PANGANDOY Remedial Provisional Remedies Cases

Remedial Law Review PANGANDOY ZBA Notes
I.PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
A. Preliminary Attachment
Case Name Reference Date Ponente Summary
Lim Jr. vs. Lazaro G.R. No. 185734, July 03, 2013 Perlas-Bernabe, J. Discharge of
Preliminary
Attachment
Ligon vs. RTC - G.R. No. 190028, February 26, 2014 Perlas-Bernabe, J. Discharge of
Makati Preliminary
Attachment
Mangila vs. CA G.R. No. 125027 August 12, 2002 Carpio, J. Requirements;
when to execute a
preliminary
attachment
Chuidian vs. G.R. No. 139941 January 19, 2001 Ynares-Santiago, J. Discharge of
Sandiganbayan Preliminary
Attachment
Torres vs. Satsatin G.R. No. 166759 November 25, 2009 Peralta, J Requirements;
Discharge of
Preliminary
Attachment
Luzon G.R. No. 203530 April 13, 2015 Peralta, J Requirements -

Development Bank deposit means
vs. Krishna cash
Northern Luzon G.R. No. 203240, March 18, 2015 Perlas-Bernabe, J. Jurisidction - effect
Island Co. vs. of appealing the
Garcia main case
Excellent Quality G.R. No. 212025 July 01, 2015 Mendoza, J. Claims for
Apparel vs. damages
Visayan Surety
Watercraft Venture G.R. No. 181721 September 9, 2015 Peralta, J. Grounds

Corp. vs. Wolfe
Phil. G.R. No. 193821 November 23, 2015 Brion, J. Discharge of

Airconditioning Preliminary
Center vs. RCJ Attachment
Lines
I can do all things through CHRIST who

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Lim Jr. vs. Lazaro

G.R. No. 185734,
July 03, 2013
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS
On August 22, 2005, Lim, Jr. filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment before the RTC, seeking to recover from respondents-spouses Tito S. Lazaro and
Carmen T. Lazaro (Sps. Lazaro) the sum of P2,160,000.00, which represented the amounts stated in several
dishonored checks issued by the latter to the former, as well as interests, attorney’s fees, and costs.
The RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment application and upon the posting of the required
P2,160,000.00 bond, issued the corresponding writ on October 14, 2005. In this accord, three (3) parcels of
land situated in Bulacan, registered in the names of Sps. Lazaro, were levied upon.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, Sps. Lazaro averred, among others, that Lim, Jr. had no cause of
action against them. Also, Sps. Lazaro equally opposed the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Nonetheless, on September 22, 2006, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby Sps.
Lazaro agreed to pay Lim, Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis, following a schedule of
payments covering the period from September 2006 until October 2013, under an agreed terms.
The aforesaid compromise agreement was approved by the RTC in its October 31, 2006 Decision and
January 5, 2007 Amended Decision.
Subsequently, Sps. Lazaro filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to lift the writ of preliminary attachment
annotated on the subject TCTs, which the RTC granted on March 29, 2007. It ruled that a writ of
preliminary attachment is a mere provisional or ancillary remedy, resorted to by a litigant to protect and
preserve certain rights and interests pending final judgment. Considering that the case had already been
considered closed and terminated by the rendition of the January 5, 2007 Amended Decision on the basis
of the September 22, 2006 compromise agreement, the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted and
quashed. Consequently, it ordered the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the writ’s annotation on the
subject TCTs.
Lim, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on July 26, 2007, prompting him to
file a petition for certiorari before the CA.
ISSUE
Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was properly lifted.
HELD
NO, the preliminary attachment was NOT properly lifted.
By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an ancillary
remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought
and expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the
main action. As such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve
and protect certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final
judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the

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action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted
service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an
attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates
that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the
judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner
provided by law.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment
against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper.
Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had already
been approved by the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the obligations thereunder have yet
to be fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80.
Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should
have continued to subsist.
In Chemphil Export & Import Corporation v. CA, the Court pronounced that a writ of attachment is not
extinguished by the execution of a compromise agreement between the parties,
xxxx
If we were to rule otherwise, we would in effect create a back door by which a debtor can easily escape his creditors.
Consequently, we would be faced with an anomalous situation where a debtor, in order to buy time to dispose of his
properties, would enter into a compromise agreement he has no intention of honoring in the first place. The purpose
of the provisional remedy of attachment would thus be lost. It would become, in analogy, a declawed and toothless
tiger. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
In fine, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment subject of this case should be restored and
its annotation revived in the subject TCTs, re-vesting unto Lim, Jr. his preferential lien over the properties
covered by the same as it were before the cancellation of the said writ. Lest it be misunderstood, the lien
or security obtained by an attachment even before judgment, is in the nature of a vested interest which
affords specific security for the satisfaction of the debt put in suit. Verily, the lifting of the attachment lien
would be tantamount to an abdication of Lim, Jr.’s rights over Sps. Lazaro’s properties which the Court,
absent any justifiable ground therefor, cannot allow.

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Ligon vs. RTC - Makati

G.R. No. 190028
February 26, 2014
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS
On November 20, 2002, petitioner Leticia P. Ligon (Ligon) filed an amended complaintbefore the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101 (Quezon City RTC) for collection of sum of money and damages,
rescission of contract, and nullification of title with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment, against Sps. Baladjay, a certain Olivia Marasigan (Marasigan), Polished Arrow Holdings, Inc.
(Polished Arrow), and its incorporators.
In her complaint, Ligon alleged, inter alia, that Rosario Baladjay (Rosario) enticed her to extend a short–
term loan in the amount of P3,000,000.00, payable in a month’s time and secured by an Allied Bank post–
dated check for the same amount. Ligon likewise claimed that Rosario, as further enticement for the loan
extension, represented that she and her husband Saturnino were in the process of selling their property in
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City (subject property), covered by a clean title, i.e., TCT No. 8502[9
in the name of Rosario Baladjay, married to Saturnino Baladjay, and that the proceeds of the said sale
could easily pay–off the loan. Unfortunately, the Allied Bank check was dishonored upon presentment
and, despite assurances to replace it with cash, Rosario failed to do so.
Moreover, Ligon discovered that the subject property had already been transferred to Polished Arrow,
alleged to be a dummy corporation of Sps. Baladjay and the individual defendants (defendants). As a
result, TCT No. 8502 was cancelled and replaced on October 11, 2002 by TCT No. 9273[11 in the name of
Polished Arrow. Thus, Ligon prayed that all defendants be held solidarily liable to pay her the amount of
P3,000,000.00, with interest due, as well as P1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees and another P1,000,000.00 by
way of moral and exemplary damages.
Subsequently, an Amended Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued on November 26, 2002, and
annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273 on December 3, 2002 (December 3, 2002 attachment
annotation).
On February 18, 2003, a similar complaint for collection of sum of money, damages, and cancellation of
title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was lodged before the Makati City RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03–186 (Makati City Case), by Spouses Cecilia and Gil Vicente (Sps. Vicente)
against Sps. Baladjay, Polished Arrow, and other corporations.
Thereafter, but before the Quezon City Case was concluded, the Makati City RTC rendered a Decision
dated December 9, 2004 (December 9, 2004 Decision), rescinding the transfer of the subject property from
Sps. Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in fraud of creditors.
Consequently, the Makati City RTC directed the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to: (a) cancel TCT
No. 9273 in the name of Polished Arrow; and (b) restore TCT No. 8502 “in its previous condition” in the
name of Rosario Baladjay, married to Saturnino Baladjay.
On September 25, 2008, the March 26, 2008 Decision of the Quezon City RTC became final and executory.
However, when Ligon sought its execution, she discovered that the December 3, 2002 attachment
annotation had been deleted from TCT No. 9273 when the subject property was sold by way of public
auction on September 9, 2005 to the highest bidder, respondent Ting, for the amount of P9,000,000.00

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during the execution proceedings in the Makati City Case, as evidenced by the Officer’s Final Deed of
Sale dated October 27, 2006 (Officer’s Final Deed of Sale) issued by Sheriff Alejo.
In view of the preceding circumstances, Ligon filed, inter alia, a certiorari petition against respondent
Presiding Judge Reynaldo Laigo (Judge Laigo), Sheriff Alejo, Atty. Garing, Ting, and Techico
(respondents), alleging, among others, that the Makati City RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the Assailed Orders.
CA denied the petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the Makati City RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
issuing the Assailed Orders
HELD
YES, RTC - Makati erred in dismissing the preliminary attachment of Ligon.
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken into
legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. Case law instructs
that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable
against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached
property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy
itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual
condemnation of it to pay the owner’s debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under
execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or
vacated in some manner provided by law. Thus, a prior registration of an attachment lien creates a
preference, such that when an attachment has been duly levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof
subsequent to the attachment takes the property subject to the said attachment. As provided under PD
1529, said registration operates as a form of constructive notice to all persons.
Applying these principles to this case, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the RTC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders as these issuances essentially disregarded, inter
alia, Ligon’s prior attachment lien over the subject property patently anathema to the nature of
attachment proceedings which is well–established in law and jurisprudence. In this case, Ligon, in order
to secure the satisfaction of a favorable judgment in the Quezon City Case, applied for and was
eventually able to secure a writ of preliminary attachment over the subject property on November 25,
2002, which was later annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273 in the name of Polished Arrow on
December 3, 2002. Notwithstanding the subsequent cancellation of TCT No. 9273 due to the Makati City
RTC’s December 9, 2004 Decision rescinding the transfer of the subject property from Sps. Baladjay to
Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in fraud of creditors, Ligon’s attachment lien
over the subject property continued to subsist since the attachment she had earlier secured binds the
property itself, and, hence, continues until the judgment debt of Sps. Baladjay to Ligon as adjudged in the
Quezon City Case is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
The grave abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies with its directive to issue a new certificate of
title in the name of Ting (i.e., TCT No. 19756), free from any liens and encumbrances. This course of action
clearly negates the efficacy of Ligon’s attachment lien and, also, defies the legal characterization of
attachment proceedings. It bears noting that Ligon’s claim, secured by the aforesaid attachment, is against
Sps. Baladjay whose ownership over the subject property had been effectively restored in view of the

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RTC’s rescission of the property’s previous sale to Polished Arrow. Thus, Sps. Ligon’s attachment lien
against Sps. Baladjay as well as their successors–in–interest should have been preserved, and the
annotation thereof carried over to any subsequent certificate of title, the most recent of which as it
appears on record is TCT No. 31001 in the name of Techico, without prejudice to the latter’s right to
protect his own ownership interest over the subject property.

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Mangila vs. CA
G.R. No. 125027
August 12, 2002
Carpio, J.
FACTS
Petitioner Anita Mangila (petitioner for brevity) is an exporter of sea foods and doing business under the
name and style of Seafoods Products. Private respondent Loreta Guina (private respondent for brevity) is
the President and General Manager of Air Swift International, a single registered proprietorship engaged
in the freight forwarding business.
Sometime in January 1988, petitioner contracted the freight forwarding services of private respondent for
shipment of petitioners products. Petitioner agreed to pay private respondent cash on delivery.
On the first shipment, petitioner requested for seven days within which to pay private respondent.
However, for the next three shipments, March 17, 24 and 31, 1988, petitioner failed to pay private
respondent shipping charges amounting to P109, 376.95.
Despite several demands, petitioner never paid private respondent. Thus, on June 10, 1988, private
respondent filed Civil Case No. 5875 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for collection of sum of
money.
On August 1, 1988, the sheriff filed his Sheriffs Return showing that summons was not served on
petitioner. A woman found at petitioners house informed the sheriff that petitioner transferred her
residence to Sto. Nio, Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that petitioner had left the
Philippines for Guam.
Thus, on September 13, 1988, construing petitioners departure from the Philippines as done with intent to
defraud her creditors, private respondent filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment. On September 26,
1988, the trial court issued an Order of Preliminary Attachment against petitioner. The following day, the
trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
On November 7, 1988, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment without submitting
herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. She pointed out that up to then, she had not been served a
copy of the Complaint and the summons. Hence, petitioner claimed the court had not acquired
jurisdiction over her person.
RTC ordered petitioner to pay respondent P109,376.95 plus 18 percent interest per annum, 25 percent
attorneys fees and costs of suit which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent court erred in holding that the writ of attachment was improperly issued
and served.
HELD
Yes, there was an improper Issuance and Service of Writ of Attachment.

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As a preliminary note, a distinction should be made between issuance and implementation of the writ of
attachment. It is necessary to distinguish between the two to determine when jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant should be acquired to validly implement the writ. This distinction is crucial in resolving
whether there is merit in petitioners argument.
This Court has long settled the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be
acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time after
filing the complaint, avail of the provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on
preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy at the commencement of the action or at any
time thereafter. This phrase refers to the date of filing of the complaint which is the moment that marks
the commencement of the action. The reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the
defendant, or even before summons issues.
In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the actual time when
jurisdiction should be had:
It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of defendant - issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment - these do not and cannot
bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either
by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the courts authority. Hence,
when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he
serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicants affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of
attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well
as a copy of the complaint xxx. (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages:
first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to
the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not
necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the
implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for
without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the
defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued on September 27, 1988 and
implemented on October 28, 1988. However, the alias summons was served only on January 26, 1989 or
almost three months after the implementation of the writ of attachment.
The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of Attachment on September 27 since a motion for its
issuance can be filed at the commencement of the action. However, on the day the writ was implemented,
the trial court should have, previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the writ, acquired
jurisdiction over the petitioner. Yet, as was shown in the records of the case, the summons was actually
served on petitioner several months after the writ had been implemented.
Private respondent, nevertheless, claims that the prior or contemporaneous service of summons
contemplated in Section 5 of Rule 57 provides for exceptions. Among such exceptions are where the
summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts or where the
defendant is a resident temporarily absent therefrom x x x. Private respondent asserts that when she
commenced this action, she tried to serve summons on petitioner but the latter could not be located at her
customary address in Kamuning, Quezon City or at her new address in Guagua, Pampanga.

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Furthermore, respondent claims that petitioner was not even in Pampanga; rather, she was in Guam
purportedly on a business trip.
Private respondent never showed that she effected substituted service on petitioner after her personal
service failed. Likewise, if it were true that private respondent could not ascertain the whereabouts of
petitioner after a diligent inquiry, still she had some other recourse under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The rules provide for certain remedies in cases where personal service could not be effected on a party.
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever the defendants whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation x x x.
Thus, if petitioners whereabouts could not be ascertained after the sheriff had served the summons at her
given address, then respondent could have immediately asked the court for service of summons by
publication on petitioner.
Moreover, as private respondent also claims that petitioner was abroad at the time of the service of
summons, this made petitioner a resident who is temporarily out of the country. This is the exact situation
contemplated in Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for service of summons by
publication.
In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed to have
cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process
on petitioner without first obtaining jurisdiction over her person. The preliminary writ of attachment
must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal
service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The
subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person
because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.

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Chuidian vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 139941
January 19, 2001
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS
The instant petition arises from transactions that were entered into by the government in the penultimate
days of the Marcos administration. Petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian was alleged to be a dummy or nominee
of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in several companies said to have been illegally acquired by the Marcos
spouses. As a favored business associate of the Marcoses, Chuidian allegedly used false pretenses to
induce the officers of the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation
(PHILGUARANTEE), the Board of Investments (BOI) and the Central Bank, to facilitate the procurement
and issuance of a loan guarantee in favor of the Asian Reliability Company, Incorporated (ARCI)
sometime in September 1980. ARCI, 98% of which was allegedly owned by Chuidian, was granted a loan
guarantee of Twenty-Five Million U.S. Dollars (US$25,000,000.00).
While ARCI represented to Philguarantee that the loan proceeds would be used to establish five inter-
related projects in the Philippines, Chuidian reneged on the approved business plan and instead invested
the proceeds of the loan in corporations operating in the United States, more particularly Dynetics,
Incorporated and Interlek, Incorporated. Although ARCI had received the proceeds of the loan
guaranteed by Philguarantee, the former defaulted in the payments thereof, compelling Philguarantee to
undertake payments for the same. Consequently, in June 1985, Philguarantee sued Chuidian before the
Santa Clara County Superior Court, charging that in violation of the terms of the loan, Chuidian not only
defaulted in payment, but also misused the funds by investing them in Silicon Valley corporations and
using them for his personal benefit.
For his part, Chuidian claimed that he himself was a victim of the systematic plunder perpetrated by the
Marcoses as he was the true owner of these companies, and that he had in fact instituted an action before
the Federal Courts of the United States to recover the companies which the Marcoses had illegally
wrested from him.
On November 27, 1985, or three (3) months before the successful peoples revolt that toppled the Marcos
dictatorship, Philguarantee entered into a compromise agreement with Chuidian whereby petitioner
Chuidian shall assign and surrender title to all his companies in favor of the Philippine government. In
return, Philguarantee shall absolve Chuidian from all civil and criminal liability, and in so doing, desist
from pursuing any suit against Chuidian concerning the payments Philguarantee had made on Chuidians
defaulted loans.
It was further stipulated that instead of Chuidian reimbursing the payments made by Philguarantee
arising from Chuidians default, the Philippine government shall pay Chuidian the amount of Five
Million Three Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$5,300,000.00). Initial payment of Five Hundred Thousand
Dollars (US$500,000.00) was actually received by Chuidian, as well as succeeding payment of Two
Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$200,000.00). The remaining balance of Four Million Six Hundred
Thousand Dollars (US$4,600,000.00) was to be paid through an irrevocable Letter of Credit (L/C) from
which Chuidian would draw One Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$100,000.00) monthly.
With the advent of the Aquino administration, the newly-established Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) exerted earnest efforts to search and recover money, gold, properties, stocks and
other assets suspected as having been illegally acquired by the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.

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Petitioner Chuidian was among those whose assets were sequestered by the PCGG. On May 30, 1986, the
PCGG issued a Sequestration Order directing the PNB to place under its custody, for and in behalf of the
PCGG, the irrevocable L/C (No. SSD-005-85). Although Chuidian was then residing in the United States,
his name was placed in the Department of Foreign Affairs Hold Order list.
In the meantime, Philguarantee filed a motion before the Superior Court of Santa Clara County of
California in Civil Case Nos. 575867 and 577697 seeking to vacate the stipulated judgment containing the
settlement between Philguarantee and Chuidian . After considering the factual matters before it, the said
court concluded that Philguarantee had not carried its burden of showing that the settlement between the
parties should be set aside. On appeal, the Sixth Appellate District of the Court of Appeal of the State of
California affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of Sta. Clara County denying Philguarantees
motion to vacate the stipulated judgment based on the settlement agreement.
After payment on the L/C was frozen by the PCGG, Chuidian filed before the United States District
Court, Central District of California, an action against PNB seeking, among others, to compel PNB to pay
the proceeds of the L/C. PNB countered that it cannot be held liable for a breach of contract under
principles of illegality, international comity and act of state, and thus it is excused from payment of the L/
C.
The Federal Court rendered judgment ruling: (1) in favor of PNB excusing the said bank from making
payment on the L/C.
On July 30, 1987, the government filed before the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0027 against the Marcos
spouses, several government officials who served under the Marcos administration, and a number of
individuals known to be cronies of the Marcoses, including Chuidian. The complaint sought the
reconveyance, reversion, accounting and restitution of all forms of wealth allegedly procured illegally
and stashed away by the defendants.
In particular, the complaint charged that Chuidian, by himself and/or in conspiracy with the Marcos
spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems by: (1) forming corporations for the purpose of
hiding and avoiding discovery of illegally obtained assets; (2) pillaging the coffers of government
financial institutions such as the Philguarantee; and (3) executing the court settlement between
Philguarantee and Chuidian which was grossly disadvantageous to the government and the Filipino
people.
In fine, the PCGG averred that the above-stated acts of Chuidian committed in unlawful concert with the
other defendants constituted gross abuse of official position of authority, flagrant breach of public trust
and fiduciary obligations, brazen abuse of right and power, unjust enrichment, violation of the
Constitution and laws of the land.
While the case was pending, on March 17, 1993, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for
issuance of a writ of attachment over the L/C.
On July 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of attachment
against L/C No. SSD-005-85 as security for the satisfaction of judgment.
On August 11, 1997, or almost four (4) years after the issuance of the order of attachment, Chuidian filed a
motion to lift the attachment based on the following grounds:

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First, he had returned to the Philippines; hence, the Sandiganbayans most potent ground for the issuance
of the writ of preliminary attachment no longer existed. Since his absence in the past was the very
foundation of the Sandiganbayans writ of preliminary attachment, his presence in the country warrants
the immediate lifting thereof.
Second, there was no evidence at all of initial fraud or subsequent concealment except for the affidavit
submitted by the PCGG Chairman citing mere belief and information and not on knowledge of the facts.
Moreover, this statement is hearsay since the PCGG Chairman was not a witness to the litigated incidents,
was never presented as a witness by the Republic and thus was not subject to cross-examination.
Third, Chuidian denies that he ever disposed of his assets to defraud the Republic, and there is nothing in
the records that support the Sandiganbayans erroneous conclusion on the matter.
Fourth, Chuidian belied the allegation that he was also a defendant in other related criminal action, for in
fact, he had never been a defendant in any prosecution of any sort in the Philippines. Moreover, he could
not have personally appeared in any other action because he had been deprived of his right to a travel
document by the government.
Fifth, the preliminary attachment was, in the first place, unwarranted because he was not guilty of fraud
in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation. In fact, the L/C was not a product of fraudulent
transactions, but was the result of a US Court-approved settlement. Although he was accused of
employing blackmail tactics to procure the settlement, the California Supreme Court ruled otherwise.
And in relation thereto, he cites as a sixth ground the fact that all these allegations of fraud and
wrongdoing had already been dealt with in actions before the State and Federal Courts of California.
While it cannot technically be considered as forum shopping, it is nevertheless a form of suit multiplicity
over the same issues, parties and subject matter. These foreign judgments constitute res judicata which
warrant the dismissal of the case itself.
Chuidian further contends that should the attachment be allowed to continue, he will be deprived of his
property without due process. The L/C was payment to Chuidian in exchange for the assets he turned
over to the Republic pursuant to the terms of the settlement in Case No. 575867. Said assets, however, had
already been sold by the Republic and cannot be returned to Chuidian should the government succeed in
depriving him of the proceeds of the L/C. Since said assets were disposed of without his or the
Sandiganbayans consent, it is the Republic who is fraudulently disposing of assets.
Finally, Chuidian stressed that throughout the four (4) years that the preliminary attachment had been in
effect, the government had not set the case for hearing. Under Rule 17, Section 3, the case itself should be
dismissed for laches owing to the Republics failure to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of
time. Accordingly, the preliminary attachment, being only a temporary or ancillary remedy, must be lifted
and the PNB ordered to immediately pay the proceeds of the L/C to Chuidian.
In a Resolution promulgated on November 13, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied Chuidians motion to lift
attachment.
ISSUE
Whether or not the order of attachment can be lifted.
HELD

12 !
NO, the order of attachment cannot be lifted.
The question in this case is: What can the herein petitioner do to quash the attachment of the L/C? There
are two courses of action available to the petitioner:
First. To file a counterbond in accordance with Rule 57, Section 12, which provides:
SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. At anytime after an order of attachment has been
granted, the party whose property has been attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable
notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is
pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The judge shall, after
hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counterbond executed to the attaching
creditor is filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the application is made, in
an amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the judge, to secure the payment of any
judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof
shall forthwith be served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance
with the provisions of this section the property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the
party making the deposit or giving the counter-bond, or the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counter-
bond aforesaid standing in place of the property so released. Should such counterbond for any reason be found to be,
or become, insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counter-bond, the attaching
creditor may apply for a new order of attachment.
or
Second. To quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued, as
provided for in Section 13 of the same Rule:
SEC. 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular issuance. - The party whose property has been
attached may also, at any time either before or after the release of the attached property, or before any attachment
shall have been actually levied, upon reasonable notice to the attaching creditor, apply to the judge who granted the
order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order to discharge the attachment on the
ground that the same was improperly or irregularly issued. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of the
party whose property has been attached, but not otherwise, the attaching creditor may oppose the same by counter-
affidavits or other evidence in addition to that on which the attachment was made. After hearing, the judge shall
order the discharge of the attachment if it appears that it was improperly or irregularly issued and the defect is not
cured forthwith.
It would appear that petitioner chose the latter because the grounds he raised assail the propriety of the
issuance of the writ of attachment. By his own admission, however, he repeatedly acknowledged that his
justifications to warrant the lifting of the attachment are facts or events that came to light or took place
after the writ of attachment had already been implemented.
More particularly, petitioner emphasized that four (4) years after the writ was issued, he had returned to
the Philippines. Yet while he noted that he would have returned earlier but for the cancellation of his
passport by the PCGG, he was not barred from returning to the Philippines. Then he informed the
Sandiganbayan that while the case against him was pending, but after the attachment had already been
executed, the government lost two (2) cases for fraud lodged against him before the U.S. Courts, thus
invoking res judicata. Next, he also pointed out that the government is estopped from pursuing the case
against him for failing to prosecute for the number of years that it had been pending litigation.

13 !
It is clear that these grounds have nothing to do with the issuance of the writ of attachment. Much less do
they attack the issuance of the writ at that time as improper or irregular. And yet, the rule contemplates
that the defect must be in the very issuance of the attachment writ. For instance, the attachment may be
discharged under Section 13 of Rule 57 when it is proven that the allegations of the complaint were
deceptively framed, or when the complaint fails to state a cause of action. Supervening events which may
or may not justify the discharge of the writ are not within the purview of this particular rule.
In the instant case, there is no showing that the issuance of the writ of attachment was attended by
impropriety or irregularity. Apart from seeking a reconsideration of the resolution granting the
application for the writ, petitioner no longer questioned the writ itself. For four (4) long years he kept
silent and did not exercise any of the remedies available to a defendant whose property or asset has been
attached. It is rather too late in the day for petitioner to question the propriety of the issuance of the writ.
Petitioner also makes capital of the two foreign judgments which he claims warrant the application of the
principle of res judicata. The first judgment, in Civil Case Nos. 575867 and 577697 brought by
Philguarantee before the Santa Clara Country Superior Court, denied Philguarantees prayer to set aside
the stipulated judgment wherein Philguarantee and Chuidian agreed on the subject attached L/C. On
March 14, 1990, the Court of Appeal of the State of California affirmed the Superior Courts judgment. The
said judgment became the subject of a petition for review by the California Supreme Court. There is no
showing, however, of any final judgment by the California Supreme Court. The records, including
petitioners pleadings, are bereft of any evidence to show that there is a final foreign judgment which the
Philippine courts must defer to. Hence, res judicata finds no application in this instance because it is a
requisite that the former judgment or order must be final.
Second, petitioner cites the judgment of the United States District Court in Civil Case 86-2255 RSWL
brought by petitioner Chuidian against PNB to compel the latter to pay the L/C. The said Courts
judgment, while it ruled in favor of petitioner on the matter of Philguarantees action-in-intervention to
set aside the settlement agreement, also ruled in favor of PNB, to wit:
On March 11, 1986, PNB/Manila received an order from the PCGG ordering PNB to freeze any further drawings
on the L/C. The freeze order has remained in effect and was followed by a sequestration order issued by the PCGG.
Subsequently, Chuidians Philippine counsel filed a series of challenges to the freeze and sequestration orders, which
challenges were unsuccessful as the orders were found valid by the Philippine Supreme Court. The freeze and
sequestration orders are presently in effect. Thus, under the PCGG order and Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2,
performance by PNB would be illegal under Philippine Law. Therefore PNB is excused from performance of the L/C
agreement as long as the freeze and sequestration orders remain in effect. (Underscoring ours)
xxxxxxxxx
Chuidian argues that the fact that the L/C was issued pursuant to a settlement in California, that the
negotiations for which occurred in California, and that two of the payments were made at PNB/LA,
compels the conclusion that the act of prohibiting payment of the L/C occurred in Los Angeles. However,
the majority of the evidence and Tchacosh and Sabbatino compel the opposite conclusion. The L/C was
issued in Manila, such was done at the request of a Philippine government instrumentality for the benefit
of a Philippine citizen, the L/C was to be performed in the Philippines, all significant events relating to
the issuance and implementation of the L/C occurred in the Philippines, the L/C agreement provided
that the L/C was to be construed according to laws of the Philippines, and the Philippine government
certainly has an interest in preventing the L/C from being remitted in that it would be the release of
funds that are potentially illgotten gains. Accordingly, the Court finds that the PCGG orders are acts of

14 !
state that must be respected by this Court, and thus PNB is excused from making payment on the L/C as
long as the freeze and sequestration orders remain in effect. (Underscoring ours)
Petitioners own evidence strengthens the governments position that the L/C is under the jurisdiction of
the Philippine government and that the U.S. Courts recognize the authority of the Republic to sequester
and freeze said L/C. Hence, the foreign judgments relied upon by petitioner do not constitute a bar to the
Republics action to recover whatever alleged ill-gotten wealth petitioner may have acquired.
Petitioner may argue, albeit belatedly, that he also raised the issue that there was no evidence of fraud on
record other than the affidavit of PCGG Chairman Gunigundo. This issue of fraud, however, touches on
the very merits of the main case which accuses petitioner of committing fraudulent acts in his dealings
with the government. Moreover, this alleged fraud was one of the grounds for the application of the writ,
and the Sandiganbayan granted said application after it found a prima facie case of fraud committed by
petitioner.
In fine, fraud was not only one of the grounds for the issuance of the preliminary attachment, it was at the
same time the governments cause of action in the main case.
We have uniformly held that:

x x x when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of
action; e.g., an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a
public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his
employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty, or an action
against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the
action is brought, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule
57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiffs application and affidavits on which the
writ was based and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued the reason
being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the
action. In other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the
regular trial. (Underscoring ours)
Thus, this Court has time and again ruled that the merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary
attachment has been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of the attachment, otherwise an
applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of the merits of the case on a mere motion.
It is not the Republics fault that the litigation has been protracted. There is as yet no evidence of fraud on
the part of petitioner. Petitioner is only one of the twenty-three (23) defendants in the main action. As
such, the litigation would take longer than most cases. Petitioner cannot invoke this delay in the
proceedings as an excuse for not seeking the proper recourse in having the writ of attachment lifted in
due time. If ever laches set in, it was petitioner, not the government, who failed to take action within a
reasonable time period. Challenging the issuance of the writ of attachment four (4) years after its
implementation showed petitioners apparent indifference towards the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.
The attachment is a mere provisional remedy to ensure the safety and preservation of the thing attached
until the plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such property applied to
its satisfaction. To discharge the attachment at this stage of the proceedings would render inutile any
favorable judgment should the government prevail in the principal action against petitioner. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan, in issuing the questioned resolutions, which are interlocutory in nature, committed no

15 !
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As long as the Sandiganbayan acted
within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to
nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil
action of certiorari.

16 !
Torres vs. Satsatin

G.R. No. 166759
November 25, 2009
Peralta, J.
FACTS
Sometime in 1997, Nicanor Satsatin (Nicanor) asked petitioners’ mother, Agripina Aledia, if she wanted to
sell their lands. After consultation with her daughters, daughter-in-law, and grandchildren, Agripina
agreed to sell the properties. Petitioners, thus, authorized Nicanor, through a Special Power of Attorney,
to negotiate for the sale of the properties.
Sometime in 1999, Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar Resources, Inc. (Solar). Solar allegedly
agreed to purchase the three parcels of land, together with the 10,000-square-meter property owned by a
certain Rustica Aledia, for ₱35,000,000.00. Petitioners alleged that Nicanor was supposed to remit to them
the total amount of ₱28,000,000.00 or ₱9,333,333.00 each to Sofia, Fructosa, and the heirs of Mario (the
children of Agripina).
Petitioners claimed that Solar has already paid the entire purchase price of ₱35,000,000.00 to Nicanor in
Thirty-Two (32) post-dated checks which the latter encashed/deposited on their respective due dates.
Petitioners added that they also learned that during the period from January 2000 to April 2002, Nicanor
allegedly acquired a house and lot at Vista Grande BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City and a car, which he
registered in the names of his unemployed children, Nikki Normel Satsatin and Nikki Norlin Satsatin.
However, notwithstanding the receipt of the entire payment for the subject property, Nicanor only
remitted the total amount of ₱9,000,000.00, leaving an unremitted balance of ₱19,000,000.00. Despite
repeated verbal and written demands, Nicanor failed to remit to them the balance of ₱19,000,000.00.
Consequently, on October 25, 2002, petitioners filed before the regional trial court (RTC) a Complaint for
sum of money and damages, against Nicanor, Ermilinda Satsatin, Nikki Normel Satsatin, and Nikki
Norlin Satsatin.
On October 30, 2002, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment.On the
same date, the trial court issued an Order directing the petitioners to post a bond in the amount of
₱7,000,000.00 before the court issues the writ of attachment.
Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of Attachment dated November 15, 2002, directing the sheriff to attach
the estate, real or personal, of the respondents.
On November 21, 2002, summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served upon the
respondents.
On November 29, 2002, respondents filed their answer, they also filed a Motion to Discharge Writ of
Attachment. In the alternative, respondents offered to post a counter-bond for the lifting of the writ of
attachment.
On March 11, 2003, after the parties filed their respective pleadings, the RTC issued an Order denying the
motion, but at the same time, directing the respondents to file a counter-bond.

17 !
Aggrieved, respondents filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order27 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 83595, anchored on the following grounds:
(1) public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction in failing to notice that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the person and subject matter
of the complaint when the subject Writ of Attachment was issued;
(2) public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction in granting the issuance of the Writ of Attachment despite non-compliance with the formal
requisites for the issuance of the bond and the Writ of Attachment.
On November 23, 2003, the CA rendered the assailed Decision in favor of the respondents,
ISSUE
Whether or not the dismissal fo the preliminary attachment is proper.
HELD
No, the preliminary attachment was not proper.
A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where
an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be
held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured
in the said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the bond posted by petitioners despite
the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is
necessary that all the requisites for its approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.
Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court showing that the company
concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for thirty (30) days from the date of its
issuance. However, it is apparent that the Certification issued by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) at the time the bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty
Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig. Therefore, the
surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted by the RTC of Dasmariñas,
Branch 90, since the certification secured by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of the
issuance of the bond certified that it may only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities. Thus, the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued
the writ of attachment founded on the said bond.
Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction between
the issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance to the validity of
the writ. The distinction is indispensably necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant should be acquired in order to validly implement the writ of attachment upon his person.
This Court has long put to rest the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be
acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time after
filing the complaint, avail of the provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on
preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any
time before entry of judgment."40 This phrase refers to the date of the filing of the complaint, which is the

18 !
moment that marks "the commencement of the action." The reference plainly is to a time before summons
is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues.
In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the actual time when
jurisdiction should be had:
It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of defendant x x x issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment x x x these do not and
cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the
court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the court’s
authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is
essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicant’s affidavit and attachment bond, and of the
order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant
as well as a copy of the complaint x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves
three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant
to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ
commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court
has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not
bind the defendant.
Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but
also upon consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the complaint against him and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor that prior or contemporaneously to
the serving of the writ of attachment, service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the
application for attachment, the applicant’s affidavit and bond, and the order must be served upon him.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the trial court validly issued the writ of attachment on
November 15, 2002, which was implemented on November 19, 2002, it is to be noted that the summons,
together with a copy of the complaint, was served only on November 21, 2002.
At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly to do so
since the motion for its issuance can be filed "at the commencement of the action or at any time before
entry of judgment." However, at the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent since no summons was yet served upon them. The proper
officer should have previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the writ of attachment,
served a copy of the summons upon the respondents in order for the trial court to have acquired
jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding effect. Consequently, even if the writ of
attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and
affect the respondents.
Moreover, although there is truth in the petitioners’ contention that an attachment may not be dissolved
by a showing of its irregular or improper issuance if it is upon a ground which is at the same time the
applicant’s cause of action in the main case, since an anomalous situation would result if the issues of the
main case would be ventilated and resolved in a mere hearing of a motion. However, the same is not
applicable in the case bar. It is clear from the respondents’ pleadings that the grounds on which they base

19 !
the lifting of the writ of attachment are the irregularities in its issuance and in the service of the writ; not
petitioners’ cause of action.
Further, petitioners’ contention that respondents are barred by estoppel, laches, and prescription from
questioning the orders of the RTC issuing the writ of attachment and that the issue has become moot and
academic by the renewal of the attachment bond covering after its expiration, is devoid of merit. As
correctly held by the CA:
There are two ways of discharging the attachment. First, to file a counter-bond in accordance with Section
12 of Rule 57. Second[,] [t]o quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently
issued, as provided for in Section 13 of the same rule. Whether the attachment was discharged by either
of the two ways indicated in the law, the attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect
in the issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the
attachment writ, instead of the other. The filing of a counter-bond is merely a speedier way of discharging
the attachment writ instead of the other way.
Moreover, again assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued, although the trial
court later acquired jurisdiction over the respondents by service of the summons upon them, such belated
service of summons on respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement
of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on respondents without first obtaining
jurisdiction over their person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous
with the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by
publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not
confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for
retroactivity of a belated service.

20 !
Luzon Development Bank vs. Krishnan

G.R. No. 203530
April 13, 2015
Peralta J.
FACTS
Petitioners Luzon Development Bank, Tomas Clemente, and Oscar Ramirez (hereafter petitioners) are the
respondents in the complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages filed by respondent Erlinda
Khrishnan (hereafter respondent Erlinda) on February 7, 2001. Respondent Erlinda claimed that she is a
client of respondent bank wherein she maintained several accounts including time deposits. On several
occasions, when respondent Erlinda presented her Time Deposits Certificates amounting to
P28,597,472.70 for payment because they have become due, petitioners refused to honor them for the
reason that they were fraudulent. Respondent Erlinda likewise applied for a Preliminary Writ of
Attachment which the RTC granted on February 27, 2001.
By virtue of the writ, petitioner bank's accounts in various banks were garnished.On September 8, 2003,
the RTC issued an order lifting the attachment.
On May 09, 2008, respondent judge issued an Order directing respondent Erlinda to file a new attachment
bond in the amount of P35,000,000.00 and petitioners to file a counterbond.
Respondent Erlinda filed her attachment bond on June 25, 2009 in the amount of P35,000,000.00 through
Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation which was approved by respondent on July 7, 2009.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2009, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion praying that a hearing be held to
determine the sufficiency of the attachment bond and they be allowed to deposit Certificates of Title of
real property, and the issuance of the writ of attachment be held in abeyance.
On July 20, 2009, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to comply and/or file the appropriate
pleading and to hold in abeyance the reinstatement of the writ of attachment.
On January 28, 2010, petitioners filed a motion to admit bank property in lieu of counterbond which was
opposed by respondent Erlinda.
On September 24, 2010, respondent judge denied petitioners' motion in the assailed Order. Their
subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on May 26, 2011.
On June 27, 2011, respondent judge issued an Order reinstating the Writ of Attachment dated March 1,
2001 for failure of petitioners to file the required counterbond. Respondent judge also issued an amended
Reinstated Writ of Attachment.
CA sided with RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's decision which denied petitioners' motion praying
that bank property be deposited in lieu of cash or a counter-bond.
HELD

21 !
The CA was correct in affirming RTC”s decision which denied petitioners' motion praying that bank
property be deposited in lieu of cash or a counter-bond.
In their petition, petitioners contend that it has the option to deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a
Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that "[a]n order of attachment may be issued either ex
parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the
Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the
applicant's demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to
that fixed in the order, which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the value of the
property to be attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs."
Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that "[t]he sheriff enforcing the writ shall without delay and with all
reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, only so much of the property in the
Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy
the applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or gives a
counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment
or to the value of the property to be attached, exclusive of costs."
From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy
of the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the
Court holds that petitioner's argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead of depositing
cash or filing a counter-bond to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is
unmeritorious.
In fact, in Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-Infante, we held that one of the ways to secure
the discharge of an attachment is for the party whose property has been attached or a person appearing
on his behalf, to post a counterbond or make the requisite cash deposit in an amount equal to that fixed
by the court in the order of attachment.
Apropos, the trial court aptly ruled that while it is true that the word deposit cannot only be confined or
construed to refer to cash, a broader interpretation thereof is not justified in the present case for the reason
that a party seeking a stay of the attachment under Section 5 is required to make a deposit in an amount
equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to be
attached. The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and "amount" is unmistakable in Section 5 of Rule
57. Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely concluded that Section 5 requires the deposit of
money as the word "amount" commonly refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of money.
In Alcazar v. Arante, we held that in construing words and phrases used in a statute, the general rule is
that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary and
common usage meaning. The words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-
accepted and most obvious signification, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to
forced or subtle construction. Words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their
ordinary and common use and acceptation. Thus, petitioners should not give a special or technical
interpretation to a word which is otherwise construed in its ordinary sense by the law and broaden the
signification of the term "deposit" to include that of real properties.

22 !
Northern Luzon Island Co. vs. Garcia

G.R. No. 203240
March 18, 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS
On September 23, 2005, petitioner Northern Islands Co., Inc. (petitioner) filed a Complaint with
application for a writ of preliminary attachment, before the RTC against respondents, dMain Case).
It alleged among others that petitioner caused the delivery to respondents of various appliances in the
aggregate amount of P8,040,825.17 and it was not paid by respondents.
In connection with the application for a writ of preliminary attachment, petitioner posted a bond. On
November 7, 2005, the RTC issued the writ sought for.
Thereafter, or on January 11, 2006, respondents filed a Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, alleging
that the attachment previously ordered by the RTC exceeded by P9,232,564.56 given that the estimated
value of the attached properties, including the garnished bank accounts, as assessed by their appraiser,
Gaudioso W. Lapaz (Lapaz), amounted to P17,273,409.73, while the attachment bond is only in the
amount of P8,040,825.17.
In an Order dated June 21, 2006, the RTC, among others, denied the Motion to Discharge Excess
Attachment, finding that the appraisal made by Lapaz was not reflective of the true valuation of the
properties, adding too that the bond posted by petitioner stands as sufficient security for whatever
damages respondents may sustain by reason of the attachment.
On July 25, 2006, respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated June 21, 2006,
specifically assailing the denial of their Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment. In this relation, they
prayed that the RTC refer to a commissioner, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, the factual
determination of the total aggregate amount of respondents' attached properties so as to ascertain if the
attachment was excessive. Also, they prayed that the order for production and inspection be modified
and that petitioner be ordered to produce the original documents anew for their inspection and copying.
The foregoing motion was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order dated August 23, 2006 for lack of
merit. Thus, respondents elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari and mandamus,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97448 (Certiorari Case).
In the interim, the RTC rendered a Decision dated September 21, 2011 in the Main Case. Essentially, it
dismissed petitioner's Amended Complaint due to the absence of any evidence to prove that respondents
had agreed to the pricing of the subject goods.
The RTC's September 21, 2011 Decision was later appealed by petitioner before the CA on October 27,
2011.
Meanwhile, the CA, in a Decision (certiorari case) dated January 19, 2012, partly granted the certiorari
petition of respondents, ordering the RTC to appoint a commissioner as provided under Rule 32 of the
Rules of Court as well as the subsequent discharge of any excess attachment if so found therein, and, on
the other hand, denying respondents' Motion for Discovery.

23 !
ISSUE
Whether the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary attachment after petitioner
appealed the decision in the Main Case, and thereafter ordered the transmittal of the records to the CA.
HELD
Yes, RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the case.
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the
time to appeal of the other parties.
In this case, petitioner had duly perfected its appeal of the RTC's September 21, 2011 Decision resolving
the Main Case through the timely filing of its Notice of Appeal dated October 27, 2011, together with the
payment of the appropriate docket fees. The RTC, in an Order dated January 25, 2012, had actually
confirmed this fact, and thereby ordered the elevation of the entire records to the CA. Meanwhile, records
do not show that respondents filed any appeal, resulting in the lapse of its own period to appeal
therefrom. Thus, based on Section 9, Rule 41, it cannot be seriously doubted that the RTC had already lost
jurisdiction over the Main Case.
With the RTC's loss of jurisdiction over the Main Case necessarily comes its loss of jurisdiction over all
matters merely ancillary thereto. Thus, the propriety of conducting a trial by commissioners in order to
determine the excessiveness of the subject preliminary attachment, being a mere ancillary matter to the
Main Case, is now mooted by its supervening appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 98237.
Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral, the Court, in view of the nature of a preliminary attachment,
definitively ruled that the attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the
principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action, viz.:
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody,
either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party.
It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence apart from the main suit or claim instituted by
the plaintiff against the defendant. Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the
suit itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified.
The consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have been issued as an
incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The
attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the principal action because the
attachment was only an incident of such action. (Emphases supplied)

24 !
Excellent Quality Apparel vs. Visayan Surety

G.R, No. 212025
July 01, 2015
Mendoza, J.
FACTS
On March 26, 1996, petitioner Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. (petitioner), entered into a contract with
Multi-Rich Builders (Multi-Rich), for the construction of a garment factory. Included in the contract was
an Arbitration Clause in case of dispute.
On January 26, 2004, Win Multi-Rich filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioner
before the RTC.
Win Multi-Rich then secured the necessary bond in the amount of P8,634,448.20 from respondent Visayan
Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety) In the Order, dated February 2, 2004, the RTC issued a
writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Win Multi-Rich.
To prevent the enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment on its equipment and machinery,
petitioner issued Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 160149, dated February 16, 2004, in the amount of
P8,634,448.20 payable to the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
On April 26, 2004, petitioner filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim before the RTC. It denied
the material allegation of the complaint and sought the immediate lifting of the writ of attachment. It also
prayed that the bond filed by Win Multi-Rich to support its application for attachment be held to satisfy
petitioner's claim for damages due to the improper issuance of such writ.
On April 29, 2004, the RTC issued another order directing the deposit of the garnished funds of petitioner
to the cashier of the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
Win Multi-Rich then filed a motion, dated April 29, 2004, to release petitioner's cash deposit to it. Notably,
the motion was granted by the RTC in the Order, dated May 3, 2004. Subsequently, on May 7, 2004, Win
Multi-Rich posted Surety Bond No. 10198 issued by respondent Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co.,
Inc. (FESICO) for the amount of P9,000,000.00, to secure the withdrawal of the cash deposited by
petitioner. Thus, Win Multi-Rich was able to receive the funds of petitioner even before the trial began.
On June 18, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure before the CA. The petition sought to annul and set aside the April 12, 2004 and April 29, 2004
Orders of the RTC. Petitioner then filed its Supplemental Manifestation and Motion, asserting that its cash
deposit with the RTC was turned over to Win Multi-Rich.
On March 14, 2006, the CA rendered a decision, annulling the April 12 2004 and April 29, 2004 Orders of
the RTC. It ruled, however, that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case inspite of the arbitration clause
because it was a suit for collection of sum of money.
On February 10, 2009, in G.R. No. 175048, the Court (SC) promulgated a decision in favor of petitioner
and held: first, that Win Multi-Rich was not a real party in interest; second, that the RTC should not have
taken cognizance of the collection suit because the presence of the arbitration clause vested jurisdiction on
the CIAC over all construction disputes between petitioner and Multi-Rich; and lastly, that Win Multi-

25 !
Rich could not retain the garnished amount, as the RTC did not have jurisdiction to issue the questioned
writ of attachment and to order the release of the funds.
Win Multi-Rich filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court in its April 20, 2009
Resolution. Pursuant to an entry of judgment, the Court's decision became final and executory on June 2,
2009.
On October 15, 2009, Win Multi-Rich opposed the motion for execution because the cash deposit awarded
to it by the RTC had been paid to suppliers and the said amount was long overdue and demandable.
The RTC granted the motion for execution in an Order, dated October 19, 2009, and issued a writ of
execution. Visayan Surety and FESICO separately moved for reconsideration of the RTC order.
On January 15, 2010, the RTC issued the order, granting the surety respondents' motion for
reconsideration and lifting its October 19, 2009 Order insofar as it granted the motion for execution
against Visayan Surety and FESICO.
ISSUE
Whether or not both Visayan Surety and FESICO can be held liable for damages.
HELD
Only FESICO can be held liable.
Visayan surety’s liability

There was an application for damages; but there was no notice given to Visayan Surety
By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, "is an ancillary remedy applied
for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in
the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such, it is available
during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests therein pending rendition and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. In
addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive
seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot
be effected."
The party applying for the order of attachment must thereafter give a bond executed to the adverse party
in the amount fixed by the court in its order granting the issuance of the writ. The purpose of an
attachment bond is to answer for all costs and damages which the adverse party may sustain by reason of
the attachment if the court finally rules that the applicant is not entitled to the writ.
In this case, the attachment bond was issued by Visayan Surety in order for Win Multi-Rich to secure the
issuance of the writ of attachment. Hence, any application for damages arising from the improper,
irregular or excessive attachment shall be governed by Section 20, Rule 57, which provides:
Sec. 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment.
An application for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the trial or
before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching party and his
surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may
be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main case.

26 !
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment was issued,
he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an application in the
appellate court, with notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or
sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The appellate court may allow the
application to be heard and decided by the trial court.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment was issued from
recovering in the same action the damages awarded to him from any property of the attaching party not
exempt from execution should the bond or deposit given by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy
the award.
Thus, the current provision of Section 20, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure covers application
for damages against improper attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, and
replevin.Consequently, jurisprudence concerning application for damages against preliminary injunction,
receivership and replevin bonds can be equally applied in the present case.
In a catena of cases, the Court has cited the requisites under Section 20, Rule 57 in order to claim damages
against the bond, as follows:
The application for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was issued;
Such application for damages must be filed before the entry of judgment; and
After hearing with notice to the surety.
The first and second requisites, as stated above, relate to the application for damages against the bond. An
application for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was issued, either (a) before the
trial or (b) before the appeal is perfected or (c) before the judgment becomes executory. The usual
procedure is to file an application for damages with due notice to the other party and his sureties. The
other method would be to incorporate the application in the answer with compulsory counterclaim.
The purpose of requiring the application for damages to be filed in the same proceeding is to avoid the
multiplicity of suit and forum shopping. It is also required to file the application against the bond before
the finality of the decision to prevent the alteration of the immutable judgment.
In the present petition, the Court holds that petitioner sufficiently incorporated an application for
damages against the wrongful attachment in its answer with compulsory counterclaim filed before the
RTC. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of the improper writ of attachment caused it actual damages in
the amount of at least P3,000,000.00. It added that the Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 160149 it issued to
the RTC Clerk of Court, to lift the improper writ of attachment, should be returned to it. Evidently, these
allegations constitute petitioner's application for damages arising from the wrongful attachment, and the
said application was timely filed as it was filed before the finality of judgment.
The next requisite that must be satisfied by petitioner to hold Visayan Surety liable would be that the
judgment against the wrongful attachment was promulgated after the hearing with notice to the surety.
Certainly, the surety must be given prior notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to the
application for damages before the finality of the judgment. The Court rules that petitioner did not satisfy
this crucial element.

27 !
Section 20, Rule 57 specifically requires that the application for damages against the wrongful attachment,
whether filed before the trial court or appellate court, must be with due notice to the attaching party and
his surety or sureties. Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in
the judgment on the main case.
Due notice to the adverse party and its surety setting forth the facts supporting the applicant's right to
damages and the amount thereof under the bond is indispensable. The surety should be given an
opportunity to be heard as to the reality or reasonableness of the damages resulting from the wrongful
issuance of the writ. In the absence of due notice to the surety, therefore, no judgment for damages may
be entered and executed against it.
In the present case, petitioner's answer with compulsory counterclaim, which contained the application
for damages, was not served on Visayan Surety. Also, a perusal of the records revealed that Visayan
Surety was not furnished any copies of the pleadings, motions, processes, and judgments concerned with
the application for damages against the surety bond. Visayan Surety was only notified of the application
when the motion for execution was filed by petitioner on June 29, 2009, after the judgment in G.R. No.
175048 had become final and executory on June 2, 2009.
Clearly, petitioner failed to comply with the requisites under Section 20, Rule 57 because Visayan Surety
was not given due notice on the application for damages before the finality of judgment. The subsequent
motion for execution, which sought to implicate Visayan Surety, cannot alter the immutable judgment
anymore.
FESICO’s liability
While Visayan Surety could not be held liable under Section 20, Rule 57, the same cannot be said of
FESICO. In the case at bench, to forestall the enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment, petitioner
issued Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 160149, dated February 16, 2004, in the amount of P8,634,448.20
payable to the Clerk of Court of the RTC. Pursuant to the RTC Order, dated April 29, 2004, the garnished
funds of petitioner were deposited to the cashier of the Clerk of Court of the RTC. The procedure to
discharge the writ of preliminary attachment is stated in Section 12, Rule 57, to wit:
Sec. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond.

After a writ of attachment has been enforced, the party whose property has been attached, or the person appearing on
his behalf, may move for the discharge of the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The court shall,
after due notice and hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if the movant makes a cash deposit, or files a
counter-bond executed to the attaching party with the clerk of the court where the application is made, in an amount
equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs. But if the attachment is sought to be
discharged with respect to a particular property, the counter-bond shall be equal to the value of that property as
determined by the court. In either case, the cash deposit or the counter-bond shall secure the payment of any
judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action. A notice of the deposit shall forthwith be served on the
attaching party. Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section, the property
attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the counter-
bond, or to the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counter-bond aforesaid standing in place of the
property so released. Should such counter-bond for any reason to be found to be or become insufficient, and the party
furnishing the same fail to file an additional counter-bond, the attaching party may apply for a new order of
attachment.
Win Multi-Rich, however, took a step further and filed a motion to release petitioner's cash deposit to it.
Immediately, the RTC granted the motion and directed Win Multi-Rich to post a bond in favor of

28 !
petitioner in the amount of P9,000,000.00 to answer for the damages which the latter may sustain should
the court decide that Win Multi-Rich was not entitled to the relief sought. Subsequently, Win Multi-Rich
filed a surety bond of FESICO before the RTC and was able to obtain the P8,634,448.20 cash deposit of
petitioner, even before the trial commenced.
Strictly speaking, the surety bond of FESICO is not covered by any of the provisions in Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court because, in the first place, Win Multi-Rich should not have filed its motion to release the
cash deposit of petitioner and the RTC should not have granted the same. The release of the cash deposit
to the attaching party is anathema to the basic tenets of a preliminary attachment.
The chief purpose of the remedy of attachment is to secure a contingent lien on defendant's property until
plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such property applied to its
satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases where the means of satisfaction
thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or concealed, or
otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors. The garnished funds or attached properties could only be
released to the attaching party after a judgment in his favor is obtained. Under no circumstance,
whatsoever, can the garnished funds or attached properties, under the custody of the sheriff or the clerk
of court, be released to the attaching party before the promulgation of judgment.
Cash deposits and counterbonds posted by the defendant to lift the writ of attachment is a security for the
payment of any judgment that the attaching party may obtain; they are, thus, mere replacements of the
property previously attached. Accordingly, the P8,634,448.20 cash deposit of petitioner, as replacement of
the properties to be attached, should never have been released to Win Multi-Rich.
Nevertheless, the Court must determine the nature of the surety bond of FESICO. The cash deposit or the
counter-bond was supposed to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover
in the action. In this case, however, Win Multi-Rich was able to withdraw the cash deposit and, in
exchange, it posted a surety bond of FESICO in favor of petitioner to answer for the damages that the
latter may sustain. Corollarily, the surety bond of FESICO substituted the cash deposit of petitioner as a
security for the judgment. Thus, to claim damages from the surety bond of FESICO, Section 17, Rule 57
could be applied. It reads:
Sec. 17. Recovery upon the counter-bond.

When the judgment has become executory, the surety or sureties on any counter-bond given pursuant to the
provisions of this Rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall become charged on such counter-bond and bound
to pay the judgment obligee upon demand the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered
from such surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same action.
From a reading of the above-quoted provision, it is evident that a surety on a counter-bond given to
secure the payment of a judgment becomes liable for the payment of the amount due upon: (1) demand
made upon the surety; and (2) notice and summary hearing on the same action. Noticeably, unlike Section
20, Rule 57, which requires notice and hearing before the finality of the judgment in an application for
damages, Section 17, Rule 57 allows a party to claim damages on the surety bond after the judgment has
become executory.
The question remains, in contrast to Section 20, why does Section 17 sanction the notice and hearing to
the surety after the finality of judgment? The answer lies in the kind of damages sought to be enforced
against the bond.

29 !
Under Section 20, Rule 57, in relation to Section 4 therein, the surety bond shall answer for all the costs
which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
attachment. In other words, the damages sought to be enforced against the surety bond are unliquidated.
Necessarily, a notice and hearing before the finality of judgment must be undertaken to properly
determine the amount of damages that was suffered by the defendant due to the improper attachment.
These damages to be imposed against the attaching party and his sureties are different from the principal
case, and must be included in the judgment.
On the other hand, under Section 17, Rule 57, in relation to Section 12 therein, the cash deposit or the
counter-bond shall secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the
action. Stated differently, the damages sought to be charged against the surety bond are liquidated. The
final judgment had already determined the amount to be awarded to the winning litigant on the main
action. Thus, there is nothing left to do but to execute the judgment against the losing party, or in case of
insufficiency, against its sureties.
Here, the Court is convinced that a demand against FESICO had been made, and that it was given due
notice and an opportunity to be heard on its defense. First, petitioner filed a motion for execution on June
29, 2009, a copy of which was furnished to FESICO; second, petitioner filed a manifestation, dated July 13,
2009, that FESICO was duly served with the said motion and notified of the hearing on August 7, 2009;
third, during the August 7, 2009 hearing on the motion for execution, the counsels for petitioner, Win
Multi-Rich and FESICO were all present; fourth, in an Order, dated September 16, 2009, FESICO was
given fifteen (15) days to submit its comment or opposition to the motion for execution; and lastly,
FESICO filed its comment on the motion on October 1, 2009. Based on the foregoing, the requirements
under Section 17, Rule 57 have been more than satisfied.
Indeed, FESICO cannot escape liability on its surety bond issued in favor of petitioner. The purpose of
FESICO's bond was to secure the withdrawal of the cash deposit and to answer any damages that would
be inflicted against petitioner in the course of the proceedings. Also, the undertaking signed by FESICO
stated that the duration of the effectivity of the bond shall be from its approval by the court until the
action is fully decided, resolved or terminated.
FESICO cannot simply escape liability by invoking that it was not a party in G.R. No. 175048. From the
moment that FESICO issued Surety Bond No. 10198 to Win Multi-Rich and the same was posted before
the RTC, the court has acquired jurisdiction over the surety, and the provisions of Sections 12 and 17 of
Rule 57 became operational. Thus, the Court holds that FESICO is solidarity liable under its surety bond
with its principal Win Multi-Rich.

30 !
Watercraft Venture Corp. vs. Wolfe

G.R. No. 181721
September 9, 2015
Peralta, J.
FACTS
Petitioner Watercraft Venture Corporation (Watercraft) is engaged in the business of building, repairing,
storing and maintaining yachts, boats and other pleasure crafts at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Subic,
Zambales.
Sometime in June 1997, Watercraft hired respondent Alfred Raymond Wolfe (Wolfe), a British national
and resident of Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Zambales, as its Shipyard Manager.
During his empolyment, Wolfe stored the sailboat, Knotty Gull, within Watercraft's boat storage facilities,
but never paid for the storage fees.
On March 7, 2002, Watercraft terminated the employment of Wolfe.
Sometime in June 2002, Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from Watercraft's storage facilities after signing a
Boat Pull-Out Clearance dated June 29, 2002 where he allegedly acknowledged the outstanding obligation
of Sixteen Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-Four and 82/100 US Dollars (US$16,324.82)
representing unpaid boat storage fees for the period of June 1997 to June 2002. Despite repeated demands,
he failed to pay the said amount.
Thus, on July 7, 2005, Watercraft filed against Wolfe a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with
Damages with an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
In his Answer, Wolfe explained that the sailboat was purchased in February 1998 as part of an agreement
between him and Watercraft's then General Manager, Barry Bailey, and its President, Ricky Sandoval, for
it to be repaired and used as training or fill-in project for the staff, and to be sold later on. He added that
pursuant to a central Listing Agreement for the sale of the sailboat, he was appointed as agent, placed in
possession thereof and entitled to a ten percent (10%) sales commission. He insisted that nowhere in the
agreement was there a stipulation that berthing and storage fees will be charged during the entire time
that the sailboat was in Watercraft's dockyard. Thus, he claimed to have been surprised when he received
five (5) invoices billing him for the said fees two (2) months after his services were terminated. He
pointed out that the complaint was an offshoot of an illegal dismissal case he filed against Watercraft
which had been decided in his favor by the Labor Arbiter.
Meanwhile, finding Watercraft's ex-parte application for writ of preliminary attachment sufficient in form
and in substance pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the RTC granted the same.
Aggrieved, Wolfe filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA granted Wolfe's petition in a Decision dated September 27, 2007, t
Dissatisfied with the CA Decision and Resolution, Watercraft filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or no the issuance of the preliminary attachment is valid.

31 !
HELD
No, the issuance of the preliminary attachment was not valid.
A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where
an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be
held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured
in the said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.10 However, it should be resorted to
only when necessary and as a last remedy because it exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance. It
must be granted only on concrete and specific grounds and not merely on general averments quoting the
words of the rules. Since attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and summary in nature,the rules on the
application of a writ of attachment must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant.
Such bond executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the court is subject to the conditions that
the applicant will pay: (1) all costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party; and (2) all damages
which such party may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
applicant was not entitled thereto. As to the requisite affidavit of merit, Section 3,16 Rule 57of the Rules of
Court states that an order of attachment shall be granted only when it appears in the affidavit of the
applicant, or of some other person who personally knows the facts:
1. that a sufficient cause of action exists;

2. that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 117 hereof;
3. that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action; and
4. that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled
to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims.
The mere filing of an affidavit reciting the facts required by Section 3, Rule 57, however, is not enough to
compel the judge to grant the writ of preliminary attachment. Whether or not the affidavit sufficiently
established facts therein stated is a question to be determined by the court in the exercise of its discretion.
"The sufficiency or insufficiency of an affidavit depends upon the amount of credit given it by the judge,
and its acceptance or rejection, upon his sound discretion." Thus, in reviewing the conflicting findings of
the CA and the RTC on the pivotal issue of whether or not Watercraft's affidavit of merit sufficiently
established facts which constitute as grounds upon which attachment may be issued under Section 1 (a)20
and (d),21 Rule 57, the Court will examine the Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment of Rosario E. Rañoa,
its Vice-President, which reiterated the following allegations in its complaint to substantiate the
application for a writ of preliminary attachment:
xxxx
4. Sometime in June 1997, the Defendant was hired as Watercraft's Shipyard Manager.
5. Soon thereafter, the Defendant placed his sailboat, the Knotty Gull, within the boat storage facilities of Watercraft
for purposes of storage and safekeeping.
6. Despite having been employed by Watercraft, the Defendant was not exempted from paying Watercraft boat
storage fees for the use of the said storage facilities.
7. By virtue of his then position and employment with Watercraft, the Defendant was very much knowledgeable of
the foregoing fact.
8. All throughout his employment with Watercraft, the Defendant used the boat storage facilities of Watercraft for
his Knotty Gull.

32 !
9. However, all throughout the said period of his employment, the Defendant never paid the boat storage fees in favor
of the Plaintiff.
10. The Defendant's contract of employment with Watercraft was terminated on 07 March 2002.
11. [Sometime] thereafter, that is, in or about June 2002, the Defendant pulled out the Knotty Gull from the boat
storage facilities of Watercraft.
12. Instead of settling in full his outstanding obligations concerning unpaid storage fees before pulling our the
Knotty Gull, the Defendant signed a Boat Pull-Out Clearance dated 29 June 2002 wherein he merely acknowledged
the then outstanding balance of Sixteen Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-four and 82/100 US Dollars
(US$16,324.82), representing unpaid boat storage fees for the period commencing June 1997 to June 2002, that he
owed Watercraft.
13. By reason of Defendant's mere accomplishment of the said Boat Pull-Out Clearance with acknowledgment of his
outstanding obligation to Watercraft in unpaid boat storage fees, Mr. Franz Urbanek, then the Shipyard Manager
who replaced the Defendant, contrary to company policy, rules and regulations, permitted the latter to physically
pull out his boat from the storage facilities of the Plaintiff without paying any portion of his outstanding obligation
in storage fees.
14. Several demands were then made upon the Defendant for him to settle his outstanding obligations to the
Plaintiff in unpaid storage fees but the same went unheeded.
15. As of 02 April 2005, the outstanding obligation of the Defendant to the Plaintiff in unpaid boat storage fees
stands at Three Million Two Hundred Thirty-One Thousand Five Hundred and Eighty-Nine and 25/100 Pesos
(Php 3,231,589.25) inclusive of interest charges.
16. For failing to pay for the use [of] facilities and services—in the form of boat storage facilities—duly enjoyed by
him and for failing and refusing to fulfill his promise to pay for the said boat storage fees, the Defendant is clearly
guilty of fraud which entitles the Plaintiff to a Writ of Preliminary Attachment upon the property of the Defendant
as security for the satisfaction of any judgment in its favor in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (d),
Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
17. The instant case clearly falls under the said provision of law.
18. Furthermore, lawful factual and legal grounds exist which show that the Defendant may have departed or is
about to depart the country to defraud his creditors thus rendering it imperative that a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment be issued in favor of the Plaintiff in the instant case.
19. The possibility of flight on the part of the Defendant is heightened by the existence of the following
circumstances:
a. The Special Working Visa issued in favor of the Defendant expired in April 2005;
b. The Defendant is a British national who may easily leave the country at will;
c. The Defendant has no real properties and visible, permanent business or employment in the Philippines;
and
d. The house last known to have been occupied by the Defendant is merely being rented by him.
20. All told, the Defendant is a very serious flight risk which fact will certainly render for naught the capacity of the
Plaintiff to recover in the instant case.
After a careful perusal of the foregoing allegations, the Court agrees with the CA that Watercraft failed to
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud, as required by Section 5,24 Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court, and that Wolfe's mere failure to pay the boat storage fees does not necessarily amount to
fraud, absent any showing that such failure was due to insidious machinations and intent on his part to
defraud Watercraft of the amount due it.
In Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that to constitute a ground for
attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting
the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. A debt is fraudulently contracted if
at the time of contracting it, the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay. "The fraud must

33 !
relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into giving
consent which he would not have otherwise given.”
Fraudulent intent is not a physical entity, but a condition of the mind beyond the reach of the senses,
usually kept secret, very unlikely to be confessed, and therefore, can only be proved by unguarded
expressions, conduct and circumstances. Thus, the applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must
sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be
inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The
particulars of such circumstances necessarily include the time, persons, places and specific acts of fraud
committed. An affidavit which does not contain concrete and specific grounds is inadequate to sustain the
issuance of such writ. In fact, mere general averments render the writ defective and the court that ordered
its issuance acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
In this case, Watercraft's Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment does not contain specific allegations of other
factual circumstances to show that Wolfe, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived
plan or intention not to pay. Neither can it be inferred from such affidavit the particulars of why he was
guilty of fraud in the performance of such obligation. To be specific, Watercraft's following allegation is
unsupported by any particular averment of circumstances that will show why or how such inference or
conclusion was arrived at, to wit: "16. For failing to pay for the use [of] facilities and services - in the form
of boat storage facilities – duly enjoyed by him and for failing and refusing to fulfill his promise to pay for
the said boat storage fees, the Defendant is clearly guilty of fraud x x x.” It is not an allegation of essential
facts constituting Watercraft's causes of action, but a mere conclusion of law.
With respect to Section 1 (a),32 Rule 57, the other ground invoked by Watercraft for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary attachment, the Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the CA's exhaustive
ruling to the effect that such writ is unnecessary because Wolfe is not a flight risk, thus:
As to the allegation that Wolfe is a flight risk, thereby warranting the issuance of the writ, the same lacks
merit. The mere fact that Wolfe is a British national does not automatically mean that he would leave the
country at will. As Wolfe avers, he and his family had been staying in the Philippines since 1997, with his
daughters studying at a local school. He also claims to be an existing stockholder and officer of Wolfe
Marine Corporation, a SEC-registered corporation, as well as a consultant of projects in the Subic Area, a
member of the Multipartite Committee for the new port development in Subic, and a member of the
Subic Chamber of Commerce. More importantly, Wolfe has a pending labor case against Watercraft – a
fact which the company glaringly failed to mention in its complaint – which Wolfe claims to want to
prosecute until its very end. The said circumstances, as well as the existence of said labor case where
Wolfe stands not only to be vindicated for his alleged illegal dismissal, but also to receive recompense,
should have convinced the trial court that Wolfe would not want to leave the country at will just because
a suit for the collection of the alleged unpaid boat storage fees has been filed against him by Watercraft.
Neither should the fact that Wolfe's Special Working Visa expired in April 2005 lead automatically to the
conclusion that he would leave the country. It is worth noting that all visas issued by the government to
foreigner staying in the Philippines have expiration periods. These visas, however, may be renewed,
subject to the requirements of the law. In Wolfe's case, he indeed renewed his visa, as shown by Special
Working Visa No. 05-WV-0124P issued by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Visa Processing Office on
April 25, 2005, and with validity of two (2) years therefrom. Moreover, his Alien Certificate of Registration
was valid up to May 11, 2006.
Meanwhile, Watercraft's reliance on Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan is misplaced. It is well settled that:

34 !
x x x when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's
cause of action; e.g., "an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted
to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or
clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a
willful violation of duty," or "an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the
debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought," the defendant is not allowed to file a
motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual
averments in the plaintiff's application and affidavits on which the writ was based – and consequently
that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued – the reason being that the hearing
on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In
other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the
regular trial.
Be that as it may, the foregoing rule is not applicable in this case because when Wolfe filed a motion to
dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment, he did not offer to show the falsity of the factual averments
in Watercraft's application and affidavit on which the writ was based. Instead, he sought the discharge of
the writ on the ground that Watercraft failed to particularly allege any circumstance amounting to fraud.
No trial on the merits of the action at a mere hearing of such motion will be had since only the sufficiency
of the factual averments in the application and affidavit of merit will be examined in order to find out
whether or not Wolfe was guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which
the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.
Furthermore, the other ground upon which the writ of preliminary attachment was issued by the RTC is
not at the same time the applicant's cause of action. Assuming arguendo that the RTC was correct in
issuing such writ on the ground that Watercraft's complaint involves an action for the recovery of a
specified amount of money or damages against a party, like Wolfe, who is about to depart from the
Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors, the Court stresses that the circumstances cited in support
thereof are merely allegations in support of its application for such writ. Such circumstances, however,
are neither the core of Watercraft's complaint for collection of sum of money and damages, nor one of its
three (3) causes of action therein.
All told, the CA correctly ruled that Watercraft failed to meet one of the requisites for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment, i.e., that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 57, and
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in improvidently issuing such writ. Watercraft failed to
particularly state in its affidavit of merit the circumstances constituting intent to defraud creditors on the
part of Wolfe in contracting or in the performance of his purported obligation to pay boat storage fees, as
well as to establish that he is a flight risk. Indeed, if all the requisites for granting such writ are not
present, then the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.

35 !
Phil. Airconditioning Center vs. RCJ Lines

GR No. 193821
November 23, 2015
Brion, J.
FACTS
On various dates between March 5, 1990, and August 29, 1990, petitioner Phil-Air sold to respondent RCJ
Lines four Carrier Paris 240 air-conditioning units for buses (units).
RCJ Lines issued three post-dated checks in favor of Phil-Air to partly cover the unpaid balance:
All the post-dated checks were dishonored when Phil-Air subsequently presented them for payment.
In view of the failure of RCJ Lines to pay the balance despite demand, Phil-Air filed on April 1, 1998 the
complaint for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Phil-Air
sought to recover from RCJ Lines:
In its answer with compulsory counterclaim, RCJ Lines admitted that it purchased the units in the total
amount of PI,240,000.00 and that it had only paid P400,000.00. It refused to pay the balance because Phil-
Air allegedly breached its warranty.
RCJ Lines averred that the units did not sufficiently cool the buses despite repeated repairs. Phil-Air
purportedly represented that the units were in accord with RCJ Lines' cooling requirements as shown in
Phil-Air's price quotation dated August 4, 1989.
As it turned out, the Carrier Paris 240 model was not suited to the 45 to 49-seater buses operated by RCJ
Lines. The units, according to RCJ Lines, were defective and did not attain full operational condition.
The RTC granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment after Phil-Air posted
an attachment bond in the amount of P1,656,000.00. Two buses of RCJ Lines were attached pursuant to
the writ dated December 18, 1998. The writ was executed on April 21, 1999. The attachment, however,
was later lifted when the RTC granted RCJ Lines' urgent motion to discharge the writ of attachment. RCJ
Lines posted a counter-bond in the same amount as the attachment bond.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE
Whether or not Phil-Air rejects the CA's order that it must reimburse the premium payment for the
counter-bond and the alleged losses suffered by RCJ Lines. The attachment bond should be answerable
for damages, if any.
HELD
No, Phil-Air is not directly liable for the counter-bond premium and RCJ Lines' alleged unrealized profits.
The CA and the RTC erred when it held Phil-Air directly liable for the counter-bond premium and RCJ
Lines' alleged unrealized profits. Granting that RCJ Lines suffered losses, the judgment award should
have been first executed on the attachment bond. Only if the attachment bond is insufficient to cover the
judgment award can Phil-Air be held liable.

36 !
We explain below the purpose of a preliminary attachment, the procedure in obtaining it, and the manner
of having it lifted.
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued by the court where an action is pending
to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant. The property is held by the sheriff as
security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured by the attaching party against
the defendant.
The grant of the writ is conditioned not only on the finding of the court that there exists a valid ground
for its issuance. The Rules also require the applicant to post a bond.
Section 4 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) provides that "the party applying for the order
must...give a bond executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the court, in its order granting the issuance
of the writ, conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs that may be adjudged to the adverse party and all
damages that he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was
not entitled thereto."
The enforcement of the writ notwithstanding, the party whose property is attached is afforded relief to
have the attachment lifted.
There are various modes of discharging an attachment under Rule 57, viz.: (1) by depositing cash or
posting a counter-bond under Section 12; (2) by proving that the attachment bond was improperly or
irregularly issued or enforced, or that the bond is insufficient under Section 13; (3) by showing that the
attachment is excessive under Section 13; and (4) by claiming that the property is exempt from execution
under Section 2.
RCJ Lines availed of the first mode by posting a counter-bond.
Under the first mode, the court will order the discharge of the attachment after (1) the movant makes a
cash deposit or posts a counter-bond and (2) the court hears the motion to discharge the attachment with
due notice to the adverse party.
The amount of the cash deposit or counter-bond must be equal to that fixed by the court in the order of
attachment, exclusive of costs. The cash deposit or counter-bond shall secure the payment of any
judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action.
The filing of a counter-bond to discharge the attachment applies when there has already been a seizure of
property by the sheriff and all that is entailed is the presentation of a motion to the proper court, seeking
approval of a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the value of the property seized and the
lifting of the attachment on the basis thereof. The counter-bond stands in place of the property so
released.
To be clear, the discharge of the attachment by depositing cash or posting a counter-bond under Section
12 should not be confused with the discharge sanctioned under Section 13. Section 13 speaks of discharge
on the ground that the writ was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the attachment bond
is insufficient, or that the attachment is excessive.
To reiterate, the discharge under Section 12 takes effect upon posting of a counter-bond or depositing
cash, and after hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cash deposit or counter-bond. On the other

37 !
hand, the discharge under Section 13 takes effect only upon showing that the plaintiffs attachment bond
was improperly or irregularly issued, or that the bond is insufficient. The discharge of the attachment
under Section 13 must be made only after hearing.
These differences notwithstanding, the discharge of the preliminary attachment either through Section 12
or Section 13 has no effect on and does not discharge the attachment bond. The dissolution of the
preliminary attachment does not result in the dissolution of the attachment bond. Justice Narvasa,
writing his separate opinion in one case, explained:
The dissolution of the preliminary attachment upon security given [Section 12], or a showing of its
irregular or improper issuance [Section 13], does not of course operate to discharge the sureties on
plaintiffs own attachment bond. The reason is simple. That bond is executed to the adverse party,. . .
conditioned that the ... (applicant) will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and
all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
applicant was not entitled thereto." Hence, until that determination is made, as to the applicant's
entitlement to the attachment, his bond must stand and cannot be withdrawn. [emphasis and
underscoring supplied, citations omitted]
In the present case, the RTC lifted the preliminary attachment after it heard RCJ Lines' urgent motion to
discharge attachment and the latter posted a counter-bond. The RTC found that there was no fraud and
Phil-Air had no sufficient cause of action for the issuance of the writ of the attachment. As a consequence,
it ordered Phil-Air to refund the premium payment for the counter-bond and the losses suffered by RCJ
Lines resulting from the enforcement of the writ. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.
We reverse the CA and RTC rulings.
As discussed above, it is patent that under the Rules, the attachment bond answers for all damages
incurred by the party against whom the attachment was issued.
Thus, Phil-Air cannot be held directly liable for the costs adjudged to and the damages sustained by RCJ
Lines because of the attachment. Section 4 of Rule 57 positively lays down the rule that the attachment
bond will pay "all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may
sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled
thereto."
The RTC, instead of declaring Phil-Air liable for the alleged unrealized profits and counter-bond
premium, should have ordered the execution of the judgment award on the attachment bond. To impose
direct liability to Phil-Air would defeat the purpose of the attachment bond, which was not dissolved
despite the lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment.
The order to refund the counter-bond premium is likewise erroneous. The premium payment may be
deemed a cost incurred by RCJ Lines to lift the attachment. Such cost may be charged against the
attachment bond.

38 !
B. Preliminary Injunction
Idolor vs CA G.R. No. 141853 February 7, 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes, J. Grounds
Gustillo vs. Real A.M. No. February 28, 2001 Quisumbing, J. Grounds
MTJ-00-1250
Lagrosas vs. G.R. No. 168637, September 12, 2008 Quisumbing, J. Requirements -
Pristo-Myers 170684 when then and can
be discharged
Jenosa vs. G.R. No. 172138 September 8, 2010 Carpio, J. Definition -

Delariarte remedy of equity
Solid Builders Inc. G.R. No. 179665 April 3, 2013 Leonardo-De Grounds - redress
China Bank Castro, J. of a right
Plaza vs. Lustiva G.R. No. 172909 March 5, 2014 Brion, J. Grounds - redress
of a right
Office of the G.R. No. 172206 July 3, 2013 Peralta, J. Definition - CA vs

Ombudsman vs. Ombudsman
De Chavez
Novecio vs. Lim G.R. No. 193809 March 23, 2015 Brion, J. Grounds -
existence of a right
that needs to be
protected
Liberty G.R. No. 205875 June 30, 2015 Villarama Jr., J. Grounds -
Broadcasting existence of a right
Network vs. that needs to be
Atlocom protected
Republic vs. G.R. No. 197472 September 7, 2016 Del Castillo, J. Grounds -
Cortez existence of a right
that needs to be
protected

39 !
Idolor vs. CA
G.R. No. 141853
February 7, 2001
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
FACTS
On March 21, 1994, to secure a loan of P520,000.00, petitioner Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private
respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial
foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage on or before September 20, 1994.
Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus private respondent Gumersindo filed a motion for
execution before the Office of the Barangay captain who subsequently issued a certification to file action.
On March 21, 1997, respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed an extra judicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage pursuant to the parties agreement set forth in the real estate mortgage dated March 21,
1994.
On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to respondent Gumersindo, as the
highest bidder and consequently, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City on June 23, 1997.
On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, a complaint
for annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction alleging among others alleged irregularity and lack of notice
in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage. In the meantime, a
temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court.
On July 28, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction. On September 28, 1999, the CAt
annulled the assailed writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was valid.
HELD
The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is not valid.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an
injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present:
1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;
2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.
Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not
designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and
positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant
has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the
existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The controlling reason for the
existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated

40 !
and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.
In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has no more proprietary right to
speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction. It appears that
the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to private respondent Gumersindo on May 23, 1997
and the sheriffs certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23,
1997. Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriffs sale to redeem the property but she
failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a
conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property.
When petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriffs sale against private respondents with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient
interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on
June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint. It is always a ground for denying
injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the
ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she shows no equity. The possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.

41 !
Gustillo vs. Real

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1250
February 28, 2001
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS
In a verified complaint dated June 15, 1997, Rimeo S. Gustilo charged respondent Judge Ricardo S. Real,
Sr., of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental with gross misconduct,
gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
relative to Civil Case No. 703-M entitled Weddy C. Libo-on v. Rimeo S. Gustilo, et al. for recounting of
ballots of Precinct Nos. 27 and 27-A, Barangay Punta Mesa, Manapla, Negros Occidental.
Complainant avers that he was a candidate for punong barangay of Barangay Punta Mesa, Manapla,
Negros Occidental in the May 12, 1997 elections. His lone opponent was Weddy C. Libo-on, then the
incumbent punong barangay and the representative of the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) to the
Sangguniang Bayan of Manapla and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental. Both
complainant and Libo-on garnered eight hundred nineteen (819) votes during the elections, resulting in a
tie. The breaking of the tie by the Board of Canvassers was in complainants favor and he was proclaimed
duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla.
On May 20, 1997, his opponent filed an election protest case, docketed as Civil Case No. 703-M, before the
MCTC of Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental. Libo-on sought the recounting of ballots in two
precincts, preliminary prohibitory injunction, and damages.
On May 27, 1997, however, Libo-on filed a motion to advance the hearing to May 29 and 30, 1997.
The next day, respondent granted Libo-ons motion. The hearing was advanced to May 29 and 30, 1997
cancelling the hearing for June 6, 1997. Complainant avers that he was not furnished a copy of this Order
dated May 28, 1997.
On May 29, 1997, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and annulled the
proclamation of complainant as the duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla. Complainant
declares that no copy of this Order dated May 29, 1997 was served on him. That same day, however, he
was able to secure copies of the orders of respondent dated May 28 and May 29, 1997 from the COMELEC
Registrar of Manapla, Negros Occidental and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
On May 30, 1997, complainant took his oath of office as punong barangay. That same day, he also filed a
petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Silay City, Negros Occidental, Branch 69 docketed
as Special Civil Action No. 1936-69.
On June 5, 1997, the RTC lifted the TRO issued by respondent and declared as null and void the order
nullifying complainants proclamation as duly elected punong barangay.
Believing that respondent could not decide Civil Case No. 703-M impartially, complainant moved for his
inhibition.
On June 11, 1997, respondent denied complainants motion for inhibition and after hearing Libo-ons
motion for permanent injunction, issued a second TRO to maintain the status quo between the
contending parties.

42 !
Complainant argues that by issuing the second TRO, respondent reversed the order of the RTC of Silay
City dated June 5, 1997. He also claims that by preventing him from assuming office, he was excluded by
the DILG from participating in the election of the Liga ng Mga Barangay on June 14, 1997.
ISSUE
Whether or not the issuance of the preliminary injunction was proper.
HELD
No, the issuance of the preliminary injunction was not proper.
The foregoing clearly show that whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on the
application only after all parties have been notified and heard in a summary hearing. In other words, a
summary hearing may not be dispensed with. In the instant case, respondent admits that he issued the
injunctive writ sought on May 29, 1997 after receiving the applicants evidence ex parte. His failure to
abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the first TRO is grave abuse of authority,
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
Worse, he compounded the infraction by annulling complainants proclamation as the duly elected
punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla and prohibiting him from assuming office. Respondent admits
that his court was not vested with the power or jurisdiction to annul the proclamation, but seeks to justify
his action on the ground that the proclamation was void ab initio. In so doing, respondent wantonly
usurped a power exclusively vested by law in the COMELEC.
A judge is expected to know the jurisdictional boundaries of courts and quasi-judicial bodies like the
COMELEC as mapped out by the Constitution and statutes and to act only within said limits. A judge
who wantonly arrogates unto himself the authority and power vested in other agencies not only acts in
oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process, but also creates chaos and contributes to
confusion in the administration of justice. Respondent, in transgressing the jurisdictional demarcation
lines between his court and the COMELEC, clearly failed to realize the position that his court occupies in
the interrelation and operation of the country’s justice system. He displayed a marked ignorance of basic
laws and principles. Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge shall be faithful to
the law and maintain professional competence. By annulling complainants proclamation as the duly
elected punong barangay, despite being aware of the fact that his court had no power to do so, not only is
respondent guilty of grave abuse of authority, he also manifests unfaithfulness to a basic legal rule as well
as injudicious conduct.
Moreover, in willfully nullifying complainants proclamation despite his courts want of authority,
respondent knowingly issued an unjust order.
Note that the RTC of Silay City corrected respondents errors by declaring null and void his Order dated
May 29, 1997. Nonetheless, he compounded his previous errors of judgment by proceeding to hear Libo-
ons motion for permanent injunction and issuing a second TRO on June 11, 1997 on the ground that
extreme urgency and grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise if no injunctive remedy were
granted. Respondent insists that his act did not reverse the Order of the RTC in Special Civil Action No.
1936-69, since the second TRO he issued satisfied the notice and hearing requirements of Circular No.
20-95.
Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there
must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction

43 !
to be directed is a violation of such right. The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right
to be protected, which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must be a
showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage. In this case, complainant had been duly
proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He had taken his oath of office. Unless his
election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office. We do not see how the complainants
exercise of such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing candidate so as
to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo. We see no reason to
disagree with the finding of the OCA that the evident purpose of the second TRO was to prevent
complainant from participating in the election of the Liga ng mga Barangay. Respondent must be held
liable for violating Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that, In every case, a judge
shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests,
public opinion, or fear of criticism.
In a similar case, a judge was fined P5,000.00 for failure to observe the requirements of Administrative
Circular No. 20-95 when he issued a TRO enjoining a duly proclaimed barangay captain from
participating in the elections of officers of the ABC of Taft, Eastern Samar. Note, however, that in the
instant case, the respondents infractions are not limited to the mere issuance of a restraining order
without conducting the summary conference required by Administrative Circular No. 20-95. He also
annulled the proclamation of the complainant knowing very well that he had no such authority. When his
first restraining order was set aside and nullification of complainants proclamation was declared null and
void by the RTC of Silay City, a superior court, he again issued a TRO, which showed his partiality to
complainants political rival. Respondent is thus guilty of violating Rules 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct; knowingly rendering an unjust order; gross ignorance of the law or procedure; as well
as bias and partiality. All of the foregoing are serious charges under Rule 140, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court. We agree with the sanction recommended by the OCA, finding it to be in accord with Rule 140,
Section 10 (A) of the Rules of Court.

44 !
Lagrosas vs. Pristo-Myers

G.R. No. 168637, 170684
September 12, 2008
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS
Michael J. Lagrosas was employed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead Johnson Phil. from January
6, 1997 until March 23, 2000 as Territory Manager in its Medical Sales Force Division.
On February 4, 2000, Ma. Dulcinea S. Lim, also a Territory Manager and Lagrosas former girlfriend,
attended a district meeting of territory managers at McDonalds Alabang Town Center. After the meeting,
she dined out with her friends. She left her car at McDonalds and rode with Cesar R. Menquito, Jr. When
they returned to McDonalds, Lim saw Lagrosas car parked beside her car. Lim told Menquito not to stop
his car but Lagrosas followed them and slammed Menquitos car thrice. Menquito and Lim alighted from
the car. Lagrosas approached them and hit Menquito with a metal steering wheel lock. When Lim tried to
intervene, Lagrosas accidentally hit her head.
While the offense is not covered by the Code of Discipline for Territory Managers, the Code states that
other infractions not provided for herein shall be penalized in the most appropriate manner at the
discretion of management.
On March 23, 2000, Bristol-Myers dismissed Lagrosas effective immediately. Lagrosas then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay,
attorneys fees, damages and fair market value of his Team Share Stock Option Grant.
On February 28, 2002, Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez rendered a Decision in NLRC NCR Case No.
00-03-02821-99, declaring the dismissal illegal.
On May 7, 2003, the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing its earlier ruling. It ratiocinated that the incident
was not work-related since it occurred only after the district meeting of territory managers. It emphasized
that for a serious misconduct to merit dismissal, it must be connected with the employees work.
Later, Labor Arbiter Hernandez issued a writ of execution. Notices of garnishment were then served upon
the Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. for the supersedeas bond posted by Bristol-Myers and the Bank
of the Philippine Islands for the balance of the judgment award.
Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it timely filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court gave due course to Bristol-Myers petition and issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution and notices of
garnishment. Upon the expiration of the TRO, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
dated September 17, 2004.
Bristol-Myers then moved to discharge and release the TRO cash bond. It argued that since it has posted
an injunction cash bond, the TRO cash bond should be legally discharged and released.
On January 28, 2005, the appellate court granted the request of Bristol-Myers.

45 !
In the meantime, Bristol-Myers moved to release the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond in view of
the Decision dated January 28, 2005. On August 12, 2005, the appellate court denied the motion as
premature since the decision is not yet final and executory due to Lagrosas appeal to this Court.
Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 28, 2005, the appellate court resolved:
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash
bond.
HELD
Yes, the Court of Appeals did err in disallowing he discharge and release of the injunction cash bond.
It is settled that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous

irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.
Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
A preliminary injunction may be granted only when, among other things, the applicant, not explicitly
exempted, files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or
person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party
or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if
the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite
bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction
ought not to have been granted. Its principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party against loss or
damage by reason of the injunction, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.
In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation
of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment pending final resolution of this case or unless the
[w]rit is sooner lifted by the Court.
By its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate court disposed of the case by granting Bristol-Myers
petition and reinstating the Decision dated September 24, 2002 of the NLRC which dismissed the
complaint for dismissal. It also ordered the discharge of the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond.
Thus, both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were satisfied.
Notably, the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to the monetary awards granted by the labor
arbiter and the NLRC, and that the implementation of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment
was properly enjoined. This in effect amounted to a finding that Lagrosas did not sustain any damage by
reason of the injunction. To reiterate, the injunction bond is intended to protect Lagrosas against loss or
damage by reason of the injunction only. Contrary to Lagrosas claim, it is not a security for the judgment
award by the labor arbiter.
Considering the foregoing, we hold that the appellate court erred in disallowing the discharge and release
of the injunction cash bond.

46 !
Jenosa vs. Delariarte

G.R. No. 172138
September 8, 2010
Carpio, J.
FACTS
On 22 November 2002, some students of the University, among them petitioners Nio Carlo Jenosa, Patrick
Canto, Cyndy Apalisok, Clint Eduard Vargas, and Nonell Gregory Duro (petitioner students), were
caught engaging in hazing outside the school premises. The hazing incident was entered into the blotter
of the Iloilo City Police.

During the 28 November 2002 meeting, the parties agreed that, instead of the possibility of being charged
and found guilty of hazing, the students who participated in the hazing incident as initiators, including
petitioner students, would just transfer to another school, while those who participated as neophytes
would be suspended for one month. The parents of the apprehended students, including petitioners,
affixed their signatures to the minutes of the meeting to signify their conformity. In view of the
agreement, the University did not anymore convene the Committee on Student Discipline (COSD) to
investigate the hazing incident.

On 5 December 2002, the parents of petitioner students (petitioner parents) sent a letter to the University
President urging him not to implement the 28 November 2002 agreement. According to petitioner
parents, the Principal, without convening the COSD, decided to order the immediate transfer of
petitioner students.

On 3 January 2003, petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, Iloilo City (trial court) docketed as Civil Case No. 03-27460. Petitioners assailed the
Principals decision to order the immediate transfer of petitioner students as a violation of their right to
due process because the COSD was not convened.

On 5 February 2003, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and directed respondents to
admit petitioner students during the pendency of the case.

On 28 May 2003, petitioners filed another complaint for mandatory injunction praying for the release of
petitioner students report cards and other credentials docketed as Civil Case No. 03-27646.

The trial court consolidated the two cases.

On 17 June 2003, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and directed the University to
release petitioner students report cards and other credentials.

On 26 June 2003, the COSD met with petitioners for a preliminary conference on the hazing incident. On 7
July 2003, the University, through the COSD, issued its report finding petitioner students guilty of hazing.
The COSD also recommended the exclusion of petitioner students from its rolls effective 28 November
2002.

On 1 September 2003, respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Respondents insisted that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case Nos.
03-27460 and 03-27646. Respondents also alleged that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping.


47 !

The Court of Appeals granted respondents petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the issuance of the preliminary injunction proper in the case at bar.

HELD
The issuance of the preliminary injunction is not proper.
Since petitioners present complaint is one for injunction, and injunction is the strong arm of equity,
petitioners must come to court with clean hands. In University of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal, Jr., a
case involving student misconduct, this Court ruled:

Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with equity or with clean hands.
This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the
principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a
court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful
as to the controversy in issue.

Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement without any justifiable reason, come to court with
unclean hands. This Court may deny a litigant relief if his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest as to the controversy in issue.

Since petitioners have come to court with inequitable and unfair conduct, we deny them relief. We
uphold the validity of the 28 November 2002 agreement and rule that the Principal had the authority to
order the immediate transfer of petitioner students based on the 28 November 2002 agreement.


48 !
Solid Builders Inc. vs. China Bank

G.R. No. 179665
April 3, 2013
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS
During the period from September 4, 1992 to March 27, 1996, China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted
several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI), which amounted to ₱139,999,234.34, exclusive of interests and
other charges. To secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several
surety agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land in the Loyola Grand Villas in
Quezon City and New Cubao Central in Cainta, Rizal.
Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a scheme through which SBI would sell the mortgaged properties
and share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis until such time that the whole obligation would be
fully paid. SBI also proposed that there be partial releases of the certificates of title of the mortgaged
properties without the burden of updating interests on all loans.
On October 5, 2000, claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous
and unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a
Complaint "To Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order”.
After hearing the parties, the trial court issued an Order dated December 14, 2000 granting the
application of SBI and MFII for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Aggrieved, CBC filed a Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81968 in the Court of Appeals
where it claimed that the Orders dated December 14, 2000 (granting the application of petitioners SBI and
MFII for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction), December 10, 2001 (denying reconsideration of
the order dated December 14, 2000), and November 10, 2003 (denying the CBC’s motion to dissolve
injunction order) were all issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In a Decision dated April 16, 2007, the Court of Appeals found that, on its face, the trial court’s Order
dated December 14, 2000 granting the application of SBI and MFII for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction had no basis as there were no findings of fact or law which would indicate the
existence of any of the requisites for the grant of an injunctive writ.
ISSUE
Whether or not the issuance of the preliminary injunction is proper.
HELD
No, the issuance of the preliminary injunction is not proper.
This Court has recently reiterated the general principles in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in
Palm Tree Estates, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a
party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the
protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for
an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be

49 !
avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is
concerned.
At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled that there is no power the
exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an
injunction. It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an
adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very
clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is
a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a
continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a
preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant,
than to establish a new relation."
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of
actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are
present in the case before it.
In this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the
applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists
prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the
violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.
Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a right to have their mortgaged properties shielded from foreclosure
by CBC on the ground that the interest rate and penalty charges imposed by CBC on the loans availed of
by SBI are iniquitous and unconscionable.
In particular, SBI and MFII assert:

There is therefore an urgent necessity for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or at least a status quo
[order], otherwise, respondent bank will definitely foreclose petitioners’ properties without awaiting the trial of the
main case on the merits, with said usurious and confiscatory rates of interest as basis.
There is therefore no legal justification for the Honorable Court of Appeals to lift/dissolve the injunction issued by
the trial court, otherwise, respondent bank – on the basis of this illegal imposition of interest – can already foreclose
the properties of petitioners and render the whole case (sans trial on the merits) moot and academic.
On this matter, the Order dated December 14, 2000 of the trial court enumerates as the first argument
raised by SBI and MFII in support of their application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
1. Their rights basically are for the protection of their properties put up as collateral for the loans
extended by defendant bank to them.
As debtor-mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do not have a right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee CBC
from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on the basis of alleged "usurious, exorbitant and
confiscatory rate of interest." First, assuming that the interest rate agreed upon by the parties is usurious,
the nullity of the stipulation of usurious interest does not affect the lender’s right to recover the principal
loan, nor affect the other terms thereof. Thus, in a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the
mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the
debt due.

50 !
Second, even the Order dated December 14, 2000 of the trial court, which granted the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, recognizes that the parties still have to be heard on the
alleged lack of "fairness of the increase in interests and penalties" during the trial on the merits. Thus, the
basis of the right claimed by SBI and MFII remains to be controversial or disputable as there is still a need
to determine whether or not, upon consideration of the various circumstances surrounding the agreement
of the parties, the interest rates and penalty charges are unconscionable. Therefore, such claimed right
cannot be considered clear, actual and subsisting. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the
injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Order dated December 10, 2001 also shows the reasoning of the trial court which betrays that its
grant of the application of SBI and MFII for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was not based
on a clear legal right. Said the trial court:
It was likewise shown that plaintiffs SBI and MFII had the clear right and urgency to ask for injunction
because of the issue of validity of the increase in the amount of the loan obligation. (Emphasis supplied.)
At most, the above finding of the trial court that the validity of the increase in the amount of the loan
obligation is in issue simply amounted to a finding that the rights of SBI and MFII vis-à-vis that of CBC
are disputed and debatable. In such a case where the complainant-movant’s right is doubtful or disputed,
the issuance of an injunctive writ is not proper.
Even assuming that SBI and MFII are correct in claiming their supposed right, it nonetheless disintegrates
in the face of the ten promissory notes in the total amount of ₱218,540,648.00, exclusive of interest and
penalties, issued by SBI in favor of CBC on March 1, 1999 which until now remain unpaid despite the
maturity of the said notes on March 1, 2004 and CBC’s repeated demands for payment. Foreclosure is but
a necessary consequence of nonpayment of mortgage indebtedness. As this Court held in Equitable PCI
Bank, Inc. v. OJ-Mark Trading, Inc.:
Where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts and promissory notes that the mortgagee
is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged properties in case of default by the mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear
right to foreclosure in case of default, making the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction improper. x x x.
(Citation omitted.)
In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them from availing
of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. In particular, SBI and MFII have stated in their Complaint
that they have made various requests to CBC for restructuring of the loan. The trial court’s Order dated
December 14, 2000 also found that SBI wrote several letters to CBC "requesting, among others, for a
reduction of interests and penalties and restructuring of the loan." A debtor’s various and constant
requests for deferment of payment and restructuring of loan, without actually paying the amount due,
are clear indications that said debtor was unable to settle his obligation. SBI’s default or failure to settle its
obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its hands and disqualified it from availing of
the equitable remedy of preliminary injunction.
As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII. The accessory follows
the principal. The accessory obligation of MFII as accommodation mortgagor and surety is tied to SBI’s
principal obligation to CBC and arises only in the event of SBI’s default.

51 !
Thus, MFII’s interest in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is necessarily prejudiced by
SBI’s wrongful conduct and breach of contract.
Even Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which SBI and MFII invoke, works against them. Under that
provision, the equitable reduction of the penalty stipulated by the parties in their contract will be based
on a finding by the court that such penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable. Here, the trial court has not
yet made a ruling as to whether the penalty agreed upon by CBC with SBI and MFII is unconscionable.
Such finding will be made by the trial court only after it has heard both parties and weighed their
respective evidence in light of all relevant circumstances. Hence, for SBI and MFII to claim any right or
benefit under that provision at this point is premature.
As no clear right that warrants the extraordinary protection of an injunctive writ has been shown by SBI
and MFII to exist in their favor, the first requirement for the grant of a preliminary injunction has not been
satisfied. In the absence of any requisite, and where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter
within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ of injunction must be struck down for having
been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it granted the
petition for certiorari of CBC and ordered the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the trial court.
Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such
constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law,
or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it
is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may
only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation.
In the first place, any injury that SBI and MFII may suffer in case of foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties will be purely monetary and compensable by an appropriate judgment in a proper case against
CBC. Moreover, where there is a valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, it cannot be correctly claimed
that the irreparable damage sought to be prevented by the application for preliminary injunction is the
loss of the mortgaged properties to auction sale.
The alleged entitlement of SBI and MFII to the "protection of their properties put up as collateral for the
loans" they procured from CBC is not the kind of irreparable injury contemplated by law. Foreclosure of
mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the
extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. As this Court stated in Philippine National
Bank v. Castalloy Technology Corporation:
All is not lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by creditors-mortgagees. The respondents
will not be deprived outrightly of their property, given the right of redemption granted to them under the law.
Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the right to receive any surplus in the selling price. Thus, if
the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the
validity of the sale but will give the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus. (Citation omitted.)
The En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial or Judicial Foreclosure of
Real Estate Mortgages, further stacks the odds against SBI and MFII. Issued on February 20, 2007, or some
two months before the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in this case, the resolution embodies

52 !
the additional guidelines intended to aid courts in foreclosure proceedings, specifically limiting the
instances, and citing the conditions, when a writ against foreclosure of a mortgage may be issued, to wit:
(1) No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not
delinquent unless the application is verified and supported by evidence of payment.
(2) No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor
pays the mortgagee at least twelve percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application
for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending.
(3) Where a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against a foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the
case shall be speedily resolved. To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the Supreme Court, through the
Office of the Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress of the cases involving ten million pesos and
above.
(4) All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction, such as the posting of a bond, which shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt, and the time
limitation for its effectivity, shall apply as well to a status quo order.
The guidelines speak of strict exceptions and conditions. To reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
and reinstate the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court will be to allow SBI and MFII to
circumvent the guidelines and conditions provided by the En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0
dated February 20, 2007 and prevent CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties based simply on
the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable. This Court will not permit such a situation.
What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
All told, the relevant circumstances in this case show that there was failure to satisfy the requisites for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The injunctive writ issued by the trial court should therefore
be lifted and dissolved. That was how the Court of Appeals decided. That is how it should be.

53 !
Plaza vs. Lustiva

G.R. No. 172909
March 5, 2014
Brion, J.
FACTS
On August 28, 1997, the CA ruled that among the Plaza siblings, namely: Aureliano, Emiliana, Vidal,
Marciano, and Barbara, Barbara was the owner of the subject agricultural land. The decision became final
and executory and Barbara's successors, respondents Guillermo Lustiva, Eleodora Vda. de Martinez and
Vicky Sayson Goloseno, have continued occupying the property.
On September 14, 1999, Vidal’s son and daughter-in-law, the petitioners, filed a Complaint for Injunction,
Damages, Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order against the respondents and the City Government of Butuan. They prayed
that the respondents be enjoined from unlawfully and illegally threatening to take possession of the
subject property. According to the petitioners, they acquired the land from Virginia Tuazon in 1997;
Tuazon was the sole bidder and winner in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of Butuan on
December 27, 1996.
In their answer, the respondents pointed out that they were never delinquent in paying the land taxes and
were in fact not aware that their property had been offered for public auction. Moreover, Tuazon, being a
government employee, was disqualified to bid in the public auction, as stated in Section 89 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. As Tuazon’s participation in the sale was void, she could have not transferred
ownership to the petitioners. Equally important, the petitioners merely falsified the property tax
declaration by inserting the name of the petitioners’ father, making him appear as a co-owner of the
auctioned land. Armed with the falsified tax declaration, the petitioners, as heirs of their father,
fraudulently redeemed the land from Tuazon.
Nonetheless, there was nothing to redeem as the land was not sold. For these irregularities, the
petitioners had no right to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
prayed for against them.
ISSUE
Whether or not the preliminary injunction was proper.
HELD
No, the preliminary injunction was not proper.
The petitioners failed to show clear and unmistakable rights to be protected by the writ; the present
action has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of the main action.
As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no ownership to confer to the petitioners despite the
latter’s reimbursement of Tuazon’s purchase expenses. Because they were never owners of the property,
the petitioners failed to establish entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. "[T]o be entitled to an
injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. A writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected
during the pendency of the principal action. When the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed,
he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper."

54 !
Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on August 8, 2013, the question of issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic.
In Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, the Court ruled that a case becomes moot and academic when there
is no more issue between the parties or object that can be served in deciding the merits of the case. Upon the
dismissal of the main action, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died
with it. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the
determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom
notwithstanding.

55 !
Office of the Ombudsman vs. De Chavez

G.R. No. 172206
July 3, 2013
Peralta, J.
FACTS
On August 18, 2005, the BSU-BOR received an Order from Deputy Ombudsman Victor Fernandez
directing the former to enforce the aforementioned Office of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and
Supplemental Resolution. Pursuant to said Order, the BSU-BOR issued Resolution No. 18, series of 2005,
dated August 22, 2005, resolving to implement the Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, herein
respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 4 (RTC), against the BSU-
BOR.
The gist of the petition before the RTC is that the BSU-BOR should be enjoined from enforcing the
Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution because the same are still on appeal and,
therefore, are not yet final and executory.
On September 26, 2005, the RTC ordered the dismissal of herein respondents' petition for injunction on
the ground of lack of cause of action. Respondents filed their notice of appeal and promptly filed a
Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction dated December 8, 2005 with
the CA. On February 17, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution granting respondents' prayer for a temporary
restraining order enjoining the BSU-BOR from enforcing its Resolution No. 18, series of 2005.
Thereafter, on March 7, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Motion to Intervene and to Admit
Attached Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order, with the Motion to Recall Temporary
Restraining Order attached thereto. Respondents opposed said motion and then filed an Urgent Motion
for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On April 7, 2006, the CA issued the Resolution subject of
the present petition, allowing the preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA has the power to uphold a preliminary injunction that stays the order of the
Ombudsman.
HELD
No, CA has no such power.
Note that for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following essential requisites must concur, to
wit: (1) that the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is clear
and unmistakable; and, (3) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. In the present case, the right of respondents cannot be said to be clear and unmistakable,
because the prevailing jurisprudence is that the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on
government employees or officials is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of
execution pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary cases.
In Facura v. Court of Appeals, the Court fully threshed out this matter, thus:
The issue of whether or not an appeal of the Ombudsman decision in an administrative case carries with it the
immediate suspension of the imposed penalty has been laid to rest in the recent resolution of the case of Ombudsman

56 !
v. Samaniego, where this Court held that the decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal
and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ, to wit:
"Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order
No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, provides:
SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and
conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the
Decision or Order denying the motion for reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid
the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office
of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or
failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against such officer. [Emphases
supplied]
The Ombudsman's decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately executory
pending appeal. It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the CA. This rule is similar to that
provided under Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
In the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of
the DPWH, we held:
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is
violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on
appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or
removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said
to have any vested right in an office.
xxxx
xxx
Here, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended, is categorical, an
appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its
own rules of procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide that the
Office of the Ombudsman has the power to "promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or
performance of its powers, functions and duties" and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may
require. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in an
administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under the

57 !
Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes the discretion given
to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case
is appealed to the CA. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is
immediately executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court. Specialis derogat
generali. When two rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail
over the other. [Emphases supplied]
Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop an
Ombudsman decision from being executory. This rule applies to the appealable decisions of the
Ombudsman, namely, those where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, or a
penalty of suspension of more than one month, or a fine equivalent to more than one month's salary.
Hence, the dismissal of De Jesus and Parungao from the government service is immediately executory
pending appeal.
The aforementioned Section 7 is also clear in providing that in case the penalty is removal and the
respondent wins his appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall
be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the removal. As
explained above, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or an absolute right to hold office,
except constitutional offices with special provisions on salary and tenure. The Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman being procedural, no vested right of De Jesus and Parungao would be violated as they
would be considered under preventive suspension, and entitled to the salary and emoluments they did
not receive in the event that they would win their appeal.
The ratiocination above also clarifies the application of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section
7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The CA, even on terms it may deem just, has
no discretion to stay a decision of the Ombudsman, as such procedural matter is governed specifically by
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The CA's issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of dismissal imposed by
the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an encroachment on the rule-making powers of the
Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution, and Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770,
which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The
issuance of an injunctive writ renders nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
From the foregoing elaboration, there can be no cavil that respondents do not have any right to a stay of
the Ombudsman's decision dismissing them from service. Perforce, the BSU-BOR acted properly in
issuing Resolution No. 18, series of 2005, dated August 22, 2005, pursuant to the order of the
Ombudsman, as its legally-mandated duty. The CA's Resolution granting respondents' prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction is patently erroneous.

