Pavia vs Ugarte GR L-2599

Facts:
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December, 1900, Maria Juana Ugarte
e Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased.
There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant or descendant line of
succession, the petitioner presented herself as a collateral descendant, that is to say, as the legitimate
niece of the deceased.
However, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of
the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e
Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased.
The father of the petitioner was in the same collateral degree of succession as Maria Juana Ugarte e
Iturralde. Pablo Linart, the father of Carmen Linart, was the legitimate son of Maria Josefa Iturralde y
Gonzalez, another sister of Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez
The court below on the 24th of February, 1905, entered judgment declaring that the petitioner had the
same right to participate in the inheritance as had Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, and ordered the latter
to render an account of the estate, enjoining her, at the same time, from disposing of any part thereof
until such accounting had been made and the estate distributed.

Issue:
Who has better right over the estate of Ramon?.

Ruling:
The High Court reverse the decision of the lower court and held that Carmen Linart has no right to
succeed the deceased with said Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who was once declared to be the lawful
heir, and who is now in possession of the estate, as to whom we hereby dissolve the injunction issued
from the Court of First Instance, following the rule that the relative nearest in degree excludes those
more distant, with the exception of the right of representation in proper cases (art. 921, par. 1 of the
Civil Code); and that the right of representation in the collateral line shall take place only in favor of
children of brothers or sisters whether they be of whole or half blood (art. 925, par. 2).
The error which the appellant claims was committed in the court below is very clearly shown. The
court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece was
entitled to, when, as a matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place
in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a
daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased
Salao vs Salao 70 SCRA 65

Facts:

The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal begot four
children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest
son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao.
After Valentina’s death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two
children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry
of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names.

The property in question is the forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at SitioCalunuran, Lubao,

Pampanga, wherein Benita Salao-Marcelo daughter of Valentin Salao claimed 1/3 interest on the said
fishpond.

The defendant Juan Y. Salao Jr. inherited from his father Juan Y. Salao, Sr. ½ of the fishpond and the
other half from the donation of his auntie Ambrosia Salao.

It was alleged in the said case that Juan Y. Salao, Sr and Ambrosia Salao had engaged in the fishpond
business. Where they obtained the capital and that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in
that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from
Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is
no documentary evidence to support that theory.

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of VictorinaSalao in a letter dated January 26, 1951
informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when
Juan took possession thereof in 1945, in which he refused to give Benita and Victorina’s children their
one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200, 000. However, there was no
mention on the deeds as to the share of Valentin and Alejandra.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not
have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt
Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of
Ambrosia’s one-half share.

Benita Salao and her nephews and niece asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr.
and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao’s supposed one-third
share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.

Issue :
Whether or not the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and
Ambrosia Salao for the basis of the claim of their inheritance

Ruling:
NO.

There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part of Juan Y.
Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There was no constructive trust
because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by
fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider
the Calunuran fishpond ” being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin
Salao.

A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. (Sec.
47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles were regularly issued and that they are
valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties
must be clear and convincing.

The plaintiffs utterly failed to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on
vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.

Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of proof. — Where a trust is to be
established by oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently strong to prove the right of
the alleged beneficiary with as much certainty as if a document proving the trust were shown. A trust
cannot be established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens title, upon vague and inconclusive proof.

Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. — In order to establish a trust in real
property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the act giving rise to the trust
obligation were proven by an authentic document. Such a trust cannot be established upon testimony
consisting in large part of insecure surmises based on ancient hearsay. (Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del
Rosario 50 Phil. 110).

The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as already noted, allows an
implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy oral evidence is required to prove an implied
trust because; oral evidence can be easily fabricated.

On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the ownership of the land referred to
therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists. that Torrens titles were regularly issued and
that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of
the parties must be clear and convincing.

The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. “Once a title is registered, the owner
may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de
su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land”.
Vizconde vs CA G.R. No. 118449

Facts:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, Carmela and
Jennifer. Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael and Salud. The other children of Rafael
and Salud are Antonio; Ramon; Teresita, and Ricardo, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents
and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children. Estrellita and her two daughters,
Carmela and Jennifer, were killed. In an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita,
Rafael and Salud, together with petitioner Vizconde, inherited from Estrellita’s estate. Subsequently,
when Rafael died in 1992, an intestate estate proceeding was instituted by one of the heirs of Rafael.

