service Chief of the Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the Civil Service
as “Director III”.
 Petitioner’s position was thus categorized as “Director III, CIIS” and he discharged the function and duties of said office.
 Petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector in Cagayan de Oro. In his place, Respondent Ray Allas was
appointed to his former position as Director III. However, Mendoza continued to receive the salary and benefits of the
position of Director III.
 Petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his termination from the
Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas’ appointment as Director III.
 Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement.
 Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the Regional Trial Court. RTC granted the petition.
It ruled that he was deemed not to have vacated his office, the appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was void
ab initio.
 Respondent Allas appealed to the CA. While the case was pending before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by
President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations.
 As a consequence of this promotion, petitioner moved to dismiss respondent’s appeal as having been rendered moot and
academic.
 The CA granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. The order of dismissal became final and entry of judgment
was made.
 Mendoza filed the CA a Motion for Execution. CA denied it on the ground that the contested position vacated by
respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto
petition.
 Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the CA.
 CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this recourse to the SC.
ISSUE(S): Whether the CA grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued, considering that respondent
Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject position.

HELD: No. Petition denied.

RATIO:
 In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed
out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray
Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court’s decision.
 Further, the respondent in a quo warranto case cannot be held personally liable for petitioner’s back salaries and benefits
where the former was merely appointed to the subject position by the President in the exercise of his constitutional power as
 Chief Executive.
 Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner’s back salaries and benefits. He was merely appointed to the
subject position by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can
the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said back salaries and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a
party to the petition for quo warranto.
Notes:
 A petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the
petitioner was ousted from his office to provide stability in the service so that public business may not be unduly hampered.
(Madrigal vs. Lecaroz, 191 SCRA 20 [1990])
 A petition for quo warranto, questioning the public official’s title and seeking to prevent him from holding office for alienage is
not covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.

07 Lokin vs. COMELEC AUTHOR: MINA

G.R. Nos. 179431-32. June 22, 2010 NOTES:
TOPIC: Quo Warranto Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
PONENTE: Bersamin, J. “X x x A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only
persons who have given their consent in writing may be
named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of
any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an
elective office in the immediately preceding election. No
change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted
to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies,
or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
representatives in the House of Representatives who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned. X x x”

versus

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:

“Section 13. Substitution of nominees—A party-list
nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or his
nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes
incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his
acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the
name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the
list of nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal
after the polls.”

Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation

provides four instances, the fourth being when the
“nomination is withdrawn by the party.” Thus, the
Resolution is invalid.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the
winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from office, but not to install the petitioner in his
place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because
the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
ER: CIBAC nominated Villanueva, Lokin as first and second nominees for their party-list. Before the election, Villanueva filed a
petition to substitute Cruz-Gonzales for Lokin as second nominee. After the election, CIBAC won 2 seats. The COMELEC issued
Resolution 7804 which provided that a nominee can be withdrawn and substituted by the party-list, which pursuant to this, Cruz-
Gonzales was proclaimed. Lokin filed a petition for mandamus and certiorari to compel COMELEC to proclaim him and to nullify
the said resolution because it expanded RA 7941. Under RA 7941, only when the nominee dies, or withdrew personally in writing
or becomes incapacitated can he be substituted. COMELEC argues that an electoral protest or a quo warranto case should be filed
before the HRET, not certiorari and mandamus. The SC held that the correct remedy is a certiorari and mandamus because this is
not an election protest nor an action for a quo warranto.

FACTS:
 CIBAC is one of the groups that were duly organized under the party-list system. They manifested their intention to participate
in the May 2007 national elections. Through their president, Joel Villanueva, they submitted a list of 5 nominees, namely: Joel
Villanueva as first nominee, Luis Lokin as second nominee; Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales as third nominee, Sherwin Tunga as fourth
nominee, and Emil Galang as fifth nominee. This was published in Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Phiippine Star.
 Before the elections, CIBAC, through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of
nominees it submitted before, where it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tunga and Galang, and substituted Armi Borje as
third nominee (VILLANUEVA NOMINATION).
 The result of the election entitled CIBAC 2 seats. CIBAC, allegedly though its counsel, filed with COMELEC en banc a motion
seeking the proclamation of Lokin as the second nominee. This was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
 The COMELEC did not act on the Villanueva nomination, which prompted Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate
of nomination.
 In response, COMELEC issued Resolution 8219, where it resolved the validity of the Villanueva Nomination in substituting
Lokin, Tunga and Galang.
 CIBAC was proclaimed as having won 2 seats in the party-list election, and pursuant to COMELEC Resolution 7804, Vilanueva
and Cruz-Gonzales were proclaimed and both took oath of office.
 Lokin filed separate petitions for mandamus and certiorari to compel COMELEC to proclaim him as second nominee of CIBAC
and wants the Resolution 8219 annulled for it amended and expanded RA 7941 (check notes), which makes the Resolution
null and void.
 COMELEC – certiorari inappropriate recourse due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales, proper recourse is to file an electoral
protest or a quo warranto in the HRET.
ISSUE(S): WON the proper remedy for Lokin is a quo warranto or an electoral protest filed before the HRET

HELD: NO
RATIO:
 The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar
situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly
be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the
defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in
which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list
organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and
disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.
 An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the
winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually
obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.
 A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate.
The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any
voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the
petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
 Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC notwithstanding the oath and
assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission
on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the
Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s
petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.