AC No.
99-634 June 10, 2002
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and
client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering
is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary
action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14,
1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:
"x x x xxx xxx
"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and
Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who
agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against
certain parties for breach of contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me
the demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have
accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the
dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he
subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee
whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January
4, 1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of
the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case
filed immediately;
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint
had already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from
Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I
frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every
time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that
the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he
even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about
4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground
floor of the building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes
with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me
that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go
to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to
personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record
at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the
Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he
continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court
personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at
all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his
own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing
two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts
of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as
Annexes D and E;
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 "That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish
to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and
oppressive conduct;"
xxx xxx x x x.1
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline,2 respondent filed his Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of
complainant "for being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly been
introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's law partners. After their meeting,
complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a
service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business
partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand
letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly
agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of
the former's law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting,
respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner
to settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by
complainant to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all
the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the
latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose
services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his
acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because
the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment
basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's secretary
and told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the
payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter
of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed.
Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee,
and that he should give the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime
the filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the
First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by
Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived
at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the
complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response,
complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondent's
acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return
of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because
their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office
personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and
encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant,
and if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBP's Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio
Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant's
deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on
the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint
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 within the time frame contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of
respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited
by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client,
which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly
dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The
subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by
complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity
of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year."4
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Commission's recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing
of the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money
given for the filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill
complaint; hence, the former's failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent
alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for
attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the
prosecution or the defense of the client's cause. They who perform that duty with
diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends
of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for
the legal profession.5 Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the
profession.6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed
between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered.
The former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for
the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be
paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits
or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established.7
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's
fees.8 Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of
respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal
favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to
prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect
the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a
client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them.9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their
utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client,
save by the rules of law legally applied.10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his
office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted
that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a
client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover,
upon discovering the "mistake" -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have
immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling
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complainant's attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the
the correct purpose of the payment. practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will
The Practice of Law -- a disbarment be imposed as a penalty.19
Profession, Not a Business
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a
for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be
profession and not a business.11Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.12 The gaining of copy in respondent's file.
a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration.13 Duty to public service
and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who
SO ORDERED.
must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice
of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence
may be attained without making much money.14

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the
receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that
lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their
professional capacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into
their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.16 It may be
true that they have a lien upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that have
lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of
such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their
duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct.17 In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their
client's interest within the bounds of law.

If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice

law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar,
and to the public.18 Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his
legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint
promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his
breach of duty.

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 DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA
had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease
petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks,
Facts: Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a
postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and
claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the
P8,000.00, respectively.
petitioner, which were not successful and so the former intimated that a case
should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and
included also amounts for the filing of the case.
Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback
as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar
office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed
Discipline of the IBP as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000deposited by
even invited petitioner to come with him to the JusticeHall to verify the status of
complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill
the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office while
complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint,
the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The
a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to
lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was
file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The
absent that day.
failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing
fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the
of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice,
clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the
no such case has been filed.
law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the
money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the
Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse
respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.”
that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown
the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he

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BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB
ASSAD, respondents.
In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against
Selim Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a
certain Atty. Ohnick.
In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and he
thenafter entered his appearance in court.
In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be
disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that in June 1945, Hilado approached Atty.
Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty. Francisco
sent Hilado a legal opinion letter.
Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no
material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s story,
Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned
with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned,
Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico
Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal
documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter where it was stated that Hilado
has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that
Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a letter
explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case.
Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential
information was relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was
already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty.
Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court for four months in the said
case.
Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.
HELD: Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty.
Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s
consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation,
then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
Further:
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor-when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating
his client’s cause in open court.
Anent the issue of what information was relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: It does not
matter if the information relayed is confidential or not. So long as the attorney-client
relationship is established, the lawyer is proscribed from taking other representations against
the client.
Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not actually written by Atty. Francisco but was only
signed by him: It still binds him because Atty. Agrava, assuming that he was the real author,
was part of the same law firm. An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant
of a law firm is information imparted to the firm, his associates or his employers.
Anent the issue of the fact that it took Hilado four months from the time Atty. Francisco filed
his entry of appearance to file a disqualification: It does not matter. The length of time is not a
waiver of her right. The right of a client to have a lawyer be disqualified, based on previous
atty-client relationship, as counsel against her does not prescribe. Professional confidence
once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.
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A.C. No. 5280 March 30, 2004
WILLIAM S. UY, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES, respondent.
William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty. Fermin L.
Gonzales for violation of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The
complainant alleges:
Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and
file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent
the circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs,
respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the petition was about to be filed,
respondent went to his (complainant’s) office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a
certain amount from him other than what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent
left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was
shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint dated July 26, 1999 against him with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for "Falsification of Public
Documents."1 The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the
transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent
was supposed to have filed. Portions of said letter-complaint read:
The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino,
married and a resident of 132-A Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila,
Quezon City, Michael Angelo T. UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors and
residents of the aforesaid address, Luviminda G. Tomagos, of legal age, married,
Filipino and a resident of Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F. Madayag,
with office address at A12, 2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex, Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila, for ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS, committed as follows:
That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land
consisting of 4.001 ha. for the amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency,
situated at Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, from FERMIN C.
GONZALES, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter in favor of
the former…; that in the said date, William S. Uy received the Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-33122, covering the said land;
That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-33122, in the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the
same in his name, William S. Uy executed a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer of
the aforesaid land in favor of his children, namely, Michael Angelo T. Uy and
Cristina Earl T. Uy, wherein William S. Uy made it appear that his said children
are of legal age, and residents of Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, when
in fact and in truth, they are minors and residents of Metro Manila, to qualify them
as farmers/beneficiaries, thus placing the said property within the coverage of the
Land Reform Program;
That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another
procured the falsified documents which they used as supporting papers so that
they can secure from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan,
TCT No. T-5165 (Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 004 32930) in favor of
his above-named children. Some of these Falsified documents are purported
Affidavit of Seller/Transferor and Affidavit of Non-Tenancy, both dated August 20,
1996, without the signature of affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that said
date, Fermin C. Gonzales was already dead… ;
That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to
defraud undersigned, still accepted the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty.
Fermin L. Gonzales, P300,000.00, in PNB Check No. 0000606, and P40,000.00,
in cash, as full payment of the redemption of TCT No. 33122…knowing fully well
that at that time the said TCT cannot be redeemed anymore because the same
was already transferred in the name of his children;
That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered by the aforesaid check,
as evidenced by the said check which was encashed by him…;
That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused
and continue to refuse to deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or
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 to return and repay the said P340,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the
undersigned.2
With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and
grossly disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his client. Respondent
unceremoniously turned against him just because he refused to grant respondent’s
request for additional compensation. Respondent’s act tarnished his reputation and
social standing.3
In compliance with this Court’s Resolution dated July 31, 2000,4 respondent filed his
Comment narrating his version, as follows:
On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9 hectare-property
situated in Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122 which
the latter acquired by purchase from his (respondent’s) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales,
Jr.. On the same date, he paid complainant P340,000.00 and demanded the delivery of
TCT No. T-33122 as well as the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Upon request, he
gave complainant additional time to locate said title or until after Christmas to deliver the
same and execute the Deed of Redemption. After the said period, he went to
complainant’s office and demanded the delivery of the title and the execution of the Deed
of Redemption. Instead, complainant gave him photocopies of TCT No. T-33122 and
TCT No. T-5165. Complainant explained that he had already transferred the title of the
property, covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his children Michael and Cristina Uy and that
TCT No. T-5165 was misplaced and cannot be located despite efforts to locate it.
Wanting to protect his interest over the property coupled with his desire to get hold of
TCT No. T-5165 the earliest possible time, he offered his assistance pro bono to prepare
a petition for lost title provided that all necessary expenses incident thereto including
expenses for transportation and others, estimated at P20,000.00, will be shouldered by
complainant. To these, complainant agreed.
On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the lost title ready
for signing and notarization. On April 14, 1999, he went to complainant’s office informing
him that the petition is ready for filing and needs funds for expenses. Complainant who
was with a client asked him to wait at the anteroom where he waited for almost two hours
until he found out that complainant had already left without leaving any instructions nor
funds for the filing of the petition. Complainant’s conduct infuriated him which prompted
him to give a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition he
prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition.
Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant
was terminated when he gave the handwritten letter to complainant; that there was no
longer any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-
complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations contained in
the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the
Office of the Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.5
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.6
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear on April 2,
2003 before the IBP.7 On said date, complainant did not appear despite due notice. There
was no showing that respondent received the notice for that day’s hearing and so the
hearing was reset to May 28, 2003.8
On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter from one Atty.
Augusto M. Macam dated April 24, 2003, stating that his client, William S. Uy, had lost
interest in pursuing the complaint he filed against Atty. Gonzales and requesting that the
case against Atty. Gonzales be dismissed.9
On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and
recommendation, portions of which read as follows:
The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle
the filing of the Verified Petition for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had
confided to respondent the fact of the loss and the circumstances attendant
thereto. When respondent filed the Letter-Complaint to the Office of the Special
Prosecutor in Tayug, Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which expressly provides that "A lawyer shall
preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated." Respondent cannot argue that there was no lawyer-client
relationship between them when he filed the Letter-Complaint on 26 July 1999
considering that as early as 14 April 1999, or three (3) months after, respondent
had already terminated complainant’s perceived lawyer-client relationship
between them. The duty to maintain inviolate the client’s confidences and secrets
is not temporary but permanent. It is in effect perpetual for "it outlasts the
lawyer’s employment" (Canon 37, Code of Professional Responsibility) which
8|Page
 means even after the relationship has been terminated, the duty to preserve the
client’s confidences and secrets remains effective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon
21 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall
not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with the full knowledge of the circumstances consents
thereto."
On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from
Atty. Augusto M. Macam, who claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy,
alleging that complainant is no longer interested in pursuing this case and
requested that the same be dismissed. The aforesaid letter hardly deserves
consideration as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules
of Court). Moreover, in Boliver vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, the Court ruled that
"any person may bring to this Court’s attention the misconduct of any lawyer, and
action will usually be taken regardless of the interest or lack of interest of the
complainant, if the facts proven so warrant."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to
have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and it is hereby
recommended that he be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS from
receipt hereof, from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and member of the
Bar.10
On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued
Resolution No. XV-2003-365, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and
considering that respondent violated Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.11
Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of
complainant Uy expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed
against respondent, has no persuasive bearing in the present case.
Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:
….
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.
This is because:
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called
to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant
or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or
disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the
charges.12
Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.
Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience.13 While it is true that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court,14 complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances
9|Page
enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein Canon 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND
respondent. SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION
IS TERMINATED.
Notwithstanding respondent’s own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of the records
reveals that the relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a Rule 21.01 – A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client
personal transaction or dealings between them rather than the practice of law by except:
respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only because he redeemed a property
which complainant had earlier purchased from his (complainant’s) son. It is not refuted a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of
that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to produce its the disclosure;
title and execute the Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him,
complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of the alleged loss of the title b) When required by law;
which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely transferred to his children,
thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as to secure the issuance of a new
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or
title to the property, in lieu of the lost one, with complainant assuming the expenses
associates or by judicial action.
therefor.
The alleged "secrets" of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-complaint.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits
Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by
or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble
respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally
of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance.
owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for
It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any previous
estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would
occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is
constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way
it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which
we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a
the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is
misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.15
that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would
be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or
Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the present proprietary interests.
case. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for "Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Documents" filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of the Integrated Bar
respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his
of the Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the administrative case filed
service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from
against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, docketed as A.C. No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of
complainant. Respondent’s immediate objective was to secure the title of the property
merit.
that complainant had earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client
relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed
filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction. SO ORDERED.

Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

10 | P a g e

[A.C. No. 5108. May 26, 2005]
ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D.
Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged
that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public
document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from
their attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards while respondent is a
Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).[1]
Complainants husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled Ruben G. Mercado v.
Rosa C. Francisco, for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and
the dismissal became final and executory on July 15, 1992.[2]
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On
February 7, 1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as
collaborating counsel for complainant.[3]
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of
Counsel,[4] informing the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel
for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against
complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled Atty. Julito
Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado, and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823,
for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised
Penal Code.[5] Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the
Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More
specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she
is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized
on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and
their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied
using any other name than Rosa F. Mercado. She also insisted that she has gotten
married only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that
are pending before or decided upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office
of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City;[6] (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, pursuit of private
business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service
rules and regulations, and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
before the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption;[7] (3)
complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found
guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month suspension without
pay;[8] and, (4) the Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No.
6713, as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan.[9]
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of
public document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information
relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her
counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against
respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is
guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and
should be disbarred.
11 | P a g e
 Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where
he alleged that the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and
irrelevant because all the allegations leveled against him are subject of separate
fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not
grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven
otherwise.[10] He also states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of
misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month without
pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of
simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.[11]
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the
falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in
no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent
as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then
counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about
the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters.
The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to
anyone.[12]
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[13]
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but
complainant failed to appear in both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles
thus granted respondents motion to file his memorandum, and the case was
submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.[14]
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of
investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule
on privileged communication between attorney and client, and recommending his
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and
recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She
stated that after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for
those who have wronged her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various
criminal and administrative cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the
tribunals where these cases are pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the
respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the
complaint or desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief
Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment
proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for
falsification of public document against his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client
and the rule on attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in
order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special
powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly
confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential
nature that is required by necessity and public interest.[15] Only by such
confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in
an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good
cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. [16] Thus, the
preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal
problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of
justice.[17] One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an
attorney is to keep inviolate his clients secrets or confidence and not to abuse
them.[18] Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his clients secrets and confidence
outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship,[19] and continues even
after the clients death.[20] It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its
client can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse
with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance
that the lawyers tongue is tied from ever disclosing it.[21] With full disclosure of the
facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result
in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the
clients cause.
12 | P a g e
 Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the
factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.[22]
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the
lawyer or the latter declines the employment.[23]The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear
that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer
to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective client.[24]
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for
some purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is
not privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca,[25] where the client and
his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten
years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of
the lease rentals would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be
delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list
of creditors which he had confidentially supplied counsel for the purpose of carrying
out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel,
in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to
those of the client. As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the
terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with
the confidential list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered
the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the professional relation then
existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. We then held that a
violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake
more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer
to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality.[26] The client must intend the communication to be confidential.[27]
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act
of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far
as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment
of the purpose for which it was given.[28]
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise
agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and
delivered to the opposing party,[29] an offer and counter-offer for settlement,[30] or a
document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity,[31] are not
privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.[32]
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional
capacity.[33]
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for
mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to
his rights or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client
to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.[34]
If the client seeks an accounting service,[35] or business or personal
assistance,[36] and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication
disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record
fails to substantiate complainants allegations. We note that complainant did not even
specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her
claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that
respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a
criminal action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal
complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by
respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the
13 | P a g e
merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the
existence of facts which the complainant must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any
testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly
divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to
determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such
confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely
assert the attorney-client privilege.[37] The burden of proving that the privilege applies
is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.[38]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Mercado vs. Vitriolo
Facts: Rosa F. Mercado filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo,
seeking his disbarmentfrom the practice of law. Complainant’s husband filed for
annulment of their marriage with the RTC ofPasig City. In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio
P. De Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7,1994, respondent entered his
appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant.Respondent
then filed a criminal action against complainant for Falsification of Public
Document.Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates
of Live Birth of her children,Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant
allegedly indicated in said Certificates of LiveBirth that she is married to a certain
Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized onApril 11, 1979, when
in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took placeon
April 11, 1978.On the other hand, respondent argued that the bases of the falsification
case are two certificates of livebirth whic h are public docum ents and in no wa y
c onnected with the c onf idenc e tak en during theengagement of respondent as
counsel.
Issue: Whether or not an attorney-client privilege exists
.Ruling: The SC ruled in negative. Dean W igmore cites the factors essential to
establish the existence of theprivilege, to wit:(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,(3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at hisinstance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8)
except theprotection be waived.Applying all these rules to the case at bar, the SC held
that the evidence on record fails to substantiatec o m p l a i n a n t ’ s a l l e g a t i o n s . T h e
S C n o t e d t h a t c o m p l a i n a n t d i d n o t e v e n s p e c i f y t h e a l l e g e d communication in
confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms
andlacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication when heinstituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public
documents because the criminal complaintdisclosed facts relating to the civil case for
annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however,spell out these facts which will
determine the merit of her complaint.
14 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 396 July 31, 1964
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY
EDUARDO M. TUASON. EMILIO C. STA. MARIA, petitioner.
PAREDES, J.:
Sometime in June, 1955, respondent Atty. Eduardo M. Tuason represented petitioner
Emilio C. Sta. Maria. and his two partners Andres Guanzon and Fausto E. Chincuanco in
prosecuting Civil Case No. 894, CFI of Pampanga, entitled "Fausto E. Chincuanco, et al.
v. Enriqueta M. de Hidalgo, et al", a collection case involving a promissory note of
P50,000.00. Defendant Enriqueta M. de Hidalgo was declared in default, and the Court
rendered judgment on October 8, 1955, ordering the defendant de Hidalgo to pay: —
(a) Plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 with interests thereon at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from June 18, 1955, the date of the filing of the
complaint, until the same shall have been fully paid, plus the sum of P3,500.00
as plaintiffs' attorney's fees;
(b) Plaintiff Andres A. Guanzon the other sum of P3,000.00 as compensation for
the injury caused to him in his credit standing; and
(c) Plaintiff Fausto E. Chincuanco another sum of P3,000.00 as compensation for
the injury caused to him in his credit standing.
On December 9, 1955, a writ of execution was issued. Sufficient amount of money to
satisfy the judgment, came into the hands of the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga.
Respondent Tuason, on September 10, 1958, obtained from the Sheriff, the amount of
P22,930.64, which he (Tuason) applied in the following manner: (1) P10,000.00 for his
alleged attorney's fees; (2) P1,648.00 to supposed expenses of litigation, which he
claimed to have advanced in the prosecution of the case; and (3) the balance of
P11,282.64, to plaintiff Fausto E. Chincuanco, his uncle.
Petitioner claims that respondent Tuason deprived him of his lawful share in the
judgment which was P25,511.62; that respondent was not entitled to P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees because even the lower court awarded him only P3,500.00; that the
foregoing acts were done, without the prior knowledge and consent of petitioner.
Upon finding that the respondent withdrew the P22,930.64 from the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff, complainant Sta. Maria repaired to the office of Atty. Tuason and
demanded the amount to be turned over to him, or to the Sheriff for proper disposition by
the Court; that upon failure of respondent to comply with any of the two things, contempt
proceedings were instituted against respondent Tuason. In view, however, of the claim of
Tuason that he gave the money to Guanzon and Chincuanco, petitioner filed with the CFI
of Pampanga, Civil Case No. 1704, against said Tuason, Guanzon and Chincuanco, for
collection of his rightful share in the judgment in Civil Case No. 894.
Respondent, in his Answer, admitted having received the amounts in question from the
Sheriff of Pampanga, and disbursed the same in the manner stated by petitioner, but he
denied that he obtained and disbursed the amounts, without the knowledge and consent
of the petitioner; the truth of the matter being that he was given full authority by
petitioner's partners (Guanzon and Chincuanco) to receive P10,000.00 for his services;
that the two were the ones who engaged his services in the prosecution of Civil Case No.
894, for their own behalf and in behalf of petitioner himself; that he delivered the balance
of the amount, to Chincuanco, who was the one who had actually retained his services
and who took charge of liquidating the accounts with his partners.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General who made the following
findings and recommendations:
The foregoing evidence presented by the parties involves two issues, namely; (1)
Whether the respondent was in connivance with Fausto Chincuanco and Andres
Guanzon in delivering to them the full amount of P22,930.64 and thereby
deprived the petitioner from getting his rightful share in the liquidation of assets of
the partnership and (2) whether the respondent was guilty of malpractice and
15 | P a g e
gross misconduct in withholding the amount of P10,000 as his attorney's fees
and also the amount of P1,648 as alleged expenses in the litigation.
The complainant in this case contends that the respondent committed
malpractice in delivering the proceeds of the judgment money to Fausto
Chincuanco, his uncle, and Andres Guanzon, his close business associate (p.
17, tsn, July 10, 1961; p. 6, rec.).
As to the first issue, the petitioner claims that he was unable to collect his rightful
share in the liquidation of the funds of the partnership as agreed upon by the
partners (Exh. E, pp. 3-4, tsn, June 15, 1960) for which reason, he had to file a
civil case against his partners. He attributes this failure mainly to the respondent
who delivered the judgment money to Chincuanco, his partner, who disposed of
the whole amount in the manner already indicated earlier. While it is true that
Fausto Chincuanco and Guanzon, the latter being the general manager from the
Sheriff (Exh. C, p. 14, rec.), there is no clear evidence presented to show that the
respondent connived with either Chincuanco or Guanzon on delivering the
judgment money to them for the purpose of depriving the complainant of his
rightful share in the partnership. What the respondent did in this case was to
deliver the judgment money to the partnership through Chincuanco and
Guanzons the latter being the general manager. The proper action for the
complainant was to demand his share from Guanzon, the managing partner, or
from Chincuanco, the other partner. This he did by filing a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga (see Civil Case No. 1704, Exh. 2). In this case
Atty. Eduardo Tuason, the herein respondent, was included as defendant. A
contempt proceeding was also filed by complainant, citing Atty. Tuason and the
Sheriff of Pampanga as respondents. It appears, however, that an amicable
settlement was finally agreed upon by the parties in this civil case resulting in a
compromise agreement, duly approved by the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, wherein the plaintiff waived all his claim against his other partners. In
said compromise agreement the plaintiff also agreed not to proceed with the
contempt case he filed against Atty. Tuason and the Sheriff of Pampanga (Exhs.
2, 3 and 5, folder of exhibits).
The issue, therefore, revolves more on the division of the partnership assets
rather than on the right of the complainant to compel the respondent to turn over
to him part of the judgment money which respondent applied as his attorney's
fees and reimbursement for his expenses in connection with the litigation he
handled for the partners. Under the foregoing circumstances, the undersigned
investigator is of the opinion that the respondent Tuason has not committed any
act that will constitute malpractice or gross misconduct in office.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts.1äwphï1.ñët
As to the second issue, there is no dispute that the respondent collected the
amount of P10,000 as attorney's fees for a collection suit in the amount of
P50,000.00 based on a promissory note. It appears that since the defendant was
declared in default, the case was terminated after one brief hearing. The
respondent also collected P1,648 as alleged expenses incurred in connection
with the litigation. No satisfactory evidence, however, was presented to show that
the respondent actually spent that amount. On the other hand, there was the
undisputed evidence which shows that the case represented by the respondent
was terminated with one brief hearing after the defendant was declared in
default. There is, likewise, no dispute that said attorney's fees and litigation
expenses were deducted from the judgment money collected by the respondent
from the Sheriff of Pampanga. This act of the respondent seems to be irregular, if
not suspicious, considering his close relationship with Mr. Chincuanco.
Notwithstanding the opinion of Mr. Guanzon, the amount of P10,000 for
attorney's fees is, to our mind, also unreasonable under the circumstances. It is
to be noted in this connection that the respondent himself alleged in the
complaint he filed for the partnership that "the plaintiffs will incur for attorney's
fees and expenses of the litigation P6,000" (u 9, Rec.).
Moreover, the circumstances of the case show that the respondent took
advantage of the fact that he was a nephew of Fausto Chincuanco and a close
associate of Andres Guanzon in collecting his lawyer's fees. Even at the time that
the respondent was already representing the partnership, the complainant
inquired from Chincuanco about the respondent's fees. In reply Chincuanco said
that he (Sta. Maria) should not worry about it because the respondent is a
nephew of his. On this assurance, the complainant could be said to have
assumed that the respondent would not collect an excessive amount, much less
take advantage of his relationship with one of the partners by retaining the funds,
considering that the case was one of a simple collection based on a promissory
16 | P a g e
 note. The act of the respondent in collecting P10,000 for attorney's fees and
alleged expenses he incurred in the litigation, aggravated the burden of the
complainant who claims that he was not given his due share in the distribution of
the assets of the partnership as his two partners were already in possession of
the money. While it is true that the partners of the complainant apparently
acceded to the respondent's acts, it cannot be denied that the latter acted with
indiscretion, induced by his close relationship with Chincuanco to the prejudice of
the complainant. In effect, respondent's act constituted a retention of the funds of
his client, an act of professional indiscretion bordering on misbehaviour.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts.1äwphï1.ñët
constitute malpractice or gross misconduct in office." Respondent also claims that the
filing of different proceedings against him was simply intended to harass and embarrass
him, because of petitioner's dissatisfaction over the disposition by his partners, of the
award in Civil Case No. 894.
After an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, We
find that the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General are supported by the
evidence of record. The fact that the respondent has placed his private and personal
interest over and above that of his clients constitutes a breach of a lawyer's oath, to say
the least. Call it professional indiscretion or any other name, but the cold fact remains
that the act, as found by the Solicitor General, is not conducive to a healthy growth of the
legal profession. The respondent is hereby admonished that a repetition of similar acts
will merit more drastic action.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
It may be stated, however, that the respondent may have felt justified in his acts, and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
since they were done with apparent acquiescence of his clients, Fausto evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.1äw phï1.ñët

Chincuanco and Andres Guanzon. Moreover, an amicable settlement of all the

suits filed by the herein complainant resulted in a compromise agreement,
whereby the complainant waived any and all claims against his partners and the
respondent arising from the transactions which are the subject matter of the
controversy, as well as from the incidents thereof (Exh. 2, folder of exhibits).
While it may be said that this compromise agreement may not affect the
misconduct of the respondent as a member of the bar, at least, it cannot be
denied that the complainant has, in effect, condoned respondent's acts.

RECOMMENDATION

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that instead of a

more severe penalty which he would otherwise deserve, the respondent be
reprimanded for professional indiscretion, with the warning that a more severe
penalty be imposed for a repetition of same or similar acts.

The report of the Solicitor General was duly set for hearing, by this Court. Respondent
excepted from the recommendation which called for the imposition of a reprimand.
Respondent points out that the findings of the Solicitor General did not warrant his
recommendation, since he found that respondent "has not committed any act that will

17 | P a g e
STA. MARIA VS. TUASON indiscretion or any other name, but the cold fact remains that the act is not conducive to the
health growth of the legal profession. Respondent is hereby admonished that a repetition of
FACTS: similar acts will merit more drastic action.

This is a petition for the disbarment of Atty. Eduardo M. Tuason, instituted by Emilio Sta.
Maria.

Sometime in June 1955, Atty. Tuason represented the partnership of Sta. Maria, Guanzon
and Chincuanco in a collection case against Enriqueta de Hidalgo, involving a promissory
note of P50,000.00. Defendant Hidalgo in this case was declared in default and was ordered
to pay. By virtue of a writ of execution, the provincial sheriff of Pampanga was able to obtain
the amount of P22,930.64.

Respondent Tuason got the whole amount from the sheriff and applied it in the following
manner : P10,000 attorney’s fees, P1,648 supposed expenses of litigation which he claimed
to have advanced during the prosecution and the balance of P11,282.64 to Fausto
Chincuanco, his uncle.

Despite demands from Sta. Maria to turn over the money to him or to the sheriff, respondent
failed to comply and contempt proceedings were instituted against Tuason. The matter was
referred to the Office of the Solicitor General who made the findings and recommendation
that: respondent Tuason was not in connivance with his uncle Chincuanco in depriving
petitioner of his lawful share in the liquidation of partnership assets, however, the collection of
P10,000 as attorney’s fees after the case was terminated after one brief hearing is
unreasonable. There was also no evidence presented to show that Tuason actually spent
P1,648 for the expenses.

The Sol. Gen. recommended that instead of a more severe penalty which he would otherwise
deserve, respondent be reprimanded for professional indiscretion, with a warning that a more
severe penalty be imposed for the repetition of the same of similar acts.

ISSUE : Whether respondent committed acts that would merit his disbarment.

RULING:

The fact that the respondent placed his private and personal interest over and above that of
his clients constitutes a breach of the lawyer’s oath, to say the least. Call it professional

18 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974
JOSE ALCALA and AVELINA IMPERIAL, petitioners,
vs.
HONESTO DE VERA, respondent.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:p
On May 19, 1964, Jose Alcala (now deceased) and his wife, Avelina Imperial, filed this present petition for disbarment
against respondent Honesto de Vera, a practicing attorney of Locsin, Albay, who was retained by them as their counsel in
civil case 2478 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, entitled: "Ray Semenchuk vs. Jose Alcala".
Complainants charge Atty. Honesto de Vera with gross negligence and malpractice: 1)
for having maliciously and deliberately omitted to notify them of the decision in civil case
2478 resulting in the deprivation of their right to appeal from the adverse judgment
rendered against them; and 2) for respondent's indifference, disloyalty and lack of
interest in petitioners' cause resulting to their damage and prejudice.
Respondent attorney, in his answer to these charges, asserted that he notified his clients
of the decision in question and that he defended complainants' case to the best of his
ability as demanded by the circumstances and that he never showed indifference, lack of
interest or disloyalty to their cause.
The Solicitor General, to whom this Court referred this case for investigation, report and
recommendation, substantially found the following:
Civil case 2478 was an action for annulment of a sale of two parcels of land (lots Nos.
1880 and 1883 covered by TCT Nos. T-12392 and 12393 respectively) filed by the
vendee, Ray Semenchuk, against the vendors, spouses Alcala, on the ground that lot
1880 "could not be located or did not exist", and for the recovery of damages and
attorney's fees.
Respondent attorney, whose legal services were engaged by complainants, filed an
answer denying the material allegations of the above-mentioned complaint and setting
up a counterclaim for the balance of the purchase price of the lots sold, the expenses of
notarials, internal revenue, registration, etc. plus damages and attorney's fees.
On April 17, 1963, the trial court rendered judgment rescinding the contract of sale, on
the ground that the vendee Semenchuk was not able to take material possession of lot
1880 it being in the possession of a certain Ruperto Ludovice and his brothers who have
been occupying the land for a number of years. The dispositive portion of the judgment
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the deed of sale (Exhibit A) rescinded;
(b) Directing the plaintiff to deliver to the defendants the possession of lot
No. 1883.
(c) Ordering the defendants to return to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00
after deducting the amount of P250.00 which is the consideration in the
deed of sale of Lot No. 185; and
(d) Without pronouncement as to costs. (p. 11, rollo)
On April 19, 1963, respondent Atty. de Vera received a copy of the decision but he failed
to inform his clients of the judgment against them. On July 17, 1963, a sheriff came to
complainants' house to serve a writ of execution issued in said case. Totally caught by
surprise, Jose Alcala immediately wrote to the trial court and inquired for the status of
case 2478. The deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply dated July 22, 1963, informed Alcala
that the case was decided on April 17, 1963, that a copy of the decision was received by
respondent attorney on April 19, 1963, and that since no appeal was taken, a writ of
execution was issued by the trial court on motion of the plaintiff Semenchuk.
19 | P a g e
On September 12, 1963, spouses Alcala instituted civil case 2723 for damages against
Atty. Honesto de Vera for having failed to inform them of the decision in case 2478 as a
result of which they lost their right to appeal from said decision. The trial court that heard
case 2723 found for a fact that respondent did not inform his clients of the decision
rendered in case 2478; however, it denied damages for lack of proof that the spouses
Alcala suffered any damage as a result of respondent's failure to notify them of the
aforesaid decision. The judgment in case 2723 was appealed to the Court of Appeals1 by
respondent herein but the same was affirmed by said appellate court.
Not content with having filed case 2723, complainants instituted this complaint for
disbarment against their former counsel.
1. "Indifference, loyalty, and lack of interest" of respondent in the handling of
complainants' defense in civil case 2478.
The basis of this particular charge is the alleged failure of Atty. de Vera to present at the
trial of case 2478 certain documents which according to the complainants could have
proven that lot 1880 actually existed, to wit: a sketch of lot 1880 prepared by the vendee,
Semenchuk, himself (Exh. L-Adm. Case); technical description of lot 1880 taken from
complainants' certificate of title (Exh. M-Adm. Case); sketch plan of lot 1880 in relation to
the adjoining lots prepared by surveyor Miguel N. Romero (Exh. N-Adm Case); a receipt
for P10.00 issued by surveyor Romero for the preparation of the sketch, Exh. N (Exh. O-
Adm. Case) — all of which documents were turned over by Jose Alcala to respondent
before the trial of case 2478.
We agree with the Solicitor General that there is no merit to this particular charge.
The records of case 2478 show that upon agreement of the parties and their attorneys,
the trial court appointed a commissioner to relocate lot 1880 and after conducting such
relocation, the commissioner reported to the Court that the lot existed, but that the same
was in the possession of other persons. Inasmuch as the existence of lot 1880 had
already been verified by the commissioner, it was therefore unnecessary for respondent
attorney to introduce in evidence Exhibits "L", "M", "N", and "O", the purpose of which
was merely to prove the existence of said lot. If the complaint for rescission prospered it
was because of complainant Alcala's failure to comply with his obligation of transferring
the material or physical possession of lot 1880 to the vendee and for no other reason;
hence, complainants had nobody to blame but themselves. The fact that the plaintiff,
Semenchuk, was not awarded any damages, attorney's fees, and costs shows that
respondent attorney exerted his utmost to resist plaintiff's complaint.
2. Gross negligence and malpractice committed by respondent for failure to inform his
clients of the decision in case 2478: —
The matter in dispute with respect to this specific charge is whether or not respondent
notified his clients, the complainants herein, about the decision in case 2478.
Respondent claims that he did inform his clients of the decision; complainants insist the
contrary.
We agree with the Solicitor General that there is sufficient evidence on hand to prove
that respondent neglected to acquaint his clients of the decision in case 2478.
As stated in the Solicitor General's report, the reaction of complainant Jose Alcala when
the writ of execution in said civil case was served upon him and his wife by a sheriff was
such that it betrayed a total unawareness of the adverse decision. The evidence shows
that when he was told about the sheriff's visit, Jose Alcala immediately inquired from the
trial Court the reason for the writ of execution and it was only then that he was informed
that a decision had been rendered, that his lawyer received a copy thereof since April 19,
1963, and because no appeal was taken the judgment became final and executory.
Alcala then sought the help of his brother, Atty. Ernesto Alcala, in Manila and the latter
wrote to respondent inquiring as to what steps were taken, if any, to prosecute an appeal
from the decision in question but respondent chose not to answer the letter. Thereafter,
Alcala instituted an action for damages and filed the instant complaint for disbarment.
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General:
Again, we do not think petitioner Alcala would have felt so aggrieved and
embittered by the loss of his right to appeal the decision in Civil Case No.
2478 so as to take all these legal steps against respondent, with all the
attendant trouble and expense in doing so, if it is not true, as he alleged,
that the latter indeed did not notify him of said decision. We believe and
so submit, therefore, that respondent really failed to inform petitioners of
the decision in Civil Case No. 2478, and this was also the finding made
by the Court of First Instance of Albay in its decision in Civil Case No.
2723 for damages filed by petitioners against respondent, and by the
20 | P a g e
 Court of Appeals in the appeal taken by respondent from said decision.
(pp. 38-39, rollo)
Is respondent's failure to notify his clients of the decision sufficient cause for his
disbarment? Complainants answer the question in the affirmative, while on the other
hand, respondent prays that he be exonerated because, according to him,
granting arguendo that he failed to inform the complainants about the decision, the truth
is that said decision was fair and just and no damage was caused to complainants by
reason thereof.
On this point, We agree with the following appraisal of the evidence by the Solicitor
General:
In this connection, it is indeed true that although both the Court of First
Instance of Albay, in Civil Case No. 2723 for damages filed by petitioners
against respondent Atty. De Vera (pp. 30-34, Exh. "D", id.), and the Court
of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. No. 35267-R (the appeal taken by respondent
from the decision of the trial court in C.C. No. 2723), found that
respondent actually did not inform petitioners of the decision in Civil Case
No. 2478, still both courts also held that petitioners did not sustain any
damages as a result of said decision, for which reason the trial court
dismissed petitioners' action for damages against respondent, which
dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We quote the finding of
the Court of First Instance of Albay in its decision in Civil Case No. 2723
in this regard:
The second issue that has to be passed upon by the
Court is neither the plaintiffs are entitled to damages. On
this issue, the Court finds that the plaintiffs cannot recover
damages from defendant Atty. Honesto de Vera. No
evidence has been presented that they sustained
damages of the decision. Neither it has been shown that
the decision is not supported by the facts and the law
applicable to the case. Consequently, the plaintiffs are not
entitled to damages because of the failure of Atty.
Honesto de Vera to inform them of the decision.
"An attorney is not bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence, but only a
reasonable degree of care and skill,
having reference to the character of the
business he undertakes to do. Fallible like
any other human being, he is answerable
to every error or mistake, and will be
protected as long as he acts honestly and
in good faith to the best of his skill and
knowledge. Moreover, a party seeking
damages resulting from a judgment
adverse to him which became final by
reason of the alleged fault or negligence
of his lawyer must prove his loss due to
the injustice of the decision. He cannot
base his action on the unsubstantiated
and arbitrary supposition of the injustice of
the decision. (Tuzon vs. Donato, 58 O.G.
6480)."
(Exh. "D", id.; pp. 33-34)
Significantly, petitioners did not appeal from the above decision, which is
an implied acceptance by them of the correctness of the findings therein.
Instead, it was respondent Atty. De Vera who appealed said decision to
the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 35267-R), and the latter Court,
although agreeing with the finding of the trial court that respondent really
did not inform petitioners of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478 (Exh.
"T"), affirmed, however, the lower court's finding that petitioners were not
entitled to the damages claimed by them by reason of respondent's
failure to notify them of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478. ... While the
rule of res judicata in civil or criminal cases is not, strictly speaking,
applicable in disbarment proceedings, which is neither a civil or a criminal
proceeding intended to punish a lawyer or afford redress to private
grievances but is a proceeding sui generis intended to safeguard the
administration of justice by removing from the legal profession a person
who has proved himself unfit to exercise such trust (p. 207, Martin, Legal
and Judicial Ethics; Re Keenan, 86 ALR 679; De Jesus-Paras vs.
21 | P a g e
 Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, April 12, 1961; In re Montague &
Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), still we consider the findings of the trial
court as well as of the Court of Appeals in the damage, suit filed by
petitioners against respondent Atty. De Vera based on the same grounds
now invoked in this disbarment case relevant and highly persuasive in
this case, especially as petitioners themselves have, as already
observed, accepted and admitted the correctness of said findings. And
we may add that we ourselves agree with respondent that petitioners had
not been prejudiced or damaged in any way by the decision in Civil Case
No. 2478, but that said decision appears in fact to be more favorable to
them than could have been the case if the trial court had applied the law
strictly against them in said case, ... (pp. 17-19, Report. pp. 39-41, rollo;
emphasis supplied).
The Solicitor General's Report continues and says:
True it is that petitioners do not appear to have suffered any material or
pecuniary damage by the failure of respondent Atty. De Vera to notify
them of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478. It is no less true, however,
that in failing to inform his clients, the petitioners, of the decision in said
civil case, respondent failed to exercise "such skill, care, and diligence as
men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such
matters of professional employment" (7 C.J.S. 979). The relationship of
lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for
the client's being adequately and fully informed and should not be left in
the dark as to the mode and manner in which his interests are being
defended. It is only thus that their faith in counsel may remain unimpaired
(Oparel, Sr. vs. Aberia Adm. Case No. 595, July 30, 1971). As it
happened in this case, because of respondent's failure to notify
petitioners of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478, the latter were entirely
caught by surprise, resulting in shock and mental and emotional
disturbance to them, when the sheriff suddenly showed up in their home
with a writ of execution of a judgment that they never knew had been
rendered in the case, since their lawyer, the respondent, had totally failed
to inform them about the same. ... (pp. 23-24, Report, pp. 45-46, rollo;
emphasis supplied).
We concur with the above-quoted observations and add that the correctness of the
decision in case 2478 is no ground for exonerating respondent of the charge but at most
will serve only to mitigate his liability. While there is no finding of malice, deceit, or
deliberate intent to cause damage to his clients, there is, nonetheless, proof of
negligence, inattention, and carelessness on the part of respondent in his failure to give
timely notice of the decision in question. Fortunately for respondent, his negligence did
not result in any material or pecuniary damage to the herein complainants and for this
reason We are not disposed to impose upon him what may be considered in a lawyer's
career as the extreme penalty of disbarment. As stated in the very early case of In Re
Macdougall:
The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment, but is
rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable, and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. This purpose should be borne in mind in the exercise of
disbarment, and the power should be exercised with that caution which
the serious consequences of the action involves.
The profession of an attorney is acquired after long and laborious study.
It is a lifetime profession. By years of patience, zeal, and ability, the
attorney may have acquired a fixed means of support for himself and
family of great pecuniary value, and the deprivation of which would result
in irreparable injury. (3 Phil. 70, 77-78)
In the words of former Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Court:
On one hand, the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an
individual and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its exercise.
The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from
him. On the other, it is extremely that the respectability of the bar should
be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved.
For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion, ought to
reside in the Court. This discretion, ought to be exercised with great
moderation and judgment; but it must be exercised. (Ex parte Burr. 9
Wheat 529; Martin, Legal & Judicial Ethics 1972 Ed. p. 213.)
22 | P a g e
Although respondent's negligence does not warrant disbarment or suspension under the
circumstances of the case, nonetheless it cannot escape a rebuke from Us as we hereby
rebuke and censure him, considering that his failure to notify his clients of the decision in
question manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to their interest expected of him
under his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Respondent's inaction
merits a severe censure from the Court.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence, the report and recommendation of the
Solicitor General, and the fact that this appears to be the first misconduct of respondent
in the exercise of his legal profession, We hereby hold said respondent GUILTY only of
simple negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer of complainants, and We
hereby SEVERELY CENSURE him. Let this decision be noted in respondent's record —
as a member of the Bar — in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Jose Alcala vs Honesto De Vera
Jose Alcala engaged the services of Atty. Honesto De Vera to defend him in a
civil case.
On April 17, 1963, the court rendered a decision against Alcala.
On April 19, 1963, Atty. De Vera received a copy of the adverse decision. Atty.
De Vera failed to inform Alcala about the adverse decision.
On July 17, 1963, the court sheriff went to Alcala to serve a writ of execution.
That was the only time when Alcala learned that he lost. And because of Atty. De
Vera’s failure to inform him of the adverse decision, the period within which
Alcala can appeal his case had already lapsed.
As a result, in September 1963, Alcala filed a civil case against Atty. De Vera in
order to collect damages as he averred that he sustained damages due to Atty.
De Vera’s negligence. The court however ruled that Alcala is not entitled to
damages.
Unfettered, Alcala filed a disbarment case against Atty. De Vera.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be disbarred because of his failure
to update his client of the status of the case.
HELD: No. Disbarment is not warranted in this case. It is true that Atty. De Vera
had been remiss in his duties as counsel for Alcala because he failed to update
him of the status of the case, however, it appears that Alcala did not sustain any
damage by reason of such negligence. But this is not to say that Atty. De Vera
can go scot-free. The lack of damage to Alcala will only serve as a mitigating
circumstance. The Supreme Court found Atty. De Vera guilty of simple
negligence and he was severely censured for his negligence. Atty. De
Vera’s failure to notify his clients of the decision in question manifests a lack of
total dedication or devotion to the client’s interest expected of Atty. De
Vera under the lawyer’s oath.
In this case, it can also be gleaned that not all negligence by counsel entitles the
client to collect damages from the negligent lawyer.
23 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30543 July 15, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO CAWILI, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Hector C.
Fule and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for plaintiff-appellee.
Juan T. Aquino (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
The difficulty that faces appellant Rodrigo Cawili, prosecuted and convicted for the crime
of rape in the lower court, arises from the coherent and straight-forward story narrated by
the offended party, a thirteen-year old girl, who, while asleep in her house was taken by
surprise by the accused and thus fell victim to his carnal desires. Nonetheless, there is in
the brief submitted by counsel a sustained effort to seek a reversal predicated on the
ground that an appraisal of the testimony offered by the prosecution would reveal that
the constitutional presumption of innocence had not been overcome.1 A careful study of
the records, however, discloses that the lower court did consider carefully and
meticulously the evidence of both the complainant and the accused. It was his
conclusion that there was enough proof to satisfy the requirement that guilt be shown
beyond reasonable doubt. We are not justified in viewing the matter differently. We
affirm.
The victim of rape in this case is Elizabeth de Jesus, who, at the time of the commission
of the offense, was thirteen years of age. She was in the sixth grade. She began by
stating that she was asleep in her house at Barrio Almacen, Hermosa, Bataan, at about
10:00 in the evening of February 11, 1968. Then she continued: "I was awakened by a
certain weight upon my body and when I was awakened, accused Rodrigo Cawili was on
top of me and [I] felt pain in my private parts."2 She then pushed and kicked him and
shouted at the top of her voice "Inang" (Mother).3 Asked why she had felt such pain, she
answered that his genital organ was inserted in hers.4 Obviously alarmed by her shout,
Rodrigo Cawili released her and ran downstairs; her mother, awakened by the shout,
went to the kitchen and came back with a bolo to chase Cawili but she did not catch up
with
him.5 On cross-examination, Elizabeth de Jesus admitted that when she went to bed she
had her panties on, but that when she woke up, she noticed that not only was appellant
on top of her but also that she was divested of such garment.6 The trial court itself did not
merely accept her story. It pursued the matter further.7 She explained that the previous
night, a Saturday, she had attended a party in Barrio Pulo, Hermosa, Bataan, one that
lasted until almost morning. All day the next day, she pressed clothes. Thus it was that
on the night of February 11, 1968, she went to bed tired and drowsy. She slept soundly.
It was not unexpected then for appellant to be able to remove such garment and for him
to place himself on top of her, without her immediately noticing it.8 When the incident
happened, on February 11, 1968, the young girl's father was not at home. When he
came back from work from Subic, Zambales, on February 17, 1968, his daughter was so
ashamed of what had happened to her that she did not even tell him specifically that
appellant had succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. It was only after she was
brought to a doctor on February 19, 1968, and it was discovered that she had a swollen
vulva, a swollen urethral orifice and a ruptured hymen with two healed lacerations, 9 that
she admitted to her father that appellant succeeded in his designs. Rodrigo Cawili, a neighbor and a "compadre" of the
young victim's mother, was readily recognized by Elizabeth de Jesus because "the house was bright inside, it being lighted
by a lamp, second, there was a light on the post just opposite our house, and third, it was a moonlit night." 10 The facts
narrated above gave rise to the charge of rape against Rodrigo Cawili.
After trial duly had, he was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the offended party and to recognize and support the offspring, if
any. The case is before us now on appeal. As noted at the outset, the principal ground
relied upon as the basis for reversal is that the constitutional presumption of innocence
had not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. While there is a recognition
that the appraisal of the lower court of the evidence offered is accorded deference and
respect, it is submitted that such finding cannot prevail in the absence of a showing that
suffices to overturn what is so clearly expressed in the fundamental law that guilt is not to
24 | P a g e
be presumed. 11 As a statement of juridical norm, that is correct. This Court has
repeatedly stressed that accusation cannot be considered as synonymous with
culpability, and the evidence offered by the prosecution must meet the required standard.
Only then is a conviction warranted. 12 It is on that basis that in several recent decisions,
a person accused of and sentenced for rape succeeded in obtaining a reversal. 13 This is
not, however, as already mentioned, one such case.
1. In appellant's brief, the principal authority cited in support of the plea that the
constitutional presumption of innocence had not been overcome is an excerpt from
Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Manoji. 14 What was conveniently left out was the
opening phrase of the citation which certainly casts a different light on the matter.
Accuracy demands that this particular sentence relied upon he quoted in full: "In the light
of the facts and circumstances of record, we feel that it is better to acquit a man on
reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the
penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may be innocent. ..." 15 As a
matter of fact, the opening sentence of that particular paragraph starts with this phrase:
"Upon the other hand, there are certain facts which if taken together are sufficient to
raise in the mind of the court a grave doubt as to the guilt of the defendant-appellant,
..." 16 In this case, on the contrary, the testimony of the offended party, so firm and so
categorical, does not give rise to any such misgivings. When put on the stand by her
counsel, she was able to narrate clearly and concisely the untoward event that befell her
in the evening on question. Afterwards, she was cross-examined intensively and
exhaustively for two days. 17 Questions searching in character but unavoidable
considering the nature of the offense, quite embarassing for a young girl of tender years,
came not only from the defense but also from the judge, desirous of ascertaining the
truth and conscious of the dire penalty that goes with conviction for this heinous crime. At
one stage, her counsel had to ask the court for a recess of five minutes as she was
evidently under strain and she was feeling dizzy. 18 The court granted a suspension of the
session not for five minutes sought but for ten minutes. Moreover, right afterwards, it was
adjourned. 19 The grueling ordeal to which she was subjected continued all throughout
the next day when the hearing was resumed. Her version of what transpired came under
the most rigorous scrutiny, again from both the defense and the court itself. No
contradiction was elicited although it was quite obvious that she would rather not
remember the details of that unfortunate incident. Twice the session had to be
suspended because she was in tears. 20 The second time, the court itself was moved to
declare: "The witness is still crying. Let us have a recess." 21
2. This notwithstanding, counsel for appellant would have the temerity to assert that the
testimony of complainant was "evasive." 22 He would seek to impress on us that there
was not enough evidence to warrant conviction for the offense of rape and would imply
that perhaps only trespass to dwelling was committed. Such a contention is devoid of
merit. As was stressed in People v. Baylon: 23 "The other point raised in the brief for
appellant that the crime of rape was not shown to have been committed defies rationality,
let alone commonsense. Time and time again, this Court had correctly observed that no
woman, especially one of tender age, would willingly expose herself to the
embarrassment of a public trial wherein she would have not only to admit but also to
narrate the violation of her person, if such indeed were not the case. Far better it is in not
a few cases to spare herself the humiliation if there be some other way of bringing the
offender to justice. Here, there was such a testimony coming from the offended party,
firm, categorical, straightforward. ... It is quite a strain on one's credulity to believe that
under such circumstances, the young girl's honor remained unsullied, the nefarious
design unfulfilled. To repeat, appellant had not made out a case for a reversal." 24 The
succeeding paragraph in the opinion therein rendered likewise deserves mention: "Nor is
this all. As was noted in a recent case, People vs. Molina, it is manifest in the decisions
of this Court that where the offended parties are young and immature girls like the victim
in this case, there is a marked receptivity on its part to lend credence to their version of
what transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The state, asparens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost
protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim
alone. The consternation it causes her family must also be taken into account. It may
reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the fundamental law for such
institution. There is all the more reason then for the rigorous application of the penal law
with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever warranted." 25
3. There is one other matter equally deserving of attention. Counsel for appellant did not
even mention the defense offered by his client. It is understandable why. In the
statement of the accused taken before Corporal Cipriano Vistan 26 and subscribed before
the Municipal Judge Bernabe T. Peñaflor of Hermosa, Bataan, he admitted having
entered the house of complainant with the explanation that he made a mistake due to his
being in a state of intoxication, but denied having done anything reprehensible. At the
trial, he had another version. He would rely on alibi. This is how the lower court disposed
of the matter: "The defense interposed by the accused is alibi. His testimony is to the
effect that starting from 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 11, 1968, he was in his
house at Almacen, Hermosa, Bataan, asleep with his wife and child. He asserts that the
25 | P a g e
filing of the instant criminal charge against him was ill-motivated, because his wife and
the spouses Dominador de Jesus and Rufina Santos had a misunderstanding; that the
spouses used to buy goods on credit from their store and failed to pay their account; that
prior to February 11, 1968, the spouses tried to get some more goods on credit which he
refused, because the old debt was not paid; that because of the incident, the spouses
went to the extent of approaching Nicanor Sioson, the owner of the lot where his store is
erected for the purpose of having him ejected from Sioson's lot. The accused further
testified that he was forced to give his statement, Exhibit C, and had to sign it because
he was mauled. He showed a scar on the upper left eyebrow; and [said] that he signed
his statement not before the subscribing officer, Municipal Judge Peñaflor, but in jail. The
defense deserves no serious consideration. The accused could not produce any one of
the persons he mentioned ... to corroborate his testimony. His claim that his sworn
statement, Exhibit C, was forcibly taken out of him as evidenced by his swollen left
eyebrow, was belied both by Pat. Conrado Alvaro of the Hermosa Police Force, who
fetched the accused from his house to the Municipal Building for investigation, and by
P.C. Sgt. Cipriano Vistan. Pat. Alvaro testified that when he made a preliminary inquiry,
the accused admitted to him having entered the house of Dominador de Jesus on the
night in question because he was drunk. Pat. Alvaro denied having mauled the accused.
Likewise Sgt. Vistan declared that in the course of his investigation, the accused
revealed to him that he (accused) was boxed by Dominador de Jesus, father of the
complainant, [thus explaining] the swollen face and cut on the upper left
eyebrow." 27 What had been stated earlier as to the ordeal undergone by the offended
party when she was placed on the stand to give her credible and competent testimony
with a clear identification of the accused would serve to bolster further the
characterization of his defense as undeserving of serious consideration. Moreover, there
is this excerpt from the recent decision of People v. Cudalina: 28 "It suffices to state that
this Court when confronted with the defense of alibi in rape cases has invariably found it
unconvincing and unsatisfactory." 29
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of March 31, 1969 by the then Judge Tito V. Tizon
of the Court of First Instance of Bataan is affirmed. Costs against appellant.
The question before us is whether or not Hospicio O. Zapata, a member of the
Philippine Bar, is to be subjected to disciplinary action. He was, under our resolution
of August 3, 1970,[1] given a period of ten days after receipt thereof to explain why no
such action should be taken against him in view of his failure to submit the brief as
counsel de parte within the reglementary period. He filed an explanation in a
memorandum submitted to us on August 22, 1970, admitting that he was remiss in
his obligation to file said brief, but seeking to minimize such failure on his part with
the allegation that the accused, Rodrigo Cawili, was in a state of indigence resulting
not only in his not being paid but also in his partly assuming the expenses entailed in
such defense. After invoking such circumstances as the expenses incident on the
printing of the brief being beyond the power of the wife of the accused to bear and
that he was not called upon to continue spending on behalf of such client, he would
have us overlook his failure to file the brief as in his opinion "the mere review of the
record of the case will readily show that the decision is contrary to law and the
evidence adduced during the trial, * *."[2] He did tender his apology, coupled with a
promise that an incident of such character will not be repeated in the future.
It cannot be denied that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within
the reglementary period is an offense that entails disciplinary action. The recital of
the circumstances on which counsel would seek to reduce its gravity do not call for
exculpation. He could have sought the permission to file a mimeographed brief, or,
at the very least, he could have informed us of the difficulties attendant on defending
his client. For him to blithely assume that a mere reading of the record would suffice
to discharge an obligation not only to his client but to this Court is to betray a degree
of irresponsibility. It is not in keeping, even, with the minimal standards expected of
membership in the bar to be so lacking in elementary courtesy that this Court was
not even informed of his inability to comply with what was incumbent on him. His
conduct was therefore inexcusable, although the explanation he tendered and the
difficulties under which he worked would, to a certain degree, invite less than full
punishment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Hospicio O. Zapata is hereby reprimanded for his
failure to submit his brief within the reglementary period, and admonished to be
much more careful in the fulfillment of his obligations to his client and to this
honorable Tribunal.
26 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7725 January 17, 1913
In the matter of the suspension of L. PORTER HAMILTON from the practice of law.
L. Porter Hamilton, in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for the Government.
PER CURIAM:
These are disbarment proceedings, instituted against L. Porter Hamilton, an attorney at
law, who was practicing his profession in the Court of First Instance of Cebu and in other
courts of these Islands, at the time the charges herein set forth were formulated.
The charges were filed by the fiscal upon the order of the Honorable Adolph Wislizenus,
judge of the Eleventh Judicial District, and the formal accusation sets out four separate
counts of professional misconduct, as follows:
1. The attorney L. Porter Hamilton, being such for the plaintiff Luciano Andrada,
in civil cause No. 1344, defended and counseled, without the latter's consent, the
defendant Isabelo Alburo in the same manner or business.
2. The attorney L. Porter Hamilton, having received from the plaintiff Luciano
Andrada, in the above-cited case, various documents among which were
vouchers or notes signed by some municipal policemen of Cebu and counter-
signed by the defendant Isabelo Alburo, did maliciously and willfully keep and
deny that he had received said documents, for the purpose of thwarting the
complaint of Luciano Andrada prepared by himself on said instruments, as he
had undertaken the defense of the defendant Isabelo Alburo.
3. The attorney L. Porter Hamilton, being such in various affairs of Isabelo
Alburo, betrayed his client by instigating complaints against the latter, solely in
order that his client should entrust him with the defense of said complaints
instigated by him.
4. The attorney L. Porter Hamilton, under date of April 8, 1911, proposed to S. L.
Joseph of Cebu that he be employed as attorney for the concern known as the
S.L. Joseph Lumber Yard, with a salary of P1,200 a year, under a threat to
compel the said Joseph to accept his proposition.
Therefore, the fiscal respectfully begs the court to proceed in legal manner to
suspend the attorney L. Porter Hamilton from the practice of his profession and
to recommend to the Honorable Supreme Court his exclusion from the list of
those admitted to practice law in the courts of the Islands.
The defendant answered formally denying the charges, and the cause came on for final
hearing before Honorable Jose C. Abreu, acting as a special judge for the trial of this
case, on January 22, 1912, and upon the proofs adduced, an order or suspension from
the practice of law was entered against the defendant, and the case is now before this
court for review.
By agreement of counsel the case was submitted on briefs, and on the record of the
proceedings had in the court below. The only matters which need to be inquired into at
this time relate to the conduct of the defendant in civil cause No. 1344 in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, entitled Luciano Andrada vs. Isabelo Alburo, and his conduct in
addressing to S.L. Joseph the letter referred to under the fourth count of the accusation
and filed as Exhibit B for the prosecution, as to both of which matters the court below
found the respondent guilty of unprofessional conduct of so grave a character as to
justify and require his suspension.
It appears from the record that the defendant advised and counseled with one Luciano
Andrada in regard to a claim which the latter had against Isabelo Alburo, and that he
prepared for Andrada a formal petition which was filed in the office of the clerk of court of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the caption "Luciano Andrada vs. Isabelo
Alburo, civil case No. 1344;" and that he also prepared for the plaintiff Andrada in that
cause papers relating to attachment proceedings against the property of the defendant,
Alburo. The petition as well as the other papers filed with the clerk in this case were
signed by the plaintiff, Andrada, who himself delivered them to the clerk. Mr. Hamilton's
name was not noted as attorney of record for Andrada. It appears that there was some
27 | P a g e
formal defect in the papers relating to the attachment proceedings, and on September
16, 1911, the defendant Hamilton addressed the following communication to the clerk of
court:
[L. Porter Hamilton, lawyer, Cebu, Cagayan, and Surigao, P.I.]
CEBU, CEBU, P.I., September 16, 1911.
CLERK OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE,
Cebu, Cebu, P.I.
SIR: I beg that you permit Mr. Luciano Andrada to get the sworn statement in civil
cause No. 1344, to be exchanged for another true and correct sworn statement;
and further I desire to invite your attention to the rights this gentleman has under
section 34 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil Procedure.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) L. PORTER HAMILTON.
On October 2 following, the defendant entered his appearance as attorney of record for
the defendant, Alburo, in civil case No. 1344 as shown by the following, which forms a
part of the record in that case:
[United States of America, Philippine Islands. Court of First
Instance of the Province of Cebu. Luciano Andrada,
plaintiff, vs. Isabelo Alburo, defendant. Civil cause No. 1344.]
To the clerk:
The clerk will please record my appearance for the defendant above-named, Mr.
Isabelo Alburo.
Cebu, Cebu, P.I., October 2, 1911.
(Sgd.) L. PORTER HAMILTON,
Attorney for the defendant.
On the 12th of October, defendant as attorney for Alburo entered the following demurrer
to the petition which had been prepared by him for Andrada:
[United States of America, Philippine Islands. Court of First
Instance of the Province of Cebu. Luciano Andrada,
plaintiff, vs. Isabelo Alburo, defendant. Civil cause No. 1344.]
DEMURRER.
The defendant in this cause through the undersigned attorney demurs to the
complaint in this case on the following grounds:
1. That the facts alleged do not constitute sufficient cause for action.
2. That the complaint is vague and ambiguous.
Cebu, Cebu, P.I., October 12, 1911.
(Sgd.) L. PORTER HAMILTON,
Attorney for the defendant.
Received today, October 12, 1911.
(Sgd.) L. ANDRADA.
On the 13th of October an order was entered by the Court citing the defendant to appear
before the court on the following day, and explain his action in appearing as the attorney
for defendant in case No. 1344. As a result of the investigation made by the court at that
time, the fiscal was instructed to file the formal accusation which forms the basis of the
present proceedings.
On the 14th of October the court made this additional order in the case:
The court provisionally directs that Mr. Porter Hamilton cease to act as attorney
for the defendant in this cause and the clerk of this court is prohibited from
receiving any document or paper presented in such character by Mr. Porter
Hamilton; and the court further directs that immediately and without delay Mr.
Hamilton deposit with the clerk of this court all the documents and papers of any
28 | P a g e
 nature which he has at any time received from Mr. Luciano Andrada, plaintiff in
this case.
Cebu, Cebu, October 14, 1911.
(Sgd.) ADOLPH WISLIZENUS,
Judge of the Eleventh Judicial District.
In compliance with the foregoing order the defendant remitted to the court all the papers
and documents in his possession relating to case No. 1344, as evidenced by the
following communication, which forms a part of this record:
[L. Porter Hamilton, lawyer, Cebu, Cagayan, and Surigao, P.I.]
CEBU, CEBU, P.I., October 14, 1911.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE FOR THE PROVINCE OF CEBU, P.I.
SIR: In compliance with the order of this court of this date I have the honor to
transmit to your possession all the papers, documents, etc., belonging to Sr.
Luciano Andrada in the case of Luciano Andrada, plaintiff, vs. Isabelo
Alburo, defendant, civil cause, No. 1344, and also of the other papers of Sr.
Andrada on all other matters which I have found in my office.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) L. PORTER HAMILTON.
Upon the hearing of the disbarment proceedings in the lower court Luciano Andrada
testified that the defendant had advised and counseled with him in regard to his claim
against Isabelo Alburo, and that an understanding had been entered into touching the
fees to be charged for his services; that the latter was his attorney with respect to this
claim, and that as such he delivered to him certain vales and papers relating to the claim,
and that he was surprised when defendant appeared as attorney for Alburo.
The defendant does not offer any satisfactory explanation of his conduct in this matter.
He admits that Andrada came to his office and consulted with him regarding this claim
against Alburo, and that he prepared the petition and other papers in the case. He
insists, however, that he did this solely as a favor to Andrada and that he told Andrada at
the time that he could not act as his attorney in the matter. In his brief the defendant
states that he refused to appear as the attorney of record for Andrada for two reasons:
First, because he failed to secure him his fee, and second, because Señores Martinez
and Vamenta were Andrada's regular attorney at that time. The record clearly
establishes, however, that Andrada had no attorney of record in this matter. It is possible
that he had consulted other attorneys with reference to his claim against Alburo, but so
far as the record shows the defendant is the only person who assumed the relationship
of attorney to Andrada. He accepted from him the papers relating to his claim, and to all
intents and purposes he was his attorney so far as such relationship could be
established by overt acts. He did all that was necessary to establish between himself and
Andrada the confidential relationship of attorney and client. He accepted from Andrada
such papers as he had relating to the claim against Alburo, papers which, as Andrada
testified, disclosed both the strength and the weakness of his claim. He counseled with
him regarding the subject matter of the suit and prepared all of the necessary papers for
the institution of the litigation, and in fact he rendered all the necessary services of an
attorney with reference to the whole matter up to the time of his appearance as he had
not done was to allow his name to be affixed to the papers filed in the office of the clerk,
and this act, far from being to his credit, can only serve as cumulative evidence of the
fact that he was not acting in good faith with the man to whom he was rendering
professional services. Andrada claims that he was working for a stipulated fee, but it is
not necessary to determine here whether or not he had been secured with his fee, or
whether he was acting as he claims as a matter of favor to Andrada. He voluntarily
assumed the relationship of attorney to Andrada and he received from the latter every
confidence that such a relation implies; he assumed the obligation of preparing the
petition and other papers in the case and of expediting the same to the point where an
answer was forthcoming from the defendant to the suit; and then without warning to
Andrada he entered his appearance as attorney for the defendant and filed a demurrer to
the very petition which he had prepared for the plaintiff. At the very time that he appeared
for the defendant he had in his possession papers belonging to Andrada which pertained
to the litigation and which had been delivered to him as the attorney for the plaintiff, and
these were only delivered up at the order of the court.
What may have been his motive in this matter we are only left to conjecture, but from
every standpoint his conduct was reprehensible in the highest degree. The record clearly
establishes the relationship of attorney and client between the defendant and Andrada,
and the conduct of defendant was a violation of the confidence which naturally resulted
29 | P a g e
from this relationship. It was a violation of his oath as an attorney and officer of this court,
in that he did not offer his services in good faith to his client and failed to served his
client's interest as it was his sworn duty to do. If in serving Andrada in the capacity that
he did, he was acting in good faith, and if there had been any reasonable grounds on
which he could have justified his transferring his services to the opposing litigant, he
should have, and, we take it, he would have, informed Andrada of his intentions and
delivered up to him such papers as he had relating to his claim. But without seeking
permission from Andrada or the court, and without disclosing his intentions in the matter,
he suddenly and unexpectedly, to the surprise of his former client, appeared in
opposition to the very suit he had instituted. His whole action in the premises reveals a
distorted conception of the ethics of his profession and an utter disregard for his duty and
his obligations to both his client and the court.
The second charge of professional misconduct against the defendant relates to the
following letter addressed by the defendant to Mr. S.L. Joseph, viz:
[L. Porter Hamilton, lawyer, Cebu, Cagayan, and Surigao, P.I.]
CEBU, CEBU, P.I., April 8, 1911.
Mr. S.L. JOSEPH, Cebu, Cebu, P.I.
DEAR SIR: It has been some time since we have had anything to say relative to
the proposition of keeping up your collections and looking after your delinquent
contract men during your absence in the U.S. What is your opinion relative to the
proposition of P1,200 per year, or have you dropped your original idea?
By the way, I have an offer of P500 to make a thorough investigation into the
reason why the Mpl., Prov., and Ins. Govmts. buy so much lumber and so
exclusively from the S.L. Joseph Lumber Yard, and P500 more if the
investigation brings satisfactory results.
What do you know about that and what do you think of the proposition?
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) L. PORTER HAMILTON.
The lower court in passing upon this letter held that the second paragraph was in the
nature of a threat inserted in this letter solely to influence Mr. Joseph in the employment
of the defendant in the matter referred to in the first paragraph, and that the defendant in
writing such a letter was guilty of such gross professional misconduct as showed him to
be unworthy of that esteem and confidence which is necessary in one who aspires to
discharge the important functions of an attorney.
The defense interposed by the defendant to the charge of professional misconduct
relating to this letter was that he did not use the language referred to as a threat in any
sense, and that it was never so understood by Mr. Joseph; that he had been Mr.
Joseph's attorney with reference to other matters and had advised him with reference to
the best interests of his business, and that the information imparted in the second
paragraph of the letter was simply referred to in an incidental way. It is further contended
that the letter in question should have been considered as aprivileged communication, it
having been addressed by him as attorney to his client. Respondent claims that for that
reason it is not proper to consider it as evidence in a proceeding of this nature.
The letter is self-explanatory and needs but little comment from the court. A careful
examination of the language used by the defendant in the second paragraph of this letter
discloses that the defendant does not say that he will not accept such employment, or
that he refused to accept such employment. The only reasonable interpretation that the
language conveys is that he has the matter under advisement and that he is holding his
final decision in abeyance. It is further quite evident from the context of the first
paragraph of the letter that Mr. Joseph had apparently dropped the question of
employing defendant with reference to the matter proposed, and that defendant was
anxious that he take the matter up for further consideration. No reasonable explanation
was given for the incorporation of the second paragraph in this particular letter, nor does
any reason suggest itself, unless it be that it was inserted there as a threat. Following as
it does immediately upon the solicitation for employment, the reasonable and logical
interpretation which it bears is that it was used as a threat to induce Mr. Joseph to give
favorable consideration to the proposition advanced in the first paragraph of the letter.
This was the conclusion of the trial court and it is also our conclusion.
The contention that this letter is a privileged communication is not tenable. The general
rule is well recognized that professional communications are privileged, but that
statements made by a client to his attorney, or the statements of an attorney to his client
fall within this rule only when it is shown that the relation of attorney and client existed
with reference to the matter to which the communication relates. (23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of
30 | P a g e
Law, 58.) Furthermore, in a proceeding of this nature, where the alleged client himself is fixing the penalty to be imposed in the event that a criminal action had been instituted
not insisting on the privilege, counsel can not be permitted to shield himself behind the against the defendant.
privilege.
Let the proper orders be entered suspending the defendant in these proceedings from
The context of the whole letter in the present case shows conclusively that no such the practice of law for a period of six years from the date of his original suspension in the
relation existed with reference to the subject matter of the letter. The defendant was court below, with the costs of these proceedings against him.
soliciting employment, and this very fact is evidence that the relation of attorney and
client did not exist. As to the second paragraph of the letter we can not accept the
contention that this information was imparted as professional advice.

After a very careful examination of the whole record we have regretfully reached the
conclusion that the facts before us show a flagrant and willful violation of the part of
defendant of his professional obligations, and a reckless disregard of the fundamental
ethics of his profession.

We have encountered some difficulty in determining whether the name of the defendant
in these proceedings should be permanently stricken from the roll, or whether, under all
the circumstances, an order suspending him for a substantial period would sufficiently
subserve the interests of justice, and of the administration of justice in these Islands.

Under the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code (art. 357) an attorney found guilty of the
unprofessional conduct of which, as appears from the record in these proceedings, this
defendant was guilty is liable to suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification,
that is to say, disqualification for a period of from six years and one day to twelve years;
and after some hesitation we have concluded that the suspension of the defendant for a
period of six years will secure the ends for which these proceedings were instituted. It is
true, of course, that, as was said by Mr. Justice Hooker, In re Shepard (109 Mich. 631).

This is not a proceeding by way of punishment, though the deprivation of the

privileges of an attorney may be a matter of serious importance to a practitioner.
It is a measure necessary to the protection of the public, who have a right to
expect that courts will be vigilant in withholding, and, if already given,
withdrawing, their certificates of qualification and character, upon which the
public rely.

But in determining the question whether the defendant should be suspended or

permanently disbarred, it would seem proper to have in mind the provisions of the statute

31 | P a g e

Lim, Jr. vs. Villarosa, 490 SCRA 494 , June 15, 2006
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued
to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, not for private vendetta.—Complaints
against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal profession,
not for private vendetta. Thus, whoever has such personal knowledge of facts constituting
a cause of action against erring lawyers may file a verified complaint with the Court or the
IBP.
Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Interests; It is only upon strict compliance with the
condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client, otherwise,
his representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible.—Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need for candor, fairness and loyalty in all
the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly provides: Rule
15.03—A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. It is only upon strict compliance with
the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client;
otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible. Conflict of interest
may be determined in this manner: There is representation of conflicting interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection.
Same; Same; Same; The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used—the rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are
parties in the same action or in totally unrelated cases.—The rule on conflict of interests
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquire in the previous employment. The first part of the rule refers to cases in
which the opposing parties are present clients either in the same action or in a totally
unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against whom
the attorney appears is his former client in a matter which is related, directly or indirectly,
to the present controversy. (emphasis ours) The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing
new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not
they are parties in the same action or in totally unrelated cases. The cases here directly or
indirectly involved the parties’ connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A.
Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the cases mentioned.
Same; Same; Withdrawal of Appearance; The right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted—an
attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by
permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should
see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case.—The rule on
termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as follows: The relation of
attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or by the court, or by
reason of circumstances beyond the control of the client or the lawyer. The termination of
the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on the part of the client and his
lawyer. Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. Canon 22
of the CPR reads: Canon 22—A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and
upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. An attorney may only retire from a case
either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and
hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is
recorded in the case. A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written
consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy of
his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the date set
for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a “mere scrap of paper.”
Respondent made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on April 26,
1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The
conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the
appearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in his place.
Same; Same; Same; Attorney’s Lien; Retainer Lien; The right of an attorney to retain
possession of a client’s documents, money or other property which may have lawfully
come into his possession in his professional capacity, until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been fully paid, is well-established.—The records do not support the
claim that respondent improperly collected P5,000 from petitioner. Undoubtedly,
respondent provided professional services to Lumot A. Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that the documents belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni were deliberately withheld. The
right of an attorney to retain possession of a client’s documents, money or other property
which may have lawfully come into his possession in his professional capacity, until his
lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid, is well-established. [Lim, Jr. vs.
Villarosa, 490 SCRA 494(2006)]
32 | P a g e
An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by
permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see
to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case.41 A lawyer who desires to retire
from an action without the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in
court.42 He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least
three days before the date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a
"mere scrap of paper."43Respondent made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as
counsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April
28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of
the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in his place.
[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and thereafter employ
another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is
free to change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to
represent him. That manner of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to
be dismissed. Nor does it require approval of the court.44
The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act
as additional counsel.45 Mrs. Jalandoni’s conformity to having an additional lawyer did not
necessarily mean conformity to respondent’s desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondent’s
speculations on the professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no
support in the records of this case.
Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel46 would be
granted by the court. Yet, he stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandoni’s counsel beginning April
28, 1999, the first hearing date. No order from the court was shown to have actually granted
his motion for withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999 had a semblance of granting his
motion:
When this case was called for hearing Atty. Lorenzo Alminaza appeared for the
defendants considering that Atty. Nicanor Villarosa has already withdrawn his
appearance in this case which the Court considered it to be approved as it bears the
conformity of the defendants.47 (emphasis ours)
That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminaza’s professional engagement on her behalf
despite respondent’s withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of his
unprofessional conduct, specially in view of the conflicting interests already discussed.
Respondent himself stated that his withdrawal from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was due to the
"possibility of a conflict of interest."48
Be that as it may, the records do not support the claim that respondent improperly
collected P5,000 from petitioner. Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services to
Lumot A. Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the documents belonging to Mrs.
Jalandoni were deliberately withheld. The right of an attorney to retain possession of a
client’s documents, money or other property which may have lawfully come into his
possession in his professional capacity, until his lawful fees and disbursements have been
fully paid, is well-established.49
Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lim’s apparent use of his wife’s community tax
certificate number in his complaint for disbarment against respondent.50 This is not, however,
the forum to discuss this lapse.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby
found GUILTY of violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective upon
receipt of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be entered into the records of respondent and furnished to the
Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
33 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with
complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel,
EN BANC eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield
herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance
A.C. No. 8243 July 24, 2009 she rendered to complainant was only in the form of “friendly accommodations,” precisely
because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the
ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., Complainant, cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.
vs.
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Respondent.
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no
written contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her and
the Philippine Supreme Court disbarred the respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez for
complainant. This argument all the more reveals respondent’s patent ignorance of
representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful
fundamental laws on contracts and of basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of
conduct in violation of her Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Below
justice. The IBP was correct when it said:
is a digest of the salient points made by the Court, thus:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional
relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
X x x.
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation,
it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:
matter pertinent to his profession.

Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done
concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
was either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was
already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of
Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste and, more importantly,
because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of
upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
interest.
connected with the client’s case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must
be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given to him to take
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus:
advantage of his client; for if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss
thereof. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double ─ dealing for only then can litigants be
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration
opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
of justice. It is for these reasons that we have described the attorney-client relationship as
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he

34 | P a g e
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar
client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been her on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and other gross misconduct, aside from violation of
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, the Lawyer’s Oath, has been rendered moot and academic by voluntary termination of her
there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to IBP membership, allegedly after she had been placed under the Department of Justice’s
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents Witness Protection Program. Convenient as it may be for respondent to sever her
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client membership in the integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do so without resolving first
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of this administrative case against her.
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in order to
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. determine the degree of her culpability and liability to complainant. The case may not be
dismissed or rendered moot and academic by respondent’s act of voluntarily terminating her
Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainant’s hapless situation, initially, by giving membership in the Bar regardless of the reason for doing so. This is because membership in
him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. The conduct of a lawyer may make him or her
respondent impressed upon complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping civilly, if not criminally, liable to his client or to third parties, and such liability may be
him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But conveniently avoided if this Court were to allow voluntary termination of membership. Hence,
simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party to terminate one’s membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first
claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested prove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to further prejudice the public
with Multitel. Respondent herself admitted to complainant that without the latter’s help, she or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the present case
would not have been able to earn as much and that, as a token of her appreciation, she was
willing to share some of her earnings with complainant. Clearly, respondent’s act is shocking,
as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, but also
toyed with decency and good taste.
Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever complained of
respondent’s unethical behavior. This remark indubitably displays respondent’s gross
ignorance of disciplinary procedure in the Bar. As a member of the Bar, she is expected to
know that proceedings for disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be initiated and
prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or by
the Board of Officers of an IBP Chapter even if no private individual files any administrative
complaint.

Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the
IBP Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, on the
admissibility of the electronic evidence submitted by complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the
same in toto.

35 | P a g e
LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO, respondent.
DECISION
For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in its Resolution of May 2, 2000
recommended the suspension from the practice of law of respondent Atty. Ricarte B.
Maderazo for the period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that repetition of the same act
will be dealt with more severely. Respondent allegedly represented conflicting interests in
violation of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.[1]
By way of a Motion for Reconsideration,[2] respondent now comes before this Court to
challenge the basis of the IBPs resolution, and prays for its reversal.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or about 3:00 in the early
morning of December 24, 1992, Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident at Caduman St.,
corner H. Abellana St., Mandaue City. At the time of the accident, Echavia was driving a Ford
Telstar car owned by a Japanese national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in the
name of his brother-in-law, Jun Anthony Villapez. The car rammed into a
small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita Artezuela.[3]
The destruction of the complainants carinderia caused the cessation of the operation of
her small business, resulting to her financial dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives
and due to financial constraints, stopped sending her two children to college. [4]
Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against
Echavia, Villapez and one Bernardo Sia.[5] Docketed as Civil Case No. 13666, the case was
assigned to Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. An Amended Complaint was
thereafter filed, impleading Echavia, Kiyami and Villapez, and dropping Sia as a party-
defendant.[6] For his services, complainant paid the respondent the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10, 000.00) as attorneys fees and Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as filing
fee.[7] However, the case was dismissed on March 22, 1994, allegedly upon the instance of
the complainant and her husband.[8]
Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant filed a civil case for
damages against the respondent. It was docketed as CEB-18552 and assigned to Branch 57,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The case was dismissed on June 12, 2001. [9]
On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint for
disbarment against the respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties
as a lawyer and failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her,
when Civil Case No. 13666 was scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993,
respondent asked for its postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding
complainants persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the
case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainants consent. [10]
Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests.
While acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended
Complaint. The said document was even printed in respondents office. Complainant further
averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial
court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent.[11]
Respondent denied the complainants allegations and averred that he conscientiously did
his part as the complainants lawyer in Civil Case No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel
because the complainant was uncooperative and refused to confer with him. He also gave
several notices to the complainant and made known his intention before he filed his
Manifestation to withdraw as counsel. Because of the severed relationship, the lower court,
after holding a conference, decided to grant respondents manifestation and advised the
complainant to secure the services of a new lawyer. Complainant, however, refused and
instead, sought the dismissal of the case.[12]
Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial Conference
scheduled on August 20, 1993 so that he could file the Amended Complaint. He admitted that
Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having
prepared the document and having acted as counsel of Echavia. He claimed that
complainant requested him to prepare Echavias Answer but he declined. Echavia, however,
went back to his office and asked respondents secretary to print the document. Respondent
intimated that the complainant and Echavia have fabricated the accusations against him to
compel him to pay the amount of P500,000.00.[13]
This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP-
Visayas Regional Committee on Bar Discipline formed an Investigating Committee to hear
the disbarment complaint.
On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a Report finding the
respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Ethics. He recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year.[14] Commissioner Ingles did not rule on the other issues.
As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upheld the
findings of the Committee with modification only as to the penalty.
Seeking reconsideration of the IBPs resolution, respondent contends that the
Investigating Committee did not conduct trial; hence, he was not able to confront and
36 | P a g e
examine the witnesses against him. He argues that the Investigating Committees finding that
he represented Echavia is contrary to court records and the complainants own testimony in
CEB-18552. He also casts doubt on the credibility of the Investigating Committee to render
just and fair recommendations considering that the Investigating Commissioner and the
respondent are counsel-adversaries in another case, Civil Case No. R-33277. Finally, he
questions the imposition of a six-month suspension, which he claims to be harsh considering
that his private practice is his only source of income.[15]
After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence
on the matter, this Court is inclined to uphold the IBPs resolution.
In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full
adversarial proceedings, as actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for
clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give
vague testimonies.[16] Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments. [17]
In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought the postponement of
the hearings, prompting the Investigating Commissioner to receive complainants evidence ex
parte and to set the case for resolution after the parties have submitted their respective
memorandum. Hence:
The records show that this is already the third postponement filed by respondent namely
December 12, 1996 (sic), January 3, 1996 and April 1, 1996.
The Commission for the last time, will cancel todays hearing and can no longer tolerate any
further postponement. Notify respondent by telegram for the hearing for (sic) April 22, 1996 at
2:00 P.M. Said hearing is intransferable in character.
In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and likewise her witness, Allan Echavia,
also affirmed the contents of his affidavit and further stated that he had executed the same
and understood the contents thereof.[18]
It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to
cross-examine the complainant and her witness. He cannot belatedly ask this Court to grant
new trial after he has squandered his opportunity to exercise his right.
Respondents contention that the finding of the Investigating Committee was contrary to
the records and the complainants own admission in CEB-18552 is without merit. It is true that
Atty. Aviola was Echavias counsel-of-record in Civil Case No. 13666 as evidenced by the
certification from the clerk of court,[19] and as admitted by the complainant in CEB-18552, viz:
ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness- ON CROSS)
Q: Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in this case was the counsel of
Allan Echavia as early as August 20, 1993, wherein you learned for the first time of
this fact when you say he is counsel of Allan Echavia. (sic) You mean he is the
counsel of record of Allan Echavia in the Civil Case before Judge Dacudao? Is that
what you mean?
A: What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of Allan Echavia in the case
before Judge Dacudao but I heard Atty. Maderazo telling Allan Echavia not to admit
that Atty. Maderazo is appearing for me because he will be the one to coordinate with
Allans case.
Q: So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the counsel of record of Allan
Echavia. It was Atty. Alviola stated by you now?
A: Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavias counsel but it was Atty. Alviola who was the
counsel of record of Allan Echavia.[20]
Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the respondent also acted as the
counsel-of-record of Echavia. Rather, it is whether or not he had a direct hand in the
preparation of Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need
not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself
as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse partys
conflicting interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and
satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the
preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with
that of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party
would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest
form of disloyalty.
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client the circumstances
of his relations to the parties and any interest in or in connection with the controversy, which
might influence the client in the selection of the counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is his
37 | P a g e
duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. (emphasis
supplied)
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature
of the attorney-client relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited
from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without
being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with that of his present or former client. Indeed, good faith and honest intention on the part of
the erring lawyer does not make this rule inoperative.[21] The lawyer is an officer of the court
and his actions are governed by the uncompromising rules of professional ethics. Thus:
The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste.
The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney
has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Ceasars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged
to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.[22]
The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided attention and zeal for his
clients cause is likewise demanded in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Inherently
disadvantageous to his clients cause, representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests
requires disclosure of all facts and consent of all the parties involved. Thus:
CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.
xxx
Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we find no reason to reverse
the same. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance
of evidence is required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by
complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is
justified.[23]
A perusal of Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint shows that it indeed conflicts
with the complainants claims. It reads:
1. The allegations (sic) in Paragraph One (1) of the Complaint is admitted in so far as it
pertains to the personal circumstance and residence of the answering defendant. The rest of
the allegations in Paragraph One (1), and all the allegations in Paragraph Two (2) , THREE
(3), FOUR (4), FIVE (5), SIX (6), ELEVEN (11), TWELVE (12), and FOURTEEN (14), of the
Complaint are DENIED for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such
allegations.[24]
By way of prayer, Echavia states:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered dismissing
plaintiffs complaint.[25]
Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document quoted above, the Investigating
Committee found the testimonies of the complainant and Echavia credible as opposed to
respondents bare denial. As pointed out by Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo,
introduced himself as his lawyer and after some sessions in the latters office, asked him to
return and sign a document which he later identified as the Answer to the Amended
Complaint.
The Investigating Committee found respondents defense weak. Respondent did not
bother to present his secretary as witness, nor obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations.
Instead, he offered a convenient excuse--- that he cannot anymore locate his secretary.
Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare Echavias
Answer to the Amended Complaint, after reaching an agreement whereby Echavia would
testify in favor of the complainant. After he declined the request, he claimed that it was the
complainant who prepared the document and asked his secretary to print the same. But as
shown, Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint was in no way favorable to the
complainant.
With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off the hook. We
cannot find any reason why Echavia would commit perjury and entangle himself, once again,
with the law. He does not stand to profit at all by accusing the respondent falsely.
Furthermore, considering complainants stature and lack of legal education, we can not
see how she could have prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint and device a
legal maneuver as complicated as the present case.
38 | P a g e
 Respondents attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner Ingles to render an
impartial decision, having been an adversary in Civil Case No. R-33277, does not convince
us to grant new trial. This is the first time that respondent questions the membership of
Commissioner Ingles in the Investigating Committee. If respondent really believed in good
faith that Commissioner Ingles would be biased and prejudiced, he should have asked for the
latters inhibition at the first instance. Moreover, we could not find any hint of irregularity, bias
or prejudice in the conduct of the investigation that would lead us to set it aside.
Finally, we remind the respondent that the practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, and as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.[26] The suspension of the respondents
privilege to practice law may result to financial woes. But as the guardian of the legal
profession, we are constrained to balance this concern with the injury he caused to the very
same profession he vowed to uphold with honesty and fairness.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the respondent guilty of violating
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is affirmed. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for
six (6) months with a stern warning that a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
LOLITA ARTEZUELA VS. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO
A.C. NO. 4354. APRIL 22, 2002
Facts:
Artezuela filed before the Supreme Court a verified complaint for disbarment against the
respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties her lawyer in a damage
suit and failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when
her case was scheduled for pre-trial conference, respondent asked for its postponement
although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant’s persistent and repeated
follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel
without obtaining complainant’s consent.
Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests.
While acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia’s Answer to the Amended
Complaint. The said document was even printed in respondent’s office. Complainant further
averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial
court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.
Held:
Yes. He is guilty of representing conflicting interests prohibited by Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not
also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as
the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse party’s
conflicting interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and
satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the
preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with
that of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party
would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest
form of disloyalty.
39 | P a g e
 [A.C. No. 4346. April 3, 2002]
ERLINDA ABRAGAN, MILA GINA JAVIER, REYNALDO MERCADO, PATERNO
TORRES, BENIGNA ANTIBO, ELEISER SALVADOR, EDNA SAPON,
JULIANA CUENCA, ESPERANZA BUENAFE, VICENTE BARNAGA,
MARTHA SAPON, JOSEFINA OPEA, PUREZA WABE, RONULFO LOPEZ,
DOMINADOR HERNANDEZ, FELIPA EMBATE, ROQUE CATIIL, JERRY
SAPON, CONCEPCION MATANOG, and PABLO SALOMON, complainants,
vs. Atty. MAXIMO G. RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers violate their oath of office when they represent conflicting interests. They taint
not only their own professional practice, but the entire legal profession itself.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Petition[1] praying for the disbarment of Atty. Maximo G.
Rodriguez because of alleged illegal and unethical acts. The Petition relevantly reads as
follows:
2. That sometime in 1986, the petitioners hired the services of the respondent and the latter,
represented the former in the case entitled PABLO SALOMON et al vs. RICARDO
DACALUZ et al., before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3
docketed as Civil Case No. 11204, for Forcible Entry with Petition for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Damages, [and] a Certified True and Correct Copy of the COMPLAINT by
Clerk of Court III Gerardo B. Ucat of the said Court, is herewith attached to the original of
this PETITION, while photocopies of the same are also attached to the duplicate copies of
this same Petition and marked as Annex A hereof;
3. That after the Case No. 11204 was finally won, and a Writ of Execution was issued by the
Honorable Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3, the same
respondent lawyer represented the petitioners herein;
4. That when respondent counsel disturbed the association (Cagayan de Oro Landless
Residents Association, Inc.), to which all the complainants belong, by surreptitiously selling
some rights to other persons without the consent of the petitioners herein, they decided to
sever their client-lawyer relationship;
5. That in fact, the National Bureau of Investigation of Cagayan de Oro City, is presently
undertaking an investigation on the illegal activities of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez pertaining to
his express involvement in the illegal and unauthorized apportionment, assignment and sale
of parcels of land subject to the Case No. 11204, where he represented the poor landless
claimants of Cagayan de Oro City, which include your petitioners in this case;
6. That petitioners herein later filed an indirect contempt charge under Civil Case No. 11204
against Sheriff Fernando Loncion et al., on August 2, 1991 engaging the services of Atty.
LORETO O. SALVA, SR., an alleged former student of law of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez,
[and a] certified true and correct copy of the complaint thereat consisting of four (4) pages is
herewith attached and photocopies of which are also attached to the duplicates hereof, and
correspondingly marked as their Annex B;
7. That respondent lawyer, Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, (in the Indirect Contempt Case under
the same Civil Case No. 11204,) REPRESENTED and actively took up the defense of
FERNANDO LONCION et al. much to the dismay, damage and prejudice of the herein
petitioners, [and] a copy of Atty. Rodriguezs Answer, which is also certified true and correct
by Clerk of Court III Gerardo Ucat of Branch 3 of MTCC Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of
three (3) pages, is attached to the original of this Petition, while photocopies of the same are
attached to the other copies hereof and accordingly marked as Annex C;
8. That the records will bear the petitioners out that their counsel, Atty. SALVA SR. later on
withdrew the case of Indirect Contempt upon the suggestion of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez; and
instead, filed the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution;
9. That on January 12, 1993, the herein respondent, without consulting the herein Petitioners
who are all poor and ignorant of court procedures and the law, filed in behalf of the plaintiffs
40 | P a g e
(which include the herein Petitioners) in Civil Case No. 11204, a Motion to Withdraw
Plaintiffs Exhibits, [and] a certified true and correct copy of said Motion by Mr. Gerardo Ucat
of MTCC Branch 3, Cagayan de Oro City is herewith attached to the original of this Petition,
while photocopies of the same are also attached to the rest of the copies of this same Petition,
and are correspondingly marked as their Annex D.
10. That the illegal and unethical actions of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez are most obnoxious,
condemnable, and highly immoral, to say the least, more so if we consider his social standing
and ascendancy in the community of Cagayan de Oro City;
11. That the records of Civil Case No. 11204 which are voluminous will bear the petitioners
allegations against the herein respondent, who, after representing them initially, then
transferring allegiance and services to the adverse parties (Lonchion, Palacio and NHA
Manager), came back to represent the herein petitioners without any regard [for] the rules of
law and the Canons of Professional Ethics, which is highly contemptible and a clear violation
of his oath as a lawyer and an officer of the courts of law;
12. That these acts are only those that records will bear, because outside of the court records,
respondent, without regard [for] delicadeza, fair play and the rule of law, has assigned,
apportioned and sold parcels of land[,] subject matter in Civil Case No. 11204 which legally
have been pronounced and decided to be in the possession of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
11204, who are partly the petitioners herein. Thus, they cannot yet enjoy the fruits of the
tedious and protracted legal battle because of respondents illegal acts, which have instilled
fear among the plaintiffs and the petitioners herein;
13. That respondent lawyer even represented ERLINDA ABRAGAN, one of the herein
petitioners, in a later proceedings in Civil Case No. 11204 wherein the apportionment of
parcels of land was erroneously, unprocedurally and illegally submitted to a commissioner,
and that ERLINDA ABRAGAN, after winning in the said Civil Case was later on
dispossessed of her rights by respondent counsels maneuver, after the decision (in Civil Case
No. 11208) became final executory;
14. That to make matters worse, respondent Atty. Rodriguez eventually fenced an area
consisting of about 10, 200 square meters within Lot No. 1982[,] the subject matter in Civil
Case No. 11204 without the consent of the herein petitioners. He even openly and publicly
proclaimed his possession and ownership thereof, which fact is again and also under NBI
investigation;
15. That all the foregoing acts of respondent lawyer plus his continuing and ongoing illegal
and unethical maneuvers have deprived the herein petitioners of their vested rights to possess
and eventually own the land they have for decades possessed, and declared as such by final
judgment in Civil Case No. 11204.
In his Comment,[2] respondent flatly denied the accusations of petitioners. He explained
that the withdrawal of the exhibits, having been approved by the trial court, was not illegal,
obnoxious, undesirable and highly immoral. He added that he took over the 8,000 square
meters of land only after it had been given to him as attorneys fees. In his words:
14. Respondent ADMITS that he fenced an area of about 8,000 sq. [m]. after the association
had awarded the same as attorneys fees in Civil Case Number 11204, the dismissal of the
appeal by the NHA, the successful handling of three (3) cases in the SUPREME COURT, the
pending case of QUIETING OF TITLE filed by the NHA, and for the pending reconveyance
case, Civil Case No. 93-573, supra. These area of 8,000 sq. [m]., was awarded as attorneys
fees, which [were] supposed to be ten percent of the 22 hectares, Lot No. 1982, the subject
matter of Civil Case No. 11204, but the association and its members were able to take actual
possession by judgment of the courts only o[f] the twelve (12) hectares. [This] area consisting
of 8,000 sq. [m]., and consisting of two (2) lots [was] fenced by the respondent to prevent
squatters from entering the area. The rights of possession and ownership o[f] this area by the
respondent depends upon the outcome of Civil Case No. 93-573, supra, for reconveyance of
title by the association and its members versus the NHA, et. al. If it is true that this is under
investigation by the NBI, then why, not wait and submit the investigation of the NHA,
instead of filing this unwarranted, false and fabricated charge based on preposterous and
ridiculous charges without any proof whatsoever, except the vile [language] of an
irresponsible lawyer.[3]
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Reply[4] in which they reiterated their allegations against
respondent and added that the latter likewise violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and/or decision.[5]
41 | P a g e
 Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In her Report and Recommendation dated January 23, 2001, Investigating IBP
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Her report reads in part as follows:
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent represented conflicting interest
considering that the complainants were the same plaintiffs in both cases and were duly
specified in the pleadings particularly in the caption of the cases. Under the said predicament
even if complainants were excluded as members of the Association represented by the
respondent; the latter should have first secured complainants written consent before
representing defendants in the Indirect Contempt case particularly Macario Palacio, president
of the Association, or inhibited himself.
It is very unfortunate that in his desire to render service to his client, respondent overlooked
the fact that he already violated Rule 15.03 of [C]anon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
We have no alternative but to abide by the rules.[6]
IBP Board of Governors Resolution
Upholding the above-quoted Report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines recommended via its May 26, 2001 Resolution that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) months for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
This Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, but
hold that the penalty should be six-month suspension as recommended by the investigating
commissioner.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
At the outset, we agree with Commissioner Navarros conclusion that apart from their
allegations in their various pleadings, petitioners did not proffer any proof tending to show
that respondent had sold to other persons several rights over the land in question; and that he
had induced the former counsel for petitioners, Atty. Salva Jr., to withdraw the indirect
contempt case that they had filed. Neither did the IBP find anything wrong as regards the
8,000 square meters awarded to respondent as payment for his legal services. Petitioners bare
assertions, without any proof to back them up, would not justify the imposition of a penalty
on respondent.
Having said that, we find, however, that respondent falls short of the integrity and good
moral character required from all lawyers. They are expected to uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times. The trust and confidence clients repose in them require a high
standard and appreciation of the latters duty to the former, the legal profession, the courts and
the public. Indeed, the bar must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealings. To this end, lawyers should refrain from doing anything that might
tend to lessen the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their
profession.[7]
In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
The Court explained in Buted v. Hernando:[8]
[A] lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or
confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in
42 | P a g e
matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. We find however that suspension of six
been reposed.[9] (Italics in the original) (6) months from the practice of law, as recommended by Commissioner Navarro, is sufficient
to discipline respondent.
In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the indirect contempt case
A survey of cases involving conflicting interests on the part of counsel reveals that the
and in the Complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 11204.[10] Respondent should have
Court has imposed on erring attorneys[12] either a reprimand, or a suspension from the
evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be counsel for the defendants in the indirect
practice of law from five (5) months[13] to as high as two (2) years.[14]
contempt proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their clients, and should at all
times weigh their actions, especially in their dealings with the latter and the public at large. WHEREFORE, Maximo G. Rodriguez is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of
They must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6)
months from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that
The Court will not tolerate any departure from the straight and narrow path demanded by
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
the ethics of the legal profession.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served
In Hilado v. David,[11] which we quote below, the Court advised lawyers to be like
on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
Caesars wife to be pure and to appear to be so.
information and guidance.
This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent SO ORDERED.
conduct, but as well as to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has
been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as
to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in
mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.

Because of his divided allegiance, respondent has eroded, rather than enhanced, the
public perception of the legal profession. His divided loyalty constitutes malpractice for
which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of Attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. Any
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x x.

43 | P a g e
ABRAGAN V. RODRIGUEZ
FACTS: The case is about a disbarment case against respondent Rodriguez, wherein it was
alleged by the petitioners that respondent represented them sometime in 1986, and that after
the case was won. Respondent disturbed the association, wherein the petitioners are
members, by selling their rights over the property without the consent of the petitioners. That
after the petitioner found out of the alleged selling of right, petitioners then severed the
attorney client relationship.
In a later date petitioners hired the Atty. Salve for his services in the contempt case
against the sheriff Loncion. In the said contempt case, respondent allegedly represented the
sheriff and against the petitioners. It was also alleged that Rodriguez later on influenced Atty.
Salva.
Additionally on January 12, 1993 respondent without the consent of the petitioners
filed a motion to withdraw their exhibit in a civil case 11204.
Aside from the unethical maneuvers of the respondent, to make matters worse,
respondent allegedly fenced an area consisting of 10,200 square meters within the lot 1982,
which is the subject matter of civil case 11204.
On the other hand the respondent states that the land he fenced off was part of the
attorney’s fee paid to him for the services he rendered. The case was then referred to the IBP
for investigation. After the investigation it was suggested that the respondent be suspended
from practice for 6 months. For violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, which states that A lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned parties,
given the full disclosure of facts. The recommendation was appealed to the IBP board of
Governors and the same was affirmed.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent violated Rule 15’03 of Canon 15.
RULING:
The Court affirmed the recommendation stating that, even if the allegations of the
petitioners pertaining to the selling of rights without petitioners consent, the inducement or
influence of respondent over atty. Salva and the fencing of the lot, were not proved due to
lack of evidence to back up the allegations, the court still finds respondent in violation of Rule
15.03 of Canon 15 by representing conflicting interest, when respondent represented against
the petitioner in the indirect contempt case against the Sheriff. The court states that lawyers
owe undivided allegiance to their clients, and should at all times weigh their actions,
especially in their dealings with the latter and the public at large. That they must conduct
themselves beyond reproach at all times . That due to the divided alleg9iance of respondent,
his divided loyalty constitutes malpractice which may be punished under sec 27 of rule 138 of
the ROC.
FACTS: Sometime in 1986, complainants hired the services of the respondent to represent in
a case for Forcible Entry with Petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages
before the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro City. The case was won by the complainants. After the
case was finally won, and a Writ of Execution was issued by the Honorable Municipal Trial
Court inCities of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3, the same respondent lawyer represented
the petitioners.But when respondent counsel disturbed the association (Cagayan de Oro
Landless Residents Association, Inc.), to which all the complainants belong, by surreptitiously
selling some rights toother persons without the consent of the petitioners herein, they decided
to sever their client-lawyer relationship.On August 1991, complainants filed a case of indirect
contempt against Sheriff FernandoLoncion et al. Much to their surprise, respondent
represented the sheriff. Since the counsel employed by the complainants was a former
student of respondent, said counsel, by the suggestions of respondent withdrew the case
without the petitioner’s consent. That as a result ofsuch withdrawal, subsequent events
occurred that damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners
.ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rodriguez should be disbarred
.HELD: Yes. Respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that “a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.” Respondent should
have evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be counsel for the defendants in the
indirect contempt proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their clients, and
should at all times weigh their actions, especially in their dealings with the latter and the
public at large. They must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times. The Court will
not tolerate any departure from the "straight and narrow" path demanded by the ethics of the
legal profession
44 | P a g e
A.C. No. 1372 June 27, 2002
SPOUSES LIRIO U. RABANAL AND CAYETANO D. RABANAL, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FAUSTINO F. TUGADE, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant spouses Cayetano and Lirio
Rabanal against Atty. Faustino F. Tugade. It is alleged that respondent, as counsel for
complainant Cayetano Rabanal, did not file the appellant's brief in the Court of Appeals,
as a result of which the appeal filed by Cayetano was dismissed and the decision of the
then Circuit Criminal Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan became final and executory.
It appears that complainant Cayetano Rabanal was one of the accused-appellants in
Criminal Case No. CCC-I-150, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Rabanal y
Ibañez, et al.," of the Criminal Circuit Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.1 He was found
guilty of homicide and the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Complainant
terminated the services of his previous counsel and engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Faustino F. Tugade as new counsel to prosecute the appeal.2 However, despite the
extension of time granted to him totalling 60 days, Atty. Tugade failed to file the
appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.3 Cayetano filed a motion for
reconsideration, but his motion was denied.4 Complainants alleged that they paid
P1,000.00 to respondent as attorney's fees and, in addition, the amount of P1,400.00 for
the preparation of the appellant's brief.5Complainants sought the suspension from the
practice of law or the disbarment of respondent attorney.6
In his comment dated October 24, 1974, respondent said he did not want to accept
complainant's case due to his busy schedule, but that he was nonetheless prevailed
upon by the latter, who is his "kababayan," to sign the appellant's brief to be filed in the
case.7 Cayetano gave the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) pertaining to the case
to respondent, and the sum of P600.00 as litigation expenses, after which respondent
asked another lawyer to prepare the appellant's brief. However, on May 11, 1974,
Cayetano informed respondent that the Court of Appeals had dismissed his appeal for
failure of counsel to file an appellant's brief. Respondent alleged he then entered his
appearance as counsel for Cayetano and filed a motion for reconsideration with the
Court of Appeals, for which he was paid P800.00.8 The motion was, however, denied and
Cayetano served sentence from 1974 to 1979, when he was released on conditional
pardon.9
In a resolution, dated November 4, 1974, the Court referred the administrative case
against respondent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.10 The OSG conducted hearings on February 5, 1976 and
November 27, 1976, during which the spouses Rabanal testified in support of their
complaint.11 On January 24, 1979, Cayetano was released from the New Bilibid Prisons
on conditional pardon.12 A few years later, the Committee on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) assumed jurisdiction over the administrative
case.13 After each of the complainants had testified, the IBP Commissioner set the
hearing for reception of respondent's evidence on June 26, 1992 with warning that the
case would be considered submitted for resolution if respondent failed to present his
evidence.14 Three notices of the hearing sent by registered mail to respondent were,
however, returned unclaimed.15 Accordingly, the IBP Hearing Commissioner, upon
motion of complainant Lirio Rabanal, considered the case submitted for resolution.16 On
May 8, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for at least one (1) year.17
On July 15, 1993, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the records of the
case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC). Later, however, the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSN) were lost.18 In any case, on May 20, 2002, the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) adopted the findings of the IBP and recommended the suspension
of respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year.19
After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds no basis for reversing the
findings and recommendation of the IBP and the OBC. Their recommendation is affirmed
with the modification that the penalty imposed is reduced from one (1) year to six (6)
months.
Respondent claims that he was not the counsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal prior
to the filing of a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals and he could not
be held responsible for the dismissal of complainant's appeal for failure of counsel to file
the appellant's brief. We disagree.
The absence of a written contract does not preclude a finding that there was a
professional relationship which merits attorney's fees for professional services rendered.
45 | P a g e
A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the
advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession.20 Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cortez,21 the Court held that the admission of
respondent lawyer that he received payment from complainant is sufficient evidence to
establish a lawyer-client relationship. In this case, complainant sought and received legal
advice from respondent Tugade, who admitted that he agreed to sign the appellant's
brief to be filed and that he received P600.00 from complainant spouses. It is therefore
clear that a lawyer-client relationship existed between the two.
It is immaterial that respondent Tugade assisted Cayetano in the case as a mere friend
or "kababayan" of the latter. In Junio v. Grupo,22 respondent also denied the existence of
a lawyer-client relationship, stating that complainant was a close personal friend whom
he helped in a personal capacity. Nonetheless, it was held:
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should
have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. . . It is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for:
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the
case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such
consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
...
In this case, Cayetano consulted respondent Tugade in his professional capacity in order
to obtain advice concerning his appeal. Respondent agreed, as shown by his acceptance
of the payment to him, his receipt of the TSNs of the case, and the fact that he signed
the appellant's brief. His claim that he merely accepted payment but that he asked
another lawyer to prepare the brief is an obvious subterfuge. He has not even named the
lawyer assuming that the latter is real. It is hard to see why respondent should personally
accept payment and the transcripts of stenographic notes from complainant if he did not
intend to prepare the appellant's brief. Moreover, the fact that respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration after the dismissal of the appeal only confirms that he was indeed
Cayetano's lawyer.
The records clearly show that respondent Atty. Faustino F. Tugade was remiss in the
performance of his duties as counsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal. He was given
by the Court of Appeals an extension of time totalling 60 days within which to file the
appellant's brief, but he failed to file the same. He thus violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
RULE 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same
or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
RULE 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
What this Court said in another case is fitting:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the
latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he
owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If
much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to
the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves
the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.23
Indeed, a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client. He should be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him, remembering always that his actions or omissions are
binding on his clients. In this case, the failure of respondent to file the appellant's brief
resulted in the dismissal of the appeal. As a consequence, the decision in the trial court
46 | P a g e
finding complainant guilty of homicide became final and executory and he was sentenced
to ten years of imprisonment. As has been held:
An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability and
with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A
failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his
part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a
serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to
delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (People vs.
Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).24
It should likewise be noted that respondent failed to notify the IBP of his change of
address, thus delaying the resolution of this case. Service of notice and other pleadings,
which must be furnished to the parties, must be made at the last address on record. If
the parties are represented by counsel, such notices shall be sent instead to the
counsel's last given address on record in the absence of a proper and adequate notice of
a change of address, unless service upon the party himself is ordered.25
In Resurreccion v. Sayson,26 the Court attributed the delay in the resolution of an
administrative case to respondent lawyer, after finding that "The 27-year delay in the
resolution of this case was, to a large extent, caused by his failure to appear before the
Office of the Solicitor General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a failure
that also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges brought against him."
Similarly, respondent Tugade likewise showed a disregard of the charge against him,
and the IBP properly made its recommendation solely on the basis of complainants'
testimonies and the documentary evidence.
In Galen v. Paguirigan,27 the Court, taking into account that it was a first offense,
suspended for a period of six (6) months a lawyer who failed to file a brief. Atty. Faustino
Tugade showed lack of due care for his client's interest and willful neglect of his duties
as an officer of the court, thus warranting the imposition of the same penalty on him.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Faustino F. Tugade is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon finality hereof
with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act charged in this complaint will
be dealt with even more severely.SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES LIRIO U. RABANAL AND CAYETANO D.RABANAL VS. ATTY. FAUSTINO F.
TUGADEA.C. NO. 1372. JUNE 27, 2002
Facts:This is an administrative complaint filed by complainantspouses Cayetano and Lirio
Rabanal against Atty. Faustino F.Tugade. It is alleged that respondent, as counsel
for complainant Cayetano Rabanal, did not file the appellant’ brief in the Court of Appeals
despite having been granted bythe appellate court an extension of time to file the same, as
aresult of which the appeal filed by Cayetano was dismissed andthe decision of the then
Circuit Criminal Court of Tuguegarao,Cagayan became final and executory.Respondent
claims however that he was not the counsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal prior to the
filing of a motionfor reconsideration before the Court of Appeals and he could not be held
responsible for the dismissal of complainant’s appeal for failure of counsel to file the
appellant’s brief.
Issue:Whether or not the lawyer should be disciplined
Held:Yes. The absence of a written contract does not preclude finding that there was a
professional relationship which merits attorney’s fees for professional services rendered. A
written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract
may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. In
this case, complainant sought and received legal advice from respondent Tugade, who
admitted that he agreed to sign the appellant’s brief to be filed and that he received P600.00
from complainant spouses. It is therefore clear that alawyer-client relationship existed
between the two. He thus violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:RULE 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to
file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for hisfailure to do so.RULE 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable
47 | P a g e
PORMENTO, SR. v. ATTY. PONTEVEDRA
FACTS Complainant claims that respondent, who was his lawyer in a civil case, deliberately
failed to inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim despite receipt of the order. Hence,
he was deprived of his right to appeal. He only came to know of the trial courts order when
the adverse party extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage executed over the parcel of land
which is the subject matter of the suit. In order to recover his ownership, he was constrained
to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an action for its recovery. Also,
he was forced to initiate a criminal case for qualified theft against the relatives of the alleged
new owner of the said land. Respondent is the counsel of the accused. Complainant claims
that respondent utilized pieces of confidential information he obtained from complainant while
the latter is still his client. In a separate incident, he claims he bought a parcel of land where
the Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized by
respondent. Since there was another person who claims ownership of the property, he
heeded respondent’s advice to build a small house on the property and to allow his
(complainant’s) nephew and his family to occupy the house in order for complainant to
establish his possession of the said property. Subsequently, complainant’s nephew refused
to vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment case. Respondent acted as
the counsel of complainant’s nephew. Respondent’s contention: Respondent contends that
he was never a direct recipient of any monetary support coming from the complainant.
Respondent denies the allegations: a) he claims that he delivered to complainant a copy of
the said order, apprising him of its contents; b) as to his representation of the persons against
whom complainant filed criminal cases for theft, respondent honestly believes that there
exists no conflict between his present and former clients interests as the cases he handled
for these clients are separate and distinct from each other and; c) with respect to the case for
ejectment, respondent admits that it was he who notarized the deed of sale but contends that
what is being contested in the said case is not the ownership of the subject land but the
ownership of the house built on the said land. IBP Board of Governors: It resolved to annul
and set aside the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner finding the respondent
guilty of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15, CPR and instead approved the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit.
Facts: Respondent was the Pormento family s legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The
family s relationship with the respondentextends beyond the mere lawyer-client
relations.The rift between complainant and respondent began when the complainant s
counterclaim in a civil case filed with the RTCof Bacolod City was dismissed. Respondent
failed to inform complainant Pormento of the dismissal of his counterclaim whichresulted to
the latter being deprived of his right to appeal. In order to recover his ownership over a parcel
of land, Pormento wasforced to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an
action to recover the subject property.In a separate incident, In 1967, he bought a parcel of
land located at Negros Occidental. The Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land
was prepared and notarized by respondent. Since there was another person who claims
ownership of the property, complainant alleges that he heeded respondent s advice to build
a small house on the property and to allow his(complainant s) nephew and his family to
occupy the house in order for complainant to establish his possession of the said
property.Subsequently, complainant s nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the
former to file an ejectment case with theMunicipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros
Occidental. Respondent acted as the counsel of complainant s nephew
Held/Ruling:Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of thefacts. Jurisprudence instructs that
there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
requirethe attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether hewill be called upon in his new relation, to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.Another testto
determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is whether the acceptance
of a new relation will prevent anattorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
ordouble dealing in the performance thereof.A lawyer is forbidden from representing a
subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the presentcontroversy is
related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he
appeared for the formerclient. Conversely, he may properly act as counsel for a new client,
with full disclosure to the latter, against a former client in amatter wholly unrelated to that of
the previous employment, there being in that instance no conflict of interests. Where,
however,the subject matter of the present suit between the lawyer s new client and his
former client is in some way connected with that of the former client s action, the lawyer may
have to contend for his new client that which he previously opposed as counsel for theformer
client or to use against the latter information confided to him as his counsel.
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A.C. No. 5808 May 4, 2005
OSCAR M. ESPIRITU, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAIME C. ULEP, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter1 addressed to the president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Nueva Ecija Chapter, complainant Oscar M. Espiritu sought assistance to enable him to
talk to respondent Atty. Jaime C. Ulep who had allegedly been avoiding him for more
than a year. He wanted a meeting with respondent lawyer for the following reasons:
(1) respondent failed to turn-over to his client, Mr. Ricardo Maon, the amount
of P50,000 given to him by complainant on December 22, 1997 as settlement of
Civil Case No. 1028, Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and
(2) respondent refused to give complainant the amount of P30,000 plus interest
and expenses as balance for a deed of absolute sale dated December 22, 1997
which the respondent brokered and notarized.
On April 5, 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner
J.V. Bautista invited respondent to a meeting at IBP Cabanatuan to determine whether
an amicable settlement of the impending complaint could be reached.2
Due to respondent's failure to appear in the meeting, the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter
formally endorsed the verified letter-complaint to the IBP - CBD on April 19, 1999.
In an order3 dated May 28, 1999, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to file his answer to
the complaint pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court.4
Respondent complied with the order by filing an affidavit which turned out to be the same
affidavit he submitted to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office for the preliminary
investigation of the estafa case filed against him involving the same subject matter. We
quote:
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
I, Atty. Jaime C. Ulep, of legal age, married, and a resident of and with postal
address at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, after having been duly sworn, in accordance with
law, depose and state:
1. The case should be dismissed because the same has no elements of
estafa;
2. The truth of the matter is that, at the time the Deed of Sale of that
agricultural land was prepared, Mr. ESPIRITU admitted for the first time
that the owner's copy of the Title was lost but the petition for the issuance
of the owner's copy was being prepared;
3. In order to please Mr. ESPIRITU and not to hamper the transaction
and, at the same time protect the interest of the clients (Buyers), Mr.
ESPIRITU agreed to hold the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) in trust to be given to him after giving to me the Owner's
Copy;
4. Afterwards, his niece kept coming to my office to ask for money in
order, according to her, to facilitate the issuance of the Title. On
November 3, 1998, his niece demanded and received the amount of five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) from me. In other words, the total amount
demanded and received from me (out of the P50,000.00) was twenty five
thousand (P25,000.00), as of November 3, 1998. (A copy of the receipt
with a note "Balance Twenty Five Thousand only (P25,000.00) was
written.);
5. After that date, no word was received by the undersigned from Mr.
ESPIRITU whether the owner's copy was issued;
6. I am obligated to give the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00), provided that he will give to me the genuine owner's copy
of the Title;
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 7. In view thereof, the case should be dismissed because this is a clear
case of specific performance and not Estafa.
Atty. Jaime C. Ulep
Affiant5
In the cover letter6 of the counter-affidavit, respondent lawyer sought a formal hearing on
the administrative case.
Consequently, notice of hearing7 was served upon the parties to appear before the
Commission on August 13, 1999.
Both parties failed to appear on the scheduled hearing. On record, however, is a letter
request8 earlier filed by respondent to cancel the scheduled hearing due to a prior
engagement. He also asked for a transfer of venue from Pasig City to Cabanatuan City.
The Commission did not immediately act on this request pending complainant's
conformity.
In the next scheduled hearing, only complainant appeared although respondent had
been duly notified of the hearing as evidenced by the registry receipt card. In the
order9 dated September 17, 1999 the Commission denied the request for transfer of
venue because of complainant's protestation.
Over the vehement objection of the complainant, respondent was given a last chance by
the Commission to appear in a hearing reset to October 29, 1999. It warned that a
motion for postponement would no longer be entertained. In case respondent still failed
to appear, the Commission was going to receive the complainant's evidence ex-parteand
deem the case submitted for resolution.
In a letter10 dated October 28, 1999, respondent once again requested a cancellation of
the hearing, alleging that he was undergoing "eye treatment."
The hearing was reset to November 19, 1999; again respondent failed to appear. The
Commission, once again exercising leniency, afforded respondent "one last chance" to
appear before it on January 21, 2000, with another warning of an ex-parte reception of
evidence.11
In a letter12 dated January 18, 2000, respondent again requested a cancellation. He
explained that he had to appear before the MTC of Talavera, Nueva Ecija on the same
date "in connection with a criminal case."
Considering that respondent failed to appear successively in all the scheduled hearings
of the case, the Commission proceeded to conduct a hearing on January 21, 2000.
Complainant was allowed to submit and offer his evidence against the respondent ex-
parte, consisting of the following:
Exhibit "A" – Complainant's verified letter-request dated March 15, 1999;
Exhibit "B" – Certification by Atty. Jaime C. Ulep dated December 22, 1997 that
he had in his possession the amount of P50,000 as consideration for the
settlement of Civil Case No. 1028;
Exhibit "C" – Promissory note issued by Atty. Jaime C. Ulep dated December 22,
1997 for the amount of P30,000;
Exhibit "D" – Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Oscar M. Espiritu dated
December 22, 1997;
Exhibit "E" – Letter of Ricardo Maon dated March 9, 1999 addressed to the
Tanggapan ng Punong Barangay of Barangay Bicos, Rizal, Nueva Ecija that he
has not received any amount from Atty. Jaime C. Ulep for the settlement of Civil
Case No. 1028; and
Exhibit "F" – Decision of the MTC of Rizal, Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No. 1028
incorporating the compromise agreement between Oscar Espiritu and Ricardo
Maon.
After the pieces of evidence were marked, the case was submitted for decision.13
On December 29, 2000 Investigating Commissioner J.V. Bautista submitted his report
and recommendation14 to the IBP Board of Governors. He found respondent lawyer guilty
of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
misappropriated the money received by him for his client. A six-month suspension from
the practice of law was recommended for his transgression.
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In a notice of resolution15 dated June 29, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It found
that the recommendation was fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules. By failing to deliver the amount of P50,000 to his client
Ricardo Maon despite demand — which constituted misappropriation of the client's
money — it found respondent guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It ordered the immediate delivery to Ricardo Maon of the amount
of P50,000 plus interest computed at the legal rate from December 22, 1997 to the date
of delivery and suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent was guilty of violating Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it
requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.16
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money
and properties of his client that may come into his possession.17 Accordingly, he shall
account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.18 Even more
specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or
gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into
the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and
should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by
him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him
on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for
his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client.
It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.19
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.20 Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law.
Here, it was established that respondent lawyer received for his client Ricardo Maon the
amount of P50,000 as settlement of Civil Case No. 1028 and that he did not deliver the
same upon demand. As summarized by the IBP Investigating Commissioner:
First, Exhibit "F"21 proved that there was an obligation on the part of complainant
Espiritu to deliver to Ricardo Maon, who was respondent's client, the amount
of P50,000 as full settlement of Civil Case No. 1028. Second, Exhibit "B"22 proved
that complainant Espiritu gave to respondent lawyer who acknowledged receipt
thereof the amount of P50,000 as settlement of Civil Case No. 1028. And finally,
Exhibit "E"23 proved that Ricardo Maon, respondent's client, did not receive any
amount of P50,000 from his lawyer as settlement of Civil Case No. 1028.24
His failure to appear on five consecutive, scheduled hearing dates — requesting the
cancellation and resetting of three and absolutely ignoring two — showed an evasive
attitude towards the resolution of the administrative case filed against him and of which
he himself sought a formal hearing. Aside from his patent lack of respect for the
Commission and its proceedings, his repeated and obviously deliberate failure to appear
in the scheduled hearings revealed an attempt to wiggle away from having to explain and
ventilate his side. Worse, he did not file an answer to controvert the allegations in the
complaint. Instead, he filed a counter-affidavit he had earlier submitted in a criminal case
which, upon scrutiny, referred only to a transaction involving what appeared to be a sale
of real property documented in exhibit "D"25 of the complainant.
Respondent has no one else to blame but himself. Had he taken the time to appear
before the Commission and present his defenses, he could have explained why he kept
the money delivered to him by the complainant as settlement of the civil case. As things
stand therefore, complainant's allegations against respondent remain completely
uncontroverted.
For misappropriating and failing to promptly report and deliver money received on behalf
of their clients, some lawyers have been disbarred while others have been suspended for
51 | P a g e
six months.26 Since this appears to be the first case of respondent in the IBP-CBD, we
impose the lighter penalty on him.
As to complainant's other claim for P30,000 which respondent lawyer allegedly promised
him, we rule the evidence to be lacking and therefore find it premature to grant the
award.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jaime C. Ulep is hereby found GUILTY of violating
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six months from notice, with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is further ordered to restitute to his client Ricardo Maon, in cash within 30
days from notice, the amount of P50,000 with interest at the legal rate, computed from
December 22, 1997 to the date of delivery.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance,
and let it be entered in respondent's record in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
In 1997, a compromise agreement was reached between Oscar Espiritu and
Ricardo Maon whereby Espiritu agreed to deliver P50k to Maon. Espiritu handed
the P50k to Atty. Jaime Ulep, his lawyer, so that the latter may deliver it to Maon.
Ulep failed to deliver the money to Maon and thereafter he avoided talking to
Espiritu. Espiritu then sought the assistance of the local IBP chapter. Thereafter,
Ulep was invited but he failed to appear for five consecutive scheduled hearings.
The IBP chapter then heard the case ex parte and subsequently recommended
Ulep’s suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation is correct.
HELD: Yes. Ulep violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer should hold in trust all money and properties of his client that may come
into his possession. In the case at bar, Ulep failed to explain what he did with the
money. The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature.
Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness
on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the
client. Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming
into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly
and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used
by him. Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross
violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in
the legal profession. The Supreme Court suspended Ulep for 6 months and
ordered him to pay the P50k plus interest.
52 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines On 30 April 1990, however, the complaint was dismissed again by the RTC for lack of
SUPREME COURT sufficient and credible evidence. 4
Manila
The case was subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC
THIRD DIVISION decision and awarded damages in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
G.R. No. 169079 February 12, 2007
CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, the joint decision appealed from is hereby
FRANCISCO RAYOS, Petitioner, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered:
vs.
ATTY. PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ, Respondent. xxxx

DECISION 2. In Civil Case No. SM-951, ordering defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally,
plaintiff-appellant, with legal interest from the date when this decision shall have become
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: final and executory, the following:

This is a Petition for Review 1 of the Resolution dated 12 March 2005 of the Integrated A. Actual damages of Five Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱520,000.00);
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dismissing petitioner Francisco Rayos’s complaint for
disbarment against respondent Atty. Ponciano Hernandez. B. Moral Damages of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00); and

Respondent was the counsel of petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951 entitled, "Francisco C. Litigation Expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00).
Rayos v. NAPOCOR," filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan. The
complaint alleged, among other things, that the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) xxxx
recklessly, imprudently and negligently opened the three floodgates of the spillway of
Angat Dam at midnight of 26 October 1978 until the early morning hours of 27 October In addition, in all the four (4) instant cases, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly
1978, during the occurrence of typhoon "Kading" causing the release of a great volume and severally, plaintiffs-appellants, attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the
of stored water, the resultant swelling and flooding of Angat River, and the consequent total amount awarded. 5
loss of lives of some of petitioner’s relatives and destruction of his family’s properties, for
which he sought damages. Of the 10 members of petitioner’s family who perished, only
The case was appealed to this Court, which affirmed the Court of Appeals
four bodies were recovered and only petitioner and one of his sons, German Rayos,
Decision. 6 The Decision of the Supreme Court became final and executory on 4 August
survived.
1993.
On 21 December 1979, the complaint was dismissed 2 on the ground that the State
Thus, a Writ of Execution 7 was issued by the RTC on 10 December 1993, upon motion
cannot be sued without its consent as the operation and management of Angat Dam,
filed by respondent. As a consequence, NAPOCOR issued Check No. 014710 dated 5
Norzagaray, were governmental functions. Said dismissal was questioned directly to this
January 1994, in the amount of ₱1,060,800.00 payable to petitioner. Thereafter, the
Court which set aside the RTC decision and ordered the reinstatement of the complaint. 3
check was turned over to respondent as counsel of petitioner. Petitioner demanded the
turn over of the check from respondent, but the latter refused.

53 | P a g e
On 24 January 1994 , petitioner filed with the RTC a motion 8 to direct respondent to
deliver to him the check issued by NAPOCOR, corresponding to the damages awarded
by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner sought to recover the check in the amount of
₱1,060,800.00 from respondent, claiming that respondent had no authority to receive the
same as he was already dismissed by petitioner as his counsel on 21 November
1993. 9 Respondent, on the other hand, justifies his retention as a means to ensure
payment of his attorney’s fees.
On 7 April 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing respondent to deliver the check to
the Sheriff of the court who will subsequently deliver it to petitioner. A Writ of Execution
was subsequently issued. Despite the Court Order, respondent refused to surrender the
check.
However, on 4 July 1994, respondent deposited the amount of ₱502,838.79 with
Farmers Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., Norzagaray, Bulacan, in the name of petitioner
which was eventually received by the latter.
Thus, petitioner initiated this complaint for disbarment for the failure of respondent to
return the rest of the award in the amount of ₱557,961.21.
In his comment, 10 respondent alleged that he handled petitioner’s case, in Civil Case No.
SM-951, for 15 years, from the trial court up to the Supreme Court. On 21 November
1993, he received a letter from petitioner dismissing him as counsel. Simultaneous
thereto, respondent received a letter dated 15 November 1993 from Atty. Jose G. Bruno
asking him to comment on the therein attached letter dated 19 November 1993 of
petitioner addressed to NAPOCOR, requesting that the award of damages granted by
the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court be paid to him.
Respondent also averred that petitioner had a verbal contract for attorney’s fees on a
contingent basis and that the said contract was only reduced in writing on 6 October
1991, duly signed by both of them. By virtue of the contract, petitioner and respondent
supposedly agreed on a 40%-60% sharing, respectively, of the court award. Respondent
was entitled to receive 60% of the award because petitioner agreed to pay him 40% of
the award as attorney’s fees and 20% of the award as litigation expenses.
Respondent further asseverated that because petitioner dismissed the respondent and
refused to settle his obligation, he deposited the amount of ₱424,320.00 in a bank in
petitioner’s name under Account No. 381 (representing petitioner’s share of 40% of the
total award) on 10 May 1994 11 ; and the amount of ₱63,648.00 in petitioner’s name
under Account No. 389 (representing petitioner’s share of 40% of the ₱159,120.00
awarded as attorney’s fees by the Court of Appeals) on 19 May 1994. 12 Petitioner
already received the amount of ₱502,838.79 in accordance with the RTC Order dated 7
April 1994.
Respondent contended that the petitioner’s complaint was without basis and was meant
only to harass and put him to shame before the residents of Norzagaray, Bulacan.
In a Resolution dated 9 August 1995, 13 the Court referred the case to the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
A series of hearings were conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP at
the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, from March to September 2001.
On 1 February 2005, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro B. Funa submitted
her Report and Recommendation, 14 recommending the dismissal of the case.
Thereafter, the IBP issued its Resolution dated 12 March 2005, approving and adopting
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that the case lacks merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. 15
We do not agree in the recommendation of the IBP.
The threshold issue in this petition is: whether respondent is justified in retaining the
amount awarded to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951 to assure payment of his
attorney’s fees.
Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client constitute
trust funds and must be immediately paid over to the client. 16 Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides as follows:
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CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
In the case at bar, when respondent withheld and refused to deliver the NAPOCOR
check representing the amount awarded by the court in Civil Case No. SM-951, which he
received on behalf of his client (petitioner herein), he breached the trust reposed on him.
It is only after an Order was issued by the RTC ordering the delivery of the check to
petitioner that the respondent partially delivered the amount of ₱502,838.79 to the
former, but still retaining for himself the amount of ₱557,961.21 as payment for his
attorney’s fees. The claim of the respondent that petitioner failed to pay his attorney’s
fees is not an excuse for respondent’s failure to deliver the amount to the petitioner. A
lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere
fact alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees. 17 The failure of an attorney to return
the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality,
as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment. In short, a lawyer’s unjustified withholding of money belonging
to his client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. 18
It is true that under Canon 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, an attorney
has the following rights;
Rule 16.03- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. (Emphases
supplied.)
But the fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for
his client, as above-stated, does not relieve him of his duty to promptly account for the
moneys received; his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 19 Thus, what
respondent should have properly done in the case at bar was to provide the petitioner
with an accounting before deducting his attorney’s fees and then to turn over the
remaining balance of the award collected to petitioner. The Court notes that respondent
represented petitioner from the time of filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. SM-951
before what is now the RTC and of the appeal of the same case to the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court. But respondent was not justified to hold on the entire amount of
award collected by him until his fees had been paid and received by him.
The relationship of attorney and client has always been rightly regarded as one of special
trust and confidence. An attorney must exercise the utmost good faith and fairness in all
his relationship vis-à-vis his client. Respondent fell far short of this standard when he
failed to render an accounting for the amount actually received by him on behalf of his
client and when he refused to turn over any portion of said amount to his client upon the
pretext that his attorney’s fees had not at all been paid. Respondent had, in fact, placed
his private and personal interest above that of his client.
We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants. 20 Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The
returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that,
unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental
interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State
regulation. 21
A lawyer is not merely the defender of his client’s cause and a trustee of his client’s
cause of action and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and
participates in the fundamental function of administering justice in society. 22 It follows
that a lawyer’s compensation for professional services rendered is subject to the
supervision of the court, not just to guarantee that the fees he charges and receives
remain reasonable and commensurate with the services rendered, but also to maintain
the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to which he belongs. Upon taking his
attorney’s oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority of the
courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees. 23
There is another aspect to this case which the Court cannot just gloss over. Respondent
claimed that he charged petitioner, his client, a contingent fee comprising of forty percent
(40%) as attorney’s fees and twenty percent (20%) as litigation expenses. The
agreement provides:
UNAWAIN NG LAHAT SA PAMAMAGITAN NITO:
55 | P a g e
Ako, si Francisco Rayos, Sr., Pilipino, may sapat na gulang at ngayon ay naninirahan sa
Pinagbarilan, Baliwag, Bulacan, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, ay nagpapatunay sa
mga sumusunod:
Na, kaugnay sa aking usapin laban sa NPC at Benjamin Chavez (Rayos vs. NPC, et al.)
na ngayon ay nakabinbin sa Court of Appeals, ako ay nakipagkasundo sa aking
abogado, Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez, gaya ng sumusunod:
1 Sakaling ipanalo ang aking usapin, ang ano mang aking makukuha ay hahatiin gaya
ng sumusunod: 40% ang para sa akin; 40% ang para kay Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez;
20% ay ilalabas bilang gastos sa kaso.
2. Kung matalo ako sa kaso ay wala akong sagutin sa aking abogado.
Sa katunayan ng lahat, ako ay lumagda sa kasunduang ito dito sa Norzagaray, Bulacan
ngayong ika-6 ng Oktubre 1991.
(SGD)PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ (SGD)FRANCISCO RAYOS
Abogado May Usapin 24
A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction 25 and is generally recognized as
valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. 26 The amount of
contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be
paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher
compensation is allowed as contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer
may get nothing if the suit fails. 27 Contracts of this nature are permitted because they
redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases where the
client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal services
unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid
out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement is the
only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and
have their rights vindicated." 28
Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in
order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. 29 Section 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics states that "a contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law,
should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a
court, as to its reasonableness." Likewise, Rule 138, Section 24, of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney’s; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for
his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court
shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own
professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be
paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
(Underscoring supplied.)
The reduction of unreasonable attorney’s fees is within the regulatory powers of the
courts. 30 When the courts find that the stipulated amount is excessive or the contract is
unreasonable, or found to have been marred by fraud, mistake, undue influence or
suppression of facts on the part of the attorney, public policy demands that said contract
be disregarded to protect the client from unreasonable exaction. 31
There is, therefore, now a corollary issue of whether the stipulated attorney’s fees are
unreasonable and unconscionable under the circumstances of the case as to warrant a
reduction thereof.
Stipulated attorney’s fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so
disproportionate compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud
perpetrated upon the client. This means to say that the amount of the fee contracted for,
standing alone and unexplained would be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had
been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on him. 32
The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a
contingent fee contract, will not, however, preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing
by the court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyer’s services.
Generally, the amount of attorney’s fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement
which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyer’s compensation. A stipulation on a
56 | P a g e
lawyer’s compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls
the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds
such stipulated amount unreasonable or unconscionable. 33 In the absence thereof, the
amount of attorney’s fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable
worth of the attorney’s services. Courts may ascertain also if the attorney’s fees are
found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. 34In no case,
however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant to
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
We have identified the circumstances to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of a claim for attorney’s fees as follows: (1) the amount and character of
the service rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance
of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility
imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the
controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the
performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the
attorney; (8) the results secured; (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being
recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent
than when it is not; 35 and (10) the financial capacity and economic status of the client
have to be taken into account in fixing the reasonableness of the fee. 36
Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the following
factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered
case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
In the case at bar, respondent retained the amount of ₱557,961.21 out of the
₱1,060,800.00 award for damages paid by NAPOCOR to petitioner. Under the said
scheme, respondent actually collected fifty-three percent (53%) or more than half of the
total amount due the petitioner; indeed, he appropriated for himself more than the
amount which he had already turned over to and actually received by his client.
As adverted to above, we note that petitioner was unschooled and frustrated and
hopeless with the tragic loss of his loved ones caused by the inundation of the town of
Norzagaray, Bulacan, on 26-27 October 1978 because of the negligent release by
NAPOCOR of the water through the spillways of the Angat Dam. Petitioner also had to
face the loss and destruction of his family’s properties. Under such circumstances and
given his understandable desire to recover the damages for the loss of his loved ones
and properties, petitioner would easily succumb and readily agree to the demands of
respondent lawyer regarding his attorney’s fees.
We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed was, under the facts
obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. Such a fee structure, when
considered in conjunction with the circumstances of this case, also shows that an unfair
advantage was taken of the client and legal fraud and imposition perpetrated upon him.
Lawyers should not be permitted to get a lion’s share of the benefits due the poor and
the helpless. Contracts for legal services between the helpless and attorney should be
zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied to the
former. This Court has the power to guard a client, 37 especially an aged and necessitous
client, 38 against such a contract.
A survey of existing jurisprudence regarding attorney’s fees would reveal the following: in
the case of Amalgamated Laborers’ Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, 39 the
rate of attorney’s fees allowed was 25%; in Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of
57 | P a g e
Appeals, 40 the rate allowed was 20%; in Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, 41 25%; in Guided by our rulings in the abovestated cases, suspension of respondent for six months
Santiago v. Dimayuga, 42 20%; in Cosmopolitan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, 43 15%; in is justified in the case at bar.
1aw phi1.net

Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 44 15%; and in Social Security Commission v.

Almeda, 45 15%. WHEREFORE the Court Resolves that:

In the present case, respondent Atty. Hernandez, after all, succeeded in obtaining a
favorable decision for his client, the petitioner. At first, respondent failed to obtain a
favorable judgment in the RTC as the case was dismissed. But on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the RTC Decision was reversed and petitioner was awarded the amount of
₱1,060,800.00 as damages and ₱159,120.00 as attorney’s fees. Said award was
sustained by the Supreme Court. We also take note respondent’s efforts in litigating
petitioner’s case for a long period of 15 years. Lastly, the respondent took risk in
representing petitioner on a contingent fee basis.
In consideration of the foregoing, a fee of 35% of the amount awarded to petitioner would
be a fair compensation for respondent’s legal services.
1. Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorney’s oath and of serious professional
misconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and
WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely;
2. Respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount equivalent to thirty-five percent
(35%) of the total amount awarded 51 to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951; and
3. Respondent is to return the amount of Two Hundred Ninety Thousand One Hundred
Nine Pesos and Twenty-One Centavos (₱290,109.21), 52 which he retained in excess of
what we herein declared as fair and reasonable attorney’s fees, plus legal interest from
date of finality of this judgment until full payment thereof.

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as member of
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, renders him the Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the IBP, and the Court
unworthy to the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
sanctioned with disbarment or suspension. 46
SO ORDERED.
The court should also exercise a sound discretion in determining whether a lawyer
should be disbarred or merely suspended. It should bear in mind that admission to the
Bar is obtained only after years of labor and study and the office acquired often becomes
the source of great honor and emolument to its possessor. To most members of the legal
profession, it is a means of support for themselves and their families. To deprive one of
such an office is often to decree poverty to the lawyer and destitution to his
family. 47 Disbarment, therefore, should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such
as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. 48

In the case of Schulz v. Atty. Flores, 49 a lawyer was suspended for six months for not
returning his client’s money despite demands, for unjustifiably refusing to return his
client’s papers, and for collecting excessive and unreasonable fees. Also in the case of
Tanhueco v. Atty. De Dumo, 50 a lawyer was suspended for a period of six months for
failure to return the money received by him on behalf of his client and for collecting
excessive and unconscionable fees.

58 | P a g e
 Rayos v. Hernandez so constitutes professional misconduct. Furthermore, the feethat he imposed was too
unconscionable. He should have greatly considered Rule 20.1 indetermining the amount of
Facts: his fees. 35% is enough. WHEREFORE the Court Resolvesthat:

Atty. Ponciano Hernandez was the lawyer of Francisco Rayos in a case wherein the latter 1. Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorney’s oath and
sued the government when NAPOCOR, recklessly opened three floodgates during the
Pading Typhoon, which resulted to the death of 10 of his family members. He won the cases of serious professionalmisconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
and damages were awarded to him. However, the check was turned over to Atty, Hernandez (6) months andWARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
as he was his counsel. When Rayos, asked it from him, Hernandez refused to give the same. severely.
On 24 January 1994 , petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to direct respondent to deliver to
him the check issued by NAPOCOR, corresponding tote damages awarded by the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner sought to recover the check in the amount of P1,060,800.00 from
respondent, claiming that respondent had no authority to receive the same as he was already
dismissed by petitioner as his counsel on 21 November 1993. Respondent, on the other
hand, justifies his retention as a means to ensure payment of his attorney’s fees. A writ of
execution was issued later on, how ever,despite this, Hernandez still refused. However, on 4
July 1994, respondent deposited the amount of P502,838.79 with Farmers Savings and Loan
Bank, Inc., Norzagaray, Bulacan,in the name of petitioner which was eventually received by
the latter. Thus, petitioner initiated this complaint for disbarment for the failure of respondent
to return the rest of the award in the amount of P557,961.21. According to the respondent, he
had been the petitioner’s lawyer for 15 years and that he was entitled to such
money because they had a verbal contract wherein Rayos agreed to give him 60 percent of t
heaward of damages.

Issue:

Is the respondent justified in retaining the amount awarded to petitioner in CivilCase No. SM-
951 to assure payment of his attorney’s fees?

Ruling:

No. When Hernandez refused to give the check to Rayos, he already breached the trust
reposed on him. He only gave partial payment when the court already issued awrit of
execution. It is true that lawyers have a right of lien under Rule 16.03, but the fact alone that
a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his client, as above-stated,
does not relieve him of his duty to promptly account for the moneys received; his failure to do

59 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983
RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S.
BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association,
Inc., complainant,
vs.
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers
Association, Inc., of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the
Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny and had to admit the practice. In
exculpation he gives the following lame explanation:
1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the
Honorable Supreme Court En Banc dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his
taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid his Bar Admission
Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792,
... paid his Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00 as shown by Official
Receipt No. 8128793, ... and also paid his Membership Dues for the year
1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as shown by Official
Receipt No. 83740,... .
2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the
Honorable Supreme Court, included the respondent as among those
taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as shown by a Letter of
Request dated July 23, 1979, ...
3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting
for my turn to take my Oath as a member of the Bar, I was made to sign
my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief Justice,
the Honorable Enrique M. Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply
of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to his Complaint. The
Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and for
which reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. *
4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable
Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;
5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme
Court may take upon my Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member
of the Bar, I received a letter from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980 informing the respondent of an
Annual General Meeting together with my Statement of Account for the
year 1980-1981, ... .
6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979
and my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the Honorable
Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of my name in the Roll of
Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a
Member in Good Standing, I paid my membership due and other
assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City
Chapter, as shown by Official Receipt No. 110326 and Official Receipt
No. 0948, ... . Likewise respondent paid his Professional Tax Receipt as
shown by Official Receipt No. 058033 and Official Receipt No. 4601685,
... .
7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon
City Chapter also included the name of the respondent as a Qualified
Voter for the election of officers and directors for the year 1981-1982, ... .
8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact
that on January 8, 1981, Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and
herein respondent submitted a verified Notice and Motion with the
Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of this
60 | P a g e
 fact with a prayer that herein respondent be allowed to take his Oath as
Member of the Bar;

9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for

his 1981-1982 membership due and other assessment for which the
undersigned paid as shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and Official
Receipt No. 3363, ... .

10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as
shown by Official Receipt No. 3195776, ... .

11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as a Certificate of Membership in
Good Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, ....

Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not
constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter. He
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature
in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)

The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71,
Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)

WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable
to this Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25)
days imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

61 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ADM. CASE NO. 5691 March 13, 2009
AVITO YU, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CESAR R. TAJANLANGIT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Avito Yu against
respondent Atty. Cesar R. Tajanlangit for violation of Rules 18.03 and 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (the Code).1
Complainant alleged that he had engaged the services of respondent as defense
counsel in Criminal Case No. 96-150393 that resulted in a judgment of conviction against
him and a sentence of thirty (30) years of imprisonment.2After the motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the trial court, instead of filing an appeal,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari3 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure imputing grave abuse of discretion on the trial court’s part in denying the
motion. This petition was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals. Due to
respondent’s alleged error in the choice of remedy, the period to appeal lapsed and
complainant was made to suffer imprisonment resulting from his conviction. In depriving
complainant of his right to an appeal, respondent allegedly violated Rule 18.034 of the
Code. Moreover, complainant averred that respondent had violated Rule 16.015 of the
Code for failing to return the bailbond to him in the amount ₱195,000.00 after having
withdrawn the same.6 Further, complainant stated that respondent had failed to pay the
telephone bill he had incurred during his stay at complainant’s house.7
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred and be ordered to pay him the amount
of ₱211,106.97 plus interest.8
For his part, respondent clarified that his legal services were engaged only after the
denial of the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial and the supplement thereto. His
legal services were limited to filing the petition for certiorari. Complainant, at the time,
had already been convicted by the trial court. Respondent also explained that he had
discussed with complainant the merits of filing a petition for certiorari and that
complainant gave his conformity to the filing of the same.9
Moreover, respondent averred that complainant had authorized and instructed him to
withdraw the cash bond in order to apply the amount as payment for legal fees and
reimbursement for expenses. With regard to the unpaid telephone bill, respondent
alleged that he was not presented a copy of the billing statement despite his previous
requests. He also contended that he had been allowed to use the telephone to facilitate
coordination between him and complainant as he was then residing in Bacolod City.10
The Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by Resolution
of 16 July 2003.11
In his Report and Recommendation dated 2 December 2004, Atty. Leland R. Villadolid,
Jr., IBP Commissioner, made the following findings:
On the charge of violating Rule 18.03
xxx
x x x Considering that Respondent was only hired after the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial, Complainant is silent whether an appeal was still
available to him at that time. Complainant failed to state the material dates when his first
lawyer, Atty. Lacsamana received the Decision dated 6 February 1998, when she filed
the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, and when his second lawyer, Atty.
Espiritu, received the Order dated 23 April 1999.
While all of the lawyers who protected Complainant’s cause were of the view that there
was a need to present additional evidence and/or hold trial anew, it is obvious that
Complainant singled out Respondent and blamed him solely for his conviction.
At any rate, Respondent exhaustively explained his legal basis for elevating the Order
dated 23 April 1999 to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari. Considering
62 | P a g e
that the Order dated 23 April 1999, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration and/or
New Trial, Respondent’s argument that the said order is not the proper subject of appeal
is tenable. This is supported by Section 1(a), Rule 43 and Section 9, Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court. For another, a perusal of grounds Respondent raised in the Petition is
acceptable grounds that warrant a new trial. At least two of the grounds Respondent
raised were: the negligence of former counsel in failing to present evidence and new
discovered evidence. It is well-settled that these grounds usually warrant the re-opening
of evidence. Thus, it cannot be said that Respondent acted negligently in advocating
Complainant’s cause. 1avv phi 1
xxx
On the charge of violating Rule 16.01
x x x In the absence of evidence controverting Respondent’s claim that a verbal
agreement exists or an amount different from what was agreed upon, it is believable that
indeed, Complainant knew of the fee arrangement entered into with the Respondent,
through Ms. Javier, who acted in his behalf. It is also indisputable that Complainant
executed a Special Power of Attorney dated 23 March 1999 authorizing the Respondent
to withdraw the cash bonds in several criminal cases on his behalf. Thus, it was not all
improper for Respondent to withdraw the same.
xxx
While Respondent is entitled to be paid for the legal services he rendered and expenses
he incurred, it is still Respondent’s obligation to render an accounting of the money
received.
xxx
Further, Respondent did not substantiate his claim that he had paid for or tendered
payment for the unpaid telephone bill. While he contends that he previously asked for the
billing statement, it was allegedly not shown to him. However, there is no showing that
from the time the instant disbarment complaint was filed, which in itself constitutes the
demand for its payment, any payment (was) made by the Respondent.12
Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be directed to: (1)
render an accounting of the money he had received and to itemize the nature of the legal
services he had rendered, inclusive of the expenses he had incurred in compliance with
Rule 16.01 of the Code; and (2) to pay the amount of the unpaid telephone bill. It was
further recommended that respondent be sternly warned that a similar offense in the
future would be dealt with more severely.13
On 12 March 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-83
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner.14
The Court is in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. 1avv phi 1.zw+
Records show that respondent did not serve as complainant’s lawyer at the inception of
or during the trial of Criminal Case No. 96-150393 which resulted to the conviction of the
latter. In fact, respondent was only engaged as counsel after the withdrawal of
appearance of complainant’s lawyers and denial of the Motion for Reconsideration
and/or New Trial and the supplement thereto. At that time, complainant had already been
incarcerated. Significantly, complainant made no mention of the availability of the remedy
of appeal at the time of respondent’s employment.
More importantly, the Court finds adequate respondent’s justification for filing the petition
for certiorari instead of an appeal. Indeed, there is no showing that respondent was
negligent in handling the legal matter entrusted to him by complainant.
The Court also agrees with the IBP that it was not at all improper for respondent to have
withdrawn the cash bonds as there was evidence showing that complainant and
respondent had entered into a special fee arrangement. But, however justified
respondent was in applying the cash bonds to the payment of his services and
reimbursement of the expenses he had incurred, the Court agrees with
the IBP that he is not excused from rendering an accounting of the same. In Garcia v.
Atty. Manuel,15 the Court held that "(t)he highly fiduciary and confidential relation of
attorney and client requires that the lawyer should promptly account for all the funds
received from, or held by him for, the client."16 The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his
attorney’s fees on the money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him
from the obligation to make a prompt accounting.17
63 | P a g e
Finally, the Court concurs with the IBP that while it is true that respondent was not
presented a copy of the unpaid telephone bill, the instant complaint itself constitutes the
demand for its payment. Considering that there is no manifestation to the effect that the
same has been paid, respondent should accordingly be required to settle it.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Cesar R. Tajanlangit is ordered
to render, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Resolution, an accounting of all
monies he received from complainant and to itemize the nature of the legal services he
had rendered, inclusive of the expenses he had incurred, in compliance with Rule 16.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent is further ADMONISHED that commission of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Yu vs. Tajanlangit
Facts:
An administrative complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant Avito Yu against
respondent Atty. Cesar R. Tajanlangit. Complainant had engaged the services of respondent
as defense counsel in a criminal case that resulted to his conviction. Complainant averred
that respondent had violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR for failing to return the bailbond to him in
the amount P195,000.00 after having withdrawn the same. Respondent,however, contended
that complainant had authorized and instructed him to withdraw the cash bond in order to
apply the amount as payment for legalfees and reimbursement for expenses.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR.
Ruling:
The SC ruled in affirmative. It was not at all improper for respondent to have withdrawn the
cash bonds as there was evidence showing that complainant and respondent had entered
into a special fee arrangement.But, however justified respondent was in applying the cash
bonds to the payment of his services and reimbursement of the expenses he had incurred,
the Court agrees with the IBP that he is not excused from rendering an accounting of the
same. The highly fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and client requires that the
lawyer should promptly account for all the funds received from, or held by him for, the client.
The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney’s fees on the money in his hands collected
for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting.
Therefore, the SC admonished the respondent and held that commission of a similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely
64 | P a g e
GARCIA v. MANUEL
FACTS:A disbarment complaint filed by MaritessGarcia against respondent Atty
Iluminado M. Manuel for gorss misconduct for ineffectively handling her case and
failing to return to he rmoney she gave him.Maritess Garcia divorced from husbandand
approached respondent for legal advice concerning child support and hercondo
unit w/c husband refused to vacate.A retainer agreement then was entered by complainant w/
respondent.Complainant gave respondent P10k for thefiling fees in the ejectment case.
She, however, asked respondent as to why thefees cost so much. Respondent replied
that it is based on the percentage of theprice of ppty and support for the child prayed
for.Several follow-ups were made by complainant but later found out that case has
not been filed. An altercation bet.them took place. After serious exchange of words,
respondent RETURNED to complainant ALL DOCS. No amount of money
was returned by respondent despite the latter’s demand for its return.
HELD:RULE 1.01 Counsel committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed
in him bythe complainant. He even asked the complainant to raise the filing fee.
After receiving the registry return card, he stilldid not file the ejectment case.RULE 18.04
(lawyer shall keep client informed)The lawyer-client relationship being one of confidence,
there is ever present the needfor the client to be adequately and fully informed of the
devts of the case.CANON 16, RULE 16.01 – The highly fiduciary and confidential
nature of such relations requires that the lawyer should properly account for
all the funds received. It shall be returned to client when became due or upon
demand.
RULING: SUSPENDED FOR 6 MOS.
YU v. TAJANLANGIT
FACTS: Disbarment case against Atty CesarTajanlangit by Avito Yu for violation of
Rule18.03 and 16.01 of CPR.Alleged that he engaged legal svs of respondent as
defense counsel in criminal case that resulted in a conviction against him. After the MR
was denied, he erroneously filed a petition for certiorari instead of filing an appeal. Due
to such error, the period to appeal lapsed and complainant was made tosuffer
imprisonment resulting from his conviction. Respondent then allegedly violated
Rule 18.3 and RULE 16.01 FORFAILURE OF THE RETURN OF BAIL
BONDTO HIM FOR P195K after w/drawal of case.CONTENTION: He was instructed
to withdraw the bail and apply the amount aspymt for legal fees and reimbursement for
expenses such as telephone exp
.HELD:AS TO RULE 18.03. Complainant failed to state material dates when his first
lawyer,Atty. Lacsamana received the decision vis-à-vis the filing of MR and arrival of second
lawyer. It was evident that compalainant singled out respondent and blamed
him solely for his conviction. The respondent explained legal basis for the filing
of petition for certiotari that a new trial is warranted in re-opening of
evidence.RESPONDENT NOT NEGLIGENT.AS TO RULE 16.01. As to
IBPCOmmisisoner, respondent was directed to render accounting of the money he
hadreceived and to itemize the nature of thelegal svs he had rendered incompliance ofRule
16.101 and pay amount of tel bill. SC: It is improper to apply cash bond as to payment for his
services and reimbursement of expenses he had incurred.
RULING: IBP RECOMM AFFRIMED
65 | P a g e

Cordon vs BalicantaA.C. No. 2797. October 4, 2002
Facts:
Complainant Rosauro Cordon, the widow of Felixberto Jaldon,inherited properties which
amounted to 21 parcels of land. The lawyer whohelped her settle the estate of her late
husband was respondent Atty. Jesus alicanta.Respondent enticed complainant and her
dau!hter to or!ani"e a corporationthat would de#elop the said real properties into a hi!h$scale
commercialcomplex with a beautiful penthouse for complainant, which
led to theestablishment of Rosaura %nterprises. alicanta was simultaneously the&resident'(
eneral )ana!er'Treasurer. *e made them si!n a documentwhich turned out to be a #otin! trust
a!reement plus an +&A to sell andmort!a!e some of the parcels of land which he transferred
the titles of to acertain Tion +uy n!. Respondent ne#er accounted for the proceeds of
saidtransfers. -sin! a spurious board resolution, he obtained a loan from andban/ in the
amount of 2.22) php secured by 0 of the parcels of land. Therespondent ostensibly intended
to use the money to construct the aliwasanCommercial Center CC, for
bre#ity . Complainant later on found out thatthe structure was made of poor materials such
as
sawali,
coco lumber andbamboo which could not ha#e cost the corporation anythin! close to
theamount of the loan secured. *e failed to pay a sin!le installment on the loanand therefore
& foreclosed. *e did not attempt to redeem, and sold theri!hts to redeem
said property.Complainant3s dau!hter disco#ered that their ancestral home
had beendemolished and that her mother was detained in a small nipa hut. 4ith
thehelp of an attorney im she found her mother. They terminatedrespondent3s ser#ices and
threatened him with le!al action.
Issue:
4hether respondent should be disbarred
Held:
5es. Respondent committed !ra#e and serious misconduct that castsdishonor on the
le!al profession. *is misdemeanors re#eal a deceitfulscheme to use the corporation as a
means to con#ert for his own personalbenefit properties left to him in trust by complainant
and her dau!hter.The Code of &rofessional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer,as his
duty to society, the obli!ation to obey the laws of the land andpromote respect for law and
le!al processes. +pecifically, he is forbidden toen!a!e in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. 6f the practiceof law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its
basic ideal, thoseenrolled in its ran/s should not only master its tenets and principles
butshould also, in their li#es, accord continuin! fidelity to them. Thus, there7uirement of !ood
moral character is of much !reater import, as far as the!eneral public is concerned, than the
possession of le!al learnin!. awyersare expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only
upon admission tothe ar but also throu!hout their le!al career, in order to maintain
one3s!ood standin! in that exclusi#e and honored fraternity. (ood moralcharacter is more than
8ust the absence of bad character. +uch characterexpresses itself in the will to do the
unpleasant thin! if it is ri!ht and theresol#e not to do the pleasant thin! if it is wron!. This must
be so because9#ast interests are committed to his care: he is the recipient of unboundedtrust
and confidence: he deals with his client3s property, reputation, his life,his all.(ood moral
standin! is manifested in the duty of the lawyer 9to holdin trust all moneys and properties of
his client that may come into hispossession.; *e is bound 9to account for all money or
property collected orrecei#ed for or from the client.; The relation between an attorney and
hisclient is hi!hly fiduciary in nature. Thus, lawyers are bound to promptlyaccount for money
or property recei#ed by them on behalf of their clientsand failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct
66 | P a g e
 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 2797. October 4, 2002]
ROSAURA P. CORDON, complainant, vs. JESUS BALICANTA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On August 21, 1985, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon filed with this Court a
complaint for disbarment, docketed as Administrative Case No. 2797, against Atty. Jesus
Balicanta. After respondents comment to the complaint and complainants reply thereto, this
Court, on March 29, 1995 referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP, for
brevity) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice.Commissioner George Briones of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was initially
tasked to investigate the case. Commissioner Briones was later on replaced by
Commissioner Renato Cunanan. Complainant filed a supplemental complaint which was duly
admitted and, as agreed upon, the parties filed their respective position papers.
Based on her complaint, supplemental complaint, reply and position paper, the
complainant alleged the following facts:
When her husband Felixberto C. Jaldon died, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon and
her daughter Rosemarie inherited the properties left by the said decedent. All in all,
complainant and her daughter inherited 21 parcels of land located in Zamboanga City. The
lawyer who helped her settle the estate of her late husband was respondent Jesus Balicanta.
Sometime in the early part of 1981, respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to
organize a corporation that would develop the said real properties into a high-scale
commercial complex with a beautiful penthouse for complainant. Relying on these apparently
sincere proposals, complainant and her daughter assigned 19 parcels of land to Rosaura
Enterprises, Incorporated, a newly-formed and duly registered corporation in which they
assumed majority ownership. The subject parcels of land were then registered in the name of
the corporation.
Thereafter, respondent single-handedly ran the affairs of the corporation in his capacity
as Chairman of the Board, President, General Manager and Treasurer. The respondent also
made complainant sign a document which turned out to be a voting trust
agreement. Respondent likewise succeeded in making complainant sign a special power of
attorney to sell and mortgage some of the parcels of land she inherited from her deceased
husband. She later discovered that respondent transferred the titles of the properties to a
certain Tion Suy Ong who became the new registered owner thereof. Respondent never
accounted for the proceeds of said transfers.
In 1981, respondent, using a spurious board resolution, contracted a loan from the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty
Pesos (P2,220,000) using as collateral 9 of the real properties that the complainant and her
daughter contributed to the corporation. The respondent ostensibly intended to use the
money to construct the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC, for brevity). Complainant later
on found out that the structure was made of poor materials such as sawali, coco lumber and
bamboo which could not have cost the corporation anything close to the amount of the loan
secured.
For four years from the time the debt was contracted, respondent failed to pay even a
single installment. As a result, the LBP, in a letter dated May 22, 1985, informed respondent
that the past due amortizations and interest had already accumulated to Seven Hundred
Twenty-nine Thousand Five Hundred Three Pesos and Twenty-five Centavos (P729,503.25).
The LBP made a demand on respondent for payment for the tenth time. Meanwhile, when the
BCC commenced its operations, respondent started to earn revenues from the rentals of
BCCs tenants. On October 28, 1987, the LBP foreclosed on the 9 mortgaged properties due
to non-payment of the loan.
Respondent did not exert any effort to redeem the foreclosed properties. Worse, he sold
the corporations right to redeem the mortgaged properties to a certain Hadji Mahmud
Jammang through a fake board resolution dated January 14, 1989 which clothed himself with
the authority to do so. Complainant and her daughter, the majority stockholders, were never
informed of the alleged meeting held on that date. Again, respondent never accounted for the
proceeds of the sale of the right to redeem. Respondent also sold to Jammang a parcel of
land belonging to complainant and her daughter which was contiguous to the foreclosed
properties and evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 62807. He never accounted for
the proceeds of the sale.
Sometime in 1983, complainants daughter, Rosemarie, discovered that their ancestral
home had been demolished and that her mother, herein complainant, was being detained in
a small nipa shack in a place called Culianan. Through the help of Atty. Linda Lim,
Rosemarie was able to locate her mother. Rosemarie later learned that respondent took
complainant away from her house on the pretext that said ancestral home was going to be
67 | P a g e
remodeled and painted. But respondent demolished the ancestral home and sold the lot to
Tion Suy Ong, using another spurious board resolution designated as Board Resolution No.
1, series of 1992. The resolution contained the minutes of an alleged organizational meeting
of the directors of the corporation and was signed by Alexander Wee, Angel Fernando, Erwin
Fernando and Gabriel Solivar. Complainant and her daughter did not know how these
persons became stockholders and directors of the corporation. Respondent again did not
account for the proceeds of the sale.
Complainant and her daughter made several demands on respondent for the delivery of
the real properties they allegedly assigned to the corporation, for an accounting of the
proceeds of the LBP loan and as well as the properties sold, and for the rentals earned by
BCC. But the demands remained unheeded. Hence, complainant and her daughter, in a letter
dated June 4, 1985, terminated the services of respondent as their lawyer and repeated their
demands for accounting and turn-over of the corporate funds, and the return of the 19 titles
that respondent transferred to the corporation. They also threatened him with legal action in a
letter dated August 3, 1985.
Soon after, complainant found out from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC,
for brevity) that Rosaura Enterprises, Inc., due to respondents refusal and neglect, failed to
submit the corporations annual financial statements for 1981, 1982 and 1983; SEC General
Information Sheets for 1982, 1983 and 1984; Minutes of Annual Meetings for 1982, 1983 and
1984; and Minutes of Annual Meetings of Directors for 1982, 1983 and 1984.
Complainant also discovered that respondent collected rental payments from the tenants
of BCC and issued handwritten receipts which he signed, not as an officer of the corporation
but as the attorney-at-law of complainant. Respondent also used the tennis court of BCC to
dry his palay and did not keep the buildings in a satisfactory state, so much so that the
divisions were losing plywood and other materials to thieves.
Complainant likewise accused respondent of circulating rumors among her friends and
relatives that she had become insane to prevent them from believing whatever complainant
said. According to complainant, respondent proposed that she legally separate from her
present husband so that the latter would not inherit from her and that respondent be adopted
as her son.
For his defense, respondent, in his comment and position paper, denied employing
deceit and machination in convincing complainant and her daughter to assign their real
properties to the corporation; that they freely and voluntary executed the deeds of
assignment and the voting trust agreement that they signed; that he did not single-handedly
manage the corporation as evidenced by certifications of the officers and directors of the
corporation; that he did not use spurious board resolutions authorizing him to contract a loan
or sell the properties assigned by the complainant and her daughter; that complainant and
her daughter should be the ones who should render an accounting of the records and
revenues inasmuch as, since 1984 up to the present, the part-time corporate book-keeper,
with the connivance of the complainant and her daughter, had custody of the corporate
records; that complainant and her daughter sabotaged the operation of BCC when they
illegally took control of it in 1986; that he never pocketed any of the proceeds of the
properties contributed by the complainant and her daughter; that the demolition of the
ancestral home followed legal procedures; that complainant was never detained in Culianan
but she freely and voluntarily lived with the family of P03 Joel Constantino as evidenced by
complainants own letter denying she was kidnapped; and that the instant disbarment case
should be dismissed for being premature, considering the pendency of cases before the SEC
and the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga involving him and complainant.
Based on the pleadings and position papers submitted by the parties, Commissioner
Renato Cunanan, in his report[1] dated July 1, 1999, recommended respondents disbarment
based on the following findings:
A. The complainant, Rosaura Jaldon-Cordon and her daughter, Rosemarie were
stockholders of a corporation, together with respondent, named Rosaura Enterprises, Inc.
Per the Articles of Incorporation marked as Annex A of Complainants Position Paper,
complainants subscription consists of 55% of the outstanding capital stock while her
daughters consists of 18%, giving them a total of 73%. Respondents holdings consist of 24%
while three other incorporators, Rosauro L. Alvarez, Vicente T. Maalac and Darhan S.
Graciano each held 1% of the capital stock of the corporation.
B. On April 5, 1981, complainant and her daughter Rosemarie Jaldon executed two Deeds of
Transfer and Assignment conveying and transferring to the corporation 19 parcels of land in
exchange for shares of stock in the corporation.
xxx xxx xxx
C. Both Deeds of Assignment particularly page 3 thereof indicate that respondent accepted
said assignment of properties and titles in behalf of the corporation as Treasurer. The deeds
were signed on April 5, 1981.
xxx xxx xxx
Together, therefore, complainant and her daughter owned 1,711 shares of the 1,750 shares
comprising the authorized capital stock of the corporation of 97% thereof.
68 | P a g e
No increase in capitalization was applied for by the corporation.
F. Respondent claims in his Comment, his Answer and his Position Paper that on April 4,
1981 he was elected as Chairman and Director and on April 5, 1981 he was elected
President of the corporation. Respondents own Annexes marked as G and G-1 of his
Comment show that on April 4, 1981 he was not only elected as Chairman and Director as he
claims but as Director, Board Chairman and President. The purported minutes was only
signed by respondent and an acting Secretary by the name of Vicente Maalac.
Said Annex does not show who was elected Treasurer.
Respondents Annex H and H-1 shows that in the alleged organizational meeting of the
directors on April 5, 1981 a certain Farnacio Bucoy was elected Treasurer. Bucoys name
does not appear as an incorporator nor a stockholder anywhere in the documents submitted.
The purported minutes of the organizational meeting of the directors was signed only by
respondent Balicanta and a Secretary named Verisimo Martin.
G. Since respondent was elected as Director, Chairman and President on April 4, 1981 as
respondents own Annexes G to G-1 would show, then complainants claim that respondent
was likewise acting as Treasurer of two corporations bear truth and credence as respondent
signed and accepted the titles to 19 parcels of land ceded by the complainant and her
daughter, as Treasurer on April 5, 1981 after he was already purportedly elected as
Chairman, President and Director.
H. Respondent misleads the Commission into believing that all the directors signed the
minutes marked as Exhibit H to H-1 by stating that the same was duly signed by all the Board
of Directors when the document itself shows that only he and one Verisimo Martin signed the
same.
He also claims that all the stockholders signed the minutes of organizational meeting marked
as Annexes G and G-1 of his Comment yet the same shows that only the acting Chairman
and acting Secretary signed.
I. Respondent claims that the Board or its representative was authorized by the stockholders
comprising 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock, as required by law, to mortgage the parcels of
land belonging to the corporation, which were all assigned to the corporation by complainant
and her daughter, by virtue of Annex I and I-1: attached to his Comment.
The subject attachment however reveals that only the following persons signed their
conformity to the said resolution: respondent Balicanta who owned 109 shares, Vicente
Maalac (1 share), Daihan Graciano (1 share).
Complainants who collectively held a total of 1,711 shares out of the 1,750 outstanding
capital stock of the corporation were not represented in the purported stockholders meeting
authorizing the mortgage of the subject properties.
The 2/3 vote required by law was therefore not complied with yet respondent proceeded to
mortgage the subject 9 parcels of land by the corporation.
J. Respondent further relies on Annex J of his Comment, purportedly the minutes of a special
meeting of the Board of Directors authorizing him to obtain a loan and mortgage the
properties of the corporation dated August 29, 1981. This claim is baseless. The required
ratification of 2/3 by the stockholders of records was not met. Again, respondent attempts to
mislead the Commission and Court.
K. Further, the constitution of the Board is dubious. The alleged minutes of the organizational
meeting of the stockholders electing the members of the Board, have not been duly signed by
the stockholders as shown in respondents annex G which was purportedly the organizational
meeting of the stockholders.
L. Also, Annex J of respondents Comment which purportedly authorized him to obtain a loan
and to mortgage the 9 parcels of land was only signed by himself and a secretary.
M. In said Annex 'J' of respondents Comment he stated that complainant Rosaura Cordon
was on leave by virtue of a voting trust agreement allegedly executed by complainant in his
favor covering all her shares of stock. The claim is baseless. The voting trust referred to by
respondent (annex D of his Comment), even if it were assumed to be valid, covered only 266
shares of complainants yet she owned a total of 1,039 shares after she and her daughter
ceded in favor of the corporation 19 parcels of land.
Being a former lawyer to complainant, respondent should have ensured that her interest was
safeguarded. Yet, complainant was apparently and deliberately left our (sic) on the pretext
that, she had executed a voting trust agreement in favor of respondent.
69 | P a g e
It is suspicious that complainant was made to sign a voting trust agreement on 21 August
1981 and immediately thereafter, the resolutions authorizing respondent to obtain a loan and
to mortgage the 9 parcels of land were passed and approved.
N. It is also highly irregular for respondent who is a lawyer, to allow a situation to happen
where, with the exclusion of complainant as director the result was that there remained only 4
members of the Board,.
O. Respondents own pleadings submitted to the Commission contradict each other.
1. For instance, while in his Comment respondent DENIES that he employed deceit and
machination in convincing the complainant and her daughter to sign the articles of
incorporation of Rosaura Enterprises and in ceding to the corporation 19 parcels of land in
Zamboanga City, because they freely, intelligently and voluntarily signed the same, yet, in his
Position Paper, respondent took another stance.
In paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of his Position Paper which was submitted 12 years later,
respondent claimed that it was actually the idea of Atty. Rosaura L. Alvarez that a corporation
be put up to incorporate the estate of the late Felixberto D. Jaldon.
2. Likewise, respondent claimed that complainant and her daughter were not directors, hence
they were not notified of meetings, in paragraph 2-6 (c) of his Comment he blamed the other
stockholders and directors for the corporations inability to comply with the Land Banks
demands saying that they have consistently failed since 1982 to convene (1.) for the annual
stockholders meetings and (i.i) for the monthly board meeting.
His own pleadings claim that he had been the Chairman/President since 1981 to the present.
If (sic) so, it was his duty to convene the stockholders and the directors for meetings.
Respondent appeared able to convene the stockholders and directors when he needed to
make a loan of p2.2 million; when he sold the corporations right of redemption over the
foreclosed properties of the corporation to Jammang, when he sold one parcel of land
covered by TCT 62,807 to Jammang in addition to the 9 parcels of land which were
foreclosed, and when he sold the complainants ancestral home covered by TCT No. 72,004.
It is thus strange why respondent claims that the corporation could not do anything to save
the corporations properties from being foreclosed because the stockholders and directors did
not convene.
This assertion of respondent is clearly evident of dishonest, deceitful and immoral conduct
especially because, in all his acts constituting conveyances of corporate property, respondent
used minutes of stockholders and directors meetings signed only by him and a secretary or
signed by him and persons who were not incorporators much less stockholders.
It is worthy of note that in respondents Exhibits 15, 16, 17 and 18 of his position paper, there
were 7 new stockholders and complainant appeared to have only 266 shares to her name
while her daughter Rosemarie had no shares at all. Respondent did not present any proof of
conveyance of shares by complainant and her daughter.
It is further worth noting that complainants voting trust (annex D of respondents Comment)
where she allegedly entrusted 266 shares to respondent on August 21, 1981 had only a
validity of 5 years. Thus, she should have had her entire holdings of 1,283 shares back in her
name in August 1986.
Respondents purported minutes of stockholders meeting (Exhs. 15 and 17) do not reflect
this.
There was no explanation whatsoever from respondent on how complainant and her
daughter lost their 97% control holding in the corporation.
3. As a further contradiction in respondents pleadings, we note that in paragraph 2.7.C of his
Comment he said that only recently, this year, 1985, the complainant and her aforenamed
daughter examined said voluminous supporting receipts/documents which had previously
been examined by the Land Bank for loan releases, during which occasion respondent
suggested to them that the corporation will have to hire a full-time book-keeper to put in order
said voluminous supporting receipts/documents, to which they adversely reacted due to lack
of corporate money to pay for said book-keeper. But in respondents Position Paper par. 6.3
he stated that:
Anyway, it is not the respondent but rather the complainant who should render a
detailed accounting to the corporation of the corporate records as well as corporate
revenues/income precisely because since 1994 to the present:
(a). The corporate part-time book-keeper Edilberto Benedicto, with the indispensable
connivance and instigation of the complainant and her daughter, among others, has
custody of the corporate records, xxx
70 | P a g e
4. In other contradictory stance, respondent claims in par. 7.3 of his position paper that
complainant and her daughter sabotaged the BCC operations of the corporation by illegally
taking over actual control and supervision thereof sometime in 1986, xxx
Yet respondents own exhibits in his position paper particularly Exhibit 15 and 16 where the
subject of the foreclosed properties of the corporation comprising the Baliwasan Commercial
Center (BCC) was taken up, complainant and her daughter were not even present nor were
they the subject of the discussion, belying respondents claim that the complainant and her
daughter illegally took actual control of BCC.
5. On the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of rentals
by lessees of the corporation, attached to the complaint as Annexes H to H-17, respondent
claims that the receipts are temporary in nature and that subsequently regular corporate
receipts were issued. On their face however the receipts clearly appear to be official receipts,
printed and numbered duly signed by the respondent bearing his printed name.
It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondent stature would issue official receipts to
lessees if he only meant to issue temporary ones.
6. With regard to respondents claim that the complainant consented to the sale of her
ancestral home, covered by TCT No. T-72,004 to one Tion Suy Ong for which he attached as
Exhibit 22 to his Position Paper the minutes of an annual meeting of the stockholders, it
behooves this Commission why complainants signature had to be accompanied by her thumb
mark. Furthermore, complainants signature appears unstable and shaky. This Office is thus
persuaded to believe complainants allegation in paragraph 3b of her position paper that
since September 1992 up to March 1993 she was being detained by one PO# (sic) Joel
Constantino and his wife under instructions from respondent Balicanta.
This conclusion is supported by a letter from respondent dated March 1993, Annex H of
complainants position paper, where respondent ordered Police Officer Constantino to allow
Atty. Linda Lim and Rosemarie Jaldon to talk to Tita Rosing.
The complainants thumb mark together with her visibly unstable shaky signature lends
credence to her claim that she was detained in the far flung barrio of Culianan under
instructions of respondent while her ancestral home was demolished and the lot sold to one
Tion Suy Ong.
It appears that respondent felt compelled to over-ensure complainants consent by getting her
to affix her thumb mark in addition to her signature.
7. Respondent likewise denies that he also acted as Corporate Secretary in addition to being
the Chairman, President and Treasurer of the corporation. Yet, respondent submitted to this
commission documents which are supported to be in the possession of the Corporate
Secretary such as the stock and transfer book and minutes of meetings.
The foregoing findings of this Commission are virtual smoking guns that prove on no
uncertain terms that respondent, who was the legal counsel of complainant in the latter part
of the settlement of the estate of her deceased husband, committed unlawful, immoral and
deceitful conduct proscribed by Rule 1.01 of the code of professional responsibility.
Likewise, respondent clearly committed a violation of Canon 15 of the same code which
provides that A lawyer should observe candor fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
Respondents acts gravely diminish the publics respect for the integrity of the profession of
law for which this Commission recommends that he be meted the penalty of disbarment.
The pendency of the cases at the SEC and the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga filed by
complainant against respondent does not preclude a determination of respondents culpability
as a lawyer.
This Commission cannot further delay the resolution of this complaint filed in 1985 by
complainant, and old widow who deserves to find hope and recover her confidence in the
judicial system.
The findings of this office, predominantly based on documents adduced by both parties lead
to only one rather unpalatable conclusion. That respondent Atty. Jesus F. Balicanta, in his
professional relations with herein complainant did in fact employ unlawful, dishonest, and
immoral conduct proscribed in no uncertain terms by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In addition, respondents actions clearly violated Canon 15 to 16 of the same
Code.
It is therefore our unpleasant duty to recommend that respondent, having committed acts in
violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, thereby causing a great disservice to
the profession, be meted the ultimate sanction of disbarment.[2]
On September 30, 1999, while Commissioner Cunanans recommendation for
respondents disbarment was pending review before Executive Vice-President and Northern
71 | P a g e
Luzon Governor Teofilo Pilando, respondent filed a motion requesting for a full-blown
investigation and for invalidation of the entire proceedings and/or remedial action under
Section 11, Rule 139-B, Revised Rules of Court, alleging that he had evidence that
Commissioner Cunanans report was drafted by the lawyers of complainant, Attys. Antonio
Cope and Rita Linda Jimeno. He presented two unsigned anonymous letters allegedly
coming from a disgruntled employee of Attys. Cope and Jimeno. He claimed to have received
these letters in his mailbox.[3]
Respondents motion alleging that Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita Linda Jimeno drafted
Commissioner Cunanans report was accompanied by a complaint praying for the disbarment
of said lawyers including Commissioner Cunanan. The complaint was docketed as CBD
Case No. 99-658. After Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan filed their
answers, a hearing was conducted by the Investigating Committee of the IBP Board of
Governors.
On May 26, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution [4] dismissing for lack
of merit the complaint for disbarment against Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner
Cunanan. And in Adm. Case No. 2797, the Board adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan, and meted against herein respondent Balicanta
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 5 years for commission of acts of
misconduct and disloyalty by taking undue and unfair advantage of his legal knowledge as a
lawyer to gain material benefit for himself at the expense of complainant Rosaura P. Jaldon-
Cordon and caused serious damage to the complainant.[5]
To support its decision, the Board uncovered respondents fraudulent acts in the very
same documents he presented to exonerate himself. It also took note of respondents
contradictory and irreconcilable statements in the pleadings and position papers he
submitted. However, it regarded the penalty of disbarment as too severe for respondents
misdeeds, considering that the same were his first offense.[6]
Pursuant to Section 12 (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,[7]the said resolution in
Administrative Case No. 2797 imposing the penalty of suspension for 5 years on respondent
was automatically elevated to this Court for final action. On the other hand, the dismissal of
the complaint for disbarment against Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan,
docketed as CBD Case No. 99-658, became final in the absence of any petition for review.
This Court confirms the duly supported findings of the IBP Board that respondent
committed condemnable acts of deceit against his client. The fraudulent acts he carried out
against his client followed a well thought of plan to misappropriate the corporate properties
and funds entrusted to him. At the very outset, he embarked on his devious scheme by
making himself the President, Chairman of the Board, Director and Treasurer of the
corporation, although he knew he was prohibited from assuming the position of President and
Treasurer at the same time.[8] As Treasurer, he accepted in behalf of the corporation the 19
titles that complainant and her daughter co-owned. The other treasurer appointed, Farnacio
Bucoy, did not appear to be a stockholder or director in the corporate records. The minutes of
the meetings supposedly electing him and Bucoy as officers of the corporation actually bore
the signatures of respondent and the secretary only, contrary to his claim that they were
signed by the directors and stockholders.
He likewise misled the IBP investigating commission in claiming that the mortgage of 9
of the properties of the corporation previously belonging to complainant and her daughter
was ratified by the stockholders owning two-thirds or 67% of the outstanding capital stock
when in fact only three stockholders owning 111 out of 1,750 outstanding shares or 6.3%
assented thereto. The alleged authorization granting him the power to contract the LBP loan
for Two Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) was also not approved by the
required minimum of two-thirds of the outstanding capital stock despite respondents claim to
the contrary. In all these transactions, complainant and her daughter who both owned 1,711
out of the 1,750 outstanding shares of the corporation or 97.7% never had any participation.
Neither were they informed thereof.
Clearly, there was no quorum for a valid meeting for the discussion and approval of
these transactions.
Respondent cannot take refuge in the contested voting trust agreement supposedly
executed by complainant and her daughter for the reason that it authorized respondent to
represent complainant for only 266 shares.
Aside from the dishonest transactions he entered into under the cloak of sham
resolutions, he failed to explain several discrepancies in his version of the facts. We hereby
reiterate some of these statements noted by Commissioner Cunanan in his findings.
First, respondent blamed the directors and the stockholders who failed to convene for
the required annual meetings since 1982. However, respondent appeared able to convene
the stockholders and directors when he contracted the LBP debt, when he sold to Jammang
the corporations right of redemption over the foreclosed properties of the corporation, when
he sold one parcel of land covered by TCT No. 62807 to Jammang, when he mortgaged the
9 parcels of land to LBP which later foreclosed on said mortgage, and when he sold the
complainants ancestral home covered by TCT No. 72004.
Second, the factual findings of the investigating commission, affirmed by the IBP Board,
disclosed that complainant and her daughter own 1,711 out of 1,750 shares of the
outstanding capital stock of the corporation, based on the Articles of Incorporation and deeds
of transfer of the properties. But respondents evidence showed that complainant had only
266 shares of stock in the corporation while her daughter had none, notwithstanding the fact
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that there was nothing to indicate that complainant and her daughter ever conveyed their
shares to others.
Respondent likewise did not explain why he did not return the certificates representing
the 266 shares after the lapse of 5 years from the time the voting trust certificate was
executed in 1981.[9]
The records show that up to now, the complainant and her daughter own 97% of the
outstanding shares but respondent never bothered to explain why they were never asked to
participate in or why they were never informed of important corporate decisions.
Third, respondent, in his comment, alleged that due to the objection of complainant and
her daughter to his proposal to hire an accountant, the corporation had no formal accounting
of its revenues and income. However, respondents position paper maintained that there was
no accounting because the part-time bookkeeper of the corporation connived with
complainant and her daughter in keeping the corporate records.
Fourth, respondents claim that complainant and her daughter took control of the
operations of the corporation in 1986 is belied by the fact that complainant and her daughter
were not even present in the alleged meeting of the board (which took place after 1986) to
discuss the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The truth is that he never informed them
of such meeting and he never gave control of the corporation to them.
Fifth, Commissioner Cunanan found that:
5. on the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of rentals by
lessees of the corporation, attached to the complaint as Annexes H to H-17, respondent
claims that the receipts are temporary in nature and that subsequently regular corporate
receipts were issued. On their face however the receipts clearly appear to be official receipts,
printed and numbered duly signed by the respondent bearing his printed name.
It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondents stature would issue official receipts to
lessees if he only meant to issue temporary ones.[10]
Sixth, respondent denies that he acted as Corporate Secretary aside from being the
Chairman, President and Treasurer of the corporation. Yet respondent submitted to the
investigating commission documents which were supposed to be in the official possession of
the Corporate Secretary alone such as the stock and transfer book and minutes of meetings.
Seventh, he alleged in his comment that he was the one who proposed the
establishment of the corporation that would invest the properties of the complainant but, in his
position paper, he said that it was a certain Atty. Rosauro Alvarez who made the proposal to
put up the corporation.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondent committed grave and
serious misconduct that casts dishonor on the legal profession. His misdemeanors reveal a
deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit
properties left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.
Not even his deviousness could cover up the wrongdoings he committed. The
documents he thought could exculpate him were the very same documents that revealed his
immoral and shameless ways. These documents were extremely revealing in that they
unmasked a man who knew the law and abused it for his personal gain without any qualms of
conscience. They painted an intricate web of lies, deceit and opportunism beneath a carefully
crafted smokescreen of corporate maneuvers.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to
society, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes. Specifically, he is forbidden to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.[11] If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic
ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should
also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.[12] Thus, the requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.[13] Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not
only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain
ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. [14] Good moral character is more
than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. [15] This
must be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of
unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his
all.[16]
Indeed, the words of former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Pompeyo Diaz
cannot find a more relevant application than in this case:
There are men in any society who are so self-serving that they try to make law serve their
selfish ends. In this group of men, the most dangerous is the man of the law who has no
conscience. He has, in the arsenal of his knowledge, the very tools by which he can poison
and disrupt society and bring it to an ignoble end.[17]
Good moral standing is manifested in the duty of the lawyer to hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may come into his possession. [18] He is bound to account for
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all money or property collected or received for or from the client. [19] The relation between an
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature. Thus, lawyers are bound to promptly
account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct.[20]
This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate personality of the
corporation to absolve him from exercising these duties over the properties turned over to
him by complainant. He blatantly used the corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation to
his client, the complainant. Toleration of such fraudulent conduct was never the reason for
the creation of said corporate fiction.
The massive fraud perpetrated by respondent on the complainant leaves us no choice
but to set aside the veil of corporate entity. For purposes of this action therefore, the
properties registered in the name of the corporation should still be considered as properties
of complainant and her daughter. The respondent merely held them in trust for complainant
(now an ailing 83-year-old) and her daughter. The properties conveyed fraudulently and/or
without the requisite authority should be deemed as never to have been transferred, sold or
mortgaged at all. Respondent shall be liable, in his personal capacity, to third parties who
may have contracted with him in good faith.
Based on the aforementioned findings, this Court believes that the gravity of
respondents offenses cannot be adequately matched by mere suspension as recommended
by the IBP. Instead, his wrongdoings deserve the severe penalty of disbarment, without
prejudice to his criminal and civil liabilities for his dishonest acts.
WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Jesus T. Balicanta is hereby DISBARRED. The
Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