Private respondent Ramon, averred that petitioner should be impleaded as one of Rafael’s children “by
right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter Estrellita.” Petitioner filed a
Manifestation contending that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he
has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The trial court granted Ramon’s motion.

Issue:
Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate proceeding regarding Rafael’s
estate is proper?

Should the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita be nullified? To declaring the
Paranaque property as subject to collation.

Held:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass
of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of
the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner is considered a third person or a stranger by Art.
887. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding.

Furthermore, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property may
be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who
inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even
assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the
Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael.
Anselma Diaz vs IAC and Jardin GR No. L-66574

Facts:

1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with
Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila
Asuncion;

2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another
child who died during infancy;

3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero;

4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero;

5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976;

6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his
six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with
Felixberta Pacursa.

Judge Raval declared Felisa Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Santero. Petitioner Diaz and
Felixberta, as guardians of their minor children with Pablo Santero, filed an opposition and motion to
exclude Felisa as heir.

Issue:
Who are the legal heirs of Simona Santer -- her niece Felisa or her grandchildren (illegitimates) ?

Ruling:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors
(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate
child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Thus, grandchildren herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to
the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Santero, because of the barrier provided for under
Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

::Felisa is declared the lone heir of Simona.

Santillon v. Miranda 14 SCRA 563

Principle:
Surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child entitled to one-half of the intestate estate.—When
intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only one legitimate child of the deceased is
entitled to one-half of the estate of the deceased spouse under Article 996 of the Civil Code.

Facts:
Santillon died intestate leaving one son Claro and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. 4 years after his death,
Claro Santillon filed a petition for administration which was opposed by Perfecta Miranda.

Subsequently, Claro filed a “Motion to Declare Share of Heirs”. Claro claimed that under Art. 891 of
the New Civil Code, after deducting ½ for conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the
remaining ½ must be divided as follows: ¼ for her and ¾ for him. While Perfecta claimed under Art.
996 of the NCC, she was entitled ½ of the remaining half besides her conjugal half. In other words,
Claro claimed ¾ while Perfecta ½.

Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the extent that it grants the widow the same share as
that of the children in intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.

Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control, regardless of its
alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a
legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular
"child."

Issue:
Whether or not a surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child is entitled to ½ of the intestate
estate?

Ruling:
Yes.

Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996
comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro
cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the
legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession.
While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse
should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and
spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on
intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.

Therefore, Perfecta is entitled to ½ of the intestate estate.

Suarez vs CA GR No. 94918

Principle:
The legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of
petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother.
Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as
children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the
action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interests.

Facts:
Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of
several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977,
petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission
of contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
(now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate
principal amount of about P70,000 as damages.

The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become final and
executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were
levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder
for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a certificate of sale which was
subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.

On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory
action 2 against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil
Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied
pieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that being strangers to the case decided against
their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are
co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on execution.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-owned by
petitioners and registered in the name of petitioner’s deceased father?

Ruling:

Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case.
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."

Article 888 further provides:

"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of
the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."

Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:

"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a
portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse
to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but
through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any
way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interests.
Rodriguez vs. Ravilan G.R. No. 5343

PRINCIPLES

1. PARTITION; OWNERSHIP; PARTIES. — In an action for the partition of property held in

common, it is assumed that the parties by whom it is prosecuted are all coowners or coproprietors
of the property to be divided, as he who claims or demands the partition of property of common
ownership must necessarily have the status of coproprietor of the undivided property.

2. ID.; ID.; OWNERSHIP NOT TO BE TRIED IN PARTITION. — In such an action for partition the
question of common ownership is not to be argued, nor the fact as to whether the interested
parties are or are not the owners of the property in question, but only as to how, and in what
manner, and in what proportion the said property of common ownership shall be distributed
among the interested parties by order of the court.

3. ID; OWNERS ONLY CAN MAINTAIN ACTION FOR PARTITION. — He who has not the status of
coowner, or shall not previously have proven that he has such status, is not entitled to prosecute
an action for the partition of property.

4. ID.; RULES OF INHERITANCE; EFFECT OF PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS. — A civil partnership

contract executed between several brothers or relatives, relating to the use and enjoyment of
property held in common, can not affect the hereditary rights of the relatives of a deceased
partner, nor alter the order of inheritance prescribed by law.

