GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL 9, Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thoupht, tans. A. Hofstadter (New ‘York: Hacper and Row, 1971), pp. 190.91 410. Let me also note here that the poem by George, “The Word,” which Hetdegger discusses at length io “The Nature of Language" represents for the latter » mrning point in George's poetry, more precisely, che point where Sa ony aca eng (ag) othr or, rat poy. Tie poem has “turned ovt wel,” as the translator suggests, itis @ poem, thet as succeeded in becoming a lyric ng of language (das sxe singendan ed von der Sprache goglick st (69), Here to, itis a question ef ick. LL, Bejremdung, im adiition, means astonishment, surprise. Te aight thus be Interesting to Linke Ita the question of theumezcin, an the pleastro of theo. ri, aed to show that the thinking experience envisioned by Heidegger Ix a plese experinee of ar altogetberciferen king than th ore at the art of the Western tradition, 12, Although, “Other” inthe canter of “The Nature of Language” reins ony he adazess, gran, or promise of tanguage, the rroctrs ef relating” devel ped hare cat bw eicetnd to al hinds of Others, te ran, or ive Other Finded Sach fe he case, ar nstance, in mane Lavin any rom 1363, “Enigma ot phnomina’ in whch perhaps is shown tbe the “new todhity forthe cru, tveguchl to the motaltes of beng and cert eae. (Emmanvel Levinas, Ex déerouunre Pesistonce avee Husser! et Hetdrager (Pars, Vein, 1978), pp. 208, 21, Fora cussing of he status of the pernopein Levinas, ves Weayazial Garek, Sermanten of Proxy: Leangoage ned the Other in the Philosophy 4° Emmanse) Levinas.” om Hesmerch in Phenomerolegy, Vol XIK, 19, rp 242-43, a8 Genhate Fatty Php Sour) ‘Yoh 8, Sarber 100 Observing Re-entries Niklas Luhmann L f.62.07.200} Let me begin with a captatio malevoientize. Lenioy the idea that the title of my lecture will not be understandable to you. And even if you iknow, by chanee, the meaning of the words you will uot immediately see their relation to the topic of this meeting: limits to rationality. “However, both notions, observing and re-entry, ean be defined with sufficient rigor and with reference to engoing research. Thay do not present weak and unanalyzable generalizations. The problem is that their definitions refer to a paradoxical foundation, Obseruing ean be Gefined as an operation using a distinetion for indi cating one side of the distinction and net the other. This obviously is a se}€Smplieating concopt because the distinction between distinction and ‘indication itself is a distinetion, Tt implies observing the obsecver. It is f second order concept with the advantage—the tradition would say: sadvantage—of an infinite regress. Or circalarity. Or of founding itself on the circularity of a self reproducing system. But then, who is the observer, that is, the cbsorving system? The observer excludes itselF from what it observes. If it distinguishes an object it presupposes another side of this distinction, an. unmarked space, and the observing system itself is part of this unmarked space. The observing cannot be sbserved—except by another observing operation. All observing needs ‘his blind spot of seifexclusion. And this is also teae if you go, following Heinz von Foerster, to the level of second order abservation. If we tarn to the notion of re-entry! we wil have the same problem. A distinction re-enters itself if is copied inta itself It then reappears as part of its own space, ax part of what it distinguishes. It is the same and not the same distinction, depending on the observing system that identifies or 485GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL LURMANN/OBSERVING RE-ENTRIES distinguishes the two levels of the re-entry. But this situation of choice forces the observing, system (like the general in Claasewitz’s wari to distinguish itself by self-reference, his means that it has to make a distinction regarding itself between self-reference and external refer cence, But this again leads to the question of how to observe the chserv- ing system in making this distinction "To warm up a little after this cold introduction I would like to give a lassical example. In his Politica Aristotle says: “Ono has to abserve the natural according to its natural condition and not according to its cor- rupted conditions.” So, nature re-enters itself as the distinction between the natural and the unnatural. A tradition which Tasted more than two thousand years has dissolved this paradox by introducing normative notion of nature into a non-normative notion of nature’ Fire wilt bum anyway but a nobleman does not necessazily behave like a nobleman, He has to be concerned aboat his nature. Moreover, the antique theory of architecture and seulpture teaches that the distinction of form and deformation (cistortion) has to reenter the form to produce a perfect appearance? ‘And another example: The old tradition of political thought presup- poses the distinction between aikoz and polis, between the economic concerns of the household and the political eancerns of the city or the realm. This distinction alsa re-enters itself. Even a long time after the ‘pernicious invention of taxes it. was seen as a political obligation of the political mar to suppart himself economieally by his own household * And the whole matter of edueation in a noble houso® is at the sama time a politiea! obligation including preventing wives from sneezing during prognaney becuse this might disturb and corrupt the catural development of the baby. The same togient structure defines the old Enropean notion of order. As created by God, order is a good thing. Without order the world could not exist, But within this arder the dis- tinction of good and bad reappears. God, says Augustine, doos not par- ‘cularly like bad things, but he cares for the distinction.” "The same form of copying distinctions into themselves appears in ‘modem thought, aithough in very different semantical contents. To give ‘one exaraple: If the legal system of modern society proclaims freedom. (excluding externa) constraints} and equality (excluding inequality) as principles, fundamental rights or values, it founds itself not on a funda- ‘mental norm but on a paradox. Fer then, cny legal norm contradicts the principles, limits freedom, ereates inequality. But this would amount to an indeterminable state of the system, Therefore, the dis- finctions re-enter themselves, Freedom excluding constraints becomes constrained freedom, equality exchuding inequality becomes controlled and justified inequality. The law is the sur total of deviations from its 486 principles. Freedom and equality romain principles, rights or values, because this terminology hides the fandamental paradox; but its latent function is to fix the system at a level of universal contingency of all structures and operations. The law is contingent deviation from the law. UL Bvor since Wittgenstein it has become fashionable ta ask how the world can observe iteelf" This requires an observing eystem reproduc- ing boundaries, severing itself from its envionment. The observing sys- tem has to have (and to reproduce) the eapacity to observe itself and its environment; i.e,, to distinguish self-reference and external reference. ‘Observing requires (for an observer observing observing) a re-entry of the distinction af ystera and environment into the system. It rests on a foundation that can be observed as a paradox only. It requires in addi. tion the capacity to draw further distinctions for indicating objects faymbols, concepts) as distinct from other parts of the world. And this again, if in tura observed, is based on the paradcx of the sameness of the distinct, Observing, then, has to be observed as a merger of two paradoxes, as the multi-mega-paradox. Therefore, self-reference and hhaving objects is in reality the same evolationary universal; or in the language of Husserl: consciousness consists of intending phenomena, ‘These considerations lead to pst-transcendental conclusions (and I say “post transcendental” to indicate the theoretical level of reflection). They ‘snggests that observation (cognition and action) is founded on unobserv. able conditions. Any attempt to observe them is systematically diseour- ‘aged by paradoxical results. The world can observe itself by withdrawing inta the unobservable. Its unity cannet be distinguished except. as the unmarked space required by any observation, It can observe itself by partly hiding itself. Hence, available stractures of cognition and action cannot be logically derived from reason or principle. They require an ‘unfolding of the paradox by Cnecessarily contingent") identities. It is this Jatent finetion which provides the context for locking at the old European tradition in more general terms, My point is that the traditional notion of, rationality had always presupposed a re-entry of a distinction into itself ‘into the distinguished space) and that it always bas been necessary to veil anc to conceal the paradox involved in this operation, ‘The humanistic tradition made the distinction between reason and will as that of different human capacities. This distinction prepared the way for two different forms of a reentry of the primary distinotion between being and con-being into itself, i., into the being. 487(GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL LUHMANN/OUSERVING RE ENTRIES In the special case of a human being equipped with reason and Jan- guage the being could reason and talk about being and non-being—or as L would prefer to say: could observe itself. It eould use Being and [Nothingness as words and, with a further re-entry, distinguish betwoen true and false statements regarding beings and non-beings. This remains strictly binary thinking under the contrcl of a binary Togie. It requires what has been called kanon or kriterion or regula that. would guide the decision whether ar not statements {re-entered beings) corre spond to the original distinction of being and non-being. The re-entered distinction served as a “frame” for “dialectical” reasoning, and the frame of the frame was validated (nowadays ane might say: constituted or even constructed) by the frame within the frame. ‘We find a similar, an exactly corresponding structure indeed, if we switch from reason 9 will or from cognition ta action. Now, the problem is not identity but difference. But if difference, whieh difference? Action, according to our understanding, seeks to produce a difference from what otherwise would be the ease. It introduces this difference into the world and therefore needs motives and social legitimation. According ‘to our understanding! Tho old-Buropean tradition had a mmpletely differ. ‘ent notion of action, Action was conceived as embesided in natare (and ‘this includes social order). It was one af the natural processes seeking its ‘own end and ending in the perfect state of nature, or failing to reach this state. Action was therefore a case of re-entry of the natural distinction of perfection and corruption into natare; and the human being was thought ‘to be able to reflect this difference, to observe its own nature accordingly Goals were objects of cognition (or error) guia ex se patet qued optatur, a3 ‘one might tay. There was no need for motives and no need for Tegitima- tion. The actor had to produce tha re-entzy of nature by knowing what. ‘nature demands and how natare can fail, can miss its own ends, ‘This bifurcation of two re-entries, coping with identity and difference respectively, was organized by the distinction of engnition and action or, in ‘terms of human potentials, reason and wil. In addition we find bridging ‘mechanisms; eg. the demand that reason should control passions that otherwise would have a corrupting influence on ends, One problem how- ‘ever remains: the unity of the difference of reason and will. This problem found a theological sclution. In God there is nc such difference because His knowledge is action and His action cannot deviate from His know!- ‘edge. Ifhumans are created as images of the unity of God they have their ‘own unity in this origin and destiny although in their present state they ‘have no immediate access to the visio Dei (except in 2 metaphorical way") ‘Again, the solution to the problem, the unfoking cf the original paradox is, given by an appropriate distinction, And appropriate means: apprepriata for the time being. 480 1 Without sharing a past we would not be able to communicate. ‘Negating the relevance of the past and operating without commitment to binding traditions belongs to the central tenets of the modem idea of rationatity. But this imperative of denying tradition has itself become a tradition leaving us with the question whether this tradition of deni remains the essence of a selfjustifying rationality—and if so, why? ‘There may be an inhorent blindness in this tradition of pastless ratio- nality. If, could we replace this blind spot with a different one? And the different one may be the blind spot required by the paradox of a re- enury of a distinction into itsof Furthermore, the distinction between rationality and tradition may re-enter itself, Rationality then presupposes a reconstruction of its own. past so that it can continue and discontiaue its own tradition, being ‘same and different. atthe same time. For tradition is no langer a sell ‘confirming process of handing over what remains tree under changing ‘Greumstances. Rather, it is a range of possibilities available for self- authenticating choice Part of this task eould be fulfilled by a sociological reeanstraction of the plausibility conditions of frames within frames or distinctions that reenter themselves. The societies of our tradition had to build their ‘own identity on a scheme of differentiation implying inequality, be it the inequality of city life and country life (citizens and farmers, center and periphery), or the inequatity of social rank; i.¢., the distinction between noblemen: and commoners, Thie order required Lin spite of admitted mobility for demographic or other reasons) 8 description that, insisted on natural positions or fixed places. Knowing your nature ‘would then mean: knowing where and in which family (and tharefere: for what) you are born, The impact of this tradition remained strong ‘even in early modem times when politieal society had become the state, tnd the state a rogional unit including cities and country. And it sur- vived the redefinition of aristocracy as a political institution, founded in civil law and not ia natural law. Since nature was imperfect anyway there could be ersors of birth which the king coutd recognized and cor rect by enneblement. But on the whole the crder required (see Moliere) you to know gour natural place and to stay there. It was difficult enough for a sinner to live up te the requirements of placa and profes: "This world we have lost, and we lost it because the cocietal aystem chargod its structural frame, its mode of difTerentiation. The primacy ‘made of societal differentiation switched from center/periphory or rank 489