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 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 150741 June 12, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SPS. VICENTE LAGRAMADA and BONIFACIA LAGRAMADA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 7 November 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59377. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision3 dated 11 March 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 216 (trial court) in LRC Case No. 9178 (97).
The Antecedent Facts
Lot 8 of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-28958, with an area of 500 square meters and
located at Banlat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, was allegedly covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 118717 in the name of Reynaldo Pangilinan (Pangilinan).
The original copy of TCT No. 118717 was allegedly destroyed when a fire razed the
office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 11 June 1988.
On 25 June 1996, Pangilinan sold Lot 8 to the spouses Vicente and Bonifacia
Lagramada (respondents). Respondents paid all the taxes on the land from 1976 to 1997
under Tax Declaration No. C-122-01735. On 16 April 1997, respondents filed a petition
for reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 118717 and for the issuance of a
second owner's duplicate copy of the title. Pangilinan allegedly misplaced the owner's
duplicate copy and it could no longer be found despite diligent efforts to find it.
After complying with the required publication and notice to all parties, the trial court heard
the petition on 7 January 1998. No oppositors appeared. However, the trial court did not
issue any default order. Bonifacia Lagramada appeared as the lone witness.
The following documents were submitted as evidentiary bases for the reconstitution:
1. Certification from the Office of the Acting Deputy Register of Deeds of Quezon
City respecting the destruction of TCT No. 118717;
2. Affidavit of Loss of TCT No. 118717 executed by Pangilinan;
3. Deed of Sale executed by Pangilinan in favor of respondents;
4. Tax payment receipts from 1976 to 1997;
5. Tax Declaration No. C-122-01735 in the name of Pangilinan; and
6. Certified true copy of the technical description, verified and approved for the
administrator by Apolinar R. Lucido of the Subdivision and Consolidation
Division; and
7. The plan prepared and verified as correct by Geodetic Engineer Eligio L. Cruz
and approved for the Land Registration Authority (LRA).4
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 11 March 1998 Decision, the trial court found the petition meritorious and ruled in
favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the original and owner's
duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 118717 to have been burned,
destroyed and/or lost. The Register of Deeds of this City is hereby directed, upon
payment of the prescribed fees, to issue and reconstitute the original and
duplicate copies of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 118717 based on the
technical description and survey plan, provided that no title covering the same
parcel of land exists in the said registry; that the encumbrance subsisting shall be
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 annotated on the reconstituted title and provided further that the fact of
reconstitution shall be noted on the certificate of title.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an appeal on the ground that
respondents' pieces of evidence are not sufficient to warrant reconstitution of TCT No.
118717. Petitioner alleged that:
1. The documents presented by respondents did not originate from official
documents which recognize respondents' ownership of the land or that of their
predecessors;
2. The plan and technical description and the blue print do not indicate the
ownership of the land described; and
3. The unregistered deed of sale between Pangilinan and respondents may not
be considered proof of ownership.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 7 November 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents sought the reconstitution of TCT No.
118717 not in their capacity as owners but as persons who have an interest in the
property. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents were asking for reconstitution not
in their names but in the name of Pangilinan.
The Court of Appeals ruled that nowhere in Republic Act No. 266 (RA 26) was it provided
that the term "any other document" refers to similar documents enumerated under
Sections 2(f) and 3(f). The Court of Appeals ruled that the only requirement was that the
"other document" must be "in the judgment of the court" proper and sufficient, and
accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property approved by the
Commissioner of Land Registration. The Court of Appeals ruled that, in this case, the
proofs presented by respondents were, "in the judgment of the court," proper and
sufficient bases to support the application for reconstitution of TCT No. 118717.
Hence, the petition before the Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the documents presented by respondents are
sufficient bases for the reconstitution of TCT No. 118717.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
In this case, two certificates of title were allegedly lost - the original copy of the transfer
certificate of title in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City which was destroyed in a fire,
and the owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title which Pangilinan misplaced.
Hence, respondents were asking for the reconstitution of the original copy of the transfer
certificate of title and the issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of
title.
Meaning of "any other document" in Paragraph (f)
of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 26
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 26, as amended, provide:
Sec. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of
title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the
case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;
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 (e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the
description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its
original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient
and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the
sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of
title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds,
containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy
thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to
which the lost or destroyed certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the
description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its
original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient
and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
The requirements of Sections 2 and 3 are almost identical. We agree with petitioner that
the enumerated requirements are documents from official sources which recognize the
ownership of the owner and his predecessors-in-interest. We likewise agree that "any
other document" in paragraph (f) of Sections 2 and 3 refers to documents similar to those
enumerated. This issue is already a settled matter.
In Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court,7 the Court ruled that "any other document"
refers to documents similar to those enumerated. Thus:
Republic Act No. 26 entitled, "An Act Providing A Special Procedure For The
Reconstitution Of Torrens Certificates of Title Lost Or Destroyed," enumerates
the sources on which the reconstituted certificate of title may be based. It should
be noted that both Sections 2 and 3 thereof list sources that evidence title or
transactions affecting title to property. When Republic Act No. 26 [Sec. 2(f)]
therefore speaks of "[a]ny other document," it must refer to similar documents
previously enumerated therein. The statutes relied upon by the private
respondent, so we hold, are not ejusdem generis as the documents earlier
referred to. Furthermore, they do not contain the specifics required by Section
12(a) and (b) of the title reconstitution law.8
The Court reiterated this ruling in Heirs of Dizon v. Hon. Discaya9 where the Court
declared that "when Section 2(f) of Republic Act No. 26 speaks of 'any other document,'
the same must refer to similar documents previously enumerated therein, that is, those
mentioned in Sections (a), (b), (c), and (d),"10 and in Republic v. El Gobierno de las Islas
Filipinas.11
Documents Submitted by Respondents are Not Sufficient
Bases for Reconstitution
We find that the documents submitted by respondents are not sufficient bases for
reconstitution.
Among the documents relied upon by the trial court was Tax Declaration No. D-122-
13529 issued for the year beginning 1996.12 Tax Declaration No. D-122-13529 was
issued in the name of Pangilinan at the instance of respondents who paid the realty
taxes from 1976 to 1996. It supposedly cancelled Tax Declaration No. C-122-01735.
However, an annotation in Tax Declaration No. C-122-01735 indicated that it was
already cancelled on 21 February 1993.13 In addition, both Tax Declaration Nos. D-122-
13529 and C-122-01735 do not even indicate the boundaries of the lot. A tax declaration
by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership.14
The Certification15 of the alleged loss of TCT No. 118717 due to fire, issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 28 February 1996 upon the request of respondents'
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counsel, was a form document where the name of Pangilinan and the TCT No. were
typed on the blanks provided. The one-page deed of sale, denominated "Kasulatan ng
Biling Lampasan ng Isang Lupang Residencial,"16 where Pangilinan allegedly sold the
500-square meter lot to respondents for P15,000, did not even indicate the TCT No. of
the lot sold. The tax payment receipts from 1976 to 1996 presented were all paid by
respondents in 1995 in the name of Pangilinan. They likewise did not indicate the title of
the lot covered.
The technical description and blue print plan, prepared at the instance of Vicente
Lagramada, are additional requirements under Section 12 of RA 26 and are not on their
own sufficient bases for reconstitution. Thus:
Sec. 12. x x x x: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made
exclusively from sources enumerated in Sections 2(f) [and] 3(f) of this Act, the
petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description
of the property duly approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration, or
with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title
covering the same property. (Emphasis supplied)
The courts must be cautious and careful in granting reconstitution of lost or
destroyed certificates of title, both original and duplicate owner's, based on
documents and decrees made to appear authentic from mere xerox copies and
certifications of officials supposedly signed with seals of their office affixed
thereon, considering the ease and facility with which documents are made to
appear as official and authentic. It is the duty of the courts to scrutinize and verify
carefully all supporting documents, deeds and certifications. Each and every fact,
circumstance or incident which corroborates or relates to the existence and loss
of the title should be examined.21
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 7 November 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 59377 and the 11 March 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 216 in LRC Case No. 9178 (97). We DISMISS the petition for
reconstitution filed by the spouses Vicente and Bonifacia Lagramada.
SO ORDERED.

The plan17 was certified true and correct by Engineer Eligio L. Cruz, the Geodetic
Engineer who prepared it for respondent Vicente Lagramada, based on the certified
technical descriptions issued by the LRA. It was verified by Land Registration Examiner
Emil S. Pugongan on 20 January 1998, after the filing of the petition, and approved
under Section 12 of RA 26 "For the Administrator" by Acting Chief Alberto H. Lingayo of
the Ordinary and Cadastral Division.18 The technical description19 was verified by
someone who signed the document but did not indicate his full name or position and then
approved "For The Administrator" by Apolinar R. Lucido, Engineer II of the Subdivision
and Consolidation Division. The trial court should have been more circumspect in
admitting the plan prepared for one of the respondents. The officials who verified and
certified the plan were not presented as witnesses to confirm their action. Pangilinan, the
alleged owner of the land, was also not presented as a witness. Only Bonifacia
Lagramada testified and her testimony did not sufficiently establish Pangilinan's
ownership of the lot.

We reiterate our admonition in Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, et al.:20

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