Facts:

Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno died having nine children, Espiridion, Feliciana, Telesfora,
Juana, Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro.

They left a property consisting of carabaos, a credit, and lands situated in the pueblo of Mandaue,
and that, their property having been divided among their nine children, that portion thereof which
corresponded to the brothers and sisters Espiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro remained undivided
and its owners, associated together, continued to enjoy it and manage it in common, separately
from their other brothers and sisters.

That the business of the said four brothers and sisters was, by common accord, administered by
one of them, EspiridionBarte, and, when he died, the three survivors remained united in their
interests and the undivided property was administered, until December, 1901, by Pedro Barte,
who at his death left four heirs, the said Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, represented by
their mother, Luisa Ravilan, the wife and widow of Pedro Barte and the defendant in this suit; that
the said property, as aforestated, was administered by EspiridonBarte, in common accord with the
others, and, he having died without leaving heirs, by force of law the pat that pertained to him
passed to his brother Pedro and his sisters Jorgia and Matea, as the heirs nearest of kin of the
said Espiridion, and, by common agreement, the said brother and sisters continued their
partnership organization and appointed the brother Pedro as administrator; that during the latter’s
administration, MateaBarte also died, leaving as her heir Nicolas Mendoza, represented by his
father Donato, one of the plaintiffs; that at the death of Pedro Barte, JorgiaBarte and Donato
Mendoza, in the name of their son Nicolas, decided upon the distribution of the property
mentioned and so stated, in February, 1902, to Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of the heirs of Pedro
Barte, but that Ravilan would not agree to the partition, on the pretext that, as the administratrix
of that property, she had to pay debts of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs desire that a division be made and therefore pray that a partition of
the property, both real and personal, be decreed and also of the profits that may have
accrued thereto during the time that it was in the possession of and usufruct enjoyed
by the defendant?

Ruling:

NO
Although it be decided that it was not necessary to prove that the said nine brothers and sisters
were unquestionably the children of the deceased Javier Barte and Eulalia, and are
therefore their only heirs, it should at least have been shown that a lawful partition was
made among their nine children, of the property left by both spouses at their death, and
that the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of Mandaue, and said to be
possessed by the said four brothers and sisters associated together, were awarded to the
same. Such a partition, were it made, should appear in an authentic document, which
was not exhibited with the complaint, since article 1068 of the Civil Code provides "A division
legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property which may have been
awarded to him."

So that he who demands or claims a partition of the property must have the status of; a
coproprietor or coowner of the property the partition of which is asked for; and notwithstanding
the fact that JorgiaBarte and the son of MateaBarte, through his representative, aver that they are
the coowners of the said Mandaue lands and of others situated in the municipalities of
Bogo and Tabogon, they have not proved their averment by titles which establish the common
ownership alleged. A mere affirmation without proofs is insufficient, since the defendant party,
represent ng the four daughters of the deceased Pedro Barte, absolutely denied all the allegations
of the complaint.

In actions for the partition of property held in common it is assumed that the parties are all
coowners or coproprietors of the undivided property to be partitioned. The question of common
ownership need not be gone into at the time of the trial, but only how, in what manner, and in
what proportion the said property of common ownership , shall be distributed among the
interested parties by order of court.

Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded, it must be remembered that the hereditary
succession of the deceased EspiridionBarte, who it is said left no legitimate descendants at
his death, should be divided among his eight brothers and sisters who may have survived him,
and in case any of these have died, the children of his deceased brother or sister, that is,
his nephews and nieces. per stirpes, are entitled to share in his inheritance, according to the
provisions of articles 946, 947, and 948 of the Civil Code, the last cited of which prescribes:
"Should brothers survive with nephews, children of brothers of the whole blood, the former shall
inherit per capita and the latter per stirpes," representing their respective fathers or mothers,
brothers or sisters of the deceased.

The record does not show whether JorgiaBarte left any legitimate heir at her death, and if she did
not, her collateral relatives succeed her in the manner provided by law.

It is to be noted that the partnership contract entered into by the four brothers and sisters can
not affect the hereditary rights which belong to the relatives of the deceased predecessor in
interest nor alter the order prescribed by law for testate or intestate successions. (Arts. 744, 763,
806, 808, 913, 946, Civil Code.)
Case Digest Assignment in Succession Law.
October 8, 2018

Lloyd V. Sanchez
submitted by: