Iran Travel Ban Aff

1ACs
 Plan Text

The United States federal government should substantially reduce restrictions on immigration from
Iran
 1AC – Iran Democracy Adv
Iran is at a crossroads – US foreign policy support is vital to shift the balance between hard-liners
and progressives
Vakil 18 – Sanam Vakil, James Anderson professorial lecturer in the Middle East Studies department at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS Europe) in Bologna, Italy. “Iran on the
Brink: Challenges & Opportunities for Washington.” The Hoover Institution at Stanford University, 25
April 2018,
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/vakil_iran_on_the_brink_updated_.pdf. Accessed
07 July 2018. Hi Roaster

Almost four decades after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran is at a decisive crossroads. Since
January 2018, four mounting interconnected internal and external crises have collided, challenging long held assumptions regarding
the Iranian government’s strength and durability. Pressures resulting from Iran’s expansionist regional foreign policy,
uncertainty over the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Iran’s economic recovery,
deep public
dissatisfaction after weeks of dissent and public protest, and unbridgeable factional divisions among the
political elite have simultaneously come to a head endangering the stability of the Islamic Republic. To be
fair, this is not the first time Iran has reached a critical fork in its post-revolutionary road. One could argue that Tehran, having
survived the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war, the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, and the decade-long standoff with
the international community over its nuclear program from 2003–2015, has been at similar junctures before. These previous
challenges though have been overcome due to a relative degree of unity among the political elite. Today,
that unity appears to be hanging by a thread as Iran’s notoriously factionalized politicians are fighting
not only for the future of the Islamic Republic, but also their place in it. Most visibly, Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s
pragmatic president is butting heads against the unelected state apparatus and Iran’s Supreme Leader
Khamenei in a fight over the economic and political future of the country. Pragmatist and reformist politicians have
long argued that the best means to protect the system of the Islamic Republic is to permit liberalizing economic and political trends
supported by the people. Hardliners
fear that these changes will open the door to the gradual transformation
and thereby dissolution of the Islamic values and revisionist ideology of 1979 revolution. This ideological
discord over the issue of reform has been ongoing for years. However, amidst the pressure of internal unrest and external unity against
Iran, Tehran is at a crossroad where decisions must finally be made to avoid a further downward spiral or
equally dangerous stalemate threading together tensions over domestic, economic, and foreign policy
reforms. The consequences of this fight could result in continued stagnation or possible evolution of the
Islamic Republic. This infighting and its outcome pose a distinct challenge for the United States as it
reconsiders its role in the Middle East as a guarantor of regional stability. Washington has been at odds with Tehran
since the 1979 Iranian Revolution that brought the anti-American Islamic Republic into existence. After four decades without official
diplomatic relations, political and ideological friction on both sides have further polarized tensions and widened the gulf between
Tehran and Washington. These tensions have resurfaced since the election of Donald Trump and his pursuit of a tougher line against
the nuclear deal, Tehran’s “malign” regional activities and ballistic missile program. In concert with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Washington has resurrected its age-old policy of containment to push back Iran.
Today though, Washington does not understand Iran—its nuances, cleavages, opportunities, or its changes. As a result,
Washington’s go-to Iran policy option of containment has become nothing but short term and reactionary
resulting in little impact on the ground. The absence of political ties has also limited its ability to
nurture or nudge Iran towards much-needed popularly supported change . Indeed, anti-Iranian sentiment has
become the status quo pillar of US foreign policy in the same way that the Islamic Republic holds fast to its anti-American ideology.
Both sides are now bound together by the conflict that has come to define their relationship. This contributes to a further hardening of
popular perceptions on both sides. As Iran teeters on the precipice, Washington must prepare for the variety of challenges and possible
political changes and outcomes that could come to the fore in Tehran. Rather than enshrining conflict as part of its foreign policy, it
requires a grand strategy that addresses Washington’s short-term conflicts and long-term opportunities. Without a comprehensive,
proactive, long-term grand strategy for Iran—one that balances pressure against engagement and is directed towards removing this
threat—Washington will be sitting on the sidelines at a moment of consequence and will be unable to translate long sought after
change into a positive development for the United States. Understanding the nexus, connectivity, misperceptions, and potential
miscalculations stemming from budding external and internal pressures is the key to unpacking Iran’s interconnected challenges to
presenting opportunities for the United States to move beyond containment and consider engaging its longtime enemy.
The travel ban prevents reform---passing the plan strengthens protesters
Maloney 18 – Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute.
“Trump can help Iran’s protesters by rejecting his own Iran policies.” Brookings Institute, 03 January 2018,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2018/01/03/trump-can-help-irans-protesters-by-rejecting-his-own-
iran-policies/. Accessed 06 July 2018.
HOW AMERICA CAN RALLY THE WORLD

The checkered U.S. track record in the face of the 2009 protests meant that restraint was never in the cards for Obama’s successor and
certainly not for an impresario like Trump. The president has made a point to differentiate himself from his predecessor on a range of
key issues and has lambasted Obama’s approach to Iran since he launched his bid for office. For this reason, Trump’s Twitter barrage
on behalf of Iran’s protestors was inevitable. In a series of tweets over the course of the past few days, the president has blasted the
Iranian leadership as “brutal and corrupt” and expressed sympathy for the “great Iranian people” who are “hungry for food &
freedom.”

Some analysts have criticized this approach, including a former Obama official who admonished the administration to “keep quiet and
do nothing.” While presumably well-intentioned, the critics are wrong. When a grassroots movement emerges to confront
one of the most durably dangerous governments in the world, there is no reasonable alternative—and no
alternative consistent with American interests and values—other than to embrace, uphold, and defend the
activists.
Official American statements can encourage Iranians who are confronting an unjust system and serve as a warning to Iran’s leadership
that, as Trump has tweeted, the “world is watching.” However, rhetoric alone is not enough—Washington and the world can do more
to assist the protesters’ cause.

First, Washington must work to build a diplomatic consensus on Iran, focusing especially on European and Asian partners. European
voices are especially important right now: Iranian leaders are counting on the old rules of the game, where the prospect of expanding
trade and investment binds Europe to silence around Iran’s worst abuses, to apply. Tehran will be sensitive to any sign that Paris,
London, or Rome—as well as Seoul and Tokyo—are willing to reconsider their growing economic and diplomatic ties if the
demonstrations are forcefully repressed.

To date, multilateralism has not been Trump’s strong suit, and the administration’s hostility toward the nuclear deal has opened new
transatlantic rifts. Still, consensus building on the Iran crisis is not impossible: The White House can look to the example of President
George W. Bush, who sought to build bridges with America’s traditional allies on Iran, even amid friction around other issues. Those
efforts eventually paid off, serving as the basis for a robust coalition around the nuclear threat that helped persuade Tehran to negotiate
in earnest.

In addition to rallying the world, the White House should make every effort to ensure that Iranians can access technology to
communicate with one another and access independent sources of information. In some cases, U.S. companies have blocked access to
useful applications out of an abundance of caution in respecting the thicket of sanctions surrounding Iran. Several firms have already
moving to remove limitations on their own, but new guidance from the Treasury Department may help sustain secure coordination
among activists and offer additional protection from Tehran’s vast intelligence and censorship machine.

most important step that the White House could take in support of Iran’s courageous opposition
Finally, the
would be to remove Iran from the list of countries subject to Trump’s travel ban. Iranians were
justifiably affronted by the restrictions, in part because they were disproportionately affected. Despite the
long rupture in diplomatic relations between the two countries, Iran sends more of its citizens to America
via non-immigrant travel—more than 35,000 in 2015—than any of the other nations included in the ban.
Even as the restrictions were put in place, they blocked women’s rights activists, victims of torture by the
security services, and other human rights defenders from entering the United States and shattered the hopes
of many others who saw the United States as a beacon of hope and freedom.
While their government may be reprehensible, there is simply no evidence that Iranian travelers pose a terrorist threat. The facts show
just the opposite: The millions of tourists, students, immigrants, and refugees who have come to the United States from Iran since
1979 have contributed greatly to American society and to the U.S. economy, assuming leading roles in arts, science, business, and
even politics.

Removing Iranians from the travel ban—or, better yet, lifting it entirely—would restore American values to
their central place in U.S. policy toward Iran and deprive Iran’s leaders of a rhetorical cudgel. Iranian
officials have already invoked Trump’s ban in scorning Washington’s expressions of sympathy for the
demonstrations.
Ending the restrictions on Iranian travel to the United States isn’t merely a symbolic step. Unfortunately, past experience suggests that
the unrest within Iran may force some activists and dissidents into hurried exile. All those who are risking
their lives and their livelihoods to challenge Iran’s repressive government should know that American
support goes beyond words—that the country can be a place of refuge for today’s human rights defenders,
just as it has been for so many before them.

Support for protesters is key to regime change and democratization – solves Middle East instability
Sajadi 6/10/18 (Saeid, MD, Iranian hematology specialist living in the US, + contributor @ Kansas City
Star, "Real hope for democracy in Iran, but the U.S. should help,"
https://www.kansascity.com/opinion/readers-opinion/guest-commentary/article212899194.html)

A change for the better in the Middle East and the Islamic world depends on a fundamental change
in Iran. The regime currently in power in Iran has acted as the most destructive force affecting the
stability, safety and security in the region and beyond , as well as the prospect for a positive historical change —
comparatively similar to the Renaissance. The nationwide uprising at the end of last year, which shook the foundation of the
regime to its core, continued into this year, surprising many observers both inside and outside the country. Strikingly, it saw
participation from all sectors of society, especially rural poor people, farmers and others who had long been assumed to
support or at least tolerate the clerical regime. These mass protests revealed that the demand for an end of the current
order is not limited to Iran’s urban middle class. They represent the will of the people as a whole. This was
expressed in the form of popular slogans such as “Death to the dictator,” which is particularly provocative in the face of a system that
can legally use the death penalty to punish any criticism of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The other pivotal slogan was “Hard-liner,
reformist, the game is now over.” The latter clearly suggests that the people of Iran look beyond the establishment as a
whole, and they want an end to the totality of the regime, including all its factions. It’s worth noting that the West
has heavily invested in this so-called “reformist” faction as a vehicle for change during the past three decades. The widespread revolt,
which spread to more than 140 cities in a matter of just a few days, points to two harsh realities: the explosive nature of the Iranian
society yearning for a fundamental change, as well as how deeply the hidden and effective network of the main Iranian opposition
force — PMOI, or the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran — is rooted throughout Iran. In trying to wipe out PMOI from Iran’s
political scene, the regime executed 30,000 of its members in the summer of 1988 alone. Khamenei said this January that opposition
activists led by the group had planned for months to facilitate the rapid spread of unrest all across the country. Prior to the uprising,
Maryam Rajavi, president-elect of NCRI, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, had predicted a “year full of uprising” and
ultimate victory of the people over the regime. Since the onset of the uprising, the movement has continued and
spread to various socio-economic sectors. The latest is an ongoing nationwide strike by truck drivers. A few days ago, the
strikers went so far as physically obstructing and forcibly unloading vehicles that had been dispatched by the hard-liner paramilitary
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. In a speech on May 21, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo outlined a new U.S. strategy toward Iran,
clearly demanding 12 areas of “behavior change” from the rulers of Iran. Even though this new policy is geared toward limiting the
destructive influence of Iran’s rulers beyond the country’s borders, it lends support to the Iranian people. Now that everyday
Iranians are risking their lives by continuously coming to streets and demanding change, the U.S. should
seize this historical opportunity with new policy objectives. It needs to support Iranians more
aggressively, and in clear and concrete terms. This protest movement is the only vehicle currently viable
for a fundamental change in Iran, and supporting it is in the best national interests of the American people.

Regime change is key to prevent human rights abuse, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation
Dubowitz and Shapiro 18 - Mark Dubowitz, chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, Iran sanctions expert at the foundation, and Daniel B. Shapiro, distinguished visiting fellow
at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. He served as U.S. ambassador to Israel and as
senior director for the Middle East and North Africa at the National Security Council during the Obama
administration. “Where We Can Agree on Iran.” Politico, 01 January 2018,
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/01/where-we-can-agree-on-iran-216205. Accessed 12
July 2018. Hi Gabe.

Imagine a free, democratic, independent and wealthy Iran giving full expression to the beauty of Persian
culture and the brains and spirit of its people. Imagine a political, clerical and military elite that doesn’t
steal its country’s patrimony while brutally repressing its own people and terrorizing its neighbors. We are
long-time friends who have disagreed vehemently on the wisdom of President Barack Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran; Dan is
Obama’s former ambassador to Israel, and Mark is one of that agreement’s most persistent critics. But we agree with equal passion
that Americans, regardless of party or position on the nuclear deal, should
be supporting the aspirations of Iranians
to be free from their brutal and corrupt rulers. That’s the dream of the tens of thousands of Iranians who
have taken to the streets this past weekend in dozens of cities across the country.
Iranians are on the streets voicing fury about corruption, inflation and unemployment—but they are also directing their ire against the
regime’s foreign adventurism in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza and against the billions of dollars provided to terrorist proxies like
Hezbollah. The Iranian clerical regime is a cruel, human-rights abusing, terrorism-sponsoring menace that is
destabilizing the Middle East, developing and proliferating missiles and seeking nuclear weapons. It
runs an economy so far incapable of capitalizing on the relief of sanctions for the good of its people
because it is regime-controlled, socialist, centrally planned and stifling to private entrepreneurship.
Companies controlled by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his Islamic Revolutionary Guards and the clerical establishment provide
billions to grease their corrupt patronage networks. They have permeated key sectors of the economy, creating legal and reputational
risks that have sidelined both foreign and private Iranian investors.

One clear takeaway from these protests is that, as outsiders, we don’t know enough. The
causes of the protests are not
monolithic, their scale is significant but not necessarily determinative, the trajectory is uncertain, the
leadership unclear and the regime’s response is likely to be repressive . We must approach these protests with
humility in understanding their ultimate meaning and impact. They are big, bold, widespread, impressive and heartfelt—but we have
no idea if these protests will mushroom into a genuine threat to the regime. We hope so; any prospect of shortening this
Iranian regime’s lease on life should be welcomed. If this movement could lead to the end of Khamenei’s
regime, it would be a boon mostly for Iranians but also for Lebanese, Iraqis, Syrians, Yemenis, Israelis,
Palestinians, Saudis, Emiratis—and for Americans.

Even the perception of Iran prolif would cause regional war which draws in the US
Amanda Erickson ’18, Foreign affairs writer for The Washington Post. Previously, she worked as an editor
for Outlook and PostEverything, “How Trump’s Iran deal decision may lead to war,” The Washington
Post, 5/11/18,
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/news/worldviews/wp/2018/05/11/how
-trumps-iran-deal-decision-may-lead-to-war/ what’s

Tension between Israel and Iran is nothing new, of course. But the speedy acceleration of violence between
the two countries is cause for concern. And it’s almost certainly a result of Trump's decision. “While Israel
and Iran have been conducting a shadow war in Syria for months under the cover of the civil war there,”
the New York Times wrote, “the conflict has now burst into the open.” It’s anyone's guess how far things
may now go.

Israel and Iran’s proxy war in Syria has been going on for years. As my colleague Ishaan Tharoor
explained, the Iranians' “presence in Syria is a legitimate defense of their beleaguered ally, Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad. And they see their capacity to threaten Israel from next door as a
potential deterrent against a long-standing regional foe.”
That’s unacceptable to Israel. Since 2012, the Israelis have allegedly launched more than 100
strikes on supposedly Iran-linked positions in Syria. It’s necessary, they argue, to keep Iran away
from their borders and stop the flow of weapons to Hezbollah, Iran's Lebanese ally.
But the existence of the accord seemed to help stave off the worst. Iran threatened retaliation
last month after an Israeli strike killed seven Iranian soldiers, but it had never directly struck
back against Israel — at least not until after Trump’s announcement.
Now, without the involvement of the United States, said Ian Bremmer, the founder and president
of the Eurasia Group, a political consultancy, “it is more likely that we see military strikes.”
Bremmer told Vanity Fair that “the Iranians have not responded, and I am sure a part of the
reason for that is that they don’t want to give the Americans any reason to leave the deal. Now
that they have done so, I assume that the gloves are off for the Iranians, and it makes mutual
military escalation between the Israelis and the Iranians much more likely.”
A flare-up between Iran and Israel also isn’t the only — or even the biggest — threat. Last
weekend, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif warned that his country might restart
suspended elements of its nuclear program in the face of new American sanctions. “We have
put a number of options for ourselves, and those options are ready including options that would
involve resuming at a much greater speed our nuclear activities,” Zarif told Margaret Brennan
on CBS’s “Face the Nation.”
If Iran can’t wrangle enough economic concessions from Europe to keep the nuclear agreement
intact, it might see a ramped-up nuclear program as its only option. If that happens, “you get a nuclear
race in the Middle East ,” James Dorsey, a Middle East specialist at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies in Singapore, told the Atlantic.
President Trump announced May 8 that the United States will resume sanctions on Iran. The
Post’s Alan Sipress and Karen DeYoung explain how his decision might affect an already tense
Middle East. (Sarah Parnass, Joyce Lee/The Washington Post)
The prospect of a nuclear arms race in an increasingly fractured and volatile region is terrifying.
Even a whiff of nuclear prolif eration activity in Iran might be enough to create a disaster. Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made no secret of the fact that he’s willing to intervene in
Iran directly, launching targeted strikes to blow up Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The Obama administration opposed such intervention, favoring diplomacy and focusing on
keeping the United States from plunging into another Middle Eastern war. In Trump, though,
Netanyahu has an ally who shares his aggressiveness. As retired U.S. Army Gen. Wesley Clark
wrote for CNBC: “Israel has several times sought U.S. help, or at least U.S. support and backup in
striking Iran’s nuclear program. Under the Obama Administration, the answer was, No. Under
President Trump, and with the emerging condominium of interests between the Saudis and the
Israelis, the possibility of war between Israel and Iran is rising.”
And if that happens, Trump might find himself unable to stay out of the fight. “President Trump’s
actions in quitting the Iran accord would place a large share of the responsibility on the United
States, increasing the likelihood that the U.S. would, in fact, support and reinforce Israel,” Clark
wrote.
So the worst-case scenario may not be a brutal regional war with thousands of lives on the line. It
could be an American intervention with tremendous global consequences. As The Post’s editorial
board put it earlier this week: “The Saudis and Israelis may hope that Mr. Trump’s decision will
draw the United States back into the Middle East through a confrontation with their enemy. The
president has frequently said that he has no wish for further Mideast wars; his decision has
made one more likely.”

Failure to replace the current Iranian regime ensures regional instability – Iran’s regime actively
seeks to destabilize the region
Pollack 18 (Kenneth, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, "Why Push Back on Iran?,"
4/30, https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/04/iran-poses-serious-threat-to-middle-east-peace-stability/)
what’s up Miss Beck

I believe that American interests will be deeply and broadly affected by the nature of these changes. The
Middle East is
transforming itself, but it is not clear what it is turning into. The region is still very early in the process . The
fall of governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq (in 2014) illustrate that the dominant trend is still the end of the
old order and not yet the emergence of the new. There are many possible futures for the Middle East. Some of these
would be very good for the United States, particularly those scenarios that bring about greater peace and
prosperity in the region. There are many other potential futures for the Middle East that would be very
harmful to the United States. Scenarios in which the Middle East became more violent and unstable would
threaten the region’s oil exports (likely to remain vital for at least the next 10–20 years no matter how much shale oil
 spawn more terrorists and refugees , and spill over in other ways onto America’s allies and
we frack),
trading partners in Europe, Asia, and Africa. One of the most profound threats that Iran poses is that it is
actively struggling to push the transformation of the Middle East in directions that best suit its interests,
most of which do not suit the United States or the people of the Middle East . At home and abroad, the Iranian
regime favors autocracy, backward economic policies, and benighted social systems . It backs virtually
anyone willing to employ violence to subvert the status quo and/or fight the United States and its allies . It
sees opportunity in mayhem, and seeks to weaken the Arab states so that they can be dominated. The more
that Tehran is allowed to shape the transformation of the Middle East over the coming generation,
the more likely it is that the Middle East will emerge even more impoverished and unstable than it is
today.

Iran-fueled Middle Eastern instability causes a great power war---it’s more dangerous than North
Korea
DiChristopher 18 (Tom DiChristopher is an award-winning multimedia journalist who covers energy for CNBC.com. He
previously coordinated online coverage of broadcast guests for a number of CNBC's Business Day programs. “Iran-Israel strikes show
risk of Middle East war is growing after US exit from nuclear deal,” 5/10/18. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/10/risk-of-war-in-the-
middle-east-grows-after-us-exit-from-nuclear-deal.html) what’s up Miss Beck

Middle East watchers warn that Trump's decision to abandon the nuclear deal emboldens Israel and Saudi Arabia
to take a more aggressive stance against Iranian forces and proxies in the region. They say it also marginalizes
Iran's political moderates like President Hassan Rouhani and emboldens the nation's hard-line conservatives
and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, an elite military organization loyal to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. "US
withdrawal from the JCPOA could shift the balance of power among the Iranian leadership from those who
want to keep the deal operational to hardline elements more willing to risk escalation by strengthening support
for regional proxies, and who favour economic self-sufficiency and opposed President Rouhani's push for greater engagement with the
West," ratings agency Fitch said Thursday, referring to the deal by its official name, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The
long-standing fear is that open military conflict among the Middle East's dominant players will devolve into a
regionwide conflict that drags global powers like the United States and Russia into war. It could also
choke off oil supplies from the world's largest energy export hub. The Israeli-Iranian exchange on Thursday is only
the latest flare up in Syria's seven-year war that has drawn in Russia, the United States, Kurdish fighters and
Turkey. The delicate balance of alliances and competing interests now risks tipping past the point of no
return, according to Helima Croft, global head of commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets. "I very much
worry that the antagonists seem to believe that this can be a managed and contained military escalation but military planners thought
the same thing in 1914," she wrote to CNBC. On Thursday, the White House condemned the Iranian strikes and defended Israel's
counterattack, calling it an act of self-defense. It said Iran's Revolutionary Guard "bears full responsibility for the consequences of its
reckless actions." Beyond Syria, Iran is backing Lebanon's political and militant group Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization and avowed enemy of Israel on the Jewish state's border. The Iranians exercise significant influence over militias in
Iraq, and Tehran is widely believed to be arming Houthi rebels in their fight against rivals in Yemen and a Saudi-led coalition
that includes the United States. To be sure, while the nuclear deal limited Iran's program, President Barack
Obama's hopes that the accord would pave the way for improved relations proved overly optimistic . Iran
has only ramped up its role in foreign conflicts since the deal took effect in 2016. Now, in the wake of Trump's
decision, an "angry Iran is loose in the region," risk consultancy Eurasia Group said in a research note laying out the potential
consequences of the U.S. exit. "In Yemen, Iran will likely encourage its Houthi allies to more aggressively fire missiles at Saudi
infrastructure and, more importantly, transfer sophisticated systems to improve missile accuracy," Eurasia Group analysts forecast.
"The risk of the deaths of Saudi citizens increases, as does the risk of a tough and escalatory Saudi response." However, it's the Syrian
conflict where Eurasia Group sees the highest risk of volatility. "As we expected, Israel has ratcheted up airstrikes against Iranian
targets, seeking to thwart the establishment of Revolutionary Guard bases throughout Syria," its analysts said. The heightened political
risks could also inflame other tensions tied to Iran that have roiled the Arabian Peninsula, Fitch warned. It notes that a blockade by
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on Qatar is largely due to the tiny Gulf nation's ties to Iran. It points out that Oman has
been accused of allowing Iran to funnel weapons through its country to neighboring Yemen, and that Bahrain pointed the finger at
Tehran-linked terrorism for a domestic oil pipeline attack. Closely followed trader Art Cashin said geopolitical concerns in the
Middle East are now eclipsing those over North Korea , whose leader will meet with Trump on June 12 after talks with
South Korea that have begun to defuse a nuclear crisis. "I would keep an eye on the Middle East a good deal more than North Korea,"
he told CNBC's "Squawk on the Street" on Thursday. "I get the feeling as you watch what's going on in North Korea
that the Chinese are very involved in making sure that this thing comes off, so if there's going to be a
concern, it's going to be the Middle East ," said Cashin, director of floor operations at the New York Stock Exchange for
UBS.

Great power war causes extinction

Hans Binnendijk 16, Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins
University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, January 2016, “Friends, Foes, and
Future Directions: U.S. Partnerships in a Turbulent World,”
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1210/RAND_RR1210.pdf what’s
up Miss Beck

Today, themost important external challenge faced by the United States is the reemergence of potential
confrontation between great powers and with rogue states. The United States now faces a risk of conflict with
several potential adversaries: Four are nation-states with nuclear weapons or nuclear ambitions (Russia,
China, North Korea, and Iran) and one is a diverse group of Salafi jihadists. Currently, the United States is engaged in military
action against a wannabe state, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).1 Most of these potential adversaries also cooperate with at
least one other hostile nation, compounding the challenge for the United States.

This is a fundamental change from the previous decade, when the focus of U.S. national security policy
was on two stability operations in the greater Middle East, nonstate actors, and transnational threats . Those
threats still exist, but a new set of challenges from nuclear states and nuclear aspirants is of greater concern .

There are dramatic differences among these potential adversaries in terms of their ability to threaten vital U.S. interests and the extent
to which their goals overlap with Washington’s. As a result, the United States must design a set of flexible and differentiated policies
to deal with each potential foe. The overall goal should be to reduce these threats and the prospect of close cooperation among
adversaries to challenge U.S. interests. To do this, the United States needs to quickly defeat ISIS, deter North Korea, dissuade Russia,
constrain Iran, and engage China.

These potential adversaries have created situations in which a large number of U.S. allies and partner nations are more vulnerable
today than they were a decade ago. Many U.S. friends are in more danger than the United States is itself, and if the United States
should be drawn into conflict with any of these adversaries (as it has already been drawn into conflict with ISIS), it will
probably be to defend its partners more than itself. The principal risk to the United States is that conflicts with any of
these adversaries could escalate. Involvement by the three nuclear powers (Russia, China, or—to a lesser
degree— North Korea) could pose existential risks.
 1AC – Pandemics Adv

US-Iran scientific collaboration is key to prevent, cure, and diagnose infectious diseases---travel
restrictions prevent scientists from migrating, attending conferences, and producing quality clinical
studies
Boodman 17 (Eric Boodman [General Assignment Reporter for STAT (a health and science media authority)] “Travel ban harms
global collaboration — the ‘lifeblood’ of biomedicine — scientists say” Published in STAT – 2/3/17 -
https://www.statnews.com/2017/02/03/travel-ban-trump-scientific-collaboration / WY-TH)

The Iranian scientist was a catch: a prize-winning young pharmacologist with over 40 publications to his
name. “He is exactly the kind of person we would like to bring to the United States,” said Dr. Thomas Michel, who hired Seyed Soheil Saeedi Saravi as
a postdoctoral fellow in his lab at Harvard-affiliated Brigham and Women’s Hospital. But not only would Saravi spend his time in
Boston trying to figure out how diabetes affects a heart’s ability to beat; he would also be acting as a kind
of scientific diplomat. “This would have led to a collaboration between my lab and the lab of his mentor in Tehran,”
said Michel, a cardiologist and biochemist. That plan was scuttled by President Trump’s executive order on
immigration, which barred nationals from seven majority-Muslim countries, including Iran, from entering
the United States. Saravi was supposed to fly to Boston from his native Iran this month, but his visa was suspended because of
last Friday’s order. On Wednesday, because there is no US embassy or consulate in Iran, he went to the consulate in Dubai — over 2,000 miles
away from his home in Tehran — to try to get answers. But a security guard wouldn’t even let him enter the office, Saravi told STAT. For Saravi, the
travel restrictions aren’t just a problem for individual researchers like
whole process has been nightmarish. But
him, or for the labs where they were slated to work. They threaten cross-border collaborations that tap
talent and ideas from elsewhere and hasten discoveries, scientists said. Many of those kinds of
collaborations begin with an encounter at a scientific conference, or, as this one would have, with a student
or postdoc coming to train in the United States, and then going elsewhere to start another lab. By working
with a different team — or multiple teams around the world — scientists may entertain hypotheses they
might not have considered, and can enlist patients from other countries who would not have been able to
participate in their study. The ban affects more researchers from Iran and Iraq than from the other
five countries , in part because more Iranians and Iraqis come to the United States every year on the types of visas given to scientists. In the 2015
fiscal year, there were 847 Iraqis and 820 Iranians here on a J1 visa, which is given to postdocs and medical residents, while there were only 122 from
Syria, and even fewer from the other countries. “About 50 percent of our members are located outside of the US; the reason for this is that science is
global,” said Stefano Bertuzzi, executive director of the American Society for Microbiology, who was adamant that his organization is nonpartisan and
willing to work with the new administration. But to him, the travel ban sends a message that is dangerous for science. “You can’t find all your expertise

Our work is on preventing,

in one country, even in a country that is the size of a continent, like the United States,” he said. “

curing, and diagnosing infectious diseases. If we don’t work together on that,

the whole society will collapse, or at least take a big hit.” His inbox has exploded with emails from organizers
and attendees of the ASM Microbe meeting in New Orleans this coming June who are worried about the ban. “I’ve been inundated,” Bertuzzi said. Even
those who would be able to get into the country are telling him they won’t come to the United States until Trump’s order is no longer in effect. “I can tell
you I have received emails saying, ‘We have already collected abstracts from people from these countries’ … ‘I don’t
want to organize a meeting in the US,’ ‘I want to withdraw my abstract.'” Dr. Mehdi Farokhnia is a postdoc
who studies alcohol addiction at the National Institutes of Health. His work depends on being able to meet
and exchange ideas with scientists at conferences. Last year, that took him to Scotland, Japan, and Canada.
And even though he has American citizenship, he’s also a citizen of Iran, and now he won’t leave the
United States for fear of not being let back in. “I’m a dual citizen, so I am somehow lucky in this situation,
but it’s very, very stressful,” he said. “I don’t feel confident now to leave the country because I’m a dual
citizen and nothing is clear .” Many worry about the ban affecting the quality of clinical studies, by
making it harder to include patients with different genetic backgrounds, experiences, and environmental
exposures. “By decreasing diversity in science, the bias in science will increase,” said Dr. Elmira Hassanzadeh, an
Iranian radiology resident at the University of Illinois at Chicago who spent the last two years as a researcher at Harvard. “If I’m an Iranian … I
will collaborate with my Iranian peers. If there is a hospital that is doing the same kind of project, I can just
pool our population and we can run a multi-center study. These are considered a very strong sort of data. If
I’m not welcome here, my resources back home will also not be welcome here, and that will affect
collaboration.” One public health professor at a major American university, who didn’t want to be identified for fear of being targeted by the
government for speaking out against the ban, is worried about collaborations like her own. While she was a postdoc at Harvard, she met some graduate
students from one of the countries covered by the travel ban. After they took faculty positions in their home country, the team kept up discussions about
public health, and in the last decade or so, that friendship has allowed them to coauthor eight to 10 scientific papers. She worries not only that the
executive order could interrupt her own fruitful collaboration — “It hinders our ability to interact and communicate in person,” she said — but also that
it will stop other potential teams from meeting each other in the first place. Saravi is devastated. Doing research at
Harvard was a “childhood dream,” he said, and he spent 16 months trying to secure his visa. But Michel sees this as a loss for Americans as much as it is
for Saravi: “This
is really the lifeblood of Boston biomedicine, foreign nationals who represent the best and
brightest of their nation.”

Specifically, US-Iran scientific cooperation solves neglected tropical diseases

Peter Hotez and Mohammad Rokni 11/ 6/ 2013 (Dr. Peter Hotez, president of the Sabin Vaccine Institute,
implores the leaders of the G8 countries to focus on an easy and relatively cheap way to save more than one
billion people from neglected tropical diseases. mohammad rokni co writer “Next Steps in U.S.-Iran
Diplomacy: Vaccines Two vaccine scientists—one American, one Iranian—offer a unique way to give the
nascent relationship between their two countries a shot in the arm. “ https://psmag.com/social-justice/next-
steps-u-s-iran-diplomacy-vaccines-69542)

The cornerstone of vaccine diplomacy is two or more countries putting aside their ideological differences
to engage in an intense and focused scientific collaboration and produce an urgently needed technology
that serves humanity. In modern times, the first triumph of vaccine diplomacy occurred in the decade that began following the
death of Stalin in 1953. Together, Dr. Albert B. Sabin in the U.S. and his Soviet virology counterpart each received back channel
permission to jointly devexlop and then test a prototype oral polio vaccine on more than 10 million children in the USSR. The
successful results led to the licensure of the oral polio vaccine in 1962, the elimination of polio in the U.S. in 1979, and ultimately the
eradication of polio in all but three countries. Similar international cooperation with the Soviets to improve the vaccine was a key step
resulting in the global eradication of smallpox. Today, both the U.S. and Iran are under serious threat from several
neglected t ropical diseases that have emerged in our countries because of a variety of factors, including extreme
poverty, urbanization, population growth, and possibly climate change. They include dengue fever, a mosquito-transmitted viral
infection that results in hemorrhage, shock, and death. Dengue has recently emerged on the U.S. Gulf Coast and in southeastern Iran
neighboring Pakistan. Kinetoplastid infections such as Chagas disease, a cause of severe heart disease, are now widespread among the
poor in Texas and the southern U.S. where over 300,000 cases occur, while leishmaniasis, a severely disfiguring skin disease, affects
100,000 or more Iranians, and has also emerged in Texas and Oklahoma. Worm infections are still commonly found in impoverished
areas in bothcountries, and where infections overall account for a significant amount of the health care burdens. Both the U.S. and
Iran would benefit enormously from research leading to the development and joint testing of vaccines
against these neglected tropical diseases. Our recent investigations reveal that the extreme poor living in middle income and
wealthy countries suffer as much from these conditions as those in the poorest countries in Africa, so that all of the world’s people
living in poverty would benefit from new vaccines. Unfortunately because there is no major commercial market for neglected tropical
disease vaccines (with the exception of dengue) the multinational pharmaceutical companies are not attempting to produce them. In
Iran, both fundamental and epidemiological research is conducted on a number of neglected tropical
diseases including Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, West Nile virus infection, brucellosis, leptospirosis,
echinococcosis, fascioliasis, and intestinal worms. Iranian scientists have made several attempts at vaccines
for some of their tropical infections, including prototype leishmaniasis vaccines made from live or killed
whole parasites. However the efficacy and safety of such vaccines has thwarted further development
along those lines. Nascent efforts to develop a safer and more effective vaccine through advanced genetic
engineering —so called recombinant vaccines—are beginning, but a U.S. collaboration to
accelerate their development will be needed. In addition, in order to enhance the efficacy of a
recombinant leishmaniasis vaccine there
may be requirements to add novel substances that increase the body’s
immune response, but the best of these immunostimulants are currently only available in the West
and can’t easily (or possibly legally) be shipped to Iran. Ultimately such steps would help to ensure
future success in terms of producing a vaccine that would be widely used in the Middle East and
adjoining regions of North Africa and Central Asia.

The Middle East is a hot zone for emerging NTDs---causes a pandemic and ignites wars---vaccine
diplomacy solves
Peter J. Hotez 2/15/18, M.D., Ph.D., Director and former president of the Sabin Vaccine Institute,
Executive Director of the Global Network for Neglected Tropical Disease Control, dean of the National
School of Tropical Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine, fellow in disease and poverty at the James A.
Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, former Professor and Chair, Department of
Microbiology, Immunology, & Tropical Medicine, George Washington University, Editor-in-Chief, PLoS
Neglected Tropical Diseases, "Modern Sunni-Shia conflicts and their neglected tropical diseases", PLOS
Neglected Tropical Disease, Feb 2018, 12(2), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5813896/

*EMR = Eastern Mediterranean Region

http://www.who.int/immunization/monitoring_surveillance/data/EMR/en/
The political scientist and Middle East and Islamic specialist Vali Nasr has written extensively about the current wars and conflicts in
the Middle East, attributing many, if not most, of these activities to recent escalations in ancient Shia-Sunni disputes [1]. Nasr writes:
“The Middle East today is more vulnerable to instability and extremism than at any time since Iran’s
Islamic revolution…” and goes on to suggest that the current wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen may represent an
Iranian-Saudi rivalry by proxy, noting that such rivalries intensified beginning in 1979 [1]. Ultimately, he points out that
“[t]he Middle East is bound to go through—indeed, is now going through—a period of violence as the old order
gives place to a new one and Shias and Sunnis adjust to the new realities” [1]. In the meantime, we are only now beginning to
fully understand the global health impact of the current geopolitical situation in the Middle East and
surrounding areas. The Global Burden of Disease Study (GBD) 2015 has recently undertaken an extensive analysis of health in
the World Health Organization’s Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMR), an area that includes the countries of the Middle East and
North Africa, as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan in Central Asia, and Somalia and Sudan in East Africa, which are nations also beset
by conflict (Fig 1) [2–4]. The GBD 2015 EMR Collaborators led by Dr. Ali Mokdad indeed find that the factors of war, mass human
displacement, and political instability have blocked improvements in health for the region, with resultant reductions in life
expectancies in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria, as well as a rise in mental health and drug-use disorders [2]. They also determined
that war and law enforcement now represent the top-ranked contributors to poor health leading to death for adolescents and young
adults [3]. We know that war, political instability, and human migrations are also important factors that promote
the emergence of infectious diseases, especially vector-borne or zoonotic neglected tropical diseases
( NTDs) [5]. Such forces explain the emergence or reemergence of sleeping sickness in Central Africa and
kala-azar in East Africa during the 1990s and Ebola in West Africa in 2014 [5]. Another important factor promoting
vector-borne and zoonotic NTDs is climate change [5], and the EMR has been severely affected in this regard, with record-setting hot
temperatures and shifting rainfall patterns in recent years [6]. According to the GBD 2015, however, overall the disease burden from
infectious diseases in the EMR has declined significantly between the years 1990 and 2015 [4]. For example, in 1990 the EMR’s
leading causes of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) were lower respiratory infections and diarrheal disease, while measles ranked
7th, tuberculosis ranked 15th, and tetanus ranked 16th [4]. Fast forward to 2015, and we find that the DALYs from diarrheal disease
have dropped by 25.6% so that it now ranks 8th, while tuberculosis has dropped to 22nd, and measles and tetanus no longer rank in
the top 30 leading causes of DALYs [4]. In their place, noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) have increased substantially [4]. But
when it comes to looking specifically at the NTDs in the war zones, the overall findings for the EMR’s
shifting balances between NCDs and infectious diseases may mask some ominous trends in terms of the
emergence or reemergence of several key diseases (Box 1). Box 1. Emerging or reemerging neglected tropical
diseases (NTDs) in the Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMR) Cutaneous leishmaniasis Visceral leishmaniasis Cholera Dengue Rift
Valley fever Alkhurma hemorrhagic fever Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever One important example is cutaneous
leishmaniasis. According to the GBD 2015, cutaneous leishmaniasis does not rank among the 30 leading causes of DALYs in the
EMR [4], but alternative estimates suggest that the DALYs from this condition may be severely underestimated
because patients with inactive disease who are left with permanent scars are not fully considered in GBD
estimates, nor are the psychosocial consequences of facial scars [7]. The GBD 2013 reports that the global prevalence
of cutaneous leishmaniasis has increased 174% since 1990, with much of that increase attributed to a sharp uptick in the number of
cases in the EMR [8, 9]. Indeed, the 5 leading countries in terms of cutaneous leishmaniasis prevalence rates are all in the EMR, led
by Afghanistan [8, 9]. Precise incidence rates and the exact number of new cases of cutaneous leishmaniasis in
the conflict areas of Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen are difficult to assess because of the lack
of active surveillance activities amid the collapsed health systems in these nations, but initial assessments
indicate high rates of the disease [10–13]. Compared to the years before the Syrian conflict, for instance, the numbers of
cutaneous leishmaniasis cases are thought to have since increased 2–5-fold to over 100,000 cases in 2014 alone, due to the stoppage of
vector control activities and the creation of new sand fly breeding sites amid the bombed-out rubble in cities such as Aleppo [13].
Subsequently, some indoor residual spraying has resumed so that the expected numbers of new cases may not be as high [13].
However, cutaneous leishmaniasis remains hyperendemic in Syria, and the reemergence of visceral leishmaniasis has now also been
noted [13]. Because refugees fleeing conflict areas of Syria also exhibit high prevalence of rates of cutaneous
leishmaniasis, they may introduce the disease in surrounding countries where sand flies are found,
especially in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon [11, 12]. Also worrisome is the worsening situation in Yemen,
where the conflict there could promote the reemergence of cutaneous leishmaniasis. Yemen is also the site
of the EMR’s other major NTD outbreak, now resulting in a massive increase in cholera cases. According to the World
Health Organization, the total number of cases now exceeds 500,000, with almost 2,000 deaths, such that
Yemen currently represents the world’s largest cholera epidemic [14]. The health system of Yemen is
believed to be collapsing, and similar to the cutaneous leishmaniasis situation in Syria, there are shortages of
medicines and supplies [14]. It’s interesting to note that despite similar circumstances and healthcare collapses in Syria, so far there
have not been major outbreaks of cholera or other diarrheal diseases [13]. The EMR region continues to be at risk for
additional outbreaks of NTDs. It has been noted that dengue and other arbovirus infections may be
reemerging and causing large outbreaks in Pakistan and on the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa , especially
in areas that border the Red Sea [15]. Egypt also experienced a dengue outbreak in 2015 [15]. There is an urgent need to better
understand the drivers for dengue emergence and to determine the relative contributions of conflict, climate change, and human
migrations and commerce [15]. There
are also several other emerging NTDs of concern, including Rift Valley
fever previously introduced into the Arabian Peninsula from Kenya, and several other viral hemorrhagic
fevers (HFs), including Alkhurma HF and Crimean-Congo HF [16, 17]. Over the last few years, the EMR has
emerged as the newest important “hot zone” for emerging and reemerging NTDs. We have also seen
important vaccine-preventable childhood diseases reappear, such as measles and polio [18], in addition to
the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome ( MERS) coronavirus [19, 20]. Tuberculosis is also a major contributor to the
premature death of young adults [4], but the extent to which this finding represents a new situation remains unclear. Overall, most
investigators attribute a rise in tuberculosis rates to the ongoing hostilities [11]. While war and political instability in the EMR have
become a major driver for NTDs and other poverty-related neglected diseases, we may be witnessing how conflict pairs with other
A major
forces such as climate change, shifting patterns of poverty, and human migrations linked to the Hajj [19, 20].

concern is that the NTDs now rising in the conflict areas are spilling into
other EMR areas and potentially could ignite a pandemic . In 2014, we saw how
Ebola arose in the setting of collapsed health systems due to the atrocities in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone and then threatened to overtake much of West Africa and beyond. We may be witnessing a similar
set of forces and drivers in the EMR [19, 20]. Professor Nasr has pointed out that “[t]he Shia-Sunni conflict is at once a
struggle for the soul of Islam—a great war of competing theologies and conceptions of sacred history—and a manifestation of the kind
of tribal wars of ethnicities and identities….with which humanity has become wearily familiar” [1]. But almost certainly the
Sunni-Shia divide is not the only driver of political instability leading to disease emergence. Today, the
world’s Islamic nations belonging to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) account for a high
percentage of the global burden of NTDs [21]. Potentially one or more of these diseases could soon
consume the EMR and possibly other parts of the Islamic world. We therefore need to identify
mechanisms to isolate or control the NTDs now emerging from the conflict zones and promote better
cooperation between the warring factions for this purpose. Ultimately, the Muslim world has been
rendered highly vulnerable to NTDs, which will further destabilize OIC countries and
promote poverty. Ultimately, we can look to science and vaccine diplomacy to promote disease control
activities across the EMR and to build new interventions for preventing the spread of the new and
emerging NTDs [19, 20].
Pandemics risk extinction---burnout’s wrong
Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs,
University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health
Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028

Historically, diseaseevents have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was
responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th
century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population ,3 while
other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting
over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright
human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.

A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease
would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade
detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is
often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6

While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely.
Although rare, thereare recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also
in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations
being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously
introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native
American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of
population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to
countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be
realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of
treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every
human community worldwide , such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other
pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population .11,12 Under optimal
virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible
levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of
diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that
resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments
demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to
transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental
survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2

US-Iran collaboration is key to modeling the Iranian “health house” model---we can learn best
practices from Iran’s experience
Wren 13 (Kathy Wren [Editorial Director at MIT News, corresponding with the AAAS] “Science & Diplomacy: U.S.-Iranian
Collaborations Promote Public Health” Published in The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) – 5/25/18 -
https://www.aaas.org/news/science-diplomacy-us-iranian-collaborations-promote-public-health / WY-TH)

Despite the complex and often adversarial relationship between the governments of Iran and the United
States, the countries’ scientists have found opportunities to cooperate on important public health projects.
Irene Jillson, a professor at Georgetown University’s School of Nursing and Health Studies, describes the fruits of these efforts in an article in the latest
edition of Science & Diplomacy. Historically, Persia, now Iran,
has been a rich center for advances in biomedicine and
the dissemination of medical knowledge. As early as the ninth century, for example, Ali Ibn Rabban Tabari wrote an early medical
“encyclopedia,” a compendium of traditions in medicine known at the time. And, medical discoveries and developments in the 10th and 11th centuries
helped set a foundation for modern advances in organ transplantation, neuroscience and biomedical engineering, according to Jillson. In
this
century, Iranian scientists, clinicians and other health experts have collaborated with their U.S. counterparts
through partnerships fostered by AAAS, the National Academy of Sciences, the National Institutes of
Health and others, on topics such as food-borne diseases, neuroscience and drug abuse, noncommunicable
diseases, health disparities and bioethics. “This sort of contact is very desirable and useful, and I think it
should be continued,” said Norman Neureiter, senior adviser to the AAAS Center for Science Diplomacy and acting director for the AAAS
Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy. Neureiter visited Tehran in June 2012 as part of a small delegation that delivered a series of lectures
and met with Iranian science leaders, researchers and students. Given the current tensions between the two countries regarding Iran’s nuclear program,
there are lots of neutral, very non-sensitive, non-
“we do not get into the really sensitive issues that keep us apart. However,
defense-related issues that you can talk about in science and technology that continue holding us together ,”
Neureiter said. “Iranian and U.S. scientists get along quite well together.” In her article, Jillson describes several examples of
U.S.-Iranian collaborations in the medical and health sciences. An interdisciplinary U.S. team, for
example, has studied the Iranian “health house” model and has implemented a similar approach in
the Mississippi delta region. This system is made up of primary-care centers in rural areas, where
community health workers provide a wide range of free, integrated health services. Key health
indicators for rural Iranians, such as immunization coverage and primary healthcare access, have
improved substantially since this system was put into place, Jillson reports. The NIH-supported initiative to
study and emulate this model shows that science diplomacy “is not just about bench lab science, but it’s
also about health services delivery. We can’t continue to make the assumption that everyone can learn from
us,” Jillson said. “In this example, the NIH, which is often considered the pinnacle of health research in the
U.S., said ‘this is an important thing to do. We can learn from [the Iranians'] experience .’” Iranian and U.S.
scientists have also collaborated on drug abuse research for more than a decade, according to Jillson. This research has contributed to knowledge about
pathways of drug abuse in both countries, including an understanding of women and drug abuse, which can inform prevention and treatment programs. It
has also led to co-authored articles and to participation by Americans on the boards of Iranian health research journals. Jillson joined this effort in 2008,
when she gave a week-long course on health science at the Tehran University of Medical Sciences, which led to a research project on women and drug
abuse proposed by her Iranian colleagues. During the same visit, she gave two lectures at an international conference on bioethics. She has returned to
address another bioethics conference in Tehran, to lecture at academic institutions in Qom and to continue collaborative research and academic pursuits.
Jillson said that U.S.
and Iranian researchers tend to continue communicating even after a specific project ends.
“I think people have an extraordinary capacity to relate to one another on a kind of parallel basis. You and I
are both scientists, ethicists, researchers—whatever brings us together. It’s that vantage point from which
we will relate, which is the reason I think there’s so much hope in science diplomacy,” she said.

Health houses are an effective and popular way to improve primary care in the US
Hosseini 16 (Hengameh Hosseini [Assistant Professor of Health Care Administration at Penn State Harrisburg] “MISSISSIPPI'S
DELTA REGION: BORROWING A NOVEL RURAL-BASED HEALTH HOUSES SYSTEM” Published in the Journal of Global
Business and Technology, Volume 12 Issue 2, Fall 2016, pg. 7 / WY-TH)

While policymakers were devoted to establishing the health houses network in Iran, the system’s
implementation in the Mississippi Delta region has been carried out solely by private institutions, such as
Jackson State University. Without the support from policymakers in Mississippi, the implementation of Iran’s successful health care protocol
could have been severely hindered. However, multiple partnerships, such as those with Project Hope and CMMC,
were formed in order to increase recognition of healthcare disparity in the region, and to promote improved
healthcare access across multiple platforms (Project Hope, 2011, & Merit Health Central, 2012). Currently, 13
counties in the Delta region are participating in this healthcare initiative, and
various medical professionals involved in this effort have lauded the many benefits of the HealthConnect
Program (Project Hope, 2011, & Merit Health Central, 2012). It is evident that this program has offered, and promises to
offer, many benefits to the region, as it did in Iranian villages. Already, the regions implementing this
system have seen hospital readmissions begin to decrease; hopefully, large-scale improvements in the
region’s health status will follow (Merit Health Central, 2012). In a larger sense, the drive
to adopt the
Iranian system by Mississippi practitioners and policymakers, and the
successes of the system to date, suggests that looking to unconventional sources for healthcare design
– including countries not commonly thought of as model healthcare systems by Western nations – for
inspiration could be a fruitful endeavor. When existing framework and scaffolding of a healthcare system fail to support the
burdensome complexities of regions like the Mississippi Delta region, US health officials and practitioners should perhaps be
more ready to embrace the transfer of knowledge “uncommon” sources outside of organs of the existing
system. Though the healthcare system has traditionally been slow to embrace change, this work suggests
that US policymakers should look to ways to facilitate experimentation within mini-satellite systems –
relatively isolated spheres such as health houses that are independent from established care networks and
systems, in which practices may be allowed to deviate reasonably from the norm. Encouraging such mini -
systems could foster more audacious and rapid innovation and test unconventional setups having the
potential to meet the needs of exceptional populations and regions like that of the Mississippi Delta,
which are being failed by systems already in place.

Strong primary care provides a safety net against bioterror attacks---response capabilities and
surveillance
Vasan 17 (Ashwin Vasan, Assistant Professor of Clinical Population Health & Medicine, Columbia University, “How Best To
Prepare For Epidemics? Strengthen Primary Care”, Huffington Post, 2/25/17, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/how-best-to-
prepare-for-epidemics-strengthen-primary_us_58b18bbce4b0658fc20f95a1)

In global public health, 2016 was a year defined by the end of two important emergencies: Ebola and Zika. But that doesn’t mean the
risk either of these viruses pose has gone away. Zika transmission continues despite the World Health Organization declaring it is no
longer a public health emergency in November. And some have characterized Ebola’s resurgence in 2017 as “a certainty.” We have
to be prepared for these viruses to return, causing future epidemics. With Zika and Ebola, much of the attention
has focused on the need for more effective vaccines, faster deployment of staff and resources in response
and better diagnostics. And all of these are vitally important. But relatively little attention is paid to
rebuilding the underresourced and underperforming primary health care systems in the places most
vulnerable to epidemic disease. I am a primary care physician, public health practitioner and researcher, and have designed,
worked within and studied global health and primary care systems for the last 15 years. We need to take a close look at how
these systems function in places at great risk of epidemic disease, and what we can do to make these
systems more resilient. All too often, however, primary care is simply an afterthought. Primary care is a first line of
defense Why is primary care important in epidemics like Ebola or Zika? First, we know that primary care providers play
an important role in initial outbreak response and surveillance. This has been studied in the context of
the H1N1 flu pandemic which infected approximately 60 million people and killed over 12,000 worldwide
in 2009. In Canada, for instance, interdisciplinary teams of primary care practitioners (called family health teams)
played a critical role in epidemic response and control. These teams identified and isolated suspected H1N1
cases to reduce the spread of the disease. They also helped to treat and stabilize these patients, and took
pressure off the hospital system by managing uncomplicated cases of the virus. Others have argued that a
“primary care safety net” is critical to stem the tide of future flu epidemics. They are often the first
health care providers a person with the flu or other illness will come into contact with. This means they are
vital to surveillance, patient triage, and initial prevention and treatment, including distributing
medication s and vaccines and providing important health information. But during the Ebola outbreak, fewer
people accessed health care services and more people died from malaria, HIV and TB. People stayed away from front-line
health facilities – the backbone of the primary care system – in part for fear that they could acquire Ebola there. This suggests a
basic lack of confidence and trust between affected communities and the health care system. A lack of trust
between communities and government health care systems can fuel epidemics , in part because people may not follow
advice from public health authorities that could reduce their risk of getting or spreading infection. One survey
from Liberia showed that respondents who expressed low trust in government were much less likely to follow Ebola-related public
advisories or precautions, thus increasing the chance of the virus’ spread. But even in settings like West Africa, where there was a lack
of trust in basic health services, there are ways to bridge this gap. Community health workers, for example, are a major pillar of the
primary care system in many rural areas and in developing countries. These workers often share common heritage and historical
background with the people they are trying to help. And they typically live in or near the communities they support. During the Ebola
epidemic in West Africa, hot spots were often in communities isolated because of distance or poor transportation and roads, bad
weather, or mistrust and fear of aid workers, government or international health officials. So community health workers carried out
important epidemic response functions and were able to overcome geographic and trust barriers by virtue of their cultural and physical
proximity to patients. They tracked whom infected patients came into contact with and identified suspected cases. They also taught
people how to recognize Ebola, how to safely bury victims and tend to the ill. In performing these functions, they improved trust
between communities and the government. Community health workers were able to fulfill these roles because they operated outside of
the facilities many people perceived as unsafe, and thus avoided. They took on larger roles, in part, to fill the gap created
by decreased clinic attendance due to mistrust. Better primary care means better health Countries with stronger
primary health care have better health overall. As the late Barbara Starfield, a pediatrician and professor of health policy at
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, showed, countries, and regions within countries, with more primary health care
practitioners had lower rates of death overall and less inequality in deaths. This means that these areas are healthier, and have fewer
disparities in health based on race, socioeconomic status or ethnicity. Primary care systems also help prevent and treat
chronic illness and diagnose common diseases sooner. This is largely because primary care providers
develop long-term relationships with their patients, which in turn increases willingness of patients to seek
care, and to seek it earlier. This foundation makes it easier to respond in times of stress, like during
infectious disease outbreaks. Primary care on the global agenda There are some early signs that primary health care is
becoming a priority on the global development agenda. The U.N. High Level Panel on Health Crises specifically called for
strengthening of primary health care systems as an essential component of pandemic disease prevention in developing world. The
World Bank, WHO and Gates Foundation in late 2015 launched the Primary Health Care Performance Initiative to make it easier for
government decision-makers and public health leaders in developing countries to understand how well primary care works in their
countries and where improvement is needed. This is an important and encouraging start. However, it should not deter us from taking
real action to improve primary health care systems in the poorest countries, which face the greatest epidemic risk. This means more
front-line staff and better training and support for them. Shifting to team-based care that includes community health workers, social
workers and others is another key. Health information technology would improve the quality of front-line patient care, strengthen
disease surveillance and reporting, and make it easier for primary care providers to communicate with each other and with the rest of
the health care system. These are among the investments into primary care that cannot wait. The United Nations Special Envoy for
Ebola reported that a total of US$8.9 billion was pledged for Ebola response by the end of 2015, with $5.9 billion disbursed. This
includes $5.4 billion pledged by the United States, which is the U.S.‘ largest ever commitment to an epidemic. Almost 80 percent of
the $5.9 billion disbursed has been specified for immediate epidemic response functions. Just 18 percent of these funds support
“recovery” efforts which include rebuilding primary health care systems. This is inadequate at best, abject at worst. The National
Academy of Medicine, by contrast, has recommended $5.4 billion in additional annual investment to strengthen essential health
services in high-risk settings with weak public health infrastructure. The National Academy of Medicine also recommended that 87
percent ($3.4 billion) of this annual investment be directed to core functions of the primary care system like treatment and primary
prevention as a first line of defense against epidemic disease. This level of support for front-line health care is the first step in
establishing a foundation of health services that is resilient to unexpected shocks like Ebola and Zika, and provides consistent, high-
The epidemic emergencies that ended in 2016 have awakened us to the threat
quality primary care to all.
that weak health systems and poor primary health care pose. We must repair these systems and improve
primary care now, or risk being similarly unprepared for the next wave.

Bioterrorism causes extinction and turns every impact---manipulated pandemics are both more
virulent and transmissible---BUT effective preparedness can prevent escalation
Miller 16 (Drew Miller is a former intelligence officer, former senior executive service member in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and retired Air Force Reserve Colonel. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard
University and currently serves as director of Advanced Analysis Applications. “The Age of Designer
Plagues” https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/09/20/the-age-of-designer-plagues/) MattG

The world is entering the age of bioengineered viral pandemics

likely New tech like and collapse—BVPC for short. nologies

bioengineering enable terrorist groups, or even one dedicated individual, to modify and release new viruses
that could cause both a pandemic and, as people react, a likely collapse in economic activity and even possibly

law and order. experts say natural or bioengineered pandemics are inevitable
of Many viral (BVP) as it becomes increasingly easier to modify an existing

Should there be a deliberately loosed pandemic, revolutionary changes will flood

pathogen, making it more lethal and transmissible.

our economy, military, foreign policy ; we can we will not live as before during the Age of Bioengineered Viral Pandemics and Collapse. This bleak Age may be unavoidable, but

prepare ourselves to minimize its dangers. Yet the specter of biological attack, especially by hard-to-identity and hold-to-account (let alone deter) non-state actors, is little addressed by the media or even

we seem to suffer from a

inside the U.S. government. Nuclear terrorism we fear and try to deal with, no doubt because we have mental images of nuclear weapons going off to provide a sense of dark possibility. But near
total failure of imagination when it comes to bioterrorism, even though for a host of technical and other
reasons— simpler engineering , much lower cost, quicker critical mass generation, smaller cadre of
workers, smaller facilities for concealment purposes and ordnance delivery—it would be vastly easier for
bad non-state actors to master a bio-attack than a nuclear one. We need to overcome that failure of imagination. In December 2011 national media reported that scientists had
created a deadly virus with 60 percent lethality. Since then, new “CRISPR” technology makes it much easier to manipulate DNA—with kits as cheap as $130 available. Genetic engineering, or bioengineering, is the manipulation of an organism’s genetic material.
Scientists have been creating genetically modified organisms (GMO) since the 1970s, and in 2010 the first synthetic new life form was created. Genetic modifications are common in nature—that’s why we continuously get new strains of flu and have had viral
pandemics (like the 1918 Spanish Flu) on account of some of them. Now it is possible to accelerate genetic change, creating viruses and bacteria that never existed. With newer techniques, a simple, cheap lab (perhaps in a neighbor’s garage) can generate millions of

a terrorist
recombinants in minutes. Through bioengineering can intentionally create a human-to-human transmissible
lone or a Revolutionary Guards lab in Iran

version of avian flu, or modify a lethal virus to have a longer latency period, which would facilitate its
undetected spread It is too late to stop the spread of
. While biotechnology promises great new treatments and advances in medicine, it will also likely be used to design such deadly new viruses.

this technology and its misuse . We have been so cavalier about this mounting problem that we have never bothered to assemble a national or a global data base so that we have some sense of what kind of experimentation is

The only good news is that well-prepared people and nations should be able to
going on for what purposes and under whose aegis.

survive and adapt . As Tara O’Toole, former director of Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, warned in congressional testimony: “We are in the midst of a bioscientific revolution that will make building and

The Director of National Intelligence has added bioengineering technology like

using biological weapons even more deadly and increasingly easy.”1

CRISPR to the list of mass-destruction threats. If a lone terrorist or lunatic launches the virus, it may not spread far before we detect it and limit the devastation. But if an enemy nation spreads a
bioengineered virus with high lethality and transmissibility, plus a long period when carriers are contagious but not suffering from the illness or symptoms, it might kill hundreds of millions. This scenario could leave survivors in a radically disrupted social, political,

A bioengineered virus, launched in our crowded, interconnected world by an enemy

economic, and security environment for years.

working to spread it widely before it is detected, could yield a more devastating pandemic than anything
experienced in the past. Smallpox killed as many as 90 percent of the Aztecs, Mayans, and Incas during the European conquest of the New World, and it killed 500 million

outbreak could be even worse now, since our immunity has expired and our populations are
people in the 20th century. A smallpox

far more vulnerable if terrorists

.A smallpox outbreak could be even worse now, since our immunity has expired and our populations are far more vulnerable. For example, Stanford Professor Dr. Nathan Wolfe warns that, “

ever got their hands on one of the few remaining vials of smallpox, the results would be devastating .”2 Smallpox has
been found in recent years in laboratories, and its genetic code has been posted on the internet. Eckard Wimmer, who headed the team of researchers at SUNY Stonybrook that made live polio virus from scratch as part of a Defense Department project to prove the threat
of synthetic bioweapons, said that any one of thousands of members of the American Society for Virology could figure out how to do the same. Rob Carlson, a physicist-turned-biologist, like many others in the biotech field, warned that developing lethal viruses is

With a human-to-human transmissible virus there is no

increasingly cheap and easy. There is no need for a national program, a big lab, expensive equipment or specialized expertise.

need for difficult weaponization efforts—the malefactor could readily find a simple means of infecting
people in crowded public transportation centers and let them spread the virus. A virus released in multiple
airports would reach every city and probably most small towns in the United States within a few days . Moreover, if
the virus is genetically modified, the limited supply of vaccines we have for smallpox may not even work. If smallpox is too difficult to obtain or synthetically create, someone can use a deadly virus like Ebola or avian flu—viruses still active in areas of the world.
Donald Henderson and other scientists, writing in an article on biosecurity, warned that H5N1 avian influenza kills about 60 percent of its victims, compared to just 2 percent for the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, which killed about fifty million: Like all influenza strains,

If it evolved to become as transmissible as

H5N1 is constantly evolving in nature. But thankfully, this deadly virus does not now spread readily through the air from person to person.

normal flu and results in a pandemic, it could cause billions of deaths around the world illnesses and .” In 2011, Ron
Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam turned the H5N1 virus into a possible human-to-human flu by infecting ferrets repeatedly until a form of H5N1 that could spread through the air from one mammal to another resulted. This was not high-tech
bioengineering, but simply swabbing the noses of the infected ferrets and using the gathered viruses to infect another round. A team of scientists at China’s National Avian Influenza Reference Laboratory combined H5N1 with genetic attributes found in dozens of other

mixing
types of flu. Some of their “man-made super-flu strains” could spread through the air between guinea pigs, killing them. This was condemned by scientists around the world as “appalling irresponsibility” since the new viral strains created by

bird-flu virus with human flu could cause a global pandemic

in With researchers
enza escape from the laboratory and —killing millions of people.

tampering with H5N1 to make it human-to-human transmissible, we should not be surprised if

terrorists and some state regimes are doing so as well. The Soviet Union’s biological warfare program, with far less sophisticated equipment and knowledge than we have today,
produced a host of biowarfare agents. This effort included 65,000 researchers in a vast network of secret laboratories, each focused on a different deadly agent. They produced traditional biological weapons and may have successfully combined smallpox, Marburg,

If someone could combine the 90-percent-lethal Ebola virus with highly contagious
Ebola, and other viruses.

smallpox, one might indeed create an existential BVP. A former leader of the Soviet biowarfare program believes his colleagues still work in Russia and many other nations, and
predicts that bioweapons “in the coming years will become very much a part of our lives.”4 BVP will come not only from accidents in professional labs, but also from do-it-yourself (DIY) biologists in their garages or basements. In 2001 Australian researchers

Other legitimate lab accidents have

attempting to make a contraceptive vaccine for pest control inserted a “good” gene into mousepox virus and accidentally created a lethal new virus that resisted vaccination.

likely occurred, but were not publicized. We shudder to imagine what do-it-yourself biologists and
biohackers are doing. There are more than 2,000 members of a website called DIY Bio. Some work alone
at home, others in small rent-a-lab spaces around the world Advances in DNA-manipulation technology, cheap lab equipment, and information posted on the internet enable a
single person to make artificial smallpox or worse. With “professional” scientists in controlled labs accidentally making human-transmissible forms of highly lethal avian flu and publishing the instructions, we must expect that DIY bio folks in their garage, biohackers,
lunatics, terrorists, or countries like Iran and North Korea will either accidentally or intentionally unleash a BVP. If the first bioengineered virus comes from an accident or is unleashed by one madman it may fail to spread to pandemic status. A worse threat is North
Korea, Iran, or a terrorist group bioengineering a virus they release against us in multiple locations, perhaps after they’ve developed a vaccine to protect themselves. For new, bioengineered viruses, however, there likely will be no immunity or treatment available. So if a

state were to task even a small lab to develop a GMO with the “cubed” power of high lethality, high transmissibility, and long latency
could
period, along with a vaccine for the state’s use only, this state destroy many
have the capability to enemies. Delivered “correctly,” the devastated population would not even know whom to blame for the attack. It may seem irrational
for a state to unleash a contagious agent. But it’s more understandable given the ability to launch the attack secretly, without any identification of responsibility. One could foresee many cases, none of which is as irrational, say, a s the world going to war after a terrorist
assassinated the archduke of a declining state in August 1914. While we cannot forecast the odds of a BVP, a host of experts believes it is inevitable. A National Defense University study of the GMO threat found that “the tools and information required for genetic
modification of microorganisms are readily available worldwide.” They are also very cheap, and “the work can be successfully accomplished by a small cadre [of three people].” This study estimated that the materials and facilities to weaponize a bioagent would cost
about $250,000. “Compared to other projects that might be undertaken by governments or private organizations, the cost of equipping and staffing a laboratory scale bioprocessing facility is trivial.” They concluded that “the potential for corruption of biotechnology to
catastrophic malevolent use is considerable,” with “tangible opportunities for many potential adversaries to acquire, modify, and then manufacture to scale a potential GMO pathogen.”5 A BVP or other triggering disaster need not be all that effective in killing infected
victims to generate a collapse that kills additional people and destroys the nation’s strength. “Collapse” is defined here as a cessation of most economic activity and the widespread lack of law and order, for a prolonged period of time, with very high fatalities (millions,

An existential threat
more than 10 percent of the population). Indeed, GMOs pose an “existential threat,” meaning a risk not just of killing millions of people, but potentially billions, wiping out civilization as we know it. is defined here as

could kill most of the population (more than 90 percent), causing a collapse that lasts beyond a few
one that

years, with the level of pre-collapse civilization not returning for generations . Despite a largely rural population and relatively little international travel,
the bubonic plague wiped out about a third of Europe’s population in the mid-14th century. Today, over half of the world’s seven billion people live in cities visited daily by international travelers. We are more urbanized and densely packed, sustained by food and water

that arrives from distant locations, relying on delivery systems and economic operations may shut down if there is a lethal contagious virus
that

spreading and people understandably do not report to work. Even those with the courage to face the risk may change
their mind when they realize they could bring a fatal virus home to their families. Those that do keep working, medics and
police in particular, are likely to catch the virus. We should expect that most economic activity, public services, production of essential goods, and transportation may cease. To
minimize inventory costs, businesses, even hospitals, now have “just-in-time” delivery of supplies, sourced from lowest-cost providers on the other side of the world. Even if your
local trucker decides to continue working, with multiple long-distance suppliers and shippers involved in moving foodstuffs, a contagious pandemic would certainly disrupt the
flow of essential goods. Panic-buying and hoarding will add to the problem of getting food to the population. How long will our public water supplies continue functioning when
maintenance personnel fail to report for work? Our highly interdependent, just-in-time delivery economy is very vulnerable to disruptions. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, an expert in risk
and thinking about rare events, points this out: “Our connected world appears to be more efficient. But when there is a disturbance, the setback is much harder to handle. Not only
are we building riskier systems, but also the risks involved in failure are a lot larger.”6 When the availability of food and water is threatened, widespread marauding may occur. In
1977, New York City suffered a lightning strike that caused a power failure for one night. Over 3,000 arrests were made for looting, 400 policemen were injured, 500 fires were
started. In 2005, after Hurricane Katrina, looting rapidly spread throughout New Orleans, often in broad daylight and in the presence of police officers. One third of New Orleans
police officers deserted their posts. Given the example of these and other, relatively small disasters, what should we expect in the event of the far more serious scenario of a deadly
viral pandemic? Pandemonium. There are many more reasons why we are far more likely to suffer when a widespread disaster hits tomorrow. For example, despite rising population, we have fewer hospital beds and emergency rooms in the United States today
than even a few decades ago. Between 1990 and 2009, emergency rooms in non-rural U.S. hospitals declined 27 percent from 2,446 to 1,779. Some may not wait to exploit a disaster, they may loot and maraud immediately. UK riots in 2011 showed that law
criminality.” Others said it was inevitable violence from youth fed up with unemployment or
enforcement can break down and violence spread without a disaster to trigger them. Prime Minister Cameron called it “pure
family breakdown. The attacks on police and looting started in London, but spread quickly to other cities across the United Kingdom. Looting and violence grew as more people
took advantage of the opportunity and “marauding gangs” formed. Police lost control of many areas. Innocent people were shot dead in cars and robbed on streets. Thugs in
Birmingham killed three men trying to protect their businesses. The riots continued the following night—and the next. Violence continued in London for four nights until an extra
16,000 police officers moved in to restore order. Criminal syndicates and gangs can accelerate the breakdown in law and order and magnify marauder threats. The number of gang
members in the world is estimated at several million. The United States has tens of thousands of gangs and perhaps a million gang members. The Salvadoran MS-13 gang alone,
known for brutal murders, has tens of thousands of members dispersed throughout most U.S. states. Many people, not just gang members, will use the disaster and the distraction
of police as an opportunity to loot. A major disaster could lead to economic and societal shutdown that escalates in ways we cannot foresee, but we can assume they may be even
worse than the losses from the trigger event. A Defense Science Board study warned that even a relatively benign cyber attack could trigger collapse: “[F]ood and medicine
distribution systems would be ineffective, transportation would fail or become so chaotic as to be useless. Law enforcement, medical staff, and emergency personnel capabilities
could be expected to be barely functional in the short term and dysfunctional over sustained periods.”7 The nation’s leading agency for protecting against WMD, the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, warns that we face the “inevitable emergency of a new threat from biological and chemical agents.” The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, the international police agency INTERPOL, the former president of the Royal Society of London all warn that bio-terror attacks
could kill millions. When Dr. Henderson, who led the World Health Organization’s global smallpox eradication campaign, predicts that a human transmissible form of avian flu
could injure and kill billions, that’s a credible warning of an existential threat. But none of this generates as much public attention or political action as North Carolina’s
transgender bathroom dispute. As for why we are blind to this pending disaster, Nassim Taleb’s The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable offers insights. A “Black
Swan” is an extreme impact event that is outside the realm of regular expectations; nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Concerning such events, Taleb
warns that “things have a bias to appear more stable and less risky in the past, leading us to surprises . . . . The history of epidemics, narrowly studied, does not suggest the risks of
the great plague to come that will dominate the planet.”8 Taleb cites 27 widespread errors in human thinking processes and misapplications of statistics to explain why we neglect
Black Swan disasters like a coming BVP. People cling to current truths and past experiences that new technologies and changing conditions may soon render wrong or irrelevant.
We often fool ourselves with stories and anecdotes, and even invent memories that calm us—but also demobilize us. What we don’t see regularly, we tend to ignore. We learn by
repetition, react and decide by gut feeling, thinking that we’ve thought it through and made a rational choice when we often have not. “We are made to be superficial, to heed what
we see and not heed what does not vividly come to mind.” Taleb cites as examples the diaries of people prior to World War II—few had any inkling that something momentous
was taking place, that large-scale war was coming. And indeed, while we hear much about Churchill’s warnings (and less about Lord Vansittart’s even earlier and more consistent
warnings), his was a rare voice and ignored. BVP “disaster blindness” may be stronger in the United States because we, with the mightiest military, feel immune from attack. This
is precisely why a BVP is a likely weapon of choice for attacking the United States. It could kill more people than even a large nuclear attack, cause more lasting devastation and
economic collapse, and best of all for the attackers—they may get away with no retaliation since we may never be able to determine or prove who released the virus. Our
government spends tens of billions of dollars every year to counter nuclear threats because it’s a long-standing, very obvious threat. The threat of bio attack is much worse, both in
terms of likelihood and of the damage it will probably cause, yet relatively little is done to try and counter or prepare. In 2012 a National Research Council committee on chemical
and biological defense scolded, “The United States probably has not yet adequately embraced the opacity of the threat. It will be much, much more difficult to prepare for and
defend against than prior threats.”9 Indeed, when I interview biologists and researchers who should be troubled by the coming BVP, their more immediate worry is that their
research will be curtailed or over-regulated. They believe that biotechnology promises great advances in medicine and is a huge economic opportunity—a belief echoed by
business executives. Scientists I’ve interviewed fear that warnings about BVP will lead to more regulations, which would drive the research to other parts of the world where it’s
not regulated. They also argue that it is too late to stop misuse of this technology. The Federal government is certainly aware of the bioterrorism risk, but it is not a top priority. The
lead agencies dealing with biotechnology fund and promote the research. Until the first instance of disaster, it is doubtful there will be strong action to prepare for the threat of a
BVP-induced collapse. Nothing major happens in Washington, DC, without laws to direct the action, budgeting, and the commitment of top elected officials. All are lacking now.
There are no special interests and lobbyists pushing for bioterrorism preparedness. The initial or “triggering” Black Swan disaster may not be the biggest thing to worry about. The
“cascading effects” of an economic shut down, the loss of law and order, looting and marauding, and the disruption of health, sanitation, water, and transportation systems
triggered by the initial disaster may deliver much worse, longer-lasting damage. What cascading problems will result when the electrical grid goes down? Can nuclear reactors
remain safely shut down when no one reports to work because they don’t want to risk viral exposure, and local water and electric systems aren’t functioning? With the police force
overwhelmed and ravaged by casualties (first responders are more likely to get the virus), many officers will abandon their jobs to protect their families from exposure. An
The real uncertainty is not whether a BVP or other Black Swan disaster will
explosion in violent crime could be worse even than the virus.

occur, but how bad it will be and how deep of a collapse will result from it. After the first pandemic and collapse, it will likely be impossible to
prevent repeat bio attacks. It may be the next epoch of warfare and terrorism that defines the next era of “civilization.” Most writers covering the Biotech Age emphasize the great
advances in medicine and new means of production. But in a time when individuals can wield the power to kill millions and cause a collapse, the outlook for mankind may be
more bleak than rosy. The destructive power of deliberately malign GMOs and the uncontrollable ability of individuals to unleash a BVP may yield a reversal in mankind’s
fortunes: shorter life spans, crueler lifestyles, and perhaps a collapse of civilization entirely. Whether the first bioengineered virus comes from an accidental release or is spread by
some regime, the key point Taleb makes is that “Black Swans being unpredictable, we need to adjust to their existence (rather than naively try to predict them).” Estimating,
we must
assuming, hoping that accidents, lunatics, terrorists, or enemy states won’t release a GMO, or that we can always detect and stop them, is a mistake. As a nation,

adapt to the existence of the BVP threat now and change the protocols of our strategy, military forces, economy, and preparedness to
ensure the consequences do not cascade into societal collapse. We need to be prepared to deal with the
consequences of a viral pandemic that produces horrific numbers of casualties that cannot be stopped with
a simple quarantine. This problem deserves far more attention and resources. While we likely can’t stop the
release of lethal new GMOs, we can survive if we are ready.
 1AC – Stem Cells Adv

US-Iran collaboration is key to stem cell development---Iranian stem cell researchers are the best in
the world, and joining forces with the US would unlock their untapped potential
Zeldovich 16 (Lina Zeldovich [Highly Awarded Author and Journalist, writing for MentalFloss - Columbia Graduate] “What Iran
May Be Able to Teach Us About Stem Cells” Published by MentalFloss – 3/3/16 - http://mentalfloss.com/article/76349/what-iran-
may-be-able-teach-us-about-stem-cells / WY-TH)

In 2002, Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a religious ruling, a fatwa, declaring
embryonic stem cell research acceptable under Islamic law. American scientists at that time were stuck in an epic political
debate over the cells’ use, but Iranian researchers had a green light to launch various experiments, develop cell lines,
and invent novel therapies. In the 14 years since, they’ve made great strides in stem cell research . And now
that Iran is losing its pariah-state status after sanctions were lifted in mid-January, there are opportunities for collaborations with

non-Iranian scientists —which has Ali Brivanlou, who leads the Stem Cell Biology and Molecular Embryology lab at The Rockefeller
University, intrigued about the possibilities. Petri Dish Picasso Brivanlou discussed the state of stem cell research in Iran—and what other scientists
might learn from that research—during a recent presentation at the American Association for the Advancement of Science's annual meeting in
Washington, D.C. Born in Tehran, Brivanlou did his post-doctoral research at the University of California, Berkeley, and continued his career in the
United States. When sanctions were lifted, he visited Tehran again. “After 36 years, I was quite impressed with what I saw,” he said during his talk.
“Iran is certainly at the cutting edge of stem cell research, in terms of basic knowledge and in terms of
application platforms.” Brivanlou later spoke to mental_floss about the potential benefits of collaborating with Iranian scientists. So too did
panel organizer Richard Stone, who oversees international coverage at the journal Science. Stone noted to mental_floss that before the sanctions were
lifted, there were too many constraints for any American-Iranian scientific collaborations to really work. “That turned scientists off,” Stone said. Now
embryonic stem cells are pluripotent—under the right
new possibilities are opening up. Derived from a fertilized human egg,
conditions, they can develop into any of the 200 cell types present in the body of an adult. Under certain
other conditions, they can keep replicating themselves forever. All these unique qualities make embryonic
stem cells extremely valuable not only for basic research, but also for a gamut of medical cures—from
regenerative medicine to tissue replacement therapies to treating genetic diseases . But because embryonic stem
cell usage implies that, at some point, some embryo had been destroyed to harvest its cells, this research spawned a great deal of controversy in the
Western world. When the Bush administration placed various restrictions on the cells’ usage and funding in 2001, American embryonic stem cell
researchers found themselves in the crosshairs of ethical, religious, and funding wars. For the next several years, politicians, lawyers, and advocacy
groups wrote letters, signed petitions, and composed bills—some in favor of the practice, others against it. Bills were passed by Congress and vetoed by
President George W. Bush, until in 2009 President Obama lifted the restrictions, expanding the number of stem cell lines that qualified for federally
funded research. Meanwhile, the Royan Institute in Tehran, a city of nearly 9 million people on the slopes of the Shemiran Mountains, was an embryonic
research safe haven. (Royan means "embryo" in Farsi.) Iran
didn’t view stem cell research as problematic because under
Islamic law life is defined not at conception, but when one can distinguish a heartbeat, Brivanlou explained in his
talk. Royan scientists began operating embryonic cell lines in 2003, and now have over 40 different lines in clinical trials, Brivanlou told mental_floss. In
2006, they successfully cloned a sheep, naming it Royana, and last year they cloned an endangered animal—an
Isfahan mouflon (a wild sheep). “This was their tour de force,” he said at the conference. “It was a nucleus of a mouflon grown
inside a sheep.” While the world scrutinized Iranian nuclear advances, the country’s stem cell embryonic research had risen to
the scientific forefront. For the past few years, stem cell research in the U.S. has made a lot of progress, David Schaffer, director of the Berkeley
Stem Cell Center, told mental_floss. Schaffer studies stem cell bioengineering and its applications in regenerative medicine. “We now have 362 lines on
the federal registrycompared to something like a dozen in 2004,” he said. Scientists in the U.S., often in collaboration with researchers in Europe and
Japan, have managed to grow muscles, bones, kidneys, intestines, and liver and heart tissue from stem cells, aiming to treat disease or alleviate the
shortage of donor organs. There are clinical trials underway to treat degenerative eye disease with retinal cells derived from stem cells. The goal of
another trial is to alleviate spinal cord injuries by growing myelinated cells, which serve as neuron insulators. Schaffer’s lab is looking into the
Partnering with Iranian colleagues offers many
possibilities of regenerating brain cells that die off in Parkinson’s disease.
advantages, Brivanlou said. The Iranian scientists, who worked in isolation from the rest of the world,
experimented in different research areas—such as cloning endangered species to prevent their
extinction. (Besides the mouflon, they’re also working on potentially cloning an endangered white tiger that lives in the mountains of Iran.) They
focused on finding ways to treat region-specific infectious diseases and genetic disorders caused by
inbreeding. They also focused on producing antidotes to local venomous snakes such as cobras. These
technologies can help countries neighboring Iran, which face similar medical and environmental challenges
but aren’t as advanced. It’s important to note, Brivanlou said, how much Iranian scientists were able to achieve
with the rudimentary tools they had. He likens it to building a car without having hammers and
screwdrivers at hand. Bioreactors that grow stem cells are complex pieces of equipment— computer-controlled to feed nutrients to cells, remove
cellular waste, and keep cultures at precise temperature. Reagents used to grow cells are specific chemical solutions that Western labs buy from
companies that make them. Sequencing DNA, which is part of stem cell research, requires high-end robotics and various chemical solutions. Brivanlou’s
lab can order a dozen reagents from around the world and they get shipped by FedEx the next day. But many Western biochemical
companies couldn’t sell products to Iran, and there’s still no FedEx delivery, so Iranian scientists have had to make everything from
scratch. A bioreactor Brivanlou saw in Iran looked as if it was made in someone’s garage. “It was just a metal chamber with a couple of tubes and a
burning candle underneath to keep it at the right temperature—but it worked and it grew cells,” Brivanlou recalled. “ An
experiment that takes
me a week to make would take an Iranian scientist a year. Imagine what they could accomplish if they
had the same access we do.” Stone also said that because Iranian scientists had to play by tougher rules, they learned to think about every
little detail of a study or experiment. Repeating experiments was difficult and costly, so they learned to anticipate what a paper reviewer might ask for—
and plan for it. “That allowed them to be competitive in a very tough research field,” Stone said. “It made them better scientists.” Joining
forces
in research would unlock the untapped potential the Iranian stem cell scientists hold, Brivanlou said. It
would also allow Western and Iranian scientists to share and exchange research materials, allowing for
greater genetic diversity in experiments. Brivanlou hopes to begin collaborating soon, starting by Skype and expanding to other
venues: “My dream is to have universities in the United States, such as The Rockefeller University, and
institutes in Iran, such as the Royan Institute, to be engaged in a double exchange program as soon as
possible,” he said at the conference.

The plan opens up avenues for academic collaboration, commercial innovation, and open exchange of
researchers that push stem cell research into broader medical practice
Brivanlou 16 (Ali Brivanlou [Robert and Harriet Heilbrunn Professor of Stem Cell Biology and Molecular Embryology at
Rockefeller University, and the head of the University's laboratory] “Prospects for Cooperation in Stem Cell Research” Published by
the American Association for the Advancement of Science – 2/13/16 -
https://aaas.confex.com/aaas/2016/webprogram/Paper18531.html / WY-TH)

**hESCs = human embryonic stem cells

In September 2015, I was invited to lecture at Iran’s Royan Institute, a leading in stem cell research in the Middle East.
I had declined previous invitations due to political tensions. But with agreement assured, and the respect I have for the Royan Institute, I decided to
As a stem cell biologist who took the lead in
accept. After 36 years away, this trip promised to be exciting and emotional. It was.
deriving human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) in academia during the Bush administration, I delved not
only into science but also the socio-political and ethical issues surrounding this research. The hESC project in my
laboratory at The Rockefeller University started in 2002, coincidentally the same year Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, issued a fatwa declaring such research permissible under Islamic law. Surprisingly, Iran became
endowed with some of the most liberal laws on stem cell research allowing not only for hESC derivation
but also cloning (in animals). The situation in the US was not the same, as public funds could not be used for
this research. I therefore was eager to see how far Iran had gone in the stem cell field. I was stunned with what the Royan
Institute accomplished despite limited resources and severe international sanctions. Royan researchers
were the first in the Middle East to clone a lamb, and the first in the world to clone a mouflon, clearly at par
and sometimes ahead of Western labs. Yet Royan scientists cannot perform aspects of research routinely
done here. It is sad to see the consequences of politics on their scientific progress. The removal of
sanctions provides a unique prospect for cooperation between US and Iranian
researchers that can be synergistic if planned and executed tactfully. This can occur at different
levels. In academia, Iranian students will benefit from Western education and technology. It will also
allow Iranian researchers to contribute more efficiently to our current knowledge of human development,
hESCs, and regenerative medicine. Open exchange of students and professors between the two
countries will foster academic collaborations that are vital to our research. In
the private sector, cooperation among companies focusing on human reproduction and stem cell-based
therapies will boost large-scale projects and clinical trials, and will inevitably benefit the economy of
both countries. This cooperation will unveil the best common attributes of two culturally powerful
societies in pushing the leading edge of science ahead for the benefit of all.
Advancement of stem cell research is key to the development of induced pluripotent stem cells, which
reprogram cells and provide new genetic variation - critical to save endangered species from
extinction
Verma & Verma 14 (Rajneesh Verma [PhD Student at Mahidol University in Bangkok] and Paul John Verma [Principal
Scientist - Reproductive Biology - South Australian Research Institute] “Using Stem Cells to Study and Preserve Biodiversity in
Endangered Big Cats” Stem Cells in Animal Species: From Pre-clinic to Biodiversity - 2014 Ed. Tiziana A.L. Brevini, Published by
Humana Press, 2014, pgs. 111-116, ISBN: 978-3-319-03572-7 / WY-TH)

**iPSC = induced pluripotent stem cells

4 Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells Despite

this reality check on what is possible today, it is essential to consider what
might be promising for future intensive management of endangered species, especially as embryo and
molecular technologies advance. So it is imperative to [graph omitted] consider the potential benefits offered
by induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSC) generated by reprogramming adult or differentiated
somatic cells to a pluripotent stem cell-like state using defined transcription factors. In a seminal study, Japanese
scientists (Takahashi and Yamanaka 2006) used viral transduction of mouse fibroblasts to screen a combination of 24 candidate genes with putative roles
in pluripotency and remarkably found that four previously known transcription factors (Oct3/4, Sox2, Klf4 and cMyc) could reprogram mouse embryonic
fibroblasts (MEFs) and tail tip fibroblasts into ES-like cells, which were almost indistinguishable from mouse ESC in terms of pluripotency and coined
the term iPSC. iPSC have now been isolated from rodents (mouse and rats) (Takahashi et al. 2007 ; Honda et al. 2010 ), primates
(human and monkeys) (Liu et al. 2008 ; Park et al. 2008), livestock (pigs, sheep, horse and cattle) (Ezashi et al. 2009 ; Nagy et al. 2011 ; Sumer et al.
2011 ; Khodadadi et al. 2012 ; Liu et al. 2012) and endangered species (Ben-Nun et al. 2011 ; Verma et al. 2012 ). The use of iPSC
technology to provide a source of pluripotent cells for use in felid conservation was considered to be likely
a more successful approach than isolating ESC from endangered felids embryos because it is a non-
invasive technique, which only requires somatic cells. In mice, iPSC are similar to ESC and can form chimeric embryos when
injected into blastocysts. This opened a new chapter, offering the possibility to convert cells from skin to ESC regardless of age and gender of donor and
to use them for ART in various forms. 5 Snow Leopard The snow leopard ( Uncia uncia ) is a moderately large cat native to the mountain ranges of
Central Asia. They live between 3,000 and 5,500 m (9,800 and 18,000 ft) above sea level in the rocky mountain ranges of Central Asia. However, their
secretive nature means that their exact numbers are unknown, although it has been estimated that between 3,500 and 7,000 snow leopards exist in the
wild and between 600 and 700 in zoos worldwide (Kleihman and Garman 1978). 6 First Snow Leopard iPSC - Before attempting to produce iPSC from
snow leopard, we came across a number of unknowns as listed below (Fig. 5.3). Later, we reported the successful derivation of iPSC from ear fibroblasts
of the snow leopard transfected with five human factors OCT4 , SOX2 , KLF4 , cMYC and NANOG . We believe the high transduction efficiency (96 %)
for this study, measured using a pMx-GFP construct, was important in achieving a successful outcome (Fig. 5.4). Of particular importance was the
observation that the three key exogenous pluripotency transgenes (OCT4, SOX2, NANOG) were silenced at later passages. Interestingly, we observed a
similar requirement of transcription factors for induction of pluripotency and an identical pattern of subsequent silencing of transgenes for three globally
diverse endangered felids in a subsequent study (Verma et al. 2013). During the course of our study, we observed that snow leopard iPSC at P14, when
tagged with mCherry reporter and injected into the perivitelline space of mouse morulae, did not compromise development of the mouse embryos. We
next examined whether these iPSC were able to contribute to developing mouse embryos by incorporation into the ICM (Fig. 5.5). We propose this as a
novel in vivo assay to assess the embryo contribution ability of iPSC and pluripotent cells from exotic [graphs omitted] species where species-specific
testing is impossible because of the often extremely limited access to gametes, especially oocytes and embryos. In conclusion, we believe this is the first
report on the derivation of iPSC from both a felid and an endangered species. This is also the first report on the induction of pluripotency in a large
animal with concomitant silencing of the pluripotency associated transgenes .
The iPSC technology has the potential to impact
on conservation of endangered species at a number of levels. It can provide insights into pluripotency
and development in species where embryos are difficult to access. Furthermore, iPSC generated from the
endangered species can be easily expanded for banking of genetic material or used as a reprogrammed
donor cell to improve NT outcomes. They may also create opportunities to prevent extinction in a
wide range of threatened animals in the future. For example, it may eventually be possible to differentiate cell lines with proven
pluripotency in vitro to produce gametes or use these cell lines in vivo in conjunction with tetraploid complementation to produce whole animals (Fig.
5.6). This report has relevance to understanding pluripotency in big cats and also has application in domestic cats, which are companion animals and are
unique biomedical models to study genetic diseases (e.g. HIV, arthritis and diabetes; (Verma et al. 2013 )). 7 Future of iPSC in Endangered Species - If
the many challenges associated with advanced embryo culture, finding the appropriate surrogate mother
and synchronizing the embryo to the uterus can be over- come, then pluripotent cells may well improve
application of SCNT for producing viable offspring (Holt et al. 2004). Generating sperm from iPSC derived
from frozen somatic cell samples from long-dead animals would provide a way to infuse much
needed genetic diversity using already proven AI methods. An analogous approach using pluripotent cell- derived oocytes
could provide an endless resource for fundamental investigations into IVF, ICSI and SCNT (Holt et al. 2004). There is also potential for
these cells as a scalable resource of rare genetic material. Making iPSC for diverse species and populations
available to every interested institution would accelerate research progress on analysing phylo-geographic structure, delineating
 assessing genetic variation—information critical for decision-
subspecies, tracing paternities, evaluating gene flow and
making in managing both ex situ and in situ wildlife populations (Pope 2000 ). Therefore, wildlife-related studies
will need to focus on fidelity measures for the reprogramming process to ensure the production of
legitimate and ‘fit’ iPSC. As these are rare species and some methods for generating the cells reply on viral
vectors, the process also has to be proven indisputably safe for offspring (Verma et al. 2013).

Causes extinction
Phil Torres 4/11/16, the founder of the X-Risks Institute, an affiliate scholar at the Institute for Ethics and
Emerging Technologies, "Biodiversity loss: An existential risk comparable to climate change", Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, thebulletin.org/biodiversity-loss-existential-risk-comparable-climate-change9329
The sixth extinction. The repercussions of biodiversity loss are potentially as severe as those anticipated from climate change, or even
a nuclear conflict. For example, according to a 2015 study published in Science Advances, the best available evidence reveals
“an exceptionally rapid loss of biodiversity over the last few centuries, indicating that a sixth mass
extinction is already under way.” This conclusion holds, even on the most optimistic assumptions about the
background rate of species losses and the current rate of vertebrate extinctions. The group classified as “vertebrates” includes
mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and all other creatures with a backbone. The article argues that, using its conservative figures, the
average loss of vertebrate species was 100 times higher in the past century relative to the background rate
of extinction. (Other scientists have suggested that the current extinction rate could be as much as 10,000 times higher than
normal.) As the authors write, “The evidence is incontrovertible that recent extinction rates are unprecedented in human history and
highly unusual in Earth’s history.” Perhaps the term “Big Six” should enter the popular lexicon—to add the current extinction to the
previous “Big Five,” the last of which wiped out the dinosaurs 66 million years ago. But the concept of biodiversity
encompasses more than just the total number of species on the planet. It also refers to the size of different
populations of species. With respect to this phenomenon, multiple studies have confirmed that wild populations
around the world are dwindling and disappearing at an alarming rate. For example, the 2010 Global Biodiversity
Outlook report found that the population of wild vertebrates living in the tropics dropped by 59 percent between 1970 and 2006. The
report also found that the population of farmland birds in Europe has dropped by 50 percent since 1980; bird populations in the
grasslands of North America declined by almost 40 percent between 1968 and 2003; and the population of birds in North American
arid lands has fallen by almost 30 percent since the 1960s. Similarly, 42 percent of all amphibian species (a type of vertebrate that is
sometimes called an “ecological indicator”) are undergoing population declines, and 23 percent of all plant species “are estimated to
be threatened with extinction.” Other studies have found that some 20 percent of all reptile species, 48 percent of the world’s primates,
and 50 percent of freshwater turtles are threatened. Underwater, about 10 percent of all coral reefs are now dead, and another 60
percent are in danger of dying. Consistent with these data, the 2014 Living Planet Report shows that the global population of wild
vertebrates dropped by 52 percent in only four decades—from 1970 to 2010. While biologists often avoid projecting historical trends
into the future because of the complexity of ecological systems, it’s tempting to extrapolate this figure to, say, the year 2050, which is
four decades from 2010. As it happens, a 2006 study published in Science does precisely this: It projects past trends of
marine biodiversity loss into the 21st century, concluding that, unless significant changes are made to
patterns of human activity, there will be virtually no more wild-caught seafood by 2048. Catastrophic
consequences for civilization. The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend
beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to fully
anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and
irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for
thinking that we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the
consequences could be catastrophic for civilization. As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate
“substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any
ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination . If the global ecosystem
were to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread
social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam
Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected
consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive. Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing
societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles
between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism . (After all, climate change has
been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck
Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.) The reality is that we are
entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of this event could be felt by
civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread
decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem
on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime. The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss
constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate
change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and
survival.

Tissue engineering innovation is key to global food security.

Mark Post 14, MD, PhD in Pharmacology from Utrecht University, Professor of Vascular Physiology and
Chair of Physiology at Maastricht University, and Cor van der Weele, Prof and bioethicist in the Dept of
Applied Philosophy at Wageningen University, PhD in philosophy of Biology, “Principles of Tissue
Engineering for Food,” Ch 78 in Principles of Tissue Engineering (Fourth Edition), 2014, Pages 1647–
1662, Science Direct

Most techniques in tissue engineering were developed for medical applications . The potential benefits of tissue engineering and
regenerative medicine for the repair of non-regenerative organs in the human body have not really been questioned. It is generally accepted that these technologies offer therapeutic
opportunities where very limited alternatives are at hand to improve quality of life. Therefore, a tremendous amount of government funded research and business R&D has been
and continues to be devoted to tissue engineering. Still, 25 years after its introduction, regenerative medicine by tissue engineering is not yet part of mainstream medical therapy

As a spin off
[1]. This suggests that the technical challenges to generate tissues that are fully functional and can immediately replace damaged tissue are substantial.¶

from this research activity, techniques in tissue engineering and regenerative medicine may be used to produce
organs to produce food. This idea is not new and had in fact been proposed by Winston Churchill in his 1932 book ‘Thoughts and adventures' [2] and by Alexis
Carrel [3]. Although the biological principles of tissue engineering of food are very similar to the medical

application there are also differences in goals, scale of production, cost-benefit ratio, ethical-psychological considerations and regulatory requirements.¶ In this chapter
the distinctions between the challenges of tissue engineering for food production are highlighted and discussed. The focus will be mainly on tissue engineering of meat as a
particularly attractive and suitable example.¶ Why Tissue Engineering of Food?¶ Growing food through domestication of grasses, followed by other crops and livestock has a
13,000 years head start. The success of economical food production likely determined the growth and sophistication of our civilization [4]. Why would we try to replace the
relatively low-tech, cheap and easy natural production of food by a high-tech complicated engineering technology that is likely to be more expensive? There are two main reasons

why current ways of food production need to be reconsidered.¶ First, with growth of the world population to 9.5 billion and an even faster
growth in global economy, traditional ways of producing food, and in particular meat, may no longer suffice to feed

the world [5]. Food security is already an issue for some populations, but absence of this security may spread across
all civilizations due to generalized scarcity of food . Meat production through livestock for example already
seems maximized by the occupation of 70% of current arable land surface, yet the demand for meat will double over the next four decades
[6]. Without change, this will lead to scarcity and high prices. Likely, the high prices will be an incentive for intensification of meat

production, which will increase the pressure of using crops for feed for livestock instead of feeding people .
The arable land surface could be increased but this would occur at the expense of forests with predictable unfavorable climate consequences. Lifestyle changes that

include the reduction of meat consumption per capita would also solve the problem, but historically this seems unlikely to
happen. A technological alternative such as tissue engineering of meat might offer a solution. In fact, the
production of meat is a good target for tissue engineering. Pigs and cows are the major sources of the meat we consume, and these animals are very

inefficient in transforming vegetable proteins into edible animal proteins, with an average bioconversion rate of 15% [7]. If this efficiency
can be improved through tissue engineering , this will predictably lead to less land, water and energy
use for the production of meat [8], which introduces the second major reason why alternatives and more efficient meat production should be considered.

Food wars go nuclear

FDI 12 – Future Directions International ’12 (“International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points
Resulting from Food and Water Insecurity Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme”, May 25,
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/files/Workshop_Report_-_Intl_Conflict_Triggers_-_May_25.pdf,)
 the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources .
There is a growing appreciation that

Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack
Yet, in a sense, this is not new.

of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived
need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future
could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in
the developing world.¶ In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses
the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. .¶ He writes (p.36), “… if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not
stable – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.” “Hunger feeds anarchy.” This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The
Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food , land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars

are liable to follow .” He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a
confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.”
He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and

huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by
bloody competition over dwindling resources.” As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they
go to war over resources , either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over
resources, not because people are going hungry. A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is

more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such
wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon.¶ The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the
US C enter for S trategic and I nternational S tudies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a
potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war .
 1AC – Oil Adv
The US oil industry faces a labor shortage now---the next generation of high-skilled workers is
uniquely key (what’s up Miss Beck)
Hampton 18 (Liz Hampton has an M.S. in education and an MBA. She is an energy reporter for Reuters “As oil prices surge, U.S.
service providers eye growing labor shortage,” 5/17/18. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-oil-labor/as-oil-prices-surge-u-s-
service-providers-eye-growing-labor-shortage-idUSKCN1II325)

HOUSTON (Reuters) - Finding roughnecks remains a challenge for oil drillers as rising crude prices increase demand for their
services, oilfield executives said on Thursday at a conference in Houston. Oilfield service suppliers cut tens of thousands
of workers following the 2014 oil-price collapse, and skilled employees have moved to other industries or
are no longer interested. A worker shortage is helping drive up service costs for oil producers, especially in the hottest shale
fields. “Recruitment and staffing is a big challenge. We’re aggressively focused on recruiting people,” said Kevin Neveu, chief
executive at Precision Drilling Corp (PD.TO). The Calgary, Alberta-based company added about 2,000 workers last year. U.S. oil
prices CLc1 have rebounded to over $70 a barrel from lows of around $26 a barrel in 2016, aided by rising global demand and
supply cuts from OPEC-member countries and other exporters. That has spurred a rush to drill new wells in the Permian
Basin of West Texas and New Mexico and the Bakken Shale of North Dakota. In Texas, the unemployment rate was 4
percent in March, near its historic low, versus 4.6 percent a year ago, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. “I was quite shocked
at how fast we ran out of people from our recall list,” said Mike Nuss, an executive vice president at driller Ensign Energy Services
Inc. “We’ve had to scramble and resurrect our training,” he said in an interview at the International Association of Drilling
Contractors’ conference. A study led last year by the University of Houston found 25 percent of dismissed
workers had moved to another industry and 55 percent were considering it. While drillers hustle to secure more
workers, they also need employees with high-tech skills. Noble Corp (NE.N) and General Electric Co (GE.N), for example,
recently announced plans for a fully digitized drilling vessel. “We’re moving to an era where the machines do the work. They run the
analysis and they ultimately do the learning,” said Bob Newhouse, CEO of Newhouse Consultants, which advises oil and gas
companies. “We’ve got to have the right people who can look at the data, look at the information and make
the right decisions.” Although Precision Drilling fielded thousands of resumes last year, Neveu said he worries younger workers
may shun the industry due to its boom-and-bust reputation. “A big take-away for us is making our industry attractive
for the next generation of people working on rigs,” he said.

The travel ban bars Iranian students and workers from entry---Iranians are uniquely key to US oil
what’s up Miss Beck)
Merritt 17 (Asa Merritt studied journalism at CUNY Graduate School of Journalism and is currently based out of Austin, TX.
“Trump’s anti-Muslim policies may portend oil industry brain drain,” 3/9/17. https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/mar/09/trump-anti-muslim-policy-oil-industry-travel-ban)

Chemical, electrical and production engineers are among those who gather every Friday for a service at the
Muslim Association of West Texas, a small mosque in Midland, Texas. According to Farook Rafeek, who regularly
attends these services, more than half of the congregation works in the oil industry. And Trump’s new immigration ban
may keep the mosque from growing: despite an oil industry desperate for specialists like the ones who moved across the
world from majority-Muslim nations to work in Texas, fewer are on the way. “The Trump administration is
already having an impact on hiring decisions,” said George Stein, managing director at Commodity Talent, a recruiting
agency for oil companies. “Two of our international clients are considering basing foreign hires outside of the
United States because of difficulties arising from the ban.” After Trump’s first executive order to bar some travel to the
United States was blocked by courts, Trump issued his newer, somewhat narrower order on Monday. Under the conditions of this
second order, people from Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Libya, Syria and Yemen would not be able to travel unless they
receive case-by-case waivers for “significant business or professional obligations”. Announcements of the two
versions of the ban – and the accompanying rhetoric – are also already undercutting recruiting options within the
university system. Michael Webber, deputy director of University of Texas’ Energy Institute, said last week a graduate student
from Iran lost a job prospect because of the company’s concern over his visa. Webber said the university is also
reconsidering allocation of funding for future students, which might keep top talent from the ban’s six
named countries from moving to the United States. “We can’t give $100,000 to an Iranian here if we don’t
know if they can get a job afterwards,” said Webber. “Our student mix is going to change.” Most of the Muslims at the
mosque in Midland have green cards, but say the anti-Muslim undertones of Trump’s ban make moving to the
United States unappealing for job-seeking Muslims still living abroad. “Canada is looking good. So is
Germany,” said an electrical engineer in Midland from Pakistan, who asked to remain anonymous over job concerns. “When you
come here you feel like you’re giving up your honor just to get set up.” The specter of an immigrant brain drain coincides with
Trump’s promise of massive deregulation, a paradox which puts oil companies in a tricky spot: they want to remain
attractive to a broad hiring pool, but don’t want to ruffle a friendly administration. After Trump’s first
immigration executive order, for example, Chevron issued a statement asserting its commitment to inclusion without explicitly
condemning the ban. “The political priorities are changing,” said Webber. “I keep joking oil and gas will go Democratic in a decade.”
If Trump’s immigration ban clears court hurdles and is fully implemented, experts say it would have a dramatic
impact across the industry. “It would be damaging industry-wide,” said oil and gas consultant Mark LaCour. LaCour
explained the industry already faces talent shortages and has for years: frontiers in the industry such as “downstreaming”
(using petroleum to manufacture everything from plastics to paint brushes) require experts. “Especially around new technologies.
Cognitive science or big data, for example. A portion of those scientists are Muslim,” said LaCour. Oil companies already
compete with tech firms in Silicon Valley for cognitive science and big data specialists. With the ban in
place the two industries will be competing for even fewer immigrants candidates. “Oil is already competing with
tech,” said Webber. “Things just got a little bit harder.” Though some Muslims around the United States have been recent targets of
hate crimes, Rafeek and other worshippers at the mosque in Midland feel safe. “Living in west Texas one thing I’ve noticed is that,
whatever is going on in the media, whatever the rhetoric is of Donald Trump, People are very nice to me. People are kind to me.” said
Izzah Saleemi, an electrical engineer. More than a century of steady, global growth forced the oil and gas industry to learn such
tolerance, but an inclusive approach to hiring hasn’t been around forever . “Oil has a black mark going way back. Fifty,
60 years ago it was famous for being antisemitic,” said Webber. “But they can’t afford that. They need capital and people
from around the world.”

Widespread labor shortage leads to US oil decline---rising prices and a lack of native workers kill the
US oil industry’s growth what’s up Miss Beck)
Eaton 17 (Prior to joining the Houston Chronicle, Collin Eaton covered the local banking and finance scene at the Houston
Business Journal. Before that, he held internships at newspapers in Texas and Washington D.C., generally writing about business,
money or higher education. He graduated from the University of Texas at Austin in 2011. “Labor shortage weighs on oil industry
recovery,” 10/23/17. https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/article/Labor-shortage-weighs-on-oil-industry-recovery-
12295475.php)

MIDLAND - Three years ago, when crude prices still floated above $100 a barrel and the nation's oil fields were booming, Clint
Concord could hire 20 new workers a day here in the West Texas oil patch to meet the constant demand from his production company
clients. But today, with the Permian Basin booming again, Concord said he's lucky to find one qualified candidate every two days to
keep up with the work. Concord, a senior operations at Byrd Oilfield Service, estimates his company is losing $7,000 a day because it
still doesn't have enough truck drivers to deliver equipment to its crews. "Some people got smart and got out of the oil field,"
Concord said. "They're finding other career paths because they can't handle the inconsistency of it." The oil bust that
wiped out scores of companies and tens of thousands of jobs is still weighing on the industry more than 18 months after prices hit
bottom in early 2016, its brutal memories contributing to a labor shortage that is slowing the energy recovery. From small companies
like Byrd to global giants like Houston's Halliburton, the oil field services companies that drill, frack and haul equipment, supplies and
wastewater are finding far fewer people willing to work for a boom-and-bust industry. The shortages are frustrating oil
producers and disappointing investors and analysts who had expected the surge in drilling activity that has
followed rising oil prices to yield more crude and more profits. Oil executives, meanwhile, have deeper fears that
the difficulty hiring is a harbinger of long-term consequences that could hobble the industry for years - or
decades - to come . The precedent is the epic 1980s oil bust, which drove a generation away from the oil industry, leaving a
workforce gap that companies are struggling to fill. In recent years, companies have grappled with the challenge of replacing retiring
workers in their 60s with a new generation largely under 35, without midcareer employees to aid the transition. Even in the prolific
West Texas oil patch, it's as if thousands of workers have disappeared - an eerie echo of 30 years ago. Bandy Watkins, a
salesman at energy service company Pinnergy in Midland, has posted ads on social media, put up flyers in truck stops and paid for ads
on radio stations and local newspapers in the search for truck drivers. But he hasn't found nearly enough to hire. "I don't know where
they went," Watkins said. "Finding fracking truck drivers is now extremely hard." Halliburton has hired hundreds of workers in West
even the largest U.S. fracking company has had
Texas this year to meet demand for hydraulic fracturing services, but
to look beyond Texas to replenish a workforce that was decimated by years of cheap oil prices . The
company holds job fairs in places like Alabama, Mississippi and Nevada. "We have a real bottleneck with people out here," said Chris
Gatjanis, who runs Halliburton's operations in the Permian. "When the market fell, we reduced our head count. All of us did. Some of
those people didn't come back to the industry. They were burned and hurt. It takes a while to build that back up." Halliburton and its
oil field services rivals Schlumberger and Baker Hughes cut more than 100,000 jobs worldwide between them as oil prices fell in 2015
and early 2016. Since the middle of last year, as crude prices and drilling activity recovered, oil producers and service companies have
hired around 30,000 workers in Texas, after cutting more than 100,000 oil field jobs across the state - roughly one in every three such
jobs - between December 2014 and July 2016. Drilling has surged in the Permian Basin this year, but the shortage of workers
for 50-person fracking crews has led oil companies to leave hundreds of wells untapped for months in West
Texas. The number of dormant wells in the Permian Basin has climbed from 1,310 in June 2016 to more than 2,400 last month.
Analysts blame a lack of available labor and fracking equipment in West Texas, where the bulk of the oil industry's nascent recovery
has occurred this year. The unemployment rates of Midland and Odessa, two Texas cities at the heart of the Permian Basin, have
fallen from 4.9 percent and 6.8 percent, respectively, in June 2016, to 3.2 percent and 4.3 percent in August, according to the Labor
Department. "The labor pool has been completely plundered ," said Bill Herbert, an analyst at Simmons & Company
International in Houston. "Growth expectations are being recalibrated ." The oil industry's ongoing recovery began in an
economy with a low unemployment rate and far less spare labor than after the financial crisis in 2009, when the nation's first shale oil
boom began. To lure workers from out of state, Halliburton and its rivals are raising wages, offering housing allowances and
providing temporary homes, known as man camps. All of this, however, is increasing labor costs that will soon eat
into companies' bottom lines, ultimately slowing investment and further weighing on the recovery, analysts
said. So far, prices for various oil field services have risen between 15 percent and 25 percent in the Permian Basin, but those prices
will have to continue to increase to get workers back into the oil patch. CUDD Energy Services, a hydraulic fracturing firm in
Midland, took several months to fully staff its fracking crews after idling about half of the pressure pumping equipment used in
hydraulic fracturing during the oil downturn. "Right now, we've got more demand for frack crews than there are
frack crews," said Clint Walker, general manager at CUDD. "Everybody's trying to hire as fast as they can to meet
demand. But the manpower isn't there yet."

US oil key to heg---increases US soft power while boosting Israel and undermining foreign powers
(what’s up Miss Beck)
Mead 17 (Walter Russell Mead is an American academic. He is the James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and
Humanities at Bard College and previously taught American foreign policy at Yale University. He was also the Editor-at-Large of The
American Interest magazine. Professor Mead is a Global View Columnist for The Wall Street Journal and a Distinguished Scholar at
the Hudson Institute. “Fracking Our Way to Mideast Peace,” 12/11/17. https://www.wsj.com/articles/fracking-our-way-to-mideast-
peace-1513035925)

Whatever you think of President Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, it points to the most important strategic
reality in the Middle East: Arab power has collapsed in the face of low oil prices and competition from
American frackers. The devastating oil-price shocks of the 1970s, orchestrated by the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries, nearly wrecked the world economy. Ever since, the U.S. has looked for ways to break
OPEC's parasitic and rent-seeking grip on the oil market--and thereby to reduce America's geopolitical
vulnerability to events in the Middle East. Victory did not come easily. Intense conservation efforts made the U.S. much
more energy-efficient. New oil discoveries in Africa and elsewhere significantly broadened the available supply.
Renewable energy sources added to the diversification. But the most decisive development was that decades of public
and private research and investment unleashed an American oil-and-gas boom, leading to a revolution in
energy markets that has sent geopolitical shocks through world affairs. The consequences reverberate in the
Middle East and beyond. Future oil revenues to countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, Russia and Iraq
will fall trillions of dollars short of what once might have been expected. The shift in energy markets will benefit
consumer economies like Japan, China, India and the nations of the European Union. The U.S. and similarly situated nations, like
Australia and Canada, can look forward to faster growth and greater foreign investment, since they will capture much
of the oil revenue that Russia and OPEC lose. Low energy prices already have given the EU's struggling southern
countries a chance to return to growth. They have limited Russia's prospects and forced Vladimir Putin onto a
tight budget. They have largely offset the gains Iran had hoped to make from signing the nuclear deal and
escaping Western sanctions. But the greatest consequences are being felt in the Arab world, where the
long-term decline in oil revenues threatens the stability of many states. It is not only the oil producers that will
suffer; the prosperous Gulf economies have been a major source of opportunity for Egyptians, Pakistanis, Palestinians and many other
Middle Easterners. The shining cities that rise where the desert meets the Gulf may be in for harder times. The sheikhdoms' glassy
skyscrapers, gleaming malls and opulent apartment complexes were conceived for a world in which runaway energy demand and
limited sources (remember "peak oil"?) led to inexorably rising prices. These fragile and artificial economies require
hothouse conditions that a weakened OPEC can no longer provide. Now the great Gulf Bubble seems set
to slowly deflate. There's more. The staggering affluence of the Gulf countries during the OPEC era concealed
the Arab world's failure to develop states and economies capable of competing effectively in the 21st
century. As their dream of revival through oil riches fades, they are waking to a new era of weakness and dependency. The Gulf
states increasingly see Israel not as an insect to be crushed by resurgent Arab power, but as a lion that can defend them
from Iran. Syria, once a citadel of Arab nationalism, now haplessly hosts Russian, American, Iranian and Turkish forces that the
Assad dynasty can neither control nor evict. Arab diplomats, lobbyists and financiers must brace for more bad news: As the
declining long-term prospects of the OPEC states become apparent, their diplomatic and economic
influence across the West can be expected to wane even further. Many analysts look at the frustrations of America's
policy in the Middle East and conclude that the U.S. is in retreat and hegemonic decline. That misses the deeper truth. American
diplomacy has had its share of failures, but the region is now being fundamentally reshaped by drillers in Texas,
Pennsylvania, North Dakota and elsewhere. Even with OPEC's hold broken, the Middle East will remain a problem for
American policy. Moreover, not all the consequences of OPEC's decline are good. In the short term, Russia and Iran are likely to
double down on adventurous foreign policies as a way of distracting their populations from the tough challenges ahead. Instability in
America's key Gulf allies and in Egypt could create major headaches for the U.S. Nevertheless, reducing OPEC's ability to capture
rents, while forcing more corrupt petrostate oligarchies to contemplate reform, is likely over time to reduce both the costs and the risks
of American foreign policy. This is what winning looks like.

US heg ensures peace and economic growth---checks foreign actors reliant on US power (what’s up
Miss Beck)
Borgman 17 (Chad Borgman was a senior staff writer for the Harvard Political Review and currently inters at CBS and the
Council on Foreign relations. “Who’s Got the Power?,” 10/16/17. http://harvardpolitics.com/world/whos-got-the-power/)

The Myth of Multipolarity But whileemerging powers can challenge American hegemony on a regiona l, and even
continental scale,
to assess world power on a purely regional basis would ignore the globalist reality of the
21st century. After all, regional powers like India and China would never be able to grow so rapidly without
excessive demand from well-established powers in Western Europe and North America. In an interview with the
HPR, Tad Oelstrom, the former director of the National Security Program at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government*, explained:
“this world is no longer one that we can put in an envelope someplace and say, ‘this is the piece we worry
about, and the rest of it [is] inconsequential.’” From a global perspective of power distributions, America remains
perched safely upon its pedestal as the world’s premier economic and military power. Although the
emergence of regional powers prevents the United States from throwing its weight around as it did in decades past, the United
States remains the bedrock for global commerce. It accounts for nearly 25 percent of the world’s GDP,
and two of its closest economic partners, Japan and the European Union, account for an additional 28
percent. Of the next nine strongest economies in terms of GDP, the United States ranks among the top four export
recipients for each. While economic powers like India and China continue to rise, maintaining a healthy
U.S. economy remains crucial for their growth. GDPDistribution In terms of military expenditures, the United
States spends nearly $20 billion more than the world’s next eight highest spenders combined. Of the next nine
highest spenders, six are close allies of the United States. MilitarySpending But what distinguishes the United States from
the next highest spenders is its ability to project force around the globe. Through its vast naval superiority
and international network of military installations, the United States projects its power to secure what
Oelstrom called “global commons.” Ranging from the high seas to the open sky, these commons serve as avenues
through which nearly all goods transfer between states and non-states. By securing these commons, states allow
for the safe passage of shipping and travel throughout the world. America’s navy remains its most versatile tool of
force projection, and consequently, what distinguishes it most from the other world superpowers. While China and
Russia claim impressive land capabilities, the fact remains that 90 percent of the world’s goods travel by water. No
matter how many regional powers continue to challenge U.S. hegemony in different corners of the globe,
none can match the global reach of the U.S. Navy. The gap between America’s navy and the rest of the world’s is
exemplified best by its marquee vessel—the aircraft carrier. The United States leads the world with 19 aircraft carriers in its arsenal.
France comes in second with only four. Russia and China own a combined three, each with a tonnage of roughly 43,000, compared to
America’s newest carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, which boasts a displacement of 100,000 tons. American carriers also account for
roughly 70 percent of the combined tonnage of the world’s aircraft carriers. Combine its numerous carriers with its extensive
forward operating base network, and the U.S. military can threaten rapid land, air, and sea deployments
anywhere on the globe. The United States maintains roughly 800 military bases in 70 countries abroad, and stations more than
275,000 overseas personnel in more than 160 countries. Meanwhile, China claims only one foreign military base in Djibouti, and
Russia touts only nine, all concentrated in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Until another country gains this ability to
project power anywhere on the globe, America will continue to lead the way in securing the global
commons, and thus the international flow of goods. Theorists favoring multipolarity correctly identify the diminished
ability of the United States to impose its will upon other countries. But the United States remains the only nation capable
of securing the peaceful globalist structure of trade and commerce so many developed and developing
countries rely on. Therefore, the ambitions of rising powers are checked by the disincentive of destabilizing
U.S. power. For example, the solidified role of the U.S. dollar as a centerpiece to the international economy was
recently described in a piece by Kimberly Amadeo in The Balance: “the United States is the world’s best customer … the very
countries that could cause a dollar collapse are those who need Americans to keep buying their products .” In
his article titled “The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs scholar Richard Haas wrote: “many of the other major powers are
dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability. They do not,
accordingly, want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests.”

US oil is key to the economy what’s up Miss Beck)

API 17 (Energy API is a US think tank focused on the oil and gas industry. “Impacts of the Oil and Natural Gas Industry on the US
Economy in 2015,” July 2017. https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Jobs/Oil-and-Gas-2015-Economic-Impacts-Final-Cover-07-
17-2017.pdf)

III. Total Economic Impact This section presents the estimated total economic impact of the US oil and natural gas industry on the
national and state economies. As shown below, the oil and natural gas industry has a widespread economic impact
throughout all sectors of the economy and across all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The total economic impact
we have measured includes the direct impact (the jobs, labor income, and value added within the oil and natural gas industry), the
indirect impact (the jobs, labor income, and value added occurring throughout the supply chain of the oil and natural gas industry), and
the induced impact (the jobs, labor income, and value added resulting from household spending of income earned either directly or
indirectly from the oil and natural gas industry’s spending and from dividends received from oil and natural gas companies). A.
National Impact As shown in Table 2, below, the total economic impact of the US oil and natural gas industry in terms of jobs, labor
income (including wages and salaries and benefits as well as proprietors’ income), and value added is significant. Employment PwC
estimates that the US oil and natural gas industry’s operations directly or indirectly supported 8.1 million full-
time and part-time jobs in the national economy in 2015. Further, the industry’s capital investment supported an
additional 2.3 million jobs in the national economy. Combining the operational and capital investment impacts, the oil
and natural gas industry’s total employment impact on the national economy amounted to 10.3 million full-
time and part-time jobs in 2015, accounting for 5.6 percent of total US employment. Labor Income The
associated labor income (including wages and salaries and benefits as well as proprietors’ income) from jobs directly or
indirectly supported by the oil and natural gas industry through its operations, capital investment, and spending out of
dividend payments is estimated to be $714.2 billion, or 6.7 percent of total US labor income in 2015. Value
Added Value added refers to the additional value created at a particular stage of production. The sum of value added across all
industries in a country or region is, by definition, equivalent to its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Value
added consists of: employee compensation, proprietors’ income, income to capital owners from property, and indirect business taxes
(i.e., those borne by consumers rather than producers). PwC estimates that the US oil and natural gas industry’s operations
directly or indirectly generated $1.1 trillion of value added in the national economy in 2015, and its capital
investment added an additional $219.9 billion of value added . Combining both operational and capital
investment impacts, the industry’s total value added impact at the national level was $1.3 trillion, accounting
for 7.6 percent of US GDP in 2015.

US growth leads to global economic growth what’s up Miss Beck)

Stocker 17 (Marc Stocker is a Senior Economist, World Bank; MS, Economics and Econometrics, Southampton University,
Franziska Ohnsorge, Lead Economist, World Bank; PhD, Economics, Toronto, Csilla Lakatos, Economist, World Bank; PhD,
International Trade and Development, Perdue, M. Ayhan Kose, Director, World Bank, 3/2/2017, “This is how important the US is to
the global economy.” World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/this-is-how-important-the-us-is-to-the-
global-economy)
Because of its size and interconnectedness, developments in the US economy are bound to have important effects
around the world. The US has the world’s single largest economy, accounting for almost a quarter of global GDP (at
market exchange rates), one-fifth of global FDI, and more than a third of stock market capitalisation . It is the most important
export destination for one-fifth of countries around the world. The US dollar is the most widely used
currency in global trade and financial transactions, and changes in US monetary policy and investor sentiment play
a major role in driving global financing conditions (World Bank 2016). At the same time, the global economy is
important for the US as well. Affiliates of US multinationals operating abroad, and affiliates of foreign companies located in
the US account for a large share of US output, employment, cross-border trade and financial flows, and stock market capitalisation.
Recent studies have examined the importance of global growth for the US economy (Shambaugh 2016), the global impact of changes
in US monetary policy (Rey 2013), or the global effect of changing US trade policies (Furman et al. 2017, Crowley et al. 2017). It is
likely that there will be shifts in US growth, monetary and fiscal policies, as well as uncertainty in US financial markets. What will be
the global spillovers? Our recent work (Kose et al. 2017) attempts to answer these questions: How synchronised are US and global
business cycles? How large are global spillovers from US growth and policy shocks? How important is the global economy for the
US? How synchronised are US and global business cycles? Business cycles in the US, other advanced economies (AEs),
and emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) have been highly synchronous (Figure 1.A). This
partly reflects the strength of global trade and financial linkages of the US economy with the rest of the
world, but also that global shocks drive common cyclical fluctuations. This was particularly the case at the time of the 2008-09
Global Crisis. It is not a new phenomenon, however. Although the four recessions the global economy experienced
since 1960 (1975, 1982, 1991, and 2009) were driven by many problems in many places, they all overlapped with severe
recessions in the US (Kose and Terrones 2015). Other countries tend to be in the same business cycle phase as
the US roughly 80% of the time (Figure 1.B). The degree of synchronisation with US financial cycles is slightly
lower, but still significant – credit, housing, and equity price cycles are in the same phase about 60% of the time.
Although it is difficult to establish empirically whether the US economy leads business and financial cycle turning points in other
economies, recent research indicates that the US appears to influence the timing and duration of recessions in many
major economies (Francis et al. 2015). How large are global spillovers from US growth and policy shocks? A surge in US
growth – whether due to expansionary fiscal policies or other reasons – could provide a significant boost to the global
economy . Shocks to the US economy transmit to the rest of the world through three main channels. An acceleration in US
activity can lift growth in trading partners directly through an increase in import demand, and indirectly by
strengthening productivity spillovers embedded in trade.

Economic growth increases interdependence and prevents war what’s up Miss Beck)
Strauss-Kahn 09 (Dominique Gaston André Strauss-Kahn is a French politician and former managing director of the
International Monetary Fund. “Economic Stability, Economic Cooperation, and Peace—the Role of the IMF,” October 23, 2009.
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp102309)

Over the past year or so, the global financial crisis has been the subject of intense debate. But today, instead of dwelling on the
economic risks, I would like to turn instead to another important topic—the relationship between economic stability and peace. It is
my abiding belief that they are intimately entwined. If you lose one, you are likely to lose the other. Peace is a necessary precondition
for trade, sustained economic growth, and prosperity. In turn, economic stability, and a rising prosperity that is broadly
shared—both within and among countries—can foster peace. This is most likely to happen in an atmosphere of
economic cooperation, of openness, of a multilateral approach to economic and political problems. Ultimately, peace and
prosperity feed on each other. I believe history teaches us this lesson. We all remember how the Great Depression created
fertile ground for a devastating war. More recently, in many parts of the world, economic instability provoked political upheaval,
social unrest, and conflict. Why should we talk about the risks to peace? The current slowdown is the deepest and broadest since the
Great Depression. Not long ago, the global economy stood at the edge of the abyss. With the collapse of Lehman Brothers, uncertainty
turned to outright panic, and economic activity started to collapse. People raised the specter of another Great Depression, and these
fears were not unfounded. But today’s world looks different. Fear has turned to hope. We seem to have turned the corner as the growth
engine starts up again. Our latest projections suggest that global economic activity will expand by about 3 percent in 2010. This was
no mere accident. It was not just good luck. It came from the bold decisions taken by policymakers the world over, and—just as
importantly—from an unprecedented degree of economic policy cooperation. In the face of crisis, countries came together
to face common challenges with common solutions, focusing on the global common good. We saw this in fiscal
policy, in monetary policy, and in financial sector policy. This collaboration encompassed more countries than ever before in
history—showing us that in our modern globalized world, responsibility for the economic policy agenda can no longer rest with a
small club of countries. This crisis heralded the ascent of the G-20—a group that includes the dynamic emerging economies—as the
leading vehicle of multilateral cooperation. The challenge is to sustain this spirit of cooperation as we venture into the post-crisis
world. In an atmosphere of great fear and uncertainty, cooperation was not so hard to achieve. But with optimism on the rise, and
recovery on the horizon, countries may be tempted to go their own way, and to abandon the cooperative approach that served them so
well during the crisis. I am happy to note that early signs are positive. Meeting a short while back in Pittsburgh, G-20 leaders stressed
that the global collective interest must always infuse national policy decisions. Multilateralism, I hope, is here to stay. The IMF played
its part in this multilateral response, promoting the global public good of economic stability. When the crisis hit, we were sent out as a
first responder, and G-20 leaders boosted our resources substantially. And as the crisis unfolded, we scaled up our emergency
financing dramatically, we injected an unprecedented amount of liquidity into the system, we made our lending more flexible, and we
supported the international response to the crisis with our forecasts and policy advice. We tried to play our part in calming the waters.
And having earlier expressed confidence in us by increasing our resources, G-20 leaders meeting in Pittsburgh extended this
confidence to our surveillance, asking us to help with their mutual assessment of policies. Our goal is now to adapt to the needs of the
post-crisis world. Of course, to be effective, we must be seen as legitimate. Here, too, the G-20 has moved the institution forward,
pledging to shift quota shares toward dynamic emerging markets and developing countries by at least five percent from over-
represented to under-represented countries. This boosts our legitimacy, and represents a significant down payment on our future
effectiveness. Securing stability Let me stress that the crisis is by no means over, and many risks remain. Economic activity is still
dependent on policy support, and a premature withdrawal of this support could kill the recovery. And even as growth recovers, it will
take some time for jobs to follow suit. This economic instability will continue to threaten social stability. The stakes are particularly
high in the low-income countries. Our colleagues at the United Nations and World Bank think that up to 90 million people might be
pushed into extreme poverty as a result of this crisis. In many areas of the world, what is at stake is not only higher unemployment or
lower purchasing power, but life and death itself. Economic marginalization and destitution could lead to social unrest,
political instability, a breakdown of democracy, or war. In a sense, our collective efforts to fight the crisis
cannot be separated from our efforts guard social stability and to secure peace. This is particularly important in
low-income countries. War might justifiably be called “development in reverse”. War leads to death, disability, disease, and
displacement of population. War increases poverty. War reduces growth potential by destroying infrastructure as
well as financial and human capital. War diverts resources toward violence, rent-seeking, and corruption.
War weakens institutions. War in one country harms neighboring countries, including through an influx of
refugees. Most wars since the 1970s have been wars within states. It is hard to estimate the true cost of a civil war. Recent research
suggests that one year of conflict can knock 2-2½ percentage points off a country’s growth rate. And since the average civil war lasts
7 years, that means an economy that is 15 percent smaller than it would have been with peace. Of course, no cost can be put on the
loss of life or the great human suffering that always accompanies war. The causality also runs the other way. Just as wars
devastate the economy, a weak economy makes a country more prone to war. The evidence is quite clear on this
point—low income or slow economic growth increases the risk of a country falling into civil conflict. Poverty
and economic stagnation lead people to become marginalized, without a stake in the productive economy.
With little hope of employment or a decent standard of living, they might turn instead to violent activities. Dependence
on natural resources is also a risk factor—competition for control over these resources can trigger conflict and income from natural
resources can finance war. And so we can see a vicious circle—war makes economic conditions and prospects worse, and weakens
institutions, and this in turn increases the likelihood of war. Once a war has started, it’s hard to stop. And even if it stops, it’s easy to
slip back into conflict. During the first decade after a war, there is a 50 percent chance of returning to violence, partly because of
weakened institutions. How can the IMF help? At a broad level, by helping countries maintain or consolidate
economic stability. The most obvious way to do this is by providing financing when needed. Without this, governments might be
forced to cut social safety nets and essential public services. Economic activity might be further disrupted, and employment
opportunities diminished. Here, the IMF is delivering—support to low-income countries over the next year or two will be three times
what was available before the crisis. And to ease the burden, we will charge zero interest on all concessional lending through 2011.
Our lending has made a difference. Countries with sustained program engagement over the past two decades saw
bigger boosts to growth than those without such involvement. We are trying to do better still, reforming the way we
lend to low-income countries, and making this lending more flexible and better tailored to individual country circumstances. Our
lending programs in these countries always emphasize poverty reduction and protecting the most vulnerable. I am pleased to note that
most low-income countries with a program backed by the IMF have budgeted higher social spending and many are making efforts to
better target spending toward the poor. This is one of our top priorities. The IMF also places great emphasis on good governance.
About 40 percent of the conditions in our low-income country programs focus on improving public resource management and
accountability. We also provide advice and technical assistance to resource-rich countries, allowing them to better manage their
revenues, again contributing to social stability. The IMF also extends special help to countries in post-conflict or other fragile
situations—again through lending and technical assistance. We help rebuild or strengthen institutions and economic management—
essential elements of state building. We introduced a more flexible emergency lending facility that can be used by
countries coming out of conflict. Sure, the IMF’s role is a limited one, but our support can also open the
door to much-needed aid flows. Sustained help is critically important given the risk of a relapse into civil
conflict.
Iran Democracy Adv
Iran Democracy Good
 Democratic Iran Good – Middle East War Ext.
Democratic Iran is the ONLY way to avert Middle East war
Safavi 17 (Ali, member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran,
"Regime change in Iran does not equal war in Iran," 9/11,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:jYCUCh8MBK8J:thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/foreign-policy/350137-regime-change-in-iran-does-not-equal-war-in-
iran+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)
Let's wholeheartedly accept that a foreign military intervention is not the answer for Iran. It is the chants inside not the weapons
outside that will make change happen. It is time to make a fundamental distinction between “regime change by war” and “regime
change by the people.”
Supporting the Iranian people in their legitimate quest to uproot a warmongering
terrorist theocracy is the only option that averts another conflict in the Middle East . Ironically, the
alternative, engagement, is a sure recipe for more conflicts and ultimately war.
 Democratic Iran Good – Kurdish Secession
Democratic Iran solves Kurdish secessionism
Iddon 15 (Paul, Staff @ Rudaw, "The state of Iranian Kurds behind the curtain of the Middle East
turmoil," http://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/30102015)

From angry riots in the Kurdish city of Mahabad after an apparent rape attempt on a young female Kurdish hotel worker
by a government official that led her to jump to her death from a window earlier this year, to the Iranian president visiting
Iranian Kurdistan and promising reform, we see just how volatile it can be . What turn it will take in the near
future could be highly informative. “Iranian Kurds have had legitimate complaints – from limits on the use of
their language and prejudice against their Sunni Muslims by Shiite authorities to receiving historically a smaller share of government
expenditure.Only a more democratic Iran can alleviate these concerns and diminish the temptation to
[se]cede . I hope Mr Rouhani can deliver his promises,” Stanford Professor of Iranian Studies Abbas Milani told
Rudaw.

Kurdish secessionism destroys Eurasian stability

Bernstam 11 (Michael, research fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. He has served as
an economic advisor to the Russian government, the Azerbaijani government, and the Iraqi Ministry of
Finance. He is currently affiliated with the Iraqi Institute for Economic Reform, "Considering Kurdistan,"
3/6, http://hir.harvard.edu/india-in-transitionconsidering-kurdistan/)

Third, the
contagion effect of the Kurdistan option is bound to exacerbate the already tense inter-ethnic
relations in various states of the Middle and Near East and the South Caucasus. The specter of civil wars
has haunted this region since the establishment of their nation-states during the last century. A combination of
the Arab-Kurdish confederation in Iraq, with the inclusion of the Iranian and Syrian Kurdistan, and a Kurdish autonomy in Turkey is
thus the best orderly option to prevent potential conflicts. Iran and Syria will , of course, reject any Kurdish secession ,
be it total independence or a confederation within Iraq. Although the independence of Kurdistan avoids double standards and
conforms to the standard of treating all ethnic and national groups equally, the Arab-Kurdish confederation looks more efficient in
practical terms. This confederation is more secure than independence because the rump states of Iran and Syria would be too weak to
attack this new Iraq and the Kurdish areas within it. Fourth, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and
the states of the former Soviet Union such as Kyrgyzstan would be reasonably concerned about their
own inter-ethnic stability . The US pursuit of the Kurdistan option would antagonize many of these countries. Alas, this
cannot be helped as they have been angry at the United States for the same domestic reasons as those behind the recognition of the
independence of Kosovo. In reality, the contagion effects of ethnic separations are usually confined to specific regions. The
dissolutions of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia caused several tragic civil wars, but they did not cause contagions beyond their
regional borders.

Eurasian instability escalates to nuclear war

Blank 12 (Stephen, PhD, Senior Fellow @ Strategic Studies Institute - US Army War College, "MAKING
SENSE OF MOSCOW’S SYRIAN GAMBIT," 6/27, http://www.sldinfo.com/making-sense-of-
moscow%E2%80%99s-syrian-gambit/)

Beyond that Moscow was and still may be equally anxious that the “Arab Spring” or some analogue of it might
erupt in Central Asia where it even publicly voiced its apprehensions about that in April 2011.[xi] Any such uprising might
spread throughout Central Asia and trigger an explosion on a scale resembling or even surpassing Syria’s current
travails. And there are analysts who have publicly warned that such a revolution could occur under the inspiration of Arab events.[xii]
Moreover, Russian perceptions of disaster were quickly confirmed as Libya fell into civil war and as it became clear that Islamist
factions might actually take power in one or more of the affected Arab states. Russian discussions of the Arab Spring regularly
complain that these revolutions’ likely outcome is an Islamist takeover leading to a protracted civil war or at least civil strife as those
forces seek to impose their vision of a just society on their countries if not neighbors as well.[xiii] Since Moscow is currently
fighting an Islamic insurgency in the North Caucasus and fears for one in Central Asia the prospect of other
Islamist victories or civil wars engendered by attempted Islamist takeovers in regions where Moscow still perceives as
its strategic perimeter might evoke profound nervousness if not anxiety in Moscow. (For a look at a video
showing Russian attack helicopters of the sort being sent to aide the Assad regime see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bKr_eOk8mNk II Strategic and Geopolitical Goals Beyond these compelling domestic reasons for
resisting the Arab Spring, Russia has equally profound strategic objections to Western interventions in the Middle East. These include
but go beyond the belief that the West deceived Moscow regarding Libya and used the UN resolutions on Libya to create a precedent
as in Kosovo for a war on behalf of democracy promotion, or, more cynically, for French access to Libyan oil and gas. If the
democracy virus could easily spread to Moscow’s restive Muslim south or Central Asia, democracy promotion on the wings of NATO
aircraft threatens Russia’s fundamental domestic system and great power interests. Since 1991 Russia has professed that any
regional strife in and around its (i.e. Soviet) perimeter not only exposes it to war or at least significant
threat, it might also escalate beyond anyone’s control as in Iraq and trigger a protracted war that could
escalate vertically even to the nuclear level if Russia is drawn in.[xiv] Alternatively it could escalate horizontally if it
spreads throughout the Middle East, which Moscow still claims as its strategic perimeter. Given Moscow’s lack of confidence in
Western judgments and suspicions of its inveterate hostility to Russia, it is hardly surprising that Russian spokesmen from Putin and
Medvedev down have repeatedly threatened that intervention in Arab revolutions could escalate all the way up to nuclear war.[xv]
 Kurdish Secession Extensions
Kurdish independence causes regional instability and war
Smith 14 (Ashley, Columnist @ International Socialist REview, "Crisis in Iraq,"
http://isreview.org/issue/94/crisis-iraq)

Last time, the ruling classes among the Shia, Sunni, and Kurds pulled back from the brink and remained
invested in the central state because each wanted a slice of oil profits. This time, each side has control of oil wells and
refineries, so they are not as committed to keeping Iraq together. The extreme sectarianism in the country also
makes the partition of the country more likely. Any conflict will be far more militarized than the last
one and will engulf the countries that surround Iraq for several reasons. The Islamic State includes Syria. A
separate Kurdish state will stir the region’s Kurds to join it, destabilizing Turkey, Iran, and Syria , all of
whom have Kurdish populations. And Maliki’s desperate attempt to hold a Shia-dominated Iraq together will draw support
from Iran and Hezbollah.

Eurasian instability is most likely scenario for global nuclear war

Blank 2K (Steven J., Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research at the U.S. Army War College and has
been an Associate Professor of Russia/Soviet Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institutes, “US Military
Engagement with Trancaucasia and Central Asia,” Strategic Studies Institute, June,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub113.pdf)
Washington’s burgeoning military-political-economic involvement seeks, inter alia, to demonstrate the U.S. ability to project military
power even into this region or for that matter, into Ukraine where NATO recently held exercises that clearly originated as an anti-
Russian scenario. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has discussed strengthening U.S.-Azerbaijani military cooperation and even
training the Azerbaijani army, certainly alarming Armenia and Russia.69 And Washington is also training Georgia’s new Coast
Guard. 70 However, Washington’s well-known ambivalence about committing force to Third World ethnopolitical conflicts suggests
that U.S. military power will not be easily committed to saving its economic investment. But this ambivalence about
committing forces and the dangerous situation, where Turkey is allied to Azerbaijan and Armenia is bound
to Russia, create the potential for wider and more protracted regional conflicts among local forces . In that
connection, Azerbaijan and Georgia’s growing efforts to secure NATO’s lasting involvement in the region, coupled with Russia’s
Moscow even threatened
determination to exclude other rivals, foster a polarization along very traditional lines.71 In 1993
World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and
Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies
from defeat. 72 Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third
parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local
structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation . Big powers often feel obliged to rescue
their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side’s stakes since interests here are not
as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are
not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost
uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to
threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could
trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies). The
real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow’s interests and forces in the Transcaucasus
makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else . As Richard Betts has observed,
The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3)
neither recognizes that the other’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject
conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.74 Russian perceptions of the
Transcaspian’s criticality to its interests is tied to its continuing efforts to perpetuate and extend the vast
disproportion in power it possesses relative to other CIS states. This power and resource disproportion between Russia and the
smaller states of the Transcaspian region means that no natural equilibrium is possible there. Russia neither can be restrained
nor will it accept restraint by any local institution or power in its pursuit of unilateral advantage and reintegration.

Eurasian instability triggers nuclear war

Cronin 13 (Audrey Kurth, Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University and author of How
Terrorism Ends and Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria. Thinking Long on Afghanistan:
Could it be Neutralized? Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 36:1
pp. 55_72http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.751650)

With ISAF withdrawal inevitable, a sea change is already underway: the question is whether
the United States will be ahead of the curve or behind it. Under current circumstances, key actions within Afghanistan
by any one state are perceived to have a deleterious effect on the interests of other competing states , so the
only feasible solution is to discourage all of them from interfering in a neutralized state. As the United States draws down over
the next two years, yielding to regional anarchy would be irresponsible . Allowing neighbors to rely on bilateral
measures, jockey for relative position, and pursue conflicting national interests without regard for dangerous
regional dynamics will result in a repeat of the pattern that has played out in Afghanistan for the past thirty
years except this time the outcome could be not just terrorism but nuclear war .
 Democratic Iran Good – Solves Prolif
Democratic Iran would get rid of their nukes – the ruling regime is the key driver
Bonicelli 1/24/18 (Paul, Bonicelli served in the George W. Bush administration, career includes a
presidential appointment with Senate confirmation as assistant administrator at the U.S. Agency for
International Development; as a professional staff member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S.
House of Representatives; and as a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly. He holds a PhD in
political science from the University of Tennessee, "Calling A Persian Spring A ‘Disaster’ Is A Desperate
Cover For Obama’s Iran Failures," http://thefederalist.com/2018/01/24/calling-persian-spring-disaster-
desperate-cover-obamas-iran-failures/)

Next, Bahgat tries to argue the mullahs’ nuclear program is domestically popular, so any change in the
regime will not end it. But there is a difference between a nuclear program per se, and a nuclear weapons
program designed to protect the dictatorship from its opponents foreign and domestic. A nuclear program
about energy and research is not a threat to anyone and can be had by states like Iran under the aegis of global treaties and
cooperation with other countries. That is not what the mullahs (or Kim Jong Un, for that matter) want or have ever
wanted . A democratic Iran could theoretically have a nuclear program that isn’t weaponized and doesn’t
threaten its neighbors or cost a significant portion of its national resources, but a violent theocracy isn’t interested
in any of that.

Democratic Iran Good – Solves Prolif

Gerecht, Foundation for defense of democracies senior fellow, 2010

(Reuel, “Iran, Beacon of Liberty?”, 2-10,

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/opinion/11gerecht.html?pagewanted=all, DOA: 10-15-11, ldg)
The impact of all this on Muslims everywhere is likely to be profound. In the Middle East, the Iranian Revolution catapulted Islamic fundamentalism into
the foreground. An Iranian democratization couldn’t help but shake Sunni fundamentalists who, too, have wrestled with the tension between the Holy
Law and voting. Sunni Arabs often like to pretend that they live in a different world from their Shiite Iranian cousins, but the truth is the opposite: cross-
fertilization has been enormous. With Iranian democracy growing, liberal Arabs and Sunni Islamists would become
much bolder in their demands. Iran’s transformation would also remind Turkey’s ruling Islamist Justice and
Development Party, whose commitment to democratic values has been increasingly shaky , that an
authoritarian path creates revolt. And an Iranian democracy would powerfully affect Iraq, whose elected
government has struggled with its own Tehran-backed demons. A democratic Iran would have little sympathy for Iraqis who
prefer autocracy and religious militancy. A democratic Tehran would also likely reduce its aid to Hezbollah in Lebanon
and the Baathist dictatorship in Syria. Palestinian fundamentalists who now receive substantial Iranian
financing would also likely be a subject of heavy debate in a free Parliament, as would aid to other radical Sunni groups
throughout the Middle East and Tehran’s disconcerting contacts with Al Qaeda (which were detailed by the 9/11 commission report). Iran could
easily become what Ayatollah Khomeini had wished — the model that transforms the Middle East — albeit
not in the manner he hoped for. Last, a democratic Iran would bring the reopening of the American Embassy, a symbolic measure of the
highest significance that has long been popular among ordinary Iranians. The “Great Satan” would be no more. President Obama has nothing to lose by
moving away from engaging Ayatollah Khamenei and toward a vigorous engagement with the Iranian people’s quest for popular sovereignty. Rhetoric,
sanctions aimed at cutting off Iran’s gasoline imports and intelligent covert aid to dissidents should be harnessed to the democratic cause. President
Obama has an openly willing partner in the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, to make Iranian liberté a trans-Atlantic affair. The administration should
have no illusions: Ayatollah Khamenei’s regime is irretrievably paranoid. In its eyes, Western states, which have so far done next to nothing to help the
isn’t going to
democracy movement, are as culpable as the dissidents for Iran’s troubles. The supreme leader will seek ways to get even. And he
give up his nukes. But a democratic Iran probably would. Without the bogeyman of a Great Satan and the
militant dream of regional hegemony, a Persian Parliament, overwhelmed with the people’s demands,
would find much better things than enriched uranium to spend the nation’s money on. And if the clerical regime
cracks, Mr. Obama will get credit. In no other endeavor, foreign or domestic, is the president likely to earn as much.
 Democratic Iran Good – Solves US-China War
US-China-Russia war and extinction
Morgan, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2009

(Dennis, World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the
human race Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December, ldg)
In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question “Is Nuclear War Inevitable??” In Section , Moore points out what most terrorists
obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to
escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant
terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow
or Israel. Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should
Moscow be destroyed,” it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States” Israeli leaders and Zionist
supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state,
it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East.
Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic”
European cities In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia.
China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more
powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for
years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing
death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear
winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many
people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false
signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of
nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is
quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would
act under the “use them or lose them” strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted
as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war . In other
words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear
escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, “everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as
large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these
nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some
of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors” In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up
by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict
leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not
all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human
civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of
unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter. In “Scenarios,” Moore summarizes the various ways a nuclear war could
begin: Such a war could start through a reaction to terrorist attacks , or through the need to protect against overwhelming
military opposition, or through the use of small battle field tactical nuclear weapons meant to destroy hardened targets. It might quickly move
on to the use of strategic nuclear weapons delivered by short-range or inter-continental missiles or long-range bombers. These
could deliver high altitude bursts whose electromagnetic pulse knocks out electrical circuits for hundreds of
square miles. Or they could deliver nuclear bombs to destroy nuclear and/or non-nuclear military facilities,
nuclear power plants, important industrial sites and cities. Or it could skip all those steps and start through
the accidental or reckless use of strategic weapons

Iran prolif causes ME war, terrorism and war with China

Sohoni, Afghanistan presidential advisor, 2011

(Shrinivasrao, “Worst-case Scenarios?”, 3-4, http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/2011/03/3864, DOA: 10-17-

11, ldg)

Assuming this negative impasse continues, what

the world will then witness, essentially, is the erosion of the West,
simultaneous to an upsurge, unchallenged, of Saudi-Wahhabi-Terrorism with the imperialistic and
vainglorious goal of world conquest, and Chinese expansionism - also imperialistic in nature; the Pakistani military
facilitating both. Over time, these trends pervasively undermine the US, NATO member-countries and
democratic and peace-loving societies the world over. That Israel will not succumb without a fight is
definite. The Israelis will strive to the maximum of their capacity to thwart being overwhelmed by any State or non-State actors. The Israelis
will not baulk at using any and all of the resources and options available, including atomic weapons under
their deployment. One of Israel's principal antagonists, Iran, also will not buckle under without responding
to perceived threats from Saudi Arabia, Israel, or the West. Iran is straining hard to acquire nuclear
weapons at the earliest, and if it succeeds, and sensing a threat to its existence, will not shrink from using
nuclear weapons against perceived adversaries. Iran will continue its policy of supporting Shia enclaves
and organisations in the Muslim world, especially in Sunni-majority areas; and cultivating mercenary Sunni subversive assets. Israel on the
other hand, will, as a matter of cardinal policy, not brook Iran's nuclear weapon capability, and will either work to contrive UN-sanctioned US-led
attack on Iranian facilities, or attempt by itself to neutralise or degrade Iranian nuclear weapon potential. The latter will
take the form of kidnapping and eliminating Iranian scientists, technological attacks - such as cyber attacks to debilitate or make dysfunctional the
relevant Iranian facilities, and, in the last resort, kinetic attacks. It is no secret that the Saudi policy is to facilitate Israel
against Iran to the extent possible, and also to outflank and envelope Iran by pursuing Wahhabi Islam in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey and
Central Asia, - rather than getting involved in direct armed conflict with Iran. What of China? Who in the short term will
oppose China? China's rapid progression to great power status is almost meteoric in ascent, and this is based on complex, subtle and long range
calculation and preparation. There
is discernment and boldness in execution of China's foreign and economic
policy. China will increasingly flex its military sinews as it factors in assessments of the US's vulnerability,
weakness, and timidity of approach. The US has floundered and got entrapped in the quagmire in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Muslim world
alienated; indebted neck deep to China - its principal emerging adversary, and furthermore witnessing China's daily acquisition of new market share and
natural resources, globally. Some things may be conjectured and visualized as possible, even probable: Iran's
nuclear weapons program
will be thwarted - whether by technological strikes, internal fifth columnist sabotage, or aerially delivered
impact. Israel will be behind the strikes, and the kinetic option will be facilitated by the Saudis. Iran will retaliate against
kinetic attacks - whether by missile strikes or sponsoring terrorist attacks against Israel, Saudi Arabia and
the US. Iran's retaliatory attacks will be responded to with attacks by Israel and possibly the US - if its facilities
anywhere in the world are targeted at. This conflict will greatly affect the price of oil, gold, and the US dollar - with
cascade effects on national economies world wide. In secondary effects, the level of resentment in the
Muslim world will rise - transcending the Shia-Sunni divide. The Muslim Ummah will seethe with fury and revenge motive.
This will impel autonomous individual and organised terrorist attacks. China will strive to
operationalise Gwadar port on Pakistan's Baluchistan coast, and connect it with rail and road ways via the
Karakoram to its hinterland. As against the vulnerability and high cost of shipment by the sea route around the East Asian coast and through
the Straits of Malacca to the Gulf, the overland route from Gwadar will make for much safer, faster and cheaper oil supply to China and give a quantum
strategic boost to the Chinese economy. The
West, including Russia and European nations may eventually give up
passivity vis-à-vis China and Saudi Arabia. The West may well seek to pose an interdictory threat to the new
transportation routes developed by China to and fro Gwadar. The West will eventually seek to and strive to
thwart the Saudi campaign for spread of Wahhabism. Baluchistan may be identified by the West and its
allies as the sub-region in which China on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other can be stymied. The
West will encourage an independent Baluchistan supported and beholden to the West. This will yield rich dividends. Even signs of this policy being
brought to bear, will exert a salutary effect. Pakistan's nuclear assets will eventually be neutralized or sequestered and
taken control of by the West.

Unchecked Chinese rise causes nuclear war

Walton, Reading University IR lecturer, 2007

(Dale, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, pg 49, ldg)

Obviously,
it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern
Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as
pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any
Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American
The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner,
intervention in local squabbles.
establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of
power, thus both necessitating very active American intervention in Eastern Eurasia and creating the
underlying conditions for a massive, and probably nuclear, great power war. Absent such a "super-threat,"
however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of
unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not
marked by close great power alliances.
 Democratic Iran Good – US Credibility
Material support to democratic forces is key US credibility.
Pollack, Saban Center for Middle East Policy director, 12-5-11

(Kenneth, “America's Second Chance and the Arab Spring”,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/05/americas_second_chance?page=0,3, DOA: 12-8-11, ldg)

To this end, the

United States must embrace a long-term commitment to help the countries of the Middle East
pursue a process of political, economic, and social transformation. This process should grow from within, rather
than be imposed from without. It should reflect the values, traditions, history, and aspirations of the people of the region themselves, not a Western best guess
at them. And it should also recognize that change and stability are not mutually exclusive, but mutually reinforcing -- and ultimately mutually essential. This will be a difficult
people of the Middle East
course to pursue, but it is ultimately the only good path to follow. Defining a New Narrative While it is unquestionably true that the

want to secure their own futures, it is also true that they want to know that the United States supports them and will help
them when they ask for assistance. Many suspect that the United States still backs the region's moribund and repressive
regimes. For all of them, the United States must articulate and consistently hew to a new strategy that
supports transformation in the Middle East. But the message is equally important for the extant rulers themselves. Some hope simply to withstand the popular furor and,
when passions have cooled, go back to the way things were. If they are going to be brought around to making more meaningful change, they need to understand that this is unacceptable to Washington and will place
them squarely at odds with what will become a new, long-term American strategy toward the region. Other Arab leaders fear that the United States will define its interest in change in such a way that will set the old
political elite at odds with Washington. For them, the United States needs to articulate a vision of change that is compatible with their own interests (broadly defined), and that lays out a path forward that they could
be persuaded to tread, even if grudgingly at first. Saudi Arabia is clearly paramount in this area. King Abdullah himself appears to recognize the need for change within his oil-rich kingdom, and has begun a number
of initiatives to overhaul the Saudi educational, economic, judicial, and social systems, although Riyadh has been notably slower to introduce reforms in the political sphere. Despite this, the Saudis clearly fear that
the Obama administration now plans to throw its support behind revolutionary regime change across the region -- something very frightening to the Saudi ruling family, both in terms of what they believe it would
mean for themselves and for their allies. To some extent, they even fear that the United States will go so overboard in embracing transformation that it will forget traditional threats like Iran, and will decide that
countries that are not reforming at revolutionary speeds should become the principal target of American pressure instead. For Riyadh in particular, then, it is vital for the United States to develop a new strategic
narrative that paints developments in the region and the future of U.S. policy toward it in terms that are compatible with Saudi interests and fears, and that indicate how the United States will adjust to the changes

The United
sweeping the region, continue to address traditional threats like Iran and Salafist terrorism, and will do both in ways that Saudi Arabia and other U.S. allies can accept -- even if reluctantly.

States should define the new regional struggle as one based on internal politics and the aspirations of the
people of the region. It should accept that the region is now clearly divided. On one side are the states that have acknowledged the desires of their people for a better future and are taking concrete
steps to improve their peoples' lives. On the other side are the states that are not, and are employing the failed methods of the old Middle East: repression, violence, fear, totalitarian control over information and
expression, and the creation of internal or external scapegoats on which to blame their problems -- all to deny their people the better future they dream of. Not accidentally, such a framework places the new Egypt,
the new Tunisia, the new Libya, and hopefully the new Iraq squarely in the camp of those states in which such a change has begun, even despite the challenges that beset them. Despite their daunting problems, all are
trying to democratize, all are responding to the desires of their people for better lives, more or less. It also places Iran, Syria, and groups like Hezbollah -- which is slowly gaining control over Lebanon -- in the camp
of those states decidedly on the wrong side of history. In so doing, it should rally popular support for Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia and further alienate Iran and Syria from Arab public opinion. Indeed, recent
public opinion polls demonstrate that this is already happening: Iran is no longer viewed by the Arab public as championing resistance to the old status quo, and is instead viewed as supporting its repressive clients in
Syria and Lebanon and practicing similarly autocratic policies at home. This strategic framework places a number of other countries exactly where they need to be -- right in the middle. Saudi Arabia, Morocco,
Jordan, Oman, Bahrain, Algeria, and others have in the past made mostly half-hearted forays at reform. The United States should convey that it wants to help them move into the first camp. Indeed, all of them have
been frightened by the waves of unrest, and this ought to serve as an important motivation to adopt meaningful change. An American willingness to help, if not push, such change should also keep them on the

But can the United States actually affect this

straight path and bring them more fully into the progressive camp farther down the road. Reconciling Ends and Means

kind of change? It is clear that, today, the country faces very significant financial problems. Although the foreign aid
budget had virtually nothing to do with those problems, the issue of spending cannot be ignored. Today, every nickel the U.S. government spends will be scrutinized, and there is
little stomach for disbursing large amounts of new aid. Part of the answer to this problem is that the United States can and should emphasize providing assistance to Middle Eastern
states that costs little or nothing at all. To some countries, the United States can provide technology and know-how at little cost. Another thrifty way to help the Arab states is with
diplomatic assistance -- from mobilizing NGOs and inclusive civil society to creating new international institutions, to addressing troublesome international issues. Some
assistance can and should come in the form of military aid, such as maintaining training programs with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and other states, and building a similar relationship
with Libya. In most cases, such military assistance could employ forces that already exist, and much could be paid for by the governments themselves. The new Libyan
some commitment of U.S.
government, for example, might use frozen Libyan assets to pay for U.S. arms and training for new security services and police. But

resources will inevitably be warranted and required to push forward the changes occurring in the Middle
East. Even small new aid packages could have an outsized impact on countries struggling to change, especially
when they form the kernel of larger packages from U.S. allies and international organizations. Moreover, it is vital to remember the optics of U.S. policy
at this crucial juncture: The people of the Arab world believe that the United States gave generously to the bad old
regimes. If Washington were to suddenly cut its assistance to the Middle East precisely when the people of
the region rose up and threw off their autocratic shackles, they will conclude -- now, and for a very long
time to come -- that the United States was only interested in supporting repressive autocrats that did their
bidding and had no real interest in helping the Arab people themselves. Washington cannot lose sight of the importance of the changes that have now begun in the Middle East as a result of the Arab Spring.
They are too important to the vital national interest to allow a few billion dollars -- an insignificant fraction of the total U.S. budget, let alone the national debt -- to become the difference between success and failure.
Out with the Old Throughout the Cold War and over the past 20 to 30 years, the United States has seen the Middle East largely through the traditional lens of political power. It was the governments of the region that
mattered, and conflicts between states that posed the greatest threat (even if those conflicts manifested themselves in competing attempts at internal subversion). Because the United States had allied itself with those
states that largely benefited from the prevailing geopolitical arrangements, Americans saw the status quo as highly beneficial and any threat to it as correspondingly dangerous. Our great Arab allies -- Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Morocco -- all liked things the way they were. The United States -- intent on ensuring that the oil flowed and that Arab states were officially or unofficially at peace
with Israel -- also liked the way things were. Even Israel, after its victories in 1967 and 1973 and its failed attempt to rearrange the Levantine status quo in its favor in 1982, had itself become a status quo power.

, the United States became the great champion of the status quo in the Middle East and defined its
Consequently

adversaries -- Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Libya (until 2004) -- as those states seeking to overturn the status quo. In some sense this was
correct, because those states were attempting to subvert the prevailing geostrategic realities to create new ones, centered on their own interests. The
great problem inherent in this construct was that the people of the Middle East saw the preservation of the
status quo as condemning them to eternal misery. Maintaining the status quo against all foreign and domestic threats meant keeping
the people of the Arab world down. It meant preserving the stagnant economic, social, and political systems of the region that were the source of their
frustration. Thus preserving the status quo meant dismissing the aspirations of the people of the Middle East.
This, more than anything else, is why so many Arabs admired Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and even
Osama bin Laden. They, at least, seemed to be fighting for change -- for overturning the status quo. And although most Arabs did not like what they
stood for, they loved what they stood against -- the traditional order that oppressed them. Because
the United States supported the
traditional order for geopolitical reasons, this also put it on the wrong side of Arab public opinion. Washington's
support for the status quo was based on its focus on the region's geopolitical dynamics, but for the people of the Middle East, whose central concern was the region's stagnant
It was a principal (albeit not the only)
economies and callous autocracies, that same defense of the status quo became a defense of their oppressors.

cause of the region's pervasive anti-Americanism. Today, this strategy is categorically the wrong one for the United States to pursue,
if it ever was the right one. More than anything else, the great Arab Awakening has meant that the people of the
region can no longer be dismissed. After the wave of popular upheavals that rolled across the region in 2011, no Arab or external
government can ever again afford to ignore the wishes of its people. The old status quo is gone. Parts of it might be preserved for some time in some
places, but it will never be re-created. The only wise path that the United States can take at this point is to accept that change is coming to the region, and
to help the people of the region shape that change to their ends .
If the United States comes to be seen as a willing partner of
the Arab peoples in their quest to build a new kind of Middle East, then over time, we might find a new
status quo emerge -- one that is truly peaceful and prosperous, and therefore stable. And if the United States
helps in that effort, perhaps it, too, can be transformed, from the most hated and feared foreign power to
one of the most beloved. Certainly, Washington has nothing to lose. The strategy of the past condemned it to endless crises and conflicts in the
Middle East, consuming more and more blood, treasure, and time as the years passed. And for what? In return, the United States reaped a volatile oil
market and worsening anti-Americanism. It was not a very good deal. The
Arab Awakening has offered the United States a
second chance. It represents a new opportunity to remake America in Middle Eastern eyes, and become the
country it imagines itself to be.
 Iran War Add-On
Iran's inclusion in the travel ban sparks US-Iran war - creates a pretext for relations collapse and US
attacks
Millman 17 (Noah, senior editor, is an opinion journalist, critic, screenwriter, and filmmaker who joined
The American Conservative, "Why Is Iran Part of the Ban?," 1/31,
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/millman/why-is-iran-part-of-the-ban/)

There are many things that could be said about Trump’s travel ban, and most of them have already been said in
multiple venues, including by TAC‘s own Daniel Larison. I just want to highlight again one item: nearly half of those affected
by the ban come from Iran, a country that is not experiencing Islamist violence, that is not producing large numbers of refugees,
and from which we have no particular reason to suspect terrorists might be planning to sneak into America. I can think of legitimate
reasons why Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan were not included (all major regional allies whose cooperation we need), as well as
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and Russia (at that point, you might as well ban the world), all of which have
produced home-grown Islamist terrorists who might travel to America — or already have. Those reasons do tend to undermine the
argument that, even if it had been rolled out in a more prudent and less gratuitously-cruel manner, the ban was a sensible way to
protect American security — but let’s grant that being extra cautious about people coming from a war zone isn’t obviously crazy, and
that we should be able to argue like civilized people about how to balance helping people facing death versus protecting ourselves
from wolves who may be hiding among the sheep. But it seems to me that anyone arguing with a straight face that the
ban was about protecting America from terrorists should be arguing — among other things — that Iran
doesn’t belong on the list. Yet this is the only mention of Iran in David French’s defense of Trump’s order (which is probably
the best defense I’ve read so far): [T]he order imposes a temporary, 90-day ban on people entering the U.S. from Iraq, Syria, Iran,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. These are countries either torn apart by jihadist violence or under the control of hostile, jihadist
governments. That’s it. Iran is a “hostile, jihadist government” so we should presume all Iranians are a security risk. This is why I’m
a primary reason for the ban in the first place was to provoke Iranian
going to continue to assume that
retaliation, with the ultimate goal that poisoned relations will eventually provide a pretext for war.

Iran war escalates – risks extinction

Avery 13 (John, Associate Professor @ University of Copenhagen, 11-6-2013, “An Attack On Iran Could
Escalate Into Global Nuclear War,” http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm)

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli
pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with
catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster
escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate
into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable
government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of
Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into
a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly
cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy . In the
dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be
used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the
world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination , a nuclear war would damage global
agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate
ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere . To risk such a war would
be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.
 Human Rights Cred Add-On
Travel ban poses restrictions
human rights cred/demo promo - 2ac addon

Buonomo 7/6/18 (Thomas, Humanist Studies Coordinator with the American Humanist Association and
formerly a geopolitical risk analyst with an international energy consulting company, with primary
expertise on Middle East affairs, "Trump’s Travel Ban: Responsibly Vigilant or Fear-Driven?,"
https://thehumanist.com/commentary/trumps-travel-ban-responsibly-vigilant-or-fear-driven)

These travel restrictions do impose real hardships on the families of their fellow citizens and there are
arguably ways of alleviating those hardships while appropriately mitigating security risks—including by
recommitting to constructive diplomacy with Iran, however frustrating its government is to engage. Suzanne Maloney,
deputy director of foreign policy and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy, Energy Security
and Climate Initiative, notes that Trump’s travel ban “blocked [Iranian] women’s rights activists, victims of
torture by [Iran’s security services], and other human rights defenders from entering the United States and
shattered the hopes of many others who saw the United States as a beacon of hope and freedom .”
Moreover, “The millions of tourists, students, immigrants, and refugees who have come to the United States from Iran since 1979
have contributed greatly to American society and to the US economy, assuming leading roles in arts, science, business, and even
politics.” The potential for these visitors, residents, and citizens of the US to contribute positively to
improving relations between Iranians and Americans and ultimately our two governments over the longer
term should not be underestimated. We as Americans arguably have a moral responsibility to help , at the very
least, the families of those who, whatever their religion, have risked their lives to establish more liberal
democratic governments in the Middle East. The value of what they would be able to learn from and teach us as well as
their countrymen suffering under oppressive regimes should also not be underestimated. It’s critical in this time of high
tension that Americans reestablish a healthy poise between maintaining their vigilance and preserving their
humanity. The president of the United States should lead the way with emotionally disciplined rhetoric
and measured policies reflective of poised leadership .
 human rights cred - 1ar

Rubin 18 (Jennifer, Columnist @ Wash Post, "What exactly is our Iran policy now?," 1/2,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2018/01/02/what-exactly-is-our-iran-policy-
now/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fa2817722b2f)

Second, the administration should nix its idiotic travel ban (which would ban Iranian protesters, students and
others from coming to the United States), cease hugging dictators such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and drop the noxious
America First rhetoric, which signals contempt for the welfare of other peoples and the fate of our allies.
Consistency on human rights is hard, but in the case of Trump, the egregious hypocrisy — fawning over
the Saudis, Russia and other repressive regimes — hobbles our credibility .

Larison 18 (Daniel, senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the
New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The
American Scene, and Culture11, and is a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the
University of Chicago, "Trump’s Iran Obsession Discredits Him," 1/1,
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/trumps-iran-obsession-discredits-him/)
Trump’s comments can’t do the protesters any good, and will almost certainly be used against them, but that doesn’t fully capture how
stupid they are. The striking thing about the president’s latest outburst is how disconnected it is from administration policy except for
the usual denunciation of the nuclear deal. Trump wants to keep Iranians from coming to the U.S ., so it really doesn’t
matter to him if they are “hungry” for freedom. If
an Iranian dissident wanted to come to the U.S. right now, he
would not be allowed in under Trump’s ridiculous travel ban solely because of his nationality. Trump would like to
scrap the nuclear deal and put additional economic pressure on Iran until they make much larger concessions. This is an unrealistic
and misguided goal, but it is also completely at odds with any concern for the well-being of the Iranian people, who have suffered for
years under sanctions and would bear the extra burden that additional sanctions would impose. Iran hawks love to present themselves
as friends of the Iranian people so long as they think Iranians are prepared to do what they want (i.e., overthrow the regime), but every
policy they support is aimed at impoverishing, harming, vilifying, and excluding Iranians. It is just a little too obviously two-faced to
fool anyone. It is no surprise that Iranians remember this and have no interest in receiving “support” from the people that otherwise
want to bomb them or strangle their country into submission. It isn’t possible to show unremitting hostility to Iran at
every turn without inflicting harm on the people of Iran, and Trump’s policies prove that . There is nothing that
Trump and his hard-liners can say now that will change this. It is fitting that the hard-line policies that are supposed to
bolster U.S. “leadership” and “credibility” in the world are so often the reason why the rest of the
world doesn’t believe American leaders and can’t take what they say seriously.
 Econ Add-On
Travel ban decks US economy – Iranians are key contributors to growth
Slavin 7/3/18 (Barbara, directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council, "How U.S. Iran Policy
Hurts Iran and America," http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/how-u-s-iran-policy-hurts-iran-
and-america/)

But the same animus that motivates U.S. policy toward Latin American asylum-seekers runs through recent
U.S. actions against Iran and will also be damaging to the U.S. economy . Despite claims that the Trump
administration “stands with the Iranian people”—repeated on July 2 by the State Department policy planning chief Brian Hook—the
negative impact of U.S. policies falls most heavily on ordinary Iranians . It is not just that the Trump administration
is seeking to starve the Islamic Republic of its oil income—despite Iran’s full implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement.
Iranians—from grandparents of American citizens to graduate students—are being barred entry to the U.S.
on false grounds that they threaten U.S. national security. This is happening despite the fact that Iranians have made
substantial contributions to our economy and society and no Iranian granted a visa to come to the U.S. has conducted an
act of terrorism on U.S. soil.
 A2 Pressure/Sanctions CP
Hard-line measures against Iran fail – only positive signals of support can empower democratic
forces
McFaul and Milani 5/30/18 (Michael and Abbas, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International
Studies and a Hoover fellow at Stanford University, and a contributing columnist to The Post. He was
previously special assistant to President Obama at the National Security Council from 2009-2012 and
former U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2012-2014 + research fellow and co-director of the Iran
Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution, "Why Trump’s plans for regime change in Iran will have the
opposite effect," https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/05/30/why-trumps-
plans-for-regime-change-in-iran-will-have-the-opposite-effect/)

Over the long term, certainly, atransition to democracy in Iran would be the most effective way to reduce
tensions between Iran and the United States and to guarantee a less disruptive regional role for Tehran. A
democratic Iran could potentially become a strategic partner for the United States (and even Israel). Yet
Trump’s actions and Pompeo’s 12-step program make that outcome less likely while damaging other core American
national security interests. Tough rhetoric doesn’t always translate into effective policy . Some hope that this
new confrontational tone coming from Washington might weaken Iran’s theocracy. In fact, however, the
opposite is more likely .
 A2 Advantage CP Grab-Bag
Your advantage CP’s attempt to “help” the Iranian people fails – it’s FAILED for years
Bonicelli 1/24/18 (Paul, Bonicelli served in the George W. Bush administration, career includes a
presidential appointment with Senate confirmation as assistant administrator at the U.S. Agency for
International Development; as a professional staff member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S.
House of Representatives; and as a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly. He holds a PhD in
political science from the University of Tennessee, "Calling A Persian Spring A ‘Disaster’ Is A Desperate
Cover For Obama’s Iran Failures," http://thefederalist.com/2018/01/24/calling-persian-spring-disaster-
desperate-cover-obamas-iran-failures/)

Bahgat’s recommendation: “A better approach would be for the United States to work with its European and
Asian allies to help the Iranian government to address the major socioeconomic and political aspirations of
the Iranian people. Adhering to the nuclear deal, supporting foreign investment, activating cultural
engagement, and promoting strategic dialogue are likely to serve the interests of all concerned parties. A
stable Islamic Republic is good for the Iranian people, regional powers and the international community.” Obama and the
Europeans have assiduously tried everything on his list , and still the ungrateful Iranian people rose up
across the nation for days, risking their lives to demand self-governance as the only solution to their problems. I suspect the only thing
Bahgat really intends is to support the Obama nuclear deal with Iran. He does so because he knows , as does the regime, that
besides the Trump administration the uprisings are the primary threat to the regime’s agenda .
 A2 Appeasement DA
Travel ban undermines global pressure against Iran
Byman 17 (Daniel, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy @ Brookings, "Nuclear
deal fallout: The global threat of Iran," 5/24, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/nuclear-deal-fallout-
the-global-threat-of-iran/)

An effective policy against Iran will also require a sustained and steady U.S. commitment. Inconsistent rhetoric, bombast, and
efforts to score points to domestic audiences at the expense of Muslims will hinder U.S. efforts to build
an anti-Iran alliance , among other costs. Similarly, anti-Iran rhetoric that is not tied to actual policies and events on the group
will make Iran more likely to work with anti-American local groups. Unless the administration is more careful in its rhetoric, allies
and adversaries alike are more likely to see the United States as unreliable or to simply ignore signals they
do not like, leading to misperceptions that could backfire on the United States .
 Terror Add-on
The Travel ban increases recruitment by radical terrorist groups – leads to terror attacks on the US
Abdelaziz 17 (Mohamed Abdelaziz [Arabic writer and former project officer for Freedom House] “Regional Consequences of
Trump's Travel Ban” Published by The Washington Institute, 4/20/17, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/middle-
east-reactions-to-trumps-travel-ban / WY-TH)

President Donald Trump issued an executive order suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions
On January 27, 2017,

Program, indefinitely prohibiting all Syrian refugees from entering the United States and banning
immigrants from seven Muslim-majority countries: Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen. The executive order
unleashed a storm of criticism from countries across the world and from some international and regional
entities, such as the African Union, the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Official reactions in the
Middle East ranged from defensive and accusatory to supportive, while some offered only silence. Sudan and Iraq were among the first countries to defend themselves against the
executive order, while Yemen and the Libyan Government of National Accord took a hostile position. In contrast, all Gulf countries, except Qatar, expressed support. Syria also
Iran's foreign minister Mohamed Javad Zarif declared that
backed the directive, while Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon remained silent.

his country would implement a reciprocal policy in response to these orders, as Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei accused the United States of political corruption. This forceful Iranian reaction came in the wake
of a deterioration in U.S.-Iran relations after Trump announced his intention to re-examine the nuclear deal
and imposed further sanctions on Iran following its latest missile test. Similarly, Yemen's deputy foreign minister Abdul Malek al-
Mekhlafi opposed the order, describing it as "unjustified" and ultimately promoting terrorism. Yemen did not expect to be included
in Trump's ban list, particularly since it is leading a grinding war against the Iranian-backed Houthi militias. In the case of Libya, the foreign minister of the Government of
National Accord described the executive order as "unfair" and "racist" as it encourages faith-based discrimination, which is a violation of the international principles of human
rights. As a direct result of the order, a high-level conference on Libya set for mid-January in Washington was canceled. Other countries opted for a more reconciliatory and
adaptive approach, adopting a defensive position while hoping that Trump would repeal the order. For example, Sudan's Foreign Ministry declared in a statement that the Sudanese
community in the United States has a good reputation, observes the nation's laws, and does not commit any criminal or extremist acts. It also called on the president to reconsider
his orders. But Sudan is also actively seeking to maintain and develop relations with the United States. Bearing this in mind, Sudan has seemingly embraced a defensive posture so
as not to undermine these efforts, especially in light of the recent lifting of sanctions thanks to bilateral discussions, which paved the way for joint economic and security
cooperation. Iraq's position was not significantly different from Sudan's. In its statement, Iraq's Foreign Ministry expressed surprise and disappointment toward the executive order,
as both countries have come a long way in fighting the Islamic State. The statement also called on Trump to reconsider, highlighting Iraq's desire to maintain its strategic
partnership with the United States in order to intensify counterterrorism efforts. As the major regional counterterrorism ally of the United States, Iraq hopes to continue receiving
military and economic aid. Therefore, the Iraqi leadership is trying to convince the Trump administration to remove Iraq from the ban list; a successful move, as Trump issued
another executive order on March 6 excluding Iraq from the ban. This came after a phone call between Trump and Iraqi prime minister Haider al-Abadi on February 10, during
which Trump promised to reconsider Iraq's inclusion on the ban list. The Trump administration most likely made this decision for fear that Iran would expand its influence by
appealing to disenfranchised Iraqis prohibited from entering the United States. This understanding culminated in Abadi's mid-March visit to Washington, during which Trump
pledged to increase military aid to Iraq in support of counterterrorism efforts. Except for Qatar, the majority of Gulf countries endorsed the executive order. Saudi energy minister
Khalid al-Falih, for example, declared that the United States had the right to take the necessary precautions to protect its people, describing U.S.-Saudi relations as "strong and
deep." For his part, Emirati foreign minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed said that this order is a domestic issue for the United States and does not target Muslims. Kuwaiti foreign
minister Khaled al-Jarallah announced that his country respects the sovereignty of the president, saying that the ban is ultimately in accordance with U.S. interests. These Gulf
leaders chose to stay on good terms with Trump in order to serve their own agendas better. Trump's call for safe zones in Syria was widely welcomed by the Gulf states, which
expect the Trump administration to take a firmer stance to counter the threat posed by Iranian intervention in Syria and Yemen. Syria supported the executive order as well. Syrian
president Bashar al-Assad declared that the executive order did not target the Syrian people themselves but the terrorists who infiltrate Western countries in the guise of refugees.
Assad added that it is not his responsibility to ask Trump to allow refugees to enter his country. Syria announced its support for Trump after the latter's declaration that his
administration will cut off support for Syrian rebels. However, the winds do not blow as the vessels wish; after the Assad regime attacked civilians in Khan Sheikhoun with
chemical weapons, the Trump administration responded by launching missile strikes on Syria's al-Shayrat Air Base. The countries not included in the ban, however -- Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia -- chose to remain silent. These countries have always sought to establish close security and economic ties with the United States and rushed to
implement Trump's order on the ground. Egypt and Jordan banned certain nationalities included in the order from traveling to the United States through their airports. Similarly,
Egyptian president Abdul Fattah al-Sisi was among the first to congratulate Trump on his electoral victory. In turn, Trump described Sisi as a "great man." Sisi's tough stand
against Islamists seems to please Trump, especially since Egypt is seeking to convince the United States to add the Muslim Brotherhood to its list of foreign terrorist organizations.
Tunisia also remained mute on the issue, as it is facing harsh economic and security conditions that require the support of the United States. Trump promised President Beji Caid
Essebsi that Washington would stand behind Tunisia and provide the necessary support to counter its economic and security challenges. Lebanon and Jordan are seeking to
maintain already close economic and security relations with the United States. Despite the region's general support for a ban many argue is racist and targets Muslims, there
is a widespread consensus that the ban will empower extremist terrorist groups .
These groups will quite effortlessly persuade youths facing economic and social setbacks that the
United States is fighting Islam, which is a narrative typically leveraged for recruitment. Effective
counterterrorism consists of fighting radical ideologies that are not bound by any borders or security
measures. The United States has itself fallen prey to a number of local terrorist acts by residents espousing
radical ideologies. The Orlando shooting is a prime example in this regard: Omar Mateen did not need a visa as he was already a
citizen. Furthermore, the Trump administration must still work closely with the governments of countries not on the list that suffer from terrorism and radical ideologies. It must
also realize that its counterterrorism partners in the Middle East were themselves partly responsible for expanding this phenomenon. The suppression of freedoms, the spread of
corruption, and the absence of social justice are all factors to blame for the frustration experienced by those driven to join terrorist groups.

The travel ban undermines critical counterterrorism and intelligence partnerships and increased
anti-American sentiment increasing the risk of terrorism
Clapper et al 18 (James R. Clapper, Jr. [Served as director of National Intelligence from 2010 to 2017, Served previously as
director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and director of the Defense Intelligence Agency], Joshua A. Geltzer [Served
as senior director for counterterrorism and deputy legal adviser at the National Security Council from 2015 to 2017, Now the
executive director and visiting professor of law at Georgetown's Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection], and Matthew
G. Olsen [Served as director of the National Counterterrorism Center from 2011 to 2014, Now an adjunct senior fellow at the Center
for a New American Security and a lecturer at Harvard Law School] “We've worked on stopping terrorism. Trump's travel ban fuels
it” Published by CNN, 4/23/18, https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/23/opinions/trump-travel-ban-fuels-terrorism-clapper-geltzer-
olsen/index.html / WY-TH)
(CNN )- Speaking in Davos this January, President Donald Trump promised that, "when it comes to terrorism, we will do whatever is necessary to protect our nation." It's a
commitment we share with the President. In fact, developing and implementing lawful and effective counterterrorism
strategies and policies used to be our jobs in the intelligence community, at the White House and at the
National Counterterrorism Center, respectively. That's precisely why we are opposed to Trump's travel ban,
which heads to the Supreme Court this week for oral arguments. It's unnecessary, at odds with the
Constitution, and ultimately counterproductive because it makes Americans less safe rather than more.
Effective counterterrorism policies respond to real threats, which in turn means responding to real
intelligence about threats. But Trump's prohibition on entry to the United States from a number of
overwhelmingly Muslim-majority countries is grounded in neither real threats nor real intelligence.
We've spent countless hours tracking and disrupting real terrorist threats. Those threats are caused by particular individuals, not the 150

million people categorically barred from our country by Trump's fulfillment of his campaign promise to
implement "a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States." Moreover, there
certainly aren't countrywide threats emanating from the nations affected by Trump's travel ban, given that
no national from any of those countries has caused any of the terrorism-related deaths in the United States
since 1975. Legitimate threats involve specific people, and that's why our country conducts rigorous and
tailored vetting for specific travelers coming to the United States. It's an approach that involves vetting those travelers across the
information possessed by the intelligence and law enforcement communities multiple times, in response to threats and intelligence about specific individuals seeking entry to the
United States. Over the past several years, the government, working with career national security professionals, has reviewed and revised the screening process to adapt to new
threats when the intelligence warranted a shift. That's an approach diametrically opposed to the one found in Trump's travel ban. One year after the travel ban, I am not your
American Muslim Trump's ban isn't just unnecessary; it's also contrary to our constitutional values. Before we worked on counterterrorism policy, two of us were national security
lawyers in the executive branch. We believed and continue to believe that the Constitution provides significant leeway to the president to protect Americans. But penalizing
individuals because they belong to a particular religion -- even when the government tries, as a proxy, penalizing countries with populations overwhelmingly of that religion -- falls
outside that leeway. Indeed, our Constitution's First Amendment specifically forbids it. Yet it's precisely what President Trump's travel ban does. Trump has made clear his view of
Islam: "Islam hates us," he's declared, later adding, "We're having problems with the Muslims, and we're having problems with Muslims coming into the country." Trump's view of
rump's travel ban
Muslims has driven his three attempts at implementing the "shutdown of Muslims entering the United States" he promised as a candidate. Moreover, T

has stunned national security experts across the government, none of whom appears to have ever suggested
a blanket ban as a way to protect Americans. And, ultimately, Trump's view of Islam and Muslims makes his travel ban unconstitutional, as several
courts have concluded, because it runs headlong into the First Amendment's protection against the government favoring or, as here, disfavoring any particular religion. It would be
it's also downright dangerous, especially to our country's
bad enough if Trump's travel ban were simply unnecessary and unlawful. But

counterterrorism efforts. The ban is so obviously, palpably, indeed explicitly anti-Muslim in nature that it
has -- understandably -- offended Muslim-American communities around the world, including in the
United States. Yet those are precisely the communities that can prove critical for
identifying and responding to individuals becoming radicalized by groups like ISIS and al
Qaeda. Moreover, effective counterterrorism relies heavily on robust intelligence-sharing
relationships with foreign governments. Banning all travelers from a foreign country seems a surefire
way to offend that country's government and impede intelligence-sharing, rather than enhancing the
, after Chad's inclusion in the third travel ban, Chad
flow of information about terrorist threats as effective counterterrorism requires. Indeed

pulled its troops out of the continuing counterterrorism struggle with Boko Haram in Niger. Trump recently
removed Chad from the list of countries subject to his travel ban; yet, despite that step, there's been no
indication of when, if ever, Chad's troops will return to Niger. It's usually not easy to soothe an offended partner. And, more broadly,
Trump's travel ban has inflamed anti-American sentiment globally and
undermined key counterterrorism partnerships with countries from Europe to the Middle East. As
former national security officials, we're not alone in thinking that Trump's travel ban fails to respond to threats to our country and actually undermines our security. Forty-nine of
Trump's travel ban "not only fails to
our most senior former colleagues joined the three of us in telling the Supreme Court, in a brief filed last month, that

advance the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States, it harms those interests by
taking discriminatory actions unprecedented in American history." Like our former colleagues, we've dedicated much of our careers to
countering terrorism. Trump's travel ban hinders, rather than helps, the critical mission of protecting Americans.
 A2: Terror DA
The travel ban doesn’t solve terror
Wolfe 18 - Rebecca Jayne Wolfe, Fellow, Program for Refugees, Forced Migration and Humanitarian
Action, Yale University. “Trump travel ban targeting Muslims will not make America safer.” The
Conversation, 27 June 2018, http://theconversation.com/trump-travel-ban-targeting-muslims-will-not-
make-america-safer-97519. Accessed 19 July 2018. Hi Bren-Bran

The U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld the Trump administration’s policy barring people from several
predominantly Muslim nations from entering the U.S., ruling that the travel ban was an appropriate use of
executive power aimed at strengthening national security. In her dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor agreed
with the plaintiffs’ argument that the policy – which targets travelers from Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Somalia – was
discriminatory because it brands Muslims as potential terrorists. I have studied violent extremism worldwide,
including in some of the countries Trump’s travel ban targets. My research reveals why profiling Muslims will not keep the
United States safe from terrorism. Profiling worldwide Many countries try to identify and track potential
terrorists through profiling as part of their national security policy. Israel regularly uses racial profiling in
airport security screenings. Kenya, Belgium and Pakistan also use profiling to monitor and apprehend people they consider at
risk of engaging in terrorism. But there is no typical terrorist. People who are educated or uneducated, religious
or agnostic, join violent extremist groups. So do those who are employed, unemployed, poor, middle class
and wealthy. Some extremists are socially active and family-oriented. Others are loners. The uncertainty problem No country –
not the U.S., nor the Netherlands with its stop-and-frisk policy toward Muslims – knows who will commit
the next terrorist attack. But government officials, like most people, hate uncertainty. They want to be able to
tell voters that they can predict violence and stop it before it happens. It is difficult to disprove the counterterrorism
strategies that label huge swaths of the world’s population as potential terrorists, because to do so requires proving a negative. When
terrorist attacks do not happen, were they avoided because correctly identified extremists were deterred, or because no one in the
monitored group was planning an attack anyway? Predictive failures Other fields show why caution is in order when it comes
to the kind of predictive modeling counterterrorism experts hope to perfect. Princeton sociologist Matthew
Salganik, whose research aims to predict the academic success of children, recently discussed the challenges he has faced in an
episode of the NPR show “Invisibilia.” Despite having 15 years worth of data on 5,000 students, Salganik said, he has yet to develop a
model that can reliably predict their performance in school. The 2016 U.S. presidential election is another example of models failing
spectacularly to anticipate human decision-making. Drawing on pre-election polls, most models incorrectly picked Hillary Clinton as
the winner. Data scientists blame bad polling data for the limitations of their statistical models. Imagine, then, how fraught a
counterterrorism model is when based on data collected in war zones with high terrorist activity and limited access – places like
Somalia, northeast Nigeria and Iraq. Gang profiling Gang profiling may be the exception to the failures in predictive profiling.
Researchers at the University of Southern California claim they’ve successfully created profiles of people who are likely to join gangs
as a means of preventing recruitment. They hope to adapt the same tools to help Central America get violent gangs like MS-13 under
control. There may be something to this. According to the National Gang Center, almost all gang members committed other crimes
before joining a gang. That means that previous criminal behavior is a relevant characteristic to help police identify and protect those
vulnerable to gang recruitment. And since these people are already in the criminal justice system, they are relatively easy to monitor.
In 2012 police launched a comprehensive crime-reduction strategy in New Orleans, which at that time had the highest murder rate of
any U.S. city its size. At its core was a plan to target at-risk individuals from joining gangs by offering them various social and legal
services. By 2014, the murder rate in New Orleans had dropped 20 percent. New Orleans’ predictive policing plan demonstrates that
when it comes to gang involvement, past behavior is a decent indicator of future behavior, though there are valid concerns that this
type of profiling may stigmatize formerly incarcerated people – particularly young men. In any case, profiling alone is not enough. A
2015 crime prevention program in Chicago that identified at-risk individuals but did not offer them social services proved largely
unsuccessful. Who’s a terrorist? In closed-door meetings in Washington, I have heard numerous policymakers express hope that such
anti-gang recruitment tools can be adapted to stop people in Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Nigeria from joining extremist groups. I have
grave doubts. First, there is little evidence that prior violent behavior correlates with engaging in violent
extremism, as it does with gang recruitment. But successful profiling is all about data – and counterterrorist specialists simply do
not have enough of it. Very few people worldwide will become terrorists. As of January 2017, the Islamic State,
or ISIS, had 35,000 fighters controlling an area of Iraq and Syria with 8 million residents. More than half of
all ISIS fighters are foreign-born. In contrast, Chicago has 150,000 gang members and a population of 2.7 million.
Probability-wise, it is far more likely that any given Chicago resident will join a gang than that any one of the hundreds of millions of
residents of Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, Russia, Chechnya, Jordan, England, France and 80 other countries that ISIS fighters have traveled
from will turn to violent extremism. As the Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Danny Kahneman writes in his book “Thinking Fast and
Slow,” people often ignore these base rates when thinking about terrorism. For example, most violent extremists are young men – but
only the tiniest fraction of young men worldwide are violent extremists. Terrorist attacks are also relatively rare, providing insufficient
data on which to build a reliable model. In 2016, 25,620 deaths worldwide were attributed to terrorism. War, homicide and other kinds
of violence killed 560,000. That means terrorism is responsible for less than 5 percent of all violent deaths around the globe. What
countries can do to prevent terrorism There are better ways to fight terrorists than by trying to figure out who will become one.
Invervening in at-risk communities where terrorist cells may emerge could be more effective. Evidence confirms that extremist groups
target entrenched conflict zones with little security and a significant number of marginalized residents. Increasing security and public
services in such areas can reduce violence. In Iraq, for example, development aid that improved basic services and infrastructure in
areas with strong military presence has led to fewer insurgent attacks. Addressing vulnerable residents’ short- and long-term concerns
can also mitigate the reasons people join terrorist groups in the first place. Cash transfers and vocational training for unemployed
young Afghans contributed to a 17 percent drop in support for armed opposition groups there between 2015 and 2016. The Trump
administration’s profiling of Muslim travelers has been deemed constitutional. But that does not make it a
valid national security plan.
Iran Democracy - 2AC
 Ext: travel ban boosts hardliners
The travel ban bolsters Iranian hardliners - strengthens propaganda, weakens political reform, and
bars dissidents from refuge
Larison 6/26 - Daniel Larison, PhD in history from the University of Chicago and senior editor at The
American Conservative. “The Travel Ban and the Administration’s Contempt for the Iranian People.” The
American Conservative, 26 June 2018, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-travel-ban-
and-the-administrations-contempt-for-the-iranian-people/. Accessed 06 July 2018. Hi Brendan
Jason Rezaian responds to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. Hawaii:

For Iranian Americans, that sounds about right. They have worked hard for decades to become one of the most well-integrated and
successful immigrant communities in this country, both in terms of education and income. The travel ban is merely the latest
confirmation of a grim realization: We aren’t wanted here. How could we be, if our relatives are viewed solely as security risks?

If you look at the numbers, Trump’s travel ban could be described more accurately as an “Iran ban.” Of the total of those likely to be
affected, Iranians make up the majority.

The inclusion of Iran on this list has always seemed the least defensible, most vindictive part of an
irrational and cruel policy. Not only is the ban an insult to the Iranian people, but it is also a burden on Iranian-American
citizens and their families. The Trump administration often offers empty words of encouragement to the Iranian people, but in practice
bars them from coming here and views them as potential threats. The U.S. government claims to distinguish between the regime and
the people in Iran, but it penalizes the latter for the activities of the former under a specious national security justification. In
addition to the harm done to Iranian-Americans and their families, the ban significantly damages how the
U.S. is perceived in Iran and around the world.

The travel ban conveys the Trump administration’s undisguised contempt for the people of Iran. That is the
message that the U.S. is sending with this policy, and the Court just upheld it. The administration is
alienating whole new generations of Iranians and giving the Iranian government easy propaganda victories,
and all for the sake of guarding against a non-existent threat. Iranian nationals don’t pose a threat to the U.S., and
barring them from coming won’t make the U.S. one iota safer. Combined with other destructive and punitive measures aimed at the
country, the ban will tend to boost the fortunes of Iranian hard-liners, diminish the opportunities for political
reform, and deprive Iranian dissidents and activists of the chance to find refuge in the U.S.
 Iran/Israel War and Middle East Conflict
Iranian proliferation makes war with Israel inevitable – experts agree – multiple scenarios
Goldberg 12 – Jeffrey Goldberg, editor in chief of The Atlantic and a recipient of the National Magazine
Award for Reporting, “How a Nuclear War Would Start in the Middle East.” The Atlantic, 24 January
2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/how-a-nuclear-war-would-start-in-the-
middle-east/251915/. Accessed 17 July 2018.

How would a nuclear exchange in the Middle East come to pass? There is always a chance, of course, that the mullahs
in Tehran would decide, while sitting around one day cursing the Jews, that since they now have a nuclear weapon, why not just drop
it on Israel and be done with it? I've always believed that, all things being equal, it would be better to see atheists in charge of nuclear
weapons, rather than religious fundamentalists. Men who profess belief in the glories of the afterlife might not mind their own nuclear
obliteration quite as much as I would like. And it is also true that the Iranian regime is rhetorically genocidal, describing Israel, and
Jews, in Hitlerian terms: as cancer and tumors in need of eradication. But the mullahs are also men interested in keeping hold of
temporal power, and it seems unlikely that they would immediately deploy their weapons against the Jewish state. But, as I point out
in my Bloomberg View column this week, it might not matter. Put aside all the other good reasons the current Iranian leadership
shouldn't be considered appropriate stewards of nuclear weapons. The main threat posed by a nuclear Iran is that, based
on its past behavior -- and assuming it will be even more adventurous and provocative once it has gone
nuclear -- it will almost inevitably trigger a crisis that will escalate into a nuclear confrontation with
Israel: The experts who study this depressing issue seem to agree that a Middle East in which Iran has four
or five nuclear weapons would be dangerously unstable and prone to warp-speed escalation. Here's one
possible scenario for the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah, Iran's Lebanese proxy, launches a cross-border attack
into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli civilians with conventional rockets. Israel responds by
invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran, coming to the
defense of its proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and leaves open the question of what it will do if
Israel refuses to heed its demand. Dennis Ross, who until recently served as President Barack Obama's Iran point man on the
National Security Council, notes Hezbollah's political importance to Tehran. "The only place to which the Iranian government
successfully exported the revolution is to Hezbollah in Lebanon," Ross told me. "If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy
Hezbollah, you can see Iran threatening Israel, and they begin to change the readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain
of events that would be like 'Guns of August' on steroids." Imagine that Israel detects a mobilization of Iran's rocket
force or the sudden movement of mobile missile launchers. Does Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or
that they are not? And would Israel have time to figure this out? Or imagine the opposite: Might Iran,
which will have no second-strike capability for many years -- that is, no reserve of nuclear weapons to
respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first, knowing that it has no second chance?
The nuclear experts I respect most, including Bruce Blair, of Global Zero, and David Albright, of the Institute for Science and
International Security, both call a Middle East in which Iran possesses a small number of nuclear weapons a
dangerously unstable place. Here is what Albright told me Monday about Iran's particular challenges in an escalating
confrontation -- the no second-strike conundrum: "In a crisis, you don't want to go first, but you don't want to go
second, either. It ends up in an unstable situation. Miscalculations can result in nuclear weapons being
used. Iran may feel it doesn't have second-strike capability and so would, in an escalating crisis, feel it has
to use what it has first." Iran, he explained, will be hampered, for many years after it crosses the nuclear threshold (assuming it is
allowed to cross), by a small arsenal of comparatively modest bombs. "Our estimate of their warhead design, based on internal
documentation from the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) is that they would be building low-yield fission weapons of a
few kilotons each" -- "Fat Man," dropped on Nagasaki, was roughly a 20-kiloton bomb -- "because they're forced to miniaturize to
make it smaller for delivery," Albright said. The Israelis, on the other hand, have a much larger arsenal than the Iranians could hope
for for many years, and much more varied and sophisticated delivery systems. It is, from any angle, a hellish problem. Albright
believes that the Middle East with a nuclearized Iran (and a nuclearized Israel, and, presumably, Iran's
regional adversaries, including Saudi Arabia, seeking their own nuclear weapons) would be much more
unstable than South Asia. "The governments of Pakistan and India don't necessarily see each other as
mortal enemies. The relationship between Israel and Iran would be worse." So, what to do? Not attack. There's
plenty of time for war. Right now, the focus should be on convincing Iran, through sanctions, and a promise, if it gives up its nuclear
ambitions, to rejoin the international community. Will this work? Probably not, but it has to be pursued. Here's Bruce Blair on the
efficacy of a preemptive attack: "The liabilities of preemptive attack on Iran's nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits. But
certainly Iran's program must be stopped before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons delivery capability." I would argue that it
needs to be stopped before delivery systems are in place. The chance is small, but not vanishingly so, that an Iranian nuclear weapon
could be delivered by sea or land, not by air.
Iran will use ICBMs to start a regional war and strike the US
Prof. Raymond Tanter and Prof. Ivan Sheehan ’18, Tanter served as a senior member on the Middle East
Desk of the National Security Council staff in the Reagan-Bush administration, personal representative of
the secretary of Defense to international security and arms control talks in Europe and is now professor
emeritus at the University of Michigan and Sheehan is director of the graduate programs in Global Affairs
and Human Security and Negotiations and Conflict Management in the School of Public and International
Affairs at the University of Baltimore, “Iran and Israel Could Go to War Next Year,’ The National Interest,
2/25/18, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/iran-israel-could-go-war-next-year-24640?page=0%2C1

Not only is Israel at risk from Iran. It’s ballistic-missile programs give it the potential to hold targets at risk
across the region, and Tehran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East.
Tehran’s desire to deter the U nited States might drive it to field an ICBM, which like that of Pyongyang’s
might target the U.S. homeland per the February 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community.

Iran and Israel will go to war by 2019

Prof. Raymond Tanter and Prof. Ivan Sheehan ’18, Tanter served as a senior member on the Middle East
Desk of the National Security Council staff in the Reagan-Bush administration, personal representative of
the secretary of Defense to international security and arms control talks in Europe and is now professor
emeritus at the University of Michigan and Sheehan is director of the graduate programs in Global Affairs
and Human Security and Negotiations and Conflict Management in the School of Public and International
Affairs at the University of Baltimore, “Iran and Israel Could Go to War Next Year,’ The National Interest,
2/25/18, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/iran-israel-could-go-war-next-year-24640?page=0%2C1

If Tehran uses its militias, and other forces drafted to do Iran’s deeds, as well as its IRGC to launch attacks
on Israel, there may be war between Israel and Iran by 2019.

We asked in January if 2018 would bring revolution to Iran. Now we ask: Will Israel and Iran go to war by
2019?

By acknowledging the legitimacy of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, it would result in fewer
actions by Tehran to crack down on protestors, e.g., by going to war with Israel to divert the Iranian
population from domestic unrest.

The lead of the January 17 article was CIA Director Mike Pompeo. He said, “It is my full expectation that
you will see the Iranian people continue to revolt against this [crackdown by Tehran on protests.]

Likewise, we lead this article, with Director Pompeo. About Israel and Iran, and North Korea, Pompeo said
, “Whether it’s Lebanese Hezbollah, the threat that it [Iran] presents to both Lebanon and to Israel; whether
it’s the Shia militias—you can see the impact that they're having today, even in northern Iraq; the threat that
they pose to U.S. forces.” And even more to the point of our post, Pompeo also said , “There is a long
history of proliferation ties, as between North Korea and Iran.” Proliferation partners share technology,
making it easier for both to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.”

Regarding 2018, direct conflict between Israel and Iran is not only on the horizon, but happening now
: interception of an Iranian drone over Israel, downing of an Israeli F-16, and retaliatory strikes against
Syrian and Iranian targets. These converging events are opening scenes of a wider war—if Tehran
continues trying to fortify its presence in Syria after the defeat of Islamic State.
 Ext: plan solves protests

The travel ban suppresses protests – ending it discourages propaganda and encourages activism
Austin 18 – Leila Golestaneh Austin, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, former
Professorial Lecturer in Global Theory and History and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s
School of Advanced International Studies, now the Executive Director of The Public Affairs Alliance of
Iranian Americans. “HOW THE PRESIDENT CAN SUPPORT IRAN’S PROTESTERS.” Public Affairs
Alliance of Iranian Americans, 11 January 2018, http://paaia.org/CMS/president-can-support-irans-
protesters.aspx. Accessed 07 July 2018. Hi Miss Beck
Washington, DC — As Americans of Iranian heritage, we watch the protests of the many brave Iranian citizens with compassion and
respect for fearlessly voicing their discontent with the country’s long-standing economic, social, and political challenges. We watch in
distress as authorities block communication and social media sites, while carrying out mass arrests, resulting in 22 reported deaths.

As Americans, we prize the universal democratic values of freedom of opinion and expression above all else. As Iranian-Americans,
we believe that regardless of one’s political persuasion in a free and open democracy, it is important to support and defend the
fundamental rights of any people to peacefully express their grievances. And as the birthplace of our cultural heritage and where we
maintain family ties, we feel this even more strongly for those who live in Iran today under grievous conditions.

Even if President Trump’s expression of solidarity with the “great Iranian people” is heartening, his
message rings hollow given his administration’s policy of banning the entry of Iranian nationals to the
United States in three separate versions of his Travel Ban. This policy makes it clear that democratic values
are accessible to a limited and exclusive club that clearly does not include democratically-minded Iranians.
As one of the most highly educated and pro-American populations in the Middle East, Iranian nationals are
dismayed and upset by a ban that denies hundreds of victims of oppression and family members of US
citizens from coming to the United States, the world-wide beacon of freedom and democracy.

Abolishing the Travel Ban also eliminates the Iranian regime’s ability to paint the United States as a
belligerent and hostile enemy of the Iranian people. The evidence of how the Ban undermines America’s
national interest could not be more clear than when Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, thanked
President Trump for re-instating the third version of the ban, claiming that it “showed the real face of
America.” More than anything, the Travel Ban feeds the Iranian regime’s anti-American propaganda
machine, and unnecessarily punishes the Iranian people.
In addition to removing a flawed policy by dropping the Travel Ban, the Trump administration and others in Washington should make
every effort to enhance the free flow of communications within the Iranian nation. Social media tools have become the lifeblood of
daily information for Iranian civil society. Members of Congress in the United States can play a critical and constructive role by
encouraging the Department of Treasury and Department of State to update media licenses, ensuring that information and
communication technologies are readily available to the Iranian people.

Expanding trade exemptions for telecommunications tools in Iran will promote private entrepreneurship, civil society, and better
communications among Iranians who already exhibit a high rate of social media and telecommunications usage. Despite the current
restrictions in place, Iranians cling desperately to available social media and telecommunications tools to engage each other and the
world, proving that the Iranian people want engagement, not authoritarian isolation and pariah state status.

While Iranian protesters are courageously sharing their opinions and voicing their discontent, the United
States must hold true to our commitment to democratic values and take policy positions that benefit their
cause, rather than ones that harm it. Likewise, Members of Congress should, in bipartisan manner, encourage the President to
expedite licenses of communication technologies that enhance the free flow of information and remove the Ban that targets the
Iranian people at such a vulnerable time in their brave and determined drive toward a more democratic
future.
 Ext: protests solve regime change

Demonstrations have brought Iran to the brink of massive political liberalization – successful
protests can initiate democratization
Sheehan 18 – Ivan Sascha Sheehan, PhD in International Conflict Analysis and Resolution, the incoming
Executive Director of the School of Public & International Affairs at the University of Baltimore. “The
Rebellion in Iran: A Comprehensive Assessment.” Modern Diplomacy, 10 April 2018,
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/04/10/the-rebellion-in-iran-a-comprehensive-assessment/. Accessed 06
July 2018.

In late December 2017 and in January 2018, massive protests erupted throughout the Islamic Republic of
Iran. The largest countrywide uprising since 2009 started in the northeastern holy city of Mashhad, the second largest city in Iran,
and a few towns on December 28, and spread to some 142 cities and towns in all 31 provinces at a shocking pace. The uprising was
prompted by runaway prices of some of the most basic staples, such as eggs, but became political in a matter of just a few hours. On
the morning of December 29, protests emerged in the western city of Kermanshah, the center of the province of Kermanshah, which
was struck by an earthquake in November. It quickly became evident that what was happening was more significant than a
short-lived protest – limited to a particular region of the country – but rather a reflection of deeper, more
profound anti-regime sentiments. Unsurprisingly, the Tehran responded to the rebellion, as it did in 2009, with
brutality. According to official figures, 22 protesters were killed, but according to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, some
50 protesters were killed and a member of the mullahs’ parliament cited the head of the Prisons
Organization and said that they had registered 4,972 arrests. The opposition put the number of detainees at 8,000 but
there are indications that this may be a somewhat conservative estimate. As of the date of this writing, at least 14 protesters have been
identified as having been killed in detention[1]. After two weeks of relative calm, more than a dozen Iranian cities were again scenes
of protests on January 31 and February 1, with similar slogans that rejected the regime in its entirety. In the meantime, the world has
witnessed a steady stream of protests and strikes by laborers and victims of theft and fraud by state institutions. The extraordinary
resilience demonstrated by the Iranian people suggests that protests could reoccur relatively quickly, and
perhaps more forcefully. A careful review of the evidence clearly indicates that the protests were not a short-lived
phenomenon with temporary impact. Rather, they marked a turning point and permanent change in the
trend of events and political calculations in Iran. This is significant in various ways. Iran has historically been an enigma
for Western powers and for Washington in particular. In this sense, the protests were significant for the future of Iran. But from a geo-
political perspective, the impact and consequence of major political developments in Iran transcend the country’s borders. In recent
history, the region is still reeling from the establishment of a theocratic regime in Iran in 1979, subsequent to
deposing the country’s monarchy. Perceptions among Iran watchers in the West prior to protests It is safe to say that the
protests caught most experts and Iran analysts in the West by surprise. This is reflected in less than accurate analyses of the realities on
the ground during the uprising, as well widespread assessments of the situation inside Iran. The below assumptions comprised a
conventional wisdom regarding Iran and its future prior to the protests that was promoted for years by Tehran’s lobbyists and
apologists in the West: The Iranian regime enjoys the support of the population, in particular the urban poor and the lower class that
served as the backbone of the Iranian Revolution and comprised the main social base of the clerical rule. It stemmed from the fact that
Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the regime, had ascended to power with the slogan of supporting the Mostazafin or the deprived.
The regime in Tehran is stable and strong enough to support interference in the affairs of other countries in the region and, as such, it
should be treated as a rising regional player with significant sway. Tehran has been able to suppress all dissent, and opposition is
limited to exiles with little to no influence on the current state of affairs inside the country and with no appeal to the youth who
comprise the majority in Iran. The Iranian political landscape is defined by a contest between “moderates” and “hardliners” and the
outcome of this contest will determine the future of Iran. The West is well served by propping up the “moderates” and allaying their
concerns to neutralize the hardliners. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is in full control. They have restructured on a
provincial basis and geared up to prevent popular uprisings. The nuclear agreement and the cash windfall that resulted from sanctions
relief improved the welfare of the average Iranian and provided a capital gain for the “moderates.” JCPOA will gradually lead to a
change of behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran. But another school of thought stressed that: The clerics are isolated at
home and are loathed by the Iranians, in particular by the youth. People are waiting for the first opportunity
to express their wrath. The foreign interventions and wars are not signs of strength. Rather they are taking a
big toll on the regime and are maintained to cover up the shortcomings and failures at home. When it
comes to major issues there is not much difference between the various factions and the regime is neither
capable nor willing to get engage in any meaningful moderation. In the major annual international rally of the
opposition in Paris on July 1, 2017, Maryam Rajavi, the President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran said: “The
light of change is shining on Iran. The ruling regime is in disarray and paralyzed as never before. Iranian
society is simmering with discontent and the international community is finally getting closer to the reality
that appeasing the ruling theocracy is misguided . These observations speak to three fundamental truths
related to obtaining freedom and liberty in Iran, as well as peace and tranquility in the region: First, the
overthrow of the ruling religious dictatorship is an imperative. Second, the regime’s overthrow is
within reach. And third, a democratic alternative and an organized resistance exists which is capable of
toppling the theocracy in Iran. Protests proved the assumptions pushed by Tehran’s apologists to be totally devoid of any
bearing in reality and the second school of thought to be more attuned to realities on the ground. Root causes of the Iran uprising A
correct assessment of the roots of the uprising is of paramount importance in making a good prediction of their future. The first protest
was prompted by a sudden increase in the price of some of the most basic staples, particularly eggs, and by the announcement of a
projected major increase in fuel costs. But, the protests quickly took a political tone and quickly came to target the
regime in its entirety. In reality, the protests were the result of several factors and the culmination of the
regime’s failures in several key areas over the years. In the area of economics, despite the unfreezing of
tens of billions of dollars under the nuclear agreement, there is total stagnation and the public has not
witnessed any benefits. In recent years the private sector has been very much squeezed out. According to
reliable estimates, organizations and institutions under the control of Khamenei, which include the IRGC, now
control over 50% of Iran’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) .[2] Inflation is still in double digits, while
unemployment is staggering [3]. This is even worse in towns and smaller cities, where according to some reports
unemployment among the youth is as high as 50 percent. Iranian state media is riddled with stories of young people with PhDs or
Masters Degrees from some of the country’s best universities who have to drive taxis or work as dishwashers in order to make ends
meet. On priorities, a recent review of the official budget indicated that its allocations for the IRGC and suppressive forces are several
times more than allocations for the most basic social needs such as public health and education. According to one study, Iran’s total
health care budget for 2018 is $16.3 billion, which is a third of its total war budget. The costs of wars in Syria, Iraq, and
Yemen, which is up to tens of billions of dollars, as well as financing a range of extremist groups including
Hezbollah in Lebanon, has taken a toll on the Iranian economy and the welfare of Iranians. In other words,
Tehran’s strategic policies and priorities have had direct impact on the Iranian economy and have become
totally intertwined with it. Little noticed in the West has been the failure in the past few years of a series of major financial
institutions affiliated with the IRGC. Millions of middle class and lower income Iranians were lured to invest in government–affiliated
and sanctioned institutions that promised high returns. The institutions were allowed to gamble or run Ponzi schemes with impunity
for years because they were owned by well-connected elites: religious foundations, the IRGC and/or other investment funds in the
Iranian state. The funds, life savings for many depositors, were either embezzled or diverted to the regime’s priorities[4]. The
bankruptcy of these intuitions, known as “mal-baakhtegan” or “property losers”, impacted millions of Iranians and has been steering
public unrest for the past couple of years. A number of the regime’s main banks face bankruptcy, mainly because of bad loans
provided to the regime’s senior officials or their trade partners without any guarantee or collateral. Mohammad Reza Bahonr, a former
Vice-speaker of the Majlis (Iranian parliament) said on February 1, “A number of our main banks are on the verge of bankruptcy.
Let’s pray the Lord that their bottom will not fall out since in reality these banks are in the red.” Corruption has become so
rampant and systematic that hardly a day goes by without a story of embezzlement of mammoth
proportions being exposed in the state-run press. The problem is so acute that Supreme Leader Khamenei described it as a
“seven headed dragon” in his speech on February 8. Nepotism is as its peak. The term “Aghazadeh” (son of Agha or noble born)
has been a colloquialism in Iran since 1990s,describing the children of elites who emerge as men of means and influence by way of
nepotism and corruption. In 2017, the term “good genes” was introduced in the Iranian parlance and became synonymous with the
privilege that the children of the elite, notably the sons and grandsons of senior ayatollahs and senior government officials, or
Aghazadehs, enjoy. The protests, of course, expressed the public’s rage over the mullahs’ plundering of their wealth. Poverty,
unemployment, and class differences have inspired it. But the protests were not limited to demands for
necessities of life and were not a spontaneous and sudden upheaval by the hungry. Rather, they had clear
and distinct social and political elements. Iran is suffocating from social and political repression, lack of the
most basic freedoms, and systematic institutional discrimination and nepotism have pervaded the regime.
As such, the protests were also for freedom and popular sovereignty to establish social justice and
prosperity. In other words, the protests were the culmination and convergence of years of the ill-fated
policies and priorities of the regime with deep-rooted causes. Several factors had simply postponed the
eruption of these crises. The reality caught up with the ayatollahs. Characteristics and features of the protests The
span and rapid expansion of the protests was quite remarkable. In a few days, they spread to 142 cities in all 31 provinces of Iran, and
no major city in Iran was spared. By comparison, the protests in 2009 were mainly limited to Tehran and a number of major cities.
Tellingly, in 2018, confrontation between the protesters and the security forces were most fierce in some of the smaller cities and
towns including and not limited to Izeh (Khuzestan Province), Touyserkan (Hamadan Province) and Shahinshar (Isfahan Province).
Not only did the protests begin in the holy city of Mashhad, but also some of the strongest slogans on the first days of the protests
were chanted in Qom, the other Iranian holy city. These two cities traditionally were perceived to be bastions of clerical rule. The vast
geography of the protests not only indicated the general sentiment throughout Iran, but from a security standpoint, it forced the regime
to spread its forces and made it impossible to concentrate on major cities by amassing its forcesin a handful of locations to prevent the
protests taking place. The overwhelming majority of those engaged in the uprising were from poor and underprivileged backgrounds,
i.e. people who were tired of their circumstances and angry at the regime for ignoring their wellbeing and denying their humanity. In
other words, unlike the 2009 protests that were primarily comprised of middle class people, in 2018 the protesters were from “armies
of the hungry and the unemployed.” They clearly repudiated Tehran’s claims of enjoying a broad base of social support in general
andthe claims by the mullahs’ spin doctors about their popularity among the impoverished in particular. The mullahs’ claim that they
are “defenders of the abased” was totally discredited. The abased cried out in the streets: “People must beg while the supreme leader
lives like a God.” Sadegh Zibakalam, a Tehran University Professor who is an advocate of the “reformers” in Iran, said in an interview
on February 17, “The 2009 protests showed that the system has difficulties with the people who reside north of Enghelab (Revolution)
Avenue[5]. The problem was with office workers, writers, university students, medical doctors…. But the protests in January 2018
were much more dangerous for the system. I believe those who came out were from south of Enghelab Avenue.” People from all
walks of life and social strata took part in the protests, and young men and women, particularly those who
are called “Dahe haftadi” (those have been born in 1990s) played a key role. “Those who chanted those slogans,
chanted against the regime, most of them were Dahe Haftadi.”Zibakalam acknowledged. (Dahe Hafadi is the term used in Iran to refer
to those who have been born in 1990s).By the regime’s own estimates, 50 percent of those who were detained were between the ages
of 19 and 25, and 27 percent were between 25 and 32. The 2009 protests began and were initiated due to a rift in the leadership of the
regime, specifically over the fate of the disputed elections, expressed with slogans like “where is my vote?”. The disenchanted
population used the fissure to express its frustrations. Yet, what seemed to be a blessing at the onset turned out to be a major weakness
of the protest movement. As the public slogans became more radical and targeted the leadership of the regime and challenged the
regime in its entirety, the individuals who appeared to be the leaders of the uprising became more inclined to cut a deal with the status
quo and at one point simply abated the movement and the public demands. In 2018, the uprising was not a byproduct of an
internal power struggle. To the contrary, it was a nail in the coffin of the myth of moderation. From the outset,
protesters’ slogans – which included chants of ‘down with Rouhani’ and ‘down with Khamenei’ –
demonstrated an outright rejection of the status quo and the regime in its entirety. The slogan ‘no to reformer, no
to hardliner, this game is over’ expressed a new awareness that differences between political factions in Iran are
distinctions without a difference. The protests showed that the people of Iran detest both regime factions
and want it to be overthrown in its entirety. The protests propelled a new player into the Iranian political landscape: the
people’s power. Very quickly it became evident that the demarcation was between the people on one side and the regime on the other.
Slogans like ‘no to Lebanon, no to Gaza, my life for Iran’ demonstrated that the people are rejecting the regime’s regional interference
in addition to its domestic policy. (A full analysis of the slogans is provided below.) Subsequent to 2009, in order to prevent a popular
uprising, the IRGC had restructured and one division was designated to control each province (with the exception of Tehran,where
two divisions were devoted for its control). Yet, the speed in the movement’s expansion overwhelmed the IRGC and it could not
prevent or contain the unrelenting, pervasive, and geographically widespread protests for more than 10 days. This is despite the fact
that after the second day, there was no element of surprise and virtually all the details of the protests including locations and times
were announced in advance on social media. It seems the myth of the invincibility of the IRGC has been proven false.
Though the protests began over increased prices for staple items such as eggs, not a single shop or private commercial entity was
attacked. Rather, suppressive centers, government buildings, and offices of the Friday prayer leaders[6] – the very institutions that
push the regime’s extremist, fundamentalist agenda – were targeted. By some assessments, the “moderate” faction was the bigger
loser in a sense that it became quite evident that they enjoy neither popular base and appeal nor political sway. When the former
President Mohammad Khatami, who has been touted by some observers as a champion of “moderation” in the past decades, said “the
youth who chanted harsh slogans were not ‘barandaz’ (the person who seeks the regime’s overthrow), rather they were simply
protesting for their grievances,” the Iranian youth repudiated him fiercely in social media to a point that #‫( براندازم‬I am a barandaz) was
rewetted more than 30,000 times in less than 24 hours. Social media played a key role in organizing and also in making the activists
aware of developments and status in other locations, towns and cities. As of July 2017, there were 48 million smart phones in Iran, a
country of 80 million people. Telegram is the king of messaging apps/social media in Iran with more than 40 million users. (Telegram
has about 100 million users worldwide.) According to government statistics, there are more than 586,000 Persian Telegram channels
and in an average day more than 3 million messages are exchanged in these channels. The young people – undeterred by the regime’s
brutality – used technology to mobilize the masses, open new fronts, and fight back, and the IRGC was stretched to contain the
protests. The role of women was quite dramatic and remarkable. Indeed, women have borne the brunt of
repression for the 39 years of the mullahs’ rule. The compulsory veil, as well as subjugation and
humiliation of women for failing to observe the veil, are among the most important means for the regime to
impose repression on society. The video clips coming from Iran showed that women were at the forefront in many scenes and
took the lead in charging at the security forces. A scene of a young woman standing at arm’s length from the guards and security
forces in Hamedan and shouting in their faces “Death to Khamenei,” went viral on social media. There were signs of alarm and
concern even inside the IRGC and Bassij militia, on which the regime relies for its survival. A number of members of the Bassij
burned their membership cards during the days of the uprising and joined the protesters. Some of the people killed by the regime’s
forces during the protests were from Bassiji families. Reaction in 2018 was very different than 2009, particularly where the U.S. is
concerned. In 2009,President Obama remained very much indifferent to the protests while reaching out to the ayatollahs and hoping
for a nuclear agreement. This was despite explicit calls by protesters who chanted, “Obama, Obama, either with them (i.e. ayatollahs)
or with us.” But the Trump administration was emphatic in its support for the protesters and their demands from the moment it
appeared that the protests represented a serious force and a challenge to the ayatollahs. President Trump in his State of Union address
stated, “When the people of Iran rose up against the crimes of their corrupt dictatorship, I did not stay silent. America stands with the
people of Iran in their courageous struggle for freedom.” It appears the
wall of fear in Iranian cities suffered cracks. This
can be seen in the audacity and bravery of the young protesters and the continuation of protests by different
sectors of society demanding their rights and welfare. Le Monde, the prominent French daily wrote in an article on
March 3, 2018, “In Iran the fear has changed camp and the people are no longer fearful of the regime.” The
protesters’ slogans and the new choice It is impossible to hold an opinion poll in a country like Iran, especially where it pertains to
sensitive issues such as anti-government protests and the sentiment of the protesters. But one measure for assessing the prevailing
mood and sentiments of the protests is analysis of the slogans that are chanted. The most striking slogans which put an end to a long
misguided perception in the West was, “reformists, hardliners, the game is over.” According to Zibakalam people have passed both
the reformists and hardliners. This slogan symbolizes a new era in Iran’s political landscape. The choice in Iran is no longer
“moderate” or “hardliners” but the ruling regime or regime change. A review showed that some 130 slogans were used in the recent
protests. While a number of them were used sporadically and in a few towns or cities, some including ‘Down with Khamenei,’ ‘Down
with Rouhani,’ or ‘Down with the dictator’, were chanted in almost all the cities and towns that were the scenes of protests There were
12 slogans such as ‘Down with the clerical regime,’ ‘We are determined to overthrow the regime,’ and ‘This is the last message, the
goal is to bring down the regime,’ that called for the overthrow of the regime in its entirety. Fourteen slogans such as ‘Khamenei is a
killer, his rule is illegitimate’, ‘Khamenei be ashamed, abdicate power,’‘Seyed-Ali, it is time to go’ (referring to the first name of
Khamenei), and “Down with Rouhani,’ targeted the leaders of the regime and both factions. Eleven slogans emphasized patriotism
and rejected the regime’s strategic policies, in particular meddling in affairs of other countries. Among them were ‘Leave Syria alone,
think about us,’ ‘Down with Hezbollah,’ ‘No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, my life for Iran,’ and ‘Dignified Iranian, support, support.’
Eight of the slogans, including ‘We will fight to wrest back our country Iran’ and ‘Either death or freedom,’ referred to continuity of
the protests. One telling aspect of the slogans was that despite the protests taking place in several ethnic areas of Iran, including
Kurdistan (northwest) and Balouchistan (southeast), there were no ethnic slogans and all were in tandem with the rest of the country,
targeting the regime in its entirety. Many slogans emphasized the notion of Iran and the protesters’ affection for a unified Iranian
identity. Role of the opposition: Were the protests organized? There are a number of significant issues surrounding the question of the
protests’ leadership. The prospects for repressing and containing a leaderless movement are much better, particularly for a regime like
the one ruling in Iran that has shown no hesitancy in using brute force against its demanding citizenry. On the other hand, the chances
of success are much higher for a movement that has established leadership and a clear plan. This factor is also significant so far as it
pertains to the future course of events and providing an alternative to the status quo. A key question was about the role of the People’s
Mojahedin Organization of Iran, also known as the Mujahedeen-e- Khalq (MeK).It has been a leading Iranian opposition group and its
existence in the Iranian political landscape predates the clerical regime. The MeK espouses a democratic-anti fundamentalist
perception of Islam and played a significant role in the opposition against the Shah that culminated in the overthrow of the monarchy
on February 11, 1979. Soon after the establishment of theocracy in Iran, the MeK stood up to the new regime and rejected its
constitution as undemocratic. In the summer of 1980, the MeK staged several rallies in Tehran drawing up to 150,000 people to hear
Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the MeK promise to carry on the opposition to Islamist domination[7]. It has been the primary target of
the ruling fundamentalists since 1981. In the course of the past three decades, some 120,000 MeK activists from all walks of life and
from all over Iran have been executed and a larger number have been incarcerated and persecuted. In the course of the anti-regime
demonstrations in 2009, many MeK supporters were arrested, and some were later executed. Over the years, the MeK made key
revelations on some of the most secret aspects of the Iranian regime’s nefarious conduct including exposing scores of the most
important secret nuclear weapons sites and research facilities. The intelligence gathered by MeK operatives inside Tehran was
ultimately corroborated by the UN watchdog, the IAEA.That intelligence pointed to the MEK’s network of activists including persons
inside some of the most sensitive government intuitions. For anyone with the least knowledge of the Iranian regime’s modus operandi,
it was evident that those operatives’ work involved huge risks. While the fact that the MeK enjoyed a constant and formidable
presence in Iran was irrefutable, the regime’s focus one liminating the MeK as its arch enemy has made itrather difficult to gauge the
scope and extent of the MeK network. It is somewhat easier to gauge the opposition’s appeal among the Iranian diaspora, a vibrant
society of several million people. Historically, Iranians are not a migrating nation. The overwhelming majority of the Iranian diaspora
is comprised of Iranians who fled Iran after the establishment of the clerical regime or were born elsewhere. Expatriates throughout
Europe, North America, Australia, and even Asia are in constant contact with their homeland. Particularly in the age of
communications, the mood among the Iranian diaspora is in a way reflective of the mood at home. The MEK has held massive rallies
in Paris in recent years that have drawn more than 100,000 of their supporters from the world over. In September 2016, after years of
intense campaigning, the opposition was able to safely transfer its members, several thousand strong, from camps in Iraq to European
countries, most notably Albania. The opposition leaders and spokespersons pointed out that the transfer, in addition to being a major
humanitarian success to guarantee the safety and security of opposition members, was a major strategic achievement. They reasoned
this would free up the time and resources of the organized resistance to focus on affairs inside of Iran and on expanding its social base.
But outsiders did not initially pay much heed to the opposition’s assessment. Recent MeK efforts have focused on mobilizing public
opinion in Iran on the massacre of 30,000 political prisoners in 1988. The overwhelming majority of the victims, including juveniles
and pregnant women, were MeK activists who rejected the regime’s demand to denounce their sympathy to the MeK and were
executed subsequent to one or two minutes trials. In April and May 2017, in the run-up to the Iranian presidential elections, the
activities entered a new phase and the MeK activists started to systematically place big pictures of Maryam Rajavi, on major highway
overpasses and on walls beside major streets. The MeK network had engaged in similar activities in previous years but the uptick in
their frequency and scope was clear. Video clips showed banners and pictures of Rajavi placed in major cities including Tehran,
Mashhad, Kermanshah, Shiraz, and Hamedan, as well as in some of the smaller provincial cities. In parallel, the network became
active in exposing mullah Ibrahim Raissi, one of the two leading candidates who was one of the key officials involved in the 1988
massacre in Tehran. Given the state of repression in Iran, it has been rather impossible for the MeK or any other
genuine opposition groups to have any public presence in Iran. A key question has been the MeK’s appeal
among the young generation, Nasl sevomi (literally meaning the third generation), or the millennials. A
new feature of MeK events in recent years, in particular in the past two years, has been the presence and
activism of the youth. Some of them are Iranians who have been born or grown up in Western countries. But more remarkable
has been the presence and appearance of MeK activists who have fled Iran recently. A number of them have been incarcerated for
several years and have fled Iran subsequent to their release from prison.[8] This was a new phenomenon and a solid indicator that the
MeK had made tangible strides in gaining the attention and recruiting the Iranian youth despite Tehran’s systematic and extensive
demonization campaign against the MeK. Some of the young activists had become familiar with the opposition through their relatives
or immediate family. But according to their own accounts, and interviews with international media, a number of them had become
acquainted to the MeK in recent years for the first time and had decided to join them. The new activists came mostly from urban
middle class families but also from all over Iran. The high percentage of women among them was conspicuous. As the protests broke
out in Mashhad and a number of smaller towns on December 28, the MeK network was the first that broke the news and started
sending updates and video clips from the protest scenes. Over the course of the following two weeks that the protests were at their
peak, the MeK network distributed around-the-clock news and clips that it received from its activists. The MeK network’s role in
breaking the mullahs’ censorship was indisputable, and it persisted despite all the restrictions that Tehran imposed on the Internet and
popular social media apps. A number of MeK activists involved in organizing the protests took the risk of speaking to major
international media from Tehran and from smaller towns. In one instance, Nik, a female MeK activist was interviewed by Fox News
on January 10 while protesting with hundreds of relatives of detainees in front of the notorious Evin Prison in northern Tehran. “Calls
were given on our Telegram channels a few days before the demonstrations,” Mohammed, a 29-year-old engineering student from
Tehran and a MeK activist told the UK’s Daily Telegraph on January 6.“We cover every protest, no matter how small. Some of the
slogans that were shouted on the first day and were repeated were started by our friends on our networks,” he added. The regime’s
most senior officials repeatedly underscored the role of the MeK. Hassan Rouhani called French President Emmanuel Macron on
January 2and said the MeK was behind the protests in Iran and asked him to restrict the activities of the Iranian opposition. The
National Council of Resistance of Iran, the coalition that the MeK is its biggest constituent, is headquartered outside of Paris. In a
speech on January 9, Khamenei said, “These incidents had been organized.” The MeK implemented the plans. He added, “The MeK
had prepared for this months ago” and “the MeK’s media outlets had called for it.” He said the MeK was at the apex of the triangle
that incited the uprising. He attributed the other two angles to foreign powers. Brig. Gen. Rasoul Sanai Rad, Political Affairs Deputy
for the IRGC, provided the most detailed account of the role of the MeK. In his remarks “Role of the ‘hypocrites’ (the derogatory term
used by the regime to describe MeK or PMOI) in recent uprisings” he said: “Eighty percent of those arrested were under 30 years of
age. There were several women among them, who are middle aged. In the 1980s, those who were leading MeK protests were mostly
women. And now, the main chain of provocation and starting the protests were women. For example, four of these women caused the
protests in the city of Ilam (western Iran). After they were detained, we realized they were not from Ilam…,” “Similarly, those
arrested in Kermanshah had come from the city of Karaj (near Tehran). Those who were from Bandar Abbas were arrested in Shiraz.
These were the MeK who would go to the cities in an organized fashion and were guiding the slogans. The most radical and
sacrilegious slogans, such as ‘they have used Islam as a ladder to harass the people, neither Islam, neither the Quran, let’s sacrifice
both for Iran…. “This shows how much they hate Islam and political religion. Directing attacks on military centers, like assaults on
the State Security Force and Bassij bases were part of the planning by the MeK. They even attacked the prisons, which means they
have their hands in prisons as well.” It is very difficult to imagine that the protests spread to 142 cities and that people chanted almost
identical slogans without some sort of coordination and organization. It was telling that the protesters’ main slogans were the same as
those advocated by the MeK for years. The progress the MeK has made in recent years and remarks by the regime’s most senior
officials all lead to the conclusion that the protests were not leaderless or unorganized. Rather, some sort of organization and
coordination was involved and the MeK played a much more extensive and prominent role than might have been recognized from the
outside. Regarding future steps, the opposition has been advocating establishing secret centers of resistance in an
attempt to unleash the potential of a disenchanted population that is willing to stand up to clerical rule, and
to use the simmering situation in Iran in preparation for an uprising. It has said that practical steps include
joining together large number of individuals who are currently scattered and disconnected, and encouraging
people to invite the real hope that the mullahs can be brought down. Is Iran destined for a crisis like the one in Syria?
Tehran’s advocates have tried to scare the international community from the eruption of an internal conflict and a repeat of the Syrian
scenario in Iran. But the situation in Iran is very different than Syria or other countries in the region that
experienced the Arab Spring. In those countries, the opposition was not organized and was nascent at its
best. In Iran, the opposition has a well-defined structure, a well-known leader and a declared platform and
plan for transition. It has weathered several storms in the span of more than three decades and has shown
remarkable resilience and perseverance. As it pertains to Syria, if it were not for the Iranian regime’s full- fledged military
and financial support and the direct intervention of the IRGC and its mercenaries, the Assad dictatorship would have been ousted
several years ago and the situation would have been totally different. The road ahead: Intensified conflict between the regime and the
people Tehran is facing serious financial, political and social challenges. The policy of denying people’s
demands and outcries has failed. The policy of intervention in the region has run into a deadlock and
exhausted its resources. Its adverse consequences are already felt inside the country. The factors that led to
the protests are still in force, even aggravated and the regime does not have the power to address and solve
them. Abbas Abdi, one of the leading thinkers of the “reformists” acknowledged on February 3 that “there is no technical solution
for the Iranian society. These solutions existed in the past, but currently such solutions do not exist.” That means that tackling the web
of crises facing the clerical regime requires quick, substantial, and profound reforms. The clerical regime seems incapable of major
political reform and all signs indicate that Khamenei, who has the final say, is neither willing nor capable of serious reform, least of all
after major social unrest, since this might lead to quicker unraveling of the system. Yet, there is little doubt in Tehran that the protests
will reoccur. Saeed Hajarian, one of the strategists of the “reformists” acknowledged on January 24, protests are like sea waves. They
recede to return stronger.” As well as being unable to prevent the resurgence of the uprisings ,the mullahs have
lost their duplicitous safeguards and can only depend on the repressive apparatus. Even Khamenei recently
acknowledged the continuation of the protests. He said, “This is a battle of the nation against anti-nation, the battle of
Iran against anti-Iran, and the battle of Islam against anti-Islam and it will henceforth continue.” It can be
stated unequivocally that Iranian society will not return to the conditions preceding the 2018 protests, and the clerical regime
seems incapable of returning to the status quo ante regarding its balance of power vis-a vis the population.
It is in a weaker position than any other time. This means that the confrontation between the people of Iran and
the ruling regime will intensify and the power struggle among the regime’s internal factions will be
aggravated. Sadegh Zibakalam described the prospect in this way: “I am fearful that in the next round… there is no way to contain
these people. If this happens, this fire will burn all of us together.”
Saudi Arabian arms race add-on
 Ext: Regime change solves instability

Democracies are less likely to go to war (there are probably better cards out there that say this)
Rear 13 – Patrick G. Rear, Editor and international relations scholar at SAIS Review of International
Affairs. “Democratic Peace Theory as Applied to Europe and the Middle East.” Global Tides, Vol 7,
Article 4, https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=globaltides.
Accessed 19 July 2018.

THE EFFECT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS Democratic institutions interact in a state to promote peace with
a combination of cultural and structural factors. Culturally, democracies share methods of peaceful dispute
resolution and expectations of the behavior of other democracies. Structurally, leaders in liberal democracies
are constrained from arbitrarily going to war by a system of separation of powers which forces the
executive to receive legislative approval for a war, while the election of leaders holds them accountable to
voters. As Kant noted, the population has a vested interest in maintaining peace, which influences their voting behavior. In war, the
population must bear the risk of personal death or injury through military service or because of collateral damage.12 Economic
activity and commerce also slow down during wartime as the young men and women of the population
leave the workforce to join the military. Lastly, war disrupts trade routes and shipping, making it more
difficult for goods to get from producer to consumer and stifling economic growth.13 In light of these direct and
indirect costs on the population, liberal democratic 11 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and
International Organizations, 98-99. 12 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International
Organizations, 53-56. 13 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 129-
130. 4 Global Tides, Vol. 7 [2013], Art. 4 http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides/vol7/iss1/4 Rear 5 states lack
incentives to engage in offensive military action, creating a loop reinforcing peace.14
Pandemics Adv
Disease Impact
 Pandemics – Impact Framing
Defer aff---we cognitively underestimate disease.
Patrick S. Roberts 8. Fellow with the Program on Constitutional Government at Harvard and assistant
professor with the Center for Public Administration and Policy at Virginia Tech. Review of Richard
Posner’s “Catastrophe: Risk and Response.” Homeland Security Affairs 4(1).

Most people have difficulty thinking about abstract probabilities as opposed to events they have observed. Human
mental capacity is limited, and startling events such as the attacks of September 11 trigger our attention. But
evaluating risk requires paying attention to what we do not see. There has been surprisingly little attention
in the popular media given to pandemic flu, even though influenza killed approximately twenty million people in
1918-1919. The disease has no cure, and vaccines are difficult to produce because of the mutability of the
virus. People from all walks of life pay greater attention to issues in recent memory and tend to give greater weight to confirmatory
evidence; the cumulative effect is to underprepare for catastrophe.

There’s an invisible threshold---try or die aff

Conniff 13 (Richard Conniff, science journalist, writes for Time, Smithsonian, Atlantic Monthly, The New
York Times Magazine, National Geographic, Audubon Magazine, included in The Best American Science
and Nature Writing in 2000, 2002, and 2006, Guggenheim Fellowship, Loeb Journalism Award,
“Guardians Against a Global Pandemic: Inside the battle to protect all of us from the next Superbug,”
Men’s Health, 4-8-2013, http://www.menshealth.com/health/guardians-against-global-
pandemic?fullpage=true)
Last September, a 49-year-old Qatari man who'd recently traveled to Saudi Arabia was hospitalized in Doha with a nasty respiratory illness. He
deteriorated rapidly, and doctors promptly airlifted him to a London hospital, where he wound up on life support with kidney and lung failure. From
respiratory tract samples, investigators soon teased out an unknown coronavirus—the same one that had just killed an otherwise healthy 60-year-old in
Saudi Arabia.¶ For one tense moment, epidemiologists thought they might be witnessing a replay of the devastating 2003 SARS epidemic, also brought
on by a coronavirus. But the threat this time looked worse: Three million people were about to descend on Saudi Arabia for the hajj, a Muslim pilgrimage
to Mecca already well known for the overnight global redistribution of illnesses via passenger jet. ¶ Disease detectives of all specialties caught the next
available flights into the heart of the potential outbreak. Epidemiologists tracked down anyone who had been even remotely associated with the victims.
Veterinarians wearing protective gear went to a farm that one of the victims had visited; they took samples from hundreds of domestic and wild animals
in order to identify the species from which the virus had jumped to humans. This effort, unseen by the public but involving hundreds of experts around
the world, soon established that the disease did not, in fact, spread easily from one person to another. The hajj wasn't a hot zone after all.¶ It was a lucky
the supply of
break. As of early March, the new virus had sickened only 14 people and killed eight. But the episode was also a reminder that
emerging diseases in the modern world is almost eye-bleedingly endless, and that they can turn up
anywhere . One such pathogen, West Nile virus, killed 243 people in the United States last year. And a Denver hospital last summer experienced an
alarming outbreak of a notorious New Delhi "superbug," a bacteria with broad resistance to almost all antibiotics . Health

officials will tell you that the Big One, a disease outbreak on the order of the influenza pandemic of 1918, could happen any
day—and that sooner or later it almost certainly will .¶ They'll also tell you that men in particular need to pay attention to the
potential hazards: We travel more than women, particularly for business. Our trips tend to take us to more-remote destinations. So maybe it shouldn't
come as a surprise that we also have a much higher incidence of malaria, dengue fever, hepatitis, and Legionnaires' disease (which last year killed 13
people in Quebec City, and three at a downtown Chicago Marriott hotel)—and perhaps other diseases yet unknown. (Nervous about germs? Pick up a
copy of Don't Get Sick, a panic-free pocket guide to living in a germ-filled world.)¶
 Pandemics – Turns War

Pandemics risk nuclear war

Koblentz 10 (Deputy Director of the Biodefense Program @ GMU, Assistant Professor in Public and
International Affairs, March, "Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses."
International Security Vol. 34, No. 4, p. 96-132)

Pandemics are disease outbreaks that occur over a wide geographic area, such as a region, continent, or the
entire world, and infect an unusually high proportion of the population. Two pandemic diseases are widely
cited as having the potential to pose direct threats to the stability and security of states: HIV/AIDS and influenza.
HIV/AIDS. Since it was first identified in 1981, HIV is estimated to have killed more than 25 million people worldwide. According to the Joint UN
Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the percentage of the global population with HIV has stabilized since 2000, but the overall number of people living
with HIV (33 million in 2007) has steadily increased. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to bear a disproportionate share of the global burden of HIV with 35
percent of new HIV infections, 75 percent of AIDS deaths, and 67 percent of all people living with HIV. 116 Scholars have identified four ways that
HIV/AIDS can affect security. 117 First, the disproportionately high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the armed forces of some nations, particularly in
Southern Africa, may compromise the ability of those states to defend themselves from internal or external threats. Militaries with high rates of HIV
infection may suffer losses in combat readiness and effectiveness as infected troops are transferred out of combat roles, units lose cohesion because of
high turnover rates, middle management is "hollowed out" by the early death or disability of officers, and defense budgets are strained because of rising
will undermine the
medical costs and the need to recruit and train replacements for sick soldiers. The second threat is that HIV/AIDS
international peace-keeping system. Nations with militaries with high rates of HIV/AIDS will be unable to provide
troops for international peacekeeping missions; nations with healthy militaries may be unwilling to
commit troops to peacekeeping operations in nations with a high prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS; and war-torn nations may
be unwilling to accept peacekeepers for fear they will spread the disease in their country. The third threat is that a
"second wave" of HIV/AIDS could strike large, strategically important countries such as China, India, and Russia.
These states, which possess nuclear weapons and are important players in critical regions, also suffer
from internal security challenges that could be aggravated by a severe AIDS epidemic and its attendant
socioeconomic disruptions. The fourth threat is that the high prevalence of HIV in less developed countries will cause political
instability that could degenerate into internal conflict or spread into neighboring countries. Unlike most diseases,
which affect primarily the poor, young, and old, HIV/AIDS strikes young adults and members of the middle and upper classes. By sickening and killing
members of society when they should be their most productive, HIV/AIDS has inflicted the "single greatest reversal in human development" in modern
history. 118

Specifically an NTD pandemic---all nuclear powers would be affected

Peter J. Hotez 4/27/10, MD, PhD is Editor-in-Chief of PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases. He is
Distinguished Research Professor, Walter G. Ross Professor and Chair of his Department at George
Washington University, and President of the Sabin Vaccine Institute, "Nuclear Weapons and Neglected
Diseases: The “Ten-Thousand-to-One Gap”", PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases,
journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0000680

Together, the world's eight acknowledged nuclear powers—the United States (US), Russia, United Kingdom (UK),
France, China, India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)—have amassed an arsenal of almost
30,000 nuclear weapons since 1945. In addition, Israel is believed to be a nuclear power while Iran (and possibly Syria as well)
is also suspected of developing nuclear weapons. Despite the technological sophistication that has enabled the 11 nuclear weapons
states to produce and deliver nuclear bombs, most of these nations simultaneously also suffer from high internal
rates of poverty and endemic neglected diseases. They include high prevalence rates of neglected tropical
diseases in India, China, Pakistan, Iran, and Syria, and related neglected infections of poverty in the US and
Europe. Indeed, the 11 nuclear weapons states together account for up to one-half of the global disease
burden from all neglected diseases. However, for a tiny fraction (less than 1/10,000th) of the costs of producing and
maintaining a nuclear arsenal the 11 nuclear powers could eliminate most of their neglected diseases and engage in joint neglected
disease research and development efforts that help to reduce international tensions and promote world peace.
War doesn’t turn disease---NTD’s cause low-level conflicts to escalate, and solving disease promotes
better cooperation between warring factions---that’s Hotez
 Pandemics – Turns Econ

Disease turns the economy---and not the other way around

Alsan 6 – Marcella Alsan, MD, MPH, PhD, Assistant Professor of Medicine at the Stanford School of
Medicine, David Bloom, Clarence James Gamble Professor of Economics and Demography in the
Department of Global Health and Population, Harvard School of Public Health, David Canning, Richard
Saltonstall Professor of Population Sciences, and Professor of Economics and International Health at
Harvard University, and Dean Jamison, Professor Emeritus of Global Health at the University of
California, “The Consequences of Population Health for Economic Performance”, October,
https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1288/2013/10/PGDA_WP_13.pdf

population health has a significant

Among the most important recent advances in thinking on international development is the idea that

effect on economic performance. Although the effects of individuals' health status on their productivity and earnings
are readily observable and widely acknowledged, the consequences of population health for economic performance (at the macro level) and for
the well-being of individuals, families, and firms are more difficult to discern and have been, until recently, rather neglected. This chapter goes beyond
the traditional economic thinking about the relationship between health and income – simply stated: wealth is needed to achieve health – by presenting
evidence that population health is an important factor in strengthening economies and reducing poverty. The world's
overarching framework for reducing poverty is expressed in the UN's eight Millennium Development Goals. Three of these eight goals pertain to health:
reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. These potentially huge improvements in
health are extremely important goals in themselves, and they serve as beacons toward which numerous development efforts are oriented. But these
potential improvements in health are not only endpoints that we seek through a variety of means. The improvements are actually instruments for
achieving economic growth and poverty reduction. That is,better health does not have to wait for an improved economy ;
measures to reduce the burden of disease, to give children healthy childhoods, to increase life expectancy will in themselves contribute
to creating healthier economies. This insight is relatively new and has significant political implications: Finance ministers whose concerns
have been tightly tied to national budgets and staving off crises have a new tool to work with, since devoting resources to health improvements can be a
powerful means of abetting economic growth and mitigating poverty. This chapter first looks at some straightforward data about the links between health
and income and notes the traditional thinking that explains this connection. It then describes how views are changing and in particular focuses on new
evidence that good health can promote economic growth and well-being. After focusing on the specific connections between health and poverty, the
chapter explores the mechanisms by which improved health can lead to better economic outcomes. The final sections discuss HIV/AIDS as a window
onto the issues addressed throughout the chapter and the policy directions that flow from the research and views presented here. 1 The authors are
grateful to Larry Rosenberg, and to Helen Curry, Guenther Fink, and Jocelyn Finlay, for their assistance in the preparation of this chapter. Some basic
facts and the traditional view of their implications Table 2.1, which groups countries by their infant mortality rate (IMR – the number of infants who die
before reaching 1 year of age per 1000 live births) and income level in 1960, illustrates the general pattern connecting health and economic well-being. It
shows that, within a given income classification, countries with higher infant mortality rates in 1960 generally experienced lower rates of economic
growth between 1960 and 2000 (though de la Croix and Licandro (1999) offer a cautionary note on a related point, finding that "the effect of life
expectancy on growth is positive for economies with a relatively low life expectancy, but could be negative in more advanced economies [where life
expectancy is higher on average]"). For example, on average countries that had a GDP per capita between $3,500 and $7,000 in 1960, and IMR less than
50 per 1000, experienced an average annual growth rate of 3.5 percent over the subsequent 40 years. By contrast, a country with a GDP per capita less
than $1,000 in 1960 and IMR greater than 150 per 1000 experienced an average of 0.8 percent per capita GDP growth over the subsequent 40 years.
Indeed, the positive correlation between income per capita and good health (the latter often assessed by life expectancy; see Figure 2.1) is one of the best-
established facts in the field of international development. However, determining causality in the relationship between high incomes and good health
remains a vexing issue. Good health could lead to high incomes, the reverse could be true, both could be true, or some other variables could be driving
both health and income thereby creating the appearance of a health-wealth link. To explain the apparent health-wealth relationship, traditional economic
thinking (for example, World Bank 1993a) has asserted that income growth is a key factor underpinning improved population health. The title of a
journal article, Wealthier is Healthier (Pritchett and Summers 1996), succinctly captures this view. The assertion has a strong theoretical and intuitive
basis. Higher incomes lead to greater command over many of the goods and services that promote health, such as better nutrition, safe water, and access
to quality health services. Higher incomes also promote technical progress and dissemination of new health technologies, which have been the major
force behind health improvements (Easterlin 1999; Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006). Consistent with this perspective, policies prescribed by
rising
international financial institutions Evolving views of health, wealth, and development An early and influential analysis suggesting that

income is not the only driver of health improvements comes from Samuel Preston (1975), who plotted the
relationship between life expectancy and national income per capita during the 1900s, 1930s, and 1960s (Figure 2.2).
Preston’s curves reveal two important insights. First, a rise in per capita GDP is associated with greater gains in life
expectancy in poorer countries than in wealthy ones. Second, the curve shifts up over time. For a given level of income
per capita, life expectancy rose substantially over the study period. For example, an individual from a country with GDP per capita of $500 could expect
to live around 59 years in the 1930s and 68 years in the 1960s. Preston
calculated that if income was the sole determinant of
mortality, then gains in life expectancy would have been small (2.5 years between 1938 and 1963). Yet, when he
accounted for the upward shift of the curve during the same period, significantly larger health gains were
predicted (12.2 years). Preston concludes that factors exogenous to a country’s level of income accounted for 75–
90 per cent of the rise in life expectancy , worldwide, over this period. These exogenous factors include medical and scientific
breakthroughs – such as the development of vaccines and antibiotics – as well as advancements in sanitation and hygiene. Income growth per se
accounted for only 10–25 per cent of the gain in life expectancy. Preston summarizes his findings: “ There
is no reason to expect a direct
influence of national income per head on mortality… its influence is indirect ; a higher income implies and facilitates,
though it does not necessarily entail, larger real consumption of items affecting health such as food, housing, medical and public health services,
education, leisure and health-related research, and, on the negative side, automobiles, cigarettes, animal fats and physical inertia.” (Preston 1975: 232).
Similarly, WHO,
analyzing data from 1952–1992, found that income growth is less important to improving
health outcomes than are other factors. In the period studied, average per capitabetween income and infant mortality rate (IMR) had
remained as it was in 1952, IMR would have dropped from 144 per thousand to 116 per thousand by 1992. In reality, however, it dropped much more
sharply to 55 per thousand. This discrepancy is attributed to factors “exogenous to wealth,” namely technological progress and
knowledge diffusion (WHO 1999: 5).
 Pandemics – Brink
US NTD pandemic likely now---specifically in Texas
Peter J. Hotez 1/18/18, M.D., Ph.D., Director and former president of the Sabin Vaccine Institute,
Executive Director of the Global Network for Neglected Tropical Disease Control, dean of the National
School of Tropical Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine, fellow in disease and poverty at the James A.
Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, former Professor and Chair, Department of
Microbiology, Immunology, & Tropical Medicine, George Washington University, Editor-in-Chief, PLoS
Neglected Tropical Diseases. "The rise of neglected tropical diseases in the "new Texas"", PLOS Neglected
Tropical Diseases, 2018 Jan; 12(1), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5773009/

Introduction: The new Texas Texas

has become one of the fastest growing US states, with projections that by 2020, the
population will exceed 30 million people [1]. A
majority are expected to live in metropolitan urban areas [1].
Population growth and urbanization are accelerating at an impressive rate . According to United States Census data
released in 2016, Texas now hosts five of the 11 fastest growing small cities and five of the eight fastest growing large cities
(Houston, San Antonio, Fort Worth, Dallas, and Austin) [2]. Growth is due to immigration from both US northern states and abroad,
mostly for economic opportunities. In 2014, it was estimated that more than 4.5 million Texans are foreign born, including more than
3 million from Latin America and almost 1 million and 200,000 from Asia and Africa, respectively [3]. Texas is ranked third among
US states in percentage of foreign-born population [4]. Into
this mix of rapid growth, urbanization , and immigration
are additional and critical factors that could promote the emergence of infectious and neglected diseases
[5–8]. First is the rise in poverty in Texas. Despite the state’s enormous wealth and an overall economy that exceeds
Canada, Australia, or Russia [9], Texas also has profound pockets of intense poverty . Poverty has been shown to
be an overwhelming social determinant for the promotion of neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), and today,
most of the poverty-related NTDs and emerging infections are found in concentrated areas of poverty
hidden in wealthy economies—a concept known as “blue marble health” [10]. Texas ranks in the bottom tier of US
states in terms of high poverty levels (37th in terms of overall poverty and child poverty) [7], but because of its large overall
population, with more than 4 million Texans living below the poverty line in 2016, Texas also ranks among the states with the largest
number of people living in poverty of any US state and near the bottom (41st) in terms of food insecurity and educational attainment
[11]. Fig 1 shows a map of child poverty in Texas indicating that poverty is not evenly distributed but instead is focused in South
Texas and along the border with Mexico, in addition to focal areas of East Texas and the Texas Panhandle. Especially noteworthy are
the so-called “colonias”—unincorporated residential communities near the Mexico border that often lack basic services, including
access to clean water, sewer systems, and paved roads (Fig 2) [12]. The major urban areas and cities of Texas also experience high
levels of poverty, with child poverty rates exceeding 33% in Dallas and Houston [13]. In addition to poverty, trade and
human migrations also contribute to the risk of NTDs in the state of Texas. With regards to the former,
trade is growing massively due to a doubling in size of the Panama Canal and expansion in size for more
than a dozen Texas ports, including Port Arthur, Houston, Corpus Christi, and Brownsville, among others, which generate
close to $100 billion in annual revenue [14] but also expose Texas populations to shipping traffic and
potential diseases from Asia, Europe, and Africa [8]. Similarly, there is massive traffic across the Rio Grande River from
Mexico that facilitates human migrations as well as invasions of exotic plant species that promote tick and other vector survival [15].
There is also the threat of climate change. Among US states, Texas is disproportionately at risk to global
warming and by some estimates, Texas is projected to reach 80–100 days over 95°F by the 2050s,
compared to approximately 40 such days over the last 30 years ) [16]. The state will face rising sea levels and other
negative effects. Of particular relevance and concern are the warming effects conductive to insect vector
expansion and transmission, which could alter current mosquito, sandfly, flea, and kissing bug distributions
[15]. Finally, it has been noted that a powerful anti-vaxxer movement and lobby is causing 50,000 or more parents to file nonmedical
exemptions for childhood and school entry vaccines so that Texas is now at risk for the emergence of vaccine-preventable diseases,
especially measles [17]. The factors of rapid population expansion, human migrations, urbanization, poverty,
climate change, declining vaccine rates, transborder traffic, and sea transportation shifts have combined to
create a new Texas that is particularly suited for the rise of emerging and neglected diseases (Box 1).
 Pandemics – AT: Defense – General

Kills millions---gene transfer and long incubation circumvent defense

Pamlin and Armstrong 15 – Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager, Global Challenges Foundation,
Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School &
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 2015 (“Global Challenges: 12 Risks that Threaten Human
Civilization,” Global Challenges Foundation, February 2015,
http://www.astro.sunysb.edu/fwalter/HON301/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact-full-report-1.pdf)

Infectious diseases have been one of the greatest causes of mortality in history. Unlike many other global
challenges pandemics have happened recently, as we can see where reasonably good data exist. Plotting historic epidemic
fatalities on a log scale reveals that these tend to follow a power law; with a small exponent: many plagues have been found to follow
a power law with exponent 0.26.261 These kinds of power laws are heavy-tailed262 to a significant degree.263 In consequence most
of the fatalities are accounted for by the top few events.264 If this law holds for future pandemics as well,265 then the
majority of people who will die from epidemics will likely die from the single largest pandemic . Most
epidemic fatalities follow a power law, with some extreme events – such as the Black Death and Spanish ‘Flu – being even more
deadly.267 There are other grounds for suspecting that such
a highimpact epidemic will have a greater probability
than usually assumed. All the features of an extremely devastating disease already exist in nature :
essentially incurable (Ebola268), nearly always fatal (rabies269), extremely infectious (common cold270), and long
incubation periods (HIV271). If a pathogen were to emerge that somehow combined these features (and
influenza has demonstrated antigenic shift, the ability to combine features from different viruses 272), its
death toll would be extreme . Many relevant features of the world have changed considerably, making past comparisons
problematic. The modern world has better sanitation and medical research, as well as national and supra-national institutions dedicated
to combating diseases. Private insurers are also interested in modelling pandemic risks.273 Set against this is the fact that modern
transport and dense human population allow infections to spread much more rapidly274, and there is the potential for urban slums to
serve as breeding grounds for disease.275 Unlike events such as nuclear wars, pandemics would not damage the world’s
infrastructure, and initial survivors would likely be resistant to the infection. And there would probably be survivors, if only in isolated
locations. Hence the
risk of a civilisation collapse would come from the ripple effect of the fatalities and the
policy responses . These would include political and agricultural disruption as well as economic dislocation
and damage to the world’s trade network (including the food trade).
 Pandemics – AT: Defense – Yes Extinction

NTDs spread airborne through microbial dust particles – create conditions for global pandemics
NASA 16 (The National Aeronautics and Space Association [Globulist conspiracy cover-up, here evaluating the HyspIRI Misson
Study, a satellite built to detect ecosystem changes] “Health and Air Quality” Published by NASA, 2016,
https://hyspiri.jpl.nasa.gov/applied/health-and-air-quality / WY-TH)

The group of neglected tropical diseases is a good example of a critical public health problem according to Holtz et
al. 2007a. "The neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), a group of chronic, debilitating, and poverty-promoting parasitic,

bacterial, and some viral and fungal infections, are among the most common causes of illness of the poorest
people living in developing countries." (Table 1.) Table 1. The World Health Organization lists 17 neglected
tropical diseases* · Buruli Ulcer (Mycobacterium ulcerans infection) · Chagas disease · Dengue/Severe
dengue · Dracunculiasis (guinea-worm disease) · Echinococcosis · Foodborne trematodiases · Human
African trypanosomiasis (Sleeping sickness) · Leishmaniasis · Leprosy · Lymphatic filariasis ·
Onchocerciasis (River blindness) · Rabies · Schistosomiasis · Soil transmitted helminthiases ·
Taeniasis/Cysticercosis · Trachoma · Yaws (Endemic treponematoses) The Co-Factors important in determining the
distribution of the major NTD’s are closely linked to land use patterns resulting from human activities and alteration of the hydrology through deforestation (Table 2). The
alteration of the hydrology may intensify impacts of climate variation and may increase desertification. These Co-Factors can be monitored using HyspIRI data sets. [graph
omitted] Other tropical diseases such as Riff Valley Fever (RFV) are significantly impacted with seasonal changes in precipitation patterns
(Fig 3.). NASA funded studies using satellite data (MODIS) detected above normal NDVI in southern Africa combined with above normal rainfall indicated an elevated risk for
RVF outbreaks (J. Pinzon, SSAI). HyspIRI thermal data would enhance the use of MODIS data by providing much finer resolution thermal data (90m vs. 1km) for monitoring the
mosquito vector habitats. [graph omitted] Exposure of high concentrations of airborne particular matter, dust, on the human
respiratorysystem can have adverse health effects (Cook et al, 2005). Countless studies have been published showing the link between dust
inhalation and a variety of respiratory disease. However, the pathogenic role of the microbial and viral component of the dust

has not been extensively studied. Leski et al. (2011) conducted testing of dust particles across 19 locations in Iraq
and Kuwait and found the presences of potential human pathogens including: Mycobacterium, Brucella,
Coxiella burnetii, Clostridium perfringens, and Bacillus. King et al (2011) examined 49 previously healthy soldiers with unexplained exertial
dyspnea and diminished exercise tolerance after deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan and found that 38 of them suffered from diffused constrictive bronchiolitis that may have

resulted from inhalation exposure Long term exposure to desert dust carrying pathogens may create
conditions conductive for novel outbreaks of disease (Griffin and Kellog, 2004).
 Pandemics – AT: Defense – No Burnout

Studies disprove burnout

Karl-Heinz Kerscher 14 – professor and management consultant, “Space Education”, Wissenschaftliche
Studie, 2014, 92 Seiten

The death toll for a pandemic is equal to the virulence, the deadliness of the pathogen or pathogens, multiplied by
the number of people eventually infected. It has been hypothesized that there is an upper limit to the
virulence of naturally evolved pathogens. This is because a pathogen that quickly kills its hosts might not
have enough time to spread to new ones, while one that kills its hosts more slowly or not at all will allow
carriers more time to spread the infection, and thus likely out-compete a more lethal species or strain. This simple
model predicts that if virulence and transmission are not linked in any way, pathogens will evolve towards
low virulence and rapid transmission. However, this assumption is not always valid and in more complex
models, where the level of virulence and the rate of transmission are related, high levels of virulence can
evolve . The level of virulence that is possible is instead limited by the existence of complex populations of
hosts, with different susceptibilities to infection, or by some hosts being geographically isolated. The size of the host population and
competition between different strains of pathogens can also alter virulence. There are numerous historical examples of
pandemics that have had a devastating effect on a large number of people, which makes the possibility
of global pandemic a realistic threat to human civilization.

Specifically, NTDs are Zoonotic which means they can easily proliferate through ecosystems, causing
widespread disease
Hotez et al 12 (Peter J. Hotez [M.D., Ph.D., Director and former president of the Sabin Vaccine Institute, Executive Director of
the Global Network for Neglected Tropical Disease Control, dean of the National School of Tropical Medicine at Baylor College of
Medicine, fellow in disease and poverty at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, former Professor and
Chair, Department of Microbiology, Immunology, & Tropical Medicine, George Washington University, Editor-in-Chief, PLoS
Neglected Tropical Diseases.] Lorenzo Savioli, and Alan Fenwick “Neglected Tropical Diseases of the Middle East and North Africa:
Review of Their Prevalence, Distribution, and Opportunities for Control” Published in PLos NTDs Volume 6 Issue 2, Febuary 2012,
pg. 5 / WY-TH)

Cutaneous Leishmaniasis Both zoonotic CL, caused predominantly by L. major, and anthroponotic CL, caused by L. tropica, are
widespread in the MENA. The largest number of L. major cases occurs in arid areas of Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, and Iraq, with most of the cases transmitted by the sandfly Phlebotomus
papatasi or closely related species [17], [48]–[51]. In addition to humans, Ph. papatasi feed on a variety of
mammals and birds, especially a type of gerbil known as the fat sand rat living in the salt flats in an area geographically situated
between Morocco, Syria, and Saudi Arabia [48]. The Great gerbil (Rhombomys opimus) transmits L. major in northwestern Iran

and northern Afghanistan [48]. During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, US soldiers received intense
exposure to sandflies, incurring more than 600 cases of CL in 2003 and 2004, 99% of which were caused
by L. major [17]. The largest number of L. tropica cases occur in Syria, Iran, Morocco, and Yemen [48], [52], in addition to Algeria [53], where they are transmitted by
Phlebotomus sergenti, especially in urban areas [50]. Beginning in 2000, CL caused by L. tropica emerged in northern Israel, where it is believed the rock hyrax
(Procavia capensis) may represent an animal reservoir [54], [55]. CL caused by a Leishmania species closely related to Leishmania killicki has also been reported from Algeria
[56]. A major approach to the control of L. major infection relies on clearing of vegetation around human habitations and introducing zinc phosphide tablets into gerbil burrow
entrances, while control of L. tropica infection benefits from indoor residual spraying [48].
 Pandemics – AT: Defense – No Containment

Quarantines fail - NTDs are most often transmitted through local and foreign insect populations,
which spread rapidly across borders
Hobson 14 (Katherine Hobson [Freelance Health and Science Writer writing for NatGeo] “More Than Ebola, Other Tropical
Diseases Pose Growing Threat to U.S.” Published in National Geographic, 11/21/14,
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/11/141119-ebola-dengue-chagas-chikungunya-tropical-diseases-health / WY-TH)

The United States' latest brush with Ebola shows that, more than ever, diseases are global travelers. A physician
died at a Nebraska hospital on Monday after contracting the disease in Sierra Leone, where he was working. A New York physician came down with Ebola last month after working in West Africa, sparking
quarantines for returning health workers in some states. Earlier in October, a man died in Dallas after becoming infected in Liberia. But Ebola isn't the tropical disease that's most likely to cause health problems in the

United States—not by a long shot . A handful of other tropical diseases pose much more realistic threats. And they're
spread by insects, which can't be quarantined. Until now, most of the cases in the U.S. have been diagnosed in travelers. But infectious
disease specialists worry that these tropical diseases could gain a foothold in local insect populations,
spread to more people locally, and become a much bigger problem in the near future. Here are three of the biggest threats:
Chagas Disease Chagas disease is a parasitic disease that's spread in a particularly disgusting way: by kissing bugs

that bite people's faces at night (mostly around the mouth, to which they're attracted by exhaled breath) and leave poop behind. The parasite known as Trypanosoma cruzi, carried in the
bug's feces, enters the victim's body through the bites or via the eyes or mouth. The parasite can also be spread in more ordinary ways: from mother to child, and through contaminated blood or organ donations. (The
blood supply has been screened for T. cruzi since 2007.) Chagas disease is particularly insidious because it may not cause symptoms initially. But eventually, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 20 to 30 percent of infected people develop heart or digestive problems, some of which can be debilitating and life-threatening without treatment. An estimated six million to eight million people

worldwide live with Chagas disease, which causes about 12,000 deaths a year , according to the World Health Organization. Chagas is too rare in the U.S. to motivate big
pharmaceutical companies to research and develop drugs for prevention and treatment. The CDC estimates that it affects approximately 300,000 people in the U.S., though other estimates run as high as one million.

Most patients in the U.S. acquired the parasite in their home countries—it's endemic in Latin America—before arriving in the U.S. But kissing
bugs live in the southern U.S., too, and research describing five locally acquired cases in east Texas was published earlier this month in the American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, providing

new evidence that some cases are originating domestically. Peter Hotez, the founding dean of the National School of Tropical Medicine at Baylor College
of Medicine in Houston, fears that the cases reported so far are just the tip of the iceberg—or the "ears of the armadillo," he says, to use a more local metaphor—and that there's a huge need to look harder for local
infections in Texas and elsewhere in the South. Many people who are infected don't know they carry the parasite. The CDC has sought to raise awareness and improve diagnostic tools for Chagas as well as four other
neglected parasitic infections (cysticercosis, toxocariasis, toxoplasmosis, and trichomoniasis). The CDC doesn't mandate that states report cases of Chagas, but four states do, including Texas. Chagas, like other
neglected parasitic infections in the U.S., is associated with poverty. Why that should be isn't entirely known, says Hotez, but substandard housing and sanitation are likely contributors. The drugs currently used to
treat the disease—the antiparasitics benznidazole and nifurtimox—are not approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and need to be obtained directly from the CDC. Nonprofit groups are working to find

of chikungunya, a disease transmitted

new treatments and a vaccine. Chikungunya Americans traveling to the Caribbean are increasingly picking up a nasty souvenir: a case

by mosquitoes that produces fever, joint and muscle pain, headache, lethargy, and rash . It's rarely fatal, but some cases can lead
to chronic pain and arthritis. (Older patients and females seem to be at highest risk.) Chikungunya, which the World Health Organization says was first reported in southern Tanzania in 1952, was not a problem in the
Western Hemisphere until late last year, when the first local case popped up in the Caribbean, on the French side of St. Martin. It's now all over the Caribbean, and as of the end of last month there were more than
780,000 suspected cases in those islands and in the Americas. And yes, that includes North America. In the United States alone, 1,627 cases have been reported so far this year. Most were acquired by travelers. But
in a handful of cases—11 in Florida, at the CDC's last count—the victims had never left the country. Chikungunya is not nationally reportable, but the CDC wants states to keep an eye on it, and academic and
research organizations are also gathering data. "What happens is that people come back from the Caribbean to Florida with virus in their blood," explains Stephen Higgs, director of the Biosecurity Research Institute

The chikungunya virus is

at Kansas State University, in Manhattan. "Local mosquitoes feed on them, and then develop an infection." Then those mosquitoes bite someone else.

carried by two types of mosquitoes, the yellow fever mosquito and the Asian tiger mosquito. So far—luckily—the virus
strain circulating in the Americas is primarily spread by the less-common yellow fever mosquito (Aedes aegypti). But what if that virus mutates and comes to prefer

the Asian tiger mosquito? That's what scientists worry about, since the Asian tiger mosquito (Aedes albopictus) has a
much wider geographical range in the United State s, reaching as far north as New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. It's also more of an all-day eater, says
Rebecca Christofferson, a research assistant professor and infectious disease specialist at Louisiana State University, in Baton Rouge. That raises the question of whether chikungunya could someday become as
common in the U.S. as the more familiar West Nile virus. Luckily, says Higgs, chikungunya doesn't hide out in the local bird and mammal population the way West Nile does, which means it might be easier to stop,

since focusing on the mosquito vector would be effective. There's no treatment for chikungunya , and no vaccine, though researchers are working on that. For now, the key to keeping a
lid on the disease is mosquito eradication. That involves spraying by local authorities and individuals taking steps to protect themselves: avoiding bites with approved insect repellants, wearing long-sleeved shirts,
getting rid of stagnant water on their property, and staying away from mosquito-infested areas. Some researchers are trying to curb dengue by infecting mosquitoes, like these yellow fever mosquitoes, with a

bacterium that prevents them from transmitting the disease. Dengue More familiar than Chagas or chikungunya is dengue, the mosquito-borne virus that the World Health Organization estimates infects some
100 million people per year around the world. That's just the active cases; according to an estimate published last year in Nature, there are 96 million active infections per year, with another 294 million that are mild
or asymptomatic. Dengue is a reportable disease in the U.S. Symptoms include intense joint and muscle pain (the disease is commonly known as "breakbone fever"), as well as high fever, headache, and eye pain. It

people can die from shock, as the capillaries start to leak blood into the
can progress to severe dengue or dengue hemorrhagic fever. If untreated,

abdomen and chest cavity. Severe dengue has a mortality rate of about one percent with early detection and supportive treatment such as fluid replacement, and 10 to 20 percent without.
The more serious dengue hemorrhagic fever often does not occur until the second time someone is infected.
And that's where the danger lies. The dengue virus has four variations, known as serotypes. Often the first infection is relatively mild, and can even be hidden altogether and cause no
symptoms. So the fear, as Christofferson explains, is that people will be infected once—knowingly or not—and then somewhere down the line, if another strain comes to town, they can become dangerously ill. Like

chikungunya, dengue is spread by mosquitoes—in this case, mostly the yellow fever variety. As with chikungunya, dengue is usually found in travelers. Dengue is common in
Southeast Asia, the western Pacific islands, and Latin America. But local mosquitoes can also pick up the disease from infected travelers and
spread it to people in the U.S. Locally acquired dengue cropped up in outbreaks in Florida and Texas in
2013, raising the specter of further geographic spread in the South, where the mosquito typically lives—or
elsewhere, if its range expands. It already shows signs of expanding: Yellow fever mosquitoes were found
in California in 2013. As with chikungunya, the key to stamping out dengue is mosquito control. Researchers in Australia are trying a novel strategy: releasing mosquitoes infected with a
bacterium that prevents them from transmitting dengue. And a vaccine is on the horizon. What's most worrisome to researchers is how much is still

unknown about all three of these infections. "What does it take to break the transmission cycle?" asks Christofferson.
"And what does it take to break the cycle at different points?" Until such questions are answered, Chagas, chikungunya, and dengue loom as significant potential threats to U.S.

residents.
Bioterror
 Primary Care – Health House Solvency
The Iranian Health house system has proven massive success in Healthcare accessibility in Iran,
providing services to 95% of the population, massively reducing infectious disease spread and
increasing life expectancy.
Martin 12 (Sanaz Martin [Nurse Practitioner studying rural Healthcare and Nursing models] “Exploring the Health Houses
Network: Iran and Mississippi - A Cross-sectional Qualitative study” Published by UMI Dissertation Publishing, 2012, pgs. 7-12 /
WY-TH)

Health houses development in Iran’s PHC hierarchy Iran’s healthcare reform was modeled on a primary
healthcare delivery system (Shadpour, 2009). The goal of instituting the Primary Health Care (PHC) network in
Iran was to increase access to healthcare in underprivileged and remote villages and to reduce the
healthcare gap between urban and rural regions (Mehryar, 2004). The three main elements of the PHC
network were health houses ( Khane Behdasht in Farsi ), local community health workers
(Behvarz), and a rudimentary but integrated Health Information System (Mehryar, 2004). A
health house is a basic facility located in each village which provides healthcare to 1500 rural
residents (Shadpour, 2009). Each health house additionally provides services to one or more satellite villages
(generally with a population of fewer than 1500 and no more than a one - hour walk from the health house) (Mehryar, 2004; Shadpour , 2009). Health houses are

staffed by one female and occasionally one male community health worker (Behvarz). These community
health workers are native members of the village who received specialized training to serve as the
frontline healthcare providers in the health houses. The female Behvarz usually performs duties within the health house
such as immunizations, recording data, offering basic curative care and medication, and mother/child care.
The male Behvarz carries out responsibilities outside of the health house such as following up on cases of

communicable disease, case finding (screening community members by making home visits), environmental health, and delivery
of care to satellite villages (Mehryar, 2004; Shadpour, 2009). 8 One of the tools designed to help Behvarzes properly organize and
assemble the community’s health information is a rudimentary, paper - based integrated health information system (HIS).
This health information system consists of household files (demographic and health information), logbooks (records of

daily activities carried out by the Behvarzes), vital horoscopes (a statistical tool that creates a summary of
the community’s vital data), statistical wheels (statistic summary report; see appendix B for an im age of
statistical wheels) and monthly report forms (Mehryar, 2004). This system’s primary function is to annually report the community’s health
information from health houses to district health centers (DHCs). The information is then entered into computer s and forwarded to Tehran for planning and decision - making
(Khosravi, Motlagh, & Razavi, 2009). The functions of the health houses and Behvarzes are supervised by a second level
in the PHC chain called the rural health center (RHC). RHCs employ a physician, nurses, disease control technicians, oral health technicians,
laboratory technicians, nurse aides, and administrative staff (Aghajanian, 2007). Rural health centers usually serve a population of 9000,

inclusive of nearest health houses (Mehryar, 2004; Shadpour, 2009). The third level in the ladder of the PHC network is
the District Health Center (DHC). DHCs are associated with district hospitals. They supervise and
coordinate the activities of RHCs, provide health education, and track cases that need tertiary care in each
district (Mehryar, 2004). Behvarz Training Centers, under the umbrella of DHC, are responsible for the selection, training, and continuing education of Behvarzes. The entire
network is integrated by referral system from health houses (primary) to hospitals (tertiary), and in Iran’s rural regions the Behvarzes play an

important role in identifying the cases that require a higher level of care (Mehryar, 2004). At the district level, a directorate
of the district health network coordinates DHCs and district hospitals. At the provincial level, the Regional Health Organization consists of an executive board (executive director
and deputies for health affairs, curative affairs, food and drugs, and administrative affairs, who make planning decisions). In many provinces, the executive director of the Regional
Health Organization is also the chancellor of the local university of medical sciences. At the national level, the Ministry of Health and Medical Education creates policy and
oversees the planning, leadership, and activities of the Regional Health Organizations and the universities of medical sciences (Shadpour, 2009) (see Figure 1 for organizational
chart of Iran’s primary healthcare network) . One of the important transformations of the PHC network in Iran since 1994 was the integration of provincial health organizations and
the universities of medical sciences. This integration has created a new responsibility for university chancellors: to oversee the healthcare of the population in the province. This
unity was intended to improve coordination between healthcare and healthcare providers’ education, thus increasing the manpower and services to the community in the fight
against health disparities (Marandi, 2009). [graph omitted] Health outcomes since Health Houses Network implementation in Iran - The implementation of the
PHC network (known in rural regions as the Health Houses Network) has made a major
improvement in the health and well-being of Iran’s urban and rural populations by
increasing access to primary care services . The infant mortality rate dropped to 30 per 1000 live births by
the year 2000 (Aghajanian, 2007). Maternal mortality ratio was reduced to 25 per 100,000 live births by 2005 . Life
expectancy increased by 15 years for women and 12 years for men between 1977 and 2003 (see Table 2 for
comparing health indicators before and after implementation) (Marandi, 2009). Through the network of 2,407 rural health centers, 17,325 health
houses, and 31,380 community health workers (Behvarzes) in 65,000 villages in Iran, healthcare services are
currently provided to 95% of the rural population (Marandi, 2009; Shadpour, 2009). [graph omitted] The PHC system in
Iran continues to show remarkable improvements in population health indicators . Findings in Asadi’s 2003 study indicated
that since 1984 the PHC system in Iran has become progressively more organized and has resulted in a

remarkable reduction in infant, maternal, and neonatal mortality rates. Population growth, an increased life
span, and a reduction in communicable diseases were among the positive outcomes of the partnership
between community health workers and healthcare professionals in the Iranian PHC system (Asadi-Lari, Sayyari,
Akbari, & Gray, 2003). In a similar study, Aghajanian focused on describing the Health Houses Network in the PHC system in Iran. He described the duties of the Health Houses
Network and Behvarz (community health workers) within the Iranian PHC system, while discussing the distribution of Iranian medical providers and the effect of this distribution
on rural 12 health before and after the execution of the PHC system. Aghajanian stated that 54% of all 10,000 medical practit ioners, 87% of 6000 specialists, and 65% of 2400
dentists practiced in Tehran and five other large cities in 1979. Also, half of the approximately 700 new graduates in medicine left Iran. Major healthcare funds were allocated to
hospitals in large cities, but the availability of these funds to the rural population was inadequate due to economical, geographical, and cultural reasons. This uneven distribution of
health resources resulted in the devastating health outcomes previously noted, such as high maternal and infant mortality rates. However, health improvements after the
implementation of the Health Houses Network were significant, and proved the success of Iran’s PHC network (or, in rural areas, the Health Houses Network) (Aghajanian, 2007).
that healthcare accessibility in terms of physical, financial, and cultural
Another study by Javanparast (2009) demonstrated

access in Iran is one of the most comprehensive components of the Iranian primary healthcare network. This
study suggested that one way to improve the Iranian PHC model would be to change the health policy makers' perception of recognizing community participation as an important
element of comprehensive PHC. Javanparast suggested that a bottom - up approach, aligned with community collaboration, would empower the community, rather than simply
In summary, the literature shows that the Iranian
making community members the passive recipients of health services (Javanparast, 2009).

Health Houses Network (and associated regional and national reforms) has had a positive impact on health outcomes,
particularly for rural regions in Iran.
 Primary Care – Solves Bioterror

Domestic preventative care solves bioterror through resiliency

Jendayi Frazer 17, Co-Chair Committee on Global Health and the Future of the United States, Report
comes from the Committee Report, “Global Health and the Future Role of the United States” 5/15
http://nationalacademies.org/hmd/reports/2017/global-health-and-the-future-role-of-the-united-states.aspx

There will likely always be a demand for U.S. support when it comes to disaster relief and humanitarian efforts because the U.S. response
system excels at logistics and operations . But disaster response must be complemented by investment in programs and
countries during steady state times—acknowledging the public health mantra of “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure .” Money spent on

improvements to infrastructure, workforce training, and response systems—both in the United States and abroad— protects Americans from
threats such as emerging infectious diseases or bioterror attacks . Such investments help to build everyday resilience so communities
are prepared for all types of disasters , whether they take the form of a bus crash, an active shooter event, or an Ebola outbreak. Similarly, investing in the
development of countries around the world through partnerships and capacity building can help foster stable economies
with sufficient opportunities for their citizens, discouraging them from feeling forced to flee their country. Stable countries with growing middle class populations are
more likely to become trading partners and to purchase U.S. goods; 11 of the top 15 U.S. trading partners are former recipients of U.S. foreign assistance programs (InterAction, 2011). Moreover, beyond just trading

partners, the shared burden of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) around the world is a strong justification for health and scientific partnerships that can lead to shared solutions
to common problems . Many aid-recipient countries suffer from similar health burdens to those in the United States, such as hypertension, cancer, poor maternal health, or depression.
 Bioterror – Yes Extinction

Bioterror causes extinction

Anders Sandberg 8, is a James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity
Institute at Oxford University; Jason G. Matheny, PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at
the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; Milan M. Ćirković, senior research associate at the
Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade and assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in
Serbia and Montenegro, 9/8/8, “How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists,http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-
extinction
The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in
reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global
thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging
technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of
extinction-level pandemics . The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than
those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a
small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild
species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host
ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release
ofengineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of
causing human extinction . While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies
continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.
 Bioterror – Yes Means

Bioweapons are easy to access and deploy

Drew Miller 16, former intelligence officer, former senior executive service member in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and retired Air Force Reserve Colonel, Ph.D. from Harvard University and currently
serves as director of Advanced Analysis Applications, 9/20/16, “The Age of Designer Plagues,”
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/09/20/the-age-of-designer-plagues/

BVP = bioengineered virulent pathogen

While we cannot forecast the odds of a BVP, a host of experts believes it is inevitable . A National Defense University study
of the GMO threat found that “the tools and information required for genetic modification of microorganisms are readily available
worldwide.” They are also very cheap , and “the work can be successfully accomplished by a small cadre [of
three people].” This study estimated that the materials and facilities to weaponize a bioagent would cost about $250,000.
“Compared to other projects that might be undertaken by governments or private organizations, the cost of equipping and staffing a
laboratory scale bioprocessing facility is trivial.” They concluded that “the potential for corruption of biotechnology to
catastrophic malevolent use is considerable,” with “tangible opportunities for many potential adversaries to acquire,
modify, and then manufacture to scale a potential GMO pathogen.”5 A BVP or other triggering disaster need not be all that effective
in killing infected victims to generate a collapse that kills additional people and destroys the nation’s strength. “Collapse” is defined
here as a cessation of most economic activity and the widespread lack of law and order, for a prolonged period of time, with very high
fatalities (millions, more than 10 percent of the population). Indeed, GMOs
pose an “existential threat ,” meaning a risk not
just of killing millions of people, but potentially billions, wiping out civilization as we know it. An existential threat is
defined here as one that could kill most of the population (more than 90 percent), causing a collapse that lasts beyond a few years,
with the level of pre-collapse civilization not returning for generations. Despite a largely rural population and relatively little
international travel, the bubonic plague wiped out about a third of Europe’s population in the mid-14th century. Today, over half of
the world’s seven billion people live in cities visited daily by international travelers. We are more urbanized
and densely packed, sustained by food and water that arrives from distant locations, relying on delivery systems and
economic operations that may shut down if there is a lethal contagious virus spreading and people
understandably do not report to work. Even those with the courage to face the risk may change their mind when they realize they
could bring a fatal virus home to their families. Those that do keep working, medics and police in particular, are likely to catch the
virus. We should expect that most economic activity, public services, production of essential goods, and transportation may
cease. To minimize inventory costs, businesses, even hospitals, now have “just-in-time” delivery of supplies,
sourced from lowest-cost providers on the other side of the world. Even if your local trucker decides to continue working, with
multiple long-distance suppliers and shippers involved in moving foodstuffs, a contagious pandemic would certainly disrupt the flow
of essential goods. Panic-buying and hoarding will add to the problem of getting food to the population. How long will our public
water supplies continue functioning when maintenance personnel fail to report for work? Our highly interdependent, just-in-time
delivery economy is very vulnerable to disruptions. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, an expert in risk and thinking about rare events, points
this out: “Our connected world appears to be more efficient. But when there is a disturbance, the setback is much harder to handle. Not
only are we building riskier systems, but also the risks involved in failure are a lot larger.”6 When the availability of food and water is
threatened, widespread marauding may occur. In 1977, New York City suffered a lightning strike that caused a power failure for one
night. Over 3,000 arrests were made for looting, 400 policemen were injured, 500 fires were started. In 2005, after Hurricane Katrina,
looting rapidly spread throughout New Orleans, often in broad daylight and in the presence of police officers. One third of New
Orleans police officers deserted their posts. Given the example of these and other, relatively small disasters, what should we expect in
the event of the far more serious scenario of a deadly viral pandemic? Pandemonium. There are many more reasons why we are far
more likely to suffer when a widespread disaster hits tomorrow. For example, despite rising population, we have fewer hospital beds
and emergency rooms in the United States today than even a few decades ago. Between 1990 and 2009, emergency rooms in non-rural
U.S. hospitals declined 27 percent from 2,446 to 1,779. Some may not wait to exploit a disaster, they may loot and maraud
immediately. UK riots in 2011 showed that law enforcement can break down and violence spread without a disaster to trigger them.
Prime Minister Cameron called it “pure criminality.” Others said it was inevitable violence from youth fed up with unemployment or
family breakdown. The attacks on police and looting started in London, but spread quickly to other cities across the United Kingdom.
Looting and violence grew as more people took advantage of the opportunity and “marauding gangs” formed. Police lost control of
many areas. Innocent people were shot dead in cars and robbed on streets. Thugs in Birmingham killed three men trying to protect
their businesses. The riots continued the following night—and the next. Violence continued in London for four nights until an extra
16,000 police officers moved in to restore order. Criminal syndicates and gangs can accelerate the breakdown in law and order and
magnify marauder threats. The number of gang members in the world is estimated at several million. The United States has tens of
thousands of gangs and perhaps a million gang members. The Salvadoran MS-13 gang alone, known for brutal murders, has tens of
thousands of members dispersed throughout most U.S. states. Many people, not just gang members, will use the disaster and the
distraction of police as an opportunity to loot. A major disaster could lead to economic and societal shutdown that
escalates in ways we cannot foresee, but we can assume they may be even worse than the losses from the
trigger event. A Defense Science Board study warned that even a relatively benign cyber attack could trigger collapse: “[F]ood and
medicine distribution systems would be ineffective, transportation would fail or become so chaotic as to be useless. Law enforcement,
medical staff, and emergency personnel capabilities could be expected to be barely functional in the short term and dysfunctional over
sustained periods.”7 The nation’s leading agency for protecting against WMD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, warns that we
face the “inevitable emergency of a new threat from biological and chemical agents.” The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons
of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, the international police agency INTERPOL, the former president of the Royal
Society of London all warn that bio-terror attacks could kill millions. When Dr. Henderson, who led the World Health Organization’s
global smallpox eradication campaign, predicts that a human transmissible form of avian flu could injure and kill billions, that’s a
credible warning of an existential threat. But none of this generates as much public attention or political action as North Carolina’s
transgender bathroom dispute. As for why we are blind to this pending disaster, Nassim Taleb’s The Black Swan: The Impact of the
Highly Improbable offers insights. A “Black Swan” is an extreme impact event that is outside the realm of regular expectations;
nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Concerning such events, Taleb warns that “things have a bias to appear
more stable and less risky in the past, leading us to surprises . . . . The history of epidemics, narrowly studied, does not suggest the
risks of the great plague to come that will dominate the planet.”8 Taleb cites 27
widespread errors in human thinking
processes and misapplications of statistics to explain
why we neglect Black Swan disasters like a coming BVP.
People cling to current truths and past experiences that new technologies and changing conditions may
soon render wrong or irrelevant . We often fool ourselves with stories and anecdotes, and even invent memories that calm us—
but also demobilize us. What we don’t see regularly, we tend to ignore . We learn by repetition, react and decide by gut
feeling, thinking that we’ve thought it through and made a rational choice when we often have not. “We are made to be superficial, to
heed what we see and not heed what does not vividly come to mind.” Taleb cites as examples the diaries of people prior to World War
II—few had any inkling that something momentous was taking place, that large-scale war was coming. And indeed, while we hear
much about Churchill’s warnings (and less about Lord Vansittart’s even earlier and more consistent warnings), his was a rare voice
and ignored. BVP “disaster blindness” may be stronger in the United States because we, with the mightiest military, feel immune from
attack. This is precisely why a BVP is a likely weapon of choice for attacking the United States. It could kill more people than even a
large nuclear attack, cause more lasting devastation and economic collapse, and best of all for the attackers—they may get away with
no retaliation since we may never be able to determine or prove who released the virus. Our government spends tens of billions of
dollars every year to counter nuclear threats because it’s a long-standing, very obvious threat. The threat of bio attack is much worse,
both in terms of likelihood and of the damage it will probably cause, yet relatively little is done to try and counter or prepare. In 2012
a National Research Council committee on chemical and biological defense scolded, “The United States probably has not yet
adequately embraced the opacity of the threat. It will be much, much more difficult to prepare for and defend against than prior
threats.”9 Indeed, when I interview biologists and researchers who should be troubled by the coming BVP, their more immediate
worry is that their research will be curtailed or over-regulated. They believe that biotechnology promises great advances in medicine
and is a huge economic opportunity—a belief echoed by business executives. Scientists I’ve interviewed fear that warnings about
BVP will lead to more regulations, which would drive the research to other parts of the world where it’s not regulated. They also
argue that it is too late to stop misuse of this technology. The Federal government is certainly aware of the bioterrorism risk, but it is
not a top priority. The lead agencies dealing with biotechnology fund and promote the research. Until the first instance of disaster, it is
doubtful there will be strong action to prepare for the threat of a BVP-induced collapse. Nothing major happens in Washington, DC,
without laws to direct the action, budgeting, and the commitment of top elected officials. All are lacking now. There are no special
interests and lobbyists pushing for bioterrorism preparedness. The initial or “triggering” Black Swan disaster may not be the biggest
thing to worry about. The “cascading effects” of an economic shut down, the loss of law and order, looting and marauding, and the
disruption of health, sanitation, water, and transportation systems triggered by the initial disaster may deliver much worse, longer-
lasting damage. What cascading problems will result when the electrical grid goes down? Can nuclear reactors remain safely shut
down when no one reports to work because they don’t want to risk viral exposure, and local water and electric systems aren’t
functioning? With the police force overwhelmed and ravaged by casualties (first responders are more likely to get the virus), many
officers will abandon their jobs to protect their families from exposure. An explosion in violent crime could be worse even than the
virus. Thereal uncertainty is not whether a BVP or other Black Swan disaster will occur, but how bad it will be and how
deep of a collapse will result from it. After the first pandemic and collapse, it will likely be impossible to
prevent repeat bio attacks . It may be the next epoch of warfare and terrorism that defines the next era of “civilization.” Most
writers covering the Biotech Age emphasize the great advances in medicine and new means of production. But in a time when
individuals can wield the power to kill millions and cause a collapse, the outlook for mankind may be more bleak than rosy. The
destructive power of deliberately malign GMOs and the uncontrollable ability of individuals to unleash a BVP may yield a reversal in
mankind’s fortunes: shorter life spans, crueler lifestyles, and perhaps a collapse of civilization entirely. Whether the first
bioengineered virus comes from an accidental release or is spread by some regime, the key point Taleb makes is that “ Black Swans
being unpredictable, we need to adjust to their existence (rather than naively try to predict them).” Estimating, assuming,
hoping that accidents, lunatics, terrorists, or enemy states won’t release a GMO, or that we can always detect and stop them, is a
mistake. As a nation, we must adapt to the existence of the BVP threat now and change the protocols of our strategy,
military forces, economy , and preparedness to ensure the consequences do not cascade into societal
collapse . We need to be prepared to deal with the consequences of a viral pandemic that produces horrific numbers of casualties
that cannot be stopped with a simple quarantine. This problem deserves far more attention and resources. While we likely can’t stop
the release of lethal new GMOs, we can survive if we are ready. Many of the obvious preparations are relatively low-cost. Households
need to have not days of stored food and water, but months. While the Federal government won’t recommend something so politically
incorrect, wise citizens should stockpile and know how to use guns and ammo. The National Guard should train and equip its forces to
implement quarantines and support local law enforcement, and add a “Civil Ground Patrol” (modeled on the Air Force’s Civil Air
Patrol) to train and build a force of volunteers to help in disaster recovery and response efforts. After the first pandemic hits there will
be support for making bigger, more wide-sweeping changes in every aspect of our foreign and defense policies, economy, culture and
society. Nuclear weapons may no longer be seen as the most threatening weapons that should be eliminated, but a vital instrument for
prompt strikes to incinerate a bioweapon threat. An exodus from large cities may result as people conclude that rural areas are safer.
International travelers would not enter the country within an hour of arrival, but after days spent in quarantine communities where
they can work and recreate, but remain in a controlled state. From the Stone Age through the Bronze, Iron and Industrial Ages to
today’s Information Age, humans have enjoyed longer lifespans and improving quality of life and civilization. Every major
technological advance has also been applied to new means of killing, such as the mass-produced weapons and chemical agents
developed in the World Wars of the 20th century. Nuclear weapons were very difficult to make or hide, and are held today still only
by states. But new computer, nanotechnology, and other technological advances give individuals the power to severely
damage states and the societies they govern. Bioengineered viruses created and released by an individual could
destroy a country and, perhaps, our species. The more we do now to adjust to the threat of biotechnology and
prepare for the Age of Bioengineered Viral Pandemics and Collapse the more likely we are to survive .
 Bioterror – Yes Motives

ISIS is aggressively pursuing bioterrorism – they have access to advanced biotech and will use it
Metz 16 (Steven Metz, faculty of the Air War College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several
universities, advisor in the intelligence community, served on national security policy task forces, citing data taken from a
2014 ISIS computer, November 18, 2016. “Will Biological Weapons Be Terrorism’s ‘Next Big Thing’?”
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20486/will-biological-weapons-be-terrorism-s-next-big-thing)

Movements like the self-proclaimed I slamic

S tate must innovate or die . An insurgency is always weaker than the
government or governments it faces, so it must make the most of its limited resources and whatever
advantages it does enjoy. Often what it has in its favor is a lack of restraint and a willingness to carefully orchestrate violence to
maximize its effects. That is why groups like the Islamic State rely on terrorism, using it to generate fear disproportionate to the
resources it takes to execute an attack. In strategic terms, terrorism is cheap but potentially effective, particularly if the victim
overreacts. But like all terrorism-based movements, the Islamic State faces a persistent dilemma: Over time,
the ability of any specific form of terrorism to produce fear declines as potential targets mentally adjust . The
first few instances of some horrific type of attack—a suicide bomb in a crowded market, for instance—produce extensive
psychological effects, but the 20th, 50th or 100th time less so. This means that terrorist groups must constantly seek new
forms of attacks to produce the fear they seek. This is where the Islamic State finds itself today. Horrific, well-publicized
brutality against perceived enemies in Syria and Iraq promoted it from the “junior varsity” of violent Islamic extremists to the top tier.
Once that happened, the group found that orchestrating or inspiring murder sprees in Europe, the United States and elsewhere elevated
it even further, perversely augmenting its standing among violent, angry, alienated and, in many cases, mentally unbalanced Muslims
around the world. But now itmust up the ante again, finding new ways to create the fear it needs to fuel its
strategy. Hence the Islamic State is innovating , looking for “the next big thing ” in terrorism. The problem
is that it’s not easy to find effective new forms of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks , which increased vigilance
around and the world and led to extensive improvements in the counterterrorism, homeland defense and intelligence capabilities of the
one potential innovation that causes great concern
nations that the Islamic State might want to strike. There is, though,
among counterterrorism experts and policy experts: biological terrorism . Biological warfare has existed for
thousands of years. During the Cold War, the capabilities for it reached new levels as the Soviet Union built a massive biological
warfare capability. For a while the United States had its own offensive biological capability. Today, though, most nations
have abandoned biological warfare. The Islamic State wants to get into the game . The ethical rationale for this
is already in place. With its “end of days” ideology, the Islamic State believes that anything that advances its interests is acceptable, no
matter how barbaric. This includes biological warfare. A laptop computer captured from the group in 2014, for
instance, contained a fatwa from a Saudi cleric asserting that “it is permissible to use w eapons of mass
destruction.” In 2015, counterterrorism analysts noted increased discussion on jihadi social media about
using the Ebola virus as a weapon. These indicators suggest that Islamic State strategists are looking for a
biological warfare capability. As the group loses territory in Iraq and Syria, it will become even more
determined to amplify the effects of the tools still available to it, possibly by pair ing terrorism and biological
warfare . That’s the bad news. The good news is that the group does not yet seem to have an effective biological warfare
capability. But it is looking for one . Some of its efforts are low-tech. The laptop captured in 2014 contained a 19-
page document on how to weaponize bubonic plague from infected animals. Security officials believe that rotting
animal parts found in the backpack of an extremist linked to the 2016 Brussels attacks were intended to poison food or water supplies.
This type of biological warfare has been around for millennia. While it can sow fear, it is rarely effective. The real fear among
counterterrorism experts and policymakers is that the I slamic State might find a way to use modern
technology to develop new-generation biological weapons that are much more effective than those
made during the Cold War. The extremist movement already has a number of scientists on its payroll. In war-
torn Iraq, Libya and Syria, it has access to the remnants of the biological warfare programs that the
Soviets helped Saddam Hussein, Moammar Gadhafi and Hafez al-Assad build. The next step might be
genetically engineered bioweapons that are orders of magnitude more dangerous than the old weaponized
natural pathogens like anthrax or small pox. New -generation biological weapons could prove safer to
handle, easier to distribute , and much deadlier than their predecessors—just the thing for a desperate
terrorist movement clinging to relevance as its “caliphate” dissolves. We know that the Islamic State has
demonstrated an interest in biological weapons and is clearly looking for more dramatic methods of
terrorism. But the U nited S tates remains unprepared for bioterrorism , despite repeated warnings from national
security experts. The final report of the 9/11 Commission considered terrorist biological attacks more of a threat to the United States
than nuclear ones. In 2015, the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense warned that the United States “does not afford the biological
threat the same level of attention as it does other threats: There is no centralized leader for biodefense. There is no comprehensive
national strategic plan for biodefense. There is no all-inclusive dedicated budget for biodefense.” And even as the threat from the
Islamic State has grown, U.S. spending on public health and emergency preparedness has declined. Certainly there is much on the
plate of American security strategists and political leaders, all crying out for attention and resources. Invariably some threats receive
less priority than they should. Bioterrorism is one of them. The Islamic State is clearly motivated to use bioterrorism, and the 2014-
2016 Ebola crisis demonstrated the fear and economic damage that a large-scale health crisis can cause. America’s leaders must
give the bioterrorism threat the attention and resources it deserves. It will not go away on its own and
will only get worse in the coming years.
 Bioterror – Nuke Retal

Bioterror causes retaliation---goes global

Daniel L Byman 17, senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, PhD from MIT,
5/3/2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/05/03/trump-and-the-next-terrorist-attack/
The best response in the hours after an attack involves a mix of rhetoric, leadership, and caution. The president should publicly honor
the dead and reassure Americans that the government is working to hunt down the guilty and care for those injured. At the same time,
he should point out that American Muslims have proven vital allies against terrorism. As FBI Director James Comey put it, “They do
not want people committing violence, either in their community or in the name of their faith, and so some of our most productive
relationships are with people who see things and tell us things who happen to be Muslim.” Almost half of all tips on extremism come
from the community.¶ Animmediate retaliatory strike—one that on its surface would signal toughness and thus be
attractive to a president who talks about toughness a lot—might be a mistake. Initial information on
responsibility or the extent of overseas links is often flawed or incomplete, and it is useful for the
administration to assess a full range of options before plunging in. Since the Trump administration is
already hitting the Islamic State hard, it’s difficult to imagine an easy way to ratchet up the pressure that
does not involve significant costs or downsides. Instead, various agencies should be scrutinizing intelligence and security procedures
to determine culpability and identify real and potential holes while the military and intelligence agencies assess options overseas.¶
Trump might opt for a disastrous
Based on his initial record in office and rhetoric on the campaign trail, however,
approach . The president acts out of impulse, whether this involves sarcastic tweets to Arnold Schwartzenegger
or the sudden decision to bomb Syria after the regime’s use of chemical weapons. It’s safe to say that
restraint and deliberation are not characteristics of this administration—or the man himself. Perhaps even worse, this
administration has a track record of mismanaging policy processes. This includes signature items like the “Muslim Ban” executive
order or less prominent but important announcements, like the supposed deployment of an aircraft carrier to Korea . This bungling
and the president’s many about-faces on issues have damaged his credibility as a messenger and are likely
to make people more skeptical of the content of his statements and actions in the aftermath of a terrorist
attack.¶ The president is likely to want to overreact abroad. He seems to want to appear tough more than he
wants to be effective. So he boasted, for example, about dropping a massive bomb on Islamic State targets
in Afghanistan without waiting to learn whether it achieved its objectives. On the campaign trail, the
president wanted to “bomb the shit out of them” even though it was not clear an increase in the scale of
bombing would achieve much. Trump might also expand the war , bringing it to new zones that have only a tenuous
Islamic State or al-Qaida presence. He has already authorized the intensification of US operations targeting
Shabaab and increased the pace of strikes targeting terrorist groups more generally. ¶ Even more worrisome
is what the President might do at home. On the campaign trail, the President repeatedly conflated Muslims
and terrorists, and with tensions and emotions running high after an attack this demonization might be
especially likely. In the name of border security, he might further limit immigration and travel from Muslim-
majority countries or try to single out Muslims over other faith communities. He might embrace the decision to
declare the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group even though this would be counterproductive and
cause difficulties with several allies. Surveillance of Muslim communities around the country might be
stepped up, further alienating Muslims from law enforcement and make them less likely to turn in
suspected terrorists. After 9/11, the United States detained over one thousand Muslims, gaining almost no
useful intelligence but harming relations with the community. As Daniel Benjamin, a former senior counterterrorism
official, warns, “Repairing the damage from that crackdown took years.” ¶ Such unthinking measures might benefit Trump
politically while inadvertently helping the terrorists operationally . Trump would look tough, and his argument that
the terrorism danger is high and Muslims are the enemy would be vindicated, at least to his supporters and to some who are undecided
on this question. The
Islamic State would gain more evidence to back up the narrative that the United States
is hostile to Muslims, while the vast majority of Muslims who loath the group would be less eager to work
against it because it means working with what they see as a hostile government. It’s just the American people who
would suffer.
Internal Link Biz
 Iran Key

Iran key
Fereidoun Mahboudi 12, PhD, Biotechnology Research Center, Pasteur Institute of Iran, Tehran Iran,
Haleh Hamedifar, Hamideh Aghajani, "Medical biotechnology trends and achievements in iran.", Avicenna
J Med Biotechnol, 2012, 4 (4), pp.200-5,
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/bd92/6d58b177980c0b1f23dad1388dea1874658e.pdf

Iran has a fairly well-developed pharmaceutical industry compared to others in the developing world.
Iran has also been successful in extending healthcare to the entire population. Its origins date back about 80
years ago to the establishment of the Razi Vaccine Production Research Institute in 1925 and the Pasteur Institute in 1920. Both
institutes began by producing vaccines through traditional biotechnology methods, first for veterinary applications and subsequently
for human use. Pharmaceutical companies in Iran can be divided into two groups. One group develops the cell line and produce active
raw materials in their facilities. There are 5 companies that can be categorized into this group. The second group started their
operations by licensing the products and processes from the Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and manufacturing them locally. The
operations mainly involved importing the raw material (bulk drugs) and formulating them locally. Since 1980, more than 148
recombinant biopharmaceuticals have received approval and launched worldwide. Supporting the local manufacturing, biosimilar
regulations have been approved in the Ministry of Health and Medical Education in Iran. More than 12 products have been approved
and more than 15 are in the pipeline to be approved in the next three years for recombinant proteins and monoclonal antibodies. Table
2 shows the list of biopharmaceutical products in Iran. More than 15 recombinant pharmaceutical products are in the
pipelines. It is expected to be released to the market in the next two to three years. Considering these
products, Iran will be one of the biggest biosimilar producers in the world and will lead the countries
in Asia in a numbers of products. Table 3 shows the number of biopharmaceutical products that are in different phase of
development. There are also other companies involved in licensing biotechnology products. They are producing recombinant protein
under the license using active raw materials as imported materials. Human Growth hormones and insulin are two major ones.
Biopharmaceutical products are among the most expensive medicines available in the market. Monoclonal antibodies and recombinant
medicine for orphan drugs take most of the health care cost for all government. Iran has started to market its products outside its
borders. Interferon beta 1a is one of the most expensive recombinant medicines in biopharmaceutics. Iranian brand for this medicine,
CinnoVex, has been launched in three countries with annual sale of close to 18 million USD. Among the firms that are most
active in the biotechnology industry are: Razi Vaccine and Serum Production Research Institute and the
Pasteur Institute of Iran. Both institutes are publicly founded. The rest of the compa nies are private investments. In order to
build up a solid biopharmaceutical industry, a "big push" is needed by the government through the provision of substantial research
funding in the national research institutes and the provision of seed and venture capital funding to start-up firms. This would stimulate
entrepreneurship among the scientists. In some of developing countries such as India, the government-owned commercial banks have
started their own venture capital operations. Iranian banks should be encouraged to do likewise. Conclusion Medical
biotechnology is rapidly expanding world-wide and biotechnology-based diagnostics, vaccines and drugs
offer very high added-value productions. Iran could enter profitably in this field, initially with generic products,
since many important patents for such products have expired or are about to expire, and, conceivably, later, with novel products
and processes more specific for the country and the region.

Iran key
Cyrus Ghaznavi 17, Researcher at Baylor College of Medicine, one of 18 Luce Scholars for 2017-18,
worked at the Center for Global Health Policy, The University of Tokyo, interned in D.C. at the Federation
of American Scientists, presented on the ethical dilemmas associated with dual-use biological research at
Rice’s inaugural TEDx salon, founded the Rice University chapter of END7, an international campaign
devoted to raising awareness of neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) and funds for their elimination,
"Science Diplomacy with Iran – A Common Language for the Farsiable Future",
https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/93987/Ghaznavi-Project.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

Iranian Capacity for Vaccine Diplomacy Reports from November 2014 suggest that Iran’s
national vaccination program has
been expanding, especially with regards to more advanced pentavalent vaccines.49 In fact, in October 2014,
Iranian Health Minister Seyed Hassan Qazizadeh Hashemi announced the addition of seven new vaccines to Persian production plans,
with the intention of reducing drug imports by 25% in the next four years.14 However, similar praise cannot be given to
other large Middle Eastern nations such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which import the large majority of
their vaccines for fill and finish repurposing. Iran is consequently a very attractive partner in the Middle
East when it comes to vaccine manufacturing and development.27 In fact, Iranian scientists have attempted
to develop more advanced biomedical techniques for vaccine production, such as genetic recombination, in
order to address their NTD problem, showing significant promise in the field. U.S. collaboration is needed
to aid in these developments.
 US-Iran Key

US-Iran cooperation would expand manufacturing and clinical testing of vaccines for NTDs---Iran is
willing to cooperate and is in a strategic geographic location
Cyrus Ghaznavi 17, Researcher at Baylor College of Medicine, one of 18 Luce Scholars for 2017-18,
worked at the Center for Global Health Policy, The University of Tokyo, interned in D.C. at the Federation
of American Scientists, presented on the ethical dilemmas associated with dual-use biological research at
Rice’s inaugural TEDx salon, founded the Rice University chapter of END7, an international campaign
devoted to raising awareness of neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) and funds for their elimination,
"Science Diplomacy with Iran – A Common Language for the Farsiable Future",
https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/93987/Ghaznavi-Project.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

Suggested areas for cooperation between the U.S. and Iran include but are not limited to cancer trends, gastrointestinal disease,
and highway accidents.45 One field that is particularly ripe for cooperation but woefully overlooked is that of
vaccine development , namely for the neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) found in both countries that wreak silent
havoc under the radar of popular attention. For example, dengue fever can be found on the U.S. Gulf Coast
and Iran’s border with Pakistan. Parasitic worms have slithered into infamy in rural areas of both the U.S.
and Iran, opening a whole new can of…health crises. Leishmaniasis, a skin disease that often results in
disfigurement, is emerging in Texas and Oklahoma while over 100,000 Iranians currently suffer from its
debilitating effects.20 Statistics on NTDs show that this is a shared burden, so scientific collaboration could
lead to mutual benefits. Iran stands to gain significant advances in vaccine development for these
diseases if collaborations with the U.S. were to expand,22 not only improving relations between the two
countries but also signifying acts of good faith among big international players. Engagement in
manufacturing and clinical testing of vaccines for NTDs like leishmaniasis shall henceforth be called
vaccine diplomacy, or scientific diplomacy with a focus on vaccine engagement. Iranian Willingness for Vaccine Diplomacy
Iran’s population has been hit hard by NTDs, with 5 million cases of ascariasis, 1.6 million cases of trichuriasis, 400,000
cases of hookworm, and 15,000 cases of trachoma as of 2010.26 Though these maladies are not notorious for morbidity, they do have
some of the most significant health care implications for disabling and debilitating their hosts, as measured by Disability Adjusted Life
Years (DALYs),25 and thus represent a significant problem for the Iranian government. Moreover, Iran’s
geographic
positioning combined with high disease burdens in neighboring states like Afghanistan and Pakistan make
cross-border transmission a particularly imminent threat , especially with the prevalence of foreign trips taken in
the region like the Hajj pilgrimage.37 In fact, these NTDs have proven to be such a large problem for Iran that its two major vaccine
hubs, the Institute Pasteur and the Razi Vaccine & Serum Research Institute, have created partnerships (albeit limited) for pentavalent
Iran is clearly willing to participate in a joint effort to
vaccine production with Cuba, India, Malaysia, and France.37
combat NTDs via vaccines, and the U.S. should not overlook this opportunity to help both its own citizens
and those of a country with which it has struggled to erect ties.

US-Iran key
Peter Hotez 11/30/11, M.D., Ph.D., Director and former president of the Sabin Vaccine Institute, Executive
Director of the Global Network for Neglected Tropical Disease Control, dean of the National School of
Tropical Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine, fellow in disease and poverty at the James A. Baker III
Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, former Professor and Chair, Department of Microbiology,
Immunology, & Tropical Medicine, George Washington University, Editor-in-Chief, PLoS Neglected
Tropical Diseases. "ENGAGING IRAN THROUGH VACCINE DIPLOMACY", Pacific Standard,
https://psmag.com/environment/engaging-iran-through-vaccine-diplomacy-38029

Iran, through its Razi Vaccine & Serum Research Institute (click here for the institute’s website in Farsi) together
with some of the leading research institutes and medical universities with Tehran have reported on nascent
efforts to develop vaccines for leishmaniasis and other neglected t ropical diseases, but success on this
front would be enormously accelerated with the added expertise of U.S. vaccine scientists and
developers. While it could lead to a new generation of interventions to combat neglected t ropical
diseases in the region, any scientific collaboration between U.S. and Iranian vaccinologists is all but
impossible in the current political environment . Vaccines for neglected tropical diseases have little commercial
interest because they disproportionately affect people living in poverty. I have referred to such products as “antipoverty vaccines”
because of their potential for improving economic development as well as human health. Currently, anti-poverty vaccines are being
developed mostly through just a few U.S.-based nonprofit product development partnerships, including our own with the Texas
Children's Hospital Center for Vaccine Development, which use industry practices to produce anti-poverty vaccines with a goal of
Linking Iranian and American vaccine developers and
improving global public health rather than reaping profits.
having them partner to develop anti-poverty vaccines could help to shape an effective blueprint for
beginning a scientific dialogue with the Iranians. Ultimately, it could lead to lifesaving interventions that
would benefit tens of millions of people throughout the Middle East and the rest of the world. The U.S.
Department of State and its Iranian counterpart should consider the opportunities created through such “scientific diplomacy.” Earlier
this year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called on better integration of “civilian power” in our U.S. foreign policy. Vaccine
diplomacy represents a potential use of civilian power and a perhaps timely intervention for the Obama
administration when tensions are at their highest. It would be worth recalling the similar complexities faced
by the Eisenhower administration more than 50 years ago — and vaccine diplomacy’s positive role.
 Vaccines Key

Vaccines key
Peter J. Hotez 15. M.D., Ph.D., Director and former president of the Sabin Vaccine Institute, Executive
Director of the Global Network for Neglected Tropical Disease Control, dean of the National School of
Tropical Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine, fellow in disease and poverty at the James A. Baker III
Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, former Professor and Chair, Department of Microbiology,
Immunology, & Tropical Medicine, George Washington University, Editor-in-Chief, PLoS Neglected
Tropical Diseases. 09/24/2015. “Vaccine Science Diplomacy: Expanding Capacity to Prevent Emerging
and Neglected Tropical Diseases Arising from Islamic State (IS)–Held Territories.” PLoS Neglected
Tropical Diseases, vol. 9, no. 9. PubMed Central, doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003852.

War and the ensuing health system breakdowns in the Islamic State (IS)–occupied Syria and Iraq significantly
increase the risk of a new wave of infectious disease epidemics in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA). Proactive engagement to enable health system capacity and resilience—including expanding
immunization programs and building biotechnology capacity for vaccines that specifically target diseases
in the region—would help minimize the impact if and when outbreaks occur. A program of vaccine science
diplomacy with selected countries in the MENA region could help to avert an international public health crisis possibly
similar in scope and magnitude to the 2014 Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa. The 2014 Ebola outbreak emphasized strong links
between the forces of poverty, depletions in public health and environmental degradations as a result of long-standing conflicts in
West Africa, and the emergence of a catastrophic neglected tropical disease (NTD). A stark reality is that such links between poverty,
war, and NTDs are not new, but have been reoccurring for decades [1]. For example, beginning in the 1970s and lasting throughout
much of the 20th century, hundreds of thousands of people may have perished from African sleeping sickness—human African
trypanosomiasis, a parasitic infection transmitted by tsetse flies—in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan because of
civil wars in those countries and the inability to mount effective public health control measures [2]. Kala-azar—visceral leishmaniasis,
another parasitic infection but transmitted by sandflies—killed an estimated 100,000 people in conflict-ridden southern Sudan between
1986 and 1995 [3]. Because journalists had limited access to these war-torn areas, both epidemics went mostly unrecorded and
unacknowledged. The latest example is the collapsed health systems of post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone that were unable to cope
with an Ebola epidemic that infected more than 20,000 people and caused approximately 10,000 deaths by the early part of 2015. Go
to: Neglected Diseases and Emerging Infections in the MENA A comparable situation associated with poverty and conflict may now
be unfolding in the MENA. Our previous analysis showed a surprisingly high burden of NTDs disproportionately
affecting an estimated 65 million people who live in extreme poverty in this region [4]. Shown in Table 1 is a
reassessment of the NTD burden in the MENA based on newly released World Health Organization (WHO) and other estimates [5–
13]. In total, approximately 50 million people in the MENA suffer from an NTD . Table 1 Table 1 The major neglected
tropical diseases (NTDs) of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).a Moreover,
several important infections,
including NTDs, have re-emerged in war-torn areas of Syria, such as cutaneous leishmaniasis (CL),
scabies, hepatitis A, measles, rabies, polio, and tuberculosis, and in Afghanistan, where CL is now an important public
health threat [14,15]. Social disruptions in Egypt may have helped to promote the emergence of dengue, together with the fact that the
largest numbers of impoverished people from the MENA live in Egypt [4]. Additionally, even prior to the current outbreak of
hostilities, Yemen had the single highest poverty rate in the MENA and suffered from multiple NTDs, including much of the
schistosomiasis in the region [4]. Superimposed on an already worrisome threat from tropical infections are the
recent advances of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, and Yemen (Fig 1). Currently the IS of Iraq and al-
Sham (ISIS) is considered a pseudo-state with an estimated 30,000 fighters, together with a sophisticated command structure but with
minimal to nonexistent health systems [16], while according to a recent report, Yemen’s health system is “moving
from a crisis to a disaster” [17]. Fig 1 Fig 1 Syria and Iraq 2014-onward war map—occupied territories. In this setting we
must again anticipate breakdowns in public health infrastructure and , with those breakdowns, a steep rise in
existing infections or the emergence of new ones. They could include many of the NTDs highlighted above ,
such as CL (or even visceral leishmaniasis), dengue, and scabies, as well as tuberculosis, hepatitis A and B, and classical childhood
viral infections such as measles and polio [15]. Also of great concern is the emergence of zoonotic infections linked to animal
trafficking across fractured international borders, such as brucellosis [14,18]. As another example, Middle Eastern Respiratory
Syndrome (MERS)—recently appearing in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere on the Arabian Peninsula—could
spread undetected through camel animal reservoirs. Go to: The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) When Ebola virus
emerged in West Africa in 2014, the global health community was slow in mounting a coordinated international
response. To avoid a repeat, is there a possibility of mobilizing resources now in order to combat the NTDs
and other emerging infections that will surely arise in the MENA? Anticipatory action plans could include expansion
of public health emergency preparedness through the United States—launched Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) in partnership
with the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE) [19]. Launched in February 2014, the GHSA has an overarching mission to prevent and reduce the likelihood of
infectious disease outbreaks by detecting threats early and providing for rapid and multisectoral responses [19]. GHSA also furthers
progress towards full implementation of WHO International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR). Among the key components of the
GHSA are immunizations and access to vaccines . As an example, in 2013 when poliovirus was detected in Syria from
Pakistan, the MENA responded with a robust vaccination initiative [20], while UNICEF has since set ambitious goals for vaccinating
refugees [21]. It is unlikely that today such responses would be possible in IS-held conflict areas [14]. However, it remains highly
desirable to consider the possibility of implementing cease-fires for the purpose of vaccination in IS-occupied zones, similar to those
conducted previously in Sudan and other war-torn areas [22]. Go to: New Vaccines for the MENA But what if diseases emerge
across the MENA region for which vaccines and other countermeasures have not yet been developed? Given
that a number of diseases might be primarily of regional instead of global importance, it is unlikely they will be targeted for vaccine
development by the multinational pharmaceutical companies. We saw this situation previously when Ebola virus vaccines were not
available throughout all of 2014, and these vaccines are only now entering phase 1 trials, more than a year after the epidemic ignited
We need new vaccines developed, tested, and possibly stockpiled for the MENA region
in West Africa.
[23,24]. These might include vaccines to prevent NTDs such as leishmaniasis, but also MERS and other
emerging viral infections. While currently there are minimal capabilities for developing new neglected and emerging disease
vaccines in MENA, several MENA nations are potentially well placed to initiate such activities. Such programs could be an
important first step in creating regional leadership in this vital area. In a June 2009 speech in Cairo, Egypt,
President Barack Obama launched an initiative known as “New Beginning” in order to engage the Muslim world in science and
technology diplomacy, with an emphasis on agriculture, climate, energy, water, the environment, and sustainability [23]. A key
element of the outreach is a US Science Envoy program to send notable American scientists to Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC) countries to promote scientific collaborations. Given the urgent need to develop and possibly stockpile new
vaccines for the major NTDs emerging out of MENA, there are opportunities for “vaccine science
diplomacy,” analogous to events of the post-Sputnik era of the Cold War, when an American—Soviet
collaboration led to final development and testing of the Sabin polio vaccine [23,24].
Answers To
 AT: NTD Vaccines Now

NTD vaccine development will not occur now because of scientific and geopolitical barriers---aff
solves
Peter J. Hotez 1/17/18, M.D., Ph.D., Director and former president of the Sabin Vaccine Institute,
Executive Director of the Global Network for Neglected Tropical Disease Control, dean of the National
School of Tropical Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine, fellow in disease and poverty at the James A.
Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, former Professor and Chair, Department of
Microbiology, Immunology, & Tropical Medicine, George Washington University, Editor-in-Chief, PLoS
Neglected Tropical Diseases. "The global fight to develop antipoverty vaccines in the anti-vaccine era",
HUMAN VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 2018, VOL. 0, NO. 0, 1–4,
https://www.uthct.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/5a.-Hotez-article-1.pdf
The framework of antipoverty vaccines was shaped beginning in 2006,10 in order to promote the concept of developing new vaccines
for poverty-promoting NTDs. But progress in antipoverty vaccine development has been slow relative to scale-up for
integrated MDA.13–16 Listed in Table 1, is the current status for each of the NTDs
currently being targeted for
antipoverty vaccine development. With the exceptions of lymphatic filariasis, food-borne trematodiases, trachoma, African
trypanosomiasis, and guinea worm disease, there is some level of vaccine development underway for all of the NTDs. However,
most of these vaccines are in very early stage development or even at the preclinical stage of testing. Only
three NTDs currently have licensed vaccines – vaccines for dengue, yellow fever, and rabies – while only five others, including
hookworm disease, schistosomiasis, Zika virus infection, leishmaniasis, and Ebola virus infection, currently have vaccines in clinical
testing. Indeed, antipoverty vaccine development has lagged behind the rest of the vaccine industry, due to a
combination of both scientific and geopolitical barriers illustrated in Fig. 1.
 AT: No Profit Incentive

Pharmaceutical companies will help produce NTD vaccines---social responsibility and new alliances
Wharton 2/10/11, Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, "Profits and Social Responsibility:
Chastened Drug Makers Step Up Efforts to Bring Affordable Medicines to Poor Countries",
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/profits-and-social-responsibility-chastened-drug-makers-step-
up-efforts-to-bring-affordable-medicines-to-poor-countries/

A decade ago, drug makers came under fire for not making HIV/AIDS treatments widely available to poor
nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than two-thirds of all cases are found. Fast forward to 2011, when the
industry has made broad accommodations on pricing and access to the drugs. But creating new medicines
for patients in poor countries who cannot pay prices linked to the hefty cost of creating cures remains a daunting challenge. At issue is
how global companies decide which treatments to work on, and how they manage operations and clinical trials in the developing
world. For drug makers, serving poor nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America calls for striking a balance between
meeting public health needs and maximizing profits. Guiding the companies are codes of ethics and
corporate responsibility for doing business. “There is a special duty when you are selling medicine as opposed to pantyhose
or hubcaps,” says Arthur Caplan, director of the Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania. When drug companies
put short-term gains ahead of social responsibility , he adds, they often pay a price in bad publicity and
a backlash from regulators . Put differently, “The issue of who gets drugs developed for them is a very
important ethical issue and cuts to the heart of the strength and weakness of markets,” says Michael A. Santoro, a
Rutgers Business School professor and co-editor of the 2005 book, Ethics and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Business, Government,
Professional and Advocacy Perspectives. “On the one hand, we don’t like it that markets are harsh and unjust,” Santoro says. “But on
the other hand, it’s the power of the market that creates the therapies in the first place.” Efforts to deliver cures to the world’s
poorest regions range from new research initiatives to Big Pharma donations of medicine . Last
November, the World Health Organization unveiled an alliance with six firms that pledged to donate drugs
for neglected tropical diseases –the term for sicknesses such as leprosy and dengue fever found in countries afflicted with
poverty, overcrowding and a lack of good diets and hygiene. Among the contributions was an unlimited supply of leprosy treatments
from Novartis, and up to 200 million tablets a year from Johnson & Johnson to combat intestinal worms in children. Many such
programs are modeled after alliances between drug companies, governments and non-profit
o rganizations that have expanded affordable access to HIV/AIDS treatments in poor countries.
Perhaps the most ambitious effort has been in Botswana, which in 2001 joined forces with Merck and the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation to bring drugs to the impoverished African nation. Now 90% of Botswana’s HIV/AIDS
patients receive treatment , says Merck, compared with just 5% when the program began. Such public-
private partnerships promote corporate social responsibility in developing countries burdened with political and
economic barriers to strong pharmaceutical markets, says Guy David, a Wharton professor of health care management. But
charitable donations do not eliminate the need for companies to produce innovative new drugs for
diseases that afflict the developing world , David notes. “The biggest role for pharmaceutical companies in
terms of society is the discovery of new drugs and vaccines,” he says.
 AT: Sanctions

Sanctions don’t affect internal links about international collaboration---Iran scientists could come to
America to develop vaccines

Sanctions don’t prohibit sharing medical supplies

Dr. Julia Pfeil 5/11/18, a counsel at Dentons Europe’s Frankfurt office and is a member of the public policy
and regulatory practice, "U.S. Sanctions on Iran Set to Return: A Simple Explainer",
https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/articles/2018/5/11/us-sanctions-on-iran-set-to-return-a-simple-explainer

Activities that Remain Permitted Even before 2016, U.S. authorities had issued General Licenses which
permit certain business activities in Iran. The most important General Licenses are a General License that
permits the export to Iran of food, foodstuffs, agricultural items, pharmaceutical products (drugs) and
medical devices (often referred to as the “AgriMed” General License). In addition, U.S. authorities had
issued a General License that permits the export to Iran of many standard IT items and software, if these
products could be acquired without restrictions on the general market (General License D-1). Based on
information that is currently available, these General Licenses will not be revoked, and exports under
these General Licenses remain permitted. These General Licenses cannot only be used by U.S.
companies, but by companies from other countries as well.

Companies will still seek out business opportunities despite uncertainty

Philip Urofsky 1/31/18, partner @ Shearman & Sterling, "SECTION 219 IRAN NOTICES UPDATE:
DISCLOSURE DYNAMICS IN THE ERA OF RELAXED IRAN SANCTIONS", Shearman & Sterling,
https://www.shearman.com/perspectives/2018/01/dynamics-in-the-era-iran-sanctions?sc_lang=de-DE

Companies Explore New Iran Business Amid Fluid Sanctions Environment Through disclosures, issuers have
explicitly noted the current atmosphere of regulatory uncertainty. For example, Star Bulk Carriers, Inc. (a Greek
company) noted that sanctions regimes instituted by various jurisdictions prohibit “a wide scope of conduct,
target numerous countries and individuals, are frequently updated or changed and have vague application in
many situations.” Consequently, “there can be no assurance that we will be in compliance in the future,
particularly as the scope of certain laws may be unclear and may be subject to changing interpretations.”
Many other issuers have likewise stated that they cannot provide assurance of future compliance with all
applicable sanctions laws. For example, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (a Japanese company) described the variance of
sanctions laws across major jurisdictions as increasing the “costs and resources necessary to design and implement an appropriate
global compliance program.” Specifically, Mitsubishi UJF reported that it altered its compliance program to accommodate a series of
measures implemented by the Japanese government related to Iran. In doing so, however, Mitsubishi UJF expressed concern in its
disclosure that “there remains a risk of potential U.S. regulatory actions against us…if U.S. regulators perceive
the modified policies and procedures not to be in compliance with applicable regulations.” Other companies are
alerting investors to the potential for snap-back of nuclear-related sanctions. Capital Product Partners LP (a Greek company) noted
that, although sanctions relief was granted as part of the JCPOA, “[a]ctivities permissible under the JCPOA have not actually been
repealed or permanently terminated under U.S. law,” and that “the United States has the ability to re-impose sanctions against Iran if
Iran does not comply with its obligations under the nuclear agreement.”
Despite this uncertainty , disclosures from both
U.S. and non-U.S. issuers reveal that many companies are exploring new opportunities since the easing of sanctions
two years ago. For their part, many U.S. issuers are taking advantage of OFAC’s General License H, which
authorizes certain Iran-related transactions by foreign entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons. For example, Arthur J.
Gallagher & Co. (a U.S. company) reported that its U.K. subsidiary acted as an insurance broker and advised clients about obtaining
insurance coverage for activities related to Iran’s oil, gas and petroleum industries. The U.K. subsidiary then assisted clients in
obtaining insurance, reinsurance and retrocession coverage for a variety of oil-related activities. The company pointed out that these
activities were conducted pursuant to General License H and stated that it intends to continue acting as an insurance broker in
connection with these coverages. Similarly, Eaton Corp. PLC (a U.S. company) also stated that its subsidiaries intend to continue to
do business in Iran under General License H, noting, however, that it has no assets or employees in Iran. Validus Holdings Ltd. (a U.S.
company) has non-U.S. subsidiaries that are now conducting shipping operations in and out of Iran, including the shipment of “crude
oil from Iran to another country and transporting refined petroleum products to Iran.”
 AT: SQ Solves

SQ anti-disease efforts fail without new vaccines

Peter J. Hotez 1/17/18, M.D., Ph.D., Director and former president of the Sabin Vaccine Institute,
Executive Director of the Global Network for Neglected Tropical Disease Control, dean of the National
School of Tropical Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine, fellow in disease and poverty at the James A.
Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, former Professor and Chair, Department of
Microbiology, Immunology, & Tropical Medicine, George Washington University, Editor-in-Chief, PLoS
Neglected Tropical Diseases. "The global fight to develop antipoverty vaccines in the anti-vaccine era",
HUMAN VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 2018, VOL. 0, NO. 0, 1–4,
https://www.uthct.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/5a.-Hotez-article-1.pdf

One of the largest programs for NTDs has been integrated mass drug administration (MDA), first proposed in 2005
for Africa,1-4 and now supported in dozens of countries globally through funds from the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the British Department for International Development (DFID). These funds are channeled to government contractors or
health ministries in disease-endemic countries, together with technical support from a network of non-governmental development
organizations (NGDOs).6,7 The interventions are intended to target some of the world’s most prevalent NTDs,
including ascariasis, hookworm disease, trichuriasis, schistosomaisis, scabies, lymphatic filariasis, onchocerciasis, and yaws.
According to the WHO the number of people receiving NTD essential medicines for these NTDs has now
surpassed one billion, although almost one-half of the world’s population requiring such medicines has yet
to receive them.11 Integrated MDA is now having an impact in terms of reducing the prevalence and disease burden of several of
these NTDs,12 and could be critical for the eventual elimination of LF, onchocerciasis, ascariasis, trachoma, scabies, and yaws.
However, for other diseases such as hookworm and schistosomiasis, the impact has not been as great, possibly due to post-treatment
reinfections and lower than expected drug efficacies. Accordingly there is a need for additional biotechnologies for these
diseases. In addition to hookworm and schistosomiasis, there is also a need for new biotechnologies to combat many
of the other NTDs, especially insect-borne diseases, including the major arbovirus infections (e.g., dengue and Zika virus
infection), as well as vector-borne parasitic infections, such as leishmaniasis and Chagas disease. For these diseases, there are also
efforts underway to develop antipoverty vaccines.
 AT: Trump Thumper – Vaccines
Won’t defund vaccination programs
Jon Reid 17, Reporter at Morning Consult covering health policy, 4-20-2017, "Despite Campaign Rhetoric,
Trump Mostly Silent on Vaccine Policy," Morning Consult,
https://morningconsult.com/2017/04/20/despite-campaign-rhetoric-trump-mostly-silent-vaccine-policy/

On the campaign trail, President Donald Trump met with prominent vaccine skeptics and ranted about the
debunked theory that vaccines cause autism. But as the administration approaches its 100-day mark, the
White House has given few indications about the direction of its vaccine policy. That vacuum has left experts
drawing their own conclusions, fueling the hopes of vaccine skeptics and the fears of advocates. Changing vaccination and
immunization policies appears to be a low priority for the administration . Trump hasn’t named his pick to lead
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which sets the childhood immunization schedule, and his first budget blueprint didn’t
include details on vaccination funding. For now, theCDC continues to promote immunizations as it did under the
Obama administration. The CDC “is working as part of the new administration to protect and advance the health of
Americans through immunizations,” spokeswoman Kristen Nordlund said in an email. Despite Trump’s inaction, anti-vaccine
activists feel emboldened. Vaccine skeptics held a rally in Washington last month, when they also lobbied lawmakers on Capitol Hill.
Andrew Wakefield, the author of a since-discredited study linking vaccines to autism who met with Trump during the 2016 campaign,
remains optimistic that the White House will act on his cause, though he said he hasn’t had contact with Trump since their meeting
last summer. “I truly hope that President Trump will follow through on this,” Wakefield said in a phone interview. The uptick in anti-
vaccine activism worries public health advocates, who fear Trump’s skepticism could affect immunization rates. Trump has said he
doesn’t oppose vaccinations altogether, but also suggested that administering them over a period of time would lead to lower rates of
autism. There have already been 28 reported cases of measles this year, as of March 25, putting 2017 on pace to exceed the 70 cases
from last year. While the United States declared the disease eradicated in 2000, its return could stem from states such as California
where there is growing skepticism of vaccines. “We cured polio, we had eradicated measles, we had eradicated mumps,” Kevin
Campbell, a physician and health care consultant, said in a phone interview. “Now these things are reoccurring, and I’m concerned
when the commander-in-chief is kind of waffling on these issues that it will help these unsubstantiated movements continue to grow.”
The White House hasn’t ruled out forming a special commission to investigate vaccine safety, though administration officials have
rejected claims by vaccine skeptic Robert F. Kennedy Jr. that he would lead such a panel. Kennedy, who met with Trump during the
transition, was unavailable for comment. The White House has no announcements to make about vaccine policies at
this time, according to a spokesman who noted that Trump has discussed science related to vaccine safety with drug makers and
National Institutes of Health Director Francis Collins. So far, the people Trump has tapped to lead federal health
agencies reject the link between vaccines and autism. Scott Gottlieb, Trump’s pick to head the Food and
Drug Administration, which approves vaccines, has won praise from vaccine advocates for his efforts to
counter the theory that vaccines cause autism. Some are also encouraged by Trump’s secretary of health
and human services: Tom Price, a physician. “To have someone who understands the science, who supports the science
and uses the science to make decisions is what we want,” said L.J. Tan, chief strategy officer at the vaccine advocacy group
Immunization Action Coalition. Trump’s funding for the CDC’s 317 program, which funds vital immunization
infrastructure nationwide, may provide more insight on his position. The program receives about $600
million annually , and advocates are pressing Congress to at least maintain existing levels.

Specifically, the vaccine safety commission isn’t happening---prefer recency

Helen Branswell 17, staff writer @ stat news, 8-21-2017, "Plans for White House vaccine commission
appear to have stalled," STAT, https://www.statnews.com/2017/08/21/trump-vaccine-commission-robert-
kennedy/

Robert Kennedy Jr., the environmental activist and leading vaccine skeptic, says that it has been months since he has
talked with White House officials about chairing a vaccine safety commission — and that the idea of such
a panel may no longer be under consideration. “I’ve had no discussions specifically about the vaccine safety
commission, probably since February,” Kennedy told STAT. “You’d have to ask the White House. It may be that it’s evolved.”
Kennedy said, however, he has met with a series of top administration officials about vaccine safety since Trump took office,
including officials at the upper ranks of the Food and Drug Administration and National Institutes of Health. He said those meetings
took place at the request of the White House. A White House spokesman, asked about the vaccine safety commission, said there were
no announcements to make at this time. He declined to comment on whether the White House had arranged meetings for Kennedy.
Other officials confirmed that Kennedy had met with agency leaders, but emphasized that U.S. health officials strongly
believe in the safety and efficacy of vaccines. It was Kennedy who announced in January that Trump was going to
establish a vaccine safety commission and that he had been asked to serve as its chairman. He made the revelation after a meeting with
then-president-elect Trump, who had frequently expressed support for the debunked theory that vaccines can cause autism and who,
during the presidential campaign, said he supported “smaller doses over a longer period of time.” The news alarmed public health
officials and vaccine proponents who saw a recipe for disaster in the public pairing of a president who espouses — and tweets about
— links between vaccines and autism and a high-profile activist who has argued for years that vaccines can trigger a range of
disorders, including autism, asthma, food allergies, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. They feared a Trump-appointed,
Kennedy-led commission would further foster vaccine rejection and vaccine hesitancy. Only a small fraction of American children are
completely unvaccinated; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate they make up less than 1 percent of children. But
vaccine hesitancy — a term used to describe parents who harbor concerns about the safety of vaccinations and who as a result may
delay vaccinating their children against some pathogens or who will accept some inoculations but not others — represents a larger and
more concerning group. The seeds of these related movements are giving rise to outbreaks of preventable diseases, such as a large
measles epidemic earlier this year in Minnesota. Kennedy has said his views on vaccines have been misrepresented by the media, and
has rejected the term “anti-vaxxer.” He said he would only speak to STAT about the vaccine safety commission if the interview were
presented in a Q&A format. A spokesperson for the FDA confirmed that Kennedy met with Dr. Peter Marks, head of the Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research, and other FDA staff on March 30. Vaccines are regulated by this division of the FDA. The
session, categorized as a “listening meeting” on the FDA’s public calendar, is listed as being between FDA staff and representatives of
the World Mercury Project, a group Kennedy runs. “The FDA routinely receives requests to meet with stakeholders,” spokeswoman
Lyndsay Meyer said in an email. “In this case, the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research received a request from the
World Mercury Project to discuss vaccine safety.” Kennedy met on May 31 with top leaders of the NIH. Director Francis Collins and
Deputy Director Lawrence Tabak attended the meeting, along with the heads of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases, the National Institute of Mental Health, the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development, and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. Kennedy laid out his concerns about vaccines at the
meeting, presenting the information he views as supporting evidence, according to an official familiar with the discussion who spoke
on condition of anonymity. But the NIH participants countered, the agency suggested in an email. “In the meeting,
NIH noted that
there is strong and extensive scientific data that support the safety and efficacy of vaccines ,” a spokesman
said. “NIH reaffirmed with Mr. Kennedy that vaccines are among the most beneficial health
interventions in history in terms of the number of lives that have been saved over decades, have been
shown to be very safe, and are vital to the public health goal of preventing diseases.” While Trump and
Kennedy share some concerns about vaccines, the extent to which the president wants to prioritize the
issue has never been clear . Neither he nor his aides ever confirmed that a vaccine safety commission
was to be established. Hope Hicks, a longtime Trump employee who is now interim White House director of
communications, walked back the idea hours after Kennedy announced it, saying that while Trump was exploring the
possibility of setting up a commission on vaccine safety, no final decision had been made.
 AT: Trump Thumper – Health Diplomacy
Trump doesn’t thump health diplomacy---it’s a good business strategy
Lancet 17 – The Lancet Global Health Editorial, “Surprise Us, Mr Trump”, Volume 5, No. 3, e229, March
2017, http://thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(17)30056-6/fulltext

Indeed these are tumultuous times for the global health community. The US government , the largest funder and
implementer of global health programmes worldwide, is going rogue. Donald Trump's first weeks as President have been rocky:
marches tantamount to civil unrest have shown the level of discontent with his election around the world, most of his cabinet is still unconfirmed
(including, as we go to print, his Health and Human Services Secretary), and his executive orders have been met with uproar and legal action. The
reinstatement and extension of the Mexico City policy, which blocks federal funding for NGOs advocating for or providing abortion services, is one of
his most concrete and far-reaching actions so far, one with major negative impact for women and children around the word. We now anxiously wait to
see what other bomb is going to land on global development efforts. We know few things about Trump's position on health. His
national agenda, which already includes a repeal of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), is slowly taking shape, but he has given few clues about

his position on health diplomacy and he has not directly mentioned global health issues, aside from a rhetorical
and slightly mystifying statement in his inauguration speech, where he positioned the USA as standing “at the birth of a new millennium, ready to […]
free the Earth from the miseries of disease […]” Trump admittedly likes to be unpredictable, so it
is impossible to gauge what he is
going to do. One thing we know is that he is a businessman, so while we cannot expect Trump to exhibit the
skills of a diplomat or a policy-maker, we could rightfully scrutinise the sharpness of his business
acumen . As Trump defines a strategy for his priority issues, it would be good business practice for him to consider
existing strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats in the national and global
environments —the basic SWOT analysis. For instance, security figures high on his agenda: it is his main
argument for instating an objectionable ban on travellers from seven Muslim countries entering the USA in
late January. In this day and age, it would be aberrant to ignore that national security must include a
consideration of health security on a global scale. Borders that are closed to citizens of “unfriendly” countries are still permeable to
communicable diseases, particularly in a public health environment weakened by a Trump-supported anti-vaccination movement and a diminished ACA-
driven prevention programme. It would make sense, therefore, that Trump
should rely on existing opportunities and strengths
and provide continuity to programmes that have promoted the removal of the threats at the source , through
adequate financing for the Global Health Security Agenda and bilateral programmes like the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief or the
President's Malaria Initiative, which have been described as successful and cost-effective. And where weaknesses are found—Trump for instance has a
clearly negative view of the UN and its agencies—the role of an enlightened business leader would be to remediate these by building on existing
strengths (Trump has tweeted that the UN has “great potential”), supporting reform, or boosting the existing capacity for innovation in the USA to find
solutions. Taking over a business is one thing, but running it is another, just like winning an election is one step removed from leading a government. If
we try hard enough, we could give Trump the benefit of the doubt : after all, he has no experience in policy-making and seems
unfamiliar with global health issues. But some things make more business sense than others, so focusing our efforts on

demonstrating how sound an investment in global health would be seems practical. Let us hope he truly is
unpredictable and surprises us—in a good way .
 AT: Trump Thumper – Travel

Trump doesn’t deter nongovernmental organizations

Irene Anne Jillson 13, an assistant professor at the School of Nursing and Health Studies at Georgetown
University, "The United States and Iran: Gaining and Sharing Scientific Knowledge through
Collaboration", Science & Diplomacy, AAAS,
www.sciencediplomacy.org/files/the_united_states_and_iran_science__diplomacy.pdf

Future Collaboration The collaborations discussed above and other similar projects have been possible on
the U.S. side because of the commitment on the part of the senior leadership in nongovernmental and
governmental organizations such as the AAAS, NAS, NIH, and the U.S. Department of State. Even more
importantly, faculty members and researchers in universities and research centers in both the United
States and Iran have also supported these collaborations. The most long-standing collaborations have been
sustainable because of this dedication and because they engaged good scientists working on issues that
were of importance to both countries.

Scientists won’t be deterred

Glenn E. Schweitzer 17, Director, Office for Central Europe and Eurasia, U.S. National Academies, "U.S.-
Iran Engagement in Science, Engineering, and Health (2010-2016): A Resilient Program but an Uncertain
Future", The National Academics of Sciences Engineering and Medicine,
https://www.nap.edu/read/24861/chapter/1

For many years, such travel warnings concerning visits to Iran have dampened enthusiasm of even the most
adventurous American scientists to consider visiting colleagues in Iran. At times, U.S. citizens, and particularly dual-national
citizens, have encountered travel difficulties in Iran. Fortunately, there were no interruptions of the National
Academies-sponsored activities due to overly aggressive security officials in the two countries during
2010-2016. Delays at security check points involving excessive questioning have occurred, particularly at airports; and dual-
national Iranian-American scientists participating in the National Academies-sponsored activities have at times been subjected to close
scrutiny when visiting Iran. Still, given the occasional apprehension in Iran of visiting Americans engaged in fields other than science,
the importance of precautionary steps—usually the responsibility of the host for each visit—remains a serious concern. In the
United States, occasional scrutiny of the National Academies-invited visitors has been reported to the
National Academies but does not seem to be a major deterrent limiting exchanges.2
Vaccine Diplomacy Add-on
 Vaccine Diplomacy Add-On
Vaccine diplomacy’s key to solve tension with Iran
Cyrus Ghaznavi 17, Rice University, 2017, “Science Diplomacy with Iran – A Common Language for the
Farsiable Future,” Friends of Fondren Library Undergraduate Research Awards,
https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/93987/Ghaznavi-Project.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y
CASE STUDY: VACCINE DIPLOMACY Background Suggested areas for cooperation between the U.S. and Iran include but are not
limited to cancer trends, gastrointestinal disease, and highway accidents.45 One field that is particularly ripe for
cooperation but woefully overlooked is that of vaccine development , namely for the neglected tropical
diseases ( NTDs ) found in both countries that wreak silent havoc under the radar of popular attention . For
example, dengue fever can be found on the U.S. Gulf Coast and Iran’s border with Pakistan. Parasitic worms
have slithered into infamy in rural areas of both the U.S. and Iran, opening a whole new can of…health crises. Leishmaniasis, a skin
disease that often results in disfigurement, is emerging in Texas and Oklahoma while over 100,000 Iranians currently suffer Ghaznavi
12 from its debilitating effects.20 Statistics on NTDs show that this is a shared burden, so scientific collaboration could lead
to mutual benefits . Iran stands to gain significant advances in vaccine development for these diseases if
collaborations with the U.S. were to expand,22 not only improving relations between the two countries but
also signifying acts of good faith among big international players . Engagement in manufacturing and
clinical testing of vaccines for NTDs like leishmaniasis shall henceforth be called vaccine diplomacy, or
scientific diplomacy with a focus on vaccine engagement. Iranian Willingness for Vaccine Diplomacy Iran’s
population has been hit hard by NTDs, with 5 million cases of ascariasis, 1.6 million cases of trichuriasis, 400,000 cases of
hookworm, and 15,000 cases of trachoma as of 2010.26 Though these maladies are not notorious for morbidity, they
do have some of the most significant health care implications for disabling and debilitating their hosts, as
measured by Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs),25 and thus represent a significant problem for the Iranian
government. Moreover, Iran’s geographic positioning combined with high disease burdens in neighboring
states like Afghanistan and Pakistan make cross-border transmission a particularly imminent threat ,
especially with the prevalence of foreign trips taken in the region like the Hajj pilgrimage .37 In fact, these
NTDs have proven to be such a large problem for Iran that its two major vaccine hubs, the Institute Pasteur and
the Razi Vaccine & Serum Research Institute, have created partnerships (albeit limited) for pentavalent vaccine
production with Cuba, India, Malaysia, and France .37 Iran is clearly willing to participate in a joint
effort to combat NTDs via vaccines, and the U.S. should not overlook this opportunity to help both its
own citizens and those of a country with which it has struggled to erect ties. Ghaznavi 13 Luckily, the precedent for vaccine
diplomacy between hostile nations has already been set, and it was a resounding success . U.S. – Soviet
cooperation on the oral polio vaccine during the Cold War and its subsequent triumphs prove that
disagreeable nations can make science work when it comes to vaccinology .26 If Persian and American
vaccinologists were to come together to tackle NTDs, scientific dialogue could be widely expanded and
millions of people around the globe could be immunized as a result .23 Iranian Capacity for Vaccine Diplomacy
Reports from November 2014 suggest that Iran’s national vaccination program has been expanding, especially with regards to more
advanced pentavalent vaccines.49 In fact, in October 2014, Iranian Health Minister Seyed Hassan Qazizadeh Hashemi announced the
addition of seven new vaccines to Persian production plans, with the intention of reducing drug imports by 25% in the next four
years.14 However, similar praise cannot be given to other large Middle Eastern nations such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which import
the large majority of their vaccines for fill and finish repurposing. Iran is consequently a very attractive partner in the Middle East
when it comes to vaccine manufacturing and development.27 In fact, Iranian scientists have attempted to develop more advanced
biomedical techniques for vaccine production, such as genetic recombination, in order to address their NTD problem, showing
significant promise in the field. U.S. collaboration is needed to aid in these developments. 20 Limitations in Vaccine Diplomacy and
Domestic Development in Iran Politics
and vaccine development are inextricably intertwined . New vaccine
technology and equipment are hard to come by in Iran as a result of political tensions in the region .37 Most
notably, sanctions have traumatized vaccine (and for that matter all medical) research. First and foremost, sanctions are not intended to
target medical research materials and supplies, but unfortunately they Ghaznavi 14 have collaterally done exactly that. For example,
pharmaceutical exports to Iran from the U.S. fell more than 50% between 2010 and 2011, victimizing the Iranian populace and their
research efforts.8 According to a survey analyzing the impacts of international policy on Persian drugs, the Iranian pharmaceutical
market has been strangled by sanctions in terms of both importing finished products and active reagents. 9 As a result, sanctions
weaken Iran’s medical infrastructure and burden its health system.17 If the U.S. and Iran are to collaborate on vaccines, or more
generally anything biomedical, sanctions must be addressed because they are crippling Iran’s potential in the field. Unfortunately,
even when Persian researchers can get their hands on necessary supplies, prices are exorbitant. Sanctions on Iranian oil have blocked
off Iran’s main supply of hard currency, which caused the Persian rial’s value to plummet by half during 2013.8 The devaluation of
Iran’s currency has caused the price of the imported reagents needed to synthesize medicines to skyrocket, making many drugs
unavailable. In fact, in 2012, two drug manufacturers shut down while many pharmacies declared bankruptcy.46 Clearly, Iranian
medical development needs a dose of fresh policy to free itself from the paralyzing effects of sanctions. However, some may argue
that becausemedicines and other medical technologies are exempted from sanctions, there are no real
limitations for collaboration. Although this may be true on paper, it fails in execution. International companies fail to fill
orders because of numerous restrictions on trade and financial transactions with Iran.9 In fact, the mere specter of the risk associated
with trading with Iran encourages many potential suppliers to avoid transactions entirely. Banks have been fined millions of dollars
because of apparent (though subtle) violations of international law, disincentivizing the facilitation of the financial orders needed to
access foreign materials. Sometimes, even when a willing supplier is found, hospitals and research institutions cannot find an
appropriate way of paying for the products because there is no condoned channel for finances.8 Ghaznavi 15 Vaccine diplomacy
inherently suggests collaboration among researchers, the sharing of research samples and products, and joint development. How can
this ideal be achieved when even basic transactions are virtually impossible? U.S. Capacity for Vaccine Diplomacy Sanctions aside,
some question just how much the U.S. could contribute to Iranian vaccine diplomacy. Persian research has been doing pretty well on
its own, skeptics may suggest. If we modified sanction policy, would that not be enough, they might ask? The reality is that
cooperation is critical, and Iranian researchers agree. The importance of international cooperation with developed
nations such as the U.S. has been reiterated numerous times by key leaders in the Iranian drug
industry , especially with regards to vaccines . 37 These leaders also cite the need to address political tensions with the
U.S., often with references to sanctions. It is helpful to look at specific initiatives that Iran has attempted to tackle but could benefit
from U.S. engagement. Leishmania vaccines are a particularly good model given that Iran leads the Middle East in terms of the sheer
number of cases of zoonotic cutaneous leishmaniasis within its borders.24 As such, Persian researchers have dedicated significant
resources to trying to develop a successful leishmania vaccine, though current progress has been limited. However, efforts taken on by
the Razi Vaccine & Serum Research Institute to develop a leishmania vaccine would greatly improve with American help.23 Not
only do U.S. researchers have more experience dealing with some of the advanced vaccinology alluded
to earlier ,20 but they also have the equipment and materials that could bring their Persian counterparts
up-to-date in terms of research practices. For example, Iranian research scientists have cited the lack of an
adequate adjuvant as a main reason for the failure of leishmania vaccines insofar. The success of such
vaccines could be improved with higher quality immunostimulants and delivery vehicles .6 Just as it so
happens, the best adjuvants and immunostimulants are found in the Western world , though they cannot easily
make their way to Iran for political reasons.20 The future of recombinant leishmania vaccines may require reagents
that Iranian researchers have never had the opportunity to use, and these may unlock the secret to a vaccine
that would revolutionize Middle Eastern medicine. Moreover, Iranian leishmania researchers noted that if an adequate
adjuvant does not already exist, collaboration between pharmaceutical and immunological researchers would be the key to its
development.24 No matter how the issue is presented, the U.S. would have a lot to offer Iran in the field of
vaccines, and the benefits would be enormous . If a successful leishmania vaccine were spawned from U.S. – Iran
engagement, millions of impoverished individuals around the globe (including Iran) would be protected and good will from the
Iranian government would be likely to follow.36 Luckily, these fantasies of vaccine diplomacy are not out of reach and are in fact very
reasonable. The only obstacle remaining in the way of a potential U.S. – Iran scientific relationship is policy. POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS As alluded to earlier, science diplomacy with Iran already exists on a micro, non-governmental scale. The
following policy recommendations seek to increase the magnitude of scientific engagement, with an emphasis on government-to-
government interaction and policy measures. Short-Term Recommendations Likely, any initiative aimed at coordinating government
connections, crosstalk, and documentation would require the involvement of the U.S. State Department.22 Though there is not
necessarily any formal branch dedicated to this sort of endeavor, it would be appropriate if the seminal U.S. State Department Office
of Global Health Diplomacy spearheaded U.S. – Iran science diplomacy. Not only would global health be a major focus of
engagement (eg. cancer research), but also this office Ghaznavi 17 is equipped to build partnerships with foreign universities and
institutions, fostering international diplomacy and cooperative activities.21 It would also be ideal if this initiative were centralized in
one office for maximized coordinating power and efficacy. One of the first and perhaps easiest policies that should be enacted requires
a joint U.S. – Iran acknowledgement. U.S. scientists visiting Iran have been detained while Iranian scientists have been barred
entrance into America upon disembarking their plane.5,44 Such incidents have fostered a degree of mistrust, which though they may
have blown over today, must be addressed if science diplomacy is to expand and blossom under current leadership. A formal,
government-to-government agreement promising the security of visiting scientists would be a primary stepping stone in establishing a
future in unhindered scientific engagement.44 However, U.S. sanctions remain the most pivotal policy issue that need to be addressed
with regards to science diplomacy with Iran. Arguably, sanctions make or break the viability of a successful U.S. – Iran scientific
relationship. The myriad harms that sanctions bestow upon foreign science cooperation (aforementioned) cannot go overlooked. For
example, easing sanctions could create an outlet for the exchange of the scientific materials and technologies critical for biomedical
research.28 The adjuvants for a leishmania vaccine could finally be exported if appropriate immunostimulants already exist in
American storehouses. Luckily, the nuclear talks in Lausanne which will come to a conclusion by June’s end involve a significant deal
of sanctions relief in return for nuclear concessions on the Iranian side.10 Perhaps the nuclear deal will segue into more defined
scientific agreements in the future. If sanctions are not addressed or if agreements at Lausanne still do not manage to make the transfer
of scientifically-oriented materials and transactions feasible, some sort of channel must be created Ghaznavi 18 to facilitate these
exchanges. Selective bank authorization could provide a pathway for suppliers and Iranian research institutions to hold official and
cleared transactions without raising red flags.8 If sanctions were thoroughly addressed, two of the major, aforementioned limitations
of scientific engagement could also be fixed collaterally. First, travel restrictions could ease. Iranian scientists wanting to visit the U.S.
have to jump through a series of treacherous hoops to have a chance at obtaining a visa, which even still is slim.48 Navid Madani says
that this barrier to personal interaction must be fixed for adequate scientific engagement, otherwise the relationship would be rather
one-sided.34 Likely, an easing of U.S. sanctions may reduce the stigma associated with Iranian entrance into America and potentially
lead to easier visa-obtaining protocol. However, it is also possible that a separate policy need be created to specifically address travel
restrictions for Iranian scientists. Second, scientific journal embargoes of Iranian research would lose the justification of following
international law (as prescribed by sanctions) and instead become simply discriminatory. Persian studies have shown that
collaboration is critical to research quality and that the isolation of Iran scientifically should end.35 A particular emphasis has been
placed on publishing in English, though that has been hampered by journal bans on Persian research. Because journal administrations
have cited sanctions as a reason they want to preemptively ignore Iran for fear of legal repercussions, publishers like Reed Elsevier
and the American Chemical Society banned Iranian publication.12,42 However, if genuine scientific collaboration is to exist between
the U.S. and Iran, blatant discrimination should not be evident in the scientific sphere of knowledge dissemination. Navid Madani
suggests that the U.S. government address this problem, presumably via sanctions easing or an anti-discrimination policy for Persian
research.34 Indeed, it is ironic that such an anti-democratic, Ghaznavi 19 free speech-suppressing policy remain unquestioned when
often many refer to Iranian society as undemocratic.42 Long-Term Recommendations With regards to U.S. – Iran science diplomacy,
Glenn Schweitzer stated in 2010 that “…we could work step-by-step toward an S&T agreement like we have with 50 countries around
the world.”32 Though a Science & Technology Agreement would likely need to be preceded by a comprehensive nuclear deal, which
looks likely as of the Lausanne talks, it is a long-term ideal that the two governments should begin working towards. The precedent
already exists with Libya. Though it was considered to be a part of a so-called axis-of-evil (harkening to similar nicknames for Iran), a
bilateral S&T agreement was signed in 2008 for engagement on issues such as public health (another parallel with Iran). The
agreement was also taken as a symbol of reintegrating Libya into the international community,5 which would be quite beneficial for a
global pariah like Iran. Schweitzer outlines that a successful S&T agreement between the U.S. and Iran would entail a separate
agreement for each national organization (EPA, NSF, etc.) that would want to be a part of the deal (likely around a dozen
organizations). Each branch would be responsible for its own funding in conjunction with its Persian counterpart.44 He notes that the
best way to go about securing such an agreement would be to follow the China model. Nongovernmental engagement (currently
existent) would first need to be expanded, as it was with China in the 1970-1980s. Eventually, a political decision would be made to
transition the scientific relationship to a government-to-government level agreement, which would then require the drafting of
multiple agreements for each agency to be signed by all relevant parties.44 Though this goal looms far in the future and is surrounded
by a prioris, it is an ideal that any discussion regarding U.S. – Iran science diplomacy should strive for at its peak. If an S&T
agreement were successfully implemented, Ghaznavi 20 scientific collaboration will have successfully engendered tangible, large-
scale policy that brings the two nations closer together on multiple fronts. Funding Locating adequate sources of funding is perhaps
the most challenging part of ongoing scientific cooperation between the U.S. and Iran, let alone an expanded diplomacy initiative.34
Aside from wealthy donors invested in the cause, consistent funding is elusive. As noted earlier, the governments of both nations
would be responsible for funding the bulk of activities, representing a significant deal of public investment.44 However, if these funds
could be channeled towards publicprivate partnerships such as Product Development Partnerships (PDPs), scientific diplomacy could
get the most bang for its buck. PDPs offer a way of incentivizing high-powered American corporations (eg. Big Pharma) to participate
in risky scientific collaboration activities by removing financial risk on their end of the investment, instead just allowing them to do
what they do best: develop, test, and market products.33 Additionally, for efforts like vaccine development, different organizations
with different strengths could be recruited to tackle various aspects of product creation: vaccine development, processing, pilot
manufacturing, regulation management, and clinical testing.20,33 PDPs like Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi) have
established disease-specific platforms in order to build capacity in endemic areas,13 and the U.S. would be more than capable of
advancing similar efforts in Iran. In fact, the International Vaccine Institute (IVI) in Seoul (like many Asian organizations involved
with PDPs) has managed several PDPs and cooperates with 40 national signatories and the WHO, making PDPs a truly international
endeavor.33 The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is largely involved with PDPs as well and has shown a vested interest in
diplomatic science efforts where U.S. assistance is needed.11,33 Thus, PDPs offer a modern method of linking countries Ghaznavi 21
geopolitically in terms of science spending and would be particularly applicable to increased U.S. – Iran engagement. Other options
for funding include the Islamic Development Bank, of which Iran is a member.27 Their website (isdb.org) shows a significant interest
in science and technology funding, and they offer a wide range of scholarships for researchers in the area. Perhaps Iran’s membership
could be exploited for funding. Additionally, if sanctions relief were successful, the Iranian economy would improve dramatically
(both in terms of currency value and price adjustment), which would leave behind fresh funds for a scientific project with the U.S.1
Given Iran’s interest in boosting its scientific potential, it is not unreasonable to suggest that they would be willing to funnel
significant funding into science diplomacy, and consequently, a reintegration into the international scientific community.
CONCLUSION U.S. relations with Iran are in desperate need of revitalization. Hard power options have
been exhausted, so “softer” policies should be explored . Science diplomacy remains an overlooked
alternative that holds promise for bringing two nations together over common interests. Not only is Iran
willing and capable to participate in diplomatic science engagement, but it is also capable of high-level
science that could benefit from American collaboration . Vaccine research and development would be a
mutually beneficial avenue through which American and Persian researchers could tackle diseases found in
both nations, potentially saving millions of lives around the globe. The viability of science diplomacy stands out as a
diamond in the rough among other unpopular policies in this foreign policy arena , and should be
lauded for benefitting humanity while also reviving political ties between disgruntled states.

Unchecked relationship tensions create an escalatory spiral---rebuilding ties is key

Karim Sadjadpour 17, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment and an adjunct professor at Georgetown
University, 2-7-2017, "How America Could Stumble Into War With Iran," Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/iran-trump-nuclear-deal/515979/

In Donald Trump’s first term there is a serious possibility of a military conflict, whether intentional or
inadvertent, between the United States or Israel and Iran . What follows is how it could unfold, and how it might be avoided.
Step 1: Provocations “It is an undeniable privilege of every man,” wrote the acclaimed American diplomat and scholar George Kennan, “to prove himself
right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually
to be right.” Few world leaders embody this ethos more than Donald Trump and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. For Khamenei and
Iran’s hardliners, the United States has been continuously committed to the overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran since its very inception in 1979.
Everything from U.S. military bases in the Middle East to American celebrity culture is understood as a means to coerce and subvert the Islamic
Republic. President Obama’s efforts to allay this paranoia—including numerous personal entreaties to Khamenei—were largely dismissed. The
distrust is mutual. While the 2015 nuclear deal successfully curtailed Iran’s nuclear program, it did little
to moderate the country’s longstanding foreign and domestic policies. Internally, civil society arrests have
increased and there has been a “staggering surge” in executions. Externally Tehran has continued to arm and finance Syrian
dictator Bashar al-Assad, who by one estimate is implicated in the death of over 200,000 civilians (including 45,000 children and women), and the
displacement of over 13 million of his citizens. It has also significantly expanded its support for Shiite militias throughout the Middle East which unnerve
longtime U.S. allies in Israel and the Persian Gulf. Even after receiving $1.7 billion in its own frozen assets—at the same time it released U.S. citizens
from years in captivity—Iran has continued to take and hold more U.S. citizens hostage. My friend Siamak Namazi and his 80-year old father Baquer,
both outspoken advocates of engagement with Iran, have collectively spent nearly three years behind bars on evidence-free charges of espionage. Since
the deal was signed Tehran has violated UN Security Council resolutions (although not the nuclear deal) by reportedly testing at least 12 ballistic
missiles, several of which were capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and reaching Israel. Though Iran argues these tests are purely defensive, on at least
one occasion the missiles have carried the gratuitously provocative inscription that “Israel must be wiped off the face of the earth.” The U.S. Navy has
also recorded over 50 instances of "unsafe and/or unprofessional interactions" by Iran in the Persian Gulf, including the January 2016 capture of
American sailors. While the Obama administration sought to ignore and defuse such tensions with Iran, the
Trump administration appears
eager to confront them. As National Security Advisor General Michael Flynn simply put it, Iran is “ on notice .” Step 2: Sanctions
One of the fundamental disagreements about the nuclear agreement is whether it is permissible to further sanction Iran for non-nuclear behavior.
Washington—including both Democrats and Republicans—says yes, while Tehran believes any additional sanctions constitute a violation. In an August
2015 letter to President Hassan Rouhani, Ayatollah Khamenei warned that “Any imposition of sanctions at any level and under any pretext (including
repetitive and fabricated pretexts of terrorism and human rights) … will constitute a violation of the JCPOA and [Iran] would be obligated to take the
necessary action … and stop its activities committed under the JCPOA.” While the nuclear deal allowed for non-American companies and countries to
resume commercial relations with Iran, U.S. sanctions largely remained in place. In contrast to the Obama administration, however, which actively
encouraged global investment in Iran, the Trump administration has reversed course. Shortly after Flynn put Iran “on notice,” the Trump administration
crossed Khamenei’s ostensible red line by imposing additional sanctions against 25 individuals and entities connected to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards
(who oversee Iran’s military activities and regional policies). Additional reports suggest the Trump administration may designate the entirety of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards—the country’s most powerful political and economic institution—as a terrorist organization. While unilateral U.S.
sanctions will not be sufficient to moderate Iranian behavior, they are likely to trigger an Iranian response , and a process
of escalation. Step 3: Escalation The Obama administration was reluctant to vigorously counter Iran’s regional activities for fear of jeopardizing the
nuclear deal; the Trump administration has expressed no such concerns. Trump has routinely denounced the deal as a “disaster” and recently began to
taunt Tehran on Twitter. “Iran is playing with fire,” he tweeted, “they don't appreciate how ‘kind’ President Obama was to them. Not me!” Among the
few articulated foreign-policy priorities of the Trump administration thus far has been a reset of relations with America’s traditional Middle East allies,
namely Israel and Saudi Arabia. Embedded within this is a more confrontational approach toward Iran, which both Tel Aviv and Riyadh believe to be the
region’s greatest source of instability. Trump’s national-security brain-trust—including Defense Secretary James Mattis, Flynn, and several of Flynn’s
NSC deputies—share this assessment, and hold the Iranian Revolutionary Guards directly responsible for over a thousand U.S. military casualties in Iraq.
During the Obama administration they felt restrained, and now they’re eager to show they can and will respond. Iran has thrived in filling power vacuums
the U.S. military helped create. The opportunities for confrontation are multifold. The U.S. and Iran are on opposing
sides of numerous regional military and political disputes , including in Syria , Yemen , Lebanon ,
Israel-Palestine , Bahrain , and most recently Afghanistan , where Iran has been accused of becoming
“increasingly close” to the Taliban. Despite the U.S.’s overwhelming conventional military superiority over
Iran, however, today’s Middle East wars are increasingly unconventional fights involving nonstate actors in weak or
failing states where America has no strong allies, unclear interests, and no desire to be. Iran has thrived in filling power vacuums the
U.S. military helped create. While the 2003 Iraq war, for example, intended to spread Iraqi democracy to Iran, it instead spread Iranian
theocracy to Iraq. In contrast to the United States, and other democratic countries, the Iranian regime’s foreign-policy adventurism is far less constrained
by popular opinion. Countless billions of dollars spent and over a thousand casualties lost in Syria are simply explained away as “fighting terrorism.”
While previous U.S. administrations, especially that of George W Bush, tried to appeal to Iranian public opinion by distinguishing between the regime
and the people, the Trump administration has ignored such nuance. Trump’s Executive Order attempting to prevent Iranian visa and green-card holders—
although no Iranians have been implicated in terror-related deaths in the U.S. since at least 1975—antagonized one of the most pro-American populations
in the Middle East. Days after the Trump administration sanctioned Iran, an Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander warned that “ should the
enemy make a mistake, our roaring missiles will rain down on them .” Days later a hardline Iranian MP named Mojtaba
Zonour boasted that Tehran would respond to Washington’s “slightest aggression” by “razing to the ground” the
U.S. military base in Bahrain. And if the U.S. were to fire a missile at Tehran, he said, “ Only seven
minutes is needed for an Iranian missile to hit Tel Aviv .” After that Trump, not in reaction to Iran but in an attempt to
defend himself against charges of being a lackey for Russia, tweeted that Iran was “#1 in terror.” Over the last four decades the U.S. and
Iran have regularly engaged in rhetorical, maritime, aerial, and proxy battles. More recently this cold war has also moved
to cyberspace. Yet such brinksmanship, while at times close, has never deteriorated into a full-blown conflict.
Given the confluence of explosive issues and explosive personalities, however, this time may be
different . Step 4: Unraveling In Ernest Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises, a Scottish war veteran named Mike Campbell is asked how he went
bankrupt. “Two ways,” Mike said. “Gradually and then suddenly.” Similarly, a U.S.-Iran escalation could potentially build for years before the nuclear
deal collapses. Though politicians on both sides routinely denounce the nuclear deal, it remains unclear whether they would truly welcome the deal’s
collapse. Neither the U.S. nor Iran will want to be blamed for unilaterally tearing up the agreement and potentially triggering a global crisis. A more
likely scenario is one in which the deal gradually unravels, with each side blaming the other for its demise. Rather than race toward a nuclear weapon,
Tehran is more likely to reduce cooperation with international inspectors and resume its nuclear activities. Iran’s supreme leader signed the deal under
economic duress but never offered a strong endorsement of it, nor gave the impression he is firmly committed to the deal’s 10-year duration. On the
contrary Khamenei regularly complains about its unmet economic expectations, blaming the “devilish” United States for scaring away foreign business
while at the same time regularly denouncing foreign investment as a Trojan horse for Western imperialism. In a meeting with a group of Iranian poets he
suggested they write “to-the-point poetry ... expressing the Americans’ instances of treason in the issue of JCPOA” in order to sour popular views about
the deal. In an atmosphere of increased escalation, sanctions, and regional skirmishes, Iran’s hardliners will
find ample pretexts to make good on their threat of reexamining their nuclear commitments . But rather than
race toward a nuclear weapon, which would provoke a strong international reaction, Tehran is more likely to reduce cooperation with
international inspectors and resume its nuclear activities —under the pretext of a civilian energy program—in a way that will accentuate
fissures in the international coalition (known as the P5+1) that negotiated and enforces the nuclear deal. I asked my Carnegie colleague Mark Hibbs—a
renowned nuclear researcher—how, specifically, Tehran might go about this. “If Tehran aimed to divide the P5+1 and aggravate Israel and Western
countries,” Hibbs told me, “it might do things not expressly forbidden by the JCPOA but that would not be in the spirit of the accord. Iran's scientists
might do theoretical studies suggesting they are interested in nuclear weapons, enriching uranium with lasers, and plutonium metallurgy; Iran's diplomats
Tehran will likely move
might get suddenly tougher in negotiations with the IAEA over access to places inspectors want to visit.” In essence
deliberately enough to split the P5+1 coalition —the U.S., China, Russia, France, Germany, and the U.K.—between those who argue
Iran must be further penalized for violating the nuclear agreement (Washington) and those (Beijing, Moscow, and most of Europe) eager to preserve the
deal who argue more diplomacy, not pressure, is needed. Step 5: Disunity The JCPOA builds in dispute-resolution mechanisms in case either Iran or the
P5+1 countries feel the other side is in non-compliance. But any such mechanism is ineffectual when two parties are seemingly coveting an escalation.
And any U.S.-Iran escalation may break the unity of the U.S. and its partners. Given the chaos and carnage in today’s Middle East, most major countries
in the world (with the notable exception of the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia) see Iran as a stable regional power and a tactical ally against the more
nefarious threat of radical Sunni jihadists like ISIS. Russia is working in unison with Iran in Syria, Chinese-Iranian trade is booming, and Europe cannot
afford another unpredictable conflict that exacerbates regional unrest and creates more refugees. Despite Trump’s curious affinity for Vladimir Putin,
rather than side with Washington in a U.S.-Iran dispute it is more likely that Putin will simply continue to play the U.S. and Iran off each other:
supporting sanctions and pressure that make Iran more isolated and dependent on Moscow, while telling Tehran it has diluted Washington’s attempt to
meaningfully sanction and pressure them. The Obama administration’s greatest ally in isolating Tehran, ironically, was the previous Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose bombast and holocaust denial convinced many countries around the world that the problem was Tehran, not Washington.
In contrast, today much of the world perceives Iran to have a reasonable president in Hassan Rouhani—who is up for reelection in May 2017—and an
urbane Foreign Minister in Javad Zarif, while Trump is perceived as America’s Ahmadinejad. History has shown that Iran only responds to pressure
when it is encircled with a united international front. Unilateral U.S. pressure, however significant, is insufficient if Tehran feels it has escape doors in
Europe, Russia, and Asia. Step 6: Conflict A context in which Iran has resumed its nuclear activities and a divided P5+1 fails to meaningfully react
creates a dilemma for both the United States and Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu—who views Iran an “existential threat”—has a
lower threshold than the United States for taking military action against Iran. While the Obama administration restrained Netanyahu, Trump has thus far
indulged him. Though Netanyahu may not succeed in compelling Washington to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities—his first preference—he may
succeed in getting Trump’s greenlight, and the requisite military hardware, for Israel to take military
action . What is the likelihood that Trump himself would authorize military action against Iran’s nuclear sites or military assets? One of Trump’s core
beliefs, taught to him by his former lawyer Roy Cohn, is “When attacked, hit back harder.” While it remains to be seen how a philosophy born out of
New York City real estate quarrels can be applied to complicated geopolitical disputes, throughout his campaign and his first weeks in office Trump’s
decision making has been marked by impulsiveness more than restraint. How will he react if Iran continues to defy him despite his repeated taunts and
tweets? Trump’s confrontational style is coupled with a core national-security team that is universally cynical
about Iran. Flynn, Vice President Mike Pence, CIA Director Mike Pompeo, and Elliott Abrams—whom Trump was reportedly, until recently,
considering for deputy secretary of state—were all outspoken opponents of the nuclear deal. Last fall Abrams advocated “sinking an Iranian ship” to
show resolve. While Mattis has not recommended scrapping the nuclear deal, he has called Iran “the single most enduring threat to stability and peace in
the Middle East.” In addition to concerns that Trump’s social-media outbursts may cause an inadvertent conflict, serious observers also worry that Trump
could use either a terrorist attack or an external conflict—preferably with a longstanding Islamist adversary—to expand his power. Trump’s strategic
advisor Steve Bannon said in November 2015 that Islam was “the most radical” religion in the world and “we’re clearly going into … a major
shooting war in the Middle East again.” To those looking for “shooting wars” in the Middle East, Iran provides an unparalleled
opportunity. On numerous occasions over the past two years the U.S. Navy has fired warning shots against Iranian Revolutionary Guard patrol boats in
the Persian Gulf and interdicted shipments of weapons bound for Yemen’s Houthis, whose recent attack on a Saudi ship was allegedly intended for the
United States. In essence the opportunities for conflict with Iran are numerous and interrelated: An
unraveling of the nuclear deal could
trigger a regional war, or a regional war could trigger an unraveling of the nuclear deal. Step 7: Repercussions In
one of his final interviews before dying at age 101, Kennan reflected that "Anyone who has ever studied the history of American diplomacy, especially
military diplomacy, knows that you might start in a war with certain things on your mind as a purpose of what you are doing, but in the end you found
yourself fighting for entirely different things that you had never thought of before. War has a momentum of its own, and it carries you away from all
thoughtful intentions when you get into it. … War seldom ever leads to good results." The chain-reaction of even
“targeted” military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be unpredictable, enormous, and long-
lasting . Hundreds of articles have been written over the last decade assessing its potential impact. Among its many retaliatory options
Iran has the power to either attack, or potentially activate sleeper cells in, the oil-rich, predominantly
Shia eastern province of Saudi Arabia , sending energy prices skyrocketing . Iran may also feel
unrestrained attacking U.S. forces in the region, (mis)calculating that Trump is unlikely to respond given
the American public’s fatigue with wars in the Middle East. In addition to potentially triggering a global
economic crisis and pouring gasoline on a region already in flames , military action against Iran would
likely further entrench the most hardline elements of the Iranian Revolutionary G uards for years to come,
revitalize their moribund revolutionary ideology, and compel them to pursue deterrent nuclear weapons
in earnest . That possibility could turn what began as targeted, limited strikes into a full-blown regional war .
What is to be done? The last four decades of U.S. policy toward Iran shows Washington’s limited ability to change the nature or behavior of the Iranian
regime. The George W. Bush administration tried harder than any U.S. administration to intimidate Iran militarily and support Iranian democracy
activists, yet during his time in office Iran relentlessly attacked U.S. forces in Iraq and the country’s reform movement withered. The Obama
administration tried harder than any U.S. administration to improve relations with Tehran, including numerous letters Obama wrote to Ayatollah
Khamenei, yet Iran’s hostility toward the United States and its longtime regional policies remained unchanged. Among the important lessons of the 2015
nuclear deal is that two policies often thought of as opposites—coercion and engagement—are in fact complementary. In private conversation Obama’s
senior aides note he was eager to seriously negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran from the very beginning of his presidency, but it was not until Tehran was
faced with a global economic embargo that it began to seriously engage. In the aftermath of the nuclear deal, the Obama administration only employed
one aspect of this formula—engagement—to try to compel Iran to reconsider its longtime regional policies. In contrast to the enormous costs Tehran
endured for its nuclear intransigence, it has paid little penalty for being the chief accomplice to a Syrian regime responsible for one of the greatest
humanitarian crises in modern history. While the Trump administration seeks to counter Iran’s regional policies, its strategy is missing two
essential ingredients: multilateralism and U.S. engagement . Nearly all Iranian economic trade is with countries other than the United States. For
pressure to work it is essential that Washington closely coordinate with Iran’s largest economic and strategic partners, namely China, Russia, Europe,
India, and South Korea. Trump’s derisiveness toward U.S. allies and denunciations of a nuclear deal most of the world deems necessary for global
stability will make it difficult to compel these countries to forsake their own commercial and strategic interests with Iran to please Washington.
 Iran Impact---Overview

Iran war inevitable otherwise---escalates

John Scales Avery 13, Associate Professor, University of Copenhagen, 11/6/2013, “An Attack On Iran
Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War,” http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm
Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure
groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear
war, with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal
disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an
attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East , entirely destabilizing a region
that is already deep in problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary
Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the
conflict . Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since
much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach
unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy . In the dangerous situation that could
potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or
by accident or miscalculation . Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world
uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global
agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus,
nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the
biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the
peoples of the world, US citizens included.
 Iran Impact---I/L
Vaccine diplomacy is key to spur Iranian cooperation and avert conflict
Peter J. Hotez 11, M.D., Ph.D., Director and former president of the Sabin Vaccine Institute, Executive
Director of the Global Network for Neglected Tropical Disease Control, dean of the National School of
Tropical Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine, fellow in disease and poverty at the James A. Baker III
Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, former Professor and Chair, Department of Microbiology,
Immunology, & Tropical Medicine, George Washington University, Editor-in-Chief, PLoS Neglected
Tropical Diseases, “Engaging Iran Through Vaccine Diplomacy,” Pacific Standard, 11-30-2011,
http://www.psmag.com/science/engaging-iran-through-vaccine-diplomacy-38029/

An American researcher argues that sciencediplomacy regarding n eglected t ropical diseases could cool
tensions between Iran and the U.S. ¶ To counter Iran’s emerging nuclear threat, we might look back to a little-
known but highly effective Cold War collaboration between the U.S. and Soviet Union that defused international tensions and led to
one of the world’s greatest humanitarian discoveries.¶ Today, we are on the verge of achieving the global eradication of polio. Most of
this success can be attributed to the development of a safe and effective live oral polio vaccine, a discovery that first began during the
1950s in the Cincinnati laboratory of Dr. Albert Sabin. Few are aware, however, that Sabin’s initial discovery led to the full
development of an actual polio vaccine only through a joint collaboration with Soviet virologists from 1956-1960.¶ In the years
immediately following the Sputnik launch and the first successful detonation of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, arguably at the height of
the Cold War, Sabin and a small group of Soviet virologists received back-channel diplomatic permission from their respective
governments to collaborate on the successful development, manufacture, and large-scale clinical testing of the oral polio vaccine.
Ultimately millions of Soviet children became the first vaccine recipients. The vaccine was deemed safe and effective so that these
landmark studies first conducted in the U.S.S.R. led to the licensure, widespread acceptance, and ultimately the global use of the
vaccine that has led us to the eradication of polio.¶ The
example of two nations putting aside their ideologies for the
monumental purpose of producing a lifesaving vaccine has potential relevance to the current situation in
Iran. Today, the poorest people in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East suffer from high rates of a number
of devastating neglected tropical diseases, including leishmaniasis and brucellosis, worm infections such as echinococcosis
and fascioliasis, and viral infections such as Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever and Rift Valley fever. Indeed almost all of the 60
million to 70 million people who live in poverty in the Middle East and North Africa region suffer from one or more of these. Such
infections can affect not only the health of Middle Eastern nations, but they also trap people in poverty
through their impact on child intellectual and physical development, pregnancy outcome, and agricultural worker productivity. ¶ Iran,
through its Razi Vaccine & Serum Research Institute (click here for the institute’s website in Farsi) together with some of the
leading research institutes and medical universities with Tehran have reported on nascent efforts to develop
vaccines for leishmaniasis and other neglected tropical diseases, but success on this front would be enormously
accelerated with the added expertise of U.S. vaccine scientists and developers . While it could lead to a new
generation of interventions to combat neglected tropical diseases in the region, any scientific collaboration between U.S. and Iranian
vaccinologists is all but impossible in the current political environment. ¶ Vaccines for neglected tropical diseases have little
commercial interest because they disproportionately affect people living in poverty. I have referred to such products as “antipoverty
vaccines” because of their potential for improving economic development as well as human health. Currently, anti-poverty vaccines
are being developed mostly through just a few U.S.-based nonprofit product development partnerships, including our own with the
Texas Children’s Hospital Center for Vaccine Development, which use industry practices to produce anti-poverty vaccines with a goal
of improving global public health rather than reaping profits.¶ Linking
Iranian and American vaccine developers and
having them partner to develop anti-poverty vaccines could help to shape an effective blueprint for
beginning a scientific dialogue with the Iranians. Ultimately, it could lead to lifesaving interventions that
would benefit tens of millions of people throughout the Middle East and the rest of the world .¶ The U.S.
Department of State and its Iranian counterpart should consider the opportunities created through such “scientific diplomacy.”¶ Earlier
this year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called on better integration of “civilian power” in our U.S. foreign policy. Vaccine
diplomacy represents a potential use of civilian power and a perhaps timely intervention for the Obama
administration when tensions are at their highest. It would be worth recalling the similar complexities faced by the
Eisenhower administration more than 50 years ago — and vaccine diplomacy’s positive role.

Science-based diplomacy is key

David P Hajjar 16, Former Brookings Expert, 6-27-2016, "Want to ease tensions in the Middle East?
Science diplomacy can help," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/06/27/want-to-
ease-tensions-in-the-middle-east-science-diplomacy-can-help/
In the Middle East, governments and non-state actors alike have tried all forms of diplomacy to solve the challenges they face, with
mixed results: shuttle diplomacy by the United States between the Israelis and Palestinians worked for a time, great-power diplomacy
over the Syrian civil war largely hasn’t, and direct negotiations with unsavory groups like the Taliban have moved in fits and starts.
But progress can come from unlikely sources, and science diplomacy—whereby experts collaborate scientifically to address common
problems and build constructive international partnerships—has more potential than is often recognized. Science diplomacy can
of course helpcountries solve on-the-ground challenges and improve standards of living for their citizens.
But it can also lay groundwork for improving relations in a region often defined by tension (if not outright
conflict) through functional, scientific cooperation that is less politicized. Efforts in science and technology, on the one hand, and
diplomacy on the other, can achieve more if they are thoughtfully merged—rather than siloed. Science diplomacy, therefore, can
contribute to peace- and security-building in the Middle East (and with the United States) in unique ways. SCIENCE AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE Across the world, science diplomacy has helped set the stage for advancing foreign policy and global governance
goals. The 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 illuminated how negotiating over and collaborating
on science and technology issues can be an important gateway to achieving significant foreign policy
goals . Direct (and often very technical) diplomacy between U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and the
head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, was key to achieving the framework
agreement , as was collaboration between Iranian and Western nuclear scientists more broadly .
Provided that the agreement is thoroughly enforced, it’s a major victory for global nuclear nonproliferation
efforts—and much credit goes to effective science diplomacy.
 Iran Impact---AT: No Escalation
It would escalate to a world war
TOI 16, 12-12-2016, "Iran: If US imposes war, Israel, Gulf states will be destroyed,"
https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-if-war-imposed-on-us-israel-gulf-states-will-be-destroyed/

The election of Donald Trump has led to unease in the Middle East over threats to peace in the region and
any war would lead to the destruction of Israel and the Gulf states , Iran’s Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan
warned Sunday. His remarks came as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said earlier Sunday that he would work with Trump
to dismantle the nuclear agreement with Iran, signed last year over Israel’s fierce criticism of the pact. Trump said during the
campaign he would tear up the nuclear deal, calling it a “disastrous” and one of the worst agreements in history and has vowed to take
a harder line with Tehran. This has led to concern among the Iranians and in the wider region, Dehghan indicated. “Even though a
businessman, the assistants that … (Trump) has chosen may map a different path for him, and this has led to unease, particularly
among Persian Gulf countries,” Dehghan said at a security conference in Tehran, according to the semi-official Mehr news agency.
“Considering Trump’s character and that he measures the cost of everything in dollars, it does not seem likely that he would take
strong action against our country,” he said, but “ enemies
may want to impose a war on us based on false calculations
and only taking into consideration their material capabilities .” “Such a war would mean the destruction
of the Zionist regime ( Israel ) … and will engulf the whole region and could lead to a world war ,” Mehr quoted
Dehghan as saying. Iran has long backed armed groups committed to Israel’s destruction and its leaders have
called for it to be wiped off the map. Israel fears that Iran’s nuclear program is designed to threaten its
existence. “Among other consequences of the war,” Dehgan added, “would be the destruction of the city-
states on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf, because they lack popular support,” in reference to small
Western-allied Gulf states such as the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar .
 Iran Impact---AT: No War
War is likely because of waterway miscalculation---conventional victory can’t end it
Sharmine Narwani 17, Sharmine Narwani is a commentator and analyst of Mideast geopolitics, based in
Beirut., 3-15-2017, "The Dangerous Reality of an Iran War," American Conservative,
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-dangerous-reality-of-an-iran-war/

Here in
the Middle East, however, where every peep and creak out of Washington is scrutinized to death , interested
Trump’s foreign-policy course remains
parties haven’t stopped speculating about a U.S. confrontation with Iran. Fifty days into his term,
an enigma . He swears “all options” remain on the table with Iran—but do they? There are already some early actions that hint
at Trump’s policy directions—and limitations—in the Middle East. In three key military theaters where U.S. forces are currently engaged,
some important corners have been turned: In northern Syria, America’s Kurdish allies just voluntarily relinquished territory to the Syrian army and
Russian forces in order to avoid a direct confrontation with another U.S. ally and NATO member, Turkey. Washington has rejected a Turkish role in the
liberation of Raqqa, knowing that Ankara will not tolerate the ISIS capital falling into Kurdish hands either. It’s becoming increasingly likely that the
winning formula will see the city and its environs ceded to an authority friendly to the Syrian government, under a Russian umbrella. In northern Iraq, the
fight to regain Mosul has accelerated, with Iraqi forces liberating half of western Mosul in just twenty days. Under command of the central Baghdad
government, these fighters consist heavily of Shia militias, many of whom have received training and equipment from Iranian forces. In Yemen, where
alarming western headlines warn of U.S. military blunders and overkill, the media is missing a bigger story. The U.S. bombing blitz is actually—not
hypothetically, as once was the case—hitting Al Qaeda terrorists, working alongside UAE forces to target Islamist militias who everybody knows are de
facto Saudi allies on the ground. Just last week, the UAE reportedly upped the ante by demanding the Saudis abandon their puppet president Abdrabbuh
Mansour Hadi—ostensibly the “legitimate” Yemeni authority the western-backed Saudi coalition was fighting to reinstate. In a few short weeks, Trump
has taken an axe to Obama-style dawdling in Mideast hotspots—whether by taking direct action or by no longer impeding the actions of others. What’s
notable is that all of these developments, at face value, serve Iran’s interests in the region and undermine those of U.S. allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
is merely Trump’s opening salvo . He has larger, unknown ambitions, and these recent
But don’t be fooled. This
moves do not necessarily remove Iran from his sights. The Islamic Republic, its allies, and its detractors
will remain part of Trump’s larger geopolitical game . He can use them to engage or punish more vital targets like Russia and
China, two major powers that have carved out strategic relationships with Tehran. Iran will also be a useful tool to provoke or cajole traditional U.S.
several threatening U.S. stances
allies like Israel, Turkey, and various Arab monarchies into taking positions favored by Trump. Already,
have been employed—their ultimate aims unknown—with Iran at their center. There are whispers of a
Saudi-led “Arab NATO” that could partner with Israel to target Iran . And calls for Damascus and
Moscow to eject Iran from Syria are being heard from various western and western-allied Mideast capitals.
The Waterways: An “Accidental” Confrontation Despite the Iran-as-bogeyman narrative, it is unlikely that Trump will
launch any direct military attacks against Iran. This is a president who has voiced contempt for the $6 trillion wasted on Mideast wars
and interventions. More confrontation in the region will be costly, and is likely to draw him into clashes with major powers with which he’d prefer to do
business. Although he insists “all options” remain on the table with Iran, Trump’s
choices are actually fairly limited. Sanctions
never worked and the Iran nuclear deal has ensured that other global players needn’t participate in future ones. Under pressure from
allies, he has backtracked on his threats to scuttle the nuclear agreement, which he now seems to
understand would needlessly isolate the U.S., not Iran. Subversive activities—such as color revolution
plots, propaganda, or cyberwarfare—have proven futile given Iran’s historic vigilance on and within its borders.
Conventional war would require a substantial Iranian provocation and isn’t likely to be sanctioned by the
UN Security Council. But there is one theater in which a U.S.-Iran confrontation could easily spark: the
various waterways around the Islamic Republic and its neighborhood. Both countries have plenty of
naval and shipping vessels in close daily proximity to each other. Tensions are high, rhetoric remains
inflamed, and Iran’s foes in the Persian Gulf and Washington are in a great position to trigger an
event, then fan its flames. Defense Secretary James Mattis, a committed Iran hawk, almost did so several weeks ago
when he considered letting U.S. forces board an Iranian ship in Arabian Sea international waters, according
to a passing mention of the incident in the New York Times. But the Intercept understood the import of the
close encounter and led with the headline: “Trump’s ‘moderate’ defense secretary has already brought us to
the brink of war .” War is indeed a distinct possibility if the U.S. makes an aggressive move. Iran is no
banana republic . It has endured an eight-year war with Iraq, which was encouraged, financed, and armed by great powers and regional states
alike. The Islamic Republic performed a remarkable claw-back from the assault and went on to amass conventional and asymmetrical capabilities to deter
future attacks. So when Trump saw fit to slap sanctions on Iran after a January 29 ballistic missile test, Iranians made sure to fire off more, just a day after
sanctions were announced. And the Iranian responses keep coming, a reminder that any military confrontation with Iran will be highly unpredictable. The
Islamic Republic makes sure to remind us of its overt and hidden capabilities through regular public missile tests, advanced air defense demonstrations
and war game exercises, such as the just-concluded Velayat 95 drills in the Strait of Hormuz, Sea of Oman, and Indian Ocean. As tensions between the
U.S. and Iran have increased, so have the number of gulfs, straits, seas and oceans in which the two nations’ navies and commercial vessels now operate.
The Pentagon insists its naval presence in so many far-flung west Asian waterways is vital to thwart terrorism and piracy. But this is Iran’s backyard, and
the Islamic Republic needs little justification to police regional waterways against these very same kinds of threats—and to protect its own territorial and
maritime borders. During a November visit to Tehran, I asked Dr. Sadollah Zarei, director of the think tank the Andisheh Sazan Noor Institute and a
MENA expert close to the IRGC, about this. “U.S. actions give us a behavior precedent in our naval reach,” he said. The U.S. naval presence in Iran’s
neighboring waters “gives us even more right to be active in the Persian Gulf, in the Gulf of Aden, and other waters.” As a result, Zarei explained, “we
are now in the Gulf of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.” Is Zarei worried about an adversary state brandishing its vast military firepower within spitting
the U.S. is there, Iran’s focus and discipline is better . They’re useful
distance? He cracks a smile and explains calmly: “ When
Washington
that way. It brings us together, creates support for our security forces, our army, our borders.” On the other side of the fence,
continues to feed this Iranian discipline and cohesion by elevating recent “incidents” in the waterways—mostly
unrelated to Iran—into national media hysterics about Iran. Investigative reporter Gareth Porter has worked to untangle fact
from fiction over U.S. accusations that Iran is shipping arms to Yemen’s Houthi rebels through some of these waterways. In short, Porter has shown that
most of the Pentagon’s claims appear to be demonstrably false. And because of Wikileaks’ 2010 State Department cables cache, we now know that—in
private at least—U.S. officials are also skeptical of their own public charges. The Unpredictability of a Waterways War In January 2016, two U.S. navy
command boats entered Iranian territorial waters—it’s unclear if knowingly or unwittingly—and were apprehended by Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
Americans watched as Iranian television broadcasted the capture of 10 U.S. navy sailors on bended knees, hands behind their heads. The Islamic
Republic followed maritime regulations and international law in their actions, and released the officers shortly thereafter. But the incident brought home,
Pentagon has run war games
in technicolor, the unpredictability of waterways operations against this wily U.S. adversary. For decades, the
against Iran to test its assumptions and hone its responses. But an acquaintance who has participated in such CENTCOM
exercises told me last year that “ the U.S. military rarely beats Iran in asymmetrical war games unless it cheats

or rigs it .” Shocked, I was prompted to dig deeper and discovered the “Millennium Challenge,” a 2002 U.S. armed forces war game in the Persian
Gulf between the U.S. (blue team) and an unnamed Mideast adversary (red team), believed to be Iran. According to retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Paul
Van Riper, who led the Red’s asymmetrical response—and resigned because rules were changed mid-play to constrict his team’s maneuvers—Reds
bypassed Blue’s sophisticated electronic surveillance system using motorcycle messengers sent to the frontline and World War II-style signaling
methods, and then destroyed 16 U.S. warships and a significant chunk of its naval fleet—all on the second day of the three-week exercise. In an article
entitled “War Games Rigged?” published on the Navy, Marine and Army Times websites (which appears to have been removed and is reposted here),
Van Riper slammed the $250 million war game: “It was in actuality an exercise that was almost entirely scripted to ensure a Blue ‘win.’” Van Riper
explains: “We were directed… to move air defenses so that the army and marine units could successfully land. We were simply directed to turn [air
defense systems] off or move them… So it was scripted to be whatever the control group wanted it to be.” Rather than learning from the exercise, the
U.S. military seemed more interested in confirming existing doctrine and maintaining the facade of invincibility. These are dangerous attitudes that, in
real-life combat scenarios, can lead commanders to misjudge capabilities and make foolhardy advances. And Iran knows this well. The Cost of Primacy
Why are U.S. armed forces in the Persian Gulf anyway? Princeton University’s Roger Stern calculates that between 1976 and 2010, Washington has
spent an eye-popping $8 trillion protecting the oil flow in the Persian Gulf. As of 2010, the U.S. only received 10 percent of those oil shipments. The
largest recipients were Japan (20 percent), followed by China, India, and South Korea. Trump should take note: if access to oil was the real goal of U.S.
presence in the Gulf, Washington could have achieved it at a fraction of the cost by building pipelines to bypass that waterway. Instead, mission creep has
overtaken U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf, establishing a policy trajectory few American presidents have dared to challenge. Of the eight littoral states of
the Persian Gulf, Iran has the longest coast on the waterway, almost double the length of its other seven neighbors combined. As Washington
hawks continue to insist that Iran cannot be allowed to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Persian Gulf, they should first ponder the potential
consequences of another avoidable war—before a catastrophe humbles them into silence.
Stem Cell Adv
BioD
 BioD – Stem Cells Key

iPSCs along with developing reproductive tech solves endangered species extinction
Ben-Nun et al 11 (Inbar Friedrich Ben-Nun [Postdoctoral Fellow at the Loring Lab, a center for Regenerative Medicine] Susanne
C Montague, Marlys L Houck, Ha T. Tran, Ibon Garitaonandia, Trevor R Leonardo, Yu-Chieh Wang, Suellen J Charter, Louise C
Laurent, Oliver A Ryder & Jeanne F Loring [Loring Lab Team] “Induced pluripotent stem cells from highly endangered species”
Published in Nature Methods Volume 8 Issue 10, October 2011, pg. 831 / WY-TH)

Because they are self-renewing and pluripotent, iPSCs from endangered species have several possible
applications 9 . The iPSCs we produced are potentially useful for developing therapeutic applications for captive
animals that suffer from diabetes and other degenerative diseases. For nearly extinct species such as the
northern white rhinoceros, iPSCs might be a means to rescue the species from extinction:
preserving the genomes of individual animals as pluripotent stem cells opens the possibil - ity of
producing iPSC-derived germ cells, which could be used in conjunction with assisted reproduction efforts
to increase the size and diversity of the population. Generation of germ cells from pluripotent stem cells is an active area of
research 10,11 and progress reported in the development of assisted reproductive technologies for related Old World
monkeys 12–15 and rhinoc - eros 16 indicates that advanced reproductive technologies may be available for these rare

species in the future. Substantial chal- lenges remain, and dedicated efforts will be
necessary to integrate reprogramming technology into the aggressive concerted efforts to
conserve endangered species, but our success in generating iPSCs offers hope that these cells may be a
means to help rescue species on the verge of extinction

Iran has matched the global pace of iPSC development but needs experimental equipment and help
to conduct larger trials
Mobini et al 15 (Sahba Mobini [PhD in Biomedical engineering] Manijeh Khanmohammadi, Hamed Heidari-Vala, Ali
Samadikuchaksaraei, Ali Moshiri, and Somaieh Kazemnejad “Tissue Engineering and Regenerative Medicine in Iran: Current State of
Research and Future Outlook” Published in Molecular Biotechnology Volume 57 Issue 7, July 2015, pg. 590 / WY-TH)

The penetration of regenerative medicine field using cell therapy to clinical phase was earlier than that of tissue engineering field. Contrary with the
previously mentioned companies that begun their activities since onset of 2000, bone marrow transplantation for treatment of thalasseamia, anemia, and
leukemia was started in 1991 at Shariati Hospital. Indeed, Iran
has had a significant contribution in stem cell research
since 1998 [2]. Thereafter, a human embryonic stem cell line was established in 2004 in Iran, approximately 6
years after the first report of isolation and growth of embryonic stem cells (ESCs) line in the USA [11]. After that,
research on regenerative medicine using ESCs, mesenchymal, and hematopoietic stem cells traveled a steadily path until 2009. With
establishment of Iranian Council of Stem Cell Research and Technology Development (ICSRTD) in
2009 and its financial support, researches on regenerative medicine indicated faster acceleration. In 2010, Iranian Blood
Transfusion Organization established Cord Blood Bank by a communication with the international cord blood networks [2]. In 2011, presentation of a
protocol for long-term propagation of spermatogonial stem cells in 2011 by Avicenna Research Institute holds promise to restore fertility ability of
infertile men [12, 13]. Furthermore, in line with the globally breakthroughs in stem cell research, human-
induced pluripotent stem cell (iPSC) lines have been established since 2008 with an annually
improvement in iPSC production technology [14]. At present, Royan Institute is Iran’s leading stem
cell research center that established in 1991 and approved by the Iranian Ministry of Health in 1998. The institute has been the main forum presenting
stem cell therapy activities for skin and cartilage disorders during recent years [15]. Regarding ethical concern on the clinical use of human ESCs, the
majority of clinical efforts have accomplished using mesenchymal and hematopoietic stem cells. Moreover, many attempts launched from 2007 have
been made to translate in vitro experimental efforts into clinical strategies for stem cell therapy of different diseases. Nowadays, the results of some
clinical trials on stem cell therapy of myocardial infarction [16], decompensated cirrhosis [17, 18], vitiligo [19], and osteoarthritis [20] promise the
feasibility of stem cell-based therapy of human diseases in the future. However, to
fully establish the long-term safety profile of
stem cell therapies in clinical phase, it is required to conduct larger and more standardized protocols
for clinical trials.
 BioD Impact – Turns Econ

Loss of biodiversity guarantees collapse of the economy – our evidence is conclusive

IUCN 2k9 (International Union for Conservation of Nature, “wildlife crisis worse than economic crisis,”
7/2/2009, http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/species/?3460/Wildlife-crisis-worse-than-
economic-crisis--IUCN)

Thereport analyses 44,838 species on the IUCN Red List and presents results by groups of species,
geographical regions, and different habitats, such as marine, freshwater and terrestrial. It shows 869 species are
Extinct or Extinct the Wild and this figure rises to 1,159 if the 290 Critically Endangered species tagged as Possibly Extinct are
included. Overall, a minimum of 16,928 species are threatened with extinction. Considering that only 2.7
percent of the 1.8 million described species have been analyzed, this number is a gross underestimate, but it
does provide a useful snapshot of what is happening to all forms of life on Earth. An increased number of
freshwater species have now been assessed, giving a better picture of the dire situation they face. In Europe,
for example, 38 percent of all fishes are threatened and 28 percent in Eastern Africa. The high degree of connectivity in freshwater
systems, allowing pollution or invasive species to spread rapidly, and the development of water resources with scant regard for the
species that live in them, are behind the high level of threat. In the oceans, the picture is similarly bleak. The report
shows that a broad range of marine species are experiencing potentially irreversible loss due to over-fishing,
climate change, invasive species, coastal development and pollution. At least 17 percent of the 1,045 shark and ray species, 12.4
percent of groupers and six of the seven marine turtle species are threatened with extinction. Most noticeably, 27 percent of the 845
species of reef building corals are threatened, 20 percent are Near Threatened and there is not enough data for 17 percent to be
assessed. Marine birds are much more threatened that terrestrial ones with 27.5 percent in danger of extinction, compared with 11.8
percent of terrestrial birds. “Think of fisheries without fishes, logging without trees, tourism without coral reefs
or other wildlife, crops without pollinators,” says Vié.“ Imagine the damage to our economies and societies
if they were lost. All the plants and animals that make up Earth’s amazing wildlife have a specific role
and contribute to essentials like food, medicine, oxygen, pure water, crop pollination, carbon storage and
soil fertilization. Economies are utterly dependent on species diversity. We need them all, in large
numbers. We quite literally cannot afford to lose them.” The report shows nearly one third of amphibians, more
than one in eight birds and nearly a quarter of mammals are threatened with extinction. For some plant groups, such as conifers and
cycads, the situation is even more serious, with 28 percent and 52 percent threatened respectively. For all these groups, habitat
destruction, through agriculture, logging and development, is the main threat and occurs worldwide. In the case of amphibians, the
fungal disease chytridiomycosis is seriously affecting an increasing number of species, complicating conservation efforts. For birds,
the highest number of threatened species is found in Brazil and Indonesia, but the highest proportion of threatened or extinct birds is
found on oceanic islands. Invasive species and hunting are the main threats. For mammals, unsustainable hunting is the greatest threat
after habitat loss. This is having a major impact in Asia, where deforestation is also occurring at a very rapid rate. "The report
makes for depressing reading,” says Craig Hilton Taylor, Manager of the IUCN Red List Unit and co-
editor. “It tells us that the extinction crisis is as bad, or even worse, than we believed. But it also shows the
trends these species are following and is therefore an essential part of decision-making processes. In the run-
up to 2010, the global community should use this report wisely to address the situation.” Climate change is not currently
the main threat to wildlife, but this may soon change, according to the report. After examining the biological characteristics of
17,000 species of birds, amphibians and reef building corals, the report found that a significant proportion of species that are currently
not threatened with extinction are susceptible to climate change. This includes 30 percent of non-threatened birds, 51 percent of non-
threatened corals and 41 percent of non-threatened amphibians, which all have traits that make them susceptible to climate change.
Red List Indices make it possible to track trends of extinction risk in groups of species. New indices have been calculated and provide
some interesting results. Birds, mammals, amphibians and corals all show a continuing deterioration, with a
particularly rapid decline for corals. Red List Indices have also been calculated for amphibian, mammal and bird species used
for food and medicine. The results show that bird and mammal species used for food and medicine are much
more threatened. The diminishing availability of these resources has an impact on the health and well-being
of the people who depend on them directly.
 BioD Impact – A2 Defense
Every loss reduces ecosystem complimentarity
Newman et al. 11 (Jonathan Newman, School of environmental sciences, University of Guelph. Madhuar
Ananad, Hugh Henry, Shelly Hunt, Ze’ev Gedalof, “Climate Change Biology” pg 77-79)

Ecosystems provide many services to us, from the tangible, like primary production ( the basis of the food we
ea t), to the intangible and aesthetic (e.g. the enjoyment of wilderness). It is generally thought that loss of biodiversity
leads to reduced ecosystem functioning and stability , and to fewer or less available 'ecological goods'
such as food, fuel, fiber and medicines (Mooney et al., 2009). Figure 12.1 schematically depicts the relationships between
human well-being, ecosystem services and biodiverse (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). From Fig. 12.1 we can see that
climate change is but one of several factors that can alter biodiversity. Change in biodiversity in turn can alter the various
ways in which ecosystems function.

Why might biodiversity affect ecosystem functioning? Biodiversity is thought to increase

ecosystem functioning via at
least two different mechanisms. Since species, generally speaking, do different things (e.g. they use different resources),
the more species present the more things get done (e.g. the more thoroughly the resources get used) and so the
greater the provision of services within the system. This mechanism is referred to as 'niche
complementarity' . The other mechanism is that species may differ in the magnitude of their effect on
ecosystem functioning . on example, consider NPP (Chapters 7, 9 and 10). Some species will be highly productive, others not
so much. With higher biodiversity in a system we increase the chance of including one or more of these
'high- functioning' species, just by chance alone. This is called the 'selection mechanism' (also called the
'sampling effect'). So reductions in biodiversity could decrease the degree of niche complementarity
and/or the likelihood of a high-functioning species being present (see e.g. Bell et al., 2005; Fig. 12.2). Greater
biodiversity might also lead to greater ecosystem stability because the more species there are, the greater
the likelihood that a few will be resistant or be able to adapt to climate change or other stressors
(Loreau et al., 2001). This is called the 'insurance effect'. In addition, even if biodiversity per se is not important
to ecosystem functioning because, for example, functioning depends mainly on the particular species present
and not their diversity, another argument for preserving biodiversity is that we do not know which
species will be critical to functioning and/or stability . The relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem
functioning is not yet fully understood, nor is the relevance of much of this research to conservation entirely clear (Srivastava and
Vellend, 2005 Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that biodiversity will change as a result of climatic change, even if the relevance of
that change for eco- system functioning is still a subject of much research (see e.g. Hooper et al., 2005).

It’s not resilient---uncertainty means every loss dilutes biod’s insurance effect
Young 10 — Ph.D. in coastal marine ecology (Ruth, “Biodiversity: what it is and why it’s important”,
2/9/2010, http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/02/biodiversity/biodiversity-what-and-why/)

Different species within ecosystems fill particular roles, they all have a function, they all have a niche. They interact with
each other and the physical environment to provide ecosystem services that are vital for our survival . For example plant
species convert carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and energy from the sun into useful things such as food,
medicines and timber. Pollination carried out by insects such as bees enables the production of ⅓ of our food crops.
Diverse mangrove and coral reef ecosystems provide a wide variety of habitats that are essential for many fishery
species . To make it simpler for economists to comprehend the magnitude of services offered by biodiversity, a team of researchers
estimated their value – it amounted to $US33 trillion per year. “By protecting biodiversity we maintain ecosystem services” Certain
species play a “keystone” role in maintaining ecosystem services. Similar to the removal of a keystone from an arch, the
removal of these species can result in the collapse of an ecosystem and the subsequent removal of ecosystem
services. The most well known example of this occurred during the 19th century when sea otters were almost hunted to extinction
by fur traders along the west coast of the USA. This led to a population explosion in the sea otters’ main source of prey, sea urchins.
Because the urchins graze on kelp their booming population decimated the underwater kelp forests. This loss of habitat led to declines
in local fish populations. Sea otters are a keystone species once hunted for their fur (Image: Mike Baird) Eventually a treaty protecting
sea otters allowed the numbers of otters to increase which inturn controlled the urchin population, leading to the recovery of the kelp
forests and fish stocks. In other cases, ecosystem services are maintained by entire functional groups, such as apex predators (See
Jeremy Hance’s post at Mongabay). During the last 35 years, over fishing of large shark species along the US Atlantic coast has led to
a population explosion of skates and rays. These skates and rays eat bay scallops and their out of control population has led to the
closure of a century long scallop fishery. These are just two examples demonstrating how biodiversity can maintain the services that
ecosystems provide for us, such as fisheries. One could argue that to maintain ecosystem services we don’t need to protect biodiversity
but rather, we only need to protect the species and functional groups that fill the keystone roles. However, there are a couple of
problems with this idea. First of all, for most ecosystems we don’t know which species are the keystones !
Ecosystems are so complex that we are still discovering which species play vital roles in maintaining them. In some cases its groups of
species not just one species that are vital for the ecosystem. Second, even if we did complete the enormous task of identifying and
protecting all keystone species, what back-up plan would we have if an unforseen event (e.g. pollution or disease) led to
the demise of these ‘keystone’ species? Would there be another species to save the day and take over this role? Classifying
some species as ‘keystone’ implies that the others are not important. This may lead to the non-keystone species being considered
ecologically worthless and subsequently over-exploited. Sometimes we may not even know which species are likely to fill the
keystone roles. An example of this was discovered on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. This research examined what would happen to a
coral reef if it were over-fished. The “over-fishing” was simulated by fencing off coral bommies thereby excluding and removing fish
from them for three years. By the end of the experiment, the reefs had changed from a coral to an algae dominated ecosystem – the
coral became overgrown with algae. When the time came to remove the fences the researchers expected herbivorous species of fish
like the parrot fish (Scarus spp.) to eat the algae and enable the reef to switch back to a coral dominated ecosystem. But, surprisingly,
the shift back to coral was driven by a supposed ‘unimportant’ species – the bat fish (Platax pinnatus). The bat fish was previously
thought to feed on invertebrates – small crabs and shrimp, but when offered a big patch of algae it turned into a hungry herbivore – a
cow of the sea – grazing the algae in no time. So a fish previously thought to be ‘unimportant’ is actually a keystone species in the
recovery of coral reefs overgrown by algae! Who knows how many other species are out there with unknown ecosystem roles! In
some cases it’s easy to see who the keystone species are but in many ecosystems seemingly unimportant or redundant species are also
capable of changing niches and maintaining ecosystems. The more biodiverse an ecosystem is, the more likely these species
will be present and the more resilient an ecosystem is to future impacts. Presently we’re only scratching the surface of
understanding the full importance of biodiversity and how it helps maintain ecosystem function. The scope of this task is immense. In
the meantime, a wise insurance policy for maintaining ecosystem services would be to conserve biodiversity . In doing
so, we increase the chance of maintaining our ecosystem services in the event of future impacts such as disease, invasive species and
of course, climate change. This is the international year of biodiversity – a time to recognize that biodiversity makes
our survival on this planet possible and that our protection of biodiversity maintains this service.

It causes global wars

Homer-Dixon 98 (Thomas, assistant professor of political science and director of the Peace and Conflict
Studies Programme at the University of Toronto, associate fellow of the Canadian Institute for Advanced
Research, World Security: Challenges for a New Century, Third Edition, edited by Michael Klare and
Yogesh Chandrani, pg. 342-3, 1998)
Experts have proposed numerous possible links between environmental change and conflict. Some have suggested that
environmental change may shift the balance of power between states either regionally or globally, causing
instabilities that could lead to war . Another possibility is that global environmental damage might increase the
gap between rich and poor societies, with the poor then violently confronting the rich for a fairer share of the
world’s wealth. Severe conflict may also arise from frustration with countries that do not go along with agreements to protect the
global environment, or that “free-ride” by letting other countries absorb the costs of environmental protection. Warmer
temperatures could lead to contention over more easily harvested resources in the Antarctic. Bulging
populations and land stress may produce waves of environmental refugees , spilling across borders and disrupting
relations among ethnic groups. Countries might fight among themselves because of dwindling supplies of water and
the effects of upstream pollution . A sharp decline in food crop production and grazing land could lead to conflict between
nomadic tribes and sedentary farmers. Environmental change could in time cause a slow deepening of poverty in poor
countries, which might open bitter divisions between classes and ethnic groups, corrode democratic institutions, and
spawn revolutions and insurgencies. In general, many experts have the sense that environmental problems will
“ratchet up ” the level of stress within states and the international community, increasing the likelihood of
many different kinds of conflict—from war and rebellion to trade disputes—and undermining possibilities for
cooperation .
 BioD Impact – A2 Adaptation/Redundancy
Adaptation and redundancy are false --- even “minor” extinctions can set off catastrophic eco
collapse
Kunich 1 (John Charles, Associate Professor of Law – Roger Williams University School of Law,
“Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species With Hotspots Legislation”, Hastings Law Journal,
August, 52 Hastings L.J. 1149, Lexis)

It is possible, and even probable, that some currently "insignificant" species could take on a crucial role in the
ecosystems of the future. 67 Wild relatives of current crop species can be an invaluable source of genetic
diversity in the event the monoculture cultivated plants fall prey to disease or other environmental conditions. 68 And if
environmental conditions change, through global warming, increased pollution, or other habitat alterations, some other
species may possess traits that will prove preadapted to these new circumstances. Some species that occupy key positions
in today's ecosystems may be unable to adapt , and unless other species are available to fill their niche, the
ecosystems may suffer catastrophic degradation . The redundancy provided for by millions of years of natural
selection cannot be fully understood and appreciated unless and until it is needed. 69 It is not necessarily the large, obvious
life forms that play these pivotal roles; in fact, the "lower" levels of the food web are the foundation upon which all
other components of each ecosystem depend. 70
[*1168] The biosphere that is the planet earth may be conceptualized as an exceedingly complex "computer program" with millions
of parts, each of which is evolving. It would be foolish indeed to destroy, or to allow the destruction of, the program's codes,
because we do not and cannot know their importance, whether at present or in some unforeseeably altered world of the
future. Extinction shuts doors and deprives us forever of the option to discover value in that which we previously found
valueless. 71
Food
 Food Impact – Turns Econ
High food prices threaten the global economy
EMI 11 - world leader in strategy research for consumer markets providing comprehensive international
coverage for the international business environment(March 3, 2011, “Special Report: Record global food
prices impact business and consumers”, http://blog.euromonitor.com/2011/03/special-report-record-global-
food-prices-impact-business-and-consumers-.html)

The world is facing the challenge of a new food crisis as global food prices have been rising significantly since late 2010. This is due
to tight supply caused by strong demand and bad weather conditions in major agricultural producing countries. While high food
prices will benefit agricultural exporting countries, they will burden consumers, especially in low-income
households. Rising food prices would also harm global economic growth and undermine social and political
stability.
Key points

After an ease in 2009 as result of weaker demand and lower fuel prices, global food prices have increased sharply again since late
2010. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)'s Food Price Index – a benchmark basket tracking the wholesale
cost of 55 agricultural commodities – rose to 231 points in January 2011, the highest level since 1990, from 180 points in January
2010;

The main reason behind the new price hike has been an unexpected shortage of food supply. Bad weather conditions have destroyed
major crops in the world's key food producing countries including Australia, Russia and the USA. In January 2011, the price of wheat
stood at US$327 per metric ton, significantly up from US$158 in June 2010;

Rising oil prices, currency fluctuations and countries' policy responses are contributing to push global food prices higher. In addition,
rapid population growth, a shortage of water and farmed land as well as changes in diet brought by wealth and urbanisation will
continue putting an upward pressure on food prices;

Rising food prices are reducing consumer disposable income, with poor consumers being hit hardest as they spend
most of their income on essentials including food. Consumers in emerging and developing countries spent 20.1% of
their total expenditure on food in 2010, compared to only 10.5% of consumers' expenditure in the
developed world;

While food-exporting countries such as Thailand, New Zealand and Argentina will benefit from higher
food prices, net food-importing countries such as Egypt will suffer from higher import bills and rising trade
deficit, thus affecting the countries' macroeconomic condition. Rising food prices will also result in higher inflation,
more poverty and social unrest.
Prospects

The global economy is forecast to grow by 4.4% in 2011, slightly down from 4.8% in 2010. Rising food prices,
however, will continue posing a major challenge to global food security and thus economic development:
Global food prices are estimated to stay high at least in the short term until the next harvests in mid-2011, whereby the size of the
crops will be critical to stabilise the international agricultural markets. Further supply shocks could result in higher food
price volatility;

Generally, the global food system is becoming more vulnerable to extreme price movements. This is due to
soaring food demand, a rising dependence on international trade to meet food needs and a growing demand for food commodities
from other sectors such as energy. In addition, climate change will lead to more frequent extreme weather conditions, affecting
agricultural production;

Rising food prices will continue to have negative impacts on consumers, especially on poor households in
developing countries. A long period of high food prices could affect economic growth, even in the
world's fast-growing economies such as China and India. Real GDP growth in China and India is forecast to decline
to 9.6% and 8.4% in 2011 respectively, down from 10.3% and 9.7% in 2010;
The new surge in international food prices has raised the global community's concern on a new food crisis
and triggered policy responses to stabilise the markets. The EU planned in February 2011 to cut import duties on
important agricultural commodities including wheat and barley as well as to allow additional sugar imports. Thailand, the world's
largest rice exporter, affirmed that it would maintain the country's 2011 rice exports to the same level as in
2010. In Egypt, about 85.0% of the country's bread is subsidised by the government .
 Food Impact – AT: Defense
Best research disproves their defense
Brinkman 11 – Henk-Jan Brinkman Chief of Policy, Planning and Application in the Peacebuilding
Support Office of the United Nations and Cullen S. Hendrix, Assistant Professor at the The College of
William & Mary and Fellow at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the
University of Texas at Austin, “Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and
Addressing the Challenges”, Occasional Paper n° 24, July,
http://ucanr.edu/blogs/food2025/blogfiles/14415.pdf
Most of the types of political violence addressed here are more prevalent in societies with higher levels of chronic food insecurity. There is a correlation
between food insecurity and political conflict in part because both are symptoms of low development (Collier et al., 2003). Nevertheless, a
growing
body of research makes both direct links and indirect links – as proxied by environmental scarcity or access to water resources –
between food scarcity and various types of conflict. The causal arguments linking food insecurity to political violence lack
microfoundational evidence – evidence based on actions of individuals – to explain how the mechanism works, but there are plenty of theories. The
theories tend to rest either on the perspective of motivation, emphasizing the effect of food insecurity on economic and social grievances; or on the
perspective of the opportunity cost, emphasizing the perceived costs and benefits of participating in violence relative to other means of securing income
or food (Gurr, 1970; Tilly, 1978; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). These arguments are most valid with respect to
participation in civil war and rebellion, where participation is better explained by a mixture of grievances – which provide motivation – and selective
incentives – protection from violence and opportunities to engage in predation or to receive food, clothing, shelter and other material benefits – rather
than grievances alone (Berman, 2009). A study of demobilized combatants in Sierra Leone found that poverty, lack of educational access and material
rewards were associated with participation in the civil war (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). Interestingly, in Liberia, women were more likely than
men to fight for material benefits (Hill et al., 2008). Thus, grievances are important, but so are motivations related to that individual’s economic and
opportunistic considerations. Civil Conflict Civil
conflict is the prevalent type of armed conflict in the world today (Harbom and Wallersteen,
2010). It is almost exclusively a phenomenon of countries with low levels of economic development and high levels of food
insecurity. Sixty-five percent of the world’s food-insecure people live in seven countries: India, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ethiopia (FAO, 2010), of which all but China have experienced civil conflict in the past decade, with DRC,
Ethiopia, India and Pakistan currently embroiled in civil conflicts. Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa (2008) find that poor health and
nutrition are associated with greater probability of civil conflict , though their findings are based on small sample sizes.
Countries with lower per capita caloric intake are more prone to experience civil conflict, even accounting for their levels of economic

development (Sobek and Boehmer, 2009). This relationship is stronger in those states where primary commodities make up a large
proportion of their export profile. Some of the countries most plagued by conflict in the past 20 years are commodity-rich countries characterized by
widespread hunger, such as Angola, DRC, Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone. The mixture of hunger – which creates grievances – and the availability
of valuable commodities – which can provide opportunities for rebel funding – is a volatile combination. World
commodity prices can
trigger conflict, as higher prices, especially for food, increase affected groups’ willingness to fight. Timothy
Besley and Torsten Persson (2008) find that as a country’s import prices increase, thereby eroding real incomes,
the risk of conflict increases. Oeindrila Dube and Juan F. Vargas (2008) arrive at similar conclusions when looking at Colombia, where
higher export prices for coffee (which is labour intensive and a source of rural income) reduced violence in coffeeproducing areas while higher export
prices for oil (which is capital intensive and a source of income for rebels and paramilitary groups) increased violence in regions with oil reserves and
pipelines. Other
research links transitory weather shocks to civil conflict. In these studies, weather shocks –
like drought and excess rainfall – are thought to fuel
conflict by causing crops to fail and reducing agricultural
employment opportunities, thus increasing food insecurity both in terms of food availability and food access (ability to pay). The
people most likely to participate in armed conflict – young men from rural areas with limited education and economic prospects –
are likely to seek work in the agricultural sector. As that work dries up, fighting looks more attractive.
However, the empirical link between transitory weather shocks and civil conflict is still ambiguous. Some studies find that civil conflict is more likely to
begin following years of negative growth in rainfall (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007), suggesting that drought and
decreased agricultural productivity expand the pool of potential combatants and give rise to more broadly
held grievances. However, approaches that look at levels of rainfall, rather than growth in rainfall from year to year, find tenuous, or in fact
positive relationships, between rainfall abundance and the onset of conflict (Burke et al., 2009; Buhaug, 2010; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2010; Ciccone,
forthcoming). Some case-based research, however, links drought to conflict – though mediated by the government’s response to the crisis. For example,
during the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali, drought – aggravated by the government’s embezzlement of drought relief supplies and food aid – was a
significant source of grievance that motivated young men and women to take up arms (Benjaminsen, 2008). Recently, warmer temperatures have been
linked to an increase in civil conflict, though this finding has been challenged (Burke et al., 2009; Buhaug, 2010). Civil
war is also more likely
in the aftermath of quick-onset natural disasters, such as earthquakes, major volcanic eruptions , floods, and
cyclonic storms (Brancati, 2007; Nel and Righarts, 2008). The relationship between disaster and conflict is strongest in countries with high levels of
inequality and slow economic growth; food insecurity and resource scarcity are among the more plausible explanations
for this correlation . Interstate War The links between food insecurity and interstate war are less direct. While countries often go to war over
territory, previous research has not focused directly on access to food or productive agricultural land as a major driver of conflict (Hensel, 2000).
However, wars have been waged to reduce demographic pressures arising from the scarcity of arable land, the clearest examples being the move to
acquire Lebensraum (“living space”) that motivated Nazi Germany’s aggression toward Poland and Eastern Europe (Hillgruber, 1981) and Japan’s
invasion of China and Indochina (Natsios and Doley, 2009). Water, for drinking and for agriculture, is also a cause of conflict (Klare, 2002). Countries
that share river basins are more likely to go to war than are other countries that border one another (Toset et al., 2000; Gleditsch et al., 2006). This
relationship is strongest in countries with low levels of economic development. Institutions that manage conflicts over water and monitor and enforce
agreements can significantly reduce the risk of war (Postel and Wolf, 2001). Jared Diamond (1997) has argued that for centuries military power was built
on agricultural production. Zhang et al. (2007) show that long-term fluctuations in the prevalence of war followed cycles of temperature change over the
period 1400–1900 CE, with more war during periods of relatively cooler temperatures and thus lower agricultural productivity and greater competition
for resources. Similar findings linking cooler periods with more war have been established for Europe between 1000 and 1750 CE (Tol and Wagner,
2008). Democratic and Authoritarian Breakdowns Democratic breakdowns occur when leaders are deposed and replaced by officials who come to power
without regard for elections, legal rules, and institutions. Not all breakdowns are violent – “bloodless” coups account for 67 percent of all coups and coup
attempts – but many have been very bloody, and the autocratic regimes and instability that follow democratic breakdowns are more likely to lead to the
Food insecurity, proxied by low availability
abuse of human rights, in some cases leading to mass state killing (Poe and Tate, 1994; Harff, 2003).
makes democratic breakdown more likely, especially in higher-income
of calories for consumption per capita,
countries, where people expect there to be larger social surpluses that could be invested to reduce food
insecurity (Reenock, Bernhard and Sobek, 2007). Though statistical evidence is lacking, rising food prices have been implicated in the wave of
demonstrations and transitions from authoritarian rule to fledgling democracy in some countries across North Africa and the Middle East in 2011. There
are some historical precedents for this: a bad harvest in 1788 led to high food prices in France, which caused rioting and contributed to the French
revolution in 1789; and the wave of political upheaval that swept Europe in 1848 was at least in part a response to food scarcity, coming after three
below-average harvests across the continent (Berger and Spoerer 2001). Protest and Rioting Throughout history higher food prices have
contributed to or triggered violent riots . Protests and rioting occurred in response to sharp increases in world food prices in the 1970s
and 1980s (Walton and Seddon, 1994). Record-high world food prices triggered protest and violent rioting in 48 countries in 2007/08 (see Figure 1). The
ratio of violent to non-violent protest was higher in low-income countries and in countries with lower government effectiveness (von Braun, 2008).
Recent research links higher world food prices for the three main staple grains (wheat, rice and maize) to more
numerous protests and riots in developing countries, though this relationship can be mitigated by policy interventions designed to
shield consumers from higher prices (Arezki and Brückner, 2011; Bates, 2011). International market prices are not the only source of food-related
protests. The lifting of government subsidies can lead to rioting as well. Until recently, the biggest demonstrations in modern Egyptian history were the
three-day “bread riots” in 1977 that killed over 800 people, which were a response to the Egyptian government’s removal of state subsidies for basic
foodstuffs, as mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (AFP, 2007). “IMF riots” can be traced to popular grievances over withdrawn food
and energy subsidies (Walton and Seddon, 1994; Abouharb and Cingranelli, 2007). However, the relationship between “IMF riots” and food insecurity is
more complicated. Generalized food and energy subsidies are regressive, meaning that wealthy and middle-class households generally capture more of
the benefits. As such, it may be real income erosion, rather than acute food insecurity, that is driving participation in protest. Communal Violence
Competition over scarce resources, particularly land and water, often causes or exacerbates communal conflict
(Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 2006; Ban, 2007). Communal conflict involves groups with permanent or semi-permanent armed militias but does not
involve the government. However, it
can escalate to include government forces, as in the massacres in Darfur, Rwanda and Burundi.
These conflicts have the potential to escalate to civil war when the government is perceived to be supporting, tacitly or
otherwise, one communal group at the expense of the other (Kahl, 2006). While the conflict in Darfur began as a communal conflict over land and water,
its impact escalated to devastating proportions following the government’s support for Janjaweed militias in their fight against the Sudan People's
Liberation Army/Movement and Justice and Equality Movement rebels. Communal conflicts are common in the Sahel, the zone of transition between the
Sahara desert and the savanna, particularly in years of extremely high and low rainfall (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2010). Recurrent, long-lasting droughts in
the Sahel have undermined cooperative relationships between migratory herders and sedentary farmers, leading to food insecurity and increased
competition for water and land between farmers and herders, but also within herding and farming groups. As a pastoralist in the Sudan noted: “When
there is food, there is no cattle raiding.” (quoted in Schomerus and Allen, 2010). Once violence begins, conflict escalates and persists because of security
dilemmas (fear of future attacks leads to preemptive attacks – see Posen, 1993) and lack of alternative dispute mechanisms between groups and effective
policing within groups (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). These conflicts have been particularly lethal in Kenya, Nigeria, the Sudan and Uganda. Repeated
clashes between Fulani herders and Tarok farmers in Nigeria’s Plateau State killed 843 people in 2004. Similar clashes between Rizeigat Abbala and
Terjam herders in the Sudan killed 382 in 2007. Cattle raiding in the Karamoja Cluster, a cross-border region of Ethiopian, Kenyan and Ugandan
territory, resulted in more than 600 deaths and the loss of 40,000 heads of livestock in 2004 alone (Meier, Bond and Bond, 2007). These conflicts tend to
occur in politically marginalized territories far from the capital (Raleigh, 2010). Context Matters: Demographic, Social, Political, and Economic
Mediators Food insecurity is a clear contributor to political instability and conflict. But neither hunger nor conflict exist
in a vacuum: other aspects of the political, economic and social environment affect the degree to which food insecurity, and grievances more generally,
are expressed violently (Tilly, 1978).

Population growth alone triggers our impact

Borel 10 – James C. Borel, Executive Vice President With Responsibility For Dupont Crop Protection And
Pioneer, Dupont, “AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: OPTIMISTIC
SCIENCE MEETS GLOBAL DEMAND”, 6-8,
http://corian.hu/Media_Center/en_US/speeches/Agricultural_Innovation_the_Optimistic_Science_JBorel.p
df
I. AGRICULTURE: THE OPTIMISTIC SCIENCE Economics is often called the “dismal science.” Perhaps the most famous example came when the
Reverend Thomas Malthus said that the human
race would face horrifying starvation as the growth of population
inevitably exceeded the growth of our food supply. He was wrong. Instead we have produced more food, for more people, and we have
done it with less. Agricultural productivity has increased by almost any measure you care to use. And it was
enabled by science. Science, for example, that led to the creation of hybrid corn by Henry Wallace, the founder of DuPont‟s
Pioneer Hi-Bred business. Or the science that Norman Borlaug deployed to power the Green Revolution that saved an estimated one

billion lives . Or the science of modern farm equipment that has enabled farmers to cultivate more acres in less time
and with less labor. And all of this science originated from creative people and was then put to use by innovative farmers who recognized that progress
we have
requires the adoption of new approaches. There is, as I will explain in greater detail, more to be done, especially in the developed world. But
the tools to be successful in meeting the great global challenge of our time – to essentially double
agricultural production to meet the demands of the nine billion people who will crowd our planet in
the year 2050. This is why I think of what we do in agriculture as the “optimistic science.” The science in which my company invests over half of
our $1.4 billion annual R&D budget toward increasing global food production. This includes developing better seeds that produce higher
yields, discovering better products for controlling crop pests, providing food ingredients that benefit consumers and applying cutting-edge technology to
the food safety challenge. To date, agricultural production has worked hard to keep pace with population and economic progress in the developing world.
But, in the year 2011, our global population will exceed seven billion people. And it won‟t stop then. By 2050,
the globe will be home to
more than nine billion people.1 The need is great. Increased, sustainable productivity will become necessary
as available arable land and resources shift, remain unchanged, or in some areas, decrease . The production of food
must accompany environmental and economic progress, as sustainable development integrates social, economic and environmental needs to develop
better solutions to today‟s problems (including climate change), while also providing good stewardship of the resources needed for the future. Two
centuries ago, Malthus was wrong, but he wasn‟t asking the wrong question. The
question today is how we will feed nine billion
people. The answer is clear: only by nearly doubling food production – in a sustainable way – and ensuring
that the food is available to the people who need it. And, of course, we also need agriculture to produce more and more of our energy supply.
 Food Impact – Recency
Food scarcity escalates global conflicts and collapses Pakistan– past defense doesn’t assume new
trendlines
Michael Defeo 17, Inquiries Journal "Food Insecurity and the Threat to Global Stability and Security in the
21st Century", Inquiries Journal, http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1712/food-insecurity-and-the-
threat-to-global-stability-and-security-in-the-21st-century

In 2010, over 250,000 Syrian farmers were forced from their land due to water shortages. Lack of water left
these farmers dangerously food insecure, so they moved, en masse, into Syrian urban centers. This strained
an already overburdened infrastructure which increased tensions between urban dwellers and the displaced
farmers (El Hassan, 2014). One year later, the Syrian Civil War began, which has killed over 500,000 Syrians
and has destabilized the entire country. Since then, the Islamic State has conquered swaths of land through
terror campaigns, rebel and Syrian military clashes have left thousands dead, while bombing campaigns by
American, Russian, French, and Turkish air forces have reduced cities to rubble. The conflict began as a civil war
but has evolved to threaten the interests of major world powers . While limited access to food and
water did not directly spark the violence in Syria, it was the underlying cause of the instability seen in that region
today. Concerns about access to food can be applied to many of the world's developing countries .
Developing countries generally have large agricultural sectors but may lack the infrastructure or government
institutions to supply all of its citizens with adequate food . When people are hungry, they often fight their
government, or they break into ethnic or religious factions and fight each other. Such conflicts can destabilize countries
and even, as Syria has proven, entire regions . Regional destabilization in the developing world, in turn,
threatens the peace and security of the international community . Rich countries such as the United States and
Western Europe, must support developing countries through aid and trade policies so that food insecure countries do not become
fragile or failed states. Causes of Food Insecurity Many developing nations experience food and water insecurity on a
higher scale than developed nations because of irresponsible or malicious government policies, the effects of climate change, and
rising food prices . The war in Afghanistan has left many rural Afghans without access to food because of increases in staple
food prices. Using a multivariate framework, D’Souza and Jolliffe (2013) found that provinces experiencing declines in food
security have been active hotspots for violence . The pains of food shortages have been felt in Afghanistan
long before the American invasion in 2001, however. During the 1990s, civil conflict made it extremely difficult to
grow and distribute enough food to feed everyone. Adequate supply and distribution of food may be more important than
food production itself because it actually became a military strategy to starve off certain armed groups and civilian
supporters (Clarke, 2000). More commonly, the flow of staple food was inadequately disrupted as a result of the conflict. Fighting
closed roads and increased the cost of transportation, making it extremely difficult to reach rural areas. Similar problems affected
Syrian farmers in 2010. Destruction of roads and shutdowns cut off transportation of food in or out of the cities, which starved rural
civilians. Their desperation helped bolster Islamic State ranks because joining the group provided a better promise of food (El Hassan,
2014). The displaced farmers in the cities found themselves relying on locally produced food to survive rather than their own harvests.
This is a massive problem that follows food insecurity in rural areas. Insecurity leads to urbanization, thus forcing more citizens to
rely on other farmers or the government to feed them. Such conditions strain already weak government institutions and can lead to
internal conflict (Byrd, 2003). Sudan dealt with urbanization very poorly in the early 2000s which helped continue the Second
Sudanese Civil War. Sudan faced particularly brutal circumstances in the 21st century because of late rains, disruptions in trade,1 high
levels of displacement, and higher food prices (Moszynski, 2009). The Janjaweed, who controlled the government, refused to provide
certain areas with sufficient food, which increased violent responses from the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (Moszynski, 2009).
Higher food prices and potential effects of climate change also played roles in the Sudanese crisis. It was not just a lack of rain and
high food prices that starved Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan, it was their government’s inability to remedy these problems in the first
place. Poor Institutional Capacity Although the developed world experiences food insecurity, it is the lack of infrastructure and
government institutions in developing countries that contribute to civil wars and state fragility. Foreign exchange shortages can
provoke food and fuel scarcities that force governments to spend less on essential services and public goods. Accordingly, citizens see
their medical and educational entitlements melt away. Such circumstances create breeding grounds for internal conflict. All violent
conflicts destroy land, water, and social resources for food production. Developing countries do not have massive industrial machines
that can remedy such losses, therefore, the population will suffer. Food insecurity is a recruitment tool for violent extremist groups.
Promising food and water to a starving population, especially in urban areas, makes recruiting young and disgruntled youth easier
(Messer & Cohen, 2015). Syria had limited institutional capacity to deal with the mass displacement, and that lead to a civilian revolt
and recruitment into the Islamic State. Countries that fail to provide their people with basic services often experience gross economic
inequality, and even human-rights violations, as was the case in both Syria and Sudan. Both countries are classified as Least
Developed Countries (LDCs). LDCs are distinguished not just by their widespread poverty, but also by their structural weaknesses in
economic, institutional, and human resources that make them unable to maintain stability during a drought. The combination of
drought and political instability or violence led to famine in Somalia (another LDC) in 2011. Even with urgent humanitarian action,
the country still plunged into chaos and violence (Messer & Cohen, 2015). Severe drought, like Somalia's, may result in crop failure in
major food producing areas, which in turn is a significant threat to social stability and peace (Wischnath, 2014). Sometimes droughts
of exceptional severity (and the civil unrest that follows) are attributed to climate change, especially in particularly arid regions.
Scholars are divided on whether climate change actually impacts civil conflict. That is why African countries like Somalia and Sudan
are prime case studies. Africa has the lowest percentage of irrigated land in the world. Agriculture is the most important sector of most
African countries. Very high percentages of civilians in African countries live in rural areas. Those characteristics combined with low
economic and state capacity make African, particularly sub-Saharan African countries the most vulnerable to climate change and civil
instability. Africa experiences more civil conflict than other parts of the world, therefore, it is possible to argue that a lack of climate
variability effect on civil conflict in Africa would make it unlikely to cause civil conflict in other parts of the world (Koubi et al.,
2012). Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon attributed the conflict in Darfur to an ecological crisis arising “at least
in part from climate change” (Ki-moon, 2007). The Fourth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessed that
climate change will continue to worsen. As it does, it will increase food shortages, which may lead to conflict (AR4, 2007). The report
also stated that forced displacement and rising social instability is the most likely result of food insecurity. This is almost exactly what
happened in Syria. The first step towards conflict might be food riots, which often occur during a food shortage or when there is an
unequal distribution of food. These are usually caused by food price increases, food speculation, transport problems, or extreme
weather. In 1977, Egyptians became so desperate for food that they attacked shops, markets, and government buildings just to obtain
bread and grain (Paveliuc-Olariu, 2013). Moreover, civil war can create economic opportunities for certain groups, so they try to avoid
resolving the conflict. Urban elites in Somalia profited tremendously off of internal conflict because of the absurd amount of foreign
aid that was pumped into the country and then largely stolen (Shortland, Christopoulou, & Makatsoris, 2013). Once a country
experiences a food shortage, it may lead to protests, riots, and violence. This all contributes to state instability, but it is not the state
alone that suffers. If one country fails, it creates a crisis that could destabilize an entire region. State Failure and the Threat to Regional
Stability Although fragile governments in developing countries are at a heightened risk for internal conflict that could topple them,
that risk also threatens the country’s neighbors. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Afghanistan found itself alone in regional
trade. Without a guaranteed source of cereal, the government had to turn to Iran and Pakistan for support in order to avoid its own
collapse (Clarke, 2000). Unlike Afghanistan, many other developing countries have been unable to work together on food and water
security. Thirteen of the twenty-two members of the Arab League rank among the most water-scarce nations on the planet. Food
cannot be grown without water. The majority of the world is engaged in some sort of agreement with neighboring countries to share
water supplies, but thirty-seven countries still do not share their water resources (El Hassan, 2014). Lack of cooperation can cause
civil as well as interstate conflict. South Sudan legally has no share of the Nile River and the effects of that lack of water access have
been mass starvation and violence. The effects of climate change, water shortages, and mass migrations have resulted in acute food
insecurity not just in Syria, but across the region (El Hassan, 2014). Food insecurity, plus an increase in the prices of
staple foods have destabilized much of the area. The Arab Spring was the beginning of multiple conflicts that have affected
countries like Syria, Egypt, and Libya. In Syria, food insecurity resulted in mass violence and has now created an international crisis
involving multiple world powers. Food
insecurity is such a threat to entire regions because people cannot live
without food and people want to live . When a region experiences food scarcity and that population feels
threatened by hunger, it will relinquish dependency on any political authority and take up arms in
order to ensure its well-being (Paveliuc-Olariu, 2013). This is human survivalism . It is important for developing
countries in areas that are at risk for food insecurity to formulate policy that ensures aid goes to the food insecurity hotspots so as to
maintain stability. South Sudan experienced what happens when countries do not work together to feed their people. After
influx of human
gaining its independence from Sudan in 2011, 360,000 South Sudanese refugees returned to the country. This
beings, coupled with drought conditions exacerbated economic strain and drove food prices up . The increases
were the result of trade restrictions between Sudan and South Sudan. The overall reason for the food crisis, however, was the
government's preoccupation with fighting a political and quasi-ethnic civil war rather than negotiating fair access to the Nile River
(Tappis et al., 2013). Because of South Sudan’s weak institutions, it has done little to address the food shortage. That inability to
solve the problem fuels insurgent recruitment that continues the bloodshed in South Sudan. The conflict is
keeping regional rivalries alive with Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan; all of whom have attempted to intervene in South Sudan
militarily to bring about stability (Council on Foreign Affairs 2016). Aside from South Sudan, multiple conflicts across Africa are
consuming massive amounts of diplomatic, political, and humanitarian resources in a region that faces a multitude of threats. South
Sudan, Somalia, and Syria are all failing states that are experiencing huge food shortages, humanitarian crises, and most importantly,
extreme civil violence. South Sudan is mired in a civil war. Somalia is controlled by warlords and terror organizations. Syria has both
has turned these countries into “breeding grounds of instability, mass migration,
of those problems. Conflict
and murder ” rather than sovereign states with a monopoly on violence and control over their borders
(Rotberg, 2002). To be sure, failing states are a concern because of their ability to destabilize entire regions, but states at risk for
failure are also very important. Countries like Pakistan that are politically unstable and have food and water
shortages could result in uncontrollable civil upheaval (The Fund for Peace, 2016). Global Consequences of State
Failure Failing states and destabilized regions are not just a problem for the developing world. They are a very real
concern for the United States and other developed countries as well. The Islamic State fed off of the
Syrian Civil War and helped destabilize Iraq, Syria, Libya, and even Afghanistan and the Philippines.
They have at also inspired terror attacks in Europe and the United States . They are a threat to both the
developed and developing world. State instability allows them to recruit and train without government
interference, which in turn allows them to plan attacks outside the region. An important source of income for the
Islamic State has been agriculture from Iraq and Syria. While this revenue has received less media attention than oil extraction, it is
still an important part of their economy (Jaafar & Woertz, 2016). It is also a key aspect of their political legitimacy because it allows
them to feed their soldiers and those they control. Controlling some of the most fertile regions of the two countries has also helped the
Islamic State starve off areas that have resisted them (Jaafar & Woertz, 2016). If Syria or Iraq are ever going to stabilize, those
breadbaskets must be retaken and the food must reach the civilians in the cut off areas. In the 20th century, state failure had few
implications for international peace and security. Thanks to globalization, that is no longer the case. Failed states pose a
threat to themselves, their neighbors, and the entire international community (Rotberg, 2002). Islamic State - inspired terror
attacks in Belgium and France are a direct result of state collapse in Syria and Iraq. Preventing states from failing, rather than having
to intervene militarily when they do, ought to be a top priority in the foreign policy of rich nations. Although the situations in Syria,
Somalia, and South Sudan seem beyond repair, nation-building projects have had success in the past. Tajikistan, Lebanon, Cambodia,
Kosovo and East Timor are all examples of relatively successful attempts to put failing states back on the right track (Rotberg, 2002).
Developed countries must have the political will to ensure that people in developing countries are fed so that they remain pacified. It is
often severe food insecurity that precedes ethnic or religious violence, as has been the case in South Sudan, therefore, adequate food is
paramount to avoiding humanitarian crises that accompany ethnic and sectarian conflict (The Economist, 2016). While it is true that
many developed countries, especially the United States, are weary of providing so much financial aid and intervening militarily in
war-torn, developing countries, it is imperative that the rich do not abandon the poor to a fate of internal destruction. Money must not
be thrown blindly towards humanitarian crises and military intervention must be the last resort. Developed countries provided $1.4
billion for humanitarian aid in South Sudan in its first year of independence, but without specific conditions, that money went to
kleptocrats rather than infrastructure projects or public services (The Economist, 2016). Paying to help developing nations is
expensive and will continue to be so. Afghanistan and Iraq are proof of that. But the war on terror, repeated military intervention, and
humanitarian aid are expensive as well. In 2002, Robert Rotberg suggested that a new Marshall Plan was required for places like
Afghanistan, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. If it is true that food and water security are the keys to keeping relative
peace in new and developing countries and their collapse threatens the safety of the developed world, it seems logical that assisting
those countries is wise. In 1999, Susan L. Woodward argued that military leaders focus too much on force versus force combat rather
than the issues of insurgency and terrorism in failed states. In 2017, military leaders have adjusted their strategies accordingly.
Woodward believed that globalization made states less important, but their failure would still be felt around the world. Failed states
cannot exercise their monopoly on violence and they cannot control their borders, thus threatening more than just the failed state
(Woodward, 1999). Because state failure is so consequential, the United States military must continue to look into measures it can
take to prevent it. The Threat of the Future Finally, the threats from food shortages in South Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Syria are important to the United States and the international community at large, but there is one country that, while it is not a failing
state right now, could easily become one if the wealthy nations of the world do not ensure its stability. That country is Pakistan. The
Fund for Peace ranked Pakistan as the 14th most fragile state in the world in 2016, giving it a “High Alert” designation for state failure
(The Fund for Peace, 2016). Its Demographic Pressure Indicator was an 8.9 - 10.2 Although it improved by one-tenth of a point last
year, its decade trend is worse by seven-tenths of a point and its five-year trend is worse by four-tenths of a point, suggesting that the
food situation is actually worsening overall (The Fund for Peace, 2016). If internal conflict and potential state failure at its most basic
level begins with food and water insecurity, then Pakistan could become a real problem very soon. Considering the risk of state
failure, Pakistan
poses the greatest threat to the rest of the world because of the existence of nuclear
weapons within the country. Pakistan is not a member of the N uclear Non- P roliferation T reaty, yet it has about
120 nuclear weapons. It also has a Shaheen 1A ballistic missile that can reach targets 550 miles away (Pakistan Defence, 2015).
Should a food crisis arise in Pakistan that results in civil war and governmental collapse, those weapons
could end up in the hands of a group that intends to use them maliciously as an act of terror . That
prospect should be incentive enough for the developed countries to realize that they cannot and must not leave food insecure countries
to devour themselves. While it is difficult to argue that food insecurity immediately and directly causes civil conflict, there is no
denying that people need food and water and will fight to survive . In South Sudan, ethnic and political armies fight
one another. In Syria, rebels and government forces fight each other while also fighting the Islamic State. And in Somalia, warlords
and their armies fight. The Syrian Civil War began six years ago after a water shortage forced thousands of migrants into urban
centers. Developing countries tend to be most affected by climate change, poor governance, and food price increases. Therefore, they
are the most prone to instability that may lead to outright violence. Without the wherewithal to handle civil conflict, these countries
may become fragile or even failing states. Once that happens, they represent a threat not just in their region of influence, but the whole
world. That is why the developed Western nations must pay attention and provide aid to the developing world in order to maintain
stability. There will be more food crises in developing countries in the future, but if the North has the strength to continue aiding the
South, perhaps it will be able to curb mass starvation and avoid the horrendous violence that consumes starving countries.
Internal Link Biz
 US-Iran Key
Stem cell research is chugging along due to devotion of Iranian scientists, yet still lacks much of the
resources to develop large scale clinical trials and experimental treatments – US partnerships are
key.
Roudi et al 17 (Raheleh Roudi [PhD at Iran University of Medical Sciences in the Oncapathology Research Center – specializes
in Cancer biology and Stem cell research], Marzieh Ebrahimi, Ahmad Shariftabrizi & Zahra Madjd “Cancer stem cell research in Iran:
potentials and challenges” Published by Future Medicine in Future Oncology – Volume 13 Number 20 – 8/4/17 / WY-TH)

Tumor cells are extremely heterogeneous in terms of their malignant potential, drug sensitivity and the tendency for metastasis and relapse [129].
Hypermalignant subpopulation of cancercells, termed CSCs, also referred to as TICs or stem-like cancer cells, have been isolated from
patients with various tumor types [14,15,18,20,130–136]. These
cells are found to be highly tumorigenic and possess high
stemness properties, including self-renewal capacity, evading from apoptosis, increased expression of ABC
transporters and high telomerase activity, as well as, resistant to conventional chemoradiation. Moreover,
chemotherapy and radiation induce stemness genes in cancer cells that lead to the enrichment of CSCs in
tumor tissues [9,137,138]. A few studies have summarized the previous research studies in SC field in Iran and their strengths and weaknesses but
no data were yet available regarding CSCs research in Iran [139,140]. Therefore, in the current review, we presented CSC-related publications in Iran.
Our findingsindicate that CSC papers in Iran have been rapidly increasing in number in the last
decade. The marked increase in the number of publications in this regard is largely resulting from the
devoted efforts of Iranian scientists despite limited equipment and budget mainly stemming from the
international sanctions imposed on Iran's economy [141–143]. Isolation and characterization of CSC at an in vitro level (using flow
cytometry, colony and sphere formation assays, RT-PCR, cDNA microarray, Western blotting, cloning, siRNA and similar) and their targeting (e.g., with
nanoparticles) were frequently used in CSC research papers in Iran, whereas more expensive methods such as next-generation sequencing were rarely
used [table omitted] Similar phenotypic and functional properties among the normal SCs and CSCs have provided an opportunity for their isolation and
characterization [144]. Expression of several cell surface markers or measurement of intracytoplasmic enzyme activity of ALDH has provided the
opportunity for isolating CSCs using fluorescence-activated cell sorting. Several methods have also been used for isolation of CSCs based on their
functional features, for example, sphere formation assay [9,144]. The gold standard approach for characterization of CSCs is prolonged self-renewal
capacity of the subset of tumor cells following serial transplantations into a nude or NOD/SCID mice [144]. Due to the paucity of facilities for caring
NOD/SCID mice in Iran, in vivo assessment of CSC populations isolated from different malignant tumors was not as frequently performed when
A large proportion of CSC publications in Iran have been
compared with studies from the more affluent institutions.
performed on the clinical human cancer tissues, either fresh frozen or archival pathology samples. Identification
of diagnostic/prognostic and monitoring of patients using CSC marker(s) needs a comprehensive cancer registry, and obtaining long-term patients’
follow-up and survival data that were not used in most studies from Iran. The
existence of CSCs that have the capacity to remain
quiescent for a long time could well be the cause of treatment failure in cancer patients; thus, complete
regression and efficient treatment of malignant tumors was achieved by targeting CSCs, but not of normal
SCs, in addition to destroying the tumor bulk [145,146]. In the search for a magic bullet to target CSCs, it is crucial to find molecular
targets that are requisite for cancer stemness but not by normal tissue SCs, in other words, the molecules that help distinguish between the tumoral and
normal SCs [145,146]. Other attractive and practical approaches available include: Targeting the microenvironment, Targeting the ABC transporter,
Manipulation of miRNA expression, Induction of CSCs apoptosis, Induction of CSCs differentiation [144,147,148]. Emerging evidence indicate that
translation of CSCs knowledge from the laboratory to clinics entails a long and cumbersome path. Approximately 90% of CSC
publications in Iran were performed in academic centers without partnerships with
pharmaceutical or biotech companies. Global previous studies show that few clinical trials have started
enrolling patients testing experimental drugs for targeting CSCs, the results of which are not out yet, while
we could not yet identify any clinical trials using targeting of CSCs in Iran [149,150]. Parallel with the global
trends in CSCs research, significant effort is needed to translate the current experimental findings (in vitro
studies) of CSCs research in Iran to clinical application. We found that approximately 17% of CSC papers in Iran from the years
2004–2016 are publications addressing the breast and colorectal cancers. These two cancers are some of the most prevalent cancer types in Iran and this
might be the reason for selecting them as experimental models by the Iranian scientists. In 2008, the Council for Stem Cell Sciences and Technologies
was formed in the Iranian Presidential office for Science and Technology. The CSC workgroup was developed by the Council for Stem Cell Sciences and
Technologies and its first meeting was held in March 2016. Following the guidelines of this workgroup, the CSC group in Oncopathology Research
Center of Iran University of Medical Sciences and in Royan Institute was formed. The first symposium on CSCs was held by the cooperation of the
Council for Stem Cell Sciences and Technologies, Iran University of Medical Sciences and Royan Institute on 2 February 2017. Conclusion There is
a necessity for a comprehensive national program, site visits of high impact centers, expanding
international collaboration, training scientists and personnel, establishing setup
laboratories and buildup of the infrastructure for CSC research in Iran. Additionally, a defined
budget should be dedicated to the CSCs research in Iran [table omitted] A comprehensive research strategy for cancer
including CSCs in Iran should entail: Defining interactions of genetic and epigenetic changes in normal SCs and CSCs; Identifying molecular drivers of
stemness; Understanding the contribution of CSCs to the mechanisms of tumor heterogeneity, dormancy, resistance and identifying key target nodes the
dynamics of tumor activation; Developing valid CSC markers for chemosensitivity and radiosensitivity; Understanding the rational combinations of
CSC-targeted therapy for improved personalized therapy; Developing multimodality imaging CSC biomarkers for clinical diagnosis and response
monitoring in primary and metastatic disease; Developing bioinformatics expertise to maximize the applicability of currently available clinical and
experimental data [151]. Future perspective In a glance, the
future of CSC in Iran holds the promise of custom-made
medical solutions for early diagnosis, prognosis and targeted therapy in cancer patients. However, to fully
establish the long-term safety profile of therapies using the drug(s)-targeting CSCs in clinical phase,
standard large-scale randomized clinical trials should be performed.
 Iran Key
Iran has amazing potential for scientific collaboration due to its dedicated population of young
scientists – key to out-innovating the world challenges
Jarvis 16 (Michaela Jarvis [Freelance writer reporting on the AAAC 2016 science conference] “Panel of Experts Encourages
Scientific Collaboration With Iran” Published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science – 6/23/16 -
https://www.aaas.org/news/panel-experts-encourages-scientific-collaboration-iran / WY-TH)

Increased collaboration with Iranian scientists could speed the development of important solutions to global
challenges in many fields, experts said at the AAAS Science Diplomacy 2016 conference, and a broadening range of organizations, including AAAS and the
National Academies, can help make it happen. Throughout the “Opening Doors to Iran” session of the 5 May conference—one of eight sessions on diverse topics in science
diplomacy—panelists cited far-ranging evidence ofthe capability of Iran’s scientific community as a collaborative partner.
They described
the problems Iran is experiencing—such as energy shortages, HIV/ AIDS, and air and
water pollution—as opportunities for science and technology engagement to positively impact people’s
lives. Referring to the nuclear agreement signed last July and subsequent statements signed or released by the United States, Iran, and five other nations, panelist Ali Douraghy,
of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, said, “ There are certainly very positive opportunities
for potential scientific cooperation outlined.” Over the years, Iranian scientists, physicians, and other health experts have
collaborated with their U.S. counterparts through partnerships fostered by the National Academies, the National Institutes of Health, AAAS, and CRDF Global, on topics such as
water, food- borne diseases, neuroscience and drug abuse, noncommunicable and infectious diseases, health disparities, and bioethics. The 5 May panel was convened by CRDF
Scientific collaboration is among the
Global, a nonprofit that connects emerging scientific communities with the international scientific community. “

best ways to show that the two countries can productively work together, as opposed to work against each
other, by helping tackle the world’s greatest challenges and to build trust,“ said Tom Wang, AAAS’s chief international officer
and director of the AAAS Center for Science Diplomacy. In October 2013, newly elected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani made a speech about restoring academic freedom at
the country’s universities following nearly a decade of interference in academic affairs by a conservative government. Science International News Editor Richard Stone, who had
This is a message that is interesting for the international science
first visited Iran back in 2005, saw this as a crucial moment. “I thought, ‘

community. I’d like to see what it means on the ground ,’” said Stone, who also participated in the conference panel. His subsequent visit in
2015 resulted in a series of articles documenting the state of science and technology in Iran. As his reporting bore out, some of the projects he had seen beginning to blossom back
in 2005, such as plans for a top-caliber Iranian National Observatory, were regaining momentum after years of halting progress due to internal political pressures and international
Iranian scientists were able to push ahead on international-
sanctions imposed on Iran over its nuclear program. Stone described how

quality research despite the sanctions. The Iranian Light Source Facility, a synchrotron project, has made remarkable progress in overcoming
sanctions, thanks in large part to improvisation. Similarly, when scientists were unable to import sensors to measure seismic stress on infrastructure such as dams and bridges in a
I was struck by the ingenuity
country laced with faults, they invented their own that are now used throughout the country and are even starting to be exported. “

of many of the Iranian scientists in the face of sanctions,” said Stone. Somewhat surprisingly, stem cell research was one
of the fields that progressed, after Iranian scientists, unsure of what was permissible, petitioned Iran’s Supreme Leader Seyyed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to issue
a fatwa on stem cells. The ruling in 2002 legalized any kind of stem cell research except for human cloning, a policy more liberal than that of the United States. Iranians, given the
go-ahead from Khamenei, actively advanced the research, Stone said. Alex Dehgan, who has worked for the U.S. Department of State and has also served as chief scientist at
USAID—invoking one of his main requirements for successful science diplomacy—said that the benefits of scientific engagement with Iran
would accrue to both partners because of the strength of science and technology in Iran. The Iranian Revolution of 1979
brought university education to a much broader segment of the population than is seen in other countries in the region, and Iranians have long cultivated a

cultural pride in scholarship and creativity. Iran is now ranked fourth in the world in terms of its growth
rate in publishing scientific articles, said Dehgan, co-founder of Conservation X Labs. At Stanford University’s Ph.D. program in electrical engineering,
said panelist Douraghy, Iran’s Sharif University of Technology is known as the world’s top institution for preparing undergraduates in the field. Dehgan pointed out that

Iranian students who studied at Stanford and other U.S. universities and then stayed in this country went on
to found companies ranging from eBay, to Dropbox, to Hot Pockets. “We’re missing out,” said Dehgan,
“[if we’re not] engaging that community .” Whatever their talents and preparation, though, Iranian scientists have been isolated from the rest of the
world, said Stone, and organizations like AAAS can perform a crucial function in connecting them to the international science community. “Western scientists are not aware of
who the talented scientists are in Iran and North Korea and other isolated countries,” said Stone. “A role for nongovernmental organizations like AAAS and the National
Academies is to bring those people together.” Still, there are significant challenges to collaboration, panelists said. Rouhani was able to oversee the nuclear agreement with the
West and is seen as having a mandate from the Iranian public for opening up the country. However, an ongoing tension exists between elected officials like Rouhani and other
extremely influential leaders. Furthermore, although the nuclear agreement is gradually lifting nuclear-related sanctions, other sanctions remain in place, and panelists reported
extensive confusion over what kinds of scientific collaboration are permitted and can get licenses required to proceed. William Colglazier, a senior scholar in the AAAS Center for
Science Diplomacy and editor-in-chief of the Science & Diplomacy quarterly, asked the panelists how the U.S. government could best encourage science diplomacy and
engagement with Iran. Colglazier is a former science and technology advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State. “Where the government can help,” said Dehgan, “is by giving signals,
guidelines” regarding what is permissible, and perhaps granting “larger blanket licenses” for certain types of research projects. U.S. universities, said panel moderator Siri Oswald,
sometimes misunderstand the restrictions on scientific exchanges and needlessly abandon efforts to engage. “They back off of opportunities that, frankly, they could engage in,”
said Oswald, interim vice president for programs at CRDF Global. A publication by the Institute of International Education entitled “Reinventing Academic Ties,” which contains
a helpful guide on the impact of sanctions on academic exchanges, offers information for U.S. scientists and institutions looking to collaborate with Iranian researchers, said
Douraghy, who is a senior international programs officer for the National Academies. “In this time, we should take advantage of the good will and test the system, and see what
kind of collaborations we can start under current conditions,” said Stone, who urged environmental scientists to turn their attention to a catastrophe occurring in northwestern Iran,
where poor water management and drought have caused Lake Urmia to lose 80% of its water, creating a salt desert that threatens crops and people. “These sorts of environmental
problems are really amenable to international cooperation,” he said. “They’re an easy sell” to the U.S. government, the Iranian government, and to funders, Stone added, “and if
they’re successful, they’re going to sow a lot of good will with the Iranian people.” Meanwhile, Dehgan sees the current generation of technology
entrepreneurs in Iran as having the most potential to build bridges with partners in the West. “There’s
an unbelievable tech community in Iran right now that I think gives us the most hope,” said Dehgan, citing an
opportunity for change in Iran that will come, not necessarily through government, “but change driven
by the people themselves, driven by entrepreneurs, driven by scientists.”
 Iran Key – BioD Add-On (Persian Leopards)
Iran’s key to cloning rare Persian Leopards which function as an indicator of a weakening Irano-
Caucasian ecosystem – extinction
Barsoumian 11 (Nanore Barsoumian [editor of the Armenian Weekly] “Leopards Without Borders: Protecting Biodiversity in the
Caucasus” Published in the Armenian Weekly, 6/15/11, https://armenianweekly.com/2011/06/15/leopards-without-borders / WY-TH)

In the diverse terrain of the Caucasus—in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan—a small population of
leopards strives to survive. Considered highly endangered, there are an estimated 1,500 Caucasus leopards in the world. Most have
migrated out of the Caucasus into Central Asia and southern Iran (also referred to as non-Caucasus Iran). According to the
Caucasus Nature Fund (CNF), less than 100 still live in the area. Seven inhabit the mountains and forests of Armenia; 50 northern Iran; 10 the
north Caucasus region of Russia; 15 in Azerbaijan; and a handful in Georgia. About 250 square kilometers are required to house a male leopard along
with two or three females. It is important, therefore, to protect the core areas—or the national parks—where wildlife thrives. It is equally vital to secure
the corridors that connect the parks. “You need to have ways for the animals to get back and forth. Otherwise you
have something that’s called the ‘island effect’ and the gene pool becomes poorer because there’s no
mixing,” said CNF Executive Director David Morrison in an interview with the Armenian Weekly. “The seven leopards that live in Armenia need to
mate with the three or four that live in Georgia, and those that live in Iran and Azerbaijan.” A former corporate and financial lawyer, Morrison says the

threat to biodiversity is “the world’s unknown or unspoken environmental crisis.” At the top
of the food chain, leopards are but one indicator of the health of the eco-region, in an area deemed one
of 34 hotspots of thriving biodiversity in the world. Every 30 minutes or so, a species is erased from the face of the planet, Morrison
noted glumly, a fate that can befall the endangered wildlife of the Caucasus. The landscape in the three Caucasus countries, which together make up
roughly the size of France, is incredibly diverse. “Landscapes that go from badlands that we would think of, like out to the Dakotas, to the highest
mountains—higher than any of the Alps—and to the lowest points in Europe. [It has] 9 of the world’s 11 climate zones—all in this relatively small area,”
Morrison explained. In Armenia, the organization is supporting the Khosrov Forest, Shikahogh/Zangezur, and Arevik protected areas. “Scientists break
down the map of the world into hotspots—where biodiversity is still thriving even if threatened. People
know about the Amazon and the
incredible biodiversity in Indonesia. What people don’t know is that on this map of 34 hotspots in the
world, there is 1 in a temperate climate zone, and that’s the Caucasus. [It] has the most biodiversity—Armenia, right up
there with the rest of the countries.” The area houses a unique assortment of mammals and plants: Caucasus leopards; wolves; the Bezoar goat, which is a
subspecies endemic to the Caucasus; the Armenian mouflon, an animal that only exists in Armenia and Azerbaijan; various species of birds; and 6,500
species of plants (particularly rich in Armenia), over 1,500 of which are found only in the region. So far, CNF has been supported by non-Armenians. The
foundation was created by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in Germany and the German government in 2008. It later received support from the Virginia-
based Conservation International and, most recently, the World Bank. It now has around $20 million in funds available for the region. “These areas are
severely underfunded today. The point of my foundation is to give them the funding that they need,” said Morrison. CNF’s funds flow directly into the
field, where they support the operating costs of national parks and the protected areas. They supplement the salaries of the rangers, and fund equipment
such as Jeeps, gasoline, binoculars, and mobile phones. The organization also offers guidance on budgeting and planning, and undertakes training efforts
in protection techniques and tourism development. “The environmental world has understood that it is hard to persuade, especially the local people, to
support an environmental cause unless they see that there is something in it for them,” Morrison added. Training and salary supplements are important
since poaching is a continuing threat. For a park ranger in rural Armenia who makes about $100 a month, an offer of $1,000 in exchange for permission
to hunt is an extremely tempting proposition, explained Morrison. “So, it’s important for these people to have their standard of living raised, to be trained,
to be made to feel important.” Recently, the organization received funding from the World Bank’s Global Environment Facility—$2 million, split evenly
between Armenia and Georgia. Thus far, Azerbaijan has refused to work with CNF. “We have not yet had success in [working] in Azerbaijan, and that’s
a shame… It’s one world. We can’t save the animals in Armenia unless we save the animals in Azerbaijan, too. So I’m still trying to reach out to the
Azeri government, and hope that I can persuade them to come along,” added Morrison, who said it was hard to gauge why Azerbaijan remained
uncooperative. The reason may be the country’s unwillingness to work in tandem with other regional players, especially Armenia. Or, it may be due to its
reluctance to have an international organization monitor its internal affairs, especially because oil revenues would allow it to undertake similar efforts on
its own. “It’s hard to know,” he said. “I don’t have an explanation.” The success of the project will be visible over time. “This foundation is supposed to
be here not for a year or 3 years, it’s supposed to be with Armenia and its protected areas for the next 20 or 30 years and beyond. You can’t measure
success in six months or a year. You measure success by counting the number of leopards, by counting the number of wolves,” said Morrison. Both
animals are considered keystone species. For more information on CNF’s work in the region, or to make a donation (both general or to a specific
need to be aware that there’s a web of life out there, and we’re all
country), visit www.caucasus-naturefund.org. “People
part of that web,” said Morrison. “Humans are just as much part of it as the rest of the natural world. We depend
on that web. If it starts to break down and fall apart, the world that we live in and the world as we
know it will not survive.”
 Iran Key – BioD Add-On (Irano-Anatolian)
Iran’s key to saving The Irano-Anatolian biodiversity hotspot which contains massive amounts of
essential endemic species
Noroozi et al 18 (Jalil Noroozi [Department of Botany and Biodiversity Research, University of Vienna] Amir Talebi, Moslem
Doostmohammadi, Sabine B. Rumpf, Hans Peter Linder & Gerald M. Schneeweiss, “Hotspots within a global biodiversity hotspot -
areas of endemism are associated with high mountain ranges” Published in Science Reports, Volume 8 Issue 1, 7/9/18, pgs. 1-3 / WY-
TH)

A major goal in conservation biology is to determine areas of rich biodiversity 1. At the global scale,
conservation priorities are well established as 34 biodiversity hotspots2, i.e. areas featuring exceptional
concentrations of endemic species as well as experiencing extreme loss of habitat 3. These hotspots
are, however, at a spatial scale too coarse for conservation management and identification of hotspots at a
finer scale, “hotspots-within-hotspots”1, is needed to allow comprehensive protection management1,4,5.
Additionally, biodiversity hotspots are excellent areas to study drivers and processes of diversification. As
endemic species are well suited to recognize biodiversity hotspots that also harbour highly threatened
species3,6,7, identifying areas of endemism (AEs) is an essential part of planning regional conservation
management. AEs are fundamental entities of analyses in biogeography8 and are defined as areas of non-
random distributional congruence among taxa9, whose biogeographical histories may have been affected
by common factors, such as geological, ecological or evolutionary processes 8,10. Whereas biogeographers and
evolutionary biologists focus on explaining the causes for the occurrence of AEs11,12,13, ecologists are interested in centres of
endemism due to their importance in devising conservation priorities3,14,15,16,17, which is valuable when financial
resources for conservation are limited3,18,19. Despite the acknowledged importance of AEs, they remain under-investigated even in currently recognized

Irano-Anatolian biodiversity hotspot, which mainly covers high

biodiversity hotspots. The
elevations of central and eastern Turkey, Armenia, NE Iraq and Iran, is the only global biodiversity hotspot
entirely inside South-West Asia (Fig. 1a). This region has a dry climate with a Mediterranean precipitation regime20. It is estimated
that more than 40% of the plant species are endemic to this region2. Iran covers 54% of the surface area
of the Irano-Anatolian hotspot (Fig. 1a), and harbours high plant and animal as well as landscape
diversity21,22,23. The Iranian flora comprises more than 8,000 vascular plant taxa, of which about 30% are endemics24. Several studies have
focused on patterns of endemism, chorology and distribution of vascular plants in Iran24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36, providing hypotheses on
the locations of putative AEs. For instance, ref.25 identified an Alborz distribution pattern (in the Alborz mountains), a Zagros distribution pattern (in the
Zagros mountains), and an Armeno-Kurdic distribution pattern (Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in north-western Iran, north-eastern Iraq, south-eastern
Turkey, and Armenia), all of which indicate regions that may, at least partially, constitute AEs. These have, however, never been investigated using a
formal quantitative approach.

It's a unique biodiversity hotspot

Noroozi et al 18 (Jalil Noroozi [Department of Botany and Biodiversity Research, University of Vienna] Amir Talebi, Moslem
Doostmohammadi, Sabine B. Rumpf, Hans Peter Linder & Gerald M. Schneeweiss, “Hotspots within a global biodiversity hotspot -
areas of endemism are associated with high mountain ranges” Published in Science Reports, Volume 8 Issue 1, 7/9/18, pg. 7 / WY-
TH)

Although the high mountain ranges of the study area have already been identified as belonging to the
Irano-Anatolian biodiversity hotspot2, we could recognize hotspots-within-hotpots using biogeographical
analyses of AEs. All five AEs identified in this study have high conservation priority. They are generally rich, also in non-
endemics, so that endemic species could serve as flagship species. While resources are probably too limited to protect all
parts of the hotspot, focusing on the richest parts of these AEs would help to conserve a high number
of threatened endemic species. In spite of low species richness at high elevations compared
to mid-elevations, they harbour a high number of endemic and narrowly distributed species in a small
area (c. 25% of Iranian endemics are above 2500 m a.s.l.)24, where the species are endangered from ongoing climate
change86,87 and overgrazing effects88,89, which warrants a high conservation priority of these
habitats.
 Super Soldiers Add-On

Genetic modification is key to super-soldiers

Jared Stafford et al 16, M.S. from Johns Hopkins, analyst at the US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological
Center where he supports senior leadership, senior scientists and principal investigators in the counter-
WMD mission space, “The Real Captain America: Bioengineering the Super Soldiers of Tomorrow”,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-real-captain-america-bioengineering-the-super-soldiers-of-
tomorrow

With the rapidly advancing field of genomics and gene modification , the distinct possibility has arisen for
applying these technologies to enhance a soldier’s physical capacity . Genetic modification or “gene doping”,
already banned from its possible future use in the Olympics, has many further applications that could enhance the operational

performance of soldiers. Conceptual frameworks illuminate the “realm of the possible” which, if implemented,
could in reality realize the much fabled concept of the “super soldier”. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) defines
gene doping as “the therapeutic use of genes, genetic elements, and/or cells that have the capacity to improve athletic performance”. Thus, this technology, originally

developed for treatment of disease, can be adapted to dramatically improve physical performance . Gene doping would use

developments that manipulate DNA in the most basic regulation of biologic processes, thus increasing
speed, power and endurance beyond what is achievable through natural diet and training (Gaffney, 2007). The
leap from application in athletics to warfighting is a small one, and one that has the capacity to greatly
enhance the performance of the individual soldier . With the increasing worldwide focus on developing
more agile, smaller and lethal forces and the investment in Special Operations soldiers, focused
applications to enhance the soldier at the individual level holds great appeal. The creation of super
soldiers could be planned by well-placed genetic physiologic tweaks.

Solves power projection – that averts a China war fought by bio-engineered soldiers which outweighs
nuclear use
David Malet 15, Ph.D. is a Visiting Associate Professor of International Affairs; Director, Security Policy
Studies Program at George Washington University, and served as a defense and foreign policy aide to US
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle 2000-2003. He previously worked or interned for organizations
including the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, US Senator John Kerry, and the
Attorney General of New South Wales, Australia. Prior to joining the Elliott School he served as director of
the Center for the Study of Homeland Security at Colorado State University and as Associate Director of
the School of Government at the University of Melbourne. “Captain America in International Relations:
the Biotech Revolution in Military Affairs”, Defense Studies, 2015,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2015.1113665?journalCode=fdef20

conventional wisdom on biotechnology has held that coming decades will see Western nations
The

increasingly vulnerable to ever-more sophisticated biological weapons attacks As by non-state actors and rogue states.

recombinant genetic technology proliferates, a greater number of actors will possess genetic engineering
that will enhance the lethality and durability of their biological weapons. Proponents
capabilities note that of this perspective

the overwhelming technological advantage enjoyed by the United States creates the incentive for
in conventional forces

competitors to develop effective asymmetric responses, and that affordability, accessibility, and relatively the

easy preparatio make them a likely means of doing so this view, the superior conventional
n of biological weapons . In

capabilities not only fail to deter the proliferation of biological weapons, but encourage their
of the US military

development The priority for military biotech research is

. Western states will face an increasing number of biologically armed opponents, and will remain on the defensive.

therefore the development of protective equipment and vaccines, antibiotics and antivirals (Department of Defense 1998).

this scenario requires the presumption that military applications of biotech will simply be a secular
However, nology

progression from the bacteriological warfare that has existed throughout history. Even when analysts have factored in the vast possibilities of genetic
 Conventional wisdom
engineering, it has usually only been to the extent that they can breed deadlier pathogens, and that the growing availability of technology means that it may be used by a broader spectrum of actors.

therefore predicts an unstable future for the international system, a Hobbesian world in which the
weakest have power to kill the strongest . Rather than rogue states and non-state terrorists, it is the
most powerful in the international system that will enjoy the advantages of “biological
and resource-laden actors

warfare ” as they continuously integrate emergent biotechnologies into their military and
in the twenty-first century

national defense process will closely resemble the Revolution in Military Affairs
infrastructures and extend their dominance. This (RMA) that
occurred during the last 30 years of the twentieth century as the United States adapted its forces to exploit advances in new information technologies. The RMA, first described by the Soviet military intelligence in the 1970s and then witnessed by the world during the

Rather than a single transformative device, like

unexpectedly uneven 1991 Gulf War, occurred because the United States employed its competitive advantage in integrated computer systems.

the atomic bomb, the steady accretion of advanced technologies augmenting existing equipment came to
inform doctrine and strategies asymmetric warfare is meant to describe efforts by weaker participants in
. The term

military confrontations to frustrate stronger power by guerilla tactics the advantages of the or other unconventional methods not envisioned in force planning (Mack

). However, high technology also offers asymmetric advantages to the best-equipped actors
1975 , and American military
planners sought to use the advances of the RMA to field forces that no state competitor could match. Their goals included “dominant maneuver” capability on the battlefield in bringing dispersed resources to bear against targets, “precision engagement” capability

The ultimate expression of this vision would be a fighter

delivered by smart weapons, and “full dimension force protection” against all anticipated threats (Rizwan 2000).

comparable to a “Jedi knight” from the Star Wars films: a super-empowered solider , dressed in a
protective stealth cloak and commanding an armed companion drone, able to perform solo missions
and to transmit data back to headquarters Military (Hundley and Gritton 1994). Coincidentally or not, this is precisely how Darth Maul was depicted in 1999’s The Phantom Menace.

planners foresee similar advantages conferred by developments across

likewise biotech fields. the various In coming decades,

biotechnology is forecast to bring advances such as “rugged computers” that will provide made from biological components

situational awareness to individual soldiers on the battlefield, camouflaged materials and lightweight armor incorporating the properties of living organisms, and ingested biological markers to distinguish

the anticipated future is not one of

friendlies, which would be of particular use in counterinsurgency (Purdue University 2001). From the perspective of those involved in force planning,

vulnerability but unassailability. Defense R&D While some military (or potentially military) applications of biotechnology are indeed products of the private sector, it is no state secret that militaries actively

sponsor their own biotech research and development programs. The United States Department of Defense in particular is open about the large number of such projects that it oversees. And while most of these are described as intended for troop protection, many are
clearly intended to enhance combat operations. As with pathogen stockpiles maintained ostensibly for defensive research, it is only the intent of the wielder that determines whether or not they are offensive. And as the 2001 anthrax case illustrates, even projects
officially intended for defensive purposes may be misapplied. Much of the biotech research is conducted under the auspices of the Pentagon’s DARPA rather than legacy programs remaining from the era of bacteriological weapons stockpiles. Established in 1958 as a
response to the launch of the first Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union the year before, DARPA was intended to promote “high-risk – high-payoff” R&D in areas beyond the immediate envisioned needs of military planners. The Agency’s singular most influential
project has undoubtedly been a communications system that came to be known as DARPANET before penetrating – and transforming – the commercial sector as the internet (Van Atta 2008, pp. 20, 23, 27). While a reported 90% of its projects fail to come to fruition,
high-profile DARPA research that has had a significant impact on United States military capability includes Saturn rockets, ground radar, stealth fighters, Predator missiles, and drones. The agency’s budget of $3 billion is small compared to intelligence agencies, but it
supports an “open culture” promoting “radical innovation” praised by participant scientists, most of whom are university researchers (Moreno 2006, pp. 12–13, Basken 2013). In 2014, DARPA announced the creation of a new Biological Technologies Division, built
from existing research units and new programs, intended to ensure that biotechnology is not merely an aspect of various research programs, but that “biology takes its place among the core sciences that represent the future of defense technology.” The new division’s
primary goals include to “restore and maintain warfighter abilities,” and “to enhance global-scale stability” (DARPA 2014). Similarly, the Pentagon Office of Net Assessment (ONA), which envisions potential future strategic environments and challenges, has also
promoted biotech R&D as a defense priority. In 2002, the ONA recommended revising Federal regulations to allow experimental biotechnologies to be brought to the battlefield more readily. It also called for facilitating a greater partnership with private sector
researchers by restricting anti-trust laws to permit quicker product development (Armstrong and Warner 2003). In biotech in particular, the military has an advantage over the private sector because it does not have to go through the lengthy and rigorou s clinical testing

in collaboration with the private sector

and approval process for medical devices and treatments (Wheelis, in Pearson et al. 2007, p. 4). The future is now: from lab to battlefield Whether or directly from

leading state military programs are implementing biotech innovations that have already had
their own research facilities,

significant impacts beyond realistic aspirations of non-state actors the thousands of Coalition troops . The lives of

have been saved by biotech in Iraq and Afghanistan projects being implemented will enable
nologies deployed , and other

soldiers to fight more effectively under more adverse conditions rather than being curtailed by than previously possible. In short,

asymmetric defenses, the power projection capabilities of the strongest actors in the international system
will increase markedly during the twenty-first century . Troop health and survivability Despite the mechanization and increased destructive power of warfare in the midnineteenth

century, it was not until World War II that wartime combat deaths exceeded those off the battlefield. This shift, due to adva nces in combat medicine, permitted American and British forces to conduct forward operations with reduced fatalities. Advances in
biotechnology are responsible for the continuation of this trend into more current conflicts with similar results (Frank 2007). When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, many of its soldiers and Marines were treated with $90 HemCon bandages. The military ordered
26,000 of these dressings, made from a shrimp shell extract called chitosan, which stopped arterial bleeding within a minute of application to wounds. Another bandage, developed by the American Red Cross but with limited use because of its $1000 price tag, was made
of clotting proteins extracted from human blood. By contrast, a powdered coagulant manufactured by Z-Medica called QuikClot that could be poured directly onto wounds was issued in first-aid kits, initially to Marines and then across service branches. QuikClot is a
granular substance that can be poured directly onto a wound, almost instantly forming a clot that stops bleeding. A hemostatic agent in QuikClot draws water molecules out of blood and promotes accelerated clotting (Allen 2003). By 2010, both the United States Army
and Marines had switched to providing QuikClot Combat Gauze in first aid kits instead (Cavallaro 2010). Other options are available as well: DARPA has tasked partner company Arsenal Medical with developing its hemostatic foam into a produ ct that could be used to
stop internal bleeding even without direct access to the combat wound (DARPA, “Wound Stasis System” 2013). The use of biotechnologically advanced coagulants to treat severe combat injuries had a substantial effect on the first wars of the twenty-first century: “The
ratio of [American] combat-zone deaths to those wounded has dropped from 24% in Vietnam to 13% in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other words, the numbers of those killed as a percentage of overall casualties is lower” (Knickerbocker 2006). By the time of the War on
Terror, 55% of battlefield deaths were due to excessive blood loss (Armstrong and Warner 2003). But the development of rapid coagulants sharply reduced the rate of combat deaths and may have sustained the American public’s tolerance for the Iraq and Afghanistan

Biotech is being employed

missions. The potential implication is that democracies may become more willing to engage in future wars if the human costs of doing so are minimized. along these lines across a variety of projects:

“Technologies are under investigation to fully restore complex tissues

after traumatic injury (muscle, nerves, skin, etc.) , and most dramatically, to develop neural-controlled upper extremity

Its projects involve

prostheses that fully recapitulate the motor and sensory functions of a natural limb” (DARPA, “Restorative Biomedical Technologies” 2010). In the area of combat medicine, DARPA is moving beyond coagulants.

blood “pharming” that will produce engineered red blood cells that can be preserved for (DARPA, “Blood Pharm” 2010)

delivery to the front lines to enable transfusions for wounded troops , despite the “austere conditions of forward deployment” (DARPA, “Long-Term Storage of Blood

Achieving this goal will allow

Products” 2010). A related program would use hormone therapy to extend the survivability of combatants losing critical amounts of blood before fluids and transfusions can reach them: “

increased time – perhaps many hours or even days – for evacuation, triage, and initiation of supportive
therapies ” (DARPA, “Surviving Blood Loss” 2010). To better treat other battlefield wounds and reduce rehabilitation needs, “DARPA seeks to create a dynamic putty-like material which, when packed in/around a compound bone fracture, provides full
load-bearing capabilities within days, creates an osteoconductive bone-like internal structure, and degrades over time to harmless resorbable by-products as normal bone regenerates” (DARPA, “Fracture Putty” 2010). In vivo biomaterials, or compounds directly
incorporated by a living organism, would regenerate tissue and then be fully absorbed (Armstrong and Warner 2003). An additional development that could reduce infection and mortality among burn victims is a “self-medicating” bandage. “Laced with nanoparticles, it
detects harmful bacteria in a wound and responds by secreting antibiotics” (De Lange 2010). A fully functional prosthetics program termed HAND: is developing the fundamental research that will enable the use of neural activity to … restore natural function through
assistive devices. By directly harnessing the ability of neural pathways to operate natural systems, the HAND program seeks to provide means of restoring the lives of injured warfighters. (DARPA, “Human-Assisted Neural Devices” 2010, DARPA, “Reliable Neural
Interface Technology” 2013). Clinical trials are underway on accompanying neural-controlled prosthetic devices “almost identical to a natural limb in terms of motor control and dexterity, sensory feedback … weight, and environmental resilience” (DARPA,

research enabled amputees to experience partial sensations of touch through

“Revolutionizing Prosthetics” 2010). And in 2013, DARPA-funded

prosthetic limbs via neural interfaces (DARPA, “New Nerve and Muscle Interfaces and Wounded Warrior Amputees” 2013). That such research is being conducted by the Pentagon speaks to its perceived strategic
value. This line of research connects with the 2003 DARPA Strategic Plan, coinciding with Director Goldblatt’s speech, which also called for creating “U.S. warfighters that only need use of the power of their thoughts to do things at great distances.”

Enabling the human brain to directly control a peripheral device such as an artificial limb also means that it
could control robots on the battlefield that could fight without risk to soldiers Such would be Moreno (2006, pp. 9, 39). avatars

the infantry equivalent of drone aircraft and would profoundly change the nature of soldiering more than
UAVs are now doing with piloting . Other developments in preventing or restoring injuries to troops are more overtly related to battlefield performance. DARPA, in noting that “the negative impact that stress has on
the cognitive, emotional, and physical well-being of warfighters is irrefutable,” proposes that “Novel molecular biological techniques, coupled with in-vivo measurement technologies, can allow for management of the stress pathways and behavioral analysis in real
time” (DARPA, “Enabling Stress Resistance” 2010). Already, studies conducted with trauma victims have demonstrated that Propranolol administered shortly after the incident can mitigate the occurrence of PTSD (Dando, in Pearson et al. 2007, pp. 133–134) 138–
139). In the treatment of injuries, human stem cells that can regenerate and replace otherwise irreparably damaged cells could be used to potentially replace impaired organs (Committee on Opportunities in Biotechnology for Future Army Applications [hereafter
Committee] 2001, p. 37). Another option is using engineered viruses for delivery of genes. In 2005, researchers were able to restore enough damaged cochlear hair cells in deafened guinea pigs to recover 50–80% of their hearing levels. The therapy was delivered by
adenoviruses engineered both to render them harmless and to produce a hair growth stimulant (Coghlan 2005). Some analysts expect that advances in somatic genetics will render even therapeutic implants unnecessary because “gene therapy agents could be transfected
into cells by bombarding a patch of skin with DNA-coated pellets from a gene gun” (Committee 2001, p. 70). Another possibility is neural or cortical implants such as prosthetic retinas, both to treat injuries and to offer enhanced abilities. “As the risks and costs
associated with neural implants are reduced, they may be used to increase the visual and hearing acuity of unimpaired individuals to levels well above average. Soldiers possessing these extraordinary faculties would be well suited to gathering intelligence and

Efforts to field augmented troops represent new approaches to the

performing long range reconnaissance missions” (Committee 2001, p. 38). Human enhancement

use of biotech in warfare qualitative shift away from traditional

nology ,a weapons to entirely new but uncertain bacteriological

strategies for assuring battlefield dominance . As proponents of this biotech approach envision it, “futuristic, ‘superhuman’ capabilities of individual soldiers could ena ble small units to operate for

The first state actor to build a better

extended periods of time, carry the fight to remote locales, and endure harsh extremes of climate” (Committee 2001, p. 7). Moreno (2006, p. 114) argues that “ (or nonstate)

soldier will have taken an enormous leap in the arms race Although seemingly fantastic , billions .” of dollars

have already been spent on several programs directed toward Augments fielding various types of “ .” As with biotechnologies to increase survivability,
introducing mechanically or biologically augmented living soldiers offers multiple benefits for states with the capacity to do so. It also raises a host of political and ethical questions without clear answers. Certainly, there would be tactical advantages for militaries whose
personnel are able to operate more effectively than their adversaries under difficult conditions. And the boon of losing fewer servicemen to injury, and being able to return those who are injured to the front lines more quickly, is evident. But there are also broader
potential national and international political impacts. Democratic governments, which endeavor to avoid costly or risky wars, (Gartner and Segura 1998, Reiter and Stamm 2002) might be tempted to exert their power as their conventional force advantages grow, and as
the costs of providing for disabled veterans diminish. Duncan (2012) writes about the ethics of augmentation when everyone else is doing it. Parents might balk initially at the idea of using technology to increase their children’s cognitive performances, but not if it
means that they fall behind their augmented classmates. Citizens might hesitate to vote for presidential candidates with neural implants to enhance their reflexes and decision-making capabilities during a crisis. But at some point, the question becomes “Would you vote

if rival
for a commander in chief who wasn’t equipped with such a device?” This hypothetical involving heads of state is about as far as most of the ethicist approaches make toward questions of international security. But it raises the question, and particularly

hegemons are dispatching Augments with advanced bioweapons what country with the and biomedicines to the battlefield,

capability to do so could justify sending its soldiers into harm’s way without the best advantages
possible? The edited volume Human Enhancement presents opposing arguments over biopolitics between enthusiastic “transhumanists” and skeptical “bioconservatives” (Bostrom and Savulescu in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, p. 1). Yet, for all of the
discussion about practical issues and debates over social and ethical considerations ranging over hundreds of pages, there is no consideration that enhanced soldiers are at least as likely as enhanced athletes, and national security is not cited among the social obligations
that transhumanists claim justify even heritable germline modifications. Fukuyama (2004, pp. 42–43) noted that because “The new procedures and technologies emerging from research laboratories and hospitals … can as easily be used to ‘enhance’ the species as to
ease or ameliorate illness…. The first victim of transhumanism might be equality,” an implication even more troubling at the international level when considering what this might do to the already yawning resource gap between the richest and poorest countries. George
Annas contended that: Ultimately it almost seems inevitable that genetic engineering would move homo sapiens into two separable species: the standard-issue human beings would be seen by the new, genetically enhanced neo-humans as heathens who can properly be
slaughtered and subjugated. It is this genocidal potential that makes species-altering genetic engineering a potential weapon of mass destruction and the unaccountable genetic engineer a potential bioterrorist. (Juengst, in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, p. 48)

Major powers with both conventional and asymmetric biotechnological edges over rivals may similarly be
open to the use of force to maintain their positions if they are well beyond the capabilities secure in the knowledge that they are

of opponents to match them. The advent of nuclear weapons is credited with reducing the number of
interstate wars entrenching the hegemony of the technologically advanced states
, with the effect of

that wield them RMA advances gave the United States a lopsided advantage in its early post-Cold War
.

interventions (zero combat deaths during nearly three months of NATO missions during the Kosovo War), and its initial easy success in toppling Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq led, temporarily, to rapprochement efforts by “rogue” regimes Iran

While advanced equipment is responsible for these successes, biotech now offers the
and Libya to avoid the same fate.

opportunity to enhance the performance of the combatants themselves development of designer . [DARPA] is engaged in the

drugs will increase cognitive functioning, including attention span and alertness after periods of sleep
that

deprivation neural prostheses” will enable commanders to monitor the vital signs of soldiers
. Another area for future research is “ that
in the field or even to permit the control of UAVs directly by pilots in remote locations. (Huang and Kosal 2008) “In 2002, D ARPA launched the Augmented Cognition (or AugCog) initiative, a project dedicated to developing a headband that monitors brain activity.”
With sensory input controlled remotely, subjects doubled their recall and improved working memory by 500% (The Economist 2010). Research on reducing the amount of sleep that soldiers and pilots require to function effectively has become a global enterprise, with
countries including France, Canada, Singapore, and Taiwan establishing military research units in this area. In the language of these projects, fatigue and even sleep are described as operational weaknesses preventing humans from taking full advantage of their
equipment, weaknesses that intervention can ameliorate. Some major powers have already begun the attempt: during the Iraq War , the British Ministry of Defense had purchased 24,000 tablets of one of the most promising drugs, modafinil, and the United States and
France both began to routinely supply it to pilots. The use of stimulants by militaries is so widely entrenched, with ampheta mines in regular prescribed use for decades (Saletan 2013), that Bostrom and Savulescu (in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, p. 2) question whether
the use of modafinil is qualitatively different from “a good cup of tea.” But the premise of reducing or eliminating the need for sleep as a component of troop health is a recent development. Additionally, DARPA has provided congressional testimony about its
Continuous Assistance Program that would “make the individual warfighter stronger, more alert, more endurant, and better able to heal … prevent fatigue and enable soldiers to stay awake, alert, and effective for up to seven days straight without suffering any
deleterious mental or physical effects and without using any of the current generation of stimulants.” Potential approaches include the use of transcranial magnetic and electrical stimulation to activate brain pathways and to enhance learning (Moreno 2006, pp. 11, 118).
Lab mice that have been altered as embryos with extra copies of a memory-related gene “learn more quickly and remember things longer than normal mice … and the improvement was passed on to offspring” (Sandel, in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, p. 74). In the
meantime, the military relies on more conventional stimulants, and the results might give pause to planners considering more radical medical interventions. B-1 bomber pilots who operate 19-h flights between the Persian Gulf and United States take Dexedrine, an
amphetamine known as speed or “go pills.” One such pilot, who subsequently went drinking with buddies before attacking them in a fit of paranoid delusions in which he seemed to believe he was in the television series 24, was acquitted by a court-martial after military
psychiatrists concluded that he suffered from a “substanceinduced delirium” (Murphy 2012). American pilots who killed Canadia n soldiers in a 2003 friendly fire incident in Afghanistan had also been on Dexedrine during 30-h missions (Moreno 2006, p. 115). Another
DARPA neural program with battlefield applications is Silent Talk, which would develop the capability to communicate without speaking by recognizing the neural signals for specific words. Linked devices would permit troops in the field to recognize the signals for
the “intended speech” of at least 100 words commonly used by troops in combat operations (Warwick 2009). Beyond the advantages of silent communication and preventing hostile forces from intercepting messages, such technology would effectively produce
electronic telepathy and have a tremendous commercial sector potential for hands-free communication. While Augments would be able to receive more situational information on the battlefield through neural devices, processing it effectively is another matter.
Technologies developed through the AugCog and Enabling Stress Resistance projects might alert commanders that individuals are suffering mental or physical exhaustion. Another approach would be to “develop quantitative and integrative neuroscience-based
approaches for measuring, tracking, and accelerating skill acquisition and learning while producing a twofold increase in progression in an individual’s progress through stages of task learning.” Reminiscent of the neural training uploads for particular weapons systems
and martial arts in the science fiction Matrix films, results would be achieved through the “development of neurally based techniques for maintenance of acquired skills [and on] preferential brain network activation” (DARPA, “Accelerated Learning” 2010). Another
program with the goal of “enhancing combat performance” studies the influences of biological clocks on soldier health (DARPA, “Biochronicity” 2013). Other biotechnologies would provide physical enhancements to Augments. The field of biomimetics seeks to mimic
useful naturally occurring characteristics in living organisms. For example, ants and spiders can lift loads dozens of times their own weight, and horses can withstand freezing temperatures without thick hair. “Understanding how horses and other animals overcome
drastic changes in their environment would be extremely useful. As a measure of the importance of biomimesis, the Army has declared biomimetics one of its Strategic Research Objectives (primary focus areas for basic research)” (Committee 2001, pp.14–15). Already,
researchers have developed synthetic genes that repair damaged muscles and improve healthy ones in mice (Sandel, in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, p. 73). Another project at least at the prototype stage for humans utilizes an electrically charged under suit “focusing on
the soft tissues that connect and interface with the skeletal system.” The goal of Warrior Web is “augmenting the work of Soldiers’ own muscles to significantly boost endurance, carrying capacity, and warfighter effectiveness” (DARPA, “Warrior Web” 2013, DARPA,

epartment of Defense is indeed on its way to

“Warrior Web Prototype Takes Its First Steps” 2013). Power projection Unless the R&D invested in these projects proves futile, the United States D

developing not just super-soldiers, but essentially comic book super-heroes Mentally and physically .

enhanced soldiers with access to regenerative medical treatments not available to their enemies will be far
from the full extent of the impact of the biotech RMA. One program is intended to create a $3 billion , begun in 2002,

“metabolically dominant soldier” who will be enabled by gene therapy to lift up to 800lbs, block pain
receptors and “run at Olympic sprint speeds for 15 minutes
for days, if gene on one breath of air” (Sokolove 2007). And neural or cybernetic prostheses and

therapy do not eventually produce a Captain America research programs may still permit the , the contributions of other

fielding of a biomimetic Spiderman -Man program will develop biologically inspired climbing aids that
: The Z

will enable an individual soldier to scale vertical walls constructed of typical building materials without the need for ropes or ladders. The inspiration for these climbing aids is the way
geckos, spiders, and small animals scale vertical surfaces…. The overall goal of the program is to enable an individual soldier using Z-Man technologies to scale a vertical surface while carrying a full combat load. (DARPA, “Z-Man” 2010) DARPA has offered “a
proof-of-concept demonstration of a 16-square-inch sheet of Geckskin adhering to a vertical glass wall while supporting a static load of up to 660 pounds” (DARPA, “Z-Man” 2013). This is perhaps the most outlandish example of how biotechnologies are being

developed to aid in military power projection capabilities, but it is by no means the only one. Another, completed biomimetic project increased efficiency of the
human swimmers by 80% and more than doubled their speed by giving them oscillating foils based on the propulsion mechanisms used by some fish and sea birds (DARPA,
“PowerSwim” 2010). And a project to achieve Rapid Altitude and Hypoxia Acclimatization would permit the fielding of troops (perhaps in potential battle zones such as the Hindu Kush or the Himalayas) with “novel pharmacological, biological, and technological
approaches to adapt to high altitudes (4000–6000 meters)” (DARPA, “RAHA” 2010). The adoption of biotechnology to enable force projection began during the colonial era, when Europeans discovered that quinine could prevent malaria, thus opening the door for the
Scramble for Africa. Shortages of anti-malarial drugs during World War II caused such high morbidity rates among American personnel serving in the Pacific that General Douglas MacArthur remarked that the campaign would be a slow one unless additional measures
were taken (Marble 2010). In the twenty-first century, anti-malarial drugs remain a challenge to force projection. Mefloquine, a comparatively affordable anti-malarial also marketed as Lariam, has severe psychiatric side effects, first noted in the Vietnam War. Problems
include psychotic behavior, paranoia, and hallucinations. A 2003 report indicated that “Mefloquine use was a factor in half of the suicides among troops in Iraq in 2003 – and how suicides dropped by 50% after the Army stopped handing out the drug.” Its use was also
linked to murders and suicides by Special Forces personnel in Afghanistan 2002–2004 (Benjamin 2012). In 2012, Roche Pharmaceuticals, the maker of Lariam, notified the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that it had been alerted by a physician that a patient with
traumatic brain injury taking the drug, presumed to be a serviceman charged in a high-profile massacre of civilians, had committed a homicide involving 17 victims (Ritchie 2013). When difficulties with malaria mounted during the Vietnam War, including transmission
back to America, the United States Navy utilized recombinant technology to develop a DNA vaccine to prevent malaria infections. When the program began in the 1990s, the majority of troop deployments, aside from Bosnia, were to malarial regions, and the
Plasmodium parasites were the top cause of casualties in Somalia. In tests announced in 1998, research teams were immunized with Plasmodium DNA, with the majority of participants developing T-cells that function as antibodies when confronted with malarial
parasites. This development involved the creation of malaria vectors that functioned like common vaccines, potentially opening the way to safer deployments for American Marines (Gillert 1998). The advent of DNA vaccines of this type theoretically allows scientists to
develop vaccinations against all known diseases. The Naval Medical Research Institute therefore created a “phage library” for the purposes of developing antibodies to all possible strains of infectious agents (Wang 1998). As the technology is further developed, the

with defense planners concerned by the

militaries of advanced states will increasingly turn to active biotech solutions to biological threats, rather than pharmaceutical prophylactics. However,

possibility of the use of genetically modified bioweapons by rogue and non-state actors, they will also
conduct further research into countering genetically engineered vectors that might be created to replace
the naturally occurring agents against which American forces are already protected (Department of Defense 1998). DARPA’s (2013) “7 Day

to develop persistent and transient immunities to unspecified pathogens

Biodefense” program seeks out of the recognition that unfamiliar agents would
likely be employed in a major biowarfare attack. Benign uses of Frankenfoods The apparent arrival of the end of germ warfare for military biotech purposes does not portend the resolution of the dual-use dilemma. As the planners of the AMP project note, it is still
necessary to work with deadly pathogens if one is to find treatments for them. Another commercial sector field that is experiencing securitization, and is already highly controversial in its own right, is genetically modified food. Called “Frankenfoods” by their vocal
detractors and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) by agribusiness, they represent a growing number of plant and animal products that have been the recipients of recombinant engineering to, among other results, increase their yield, improve their flavor, or
lengthen their shelf lives. GMOs potentially hold a number of possibilities for military purposes. As far back as 1960, the United States Air Force and Navy funded studies to determine whether ions accelerated plant growth and could thereby feed troops on forward
deployments (Krueger et al. 1962). More recently, the Army has initiated programs to develop crops with enhanced levels of nutritional components, built-in vaccines, or edible factors that impart resistance to spoilage (Committee 2001, p. 53). In particular, “functional
foods” are expected to reduce logistical demands, which would enable more efficient power projection. Such foods have been modified to provide more than their normal nutritional value. Instead, they can contain nutraceuticals “such as naturally occurring
antimicrobials that inhibit certain pathogens known to exist in a given operational area. Or foods could be designed with vaccines in them, and an army could be vaccinated quickly and efficiently by distributing genetically engineered food” (Armstrong and Warner
2003). Genetically modified food is also being developed to be highly digestible to reduce the quantity of rations that require transportation, and with biomarkers to distinguish the ingestor as friendly under battlefield or peacekeeping scans (Egudo 2004, p. 14). Future
plans call for each soldier to be outfitted with [such] a wearable computer system to provide situational awareness displays, analysis of sensor and targeting data, and communications. [The prototype] is capable of withstanding virtually any environmental abuse,
including extended submersion in water … Such devices take an input data block and scan it against stored images. One practical military application is for the rapid battlefield identification of friend or foe. (Armstrong and Warner 2003) The Army Land Warrior
Program is scheduled to provide each combat soldier with a wearable computer to assist with the processing of sensor and targeting data, situational awareness displays, and communications. As the use of graphical formats to facilitate the assimilation of information in
real time increases, the Army will have a growing need for computer memory capacity on the battlefield. In principle, an optical 3-D memory based on bacteria polymers can store roughly three orders of magnitude more information in the same size enclosure than a
two-dimensional optical disk. (Committee 2001, pp. 27–28) These advancements were followed by the use of a single gram of synthetic DNA to store 700 terabytes of data – or the equivalent of 70,000 movies – indefinitely in a transportable freeze-dried form (Ingham
2013). While new biomaterials (incorporating biological organisms or their outputs) must be reviewed and approved by the Federal FDA for safety and efficacy, substances that are merely biomimetic (or “bioinspired”) do not face this hurdle. One such example,
developed by the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration, is the fastener Velcro. In addition to augmenting soldiers by giving them the proportional strength of insects, military planners also hope to endow them with lightweight body armor that
absorbs impacts as efficiently as the exoskeletons of mollusks (Armstrong and Warner 2003). “On a strength-to-weight basis, the abalone shell has armor protection capabilities equal to or greater than those of existing materials … When laminated hierarchical structures
of biological systems (e.g. the nacre of abalone shell) are mimicked … significant improvements in the composite mechanical properties have been observed” (Committee 2001, p. 43). Imaging and surveillance Enzyme research also entails the development of
“bioreceptors” comprised of thin films with photoelectronic properties. Processes recently developed include integrating lightsensitive proteins into optical devices, particularly for laser eye protection, polymerbased batteries, and electromagnetic shielding. Bioreceptors
can also detect the presence of selected DNA, which makes them useful in identifying infectious agents (United States Army: N ew Materials Development Using Biotechnology Process 1998). “A network of biosensors could considerably improve a commander’s view
of the battlefield. Some researchers envision soldiers wearing wristwatch-style biosensors that are sensitive to a variety of target molecules. In effect, each solider would become a detection device and warn of a possible biological or chemical attack. Also, such sensors
could be used to monitor the health and well-being of entire units” (Armstrong and Warner 2003). But still other efforts have made tremendous progress in reducing the role of humans in collecting data and replacing them with other agents: insects. Although the United
States Army may have experimented with mosquitoes as bioweapon delivery systems in the 1960s (Maurer, in Maurer 2009, p. 96); in 2009, DARPA-funded engineers at the University of California, Berkeley, announced that they had developed cyborg beetles that they
could direct by remote control. The researchers implanted electrodes into the brains and muscles of two species of beetle, which could then be made to fly and maneuver on command, for use in recover and spying missions (Callaway 2009). DARPA describes its Hybrid
Insect MEMS Program as follows: The animal world has provided mankind with locomotion over millennia…. The HI-MEMS program is aimed to develop technology that provides more control over insect locomotion, just as saddles and horseshoes are needed for
horse locomotion control … The realization of cyborgs with most of the machine component inside the insect body will provide stealthy robots that use muscle actuators which have been developed over millions of years of evolution. (DARPA, “HI-MEMS” 2010) Prior
to the insect agents, DARPA had already created a “roborat,” a rodent controlled by a neural prosthesis via a laptop keyboard so that it could climb stairs and navigate mazes, which Director Goldblatt compared to a child’s remote-controlled car. Further developments
included mounted cameras for visual data collection, and prostheses implanted along the rat’s belly so that it would not be observed. The neural prostheses stimulated the rats’ pleasure centers, motivating them on in their tasks, and Moreno (2006, pp. 43–44) notes that
there are obvious implications for how such prostheses could be adapted to human subjects as well. Exotic weaponry Whether commanding a fleet of drone bees along with drone aircraft, or a company of super-soldier Augments with the abilities of insects, the United
States and its technologically advanced allies and competitors are assuming the capacity to wage conventional warfare and espionage in a manner that will not soon be available to internal or regional adversaries or to non-state antagonists. But it is in the area of novel
bioweapons where hegemonic actors stand poised to offer attacks against which their adversaries could mount no possible defense. Currently, many potential lines of research are banned under the terms of the BWC, but even if state a ctors abide by its terms, private
sector breakthroughs will continue to have dual-use capabilities that can be studied. Indeed, some of them have already caused outbursts of political violence internationally. Genetic weapons Until the end of the twentieth century, bioweapons meant pathogens (and

possibly animal delivery systems). The biotech revolution, and particularly the ability to sequence and translate entire genomes, has altered that equation. Some state militaries, notably China’s , are
already publicly expressing an interest in attacking targets by reordering their bodily
functions through gene therapy The long term implications of genomics
what is known in more benign applications as . Planners in the United States also note that:

will present the Army with opportunities and challenges Army can, however, promote even in the next decade … The

development of new products and processes that will be consistent with or specific to its missions and
needs . This will require that the Army be fully aware of the synergistic effects of biological tools. (Committee 2001, p. 15) “The goal of gene therapy is to effect a change in the genetic makeup of an individual by introducing new information designed to
replace or repair a faulty gene.” This is accomplished by using the same principle employed since the first smallpox vaccination: the use of a harnessed, crippled virus to serve as a “Trojan horse” vector, in this case bearing replacement or supplemental genes to alter cell
functioning. Somatic cell therapy affects only the cells of the individual receiving it, and for reasons of ethics and technical feasibility, most therapeutic research has been of this type. But there is also the technique of germline cell therapy, which might “lead to a
heritable change that could repair problems for all future generations” (Block, in Drell et al. 1999, pp. 60–62). Although American military planners are bullish on the potential for gene therapy to improve the lots of wounded servicemen in the near future, the
technologies are not yet universally acclaimed nor even accepted. The United States Department of Energy (2009) noted that the FDA “has not yet [as of 2014] approved any human gene therapy product for sale. Current gene therapy is experimental and has not proven
very successful in clinical trials. Little progress has been made since the first gene therapy clinical trial began in 1990.” This reaction stems in part from the death and illness of several children who had received gene therapies to treat life-threatening chronic conditions.
At the same time, however, researchers elsewhere announced that gene therapy safely and successfully restored partial sight to congenitally blind test subjects. The results were accomplished by inserting healthy copies of a missing gene into patient retina cells via a
vector manufactured by a private American company called Targeted Genetics (University College of London 2008). Vector-delivered gene therapies remain an emerging biotechnology, but cases such as these demonstrate both that vectors can be used to create
significant physical alterations in targets, and that these changes can be deadly. The discovery that viruses can be carried airborne for considerable distances even after the droplets of fluid constituting their transmission media have fallen to the ground provides further
evidence that vectors might soon be used to deliver genetic therapies – or maladies – to wide target populations (The Medical News 2007). With the genetic maps of entire organisms now available – the full genome for the plague bacterium was decoded in 2001 – it is
inevitable that researchers will develop the means to rewrite specified segments of targeted genes (Preston 2009, p. 296). Direct effect weapons The United States military is currently developing “a set of design and synthesis processes that will enable the specification
of a desired function, and be able to rapidly synthesize a protein that performs the function.” Rather than modifying existing proteins, this biotechnology would allow the creation of new proteins based on specific performance objectives (DARPA, “Protein Design
Processes” 1998). The field of genetic protein decoding and engineering of this kind is known as proteomics (Committee 2001, p. 15). Understanding the functions of proteins is key to opening entirely new frontiers in medicine – and warfare. Already, researchers have
destroyed targeted cancer cells by using engineered nanoparticles to deliver genes only to the tumor and not to healthy neighboring tissue. Once the genes were inserted, they stimulated the production of a protein that selectively destroys the cancer (BBC News 2009).
However, proteomics also opens a different avenue of potential development in biotechnological attacks in shifting away from infectious agents to targeting huma n bioregulators, natural substances in the body that control automatic processes such as blood pressure and
immune responses. Alibek (1999) claimed that the Soviet Union pursued this research into “direct effect weapons” in the 1980s to circumvent the BWC. The result would not actually be an illness, but the turning of the body against itself through disruption, and projects
along these lines have at least been considered (Huang and Kosal 2008, p. 9, Preston 2009, pp. 313–314). Interfering with some of the body’s neurotransmitters, for example, could cause memory loss, panic disorder, or depression (Dando, in Pearson et al. 2007, pp.

Chinese researchers
133–134). NATO has listed “chemical technologies that could act on the central nervous system” as “technologies of interest” (Pearson, in Pearson et al. 2007, p. 89). Guo and Yang (2005) directly

addressed the security applications of such efforts in proteomics, arguing: Direct-effect weapons … can
cause destruction more powerful and more civilized than that caused by conventional killing methods
that is both

like nuclear weapons A military attack

gunpowder or might wound an enemy’s genes
… causing , therefore, , proteins, cells, tissues, and organs,

more damage than conventional weapons could. However, such devastating, nonlethal effects will require us to pacify the enemy through postwar reconstruction efforts and hatred control … [W]e
could create a microbullet out of a 1 micron tungsten or gold ion, on whose surface plasmid DNA or naked DNA could be precipitated, and deliver the bullet via a gunpowder explosion, electron transmission, or high-pressured gas to penetrate the body surface. We

Around the same time, an American biodefense

could then release DNA molecules to integrate with the host’s cells through blood circulation and cause disease or injury by controlling genes.

expert added that: If one can disrupt unit loyalty through fear or another emotion, the army would cease to
exist as a fighting force . Delivery
Claustrophobia would make soldiers tear off their protective face mask. Fear, thirst, accelerated heart rate, hypermotility of the gut – these would be the desired peptide effects.

would be accomplished using engineered pathogens, and their primary role in biowarfare would be as
delivery systems for direct effect weapons rather than the transmission of infectious disease (Moreno 2006, pp. 178–179). The

the emergence of advanced biotechnologies, many of which already exist or are being
international balance of power With

developed for expressly military purposes, the United States holds the potential for achieving a decisive
advantage in power projection capabilities Besides the United States, beyond the reach of its current adversaries and most of its likely potential competitors.

other actors are expanding their biotech R&D sectors, notably the emerging great powers China and India,
where force planners must consider the usage of bioweapons in Asian theaters of combat in both classical and modern times (Clunan et

China is developing its military capabilities to become a regional power at the least, and advanced
al. 2008).

biotechnologies could play a role in this effort it will concentrate on . “As the Chinese military expands its power projection capabilities,

creating asymmetrical advantages in the face of superior US conventional technology ” (NTI 2003). Chinese military medical
researchers have written a number of articles proposing the use of proteomic weapons to engage in non-lethal “precision injury” attacks that could be healed upon enemy surrender as evidence of hegemonic “mercifulness.” Despite the evident offensive strategic
potential of such research – one such article is titled “The Command of Biotechnology and Merciful Conquest” – there is still evidence of the constraints of international norms against biowarfare. Indeed, the author claims that biotech warfare approaches “abide by the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention more effectively, and strike a blow on the traditional bioweapons, therefore welcoming new military progresses and reforms, and changing the notions and civilization level of war” (Guo 2006, pp. 1152–1154). India, with its
reliance on the Green revolution to attempt to achieve food sufficiency, has spent the last two decades encouraging the development of agricultural biotechnologies. Many of these advances were facilitated using extensive knowledge of genetic engineering, which in
turn provided information on the de novo synthesis of biological agents. Whether such synthesis has actually been done is uncertain. India has made substantial efforts to prepare its military force for a biological attack. In December of 1998, India began to train its
medical personnel to deal with the eventualities of such an attack. (NTI 2009) India’s equivalent of DARPA, the Defense Research & Development Organization operates a network of 52 laboratories whose research includes life sciences for military purposes. These
include the Defense Institute of High-Altitude Research and the Defense Food Research Laboratory (Department of Biotechnology, Government of India 2013, p. 20). It s reported products parallel those investigated by its American counterparts, including treatments to

One
combat altitude sickness, transgenic crops, and protective polymers for uniforms, although products are frequently described in terms of their commercial rather than strategic potentials (Defense Research & Development Organization 2015).

widely cited potential threat to international security from biotechnology is that, as more actors become
involved in research into militarized biotechnology, threat of dissemination to non-state actors increases the
through the increased availability of production equipment and available data. Maurer (in Maurer 2009, p. 86) notes that commercially available micronizers are sold that can produce 1–10 μm particles, and in their advertising material, the “companies boast that they
can be operated by ‘anyone … in their garage.’” And non-state actors with interests in such technologies have been quite busy utilizing such machinery in the past decade, with individuals referred to as “garage hackers” operating autonomously with small pieces of

because such proliferation occurs over time ,

equipment and biological material that can be purchased from suppliers over the internet (United States House of Representatives 2005, p. 30). Still,

and because research by defense establishments will continue including in biodefense, the most during this period,

sophisticated uses of biotech will remain in the arsenals of advanced state actors just as they do with conventional armaments today,

Rather than being the “poor man’s nuclear weapon,” twenty-first-century

despite the proliferation of surplus conventional arms.

biotechnology will actually provide a decided asymmetrical advantage to major powers that will
complement their superiority Technologically advanced states will be far more likely to be able
in conventional forces.

to counter classical “germ warfare” by rogue states and non-state groups than will be actors bereft
like anthrax attacks

of a biotech industry to mount defenses against vectors that introduce engineered viruses, or proteomic weapons that disrupt human bioregulators. Re-evaluating Human Security after the Biotech RMA It might be asked whether, for all the
novelty of the particular technologies described, there is anything genuinely qualitatively different from any other technological developments that improved the effectiveness and reach of fighters, going back to clubs and spears. In describing efforts to enhance
cognitive functioning, Bostrom and Savulescu (cited in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, p. 2) ask “How is taking modafinil fundamentally different from imbibing a good cup of tea? How is either morally different from getting a good night’s sleep?” They note that even
simple shoes can arguably be called a technological human enhancement over bare feet. Sandel (in Savulescu and Bostrom 2009, pp. 73–74) adds that it is otherness rather than fairness that is the objection to human enhancement in sports because different athletes have
different physical capabilities to begin with. Certainly this distinction would apply to states as well. Wheelis (in Pearson et al. 2007, p. 4) argues that there is no real incentive for states to spend billions of dollars in a bid to develop lethal neurotransmitter disruptors
when they have effective conventional armaments. He does, however, note the potential power of such technology for purposes of incapacitation. A natural extension would be the use of coercion against the incapacitated (e.g. Tell us where the rebels are hiding and
your blood pressure will return to normal). Perhaps the greatest threat to international stability in the genomic age is the international emergence of two classes of humankind, separated by disparities in living conditions far wider than those between the developed and
developing worlds today. Described by biologist Lee Silver, this would be “a two-class system with rich, genetically enhanced ‘GenRich’ types lording it over poorer, inferior ‘Naturals,’” on a global scale (Armstrong and Warner 2003). Ultimately, the perception of

What these biotechnologies do not disrupt is order within the

injustice by the multitude of the have-nots would render such a system unstable (Carr 1964, Bull 2002).

international system In the past . powerful actors viewed

, advances in weapons technology have been condemned as immoral in part because the most , whether states or rulers,

them as challenges to their hegemony terrorists and rogue states are imputed to have a desire to use. Today,

bioweapons but few outcries have been heard over the legitimacy of the advantages
, meaning to release pathogens against civilian targets,

conferred by other biotechnologies upon what are already the strongest actors the biotech RMA is . In this sense,

more akin to the development of status quo-reinforcing asymmetric weapons technologies like machine
guns, which were not condemned by hegemonic powers, than by potentially status quo-disruptive asymmetric technologies such as chemical warfare (Price 1997, pp. 2–6).

While matching advanced technology is a challenge to would-be competitors, it is not an insurmountable

one (Quille, in Lewer 2002, p. 45). And it might actually inspire new forms of lower cost asymmetric counter-attacks, as attempts to use model airplanes as drones to attack American targets by would-be terrorists demonstrates. But for
now , as with the nuclear club, with their overwhelming edge in both offensive and defensive
capabilities, the United States and other advanced industrial nations can rest assured that their military and
economic dominance is in no jeopardy Biotech of the international system is being . nology, often cited as an asymmetric threat to conventional power projection capabilities,

harnessed by those very militaries as a force multiplier , and their R&D and production capabilities far
outstrip those of any possible combination of rogue states and terrorist groups . The biotech RMA is well underway, and states are free to shift their
attention from international to internal biological threats. Many of these developments are already occurring without an informed public debate and, indeed, many of the biotechnologies outlined in this paper doubtless seem too fantastical to warrant serious

ust as most of the public and decision- makers would have dismissed the plausibility of atomic
consideration. But j

weapons before Hiroshima, and were unaware before the invasion of Afghanistan that drones were already
in existence, so too are the seemingly far-fetched qualities of advanced biotech already manifesting nology

themselves in super-solider planning and budgeting in the United States and elsewhere.
Answers To
 AT: Stem Cells Illegal
Embryotic stem cell research has been legally funded by the government since 2011, when the
Dickey-Wicker amendment was reinterpreted
Timmer 11 (John Timmer [ArsTechica’s Science editor, PhD in Molecular and Cell Biology from the University of California,
Berkeley] “Appeals Court lifts stem cell research-funding injunction” Published by ArsTechnica, 4/29/11,
https://arstechnica.com/science/2011/04/appeals-court-lifts-stem-cell-funding-injunction / WY-TH)

Today, a
three-judge panel of a US Appeals Court lifted an injunction against the NIH's revised policy
on the funding of stem cell research. The new policy, which would open up research funding to many
more human embryonic stem cell lines (hESCs), attracted a lawsuit from researchers who focus on adult
stem cells, who claimed that their chances of obtaining grants had been diminished . That suit produced an injunction
that would block the National Institutes of Health from distributing funding for hESC work. The Appeals Court had previously stayed this injunction;

now it has lifted it entirely, although the case is continuing towards trial at the District Court level. For decades, legislation called the Dickey-
Wicker Amendment has prevented the US government from funding research in which a
human embryo is destroyed. Everyone agrees that this prohibits funding of work in which hESCs are
derived through the destruction of fertilized eggs. Differences arise, however, regarding research that
involves hESCs that have been previously created. President Bush's administration determined that this is acceptable, provided that
the ESC creation occurred prior to a specific date . President Obama's administration lifted this temporal restriction; work
on previously created hESC lines is now eligible for funding, regardless of creation date. This led a variety
of groups to sue the NIH over its new policy, claiming it violated Dickey-Wicker. After a few preliminary decisions,
however, only a pair of scientists remained involved in the lawsuit. They were determined to have standing to sue because their
work on adult stem cells would face increased competition for grant money from labs that were previously
ineligible for federal funding. A District Court awarded these plaintiffs a preliminary injunction that would block the NIH's new funding
policy, ruling that they were likely to win their case (i.e., the policy did violate Dickey-Wicker) and were at risk of immediate harm, grant-wise. The
appeals court stayed that injunction while it considered the NIH's appeal of the decision. Now, it has chosen to lift the junction entirely. Everyone agrees
that the relevant precedent for the new decision is Chevron v. NRDC, which states that rulings must take into account the "unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress" and whether the relevant agency (in this case, the NIH) has interpreted that intent reasonably. In this case, the intent in question is
whether Congress meant to ban all research involving an hESC line created through the destruction of an embryo, or simply the destruction of an embryo.
Using a dictionary definition of the term "research," the Circuit Court had determined that research in
the broader sense was banned; a dissenting Appeals judge also felt that way. The majority, however, noted that
Dickey-Wicker is written in the present tense, which implies that only the research involved in creating the ESC, rather than all future research involving

Dickey-Wicker is ambiguous and the NIH seems reasonably to have concluded

it, is banned. "
that, although Dickey-Wicker bars funding for the destructive act of deriving an ESC from an
embryo," the decision reads, "it does not prohibit funding a research project in
which an ESC will be used." In general, the Appeals Court's ruling is in keeping with how scientists view the term
"research," which focuses on the actual project at hand rather than the creation of all the equipment and materials needed to pursue it. The Appeals Court
also ruled that the plaintiffs were in no danger of harm as a result of the changed policy, since they had been competing against hESC researchers since
2001, when the Bush policy was first adopted. This will allow the NIH to continue its plans to fund stem cell work as
the District Court continues to hear the case; currently, both parties have requested summary judgements in their favor. Although the District Judge has
shown himself partial to the plaintiff's arguments, the Appeals Court has sent a clear signal that some of them are unlikely to hold water, which may have
a significant influence on any future decisions. Left in place, however, is the ruling that let the case proceed in the first place, however: researchers whose
chances of funding are reduced by a change in policy still have the standing to sue the funding agency. Although this still requires that the potential
litigants find a way to argue that the policy change violates a law, it still opens the door to frivolous lawsuits from disgruntled researchers.
 AT: GOP/Ethical concerns Thumpers
iPSCs solve ethical concerns involving embryotic stem cells and dodge federal restrictions – has
bipartisan support
Kolata 07 (Gina Kolata [Science and Medicine Reporter at NYT] “Scientists Bypass need for Embryo to get Stem Cells” Published
in The New York Times, 11/21/07, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/science/21stem.html / WY-TH)

Two teams of scientists reported yesterday that they had turned human skin cells into what appear to be
embryonic stem cells without having to make or destroy an embryo — a feat that could quell the ethical
debate troubling the field. All they had to do, the scientists said, was add four genes. The genes
reprogrammed the chromosomes of the skin cells, making the cells into blank slates that should be able to
turn into any of the 220 cell types of the human body, be it heart, brain, blood or bone . Until now, the only way to
get such human universal cells was to pluck them from a human embryo several days after fertilization, destroying the embryo in the process. The
need to destroy embryos has made stem cell research one of the most divisive issues in American
politics, pitting President Bush against prominent Republicans like Nancy Reagan, and patient advocates
who hoped that stem cells could cure diseases like Alzheimer’s. The new studies could defuse the issue as a presidential
election nears. The reprogrammed skin cells may yet prove to have subtle differences from embryonic stem cells that come directly from human embryos,
and the new method includes potentially risky steps, like introducing a cancer gene. But stem cell researchers say they are confident that it will not take
long to perfect the method and that today’s drawbacks will prove to be temporary. Researchers and ethicists not involved in the findings say the work,
conducted by independent teams from Japan and Wisconsin, should reshape the stem cell field. At some time in the near future, they said, today’s debate
over whether it is morally acceptable to create and destroy human embryos to obtain stem cells should be moot. “ Everyone
was waiting for
this day to come,” said the Rev. Tadeusz Pacholczyk, director of education at the National Catholic
Bioethics Center. “You should have a solution here that will address the moral objections that have
been percolating for years,” he added. The White House said that Mr. Bush was “very pleased” about the new
findings, adding that “By avoiding techniques that destroy life, while vigorously supporting alternative
approaches, President Bush is encouraging scientific advancement within ethical boundaries. ” The new
method sidesteps other ethical quandaries, creating stem cells that genetically match the donor without having to resort to cloning or the
requisite donation of women’s eggs. Genetically matched cells would not be rejected by the immune system if used as replacement tissues for patients.
Even more important, scientists say, is that genetically matched cells from patients would enable them to study complex diseases, like Alzheimer’s, in the
laboratory. Until now, the only way most scientists thought such patient-specific stem cells could be made would be to create embryos that were clones of
that person and extract their stem cells. Just last week, scientists in Oregon reported that they did this with monkeys, but the prospect of doing such
experiments in humans has been ethically fraught. But with the new method, human cloning for stem cell research, like the creation of human embryos to
extract stem cells, may be unnecessary. The new cells in theory might be turned into an embryo, but not by simply implanting them in a womb. “It really
is amazing,” said Dr. Leonard Zon, director of the stem cell program at Children’s Hospital Boston at Harvard Medical School. And, said Dr. Douglas A.
Melton, co-director of the Stem Cell Institute at Harvard University, it is “ethically uncomplicated.” For all the hopes invested in it over the last decade,
embryonic stem cell research has moved slowly, with no cures or major therapeutic discoveries in sight. The
new work could allow the
field to vault significant problems, including the shortage of human embryonic stem cells and
restrictions on federal financing for such research. Even when scientists have other sources of financing,
they report that it is expensive and difficult to find women who will provide eggs for such research. The new discovery is being published online today in
Cell, in a paper by Shinya Yamanaka of Kyoto University and the Gladstone Institute of Cardiovascular Disease in San Francisco, and in Science, in a
paper by James A. Thomson and his colleagues at the University of Wisconsin. Dr. Thomson’s work received some federal money. While both groups
used just four genes to reprogram human skin cells, two of the genes used differed from group to group. All the genes in question, though, act in a similar
way — they are master regulator genes whose role is to turn other genes on or off. The reprogrammed cells, the scientists report, appear to behave very

“induced pluripotent stem cells,” meaning cells that

much like human embryonic stem cells but were called
can change into many different types. “By any means we test them they are the same as embryonic stem
cells, ” Dr. Thomson says. He and Dr. Yamanaka caution, though, that they still must confirm that the reprogrammed human skin cells really are the same as stem cells they get from embryos. And while those studies are under way, Dr. Thomson and others say, it
would be premature to abandon research with stem cells taken from human embryos. Another caveat is that, so far, scientists use a type of virus, a retrovirus, to insert the genes into the cells’ chromosomes. Retroviruses slip genes into chromosomes at random,
sometimes causing mutations that can make normal cells turn into cancers. One gene used by the Japanese scientists actually is a cancer gene. The cancer risk means that the resulting stem cells would not be suitable for replacement cells or tissues for patients with
diseases, like diabetes, in which their own cells die. But they would be ideal for the sort of studies that many researchers say are the real promise of this endeavor — studying the causes and treatments of complex diseases. For example, researchers could make stem cells
from a person with a disease like Alzheimer’s and turn the stem cells into nerve cells in a petri dish. Then they might learn what goes awry in the brain and how to prevent or treat the disease. But even the retrovirus drawback may be temporary, scientists say. Dr.
Yamanaka and several other researchers are trying to get the same effect by adding chemicals or using more benign viruses to get the genes into cells. They say they are starting to see success. “Anyone who is going to suggest that this is just a sideshow and that it won’t
work is wrong,” Dr. Melton predicted. The new discovery was preceded by work in mice. Last year, Dr. Yamanaka published a paper showing that he could add four genes to mouse cells and turn them into mouse embryonic stem cells. He even completed the ultimate
test to show that the resulting stem cells could become any type of mouse cell. He used them to create new mice. Twenty percent of those mice, though, developed cancer, illustrating the risk of using retroviruses and a cancer gene to make cells for replacement parts.
Scientists were electrified by the reprogramming discovery, Dr. Melton said. “Once it worked, I hit my forehead and said, ‘It’s so obvious,’” he said. “But it’s not obvious until it’s done.” The work set off an international race to repeat the work with human cells.
“Dozens, if not hundreds of labs, have been attempting to do this,” said Dr. George Daley, associate director of the stem cell program at Children’s H ospital. Ever since the birth of Dolly the sheep in 1996, scientists knew that adult cells could, in theory, turn into
embryonic stem cells. But they had no idea how to do it without cloning, the way Dolly was created. With cloning, researchers put an adult cell’s chromosomes into an unfertilized egg whose genetic material was removed. The egg, by some mysterious process, then
does all the work. It reprograms the adult cell’s chromosomes, bringing them back to the state they were in just after the egg was fertilized. A few days later, a ball of stem cells emerges in the embryo, and every cell of the embryo, including its stem cells, is an exact
genetic match of the adult. The abiding questions, though, were: How did the egg reprogram the adult cell’s chromosomes? Would it be possible to reprogram an adult cell without using an egg? About four years ago, Dr. Yamanaka and Dr. Thomson independently hit
upon the same idea. They would search for genes that are being used in an embryonic stem cell that are not being used in an adult cell. Then they would see if those genes would reprogram an adult cell. Dr. Yamanaka worked with mouse cells, a nd Dr. Thomson worked
with human cells from foreskins. The researchers found more than 1,000 candidate genes. So both groups took educated guesses, trying to whittle down the genes to the few dozen they thought might be the crucial ones and then asking whether any combinations of
those genes could turn a skin cell into a stem cell. “The number of factors could have been 1 or 10 or 100 or more,” Dr. Yama naka said in a telephone interview from his laboratory in Japan. If many genes had been required, the experiments would have failed, Dr.
Thomson said, because it would have been impossible to test all the gene combinations. As soon as Dr. Yamanaka saw that the mouse experiments succeeded, he began trying the same brute force method in human skin cells that he had ordered from a commercial
laboratory. Some were face cells from a 36-year-old white woman and others were connective tissue cells from joints of a 69-year-old white man. Dr. Yamanaka said he thought it would take a few years to find the right genes and the right conditions to make the human
experiments work. Feeling the hot breath of competitors on his neck, he was in his laboratory every day for 12 to 14 hours a day, he said. A few months later, he succeeded. “We did work very hard,” Dr. Yamanaka said. “But we were very surprised.”
 AT: Stem Cell Bad – Cancer
(Also in the us-iran key header)

US-Iran stem cell collaboration solves cancer

Roudi et al 17 (Raheleh Roudi [PhD at Iran University of Medical Sciences in the Oncapathology Research Center – specializes
in Cancer biology and Stem cell research], Marzieh Ebrahimi, Ahmad Shariftabrizi & Zahra Madjd “Cancer stem cell research in Iran:
potentials and challenges” Published by Future Medicine in Future Oncology – Volume 13 Number 20 – 8/4/17 / WY-TH)

Tumor cells are extremely heterogeneous in terms of their malignant potential, drug sensitivity and the tendency for metastasis and relapse [129].
Hypermalignant subpopulation of cancercells, termed CSCs, also referred to as TICs or stem-like cancer cells, have been isolated from
patients with various tumor types [14,15,18,20,130–136]. These
cells are found to be highly tumorigenic and possess high
stemness properties, including self-renewal capacity, evading from apoptosis, increased expression of ABC
transporters and high telomerase activity, as well as, resistant to conventional chemoradiation. Moreover,
chemotherapy and radiation induce stemness genes in cancer cells that lead to the enrichment of CSCs in
tumor tissues [9,137,138]. A few studies have summarized the previous research studies in SC field in Iran and their strengths and weaknesses but
no data were yet available regarding CSCs research in Iran [139,140]. Therefore, in the current review, we presented CSC-related publications in Iran.
Our findingsindicate that CSC papers in Iran have been rapidly increasing in number in the last
decade. The marked increase in the number of publications in this regard is largely resulting from the
devoted efforts of Iranian scientists despite limited equipment and budget mainly stemming from the
international sanctions imposed on Iran's economy [141–143]. Isolation and characterization of CSC at an in vitro level (using flow
cytometry, colony and sphere formation assays, RT-PCR, cDNA microarray, Western blotting, cloning, siRNA and similar) and their targeting (e.g., with
nanoparticles) were frequently used in CSC research papers in Iran, whereas more expensive methods such as next-generation sequencing were rarely
used [table omitted] Similar phenotypic and functional properties among the normal SCs and CSCs have provided an opportunity for their isolation and
characterization [144]. Expression of several cell surface markers or measurement of intracytoplasmic enzyme activity of ALDH has provided the
opportunity for isolating CSCs using fluorescence-activated cell sorting. Several methods have also been used for isolation of CSCs based on their
functional features, for example, sphere formation assay [9,144]. The gold standard approach for characterization of CSCs is prolonged self-renewal
capacity of the subset of tumor cells following serial transplantations into a nude or NOD/SCID mice [144]. Due to the paucity of facilities for caring
NOD/SCID mice in Iran, in vivo assessment of CSC populations isolated from different malignant tumors was not as frequently performed when
A large proportion of CSC publications in Iran have been
compared with studies from the more affluent institutions.
performed on the clinical human cancer tissues, either fresh frozen or archival pathology samples. Identification
of diagnostic/prognostic and monitoring of patients using CSC marker(s) needs a comprehensive cancer registry, and obtaining long-term patients’
follow-up and survival data that were not used in most studies from Iran. The
existence of CSCs that have the capacity to remain
quiescent for a long time could well be the cause of treatment failure in cancer patients; thus, complete
regression and efficient treatment of malignant tumors was achieved by targeting CSCs, but not of normal
SCs, in addition to destroying the tumor bulk [145,146]. In the search for a magic bullet to target CSCs, it is crucial to find molecular
targets that are requisite for cancer stemness but not by normal tissue SCs, in other words, the molecules that help distinguish between the tumoral and
normal SCs [145,146]. Other attractive and practical approaches available include: Targeting the microenvironment, Targeting the ABC transporter,
Manipulation of miRNA expression, Induction of CSCs apoptosis, Induction of CSCs differentiation [144,147,148]. Emerging evidence indicate that
translation of CSCs knowledge from the laboratory to clinics entails a long and cumbersome path. Approximately 90% of CSC
publications in Iran were performed in academic centers without partnerships with
pharmaceutical or biotech companies. Global previous studies show that few clinical trials have started
enrolling patients testing experimental drugs for targeting CSCs, the results of which are not out yet, while
we could not yet identify any clinical trials using targeting of CSCs in Iran [149,150]. Parallel with the global
trends in CSCs research, significant effort is needed to translate the current experimental findings (in vitro
studies) of CSCs research in Iran to clinical application. We found that approximately 17% of CSC papers in Iran from the years
2004–2016 are publications addressing the breast and colorectal cancers. These two cancers are some of the most prevalent cancer types in Iran and this
might be the reason for selecting them as experimental models by the Iranian scientists. In 2008, the Council for Stem Cell Sciences and Technologies
was formed in the Iranian Presidential office for Science and Technology. The CSC workgroup was developed by the Council for Stem Cell Sciences and
Technologies and its first meeting was held in March 2016. Following the guidelines of this workgroup, the CSC group in Oncopathology Research
Center of Iran University of Medical Sciences and in Royan Institute was formed. The first symposium on CSCs was held by the cooperation of the
Council for Stem Cell Sciences and Technologies, Iran University of Medical Sciences and Royan Institute on 2 February 2017. Conclusion There is
a necessity for a comprehensive national program, site visits of high impact centers, expanding
international collaboration, training scientists and personnel, establishing setup
laboratories and buildup of the infrastructure for CSC research in Iran. Additionally, a defined
budget should be dedicated to the CSCs research in Iran [table omitted] A comprehensive research strategy for cancer
including CSCs in Iran should entail: Defining interactions of genetic and epigenetic changes in normal SCs and CSCs; Identifying molecular drivers of
stemness; Understanding the contribution of CSCs to the mechanisms of tumor heterogeneity, dormancy, resistance and identifying key target nodes the
dynamics of tumor activation; Developing valid CSC markers for chemosensitivity and radiosensitivity; Understanding the rational combinations of
CSC-targeted therapy for improved personalized therapy; Developing multimodality imaging CSC biomarkers for clinical diagnosis and response
monitoring in primary and metastatic disease; Developing bioinformatics expertise to maximize the applicability of currently available clinical and
experimental data [151]. Future perspective In a glance, the
future of CSC in Iran holds the promise of custom-made
medical solutions for early diagnosis, prognosis and targeted therapy in cancer patients. However, to fully
establish the long-term safety profile of therapies using the drug(s)-targeting CSCs in clinical phase,
standard large-scale randomized clinical trials should be performed.
Oil Adv
 Travel Ban Kills to US Oil Production
Travel ban hurts US oil---it raises costs for US oil companies and stifles the flow of Iranian talent
Steffy 17 (LOREN C. STEFFY is a senior writer for 30 Point Strategies, based in Houston. He is an author, speaker, consultant and
former journalist. He is the author of Drowning in Oil: BP and the Reckless Pursuit of Profit and The Man Who Thought Like a Ship.
For nine years, Steffy was the business columnist for the Houston Chronicle, and his writing has been published in newspapers and
other publications nationwide. He has appeared on CNBC, Fox Business, MSNBC, the BBC, and the PBS NewsHour. “Why Trump’s
Latest Travel Ban May Be Bad for Oil Companies,” 10/11/17. https://www.texasmonthly.com/energy/trumps-latest-travel-ban-may-
bad-oil-companies/)

From the time he first tried to institute a travel ban in the early days of his administration, President Trump’s efforts to crack
down on immigration have presented a quandary for energy producers. On the one hand, the oil industry generally
appreciates Trump’s anti-regulation stance, especially his efforts to roll back Obama-era rules enacted by the Environmental
Protection Agency. But the travel ban poses a direct threat to the industry’s workforce , both present and future. In late
September, President Trump issued new travel restrictions on foreigners from countries including Iran, Libya, Syria,
Venezuela, and Yemen. The latest restrictions were designed to replace earlier ones that had been struck down by the courts. Trump
tweeted that the measures were part of his “sacred obligation” to “ensure the safety and security of the American people.” For the oil
and gas industry, though, the ban is nettlesome. “The travel ban is a problem for the oil and gas industry because they’re a
global industry,” says Michael Webber, deputy director of the Energy Institute at the University of Texas. “If you put
restrictions on how people can move around the world, it affects how these companies operate.” Managers
may be unable to oversee workers they manage in the U.S., and supervisors may be unable to visit well
sites or meet with regulators. Recruiting new talent also may become more difficult at a time when oil and
gas companies need it most . The industry has been on the hunt for young talent as many senior engineers
enter retirement, sometimes referred to as “the great crew change.” U.S. companies operating abroad almost must be
prepared for retaliation. Countries targeted by Trump’s travel ban may impose similar restrictions on U.S. workers operating in those
countries. “That makes life more expensive for these companies,” Webber says. Companies fear that the ban could
hurt their ability to win drilling concessions overseas and curtail investment opportunities . Earlier in the year,
Iraq’s parliament called for a barring U.S. citizens from the country in response to Trump’s first attempt at a travel ban. The move,
which wasn’t enacted, would have hit Irving-based ExxonMobil particularly hard. The company produces about half a million barrels
of oil a day in Iraq. And it’s not just producers. The ban itself and any retaliation by other countries could hurt oil
field service companies such as Halliburton and Baker Hughes, with tens of thousands of workers in Texas.
The ban—or the threat of them—is affecting academia as well. UT has seen an enrollment decline among
foreign students studying geology and petroleum engineering, Webber says, and the restrictions pose concerns for
some 150 foreign students already attending the school. While the impact has been small so far, it could increase once the ban takes
effect. Oil companies themselves have said little about the ban through its different iterations this year. That may be because
companies don’t want to rile Trump, who has favored easing regulations that affect the industry, from environmental restrictions to
rules on offshore drilling. Some rules, such as loosening financial reporting requirements for publicly traded oil companies, may
benefit the industry, but Webber says hopes for less regulation may be misplaced. Much of the administration’s efforts to
roll back environmental restrictions, for example, will benefit coal at the expense of natural gas. “I think in the end that Trump is
not good for oil and gas,” he says. “Anything you do to promote coal or nuclear is bad for natural gas.”

Steffy ext---the travel ban specifically hurts Iranian students and professors
Willhelm 17 (Ian Wilhelm edits coverage of international issues and other topics. “Why the Travel Ban
Probably Hits Iranian Professors and Students the Hardest,” 1/31/17.
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Why-the-Travel-Ban-Probably/239050)

Trump administration’s travel restrictions emerge, one population in higher education seems
As reports of the impact of the
disproportionately affected: Iranian academics and students. To some, that may come as a surprise. For almost four
decades, Iran and the United States have had difficult, even hostile relations. But America has long been — and remains — a popular
destination for Iranian students to study and for Iranian scholars to pursue their careers. Here’s a snapshot of the higher-education ties
between the nations, how the links developed, and what President Trump’s executive order, which temporarily limits entry for
Iranians, among others, may mean for them. Current Ties Of the seven Muslim-majority countries that the Trump
administration’s ordertargets — Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen — Iran by far sends the most
students to American colleges. In 2015-16, more than 12,000 Iranians studied in the United States, with a
majority of them — almost 78 percent — in graduate programs, according to the Institute of International Education. Iraq sent
the next-largest cohort — 1,901. America is "still the country of first choice" for most Iranian students, said Shaul
Bakhash, an emeritus professor of Middle Eastern and Iranian history at George Mason University. "It’s striking that that popularity
has continued through the Islamic Revolution, barriers to studying abroad, and the years of financial squeeze" due to international
sanctions and economic problems in Iran. Mr. Bakhash, who was born in Iran and earned bachelor’s and master’s degrees from
Harvard University, says America is a "strong magnet" because of the large Iranian-American community in California and other
states and because of its universities’ global reputation in engineering and other scientific fields. Indeed,
more than half of the
Iranian students in the United States are studying STEM subjects. And their time in American higher
education seems to leave them with positive feelings about the country. According to a 2014 survey of recent
doctoral recipients from overseas by the National Science Foundation, Iranians more than any other nationality hoped to
stay and work in the United States. Historical Ties The intellectual exchange between Iran and the United
States goes back decades, said Abbas Milani, director of the Iranian-studies program at Stanford University. "It’s been a long,
productive process." In the 1960s and ’70s, oil wealth led to a growing middle class in Iran. But with the country’s higher-education
system unable to meet demand, families began sending their sons and daughters abroad. Fueled by that new international outlook and
government scholarships, Iran in 1979 sent more students to American colleges than did any other country, some 50,000 students.
“Despite being bombarded by anti-American rhetoric for 35 years, they still feel positively toward the country.” But that year was the
peak of the student flow. With the Islamic Revolution roiling the country and diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iranian
governments cut off by the hostage crisis, the number of Iranians studying in United States began to decline sharply. It started to
rebound only in recent years. For Iranian scholars, the revolution had something of an opposite effect, with the
United States becoming a refuge of sorts for those who chafed under the rule of the ayatollahs and the
Islamic government. America has long been the "City Upon a Hill" for many Iranian scientists and
intellectuals, said Mr. Milani, who left Iran in the 1980s after being barred from teaching and conducting research. "Despite being
bombarded by anti-American rhetoric for 35 years," he said of Iranians, "they still feel positively toward the country." Future Ties
While President Trump has proposed that visitors from Iran be subject to "extreme vetting," Iranians already faced greater hurdles to
obtaining a student visa than did most other international students. In part because of concerns about the possible military use of Iran’s
nuclear-energy program, Iranian students at American colleges are barred from studying fields such as nuclear
engineering and often do not receive a visa that allows them to make more than one entry into the United
States. Given the previous challenges — and the determination by Iranians to still study in the United States despite them — some
observers remain optimistic that the Trump administration’s changes will only hamper, not hobble, the flow of students and
intellectuals. The order will have "tactical, short-term, tragic consequences," said Mr. Milani, but he trusts that the amity between the
two peoples will win out in the end.
 US Oil Production Key to US Soft
Power/Econ
US oil boosts American soft power and economic strength and undermine foreign powers
Mead 12 (Walter Russell Mead is an American academic. He is the James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and
Humanities at Bard College and previously taught American foreign policy at Yale University. He was also the Editor-at-Large of The
American Interest magazine. Professor Mead is a Global View Columnist for The Wall Street Journal and a Distinguished Scholar at
the Hudson Institute. “WALTER RUSSELL MEAD: THE ENERGY REVOLUTION AND ITS BIGGEST LOSERS,” 10/7/12.
https://www.thegwpf.com/walter-russell-mead-the-energy-revolution-and-its-biggest-losers/)

Over the past year, we’ve been watching a geopolitical revolution get underway. It’s much bigger and more
consequential than the Arab Spring, though the legacy media are giving it much less play. It will rearrange the global chessboard,
improving the position of some powers, weakening others. It is a powerful boost to American power, reducing
America’s strategic and economic liabilities while adding considerably to its assets. And it dramatically
changes the long term outlook for, among other things, the US dollar. In line with Via Meadia‘s policy of trying to
focus attention on the most consequential events of the time, we will be following this story as it unfolds, looking at the implications
of the shifts now underway for world politics, the US economy, our domestic politics, and the green movement. While the chattering
classes yammered on about American decline and peak oil, a quite different future is taking shape. A world energy revolution
is underway and it will be shaping the realities of the 21st century when the Crash of 2008 and the Great Stagnation that
the center of gravity of the global
followed only interest historians. A new age of abundance for fossil fuels is upon us. And
energy picture is shifting from the Middle East to… North America. The two biggest winners look to be
Canada and the United States. Canada, with something like two trillion barrels worth of conventional oil in its tar sands, and
the United States with about a trillion barrels of shale oil, are the planet’s new super giant energy powers.
Throw in natural gas and coal, and the United States is better supplied with fossil fuels than any other country
on earth. Canada and the United States are each richer in oil than Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia combined. Further bolstering
America’s new geopolitical edge, the rest of the western hemisphere is also rich in oil. Venezuela is now
believed to have more oil that Saudi Arabia, and Brazil’s offshore discoveries make it a significant factor in world oil markets as well.
China is another winner, though on a smaller scale. China has the second largest shale oil reserves in the world, estimated at about half
the size of America’s. This puts China in the Saudi class as well, but given the anticipated growth in China’s economy, its shale oil
wealth will reduce but not end its need for energy imports. The other important change in the new world energy picture is one I wrote
about earlier this week: Israel’s potential emergence as a major oil and gas producer. With trillions of cubic feet of natural gas, and
potentially as much as 250 billion barrels of recoverable shale oil, Israel may be on the verge of joining the wealthiest Arab states as a
world class energy producer. These changes won’t take place overnight, but they are coming faster than many
understand. US domestic oil production is up almost half a million barrels a day thanks to North Dakota,
and the surge in US natural gas production is already changing international trade patterns. More change
will come. The Biggest Losers If the US, Canada and Israel are the likeliest big winners, the biggest losers in the coming
shift will be the Gulf petro-states and Russia . Their Gulf losses aren’t going to be economic; the Gulf will still have the
world’s cheapest oil to produce and so its oilfields will be the most profitable at any given price point. Russia, on the other
hand, is going to have a harder time. Its oil and gas are more expensive to produce and so Russia’s profit margins are likely
to fall. But regardless of the simple economic impact, in different ways and different degrees the Gulf countries and
Russia are going to lose a lot of the political advantages that their energy wealth now gives them. They will
have less ability to restrict supply and to manipulate prices than they have had in the past. Oil and gas are going
to be less special when supplies are more abundant and more broadly distributed. The unexpected success of the economic
sanctions on Iran show how this process works. Rising production in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United States enabled the
world to do something most people would have thought impossible in the golden age of OPEC. Iran’s oil sales have been cut
by something like 40 percent even as world crude prices fell. Iran’s Supreme Leader believed that the world needed his
oil so much that the US could never get the Europeans and others to agree to serious sanctions. He was like Jefferson Davis in 1860,
who believed that Britain and France needed Confederate cotton so badly that they would force the North to recognize Confederate
independence. The Supreme Leader, like Davis, was wrong. The world survived without Confederate cotton, and the world is
surviving with less oil from Iran. In fact, even as Iranian production declined, world oil prices fell. What Iran is discovering
today, others will feel tomorrow. Since the 1970s, the states on both sides of the Gulf have been central to all kinds of global
issues, and the great powers have focused enormous amounts of time and attention on their wants and needs. As the energy
revolution proceeds, they won’t completely sink into insignificance (and the US concern to protect the independence of countries
like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the rest won’t disappear), but
the days when the world hung on every word that fell
from the lips of OPEC are gone. More, the political importance of the Gulf derives in part from the
intersection of energy politics and national policy in many European countries. In places like Italy, France and
Greece, national oil companies have much greater power in national politics than they do in the US. (The US has more oil companies,
and there are more corporate and regional interests competing against what the oil companies want.) The ability of the Gulf
countries to make or mar the fortunes of foreign oil companies has been an important source of political
power for them. This power won’t go away, but it won’t be the same. There are lots of new places to look for oil
these days, and with more countries interested in attracting international investment, the balance of power will shift from resource rich
countries to firms with the capital and skill to turn those resources into revenue. Coming back to Russia, the biggest threat to
Moscow’s hopes for rebuilding its power based on energy resources comes from the discovery of huge natural gas reserves under the
eastern Mediterranean seabed. Russia can and will do what it can to join in the exploitation of these resources; Greece, Cyprus and
Israel are all willing to cooperate with the Russians when it comes to exploitation and processing. So Gazprom won’t starve — but it
could lose its ability to stop the flow of natural gas into western Europe . New pipelines will be built from Greece
north and east and while a friendly Greek government and a strong capital position for Russian companies in the Greek gas business
could give Moscow an edge, the Greeks are unlikely to allow Russia to turn Europe’s gas taps on and off at will. Additionally, new
terminals on the Atlantic coast will be built to take LNG shipments from the US. As the world gains experience with fracking
technology, and the carbon benefits of natural gas as opposed to coal grow more obvious, look for Europe to do more to explore its
own considerable potential to develop gas fields. Russia will continue making money selling gas and oil to Europe, but the political
consequences of this trade will likely disappoint. Another group numbered among the losers: energy states who
finance unorthodox economic policies and anti-US foreign policies on the basis of their oil wealth. It will still
be easier for the president of Venezuela to thumb his nose at the US and spend money on programs that build up his political strength
at home than, say, for the president of Guatemala to do that, but as world energy supplies continue to flow, both the
financial and the political benefits of having a lot of oil are going to diminish. Hugo Chavez’ successors are likely
going to have to watch their wallets and watch their words a little more closely than the Great Bolivarean has done. These changes
won’t materialize overnight. We are so far seeing only the first stages of new energy geopolitics. But one way to begin getting your
head around the new geopolitics is to think about a world in which Kuwait matters less, and Alberta more. Over the next couple of
weeks I’ll be coming back to this subject, looking at some other aspects of this big, complicated set of changes coming down the pike:
how the change will affect the winners and world politics as a whole, what the environmental and economic consequences are likely to
be, and how politics in the US may change. And going forward, Via Meadia will do its best to follow the energy revolution in the
news of the day — keeping an eye both on the progress or the lack of it at bringing the new potential sources online and on the ways
world politics shift in response.
 Iranian Scientists Key to US Oil Production
Iranian oil scientists key to US oil---the ban restricts scientists from immigrating, prevents brain
circulation, and spills over to other countries
Mandel 17 (Jenny Mandel has covered a wide range of energy, technology and business beats for all of E&E News' publications
since joining the company in 2007. Currently writing for Energywire, she tracks oil and gas issues including domestic and
international markets and technology deployment. She graduated from Stanford University with a degree in computer and cognitive
sciences. “Travel ban forces Big Oil to grapple with Trump,” 1/31/17. https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060049259)

The chaotic White House rollout of a ban on U.S. entry by travelers from seven majority-Muslim countries set in motion a new
immigration policy with unclear near-term effects and deeper impacts on the U.S. oil and gas industry and scientific community. On
Friday, the Trump administration issued an executive order stating that "immigrant and nonimmigrant entry"
into the United States by travelers from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen would be suspended for
90 days pending a policy review, triggering the detention of visitors and U.S. green card holders at airports around the country. Within
hours, the American Civil Liberties Union had secured a partial stay of the order, but by yesterday, both the guiding policy
environment and prospects for a broader policy shift out of the White House remained unclear amid a flurry of legal challenges. The
White House over the weekend offered conflicting statements on whether the arrival ban applied to legal residents with green cards, a
permit that allows a non-citizen to live and work permanently in the United States. The executive order means that people working for
U.S. companies who hail from one of the named countries cannot leave the country without risking being turned away upon their
return. Lawmakers in Iran and Iraq are said to be weighing reciprocal bans that would limit American entrance
privileges. It was not immediately clear how many employees and contractors of U.S. oil and gas
companies hail from the affected countries. But Iran, especially, has a long history of sending scientists and
engineers to U.S. academic institutions for training. Multinational energy companies working in Iraq's oil fields
participate in personnel exchanges. At least one employee of a U.S. oil company was apparently caught up in the
weekend turmoil, as The Texas Tribune reported that an Iranian engineer who works in the United States
for Chevron Corp. was detained for several hours after returning from a visit to Iran to visit a sick family
member. In a statement, the company said, "Chevron is a global company that values the contributions of all employees and
partners regardless of their country of origin, religion, race, sexual orientation or gender. We are reviewing the Executive Order to
understand any implications for our employees." One place the ban's immediate impact could be seen is at the oil and gas
industry's biggest U.S. conference, IHS Markit Ltd.'s CERAWeek, which will take place in Houston in March. The
event's media kit says the event will draw "more than 2,800 delegates from more than 50 countries" to discuss
"the most urgent issues and realities to be faced in energy markets, technologies and geopolitics." Jeff Marn, a
spokesman for IHS Markit, which hosts the event, said by email that it was too early to say how the travel ban might limit speakers'
travel to the event. Contacted yesterday, the American Petroleum Institute declined to discuss how the ban could affect the industry.
"We don't track the kind of information that you're looking for," spokesman Michael Tadeo said by phone when asked if the group had
a position on the ban. Just the beginning? On Friday, an online petition was launched to protest the ban that gathered signatures from
prominent academics. By last night, organizers claimed to have more than 9,000 verified signatures from faculty members at U.S.
institutions, including 44 Nobel laureates. The petition says opposition to the ban stems not just from its short-term
impacts on scientific work during the three-month evaluation period called for by President Trump, but
from concern that it presages a policy change that would bar arrivals from the listed countries on a lasting
basis. "The unrealistic conditions required for discontinuing the suspension make it very likely that this [executive order] will turn
into a permanent ban," the petition reads, arguing that the travel ban is discriminatory, is detrimental to the country's national interests
and imposes an undue burden on the scientific community. Another concern for the industry arises from the possibility
that the administration's list of seven "countries of concern" could grow to include other majority-
Muslim countries with which U.S. companies might do more business or have greater personnel
exchanges. According to an analysis published online last week by Alex Nowrasteh of the libertarian Cato Institute, Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates and Egypt have all been the home bases of terrorists accused of fatal attacks on U.S. soil since 1975. He
found that no fatal U.S. attacks have been carried out by terrorists from the seven newly banned nationalities over that time, though
they have been linked with some non-fatal attacks. "This is like the no-fly list but with far graver consequences," Nowrasteh said in a
discussion of the ban. "If President Trump was committed to banning immigrants from certain countries in order to reduce the already
small risk of terrorism on U.S. soil committed by the foreign-born then he would not just ban nationals from these seven countries. For
this reason, I expect his administration to expand the list of countries banned in the near future." Saudi Arabia, in particular, has U.S
refinery investments, including a 50 percent stake in the largest such facility in North America, the Port Arthur Refinery in Texas, via
the state-owned oil and gas company, Saudi Aramco. Up-and-comers in the country's energy industry have long sought out technical
and business training in the West, including in the United States as well as in Europe. Many critics of the ban have homed in on its
failure to include countries with stronger terrorism ties as a reflection of the president's conflicts of interest stemming from his real
estate holdings; the Trump Corp. has current or former business interests in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. In a Sunday statement
posted on Facebook that was linked from the president's Twitter account, Trump defended the administration's travel restrictions. "To
be clear, this is not a Muslim ban, as the media is falsely reporting," the statement said. "There are over 40 different countries
worldwide that are majority Muslim that are not affected by this order. We will again be issuing visas to all countries once we are sure
we have reviewed and implemented the most secure policies over the next 90 days." Trump stressed his "tremendous feelings" for
those affected by the humanitarian crisis in Syria. "My first priority will always be to protect and serve our country, but as President I
will find ways to help all those who are suffering," he said.

Ext---Iran is key---the travel ban is a pretext for war

Millman 17 (Noah Millman, senior editor, is an opinion journalist, critic, screenwriter, and filmmaker who joined The American
Conservative in 2012. Millman’s work has also appeared in The New York Times Book Review, The Week, Politico, First Things,
Commentary, and on The Economist’s online blogs. “Why is Iran Part of the Ban?” 1/31/17.
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/millman/why-is-iran-part-of-the-ban/)

There are many things that could be said about Trump’s travel ban, and most of them have already been said in multiple venues,
including by TAC‘s own Daniel Larison. I just want to highlight again one item: nearly
half of those affected by the ban
come from Iran, a country that is not experiencing Islamist violence, that is not producing large numbers
of refugees, and from which we have no particular reason to suspect terrorists might be planning to sneak
into America. I can think of legitimate reasons why Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan were not included (all major regional allies
whose cooperation we need), as well as Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and Russia (at that point, you might as
well ban the world), all of which have produced home-grown Islamist terrorists who might travel to America — or already have.
Those reasons do tend to undermine the argument that, even if it had been rolled out in a more prudent and less gratuitously-cruel
manner, the ban was a sensible way to protect American security — but let’s grant that being extra cautious about people coming from
a war zone isn’t obviously crazy, and that we should be able to argue like civilized people about how to balance helping people facing
death versus protecting ourselves from wolves who may be hiding among the sheep. But it seems to me that anyone arguing with a
straight face that the ban was about protecting America from terrorists should be arguing — among other things — that Iran doesn’t
belong on the list. Yet this is the only mention of Iran in David French’s defense of Trump’s order (which is probably the best
defense I’ve read so far): [T]he order imposes a temporary, 90-day ban on people entering the U.S. from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. These are countries either torn apart by jihadist violence or under the control of hostile, jihadist
governments. That’s it. Iran is a “hostile, jihadist government” so we should presume all Iranians are a security risk. This is why I’m
going to continue to assume that a primary reason for the ban in the first place was to provoke Iranian retaliation,
with the ultimate goal that poisoned relations will eventually provide a pretext for war. Regular readers know
I was very clear in calling out the Democratic candidate’s enthusiasm for conflict with Iran. I have zero reason to trust that this
administration is any less enthused, and I interpret their actions accordingly.

The travel ban hurts US oil industry---relations with Iran are key
Eaton, Blum, Hunn 17 (Prior to joining the Houston Chronicle, Collin Eaton covered the local banking and finance scene at the
Houston Business Journal. Before that, he held internships at newspapers in Texas and Washington D.C., generally writing about
business, money or higher education. He graduated from the University of Texas at Austin in 2011. Jordan Blum is a senior energy
reporter at the Houston Chronicle since 2015. He has extensively covered the industry from the 2014 bust in oil prices to the more
recent boom in West Texas’ Permian Basin. He has written about everything from Texas’ national lead in renewable wind power to
the Houston area’s growing dominance in petrochemical and plastics manufacturing. David Hunn came to the Houston Chronicle in
June 2016. He has since written on bankruptcies and debt loads after the 2014 oil price crash, on the boom in the Permian Basin that
followed, and at length on the discovery of Houston-based Apache Corp.'s Alpine High oil and gas field in the Permian's southern
Delaware Basin. Hunn previously covered government spending for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, including the $380 million
renovation of the Gateway Arch grounds, the five-institution tax-payer-funded Zoo-Museum District, and the $1 billion plan to build a
new football stadium on the Mississippi River, in hopes of keeping the then-St. Louis Rams in the city. “Travel ban threatens big oil
ties in Middle East,” 1/30/17. https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/article/Travel-ban-frays-big-oil-ties-in-Middle-East-
10895411.php)

The U.S. travel ban on citizens of seven predominantly Muslim nations could backfire on American energy
companies - many with headquarters or large operations in Houston - as they try to forge delicate ties with countries
like Iraq for a share of the bountiful oil fields. President Donald Trump's executive order on Friday restricted
travelers from three major oil-producing nations, Iraq, Iran and Libya, sparking international controversy and
stoking industry fears that these countries could seek payback against U.S. drillers and oil-equipment
suppliers. In Iraq, some lawmakers have already called for a reciprocal ban against visa-holding U.S.
travelers including contractors, a move that, like the Trump administration's ban, would stem the free flow of
energy workers between the two nations and possibly slow American investment into one of the world's last big oil
developments. "It's a slap in the face and it deteriorates a lot of good will that's been built over the years between the two countries,"
said Subhi Khudairi, founding partner and president of Khudairi Group, a Houston-based contractor that supplies equipment and
services to oil companies in Iraq. "This is just another potential barrier to progress that frankly Americans should have a piece of."
Few industries are as directly connected to the Muslim world as energy. As a result, few cities face as great a potential disruption as
Houston from Trump's order, which bans visa holders from the seven nations - Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen -
from entry into the United States for at least 90 days. Two major industry conferences that attract tens of thousands of participants
from all over world, including the Middle East, are scheduled in Houston over the few months. IHS CERA Week is set for early
March, the Offshore Technology Conference for early May; organizers for both declined comment on the potential impact of the
executive order on attendance. Many of the region's biggest employers have operations in nations affected by the
travel ban. Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Royal Dutch Shell and Marathon Oil , as well as energy services companies
Schlumberger, Halliburton and Weatherford operate in Iraq. Marathon Oil and ConocoPhillips, both of Houston, have operations in
Libya. Exxon also has operations in Yemen. Unlike automakers, technology companies and financial services firms that sharply
criticized Trump's order Monday, energy companies were largely silent. Nearly all declined comment or did not respond to requests
for comment; the industry trade group, American Petroleum Institute, also declined comment. Market share at stake Kent Robertson, a
spokesman for Chevron, said the travel ban hasn't yet had a discernible impact on the company, but it is reviewing the executive order
to understand the implications for employees. "Chevron is a global company that values the contributions of all
employees and partners regardless of their country of origin, religion, race, sexual orientation or gender,"
Robertson said. It's likely the U.S. travel ban would create a hostile working environment for American workers and companies
helping Iraq's economy recover from more than a decade of war and civil strife, analysts said. It also could give competitors from
other nations, a chance to move in on the U.S. share of the market. Iraq and other oil-rich Muslim countries, for example,
could retaliate against at U.S. drillers by awarding oil and gas development contracts to European rivals such
as Royal Dutch Shell, BP and the French oil company Total. "It could be a backhanded way to get back at the U.S.," said Rob Desai,
an energy analyst at Edward Jones in St. Louis. The major oil companies have largely suspended operations in
Sudan, Iran and Syria. But Chevron operates and holds an 80 percent contractor interests in the Sarta and Qara Dagh blocks of the
Kurdish-controlled region of Iraq. By the start of last year, Exxon Mobil controlled more than a half-million acres in Kurdistan and
10,000 acres in the Republic of Yemen. Most of the biggest U.S. oil field services companies also have sizable footprints
nations covered by the travel ban. Houston-based Halliburton has offices in Basra, Iraq, while Schlumberger had offices in
Baghdad and Kurdistan. Weatherford International lists Iraqi offices in Baghdad, Basra and Erbil. Weatherford and Schlumberger also
operate in Libya and Yemen. For U.S. oil field service companies, the travel ban may not bring too strong a headwind, because many
firms hire local talent overseas and typically don't send them to the United States, said Matt Marietta, an analyst at investment
group Stephens. Likewise, U.S. companies don't import much blue-collar talent for the oil fields, and the only overlap is for some
white-collar engineers and other workers brought over, he added. "I don't really see a crackdown on open borders as having a big
impact on the energy labor force," Marietta said. "Energy companies were already risking the lives of their employees putting people
in war-torn countries. It's not going to change too much." "They're scared' But Geoffrey Hoffman, director of the immigration clinic at
the University of Houston Law Center, said Trump's orders could affect higher-level employees who work in the
United States under H-1B visas granted to those with specialized skills. "They need managers to travel all over the
world," Hoffman said of energy firms. Immigration attorney Sarah Monty said her firm, Monty & Ramirez of Houston, helps more
than 100 clients a year land work visas and work-related green cards. And Trump's freeze has them worried, she said. "They're scared
right now. Freaked out," Monty said. "My phone has been going crazy." The freeze threatens at least two types of business-related
visas: Work visas, which are temporary, and green cards, which provide for permanent residency. The process for both is grueling,
Monty said. Each company has to prove that the worker has expertise they can't find in the United States. Companies have to pay the
worker above-market wages. The Department of Homeland Security and the State Department have to vet each candidate. The
government application fees alone cost the companies about $3,000 per person, and take about eight months. Monty said perhaps a
dozen of her clients this year come from the seven countries outlined by Trump. "It's a problem for Houston," she continued. "It's
already so hard to get a visa. This is going to really cool the markets."
 Iran-US Relations Key to Global Oil Market
US/Iran relations key to the global oil market
Ratner 17 (Jonothan Ratner is a web editor/producer for FP Investing and FP Trading Desk, Buy & Sell columnist, Financial Post
investing reporter. “How Donald Trump's immigration policy could impact oil markets in Iraq, Iran and Libya,” 2/1/17.
https://business.financialpost.com/investing/trading-desk/how-donald-trumps-immigration-policy-could-impact-oil-markets-in-iraq-
iran-and-libya)

Donald Trump’s new immigration policies could have a meaningful impact on global energy markets, as three key
OPEC countries are included in the travel restrictions. Iraq, Iran and Libya together produce almost nine million barrels of oil per
day, and the impact from the U.S. President’s controversial order could play out in very different ways for each country. Helima Croft,
global head of commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets, noted that in Iraq, U.S. energy companies that employ Americans could
face challenges if a parliamentary measure calling for reciprocal restrictions becomes law. The decision will ultimately be left to
Prime Minister Abadi, but so far, the tone has been negative from Iraq’s executive brand. The Foreign Ministry expressed “regret and
astonishment” and asked the White House to reconsider. Croft noted that leading Iraq experts doubt Abadi will risk hurting his
relationship with the U.S. military or foreign oil companies, yet there are power political players with close links to Iran that could
push the Prime Minister to take a tougher stance. If Abadi does chose to enact the parliamentary measure, Croft expects it would
prevent American employees of oil and service companies from entering the country. “Actual production would probably be
unaffected given the heavy reliance on local staff for day-to-day operations,” the strategist said, adding that the U.S. military
may find itself short of American contractors to assist with the anti-ISIS effort. Iran was quick to announce
a reciprocal travel ban, stating that the new restrictions are an “affront against the Muslim world and the Iranian nation in
particular and will be known as a gift to extremists.” Since U.S. energy companies are restricted from operating in Iran ,
and European firms remain largely absent from the country, the immediate impact won’t be severe. However, Croft warned that
Iran’s inclusion on Trump’s list could have profound oil market implications, particularly if relations
between the two countries deteriorate. She considers a snap back of U.S. sanctions on Iran as the biggest
geopolitical upside risk for oil in 2017. “Moreover, we contend that an escalation in provocative Iranian military
maneuvers could be the catalyst for President Trump to refuse to give Iran a positive quarterly certification
– a requirement for the continued waiver of U.S. congressional energy sanctions,” the strategist said. Iran
reportedly conducted its first ballistic missile test since Trump took office this week. Meanwhile, international oil
companies have already removed most of their staff from Libya as a result of security problems there However, Croft noted that there
is a risk of the U.S. shifting its support away from the U.N. government in Tripoli, and toward General Haftar and his militia. “Hence,
the precarious stalemate that has persisted for the past year could collapse and the recent production gains could be a casualty of a
worsening security environment,” the strategist said.

No impact to US sanctions---multilateral action is key

Byman 18 (Daniel Byman is a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, where his research focuses on
counterterrorism and Middle East security. He previously served as the research director of the center. He is also senior associate dean
for undergraduate affairs at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and a professor in its Security Studies
Program. Previously, Byman served as a staff member with the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (“The
9/11 Commission”) and the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Prior to that, Byman was a
policy analyst and the director for research in the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corporation and worked for the
U.S. government. “Iran’s foreign policy weaknesses, and opportunities to exploit them,” 1/3/18.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2018/01/03/irans-foreign-policy-weaknesses-and-opportunities-to-exploit-them/)

Similarly, economic pressure from the U.S. helped drive Iran to the negotiating table over its nuclear
program, but such pressure is far more effective when it is multilateral. U.S. allies and major economic
powers like China are skeptical of unilateral U.S. sanctions, seeing them as driven more by politics than
strategy. To gain international support for more economic penalties, when possible the United States should
highlight Iran’s violations of existing U.N. Security Council resolutions such as those involving transfers of
arms to Hezbollah in Syria or its Houthi allies in Yemen or complying with money laundering and terrorist
financing rules. International sanctions and financial penalties make it harder for Iran to attract foreign
investment, maintain its financial system, and otherwise expand (or even sustain) its economy. Given the
IRGC’s massive role in Iran’s economy, pressure on IRGC front companies might yield modest results. In
addition, the United States should constantly highlight the cost of Iran’s adventurism in Yemen and support
for the Syrian regime to increase popular disgruntlement regarding the regime’s foreign policy.
Volatile oil prices increase regional stability by forcing economic cooperation---empirics prove
Gause 15 (F. Gregory Gause, III is the John H. Lindsey ’44 Chair, Professor of International Affairs and Head of the International
Affairs Department at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. He is the author of three books
and numerous articles on the politics of the Middle East, with a particular focus on the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.
“Sultans of Swing? The Geopolitics of Falling Oil Prices,” April 2015. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Falling-Oil-Prices-English.pdf)

More likely than regional conflict driven by falling oil prices is some effort by the region’s oil producers to
find agreement on production cuts. This has been the pattern during past episodes of price collapses: ▪ About
a year after the Saudis had commenced the “good sweating” in the summer of 1985, at the August 1986 OPEC meeting,
Iran agreed to reduce its production and accept a new OPEC system of production quotas. This took place in spite of the extremely
high level of regional tensions during the IranIraq War, where Saudi Arabia openly backed Iraq’s war effort against Tehran. Non-
OPEC countries like Norway and 7 even the Soviet Union made unofficial commitments of production restraint as well.13 ▪ In 1998
oil prices again fell dramatically, this time from nearly $20 per barrel in 1997 to below $10 per barrel in December 1998. The
fall was the result of a combination of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and an OPEC miscalculation of world demand that had led to
a production quota increase in 1997. Saudi Arabia took the lead in putting together an agreement in March 1998 on production cuts
that included not just OPEC members but also non-OPEC producers Norway, Mexico, and Oman that took 1.5 million barrels per day
off the market. Iran, however, would not accept a reduction in its quota and continued to produce at its previous rate. With prices still
falling, the
Saudis brokered another production cut in March 1999 among OPEC and non-OPEC producers.
This time Iran did agree to cut its production. The March 1999 deal took a further two million barrels per day off the
market. This cut, along with faster-thanexpected demand recovery in Asia and a strong American economy, helped to push oil prices
up in 1999 to $18 per barrel.14 Russia also agreed to join the cuts in 1999, but did not follow through on its promise. Its average
production increased by over 200,000 barrels per day from 1998 to 1999.15 ▪ Amidst the oil boom of the 2000s there were
two brief episodes of oil price decline. Prices declined from $75 per barrel in August 2006 to just above $50 per barrel in
January 2007. Saudi Arabia brokered two OPEC production cut deals in October 2006 and December 2006 in which Iran accepted a
nearly proportional reduction in its production to other OPEC members. By June 2007, prices were back at $70 per barrel. During the
global financial crisis of 2008, prices crashed, falling from over $100 per barrel to $32 per barrel in January 2009. Once again, the
Saudis took the lead in forging agreements to cut OPEC production in September, October, and December of 2008. All of those
agreements included production cuts by Iran.16 In all of these cases, despite serious geopolitical tensions
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, lower oil prices led the two countries to cooperate in the oil arena to try to
put a floor under falling prices and push those prices up. So far, in the current oil price collapse, the Iranians have not
been willing to accept production cuts. However, given their past practice and the severity of the strains the fall in prices is placing on
the Iranian economy, it would not be at all surprising to see Tehran reconsider its position and begin dealing with Riyadh over some
kind of production cut agreement within OPEC, even if that cut is not proportional to the reduction Riyadh takes on. There are already
some signs that the Russians are reaching out to the Saudis in search of some kind of production cut arrangements that would include
OPEC and non-OPEC states.17 Far from leading to increased regional tensions, the current drop in oil prices might force
geopolitical rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia to deal with one another purely out of economic self-interest.
Russia might also find itself constrained to join those negotiations. The question remains whether negotiations, or even agreements, on
oil questions might lead to enough improvement in the atmospherics of regional relations that security issues like the Syrian civil war,
the fight against the Islamic State, and the political turmoil in Yemen might become amenable to negotiations among Riyadh, Tehran,
and Moscow.
2AC AT: CP
AT: Adv CPs
 A2 Advantage CP Grab-Bag
Your advantage CP’s attempt to “help” the Iranian people fails – it’s FAILED for years
Bonicelli 1/24/18 (Paul, Bonicelli served in the George W. Bush administration, career includes a
presidential appointment with Senate confirmation as assistant administrator at the U.S. Agency for
International Development; as a professional staff member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S.
House of Representatives; and as a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly. He holds a PhD in
political science from the University of Tennessee, "Calling A Persian Spring A ‘Disaster’ Is A Desperate
Cover For Obama’s Iran Failures," http://thefederalist.com/2018/01/24/calling-persian-spring-disaster-
desperate-cover-obamas-iran-failures/)

Bahgat’s recommendation: “A better approach would be for the United States to work with its European and
Asian allies to help the Iranian government to address the major socioeconomic and political aspirations of
the Iranian people. Adhering to the nuclear deal, supporting foreign investment, activating cultural
engagement, and promoting strategic dialogue are likely to serve the interests of all concerned parties . A
stable Islamic Republic is good for the Iranian people, regional powers and the international community.” Obama and the
Europeans have assiduously tried everything on his list , and still the ungrateful Iranian people rose up
across the nation for days, risking their lives to demand self-governance as the only solution to their problems. I suspect the only thing
Bahgat really intends is to support the Obama nuclear deal with Iran. He does so because he knows , as does the regime, that
besides the Trump administration the uprisings are the primary threat to the regime’s agenda .
 A2 Pressure/Sanctions CP
Hard-line measures against Iran fail – only positive signals of support can empower democratic
forces
McFaul and Milani 5/30/18 (Michael and Abbas, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International
Studies and a Hoover fellow at Stanford University, and a contributing columnist to The Post. He was
previously special assistant to President Obama at the National Security Council from 2009-2012 and
former U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2012-2014 + research fellow and co-director of the Iran
Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution, "Why Trump’s plans for regime change in Iran will have the
opposite effect," https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/05/30/why-trumps-
plans-for-regime-change-in-iran-will-have-the-opposite-effect/)

Over the long term, certainly, atransition to democracy in Iran would be the most effective way to reduce
tensions between Iran and the United States and to guarantee a less disruptive regional role for Tehran. A
democratic Iran could potentially become a strategic partner for the United States (and even Israel). Yet
Trump’s actions and Pompeo’s 12-step program make that outcome less likely while damaging other core American
national security interests. Tough rhetoric doesn’t always translate into effective policy . Some hope that this
new confrontational tone coming from Washington might weaken Iran’s theocracy. In fact, however, the
opposite is more likely .
 AT: China Stem Cell CP

Stem Cell research in China may be quantitatively large, but the majority belongs to hospitals selling
non-clinically tested solutions that often kill patients.
Lyn 11 (Tan Ee Lyn [Instructor in the department of communications and new media at the National University of Singapore]
“China "stem cell therapies" offer heartbreak for many” Published by Reuters, 9/21/11 - https://www.reuters.com/article/us-stemcell-
scams/china-stem-cell-therapies-offer-heartbreak-for-many-idUSTRE78K18120110921 / WY-TH)

) - Chinese hotel manager Hong Chun had trouble using chopsticks after a minor stroke and
HONG KONG (Reuters

sought treatment at a large Shanghai hospital where doctors injected what they said were donor stem cells
into his spinal cord and buttocks, according to his father and cousin. Leaving hospital the next day, Hong, 27, fell so ill he
had to be taken off the train and rushed to another hospital. But doctors were unable to save him and he was
declared brain dead before dying a month later. Desperate for help, patients with incurable diseases are
admitting themselves into hospitals in China for “stem cell therapies” but experts say such treatments
are backed by little or no scientific evidence and are at best experimental. Some of these
cases involve large general hospitals where patients pay thousands, even tens of thousands, of dollars for
treatments that are advertised online. Patients have come away with little or no improvement and a number
have died, according to patients, doctors and relatives of patients who spoke to Reuters. Hong paid 30,000 yuan ($4,800) to the Chinese army’s 455 PLA Hospital in
Shanghai for the treatment last year, according to hospital receipts seen by Reuters. His father, Hong Gensho, travelled to Shanghai to seek an explanation. But hospital

administrators told him his son didn’t die in their hospital, paid him 80,000 yuan and told him not to pursue
the matter. “I am miserable, it’s like my son was worth only 80,000 yuan. It’s not about money. Our human rights, our place in this society, are not respected. I am
devastated. If he hadn’t sought treatment, he would not have died,” said the elder Hong, 61. “I can’t get my son back, but people must know about these stem cell therapies and no
one must be deceived.” LACK OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE Experts have raised the alarm on patients turning up at clinics and
hospitals in China, Mexico, India, Turkey, Russia and elsewhere for stem cell therapies that have
not undergone clinical trials and which are not recognized as standard treatment. Patients often
Stem cell tourism is regarded as ethically
pay fees of $20,000 and more for such therapies after exhausting conventional treatments. “

problematic because patients receive unproven therapies from untrustworthy sources,” Dr David Resnik at the U.S.
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences and Zubin Master at the University of Alberta in Canada wrote in a paper published in the journal European Molecular
Biology Organization. Echoing the same concerns, Dr George Daley at the Harvard Stem Cell Institute and Harvard Medical School said he was swamped by enquiries from
patients asking about therapies in China and Brazil for diseases from Alzheimer’s to spinal cord injuries. “What I’m talking about are the less legitimate treatments that have not

even undergone clinical trials but are directly marketed therapies... We really have no idea how to use stem cells for
these treatments,” Daley told Reuters. When contacted by Reuters, a director at the PLA 455 Hospital, who declined to be identified, said: “There are always good and
bad outcomes. No therapy can guarantee success to everyone... Besides, you don’t have a better alternative. “As for patients dying, all deaths must be investigated. What caused
the death? If our treatment caused the death, the patient (relatives) can seek redress. If it is a death caused by old age and sickness, then there is nothing I can say.” China’s
Ministry of Health did not respond to questions from Reuters on stem cell therapies being offered in the country. VICTIMS ARE THOSE FACING DEATH Suffering from late-
stage liver cirrhosis caused by a lifelong hepatitis B virus infection, Fan Hongkun was led to believe her body would spontaneously grow a healthy liver once stem cells were
transplanted. “We saw the therapy advertised online and talked to the doctor over the phone. He said stem cells were like seeds, after being planted on a liver, they grow, divide
and spread and finally form a healthy liver,” said Fan’s son, Zhou Junjie. Fan, 63, was so convinced, she admitted herself into Beijing Military General Hospital, whose website
still carries information on the stem cell therapies it offers. “My mother said the PLA (Chinese army) doesn’t lie. That’s why she trusted them,” said Zhou. Doctors there took her
off the drug lamivudine for four weeks to “prepare her for the stem cell therapy”. But she fell into a coma before doctors could treat her. Sold under the brand Epivir by
GlaxoSmithKline Plc, lamivudine minimizes liver damage by blocking the hepatitis B virus from replicating. Fan’s family learnt later from other doctors that she suffered a sudden
surge of the virus after she stopped her medication, which pushed her into a coma and killed her. According to documents seen by Reuters, her family sued the hospital, but the
case was dismissed by a Chinese court. When contacted, a doctor at the hospital, who declined to be identified, said the entire procedure to transplant stem cells into a patient’s
liver takes only a day. “We extract the patient’s bone marrow cells and isolate the stem cells, which are then inserted into the liver,” said the doctor. “...We extract bone marrow
Advertisements for these treatments
cells in the morning and in the afternoon we inject them (stem cells) into the liver. Yes, all it takes is a day. Very fast.”

remain on the hospital’s website. In Ireland, many patients have returned from treatments abroad with no improvement, but they are less willing to talk.
“Virtually none will go on record to state they have been conned. This is mainly because many patients have serious immediate health concerns and they need to focus on that,”
Patients are also reluctant to come forward as they
Stephen Sullivan, chief scientific officer of the Irish Stem Cell Foundation, told Reuters. “

are embarrassed at spending lots of money against professional medical advice. Some patients will even
claim improvement when there is no measurable improvement.”
AT: JCPOA CP
 Perm do Both
Perm do both – supports the Iranians the most and solves the nuclear program permanently
Nader, 1/7 Alireza Nader, Senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND
Corporation, January 7, 2018, “Why the Iranian Uprising Won’t Die”, Politico,
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/07/why-the-iranian-uprising-wont-die-216255, EO

Ultimately, only Iranians can change Iran. But the Trump administration could increase U.S. leverage by
rescinding the travel ban against Iranians, by providing satellite internet to Iran’s struggling activists, and by increasing
support and funding for human rights efforts. It would be wise for Washington to keep the Iran nuclear agreement
while it pressures the Islamic Republic on other fronts. After all, the source of Washington’s problem is not just the
nuclear program, but the regime that wields it. And ultimately, the key to finding a permanent solution to the nuclear
program is fundamental change in Iran, which may be beginning.
 JCPOA Bad
The JCPOA was appeasement – it ignored human rights abuses and gave money to the regime’s
army
Titus, 1/10 Alex Titus, writer about politics, culture, national security, and foreign affairs for National
Review, The Hill, RealClearPolitics, Washington Examiner, and others, January 10, 2018, “Obama's
doctrine of appeasement in Iran has finally come to an end”, The Hill,
http://thehill.com/opinion/international/368161-obamas-doctrine-of-appeasement-in-iran-has-finally-come-
to-an-end, EO

Despite these blatant abuses, the

Iranian regime has been able to go largely unpunished due to the failed
appeasement approach of the previous administration. Thankfully, President Trump has made clear that supporting
basic rights for the Iranian people and combatting the regime’s spread of radical Islamic terrorism is a top priority of his
administration. Americans can rest assured that Obama’s foreign policy doctrine of appeasing Iran’s radical regime is
over.
This approach by Trump is a stark contrast to the Obama administration, who blatantly ignored the Iranian regime’s frequent human rights violations and opposition to democratic
values. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in Obama’s lack of support for the Iranian protestors during the Green Revolution in 2009.

President Obama refused to give any support — even vocally — to pro-democracy protestors. He stated that it was “up to Iranians to make decisions about who Iran’s leaders will
be,” and that his administration wanted “to avoid the United States being the issue inside of Iran.”

Furthermore, the Obama administration worked to directly empower the Iranian regime by limiting alliances with key partners in the region such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the
UAE. This approach had severe consequences for the U.S and the Iranian people as the regime worked overtime to spread instability and radical Islamic terrorism throughout the
broader Middle East.

The Iran nuclear-arms deal in 2015 was the apex of Obama’s appeasement approach. Beyond merely setting
loose terms of agreement and ignoring Iran’s human rights abuses, the administration also lifted
sanctions on Iran, allowing hundreds of billions of dollars to flow back to the regime. Much of this money
has gone to the regime’s terror army, whose soldiers are currently gunning down pro-democracy protesters
in the streets.

Lifting the sanctions help the government and hurt Iranians

Sheehan, ’17 Ivan Sascha Sheehan, University of Baltimore Professor and director of the graduate
programs in Global Affairs and Human Security and Negotiations and Conflict Management in the School
of Public and International Affairs. December 30, 2017, “Iran protests: How Trump can strike a fatal blow
against a dangerous, tyrannical regime”, Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/12/30/iran-
protests-how-trump-can-strike-fatal-blow-against-dangerous-tyrannical-regime.html, EO
The latest nationwide demonstrations are indicative of fierce discontent and growing frustration with the Iranian regime’s corruption,
incompetence and badly misplaced priorities.

The demonstrations have proven beyond doubt that the welfare of Iranians was never going to improve
after the 2015 agreement that lifted worldwide economic sanctions against Iran in return for actions designed to
halt the nation’s development of nuclear weapons.

Thanks to the lifting of those sanctions, Iranian companies linked to the government and the
Revolutionary Guards are reaping the rewards of reopened international trade. But the Iranian people face
increasingly dire economic circumstances, prompting the demonstrations and sharp criticism of Iranian President Hassan
Rouhani.

With slogans like “Death to the dictator, death to Rouhani,” and “Leave Syria alone; think about us instead,” – referring to Iran’s
unpopular military intervention to prop up Syrian dictator Bashar Assad – protestors have demonstrated their frustration
with the endemic culture of corruption in Iran.

The JCPOA saved the regime that was pushed to the wall
IBD, 5/22 Investor’s Business Daily, American newspaper and website covering the stock market,
international business, finance and economics, May 22, 2018, “Trump Iran Policy Ends Disastrous Obama
Era Of Nuclear Appeasement — Finally”, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/trump-ends-
obama-iran-appeasement/, EO

Iran Regime Change Hard words to be sure. But Obama's genial blandishments didn't change Iran's behavior; to the
contrary, it became increasingly belligerent toward the west and its military and terrorist groups such as
Hamas and Hezbollah have meddled in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere. Iran had been
pushed to the wall by sanctions in 2015. But the JCPOA deal, signed along with Britain, France, China, Russia and
Germany, eased sanctions and gave Tehran access to nearly $150 billion in badly needed cash. The result,
Pompeo said: "Iran continues to be, during the JCPOA, the world's largest sponsor of terror."
 CP doesn’t solve Oil Adv
Re-certifying the Iran deal will put more Iranian oil into the market
Salcito, 5/22 Kendyl Salcito, Security fellow with Truman National Security Project and PhD in
Epidemiology and Human Rights Impact Assessment from Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute, May
22, 2018, “U.S. should rejoin Iran nuclear deal”, The Pueblo Chieftain,
https://www.chieftain.com/opinion/ideas/u-s-should-rejoin-iran-nuclear-deal/article_0b732380-7781-5ed4-
a799-21a05c89a7e6.html, EO

there are real questions of economic and energy security that result from the withdrawal from the
Finally,

JCPOA. Oil prices have surged in the past year as OPEC countries have restricted supply. Trump's sanctions will remove 200,000 to 1
million barrels of Iranian oil from the market -- which could not only harm U.S. businesses, but also give more power to Russia as a global oil
supplier.
 At: Iranian Econ
Alt causes to the Iranian economy than the Iran deal
Laub, 5/8 Zachary Laub, B.A. in International Relations from Tuff University, May 8, 2018, “The Impact
of the Iran Nuclear Agreement”, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/impact-
iran-nuclear-agreement, EO

How is Iran’s economy performing?

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the country’s non-oil growth in 2017 reached 4 percent. Still, Iranians have not
seen as robust an economic recovery as many had expected to follow the JCPOA’s implementation. The
expectation that the United States would restore nuclear sanctions discouraged trade and investment. So too did a wide range of
U.S. sanctions unrelated to the nuclear program. Multinational firms fear being held liable for transacting with the
numerous sanctioned entities associated with, for example, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is ubiquitous in
some industries.

But factors
unrelated to sanctions are also hampering the recovery. Corruption, mismanagement, and
aging infrastructure are widely acknowledged barriers to industry, and relatively low oil prices have
dampened the revenues to be made from export; oil was trading for much of 2016–2017 at around half the price it had
been five years earlier. (The recent surge of oil prices has in part been attributed to the expectation of renewed sanctions.) Economic
stagnation and rising inequality drove a week of widespread protests that began at the end of 2017.

The Iran deal hurt the Iranian economy and Iran is implementing strategies to make sanctions
ineffective
Jebraily, 5/29 Seyed Yasser Jebraily, MA in International Political Economy from University of Tehran
and a PhD in Political Sciences from IHCS, May 29, 2018, “How will the US nuclear deal pullout affect
Iran's economy?”, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/nuclear-deal-pullout-affect-iran-
economy-180528104638815.html, EO
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's economic team believed that if they maximise the profits of Western companies in Iran, they
would confront the possible re-imposition of sanctions. So, after the implementation of the JCPOA, they opened Iran's
market to the foreign goods and services, which not only hurt Iranian suppliers and caused stagnation, but
also resulted in an increase of 50 percent in the negative trade balance between Iran and its top 20 trade partners from 2016 to 2017.

Capital outflow surpassed inflow and last year Iran had a capital account deficit of $11bn. That balance used to be
positive before the deal. These developments resulted in a steep slide in its currency value , something President
Rouhani promised to control after the implementation of the JCPOA. Iran's short-term foreign debt increased from
$777m to close to $3.7bn by the end of 2017.

Given these deal-related complications, one can venture to say that with the death of the JCPOA, some of Iran's
macroeconomic problems will be solved.
Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear deal will unite the political forces inside Iran and encourage them to follow a different path to
run the economy and solve its current problems. The demise of the deal and its economic implications proved to Iranians that the US
is not worthy of their trust, that it is an enemy to Iran, and that they can never play a win-win game with it. The fate of the deal also
showed that integration into the Western economy will not help Iran's economic development, and may even hinder it.

President Rouhani's government will now focus on domestic measures to make sanctions ineffective . Some
measures to insulate the economy against foreign shocks are already in place and more will be implemented. According to some
reports, two-thirds of Iranian imports are goods that are similar to ones that are being produced at home.

Iran spends almost $30bn annually to import these "similar goods" (last year Iran imported $45bn worth of goods in total). Iran's
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has suggested a ban on such imports, which, if implemented, will lead to a
substantial shift in the country's trade balance. The effects of such a measure will be market expansion for domestic
suppliers, decrease in unemployment rate, increase in the value of the Iranian currency, and reduction in
oil revenue dependency.
A range of tax measures in pursuit of the objectives outlined by the supreme leader to free the budget from dependence on oil
revenues are also under consideration. Masoud Nili, an economic adviser to President Rouhani recently reported that the top 10
percent of Iranian society pay just three percent of all income taxes, while in the US the top 10 percent pay more than 70 percent of
the total income taxes. According to Nili, if the share of the top 10 percent in total income taxes should increase.

In addition to the aforementioned trade and tax measures, some financial measures are also needed to make the US sanctions
ineffective. The ability of the US to impose financial sanctions results largely from the integration of banking
systems, whereby banks depend on a global network to borrow, lend, exchange, invest, and clear funds. The more Iran relies on
these integrated systems, the more it will become vulnerable to sanctions and vice versa.

Tehran has already started to walk away from this US-dominated system. Iran formally signed its first currency
swap deal with Turkey last October, and in April 2018 the two countries issued their first local currency letters of credit. Iran's other
main trade partners, such as China, are also ready to sign currency swap agreements which will de-dollar their
trade.
2AC AT: DA
AT: Appeasement DA
 2AC Pressure Fails

Increasing pressure empirically doesn’t work on Iran

Mousavian 18 (Seyed Hossein Mousavian is the former spokesperson for Iran’s nuclear negotiating team and the author of The
Iranian Nuclear Crisis, A Memoir, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Dangerous Escalation: Why
Trump's Pressure Tactics Won't Work on Iran” 2/8/18, Dangerous Escalation: Why Trump's Pressure Tactics Won't Work on Iran,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/dangerous-escalation-why-trumps-pressure-tactics-wont-work-24411)

In a paper for the Washington Quarterly ’s Fall 2017 issue, we outlined the principal lessons offered by the nuclear negotiations for
relations and future diplomatic engagement between Iran and the West. While Trump appears to believe that the United
States can coerce Iran to its desired path, with only a matter of applying more pressure for a longer period, his
untenable conditions to “fix” the JCPOA promise dangerous escalation.

During the Bush era and Obama’s first term, maximalist U.S.
demands such as zero uranium enrichment did not result in Iran
capitulating, even in the face of an unparalleled international-sanctions regime. Instead, Iran expanded its
own bargaining chip of nuclear capacity—including by increasing its number of centrifuges and level of enrichment—and
attained a breakout window of as short as one month.

Similarly, to pressure Iran now for its regional and missile policies will not result in Iran backing down, but rather
will create a new escalation cycle as Iran will seek to secure its core interests. For example, while Iran
has voluntarily limited the range of its ballistic missiles to two thousand kilometers, Iranian military commanders have said this could
be increased in response to foreign pressure. Likewise, Iran may respond to efforts to isolate it by strengthening
regional anti-Western alliances.
 1AR Pressure Fails

Trump’s policy pressuring Iran fails-only hurts US’ interest.

Pauly 17, (Reid Pauly PhD candidate in Political Science at MIT and a member of the Security Studies Program,
December 21, 2017 “This Is Why Trump's Strategy for Iran Will Fail” The National Interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-trumps-strategy-iran-will-fail-23748)
Trump’s strategy appears to be one of brinkmanship— rocking the boat in hopes that the other party is less risk-
tolerant and will give in before the boat capsizes.
Although a range of legislative and executive options remain in play, Congress’ window to expedite the re-imposition
of sanctions lifted under the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) has closed. The sixty-
day clock to do so began running on October 13, when President Trump announced his comprehensive Iran strategy,
which included the decertification of the Iran nuclear deal to Congress. The product of a “complete strategic review,”
the strategy was described as aiming to “counter the regime’s destabilizing activity and support for terrorist proxies,”
“block their financing of terror,” “address the regime’s proliferation of missiles,” and “deny all paths to a nuclear
weapon.” Trump focused on employing coercive tools such as sanctions and threats, including a
threat to abrogate the JCPOA absent “fixes,” and appeals to the Iranian people that signaled a possible shift towards
the pursuit of regime change. The strategy aims to compel Iran to change its policies and European
allies to fall in line with the U.S. approach. We evaluate the strategy from the perspective of “coercive bargaining
theory”—a pillar of American foreign policy—and find that it lacks key components for success. Namely, it too
heavily rely on threats, disregards the role of coercive assurances and incentives,
introduces unlimited aims and neglects diplomatic engagement.
Holding the Nuclear Deal Hostage
In international relations, coercive diplomacy is the art of making threats to affect a target’s decision making. Threats communicate punishments that will follow noncompliance with specific demands. Most people
intuit the value of credible threats. Yet, in threatening to dismantle the JCPOA, Trump has forgotten that successful coercion also requires credible assurance that a target’s compliance with demands will result in
reciprocal restraint.
As any good diplomat or “dealmaker” knows, and Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling has famously said, you cannot communicate “stop or I’ll shoot,” without implying that “if you do stop, I won’t shoot.” Trump has
made clear that he preferred to rip up the “worst deal ever,” undermining the credibility of any coercive assurance not to abrogate it, even if Iran makes additional concessions. This is just poor coercion. Threats
without credible assurance are merely bullying—darned if you do and darned if you don’t—and one should not expect them to succeed.
Assurances are also distinct from incentives or “carrots,” which entice states to strike or abide by diplomatic bargains, and complement coercive bargaining. Trump’s Iran strategy is equally devoid of so called
“ more for more ” offers to build upon the JCPOA with additional incentives.
So often policymakers fail to appreciate the breadth of coercive tools at their disposal. In the case of U.S.-Iran relations, however, the elements of coercive success are staring the Trump administration in the face.
Coercive Assurances and Compellent Success with Iran
The JCPOA was the product of years of coercive diplomacy with Iran by the P5+1 and European Union. Credible threats were critical, but so were credible assurances and incentives. The threat of continued or
increased multilateral sanctions provided significant leverage and the threat of unilateral airstrikes backstopped the negotiations. At the same time, as part of its calculus to adhere to the deal’s strict terms, Iran
understood (in part based on the text of the JCPOA) that in exchange for its compliance it was gaining credible assurances. These included the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions and Iran’s perceived reprieve from
the looming threat of American (or Israeli) military action against its nuclear facilities so long as the deal held. The incentive of maintaining a civilian enrichment program also played a major role in Iran’s
calculations.
The Obama administration seems to have understood the important role of coercive assurances in securing and maintaining Iranian compliance with nuclear constraints. For example, they recognized that just as
sanctions required significant international engagement to serve as credible threats, similar efforts were needed to ensure that the assurance of lifting of nuclear-related sanctions was also credible. Such efforts
included U.S. officials consistently engaging international banks and businesses to clarify the scope of legitimate business with Iran and explain remaining nonnuclear sanctions. While a host of Iran’s policies
continued to deter foreign investment independent of sanctions, these actions demonstrated the credibility of U.S. coercive assurances.
In contrast, the Trump administration has not only ceased communications clarifying the lifting of sanctions, Trump has broadly discouraged any business with Iran and threatened to withdraw from the accord—all
despite Iran’s continued verified compliance. These developments have led Iran to accuse the United States of violating specific articles of the deal that refer to good faith efforts to “sustain this JCPOA” and prevent
“interference” with the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions. Given such factors, Trump’s new Iran strategy appears to fail the tests of coercive assurance.
Reintroducing Regime Change
The Trump administration has also reintroduced the threat of regime change, including in remarks by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis publicly expressing a desire to see a
“transition” of Iran’s government.
It is unlikely that Tehran truly fears the threat of an Iraq-style ground invasion. Iran perceives that its regional position has strengthened since 2003, along with its ability to deter by engaging in asymmetric warfare.
Moreover, rising instability and the perception of American fatigue in the Middle East cast a pall on brute-force options. Nevertheless, statements alluding to regime change unhelpfully exacerbate Iran’s threat
perceptions that survival of the regime is at stake. Such boundless intentions foreclose coercive bargaining space and contribute to domestic political constraints in Iran that preclude the leadership from engaging with
the West. Moreover, regime change is an unlimited aim—an existential threat—that undermines a coercer’s ability to make credible assurances to secure concessions.

The Strategy is Flawed

According to Trump’s “America First ” foreign policy, his administration “will embrace diplomacy” and even work to
potentially see “old enemies become friends.” Yet, despite delivering his October 13 Iran strategy remarks in the
“Diplomatic Reception Room” at the White House, Trump ironically failed to once mention “diplomacy” or “talks”
with Iran; he even failed to negotiate a “better deal.” Despite reports of an isolated attempt, the Trump administration
has not indicated that it plans to incorporate hard-won, high-level channels of communication to Iran into its new
strategy. Nor are its actions likely to allow space for such engagement. Instead, Trump’s foreign policy and dealmaking
philosophy appears centered on threats that await capitulation.
Trump’s strategy appears to be one of brinkmanship—rocking the boat in hopes that the other party is less risk-
tolerant and will give in before the boat capsizes. This is dangerous in light of Iran’s potential to “jump
ship” with other parties to the JCPOA. Allies have long shared U.S. concerns regarding a range of Iran’s policies, but
they have thus far rejected Trump’s approach. Instead they have voiced support for the deal and a balance between
pressure and engagement to address remaining problems with Iran. When coupled with no apparent limits to his aims,
it is difficult to imagine Iran, or close American allies for that matter, falling in line.
While the sixty-day window to “snap-back” sanctions has closed, many question lie ahead for Congress and the
administration. If Trump takes seriously the goal of “fixing” the JCPOA, reining in Iran’s ballistic-missile development
or curbing its regional activities and influence, he and Congress would be wise to recognize the importance of
maintaining credible assurances, avoiding less-than-credible threats, and offering incentives when appropriate. Absent
changes, Trump’s strategy is deeply
flawed and is likely to weaken, not strengthen, the
coercive bargaining position of the United States going forward.

Sanctions and pressure don’t work on Iran, hurting the Iranian economy has proven impossible and
the prereqs for a pressure focused approach are not here
Maloney 10 (Suzanne Maloney is a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. The
author of Iran’s Long Reach and a forthcoming book on Iran’s political economy since the revolution. She holds a Ph.D. from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. January 2010, “Sanctioning Iran: If Only It Were So Simple”,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/author/suzanne-maloney)

In the wake of Iran’s internal unrest, the U.S. policy debate has reverted to the familiar formula of carrot-and-stick, with a distinct
emphasis on the latter. Although diplomacy remains the U.S. default position, at least through December 2009, the U.S. discourse
has largely presumed its failure and leapfrogged to focus on prospects for new punitive measures to
pressure Iran into abandoning the more worrisome elements of its nuclear infrastructure. Even as the first round
of nuclear negotiations produced a tentativeand later rescindedIranian confidence-building measure on addressing Western concerns
about Iran’s nuclear capability, congressional committees busied themselves developing a new round of unilateral measures against
Iran, including measures to restrict sales of refined petroleum products. The new U.S. consensus on Iran favors economic
sanctions, preferably ‘‘crippling’’ measures that target Iran’s purported Achilles’ heel, primarily as a means of derailing an
Iranian nuclear weapons capability, but also with the hope of facilitating a democratic breakthrough. Unfortunately, the
prospect of crippling the Iranian economy is a fallacy, and a dangerous one at that. A survey of the
manifold measures already in place and their track record in moderating Iranian behavior speaks to the
limitations of economic pressures as a means of altering Iran’s security priorities and policies. Moreover, as
even the most ardent advocates will privately acknowledge, the key prerequisites for a successful sanctions-centric
approachprotracted duration and broad adherenceare almost certainly unattainable in this case. As a result, despite Iran’s
economic liabilities and its deeply divided polity, the recent embrace of sanctions by many in Washington represents a dangerous
illusion. Economic pressure may have a role to play in persuading Tehran of the utility of dialogue, but as the primary tool of U.S.
policy, punitive measures will not succeed in solving U.S. concerns about the Iranian regime and its behavior. If the Obama
administration is going to blunt Iran’s nuclear ambitions without the use of force, negotiations remain the tool
of choice.

Iran does not respond negatively to pressure, officials claim it helps the country by improving self
sufficiency
Maloney 10 (Suzanne Maloney is a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. The
author of Iran’s Long Reach and a forthcoming book on Iran’s political economy since the revolution. She holds a Ph.D. from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. January 2010, “Sanctioning Iran: If Only It Were So Simple”,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/author/suzanne-maloney)

Iran’s traditional reaction to external attempts to exert economic pressure has been defiance and, at
minimum, rhetorically rejecting the idea that sanctions have had any sort of negative impact on its
economy. Indeed, withstanding the sustained U.S. embargo is something of a point of pride for Iran, particularly
during its earliest years when the revolutionary leadership’s quest for independence and its ambivalence about capitalism and
international entanglements corresponded neatly to the attenuation of its economic relationship with the United States. Iranian
political figures have consistently sounded the refrain that sanctions have actually benefited Iran by
strengthening its indigenous capabilities and sovereignty. Most recently, Tehran has suggested that U.S. plans to restrict
sales of imported gasoline would enhance the government’s economic reform program. ‘‘We have lived with sanctions for 30
years; they cannot bring a large nation like Iran to its knees,’’ Saeed Jalili, Iran’s nuclear negotiator, boasted to a
German interviewer on the eve of his October 2009 talks with representatives of the P51. ‘‘They do not frighten us. On the
contrary, we welcome new sanctions’’ and ‘‘We want to use our resources carefully.’’11 He elaborated by saying that Iran
welcomes everything that limits consumption and contributes to increasing self-sufficiency.
More pressure can’t cause change to Iranian leadership, it just hurts the poor
Maloney 10 (Suzanne Maloney is a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. The
author of Iran’s Long Reach and a forthcoming book on Iran’s political economy since the revolution. She holds a Ph.D. from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. January 2010, “Sanctioning Iran: If Only It Were So Simple”,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/author/suzanne-maloney)

The final relevant dimension to the prospective impact of sanctions on Iranian conduct and preferences relates to the domestic political
unrest that has followed in the wake of the contested outcome to the June election . The argument that sanctions could offer
particular utility in forcing a change in the Iranian leadership has little basis in the past history, or the
present rhetoric, of the opposition leaders and movement. Iranians have long balanced their dissatisfaction in
their government and ruling system with resentment of sanctions for reducing investment, employment, and
opportunities for international interaction. Although the regime has far greater internal liabilities today than
perhaps at any point since the mid-1980s, the likelihood that sanctions would strengthen the struggling
opposition seems quite limited at best, primarily because sanctions would not ameliorate the movement’s
greatest obstacles, which is the lack of a coherent strategy or objective and the regime’s continuing capacity for
repression. Mousavi himself has publicly appealed to the international community against tightening the sanctions regime, arguing
that further economic pressures would disproportionately impact the poor and those who have suffered as a
result of the mismanaged and adventurous foreign policy of the Ahmadinejad administration.16

Putting pressure on Iran fails – they don’t listen

Fox News 17 (2/19/17, “Iran says 'unmoved by threats' after new U.S. pressure” http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/02/19/iran-
says-unmoved-by-threats-after-new-u-s-pressure.html)

Iran’s foreign minister brushed aside pressure from the United States on Sunday, declaring that they respond
well to respect, saying the country is "unmoved by threats." President Trump has criticized the 2015 nuclear agreement
between Iran, the U.S. and five other world powers, under which Tehran agreed to curb its uranium enrichment in exchange for the
lifting of international sanctions, but hasn't yet announced what he plans to do about it. Trump’s administration put Iran “on notice”
over a recent ballistic missile test, and imposed new sanctions on more than two dozen Iranian companies and individuals. "Iran
doesn't respond well to threats," Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif told the Munich Security
Conference, an annual gathering of top diplomats and defense officials. "We don't respond well to coercion. We don't
respond well to sanctions, but we respond very well to mutual respect. We respond very well to
arrangements to reach mutually acceptable scenarios." "Everybody tested us for many years — all threats
and coercions were imposed on us," Zarif added.
AT: Brain Drain DA
 2AC No Link – Iran Specific

Lifting the travel ban won’t cause serious brain drain---many Iranians prefer staying home, even if
they spend time in the West
Scott Peterson 3/26/15, staff writer @ CSM, "Iran brain drain in reverse? Why some young professionals
are going home.", Christian Science Monitor, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2015/0326/Iran-brain-drain-in-reverse-Why-some-young-professionals-are-going-home

His move back to Tehran is part of a reverse brain drain encouraged by the June 2013 election of President
Hassan Rouhani. Shouting out PINs is just one of many quirks embraced by those young professionals
educated abroad who have spurned good prospects in the West to return to live and invest here. It’s a bet on
the future, and for many a bet on the presidency of Mr. Rouhani, the relatively moderate regime insider
who has promised to resolve Iran’s nuclear issue with world powers and revive an economy crippled by
sanctions and tumbling oil prices. Sustained brain drain To be sure, returnees like Salar are still a minority.
Despite a decade of official efforts to woo home an Iranian diaspora of perhaps five million – to tap their
cash and expertise, but not any Westernized political thinking – the brain drain continues. Rouhani favors
an open-door policy for returnees, whom he calls a “huge asset” who have “love for their country.” But
security officials who often oppose the president have pushed back, causing a chill among would-be
returnees, with a number of high-profile arrests and detentions among those who have returned. “Now 85
percent of my friends I grew up with are not here, they are in Australia, France, the US, Vienna,” says
Salar, adding that he still wonders if he'd be better off in Dubai. “But to be honest, are all of them happy?
The number is miniscule.” Salar asked that his real name not be used so he could speak more freely; his
chosen pseudonym means "great man." He moved back here in August 2014 after nearly six years in the
UK studying finance and accounting, and investing with his brother in an asset portfolio that paid off all
school debts. But he felt the tug of home and family in Iran, including the Tehran house where he was born
and now lives. “The political landscape [in Iran] didn’t matter. I came to a decision I wanted to come back,
to be close to the country. The election acted as a stimulant," he says. Moreover, he saw an economic
uptick in Iran after Rouhani’s victory that he says now requires careful handling – and probably a nuclear
deal in order to offset low oil prices and the impact of US, European, and UN sanctions. A costly exodus
“The Rouhani election, and opening of this dialogue with the US, is having a huge psychological impact on
the country,” says Rouzbeh Pirouz, a Harvard-educated Rhodes scholar and founder of the Iranian Business
School, an elite mid-career MBA program in Tehran. “Toward the end of the Ahmadinejad period [2005 to
2013], I really got the sense people were quite bleak, there was a great sense of hopelessness,” he adds. An
exodus of young talent since the 1979 Islamic revolution has proven costly to Iran. Statistics from the
Migration Policy Institute published by the IREconomy website indicate that some 67,000 Iranians left the
country in the 1970s and another 281,000 in the 1980s. That became a cascade in the 1990s, with another
2,100,000 leaving. Emmigration eased in the 2000s. But the International Monetary Fund often puts Iran
near the top of countries losing their academic elite, at a cost, government officials estimated in 2006, of
$40 billion each year. World Bank figures show Iran's net migration to be 300,000 from 2010 to 2014. Fear
of legal complications “It’s paradoxical. A lot of the young people who grew up here, who never left the
country, are actually quite keen to leave,” says Pirouz. Those ready to go are often from middle-class
backgrounds with a “very pronounced lack of opportunity, and have a quite romanticized notion of life in
the West.” On the other hand, there are Iranians from privileged backgrounds educated or raised abroad
making the reverse trip. “They have realized the West has advantages and disadvantages, but is not the be
all and end all, either," says Pirouz. To ease the fears of potential returnees, the Rouhani government has
set up a website where people can inquire about whether it is legally safe for them to come back. Iran's
disputed 2009 election, and the months of Green Movement street protests afterwards – with scores of
deaths, cases of rape in detentions, and thousands of arrests – prompted a spike in departures, say officials.
 2AC No Link – General

Migration doesn’t lead to brain drain---levels of emigration are too low, remittances check
Hein de Haas 3/21/17, a professor of sociology at the University of Amsterdam, "Myths of Migration:
Much of What We Think We Know Is Wrong", Spiegel Online, www.spiegel.de/international/world/eight-
myths-about-migration-and-refugees-explained-a-1138053.html

5. No, migration doesn't lead to "brain drain." One oft-repeated argument holds that emigration causes
"brain drain" - the departure of those with higher levels of education - thus undermining the development
potential for origin countries. In this case, too, levels of emigration are simply too low to have such an
effect. Research has shown that it would generally be unreasonable to blame migration - the departure of
doctors, for example - for structural development problems such as inadequate health-care facilities.
Second, many developing countries face increasing levels of unemployment among university graduates.
Third, the "brain drain" theory ignores the fact that migrants often invest significant amounts of money in
their countries of origin. In 2015, migrants from developing countries sent some $410 billion back home,
and that is just the officially recorded remittances. The amount is well more than 2.5 times the global total
of development aid that same year ($161 billion). Such remittances improve living standards and decrease
poverty levels for families and communities in origin countries. At the same time, however, it would be
erroneous to believe that migrants can solve fundamental development problems such as corruption and
inequality.
 No Link – Canada Thumps
Canada thumps
Lunn 17 – Susan Lunn, reporter for CBC, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. It’s like the Canadian
version of CNN. “Trump's travel bans and cuts to science could create a Canadian brain gain.” CBC, 21
March 2017, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/brain-gain-trump-canada-1.4034304. Accessed 18 July
2018.

U.S. President Donald Trump's efforts to limit travel into his country while simultaneously cutting money
from science-based programs provides an opportunity for Canada's science sector, says a leading Canadian
researcher. "This is Canada's moment. I think it's a time we should be bold," said Alan Bernstein, president of CIFAR, a
global research network that funds hundreds of scientists in 16 countries. Bernstein believes there are many reasons why
Canada has become increasingly attractive to scientists around the world, including the political climate in
the United States and the Trump administration's travel bans. "It used to be if you were a bright young person
anywhere in the world, you would want to go to Harvard or Berkeley or Stanford, or what have you. Now I think you should give
pause to that," he said. "We have pretty good universities here. We speak English. We're a welcoming society
for immigrants." The latest executive order signed by Trump bans people from six Muslim-majority countries from getting visas
to come to the U.S. for 90 days. (The order has been temporarily halted after a judge in Hawaii ruled the ban appears to
unconstitutionally target Muslims.) High-tech sector looks to federal budget to spark innovation boom Trump immigration policies
kill work visas for Canadian nurses Ottawa's high-tech innovators build wish list ahead of budget Bernstein said he has already spoken
with three experienced scientists who want to transfer to Canadian universities, and two have received offers. Rush Holt, head of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science — the world's largest science membership organization — isn't surprised about
this. The association sent a letter to the White House, signed by all 182 member agencies, after Trump's first executive order targeting
travel was signed in January, arguing it would affect scientists hoping to come to the U.S. Holt said the concerns didn't change with
the second travel ban. "We do know scientists around the world are considering boycotting meetings here. And they're demanding the
international science society hold their meetings in other countries other than the United States. I don't like to see that," said Holt,
who's also a former Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Adding to the anxiety, Holt said, is the budget
blueprint from the White House last week, which would cut funding for many science-based programs, from the environment to
health. U.S. budget director Mick Mulvaney said there are cuts to climate change research because the president believes it is a "waste
of your money." Mulvaney also said there were "tremendous opportunities for savings" through cuts to the National Institutes for
Health.
 Brain Gain Turn
Iran brain drain is wrong - brain gain is more likely
Jarahzadeh 15 (Kamyar, editor at Ajam Media Collective, and is currently working as a refugee rights and
international development professional. He is a proud alumnus of the MSc in Migration Studies at the
University of Oxford, "Exploring Iranian Migration: Reimagining the Brain Drain,"
https://ajammc.com/2015/12/06/exploring-iranian-migration/)

The scholarship on brain drain is evolving even if the mainstream debate is not. Recent literature in migration
scholarship suggests how brain drain as a concept should be replaced by brain gain: the idea that letting
educated and ambitious individuals emigrate will actually produce a flow of knowledge back to their home
country that benefits those who stay behind as well. Who is to say that educated migrants would not
return to their home countries to help aid in development , if only states made that choice easier to make? This is
not to again oversimplify the solution, but to suggest that this debate can be re-imagined if only strict binaries and
panic-based narratives could be overcome. Until the concept of brain drain is abandoned and space is created for more
nuanced conversations about migration, perceptions of Iranian migration will continue to reproduce the same doomsday stories about
fleeing youth. To restart this debate and consider new possibilities for how to embrace human mobility, brain drain needs to be
put to rest as a concept and be replaced with more nuanced understandings of how and why people move.
 No Risk of Brain Drain
Brain drain isn't a threat - math proves it's microscopic
Jarahzadeh 15 (Kamyar, editor at Ajam Media Collective, and is currently working as a refugee rights and
international development professional. He is a proud alumnus of the MSc in Migration Studies at the
University of Oxford, "Exploring Iranian Migration: Reimagining the Brain Drain,"
https://ajammc.com/2015/12/06/exploring-iranian-migration/)

Despite the association between Iran and brain drain, the country’s net migration rate is only about -.08%.
This number is a simple calculation of how many people leave the country relative to how many people immigrate to the country, but
it is useful to show how small the scale of this emigration “panic” truly is . Iran is nearly in the middle of all
countries when ranked by emigration rates. To
give a better idea of where other countries stand, neighboring
country Turkey has a net migration rate of .46%, whereas the lower end of the list has countries like
Armenia at -5.8%, El Salvador at -8.44%, and Somalia at -9.5%. The demographic alarm bells seem to
have little reason to go off.
AT: Dual-Use/Espionage DA
 No Link – Not Mil Tech Coop

No link---scientists won’t be cooperating over sensitive military tech

Glenn E. Schweitzer 17, Director, Office for Central Europe and Eurasia, U.S. National Academies, "U.S.-
Iran Engagement in Science, Engineering, and Health (2010-2016): A Resilient Program but an Uncertain
Future", The National Academics of Sciences Engineering and Medicine,
https://www.nap.edu/read/24861/chapter/1

The National Academies have been reluctant to engage in cooperative activities with sensitive security
dimensions. The focus on “peaceful” activities has helped convince Iranian organizations that engagement
activities are not targeted on obtaining information of importance to intelligence agencies. At the same
time, this approach relieves anxieties of the U.S. government that the program might enhance Iran’s
military technology capabilities. Unfortunately, cautious avoidance of cooperative projects with potential
dual-use implications has, in recent years, curtailed exchanges in basic research in physics, chemistry, and
biology; and the curtailment has even extended to some aspects of basic mathematics.
 No Link – Empirically Disproven

The link is empirically disprove---thousands of scientists have cooperated with Iranian scientists with
years---government officials are always actively engaged to ensure no wrong-doing
Glenn E. Schweitzer 17, Director, Office for Central Europe and Eurasia, U.S. National Academies, "U.S.-
Iran Engagement in Science, Engineering, and Health (2010-2016): A Resilient Program but an Uncertain
Future", The National Academics of Sciences Engineering and Medicine,
https://www.nap.edu/read/24861/chapter/1

More than 1,500 scientists from about 120 institutions in the two countries have been active participants in
the projects sponsored by the National Academies since 2000. About one-half of the participants were
involved during the seven years covered by this report. Most participants have been faculty members from
universities in the two countries, although a significant number of scientists from government, research
institutions, and nongovernment organizations have also participated. In addition, a comparable number of
scientists from the two countries have been involved as observers at meetings, hosts at sites of field visits,
and participants in training programs organized by the National Academies and their Iranian partners. Of
special importance in considering impacts of exchange activities are the number and positions of
government officials in both countries who have been aware of the overall program or of specific activities.
They have included Foreign Ministers and Secretaries of State, who have been briefed by participants on
program activities. According to Iranian organizers of exchanges, the Supreme Leader and two Presidents
of Iran have at times expressed support of science exchanges; and President Mohammad Khatami
participated in a collaborative workshop in Tehran following his retirement from government service. In
Washington, close advisers to former U.S. presidents have also taken an active interest in the program.
Iranian ministers, U.S. senior officials, and/or their staffs have been aware of projects when they were
being developed and carried out. At times, these officials have played crucial roles in obtaining
governmental approvals (for visas or licenses, for example) or political endorsements of activities. Almost
always, when informed of the details of exchanges, government officials in both countries have expressed
interest in learning about the results of jointly sponsored events.

AND the benefits outweigh the risk of a DA

Tucker 6 (Jonathan Tucker had a BS in biology from Yale and a PhD in political science from MIT.
Tucker worked as an arms control specialist for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, the
U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. State Department. He was an editor at High
Technology and Scientific American magazines and wrote about military technologies, biotechnology, and
biomedical research. Tucker was a UN weapons biological inspector in Iraq. He served as founding director
of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and then served as a senior
fellow in its Washington Office. He was a professional staff member for the bipartisan Commission on the
Prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism, which published World at Risk, a volume critical of US
prevention strategies for post-9/11 terrorism. 6/2006, https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/kf/BIOSECURITY_A_COMPREHENSIVE_ACTION_PLAN.PDF)

There is broad agreement that research posing a potential threat to public health or national security
should be designated “dual-use” and subjected to special oversight procedures or constraints on
publication.13 At the same time, the rapid pace of innovation in the life sciences depends in large
measure on the free and open exchange of ideas among researchers in many countries. It is therefore
essential to find a reasonable balance between preventing bioterrorism and maintaining the openness
that is vital to scientific progress. In 2004, the U.S. government established an advisory committee called
the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to help define this balance. The NSABB
consists of 25 biologists, physicians, and security professionals from outside of government. Operating
under the auspices of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the board assesses the national security
implications of dual-use research in the life sciences and develops additional guidelines for the
Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) that currently oversee recombinant-DNA research. The NSABB
held its first meeting in the summer of 2005. Since then it has created working groups to refine the
definition of dual-use research, develop policies for the security review of such research projects prior to
funding or publication, draft a professional code of conduct for the life sciences, and foster international
cooperation in developing common approaches to the problem of dual-use research.14
 2AC Link Turn – Trust

Scientific collaboration improves U.S. and Iran trust, which reduces military tensions
Amanda Almeida Domingue, PhD in University of São Paulo and Henrique Ribeiro Neto, Master in University of São
Paulo, 2017, “SCIENCE DIPLOMACY AS A TOOL OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS: THE POWER OF ‘SOFT POWER’”, Brazilian Journal of International Relationships
http://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/bjir/article/view/6938

In 2009, President Obama gave a speech at the University of Cairo where he declared the
commitment of the United
States to a program of scientific and technological cooperation with Muslim countries .
That program was a cornerstone to the U.S. efforts to improve relations with Muslim
countries (OBAMA, 2009). Muslim countries is a simplified category that does not represent all the diversity in terms of politics,
economics and social relations of Middle-East and African countries. We acknowledge these differences and abhor the
generalization in one simple category; however, we use it in this article for a good reason: it makes sense in the context of U.S.
foreign policy. The effort of strengthening American relations with Muslim countries comes within an overall policy of improving the
perception of the U.S. in Muslim majority countries. According to Campbell (2015), in worldwide polls, the U.S. received strong
negative views regarding its relations to Muslim countries, although these countries have strong admiration for U.S. S&T. Before
Cairo in 2010, the U.S. had already had cooperative plans with some Muslim countries. Libya, for example, was a
good collaborator despite its status of a state sponsor of terror. After Libya announced plans to dismantle its weapons of
mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile program and begin to cooperate with international partners, a S&T(science,
technology) agreement was signed, which represented a “new phase in U.S. - Libyan relations”
and demonstrated the U.S. commitment to bilateral cooperation (DOLAN, 2012). According to a
note of the Department of State, the Libyan example is one among a “broader effort to reach out to the Maghreb
countries in particular and Muslim-majority countries more broadly, and to improve international public
understanding of American values, policies and initiatives.” (DoS, 2007). From 2004 to 2006, the Department of State
started regional dialogues about S&T and agreement negotiations with Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (DOLAN, 2012). The relations
with Pakistan are another example of the U.S. initiative towards Muslim countries. Following 9/11, Pakistan had become a vital ally
for antiterrorism efforts. In 2003, an S&T agreement was signed in order to initiate cooperation in education, health, and capacity
building. In the U.S., the program is coordinated by the U.S. Academy of Sciences. The partnership is considered to be very
successful by the two countries: both governments committed funds for joints programs within the agreement; the groups that
receive funding are selected through a competitive and transparent review process in which all funding decisions are made by
consensus; a joint committee was established and they are committed to regular meetings; the areas for potential collaboration are
already known since they were mapped prior to signing the agreement. (DOLAN, 2012). In
addition to programs with
Libya and Pakistan, the U.S. has worked since 2002 with Iran in the U.S.-Iran engagement in
science, engineering, and health. During the first decade of this program, both national academies
and partner organizations engaged more than 500 scientists and engineers from over
80 institutions in both countries. During visits, hundreds of additional scientists have met with their counterparts
abroad and American scientists delivered lectures for thousands of Iranian scientists and students. Moreover,
workshops have been the primary mechanism for the engagement effort, and seventeen were jointly organized,
with more than 500 participants. (SCHWEITZER, 2010). In addition to bilateral initiatives, in 2009 and 2010, the U.S. invested in
three actions in order to convene scientists from a higher number of Muslim countries. The Department of State sent nine
prominent U.S. scientists to a group of Muslim countries “to explore ways to strengthen partnerships and solve common science and
engineering challenges” (CAMPBEL, 2015, p. 35). The envoys came back with series of advices on how to improve and consolidate
the program and extend its duration. The future of the program is uncertain, since it has no direct funding associated with it,
however, the initiative is unprecedented and it can represent the beginning of a new program. In 2009, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the State Department began the creation of a center of excellence: (CAMPBELL, 2015) the
Middle East, and North Africa Network of Water Centers of Excellence (MENA). The center convenes several institutions, universities
and international organizations from the Middle East, North Africa, Europe and North America to share knowledge, cooperate on
technical research and develop capacity. Lastly, since 2011, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of
Engineering organize the Arab- American Frontiers of Science, Engineering, and Medicine program with a variety of Arab partners
(CAMPBELL, 2015). The meeting convenes outstanding young scientists, engineers, and medical professionals from the United
States and the 22 countries of the Arab League. The overall goal of the program is to “increase scientific exchange and dialogue
among researchers in Arab countries and the United States, and to facilitate research collaboration within and beyond the region”
(CAMPBELL, 2015). III. Concluding remarks The goal of this paper was to demonstrate how SD has unified countries and has been
employed as a strategy that assists diplomats in interpreting technical knowledge, supports scientists in negotiating multilateral
projects, and, most importantly, promotes alliances between countries. Following a brief summary of the intellectual history of the
concept of SD, we presented four cases in which SD strategies were used by the U.S. These cases reveal the power of SD in building
relations between countries that otherwise have weak or even hostile political and economic ties. The number of programs financed
by the partners in these cases reveal reciprocal interest in building research partnerships. Despite a blockage in U.S. – Cuban political
and economic relations, cooperation in S&T persisted in the Cuban case. Scientists continued to work together, overcoming political
and economic obstacles. Regarding the partnership between the U.S. and Muslim countries, researchers continued to meet, travel
and benefit from research opportunities even in times of open military conflict. The same occured for the cases of North Korea and
Russia, where the political scenario did not impede scientific cooperation between these countries and the U.S. The role of non-
governmental institutions in building research links is a significant component in all cases. Despite being underrepresented by
analytical studies on SD issues, scientific institutions, national academies of science and other agencies that are independent from
national governments governments are especially relevant in maintaining a healthy relation and dialogue among researches of
different states. On the other hand, the lack of political and economic ties complicated an effective approximation of the countries.
For instance, Cuba, North Korea and Muslim countries face harsh financial constraints, as well as varied degrees of political turmoil
(some are in times of civil war). Therefore, the commitment to any kind of stable funding is complicated and it can result in
cancellation of scientific programs or slower implementation, at best. Since the Arab Spring, cooperative activities have been put on
hold with many countries in the region. The agreements signed by the U.S. are a gesture of good faith but they do not automatically
compromise money to programs. In addition, there are still visa and security restrictions that prevent the mobility of researchers
and students, which stimulate Cuban, North Korean, Russian and Muslim scholars to turn toward other regions of the world,
especially Europe and Asia. Considering all these difficulties, we conclude that, even though SD is especially dependent on political
and economic factors, the aforementioned cases reveal that cooperative activities among researchers are possible even in situations
where political and economic ties are nonexistent or underdeveloped. SD proved to be a good strategy to unified countries -
including countries whose diplomatic relations are shaken - and to promote some kind of bargain in order to obtain assets, access to
markets, or to reward certain kinds of behavior. Libya and Pakistan are excellent examples. As we showed, U.S.
SD strategy
intensified after Libya disarmament and the alliance with Pakistan was crucial for U.S.
foreign policy objectives. In both cases, S&T were used strategically and allowed the
maintenance of good relations.
 1AR Link Turn – Trust

Scientific collaboration between the US and Iran will help build trust and empirically spills over to
allow for collaboration on larger issues.
Tabatabai 16 (Ariane M. Tabatabai is the director of curriculum and an assistant teaching professor of
security studies in the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; a senior associate in the
Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); and a post-
doctoral fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, where she was previously a Stanton
nuclear security fellow and an associate. Published on Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 10/17/16,
https://thebulletin.org/2016/10/hands-across-the-lab-will-the-us-and-iran-cooperate-on-science/)

The will is there in the US scientific community. American experts and scientists, including at the National
Academies, have encouraged a return to greater scientific exchange and collaboration. They argue that this
will allow for the United States and Iran to build trust and find a way to work together on other matters too.
Science diplomacy has a proven track record in building bridges and helping pave the way for cooperation
on broader issues. At the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union had a number of
programs facilitating collaboration and exchange between the two countries’ scientific and technical
communities. This proved to be vital in making sure nuclear weapons and materials didn’t fall into the
wrong hands with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Specifically vaccine cooperation---it’s a good will gesture

DONALD G. McNEIL Jr. 12/19/2011 (McNeil Jr. is a science and health reporter specializing in plagues
and pestilences. He covers diseases of the world’s poor, including AIDS, Ebola, malaria, swine and bird
flu, mad cow disease, SARS and so on.” Leishmaniasis: Extend Friendly American Hand to Iran? Doctor
Says a Vaccine Is a Place to Start“ https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/health/doctor-urges-reaching-out-
to-iran-oner-leishmaniasis-vaccine.html)

A leading tropical medicine researcher has proposed that the United States extend a friendly hand to
Iran — not over nuclear weapons or oil or Israel or Iraq, but over vaccines.
Dr. Peter J. Hotez, chief of the pediatric tropical medicine section at Baylor College of Medicine, recently published an article in
Miller-McCune, a public policy magazine, recalling a little-known joint venture between the United States and the Soviet Union at the
height of the Cold War: The oral polio vaccine developed by Dr. Albert Sabin, above, which is still used in the drive to wipe out polio,
was first tested on Russian children.

The injected vaccine of his rival, Dr. Jonas Salk, already dominated the American market, so in 1956 Dr. Sabin talked the Soviets into
making his vaccine. It ultimately proved far more effective and easier to use than Salk’s.

Iran makes basic childhood vaccines and is struggling to make one against leishmaniasis, a sandfly-
borne disease that caused the painful “Baghdad boil” that afflicted the first American troops in Iraq and, if
left untreated, eventually can kill.

A good leishmaniasis vaccine could protect millions of people in very poor countries, the Iranians
could use American expertise, and good will might ensue, Dr. Hotez argued.

similar opportunities for collaboration with Cuba’s medical establishment, which makes a
He sees
meningococcal vaccine against strains of the disease common in Latin America.
“I know most people think this is totally out there,” Dr. Hotez said in an e-mail. “But I believe this could make a difference.”
Science is the Key to US-Iran relationship. Other policies do not solve.
C Ghaznavi, 2017, “Science Diplomacy with Iran – A Common Language for the Farsiable Future”
https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/93987/Ghaznavi-Project.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y
ABSTRACT U.S. – Iran relations have been notoriously tense in the foreign policy arena, especially as portrayed in the
media. Traditional diplomacy and hard power tactics have proven to be unpredictable
and ineffective when it comes to the American dynamics with Iran, necessitating a new
approach to diplomacy. Science diplomacy proves to be a viable alternative to conventional
methods, given strong research bases in both countries that stand to benefit from one
another. Specifically, vaccine diplomacy, especially with respect to leishmania, could bridge the large political
abyss between the U.S. and Iran and pave the way toward a renormalization of political relations.
INTRODUCTION
How to deal with Iran has remained an irresolvable issue for the U.S. since the overthrowing of the Shah in 1979.
Foreign policy efforts have included raising international pressure on Iran’s regime, a strict
focus on their nuclear program, and widely unpopular economic sanctions. These measures can
largely be categorized as classical examples of “hard power,” though today’s geopolitical climate and plethora of
conflicts has begun to show that even “the stick” has its functional limits.5 Many have suggested that the
solution to several controversial policy disputes involves civilian power, or “the carrot.”23 Though this kind of policy
can manifest in many ways, one often- overlooked facet of “soft power” lies in the vehicle of
science. As unappreciated as the prospects of so-called “science diplomacy” may be for U.S. policy, President
Obama has made mention of their utility, especially for countries like Iran that are mired in the geopolitical whirlpool
that is the Middle East. In his 2009 speech at Cairo University, President Obama noted that he aims to bring the
American and Muslim worlds closer with scientific collaboration
and the use of science envoys.28
Perhaps we are witnessing the beginning of an “interdisciplinary” political era where science is
particularly active.

Positive outcome of collaboration builds trust, forming a virtuous cycle.

Vangen 03, (Siv Vangen, Professor at Open University Business School, March 2003 5-31, “Nurturing Collaborative
Relations: Building Trust in Interorganizational Collaboration”, THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239536801_Nurturing_Collaborative_Relations_Building_Trust_in_Interor
ganizational_Collaboration)
The theory on the management of trust in interorganizational collaboration presented in this article aims to reflect
It developed from
the management challenge (Li et al., 1999; Spekman et al., 1998) that practitioners face.
initial conceptualization of a trust-building loop capturing pragmatic lessons elicited
from the literature on trust in collaboration. The loop coveys trust building as a cyclical
process within which positive outcomes form the basis for trust development and with
each consecutive positive outcome trust builds on itself incrementally, over time, in a
virtuous circle. We argue that there is a tension between the ideology that trust is needed for collaboration to
be successful (e.g., Cullen et al., 2000; Dasgupta, 1988; Das & Teng, 1998; Oliver, 1997; Ring, 1997) and the pragmatic
difficulties pertaining to trust building itself and the frequent need to initiate and enact collaborative agendas in
situations where trust is lacking. Practitioners’ perceptions suggest that unequal power relations and the need to
protect individual organizations’ interests by manipulating and controlling collaborative agendas are inevitable
difficulties pertaining to the collaborative processes and that these issues in particular tend to hamper trust building.
We see the theory contributing to the management of collaboration at two levels. First, the theory
suggests that successful management of trust implies both the ability to cope in situations
where trust is lacking and the ability to build trust in situations where this is possible. This
is in contrast to much previous literature, which argues that the presence of trust is essential for collaboration to be
successful. Given the reality of many collaborative situations, practitioners inevitably will find themselves in situations
where trust at best is insufficient. Indeed, although practitioners tend to say that trust is a vital ingredient for success,
they also argue that their lack of trust in each other is mutual but their only choice in as far as the collaboration is
concerned is to get on with it. Although other researchers have argued differently (e.g., Creed & Miles, 1996; Cullen
et al., 2000), our observations do not suggest that such lack of trust inevitably leads to failure. As a manager involved
in a public service leadership initiative commented, collaboration frequently entails the “suppression of hatred in
pursuit of money.”
It may be argued that the key to success lies in the ability to predict others’ behavior and that trust management is
about managing the risk and vulnerability inherent in the collaborative situation. The act of collaborating will increase
partners’ ability to predict outcomes and how others may act—so enabling them to assess uncertainty and reduce
fear of opportunistic behavior regardless of whether trust exists. Sharfman et al. (1991) argued similarly that “the
advantages of sharing resources such as technology, engineering expertise, and quality management outweigh (at
least to some extent) the disadvantages stemming from mistrust” (p. 185).
Second, the theory clarifies different implications for initiating and sustaining the trust-building loop across
different situations. It argues that the small-wins approach (Bryson, 1988) to trust building within which trust is
built incrementally via successful implementation of modest collaborative initiatives is
the preferred strategy. In situations requiring the collaborating organizations to be more ambitious, managing the
associated risk is seen as an integral component to trust building and to coping with lack of trust. Trust management
therefore requires the assessment of each collaborative situation with regard to level of associated risk, level of trust
existing between the partners, and whether trust can be built incrementally via a small-wins approach or whether a
more rapid and comprehensive approach to trust development is required to pursue collaborative advantage. The
discussions of issues pertaining to initiating and sustaining trust in each situation provide practitioners with vital
conceptual handles with which to grasp the challenges that managing trust implies. The examples of the type of
activities that can help build and sustain trust in each situation provide vital cues to practitioners about how to
manage these challenges. It is argued that the facilitation of the cyclical trust-building process requires careful and
continuous attention to a range of nurturing activities

Science diplomacy protects US national security and reduces international conflict.

Bridget M. Dolan, June 2012, research scholar at the American Association for the Advancement of Science ,“Science
and Technology Agreements as Tools for Science Diplomacy: A U.S. Case Study”, AAAS
http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/files/science_and_technology_agreements_as_tools_for_science_diplomacy_scie
nce__diplomacy.pdf
Protecting U.S. National Security National security concerns often motivate bilateral engagement,
including S&T. In the early years of the post-Soviet era, science diplomacy focused on demilitarization of science
infrastructure and redirection of former Soviet weapons scientists into careers that were peaceful as well as
meaningful and sustainable. The security concerns of the last decade with Muslim extremism
following 9/11 have motivated S&T engagement with Muslim-majority countries. The
United States signed seven S&T agreements with Muslim-majority nations between 2003 and 2008 as part of the
Bush administration’s strategy to fight the “war on terror.” Another five S&T agreements have been finalized since
President Barack Obama’s “New Beginnings” speech, and one more is awaiting a signature. This represents
a
shift in the S&T engagement strategy from that prior to 9/11 when only one of
the twenty-nine S&T agreements was with a predominantly Muslim nation (Egypt). This
indicates that the U.S. government considers science a strategic asset for national security
and uses S&T agreements as tools for relationship building with the long-term benefits
of mitigating international conflicts.
 Travel Ban Hurts Intelligence
Getting rid of the travel ban is key to intelligence on Iran so we know whether they are developing a
nuke.
Stein, ’17 Jeff Stein, investigative reporter of long standing, specializing in intelligence, defense and
foreign policy and former Army Intelligence case officer in Vietnam, January 28, 2017, “Spy Veterans Say
Trump's Muslim-Country Visa Ban Will Hurt Recruitment”, Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/spy-
veterans-trump-visa-ban-hurt-recruitment-549588, EO

For decades, CIA and U.S. military intelligence spy recruiters have held out the promise of eventual
resettlement in America to induce foreigners to turn coat and work secretly for the United States against
terrorist groups or repressive governments. In reality, many were caught before they ever made it, but during the Cold War
countless Eastern Europeans living under communist rule, and more recently, Muslims across the Middle East, North Africa
and Central Asia, have worked secretly for U.S. spy agencies on the promise that they or their children would
eventually be extracted. Another effective recruiting tool for U.S. operatives has been to offer their agents’ families medical care
or education in the United States.

Those inducements, a primary recruiting tool in Muslim lands, were effectively suspended with Trump’s
executive order Friday to temporarily ban immigration from seven critical targets of U.S. spy agencies —
Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Libya and Somalia. The departments of State and Homeland Security, the order stipulates, may allow
entry from those countries on “a case-by-case basis,” but it’s a balky arrangement not likely to appeal to managers of the CIA’s highly
secretive operations directorate, its espionage and covert action arm.

Intelligence veterans with vast counterterrorism experience are expressing dismay about how the order will affect their spy operations.

Countries Unlikely to Collaborate

“These individuals often put themselves at the risk of death for working with the U.S. and without the
ability to offer them safety, we will be reducing the likelihood that those in countries targeted by the
ban will work with us in the future,” Phillip Lohaus, a decorated veteran of the U.S. Special Operations Command and
CIA, tells Newsweek .

“We relied heavily on local translators, many of whom have gone on to forge productive lives for themselves here in the States,”
Lohaus added. “Why would they take such a risk if they knew that they would face retribution or death by staying in their home
countries?”

“Absolutely,” agreed Cindy Storer, a former member of the CIA intelligence team that tracked al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden. “It
hurts,” she said in a brief interview. “Capital h-u-r-t-s.”

Imagine, she said, if the ban had been in place when Jamal al Fadl, a Sudanese Muslim and key al-Qaeda operative, showed up at the
American embassy in Eritrea in the mid-1990s and volunteered to “defect” to the United States. FBI counterterror agents brought him
into the U.S., where he provided "a major breakthrough of intelligence on the creation, character, direction, and intentions of al-
Qaeda," according to the official 9/11 Commission report.

Ironically, says Robert McFadden, a former deputy assistant director of national security operations for the NCIS, or Naval Criminal
Investigative Service, “None of the 9/11 hijackers had passports from any” of the countries on Trump’s exclusionary list. Moreover,
the visa ban does not include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon or the United Arab Emirates—the origins of the 9/11 hijackers. The
Tsarnaev brothers who carried out the Boston Marathon attack came from Russia. The deceased San Bernardino attacker Syed Rizwan
Farook was a U.S. citizen of Pakistani origin. His wife, Tashfeen Malik, was Pakistani but lived most of her life in Saudi Arabia.
Pakistan, which has harbored al-Qaeda, and other terror groups, is also not on Trump’s list.

Vetting Already Thorough

The president’s order banning all Syrian refugees is based on a theory he frequently propounded on the campaign trail: that the
refugee stream offers Islamic State (ISIS) militants an easy route into the United States.

But intelligence veterans like Henry Miller-Jones, a retired CIA operations officer who worked in the Middle East, scoff at that idea.

"ISIS would never be likely to use such a route and risk losing a valuable potential asset in a rubber dinghy before he even arrived in a
target territory,” Miller-Jones tells Newsweek. “Then there is the wait for them in Europe, and the Europeans do some vetting
themselves now.” The point, Miller-Jones says, is that “these refugees are already vetted pro forma very thoroughly. There is room to
be more thorough, but not much, and more will not improve our security for the cost.”
As for a route through Mexico, “the handful of refugees who might be coming over the southern border illegally or legally aren’t
worth” a ban, he says. “To risk getting caught or dying in the desert in order to blow up a car somewhere and maybe kill a few people
would be foolish and the ISIS leadership is not stupid.”

ban would likely damage the flow of intelligence from contacts with “Muslim-
Miller-Jones also said the
country students, professors, visiting businessmen and others from whom [CIA officers] attempt to develop
sources or debrief.” The same goes for intelligence from "American businessmen who travel and work in the Muslim world” but
now "may get the cold shoulder” now from valuable contacts there.

Iran on Saturday announced it was going to refuse entry to U.S. citizens in retaliation to Washington's visa
ban against Tehran and six other majority-Muslim countries, throwing another roadblock to U.S. spies.
'Disastrous Mistake'

All in all, the Trump order could pose a serious setback for U.S. intelligence and damage the very effort the president says he’s
making: to reduce the chance of a terrorist attack from abroad, the ex-spies and security officials say.

“From an intelligence, operations, and foreign liaison perspective, there will most certainly be a profound
chilling effect, with respect to developing contacts, recruiting sources, and working with foreign
counterparts...” says McFadden, who also served on the experts panel for Detainee Interrogation, Detention, and Rendition policy
in the office of the Director of National Intelligence.
 No Iran Nukes
It would take a long time to build a bomb – they need to rebuild its enrichment complex, new
stockpile of uranium, and get new centrifuges
Sanger, 5/8 David E. Sanger, graduate of Harvard College, the first senior fellow in The Press and National
Security at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, and teacher of Central
Challenges in American National Security, Strategy and the Press at the Kennedy School of Government,
May 8, 2018, “How Long Would It Take Iran to Build a Nuclear Bomb? It Depends”, The New York
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/us/politics/iran-build-nuclear-bomb-.html, EO
David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a private group in Washington that tracks nuclear
arms, said it would currently take Iran eight to 10 months to rebuild its enrichment complex and acquire
sufficient uranium fuel to make a bomb.

“It’s something less than 12 months,” he said in an interview. That, however, is only the first step because the fuel
would have to be turned into a weapon.
Iran has studied that process for years, a point Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel made last week when he presented a
stolen trove of old Iranian documents. The documents suggest significant conceptual progress in warhead design, but it is unclear
whether the Iranians know how to produce the bombs or whether its missiles have the capability to deliver them.

Mr. Albright added that he expected Tehran to show restraint, at least in the near term, and keep its nuclear complex in line with the
accord’s rules. “I’m assessing they won’t do anything” that would violate the curbs, he said.

Just building up a new stockpile of uranium would take a while. When the deal was struck, Iran had
roughly 22,000 pounds of low-enriched uranium on hand, the kind used for powering nuclear reactors. But
it had to ship almost all of it out of the country.

had about 250 pounds in its stockpile — not

The last time inspectors issued a detailed report, they indicated that Iran
enough to make a single nuclear weapon, even with considerable enrichment to bomb-grade levels.

That is why it would probably take Iran a long while to resume production: It does not have the uranium
needed to keep a larger number of centrifuges running.

Building that stockpile would be difficult. And the Iranians have already made clear they have little
interest in bringing back their old, inefficient centrifuges. They were working on far more powerful models before
the deal was struck, but could not begin to experiment with them, under the rules of the agreement, for another seven years or so.
2AC AT: T
AT: T – Immigration
 We’re T – Contextual Ev
Travel ban is a restriction on immigration to the US
Burch 6/26/18 (Liz, Columnist @ WLOS in Asheville, NC, "Iranian immigrant supports Supreme Court
decision on Trump's travel ban," https://wlos.com/news/local/iranian-immigrant-supports-supreme-court-
decision-on-trumps-travel-ban)

ASHEVILLE, N.C. (WLOS) — President Trump celebrated a victory for his administration on Tuesday after the Supreme Court
upheld his controversial travel ban. The decision by the justices barely passed in a 5-4 vote. The ban itself is drawing
widespread criticism, especially since the majority of the countries banned are mostly Muslim. However, one Iranian immigrant in the
mountains says he supports both the ban and the Supreme Court’s decision. In Saiid Rabiipour’s office are reminders of the country he
left behind and symbols of the country he immigrated to. “I'm Iranian. I'm from Iran,” Rabiipour explained. Rabiipour came to the
United States in the '70s to attend The Citadel. His original intention was to return to Iran. Saiid Rabiipour is an Iranian immigrant
who now lives in Western North Carolina. He says he supports Trump's travel ban and the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold it.
(Photo credit: WLOS Staff) “My first impression when I first came here, I did not like it. There was too much to digest, too much
freedom,” he said. But he grew to love that freedom, and eventually converted from Islam to Christianity. He stayed and became a
citizen in the '80s. “This is one of the best countries on the face of this Earth, and I'm proud to call myself an American,” Rabiipour
said. “The way I see the travel ban is this, we need a period of time to educate ourselves in this country,” he said . The ban makes
immigration more difficult for people coming from Iran, Yemen, Somalia, Venezuela, North Korea, Syria, and
Libya.

The travel ban prohibits entry of immigrants

Lucy Lu 17, immigration lawyer, "Trump's Travel Ban: Who does it affect?", Immigration Learning
Center, https://learn.simplecitizen.com/2017/10/trumps-travel-ban-who-does-affect/

Faster than Apple updates, the Trump administration is already carrying out version 3.0 on immigration
policy, commonly known as the Travel Ban. This update aims to prohibit entry of nonimmigrants and
immigrants who are nationals from 8 countries; Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela,
Yemen. Each country has its own set of specific restrictions. Instead of a 90-day vetting period like the first
version, this ban is basically indefinite. To break it down, the new update is being carried out in two phases.
September 24, 2017 marked the beginning of phase 1 and phase 2 will start on October 18. Trump
administration announced that the update does not apply to refugees, but they will have a separate policy
regarding refugees from these 8 countries forthcoming. We’ll pinpoint the takeaways from this ban for
those who may be affected in any way. Before we delve in, it helps to understand why these new
regulations exist.
AT: T – Restriction
 We’re T – Contextual Ev

The travel ban is a restriction on legal immigration

Kavitha George 6/26/18, news writer @ Bustle, "What The SCOTUS Travel Ban Decision Means For
Immigrants & Refugees", Bustle, https://www.bustle.com/p/what-the-scotus-travel-ban-decision-means-
for-immigrants-refugees-9590860

Who Does This Affect? According to Berardi, restrictions on travel visas do not affect refugees coming to the United States for
asylum, but they do pose a serious roadblock for potential immigrants, immigrant families, students, and others
seeking to move to — or even just visit — the country. Brittney Rezaei, an immigrants' rights attorney at the Council on
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) said her organization is in the process of helping multiple families who have members
stranded in one of the banned countries, and are unable to obtain visas to the United States in order to be
reunited. "CAIR is incredibly disappointed. This continues a legacy of bad decisions," Rezaei says, referencing the Court's decisions
to uphold slavery in the 1800s and the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. "Today’s court decision attacks
Muslim communities and opens the door to court-sanctioned discrimination of other ethnic and religious groups." Esther Sung, a staff
attorney at the National Immigration Law Center says others, who had obtained travel visas before the ban was in place, are now stuck
in banned countries with volatile political climates, such as Yemen and Syria. "People trying to leave dangerous countries are
stranded," she says. What Are Their Options? Under the travel ban, there is a waiver process where people in banned countries can
apply for visas, but the system is ineffective, according to Rezaei. "The waiver process is a sham," she says. She explains that the
government has provided very little information about the process, and consulates will hold applicants in limbo. For some countries,
like Yemen and Iran, there aren't even American Consulates in the country, so waiver applicants must travel to a neighboring state to
apply. State Department data shows that in the first two months of the travel ban only two waivers were granted, out of more than
8,000 applications. Sung says numbers picked up after that, but still remained relatively low. Christopher Richardson, a former State
Department official reported to Slate that "regardless of the instructions that we had 'discretion to grant the waiver,' we were not
allowed to exercise that discretion." Bustle has reached out to the State Department for comment. "My understanding was no one is to
be eligible to apply," he added. Going Forward The current policy will be in effect indefinitely, unless Congress passes a bill against
it, the Court overturns its decision, or the president changes his mind. Advocates fear that this decision will encourage
President Trump to place more restrictions on legal immigration, and potentially worsen the current immigration crisis
on the southern border. "The court’s judgement is a deep vindication for President Trump and shows that the string of lower court
cases ruling against the immigration executive orders were a kind of judicial mass hysteria," says Eugene Kontorovich, a professor of
constitutional law at Northwestern University. And the momentum this decision might give to the Trump agenda is dangerous, argues
Sung. "The decision today essentially endorses President Trump’s anti-Muslim animus." “The pain is in individual households," she
says. "The effects are harder to see, which makes them insidious - but that doesn’t make the harm less real."