58 !
Novecio vs. Lim

G.R. No. 193809
March 23, 2015
Brion, J.
FACTS
Respondents Maria Carmen J. Tuazon and Manuel V. Nieto, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Lope
Durotan (the respondents), filed complaints for forcible entry with damages against petitioners Saturnino
Novecio, Gavino Novecio, Anastacio Golez, et al. (the petitioners).
The respondents alleged that on February 15, 2004, the petitioners, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
and stealth, unlawfully squatted and took possession of several portions of land with an area of eight (8)
hectares, described as Project No. 9, Block 1, LC Map No. 777. The petitioners allegedly planted crops,
erected makeshift shelters, and continue to plant and /or improve the shelters as of the filing of the
complaints for forcible entry, all without the consent and/or against the will of the respondents.
The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that they have already been in possession of the land for
more than two years when the complaints were filed. They maintained that they have planted the land
with corn, durian, coconut, mango, jackfruit, rambutan, etc. for their livelihood. They also alleged that
they were harassed by some men armed with shotguns and pistols on February 12, 2004.
The MTC dismissed the complaint of the defendant. The RTC reversed the MTC decision.
As the respondents sought the execution of the RTC judgment, the petitioners filed on May 14, 2010 an
Extremely Urgent Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order.
On January 28, 2010, the CA issued the first assailed resolution denying the petitioners' application for
preliminary injunction.
This Court, acting on the petitioners' prayer, issued a TRO on October 18, 2010, enjoining the RTC from
executing its decision. The TRO remains effective until this day.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA is correct in denying the preliminary injunction.
HELD
Yes, the CA erred in denying the preliminary injunction.
Subject to this clarification, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
injunctive relief prayed for by the petitioners.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal
bias.

59 !
A review of the records, however, shows that the CA ignored relevant facts that would have justified the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. Contrary to established jurisprudence, the CA also denied the prayer
for preliminary injunction without giving the factual and legal bases for such denial.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a preliminary injunction may be granted when the
following have been established:
That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consist in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually;
That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to
be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
A preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has
substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. As this Court has previously ruled, "while the existence of the
right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear."
A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete evidence. Such evidence
need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an evidence of justification for a preliminary
injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the principal action
which has yet to be decided.
In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive and complete
evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his
complaint.
In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a preliminary injunction. First, the
relief demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC decision ordering their ejectment from
the disputed land. Second, their ejectment from the land from which they derive their source of livelihood
would work injustice to the petitioners. Finally, the execution of the RTC decision is probably in violation
of the rights of the petitioners, tending to render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible entry cases
ineffectual.
Moreover, the court in granting or dismissing an application for a writ of preliminary injunction based on
the pleadings of the parties and their respective evidence must state in its order the findings and
conclusions based on the evidence and the law. This is to enable the appellate court to determine whether
the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
resolving, one way or the other, the plea for injunctive relief.
Thus, we do not understand why the CA denied the prayer for preliminary injunction without citing any
legal or factual basis for the denial.

60 !
Neither does the resolution denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration contain any factual and
legal bases for the denial. It only provides that "[u]pon careful evaluation of the petitioners' Motion, We find no
cogent and compelling reasons to warrant reversal of Our Resolution."
We therefore have no idea why and how the CA came to the conclusion that the petitioners are not
entitled to the injunctive relief. Hence, we are forced to go beyond the function of a certiorari under Rule
65 and examine the factual findings of the MTC and the RTC.
The MTC found that the petitioners have been in actual and physical possession of the land for more than
two (2) years prior to the institution of the complaints for forcible entry. The MTC also found that the
respondents were not even sure how the petitioners entered the land. In their complaints, they alleged
that petitioners entered the land by means of "force, intimidation, threat, stealth and strategy," a shotgun
allegation which shows that respondents' lack knowledge of how the petitioners entered the disputed
property.
We quote the MTC decision with approval, viz:
xxx Force, intimidation[,] and threat usually connote actual knowledge of dispossession. One cannot force,
intimidate or threaten another who is not around. In stealth and strategy[,] the actual entry is usually done without
the knowledge of the plaintiff. If they are not sure how [the] defendants entered the land[,] the likelihood is that they
also do not know when [the] defendants] entered the land. The court is apt to believe that [the] defendants have been
in possession of the land for more than 2 years. And under Rule 70[,] the action of forcible entry must be filed within
one year from dispossession. The filing of these cases was beyond the one-year period.
The RTC, on the other hand, relied on a mere request for authority to conduct a land survey, allegedly
showing that respondent Manuel V. Nieto was the occupant and tiller of the land.
However, this document does not prove prior possession of the subject land. It only points to the fact that
there was an application for a land title in the name of one of the respondents, which application was not
even shown to have been granted. This document merely authorized the survey of the land; the
declaration regarding possession was just incidental to the application for land survey.
Between the clear findings of the MTC, which conducted the trial of the forcible entry cases, and the RTC
acting as an appellate court, which relied on documentary evidence but without sufficiently explaining
how such evidence would prove prior possession, we are inclined to give weight to the MTC's ruling.
This Court has held:
xxx The Court generally recognizes the profundity of conclusions and findings of facts reached by the trial court and
hence sustains them on appeal except for strong and cogent reasons inasmuch as the trial court is in a better position
to examine real evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses in a case. No clear specific contrary evidence was
cited by the respondent appellate court to justify the reversal of the lower court's findings. Thus, in this case,
between the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court, those of the trial court must prevail over that
of the latter.
Under this factual backdrop, we conclude that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the prayer for preliminary injunction without explanation and justification.

61 !
We ought to remember that the grant of preliminary injunction would have only been provisional and
would not be conclusively determinative of the principal action. The issuance of the writ would have
served its purpose, i.e., to preserve the status quo or to prevent future wrongs in order to preserve and
protect the interests of the petitioners during the pendency of the action.

62 !
Liberty Broadcasting Network vs. Atlocom

G.R. No. 205875
June 30, 2015
Villarama Jr., J.
FACTS
Atlocom Wireless System, Inc. (Atlocom) is a grantee of a legislative franchise under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8605. On October 8, 2003, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued an Order in
NTC Case No. 98-158 relative to the application of Atlocom for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC).
On December 23, 2008, NTC denied Atlocom's motion for extension of PA, citing the re-allocation of
MMDS frequencies for Broadband Wireless Access in accordance with MC 06-08-2005 and the
unavailability of other alternative frequencies.
On September 8, 2009, Atlocom filed in the RTC a Petition to enjoin the implementation of MC 06-08-2005
and reinstate the frequencies of Atlocom.
Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. (LBNI), also a grantee of a legislative franchise (R.A. No. 1553, as
amended by R.A. No. 4154) for radio and television broadcasting, as well as radio stations for
international and domestic communications of all types and services, and holder of a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to operate a radio communications network, was allowed to
intervene in the case, joining the defendant NTC in opposing Atlocom's claims.
On December 9, 2010, the RTC, after due hearing, issued an Order denying Atlocom's application for a
writ of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction. Atlocom filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was likewise denied by the RTC under Order dated March 21, 2011.
ISSUE
(1)Whether or not Atlocom complied with the requisites for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
(2)Whether to not LBNI's motion to file counter-bond was correctly denied by the CA.
HELD
(1)No, Atlocom did not comply with the requisites for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
A preliminary injunction is defined as "[a]n order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment
or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts." It
may be a prohibitory injunction, which requires a party to refrain from doing a particular act, or a
mandatory injunction, which commands a party to perform a positive act to correct a wrong in the past.It
is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests during the pendency of an action.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts,
either for a limited period or perpetually;

63 !
(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation
would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering
to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
The following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction will issue: (1) The
applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is, a right in esse; (2) There is a
material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and ( 4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction is discretionary upon the trial court because the
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of fact left to the said court for
its conclusive determination. For this reason, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall
not be disturbed unless it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.
We do not concur with the CA in holding that NTC's inaction or delay on Atlocom' s application for
extension of PA had violated the latter's right to due process because it resulted in depriving Atlocom of
the use of frequencies which were re-allocated through the issuance of MC 06-08-2005. Such declaration
rather conveys an inaccurate picture of the regulatory process for public broadcasting and
telecommunications services.
Under existing laws and regulations, it is clear that a frequency assignment is not automatically included
in the PA granted by the NTC to an applicant for a CPC. Thus, the Order dated October 8, 2003 expressly
provided that the PA granted to Atlocom, valid for 18 months, is subject to several conditions, foremost of
which is the assignment of frequency by the Frequency Management Division (FMD).
While Atlocom presented a Certification dated October 22, 2003 issued by Alvin N. Blanco, Chief of
NTC's Broadcast Division, stating that certain frequencies were "identified" for Atlocom's MMDS (Metro
Manila) covering 2572-2596 frequency bands, there is no document evidencing that these frequencies
were actually assigned to Atlocom by the FMD. There is likewise nothing in the records to suggest that
NTC "unreasonably" withheld or delayed authority to use such frequencies identified for Atlocom.
Atlocom blamed NTC's three-year delay in resolving the motion for extension of PA for its inability to use
the frequencies identified for its MMDS, as these were eventually re-allocated in 2005 under MC
06-08-2005. But as Atlocom was fully aware, Section 6 of R.A. No. 8605 provides that the Government
may at anytime withdraw the frequency after due process. Records showed that a notice was duly
published and a public hearing was actually conducted on July 12, 2005 by NTC on the proposed Memo
Circular: Frequency Band Allocations for Broadcast Wireless Access. Saidevent was attended by
representatives of the different broadcasting and telecommunication companies, including Atlocom.
The position papers and feedback submitted by various companies in connection with the proposed
memorandum circular on wireless broadband access were all presented as evidence in the RTC. We have
held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. The requirements of due process were thus satisfied by
the NTC in the re-allocation of frequency.

64 !
Contrary to the CA's pronouncement, the re-allocation of frequency cannot be conditioned on resolution
of any pending request for extension of PA previously granted. Even entities with unexpired PA cannot
claim a vested right on a specific frequency assignment. This proceeds from the nature of its franchise
which is not solely for commercial purposes but one imbued with public interest. As earlier quoted,
Atlocom's franchise (R.A. No. 8605) declared the use of radio spectrum as a mere privilege conferred
upon the grantee by the State that may be withdrawn anytime provided that due process is observed. It
further emphasized that the radio spectrum is a finite resource and its use and distribution should be
aligned with existing laws and policies.
As a grantee of PA, Atlocom can only invoke the condition in MC 06-08-2005 that "[t]he transfer of
previously authorized persons or entities operating radio stations within the above listed radio frequency
bands shall be governed by Rule 603 of MC 3-3-96."
Considering that Atlocom has not even launched its MMDS network nor constructed radio stations, it is
doubtful whether Atlocom can exercise the foregoing rights of an affected frequency user. Neither can
Atlocom attribute its non-operational state to the delayed action on its motion for extension of PA.
Among the conditions of its PA is the commencement of the construction and installation of its station
within six months from issuance of the order granting it the provisional authority and its complete three
months thereafter. Perusal of the motion for extension reveals that Atlocom at the time was still in the
process of identifying and finalizing arrangements with its potential investors for the establishment of a
nationwide MMDS network coverage.
Based on its evaluation, the NTC found that: (1) Atlocom filed an application for Permit to Purchase
MMDS transmitter on February 9, 2005, but no permit of any kind was issued to it; (2) In the clarificatory
hearing held on September 4, 2006, concerns were raised regarding reports of foreign equity on Atlocom's
capital structure and status of band allocated for MMDS within the 2.5-2.7 Ghz band; and (3) On June 21,
2008, Atlocom is requesting for an allocation of a Digital Terrestrial TV frequency (Ch 14-20 & Ch 21-51) in
replacement for their MMDS frequency, but the NTC thru FMD denied such request because the
proposed frequency band for DTT service is not yet approved/allocated. With the re-allocation of MMDS
frequency bands for the Broadband Wireless Access under MC 06-8-2005, and the aforesaid findings, the
NTC en bane decided not to grant the extension sought by Atlocom.
A right to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable
as a matter of law. An injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future
rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act
which does not give rise to a cause of action.
From the evidence on record, no clear, actual and existing right to the subject frequencies or to the
extension of PA had been shown by Atlocom. Accordingly, no grave abuse of discretion was committed
by the RTC in denying Atlocom's application for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
implementation of MC 06-08-2005 insofar as the use of the re-allocated frequencies claimed by Atlocom.
The CA thus seriously erred in reversing the RTC and holding that Atlocom was entitled to injunctive
relief due to alleged violation of its right by the NTC.
A writ of preliminary injunction being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a strong arm of equity or a
transcendent remedy, it must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. In the

65 !
absence of the same, and where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the
conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for having been rendered in grave
abuse of discretion.
Pursuant to Section 6,32 Rule 5 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a preliminary injunction may be
dissolved if it appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining
order, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the
party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may
suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court on condition that he will pay all
damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining
order. Two conditions must concur: first, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the
continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully
compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a counterbond.
(2)Yes, the denial of BNI’s motion to file counter-bond was not valid.
In denying LBNI's offer to file counterbond, the CA relied on the Affidavit executed by Rene Rosales,
Atlocom's technical consultant, to refute the earlier Affidavit submitted by LBNI, which was executed by
its Director for Network Engineering, Edwin C. Mabitazan. Mabitazan stated that the injunction issued
by the CA will result in reducing LBNI's usable bandwidth from 40 Mhz to only 15 Mhz, which is
inadequate to serve LBNI's thousands of subscribers. Mabitazan's opinion should have been given more
weight in view of his intimate knowledge of LBNI' s operations and technical requirements. Moreover, it
should be stressed that LBNI's business projections were based on its existing technical capability which
stands to be greatly diminished once the frequency bands re-assigned to it will be reduced as a result of
the CA's injunction order.
The possibility of irreparable damage is indeed present, not only in terms of financial losses -the total
investment by LBNI has already reached billions of pesos - but on the reputation of LBNI as a new player
in the telecommunications industry for reliability and dependability of its services. In contrast, whatever
damage Atlocom stands to suffer should the injunction be dissolved, can be fully compensated
considering that it has not constructed stations nor launched any network service. No single document
was submitted by Atlocom to show it had actually complied with the conditions of its PA and invested in
the establishment of MMDS network, which never materialized.
In gross abuse of discretion, the CA brushed aside evidence presented by LBNI in support of its offer to
file counter-bond, stating that these were submitted only after the appellate court had rendered its
decision granting Atlocom's prayer for preliminary injunction. The CA failed to consider the fact that it
was Atlocom which misled the courts and the NTC in claiming that the subject frequencies had been
assigned to it. The matter was raised by NTC and LBNI only in their motions for reconsideration because
it was only at that time when their inquiry from FMD disclosed that said office had not actually granted a
frequency assignment to Atlocom. Thus, NTC in its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, submitted
a Certification dated August 2, 2012 issued by the FMD Chief, Pricilla F. Demition, together with attached
documents, setting forth the same facts relative to Atlocom's non-operational state. Atlocom countered
that said evidence was just an afterthought because the absence of frequency assignment was not
mentioned by Engr. Demition when she testified before the RTC on January 14, 2009 during the hearing
on the application for writ of preliminary injunction. Atlocom, however never disputed the findings of
the FMD.

66 !
In light of all the foregoing established facts, we hold that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it
issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the implementation of MC 06-08-2005 in the absence of a
clear legal right on the part of Atlocom, and subsequently denying LBNI' s offer to file counter bond
despite compliance with the requisites provided in Section 6 of Rule 58. However, with our ruling that the
writ of preliminary injunction was improperly issued, hence, null and void, the matter of allowing LBNI
to post a counter-bond has been rendered moot.

67 !
Republic vs. Cortez

G.R. No. 197472
September 7, 2016
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS
Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a missionary by vocation engaged in humanitarian
and charitable activities, established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island, San Vicente,
Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of
land located in the western portion of Palaui Island in Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana, Cagayan which he, with
the help of Aetas and other people under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in
order to support his charitable, humanitarian and missionary works.
On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 201 reserving for military
purposes a parcel of the public domain situated in Palaui Island. Pursuant thereto, 2,000 hectares of the
southern half portion of the Palaui Island were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the
use of the Philippine Navy, subject, however, to private rights if there be any.
More than two decades later or on August 16, 1994, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Proclamation No. 447
declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding waters situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as
marine reserve. Again subject to any private rights, the entire Palaui Island consisting of an aggregate
area of 7,415.48 hectares was accordingly reserved as a marine protected area.
On June 13, 2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Rogelio C. Biñas (Biñas) in his capacity as Commanding
Officer of the Philippine Naval Command in Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. According to him,
some members of the Philippine Navy, upon orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and lawful
possession of the said 50-hectare portion of Palaui Island when on March 15, 2000, they commanded him
and his men, through the use of force and intimidation, to vacate the area. When he sought assistance
from the Office of the Philippine Naval Command, he was met with sarcastic remarks and threatened
with drastic military action if they do not vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his men were constrained to leave
the area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said Petition with the RTC seeking preliminary mandatory
injunction ordering Biñas to restore to him possession and to not disturb the same, and further, for the
said preliminary writ, if issued, to be made permanent.
After the conduct of hearing on the application for preliminary mandatory injunction and the parties’
submission of their respective memoranda, the RTC issued an Order dated February 21, 2002 granting the
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. However, the same pertained to five hectares
(subject area) only, not to the whole 50 hectares claimed to have been occupied by Rev. Cortez.
In his Answer, Biñas countered that: (1) Rev. Cortez has not proven that he has been in exclusive, open,
continuous and adverse possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner; (2) Rev. Cortez has
not shown the exact boundaries and identification of the entire lot claimed by him; (3) Rev. Cortez has not
substantiated his claim of exemption from Proclamation No. 201; (4) under Proclamation No. 447, the
entire Palaui Island, which includes the land allegedly possessed and occupied by Rev. Cortez, was
reserved as a marine protected area; and, (4) injunction is not a mode to wrest possession of a property
from one person by another.

68 !
On July 3, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision making the injunction final and permanent. In so ruling,
the said court made reference to the Indigenous Peoples’ [Right] Act (IPRA).
In its Decision dated June 29, 2011, the CA upheld the RTC’s issuance of a final injunction.
ISSUE
Whether or not Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction.
HELD
No, Rev. Cortez is not entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction.
For starters, the Court shall distinguish a preliminary injunction from a final injunction.
"Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular
act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction, [as in this case,] or to refrain from doing a particular
act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction." "It may be the main action or merely a provisional
remedy for and as an incident in the main action.”
"The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction." A preliminary injunction does not determine the merits of a case or decide controverted facts.
Since it is a mere preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury and
irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties are settled. "It is usually granted when it is
made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing
an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the
status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.” A preliminary
injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to judgment or final order. For its
issuance, the applicant is required to show, at least tentatively, that he has a right which is not vitiated by
any substantial challenge or contradiction. Simply stated, the applicant needs only to show that he has
the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
On the other hand, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment that embodies a final injunction. A
final injunction is one which perpetually restrains the party or person enjoined from the commission or
continuance of an act, or in case of mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the preliminary
mandatory injuction.
It is issued when the court, after trial on the merits, is convinced that the applicant is entitled to have the
act or acts complained of permanently enjoined. Otherwise stated, it is only after the court has come up
with a definite pronouncement respecting an applicant’s right and of the act violative of such right, based
on its appreciation of the evidence presented, that a final injunction is issued. To be a basis for a final and
permanant injunction, the right and the act violative thereof must be established by the applicant with
absolute certainty.
What was before the trial court at the time of the issuance of its July 3, 2007 Decision is whether a final
injunction should issue. While the RTC seemed to realize this as it in fact made the injunction permanent,
the Court, however, finds the same to be wanting in basis.
Indeed, the RTC endeavored to provide a narrow distinction between a preliminary injunction and a final
injunction. Despite this, the RTC apparently confused itself. For one, what it cited in its Decision were
jurisprudence relating to preliminary injunction and/or mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ and
not as a final injunction. At that point, the duty of the RTC was to determine, based on the evidence

69 !
presented during trial, if Rev. Cortez has conclusively established his claimed right (as opposed to
preliminary injunction where an applicant only needs to at least tentatively show that he has a right) over
the subject area. This is considering that the existence of such right plays an important part in
determining whether the preliminary writ of mandatory injunction should be confirmed.
Surprisingly, however, the said Decision is bereft of the trial court’s factual findings on the matter as well
as of its analysis of the same vis-a-vis applicable jurisprudence. As it is, the said Decision merely contains
a restatement of the parties’ respective allegations in the Complaint and the Answer, followed by a
narration of the ensuing proceedings, an enumeration of the evidence submitted by Rev. Cortez, a
recitation of jurisprudence relating to preliminary injunction and/or specifically, to mandatory injunction
as an ancillary writ, a short reference to the IPRA which the Court finds to be irrelevant and finally, a
conclusion that a final and permanent injunction should issue. No discussion whatsoever was made with
respect to whether Rev. Cortez was able to establish with absolute certainty his claimed right over the
subject area.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule 36 and Section 1, Rule 120 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, similarly state that a decision, judgment or final order determining the merits of
the case shall state, clearly and distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is based. Pertinently, the Court
issued on January 28, 1988 Administrative Circular No. 1, which requires judges to make complete
findings of facts in their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the
evidence presented, and avoid the tendency to generalize and to form conclusion without detailing the
facts from which such conclusions are deduced.
Clearly, the Decision of the RTC in this case failed to comply with the aforestated guidelines.
In cases such as this, the Court would normally remand the case to the court a quo for compliance with
the form and substance of a Decision as required by the Constitution. In order, however, to avoid further
delay, the Court deems it proper to resolve the case based on the merits.
"Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the
acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right." Thus, it is necessary that the
Court initially determine whether the right asserted by Rev. Cortez indeed exists. As earlier stressed, it is
necessary that such right must have been established by him with absolute certainty.
Rev. Cortez argues that he is entitled to the injunctive writ based on the right of possession (jus
possesionis) by reason of his peaceful and continuous possession of the subject area since 1962. He avers
that as this right is protected by law, he cannot be peremptorily dispossessed therefrom, or if already
dispossessed, is entitled to be restored in possession. Hence, the mandatory injunctive writ was correctly
issued in his favor.
Jus possessionis or possession in the concept of an owner3is one of the two concepts of possession
provided under Article 52537 of the Civil Code. Also referred to as adverse possession, this kind of
possesion is one which can ripen into ownership by prescription. As correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez, a
possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just
title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. In the same manner, the law endows every possessor
with the right to be respected in his possession.
It must be emphasized, however, that only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated
may be the object of possession. The following cannot be appropriated and hence, cannot be possessed:

70 !
property of the public dominion, common things (res communes) such as sunlight and air, and things
specifically prohibited by law.
Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he,
nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public
domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. Hence, "[a]ll lands
not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public
lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons." To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring
the land as alienable and disposable must be established.
In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared
alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as
still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of
possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez’ claimed right of
possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of
an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be
lawfully possessed in the first place.
In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed to prove that, before the proclamation, the subject
lands were already private lands. They merely relied on such ‘recognition’ of possible private rights. In
their application, they alleged that at the time of their application, they had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land for at least thirty (30) years and became
its owners by prescription. There was, however, no allegation or showing that the government had earlier
declared it open for sale or settlement, or that it was already pronounced as inalienable and disposable.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev. Cortez failed to conclusively establish his claimed right
over the subject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle him to the issuance of a final injunction.

71 !
C. Receivership
Larrobis Jr. vs. G.R. No. 135706 October 1, 2004 Austria - Martinez, When writ may
Phil. Veterans J. issue;
Bank Requirement;
Power of receiver
Chavez vs. CA G.R. No. 174356 January 20, 2010 Abad, J. When writ may
issue
Koruga vs. G.R. Nos. 168332, June 19, 2009 Nachura, J. Requirements - for
Arcenas 169053 banks, Monetary
Board has
jurisdiction on
receivership
Tantano vs. G.R. No. 203585 July 29, 2013 Velasco, Jr., J. When writ may
Espina-Caboverde issue; requirement
- bond mandatory
for the order of
receivership be
granted

72 !
Larrobis Jr. vs. Phil. Veterans Bank

G.R. No. 135706
October 1, 2004
Austria - Martinez, J.
FACTS
On March 3, 1980, petitioner spouses contracted a monetary loan with respondent Philippine Veterans
Bank in the amount of P135,000.00, evidenced by a promissory note, due and demandable on February
27, 1981, and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage executed on their lot together with the improvements
thereon.
On March 23, 1985, the respondent bank went bankrupt and was placed under receivership/liquidation
by the Central Bank from April 25, 1985 until August 1992.
On August 23, 1985, the bank, through Francisco Go, sent the spouses a demand letter for accounts
receivable in the total amount of P6,345.00 as of August 15, 1984, which pertains to the insurance
premiums advanced by respondent bank over the mortgaged property of petitioners.
On August 23, 1995, more than fourteen years from the time the loan became due and demandable,
respondent bank filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of petitioners property. On
October 18, 1995, the property was sold in a public auction by Sheriff Arthur Cabigon with Philippine
Veterans Bank as the lone bidder.
On April 26, 1996, petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC, Cebu City, to declare the extra-judicial
foreclosure and the subsequent sale thereof to respondent bank null and void.[
On April 17, 1998, the RTC dismissed the complaint of the petitioners.
ISSUE
Whether or not the period within which the respondent bank was placed under receivership and
liquidation proceedings may be considered a fortuitous event which interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period in bringing actions.
HELD
No, the period within which the respondent bank was placed under receivership and liquidation
proceedings cannot be considered a fortuitous event.
One characteristic of a fortuitous event, in a legal sense and consequently in relations to contract, is that
its occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for a party to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner.
Respondents claims that because of a fortuitous event, it was not able to exercise its right to foreclose the
mortgage on petitioners property; and that since it was banned from pursuing its business and was
placed under receivership from April 25, 1985 until August 1992, it could not foreclose the mortgage on
petitioners property within such period since foreclosure is embraced in the phrase doing business, are
without merit.
While it is true that foreclosure falls within the broad definition of doing business, that is a continuity of
commercial dealings and arrangements and contemplates to that extent, the performance of acts or words

73 !
or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to and in progressive prosecution of the
purpose and object of its organization.
It should not be considered included, however, in the acts prohibited whenever banks are prohibited from
doing business during receivership and liquidation proceedings.
This we made clear in Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank vs. Monetary Board, Central Bank of the
Philippines where we explained that:
Section 29 of the Republic Act No. 265, as amended known as the Central Bank Act, provides that when a bank is
forbidden to do business in the Philippines and placed under receivership, the person designated as receiver shall
immediately take charge of the banks assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible, collect and gather all the
assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, and represent the bank personally or through counsel
as he may retain in all actions or proceedings for or against the institution, exercising all the powers necessary for
these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank.
This is consistent with the purpose of receivership proceedings, i.e., to receive collectibles and preserve
the assets of the bank in substitution of its former management, and prevent the dissipation of its assets
to the detriment of the creditors of the bank.
When a bank is declared insolvent and placed under receivership, the Central Bank, through the
Monetary Board, determines whether to proceed with the liquidation or reorganization of the financially
distressed bank. A receiver, who concurrently represents the bank, then takes control and possession of its
assets for the benefit of the banks creditors. A liquidator meanwhile assumes the role of the receiver upon
the determination by the Monetary Board that the bank can no longer resume business. His task is to
dispose of all the assets of the bank and effect partial payments of the banks obligations in accordance
with legal priority. In both receivership and liquidation proceedings, the bank retains its juridical
personality notwithstanding the closure of its business and may even be sued as its corporate existence is
assumed by the receiver or liquidator. The receiver or liquidator meanwhile acts not only for the benefit
of the bank, but for its creditors as well.
In Provident Savings Bank vs. Court of Appeals, we further stated that:
When a bank is prohibited from continuing to do business by the Central Bank and a receiver is appointed for such
bank, that bank would not be able to do new business, i.e., to grant new loans or to accept new deposits. However,
the receiver of the bank is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which debts form part of the assets of the
bank. The receiver must assemble the assets and pay the obligation of the bank under receivership, and take steps to
prevent dissipation of such assets.
Accordingly, the receiver of the bank is obliged to collect pre-existing debts due to the bank, and in connection
therewith, to foreclose mortgages securing such debts. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that we also held in said case that the period during which the bank was placed under
receivership was deemed fuerza mayor which validly interrupted the prescriptive period. This is being
invoked by the respondent and was used as basis by the trial court in its decision. Contrary to the
position of the respondent and court a quo however, such ruling does not find application in the case at
bar.

74 !
A close scrutiny of the Provident case, shows that the Court arrived at said conclusion, which is an
exception to the general rule, due to the peculiar circumstances of Provident Savings Bank at the time. In
said case, we stated that:
Having arrived at the conclusion that a foreclosure is part of a banks business activity which could not have been
pursued by the receiver then because of the circumstances discussed in the Central Bank case, we are thus convinced
that the prescriptive period was legally interrupted by fuerza mayor in 1972 on account of the prohibition imposed
by the Monetary Board against petitioner from transacting business, until the directive of the Board was nullified in
1981. (Emphasis supplied.)
Further examination of the Central Bank case reveals that the circumstances of Provident Savings Bank at
the time were peculiar because after the Monetary Board issued MB Resolution No. 1766 on September
15, 1972, prohibiting it from doing business in the Philippines, the banks majority stockholders
immediately went to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which prompted the trial court to issue its
judgment dated February 20, 1974, declaring null and void the resolution and ordering the Central Bank
to desist from liquidating Provident. The decision was appealed to and affirmed by this Court in 1981.
Thus, the Superintendent of Banks, which was instructed to take charge of the assets of the bank in the
name of the Monetary Board, had no power to act as a receiver of the bank and carry out the obligations
specified in Sec. 29 of the Central Bank Act.
In this case, it is not disputed that Philippine Veterans Bank was placed under receivership by the
Monetary Board of the Central Bank by virtue of Resolution No. 364 on April 25, 1985, pursuant to
Section 29 of the Central Bank Act on insolvency of banks.
Unlike Provident Savings Bank, there was no legal prohibition imposed upon herein respondent to deter
its receiver and liquidator from performing their obligations under the law. Thus, the ruling laid down in
the Provident case cannot apply in the case at bar.
There is also no truth to respondents claim that it could not continue doing business from the period of
April 1985 to August 1992, the time it was under receivership. As correctly pointed out by petitioner,
respondent was even able to send petitioners a demand letter, through Francisco Go, on August 23, 1985
for accounts receivable in the total amount of P6,345.00 as of August 15, 1984 for the insurance premiums
advanced by respondent bank over the mortgaged property of petitioners. How it could send a demand
letter on unpaid insurance premiums and not foreclose the mortgage during the time it was prohibited
from doing business was not adequately explained by respondent.
Settled is the principle that a bank is bound by the acts, or failure to act of its receiver. As we held in
Philippine Veterans Bank vs. NLRC, a labor case which also involved respondent bank,
all the acts of the receiver and liquidator pertain to petitioner, both having assumed petitioners corporate existence.
Petitioner cannot disclaim liability by arguing that the non-payment of MOLINAs just wages was committed by
the liquidators during the liquidation period.
However, the bank may go after the receiver who is liable to it for any culpable or negligent failure to
collect the assets of such bank and to safeguard its assets.

75 !
Chavez vs. CA
G.R. No. 174356
January 20, 2010
Abad, J.
FACTS
Respondent Fidela Y. Vargas owned a five-hectare mixed coconut land and rice fields in Sorsogon.
Petitioner Evelina G. Chavez had been staying in a remote portion of the land with her family, planting
coconut seedlings on the land and supervising the harvest of coconut and palay. Fidela and Evelina
agreed to divide the gross sales of all products from the land between themselves. Since Fidela was busy
with her law practice, Evelina undertook to hold in trust for Fidela her half of the profits.
But Fidela claimed that Evelina had failed to remit her share of the profits and, despite demand to turn
over the administration of the property to Fidela, had refused to do so. Consequently, Fidela filed a
complaint against Evelina and her daughter, Aida C. Deles, who was assisting her mother, for recovery of
possession, rent, and damages with prayer for the immediate appointment of a receiver before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan, Sorsogon.
In their answer, Evelina and Aida claimed that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case since it actually involved an agrarian dispute.
After hearing, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
On April 12, 2006 the CA granted the motion and ordained receivership of the land.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in granting respondent Fidela's application for receivership.
HELD
Yes, the CA erred in granting respondent Fidela's application for receivership.
For one thing, a petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially
injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the prevention of imminent danger to the
property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy is not receivership.
Here Fidela's main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the land's produce. She
does not claim that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a
receiver. Nor does Fidela claim that the land has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and
preservation. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations,
Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she has not. Indeed, in none of the other cases she filed
against Evelina and Aida has that remedy been granted her.
Besides, the RTC dismissed Fidela's action for lack of jurisdiction over the case, holding that the issues it
raised properly belong to the DARAB. The case before the CA is but an offshoot of that RTC case. Given
that the RTC has found that it had no jurisdiction over the case, it would seem more prudent for the CA to
first provisionally determine that the RTC had jurisdiction before granting receivership which is but an
incident of the main action.

76 !
Koruga vs. Arcenas

G.R. Nos. 168332, 169053
June 19, 2009
Nachura, J.
FACTS
G.R. No. 186332
Koruga is a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank. On August 20, 2003, she
filed a complaint before the Makati RTC. Korugas complaint alleged among others “violation of Sections
31 to 34 of the Corporation Code (Code) which prohibit self-dealing and conflicts of interest of directors
and officers”.

On September 12, 2003, Arcenas, et al. filed their Answer raising, among others, the trial courts lack of
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. They also filed a Manifestation and Motion seeking the
dismissal of the case on the following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; (c) forum-shopping; and (d) for being a nuisance/
harassment suit. They then moved that the trial court rule on their affirmative defenses, dismiss the intra-
corporate case, and set the case for preliminary hearing.

In an Order dated October 18, 2004, the trial court denied the Manifestation and Motion,
On February 9, 2005, the CA issued a 60-day TRO enjoining Judge Marella from conducting further
proceedings in the case.

On February 22, 2005, the RTC issued a Notice of Pre-trial setting the case for pre-trial on June 2 and 9,
2005. Arcenas, et al. filed a Manifestation and Motion before the CA, reiterating their application for a
writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, on April 18, 2005, the CA issued the assailed Resolution.

Dissatisfied, Koruga filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Meanwhile, on March 13, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution granting the prayer for a TRO and
enjoining the Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 138, from proceeding with the hearing of the case
upon the filing by Arcenas, et al. of a P50,000.00 bond. Koruga filed a motion to lift the TRO, which this
Court denied on July 5, 2006.

G.R. No. 169053
In their Petition, Arcenas, et al. asked the Court to set aside the Decision dated July 20, 2005 of the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 88422, which denied their petition, having found no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Makati RTC.

Meanwhile, in a Manifestation and Motion filed on August 31, 2005, Koruga prayed for, among others,
the consolidation of her Petition with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by
Arcenas, et al., docketed as G.R. No. 169053. The motion was granted by this Court in a Resolution dated
September 26, 2005.
ISSUE
Whether or not the regular courts have jurisdiction in issuing an order of receivership with regards to
banks.

77 !
HELD
No, regular courts have jurisdiction as this is lodged to the Monetary Board.

Consequently, it is not the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, or Rule 59 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure on Receivership, that would apply to this case. Instead, Sections 29 and 30 of the
New Central Bank Act should be followed, viz.:

Section 29. Appointment of Conservator. - Whenever, on the basis of a report submitted by the appropriate
supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or a quasi-bank is in a state of
continuing inability or unwillingness to maintain a condition of liquidity deemed adequate to protect the interest of
depositors and creditors, the Monetary Board may appoint a conservator with such powers as the Monetary Board
shall deem necessary to take charge of the assets, liabilities, and the management thereof, reorganize the
management, collect all monies and debts due said institution, and exercise all powers necessary to restore its
viability. The conservator shall report and be responsible to the Monetary Board and shall have the power to overrule
or revoke the actions of the previous management and board of directors of the bank or quasi-bank.

xxxx

The Monetary Board shall terminate the conservatorship when it is satisfied that the institution can continue to
operate on its own and the conservatorship is no longer necessary. The conservatorship shall likewise be terminated
should the Monetary Board, on the basis of the report of the conservator or of its own findings, determine that the
continuance in business of the institution would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, in which case the
provisions of Section 30 shall apply.

Section 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. - Whenever, upon report of the head of the supervising or
examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank:

(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business: Provided, That this shall not
include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic in the banking community;

(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its liabilities; or

(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or creditors; or

(d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final, involving acts or
transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution; in which cases, the Monetary
Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the
Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking institution.

xxxx
The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and
executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the
action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of
the capital stock within ten (10) days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing
receivership, liquidation or conservatorship.

78 !
The designation of a conservator under Section 29 of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board. Furthermore, the designation of a conservator is not a
precondition to the designation of a receiver.

On the strength of these provisions, it is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
proceedings for receivership of banks.

Crystal clear in Section 30 is the provision that says the appointment of a receiver under this section shall
be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board. The term exclusively connotes that only the Monetary
Board can resolve the issue of whether a bank is to be placed under receivership and, upon an affirmative
finding, it also has authority to appoint a receiver. This is further affirmed by the fact that the law allows
the Monetary Board to take action summarily and without need for prior hearing.

And, as a clincher, the law explicitly provides that actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section
or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the
court except on a petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or
with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a
suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership.

79 !
Tantano vs. Espina-Caboverde

G.R. No. 203585
July 29, 2013
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS
Petitioners Mila Caboverde Tantano (Mila) and Roseller Caboverde (Roseller) are children of respondent
Dominalda Espina-Caboverde (Dominalda) and siblings of other respondents in this case, namely: Eve
Caboverde-Yu (Eve), Fe Caboverde-Labrador (Fe), and Josephine E. Caboverde (Josephine).
Petitioners and their siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna, are the registered owners and in possession
of certain parcels of land, identified as Lots 2, 3 and 4 located at Bantayan, Sindangan and Poblacion,
Sindangan in Zamboanga del Norte, having purchased them from their parents, Maximo and Dominalda
Caboverde.
The present controversy started when on March 7, 2005, respondents Eve and Fe filed a complaint before
the RTC of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte where they prayed for the annulment of the Deed of Sale
purportedly transferring Lots 2, 3 and 4 from their parents Maximo and Dominalda in favor of
petitioners.
In their verified Answer, the defendants therein, including Maximo and Dominalda, posited the validity
and due execution of the contested Deed of Sale.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. S-760, Maximo died. On May 30, 2007, Eve and Fe filed an
Amended Complaint with Maximo substituted by his eight (8) children and his wife Dominalda. The
Amended Complaint reproduced the allegations in the original complaint but added eight (8) more real
properties of the Caboverde estate in the original list.
As encouraged by the RTC, the parties executed a Partial Settlement Agreement (PSA) where they fixed
the sharing of the uncontroverted properties among themselves, in particular, the adverted additional
eight (8) parcels of land including their respective products and improvements. Under the PSA,
Dominalda’s daughter, Josephine, shall be appointed as Administrator. The PSA provided that
Dominalda shall be entitled to receive a share of one-half (1/2) of the net income derived from the
uncontroverted properties. The PSA also provided that Josephine shall have special authority, among
others, to provide for the medicine of her mother.
The parties submitted the PSA to the court on or about March 10, 2008 for approval.
Before the RTC could act on the PSA, Dominalda, who, despite being impleaded in the case as defendant,
filed a Motion to Intervene separately in the case. Mainly, she claimed that the verified Answer which she
filed with her co-defendants contained several material averments which were not representative of the
true events and facts of the case. This document, she added, was never explained to her or even read to
her when it was presented to her for her signature.
On May 12, 2008, Dominalda filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer, attaching her
Amended Answer where she contradicted the contents of the aforesaid verified Answer. In sum,
Dominalda prayed that the reliefs asked for in the Amended Complaint be granted with the modification
that her conjugal share and share as intestate heir of Maximo over the contested properties be recognized.

80 !
On May 13, 2008, the court approved the PSA, leaving three (3) contested properties, Lots 2, 3, and 4, for
further proceedings in the main case.
Fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, Dominalda filed with the RTC on July 15,
2008 a Verified Urgent Petition/Application to place the controverted Lots 2, 3 and 4 under receivership.
On February 8, 2010, the trial court issued a Resolution granting Dominalda’s application for receivership
over Lot Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
In the same Resolution, the trial court again noted that Mila, the nominee of petitioners, could not
discharge the duties of a receiver, she being a party in the case. Thus, Dominalda nominated her
husband’s relative, Annabelle Saldia, while Eve nominated a former barangay kagawad, Jesus Tan.
The CA affirmed the order of receivership.
ISSUE
(1)Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the appointment of a receiver
despite clear showing that the reasons advanced by the applicant are not any of those enumerated by the
rules; and
(2) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Resolution of the RTC
and ruling that the receivership bond is not required prior to appointment despite clear dictates of the
rules.
HELD
(1)The order of receivership is not valid.
We have repeatedly held that receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost circumspection
and only in extreme situations. The doctrinal pronouncement in Velasco & Co. v. Gochico & Co is
instructive:
The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme caution and only under
circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, lest the
injury thereby caused be far greater than the injury sought to be averted. The court should consider the
consequences to all of the parties and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable
injustice or injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of others
whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the court as those of the complainant.
To recall, the RTC approved the application for receivership on the stated rationale that receivership was
the most convenient and feasible means to preserve and administer the disputed properties. As a
corollary, the RTC, agreeing with the applicant Dominalda, held that placing the disputed properties
under receivership would ensure that she would receive her share in the income which she supposedly
needed in order to pay for her vitamins, medicines, her regular check-ups and daily sustenance.
Considering that, as the CA put it, the applicant was already an octogenarian who may not live up to the
day when the conflict will be finally settled, the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the application for receivership since it was
justified under Sec. 1(d), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, which states:

81 !
Section 1. Appointment of a receiver. – Upon a verified application, one or more receivers of the property subject of
the action or proceeding may be appointed by the court where the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or by
the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the following cases:
xxxx
(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and feasible means
of preserving, administering, or disposing of the property in litigation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, Sec. 1(d) above is couched in general terms and broad in scope, encompassing instances not
covered by the other grounds enumerated under the said section. However, in granting applications for
receivership on the basis of this section, courts must remain mindful of the basic principle that
receivership may be granted only when the circumstances so demand, either because the property sought
to be placed in the hands of a receiver is in danger of being lost or because they run the risk of being
impaired, and that being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be granted only when there is a
clear showing of necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave and immediate loss or damage.
Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the injury resulting from such
appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and
(2) whether or not the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a
consideration from the court as those of the person requesting for receivership.
Moreover, this Court has consistently ruled that where the effect of the appointment of a receiver is to
take real estate out of the possession of the defendant before the final adjudication of the rights of the
parties, the appointment should be made only in extreme cases.
After carefully considering the foregoing principles and the facts and circumstances of this case, We find
that the grant of Dominalda’s Application for Receivership has no leg to stand on for reasons discussed
below.
First, Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a valid
justification for the appointment of a receiver. The approval of an application for receivership merely on
this ground is not only unwarranted but also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial need
and like reasons are not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which prescribes specific grounds or reasons for
granting receivership. The RTC’s insistence that the approval of the receivership is justified under Sec.
1(d) of Rule 59, which seems to be a catch-all provision, is far from convincing. To be clear, even in cases
falling under such provision, it is essential that there is a clear showing that there is imminent danger that
the properties sought to be placed under receivership will be lost, wasted or injured.
Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially
impaired and that placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible means to preserve,
administer or dispose of them.
Based on the allegations in her application, it appears that Dominalda sought receivership mainly
because she considers this the best remedy to ensure that she would receive her share in the income of the
disputed properties. Much emphasis has been placed on the fact that she needed this income for her
medical expenses and daily sustenance. But it can be gleaned from her application that, aside from her
bare assertion that petitioner Mila solely appropriated the fruits and rentals earned from the disputed
properties in connivance with some of her siblings, Dominalda has not presented or alleged anything else

82 !
to prove that the disputed properties were in danger of being wasted or materially injured and that the
appointment of a receiver was the most convenient and feasible means to preserve their integrity.
Further, there is nothing in the RTC’s February 8 and July 19, 2010 Resolutions that says why the disputed
properties might be in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured while in the hands of the
defendants a quo. Neither did the RTC explain the reasons which compelled it to have them placed under
receivership. The RTC simply declared that placing the disputed properties under receivership was
urgent and merely anchored its approval on the fact that Dominalda was an elderly in need of funds for
her medication and sustenance. The RTC plainly concluded that since the purpose of the receivership is to
procure money from the proceeds of these properties to spend for medicines and other needs of the
Dominalda, who is old and sickly, this circumstance falls within the purview of Sec. 1(d).
Verily, the RTC’s purported determination that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and
feasible means of preserving, administering or disposing of the properties is nothing but a hollow
conclusion drawn from inexistent factual considerations.
Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is not necessary to save Dominalda from grave
and immediate loss or irremediable damage. Contrary to her assertions, Dominalda is assured of
receiving income under the PSA approved by the RTC providing that she was entitled to receive a share
of one-half (1/2) of the net income derived from the uncontroverted properties. Pursuant to the PSA,
Josephine, the daughter of Dominalda, was appointed by the court as administrator of the eight (8)
uncontested lots with special authority to provide for the medicine of her mother. Thus, it was patently
erroneous for the RTC to grant the Application for Receivership in order to ensure Dominalda of income
to support herself because precisely, the PSA already provided for that. It cannot be over-emphasized that
the parties in Civil Case No. S-760 were willing to make arrangements to ensure that Dominalda was
provided with sufficient income. In fact, the RTC, in its February 8, 2010 Resolution granting the
Application for Receivership, noted the agreement of the parties that "Dominalda Espina Caboverde shall
be given 2/10 shares of the net monthly income and products of said properties."
Finally, it must be noted that the defendants in Civil Case No. S-760 are the registered owners of the
disputed properties that were in their possession. In cases such as this, it is settled jurisprudence that the
appointment should be made only in extreme cases and on a clear showing of necessity in order to save
the plaintiff from grave and irremediable loss or damage.
This Court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in possession of the
property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued to transfer property in
litigation from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party
having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of evident usurpation.
Furthermore, this Court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not proper when the rights of
the parties, one of whom is in possession of the property, depend on the determination of their respective
claims to the title of such property unless such property is in danger of being materially injured or lost, as
by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage on it or its portions are being occupied by third persons
claiming adverse title.
It must be underscored that in this case, Dominalda’s claim to the disputed properties and her share in
the properties’ income and produce is at best speculative precisely because the ownership of the disputed
properties is yet to be determined in Civil Case No. S-760. Also, except for Dominalda’s claim that she has
an interest in the disputed properties, Dominalda has no relation to their produce or income.

83 !
By placing the disputed properties and their income under receivership, it is as if the applicant has
obtained indirectly what she could not obtain directly, which is to deprive the other parties of the
possession of the property until the controversy between them in the main case is finally settled. This
Court cannot countenance this arrangement.
To reiterate, the RTC’s approval of the application for receivership and the deprivation of petitioners of
possession over the disputed properties would be justified only if compelling reasons exist.
Unfortunately, no such reasons were alleged, much less proved in this case.
In any event, Dominalda’s rights may be amply protected during the pendency of Civil Case No. S-760 by
causing her adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title covering the disputed properties.
(2) No, as bond is a mandatory requirement.
Respondents Eve and Fe claim that there are sufficient grounds for the appointment of receivers in this
case and that in fact, petitioners agreed with them on the existence of these grounds when they
acquiesced to Dominalda’s Application for Receivership. Thus, respondents insist that where there is
sufficient cause to appoint a receiver, there is no need for an applicant’s bond because under Sec. 2 of Rule
59, the very purpose of the bond is to answer for all damages that may be sustained by a party by reason
of the appointment of a receiver in case the applicant shall have procured such appointment without
sufficient cause. Thus, they further argue that what is needed is the receiver’s bond which was already
fixed and approved by the RTC. Also, the CA found that there was no need for Dominalda to file a bond
considering that petitioners filed a Manifestation where they formally consented to the receivership.
Hence, it was as if petitioners agreed that there was sufficient cause to place the disputed properties
under receivership; thus, the CA declared that petitioners were estopped from challenging the sufficiency
of such cause.
The foregoing arguments are misplaced. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order
appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against
whom the application is presented. The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the
consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing
of an applicant’s bond is required at all times.


84 !
D. Replevin
Orosa vs. CA G.R. No. 111080 April 5, 2000 Ynares-Santiago, J. When writ may
issue
Smart G.R. Nos. 148132, January 28, 2008 Nachura, J. When writ may
Communications 151079, 151372 issue -jurisdiction
vs. Astorga
Hao vs. Andres A.M. No. June 18, 2008 Quisumbing, J. Duties of the
P-07-2384 sheriff
Navarro vs. G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009 Brion, J. When writ may
Escobido issue - demand to
the adverse party
not needed
Agner vs. BPI G.R. No. 182963 June 3, 2013 Peralta, J. When writ may
Family Savings issue - demand to
Bank the adverse party
not needed

85 !
Orosa vs. CA
G.R. No. 111080
April 5, 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS
On December 6, 1984, private respondent FCP Credit Corporation filed a complaint for replevin and
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner Jose S. Orosa and one John Doe to
recover possession of a 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan with Motor and Serial No. SUNKBT-14584.
The complaint alleged that on September 28, 1983, petitioner purchased the subject motor vehicle on
installment from Fiesta Motor Sales Corporation. He executed and delivered to Fiesta Motor Sales Corp. a
promissory note in the sum of P133,824.00 payable in monthly installments To secure payment, petitioner
executed a chattel mortgage over the subject motor vehicle in favor of Fiesta Motor Sales Corp.
On September 28, 1983, Fiesta Motor Sales assigned the promissory note and chattel mortgage to private
respondent FCP Credit Corporation. The complaint further alleged that petitioner failed to pay part of the
installment which fell due on July 28, 1984 as well as three (3) consecutive installments which fell due on
August 28, September 28, and October 28, 1984.
The lower court dismissed private respondent's complaint in a Decision
Ruling on petitioner's counterclaim, the trial court stated that there was no legal or factual basis for the
writ of replevin and that its enforcement by the sheriff was "highly irregular, and unlawful, done, as it
was, under shades of extortion, threats and force.”
Meanwhile, in private respondent's appeal, the Court of Appeals' Eighth Division partially affirmed the
ruling of the trial court, with the following modifications:
(1) The award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is DELETED;
(2) The order directing plaintiff-appellant FCP Credit Corporation to return to defendant-appellee Jose S.
Orosa the subject 1983 Ford Laser Sedan, with Motor and Serial No. SUNKBT-14584, its equivalent, in
kind or value in cash, as of 25 March 1988, and to pay the costs is DELETED; and;
(3) Plaintiff-appellant FCP Credit Corporation is ordered to pay defendant-appellee Jose S. Orosa the
amount equivalent to the value of the fourteen (14) monthly installments made by the latter to the former
on the subject motor vehicle, with interest from the time of filing of the complaint or from 6 December
1984.
ISSUES
(1) The Hon. Court of Appeals (former Eighth Division) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it
reversed a final decision dated September 9, 1988, of a co-equal division of the Hon. Court of Appeals
(Special First Division) promulgated in CA G.R. No. 14938, and which was sustained by the Hon.
Supreme Court in a final decision promulgated in G.R. No. 84979 dated November 6, 1989 which cases
have the same causes of action, same set of facts, the same parties and the same relief. novero
(2) The Hon. Court of Appeals (former Eighth Division) acted with grave abuse of discretion and
authority when it considered causes of actions not allege in the complaint and which were raised for the
first time on appeal in deciding this case.

86 !
HELD
(1)CA acted with jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is simply the power or authority to hear a case. The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals to review decisions and orders of lower courts is conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. More
importantly, petitioner cannot now assail the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction after having actively
participated in the appeal and after praying for affirmative relief.
Neither can petitioner argue that res judicata bars the determination of the present case. The two cases
involve different subject matters, parties and seek different reliefs. decision
The petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 14938 was for certiorari with injunction, brought by Stronghold
Insurance Company, Inc. alleging that there was grave abuse of discretion when the trial court adjudged
it liable for damages without due process, in violation of Rule 60, Section 10 in relation to Rule 57, Section
20, of the Rules of Court. The surety also questioned the propriety of the writ of execution issued by the
trial court pending appeal.
On the other hand, CA-G.R. CV No. 25929 was filed by petitioner Orosa under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court raising alleged errors of law on the part of the trial court. The subject of the appeal was the
main decision, while the subject of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 14938 was the Supplemental Decision.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14938 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 84979
did not pass on the merits of this case. It merely ruled on the issues of whether the surety, Stronghold
Insurance Co., Inc., can be held jointly and solidarily liable with plaintiff-appellant and whether
execution pending appeal is proper under the facts and circumstances of this case. Consequently, this
Court is not marinellaestopped from reviewing the conclusions reached by the court a quo. (underscoring
ours)
(2)No, no error was committed by the CA.
In its second assigned error, petitioner posits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it considered causes of actions which were raised for the first time on appeal.[15]
True, private respondent submitted issues to the Court of Appeals which were not raised in the original
complaint.
Private respondent argued that based on the provisions of the Promissory Note itself, petitioner incurred
in default since, even though there was actual payment of the installments which fell due on July 28, 1984,
as well as the three installments on August 28 to October 28, 1984, the payments were all late and
irregular.Private respondent also argued that petitioner assigned the subject car to his daughter without
the written consent of the obligee, and hence, violated the terms of the chattel mortgage. Meritorious as
these arguments are, they come too late in the day. Basic is the rule that matters not raised in the
complaint cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Contrary to petitioner's accusation, the Court of Appeals restricted the determination of the case to
matters alleged in the complaint and raised during trial. Citing jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals held
that "it would be offensive to the basic rule of fair play, justice and due process" if it considered issue
raised for the first time on appeal.

87 !
The Court of Appeals' statement that "under the terms and conditions of the chattel mortgage, defendant-
appellee Jose S. Orosa was already in default," was made only to justify the deletion of the trial court's
award of moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees, in consonance with its finding that private
respondent was motivated by a sincere belief that it had sufficient basis an acted in good faith when it
filed the claim.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred when it ordered private respondent to
return the subject car or its equivalent considering that petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase
price. Verily, to sustain the trial court's decision would amount to unjust enrichment. The Court of
Appeals was correct when it instead ordered private respondent to return, not the car itself, but only the
amount equivalent to the fourteen installments actually paid with interest.

88 !
Smart Communications vs. Astorga

G.R. Nos. 148132, 151079, 151372
January 28, 2008
Nachura, J.

FACTS
Regina M. Astorga (Astorga) was employed by respondent Smart Communications, Incorporated
(SMART) on May 8, 1997 as District Sales Manager of the Corporate Sales Marketing Group/ Fixed
Services Division (CSMG/FSD). As District Sales Manager, Astorga enjoyed additional benefits, namely,
annual performance incentive equivalent to 30% of her annual gross salary, a group life and
hospitalization insurance coverage, and a car plan in the amount of P455,000.00.

In February 1998, SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations.
This was made known to the employees on February 27, 1998. Part of the reorganization was the
outsourcing of the marketing and sales force. Thus, SMART entered into a joint venture agreement with
NTT of Japan, and formed SMART-NTT Multimedia, Incorporated (SNMI). Since SNMI was formed to do
the sales and marketing work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD, Astorgas division.

To soften the blow of the realignment, SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG personnel who would be
recommended by SMART. SMART then conducted a performance evaluation of CSMG personnel and
those who garnered the highest ratings were favorably recommended to SNMI. Astorga landed last in the
performance evaluation, thus, she was not recommended by SMART.

Despite the abolition of the CSMG/FSD, Astorga continued reporting for work. But on March 3, 1998,
SMART issued a memorandum advising Astorga of the termination of her employment on ground of
redundancy, effective April 3, 1998. Astorga received it on March 16, 1998.

The termination of her employment prompted Astorga to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of salaries and other benefits with prayer for moral and exemplary damages against SMART
and Ann Margaret V. Santiago (Santiago).

SMART responded that there was valid termination. It argued that Astorga was dismissed by reason of
redundancy, which is an authorized cause for termination of employment, and the dismissal was effected
in accordance with the requirements of the Labor Code.

In the meantime, on May 18, 1998, SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current
market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given to her under the companys car plan program, or
to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition. Astorga, however, failed and refused to do
either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) on
August 10, 1998. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1936 and was raffled to Branch 57.

Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of (i) lack of jurisdiction; (ii) failure to state a cause
of action; (iii) litis pendentia; and (iv) forum-shopping. Astorga posited that the regular courts have no
jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a benefit arising from an
employment contract; hence, jurisdiction over the same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in regular
courts.


89 !
On March 29, 1999, the RTC issued an Order denying Astorgas motion to dismiss the replevin case. In so
ruling.

Astorga elevated the denial of her motion via certiorari to the CA, which, in its February 28, 2000
Decision, reversed the RTC ruling. Granting the petition and, consequently, dismissing the replevin case,
the CA held that the case is intertwined with Astorgas complaint for illegal dismissal; thus, it is the labor
tribunal that has rightful jurisdiction over the complaint. SMARTs motion for reconsideration having
been denied, it elevated the case to this Court, now docketed as G.R. No. 148132.

ISSUE
Whether or the the CA is correct in dismissing the order of replevin due to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD
No, CA is not correct as the RTC has jurisdiction on the replevin case.

Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may
recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully
detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover property
in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may refer either to the
action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it,
by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency
of the action.

That the action commenced by SMART against Astorga in the RTC of Makati City was one for replevin
hardly admits of doubt.

Contrary to the CAs ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well
within its discretion in denying Astorgas motion to dismiss. SMARTs demand for payment of the market
value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves
the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such, the dispute falls
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the replevin suit,
explained:

Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought
therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory
proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of whether or not a party
has the right of possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully
taken and detained said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor
tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.

xxxx

The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The respective issues raised in
each forum can be resolved independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it
had issued an Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and
ordering the petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is properly settled under the Labor
Code. So also with petitioners right to picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to

90 !
take possession of the Vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the Charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of
that right to possess in addressed to the competence of Civil Courts.

In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by
pertinent laws.

The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when it overturned the RTC ruling and ordered the
dismissal of the replevin case for lack of jurisdiction.


91 !
Hao vs. Andres

A.M. No. P-07-2384
June 18, 2008
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS
Complainant Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for replevin docketed as Civil Case No. 31,
127-2005 entitled Zenaida Silver, doing trade and business under the name and style ZHS Commercial v.
Loreto Hao, Atty. Amado Cantos, Kenneth Hao and John Does, pending before the RTC of Davao City,
Branch 16.
On October 17, 2005, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order of Seizure against 22 motor vehicles
allegedly owned by the complainant. On the strength of the said order, Andres was able to seize two of
the subject motor vehicles on October 17, 2005; four on October 18, 2005, and another three on October 19,
2005, or a total of nine motor vehicles.
In his Affidavit-Complaint against Andres before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Hao
alleged that Andres gave undue advantage to Zenaida Silver in the implementation of the order and that
Andres seized the nine motor vehicles in an oppressive manner. Hao also averred that Andres was
accompanied by unidentified armed personnel on board a military vehicle which was excessive since
there were no resistance from them. Hao also discovered that the compound where the seized motor
vehicles were placed is actually owned by Silver.
On October 21, 2005, in view of the approval of the complainants counter-replevin bond, Judge
Emmanuel C. Carpio ordered Andres to immediately cease and desist from further implementing the
order of seizure, and to return the seized motor vehicles including its accessories to their lawful owners.
However, on October 24, 2005, eight of the nine seized motor vehicles were reported missing. In his
report, Andres stated that he was shocked to find that the motor vehicles were already missing when he
inspected it on October 22, 2005. He narrated that on October 21, 2005, PO3 Rodrigo Despe, one of the
policemen guarding the subject motor vehicles, reported to him that a certain Nonoy entered the
compound and caused the duplication of the vehicles keys. But Andres claimed the motor vehicles were
still intact when he inspected it on October 21, 2005.
Subsequently, Hao reported that three of the carnapped vehicles were recovered by the police. He then
accused Andres of conspiring and conniving with Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang (Silvers counsel) and the
policemen in the carnapping of the motor vehicles. Hao also accused Andres of concealing the depository
receipts from them and pointed out that the depository receipts show that Silver and Atty.
Macadangdang were the ones who chose the policemen who will guard the motor vehicles.
In his Comment dated March 3, 2006, Andres vehemently denied violating Rep. Act No. 3019 and
committing gross neglect of duty.
Andres denied implementing the Order of Seizure in an oppressive manner. He said he took the vehicles
because they were the specific vehicles ordered to be seized after checking their engine and chassis
numbers. Andres likewise denied that he was accompanied by military personnel in the implementation
of the order.

92 !
After the OCA recommended that the matter be investigated, we referred the case to Executive Judge
Renato A. Fuentes for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Investigation Report dated September 21, 2006, Judge Fuentes found Andres guilty of serious
negligence in the custody of the nine motor vehicles. He recommended that Andres be suspended from
office.
The OCA disagreed with the observations of Judge Fuentes. It recommended that Andres be held liable
only for simple neglect of duty and be suspended for one (1) month and one (1) day.
ISSUE
Whether or not the sheriff was faithful to his duty with regards to the order of replevin.
HELD
No, sheriff was not faithful to his duty with regards to the order of replevin.
Being an officer of the court, Andres must be aware that there are well-defined steps provided in the
Rules of Court regarding the proper implementation of a writ of replevin and/or an order of seizure. The
Rules, likewise, is explicit on the duty of the sheriff in its implementation. To recapitulate what should be
common knowledge to sheriffs, the pertinent provisions of Rule 60, of the Rules of Court are quoted
hereunder:
SEC. 4. Duty of the sheriff.Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof on the adverse party,
together with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if it be in the
possession of the adverse party, or his agent, and retain it in his custody. If the property or any part thereof be
concealed in a building or enclosure, the sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not delivered, he must cause
the building or enclosure to be broken open and take the property into his possession. After the sheriff has taken
possession of the property as herein provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for its
delivery to the party entitled thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and keeping the same.
(Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff.If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the
adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party
so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicants bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party
requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an
approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the
applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party. (Emphasis supplied.)
First, the rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to
the plaintiff. In accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in order
to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties
thereon, or require the return of the seized motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do.
Records show that Andres took possession of two of the subject motor vehicles on October 17, 2005, four
on October 18, 2005, and another three on October 19, 2005. Simultaneously, as evidenced by the
depository receipts, on October 18, 2005, Silver received from Andres six of the seized motor vehicles, and
three more motor vehicles on October 19, 2005. Consequently, there is no question that Silver was already
in possession of the nine seized vehicles immediately after seizure, or no more than three days after the

93 !
taking of the vehicles. Thus, Andres committed a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court
with regard to the proper disposal of the property.
It matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles merely for safekeeping as stated in the
depository receipts. The rule is clear that the property seized should not be immediately delivered to the
plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized property for at least five days. Hence, the act of
Andres in delivering the seized vehicles immediately after seizure to Silver for whatever purpose,
without observing the five-day requirement finds no legal justification.
Likewise, Andres claim that he had no knowledge that the compound is owned by Silver fails to convince
us. Regardless of who actually owns the compound, the fact remains that Andres delivered the vehicles to
Silver prematurely. It violates the rule requiring him to safekeep the vehicles in his custody. The alleged
lack of facility to store the seized vehicles is unacceptable considering that he should have deposited the
same in a bonded warehouse. If this was not feasible, he should have sought prior authorization from the
court issuing the writ before delivering the vehicles to Silver.
Second, it must be stressed that from the moment an order of delivery in replevin is executed by taking
possession of the property specified therein, such property is in custodia legis. As legal custodian, it is
Andres duty to safekeep the seized motor vehicles. Hence, when he passed his duty to safeguard the
motor vehicles to Silver, he committed a clear neglect of duty.
Third, we are appalled that even after PO3 Despe reported the unauthorized duplication of the vehicles
keys, Andres failed to take extra precautionary measures to ensure the safety of the vehicles. It is obvious
that the vehicles were put at risk by the unauthorized duplication of the keys of the vehicles. Neither did
he immediately report the incident to the police or to the court. The loss of the motor vehicles could have
been prevented if Andres immediately asked the court for an order to transfer the vehicles to another
secured place as soon as he discovered the unauthorized duplication. Under these circumstances, even an
ordinary prudent man would have exercised extra diligence. His warning to the policemen to closely
watch the vehicles was insufficient. Andres cannot toss back to Silver or to the policemen the
responsibility for the loss of the motor vehicles since he remains chiefly responsible for their safekeeping
as legal custodian thereof. Indeed, Andres failure to take the necessary precaution and proper monitoring
of the vehicles to ensure its safety constitutes plain negligence.
Fourth, despite the cease and desist order, Andres failed to return the motor vehicles to their lawful
owners. Instead of returning the motor vehicles immediately as directed, he opted to write Silver and
demand that she put up an indemnity bond to secure the third-party claims. Consequently, due to his
delay, the eventual loss of the motor vehicles rendered the order to return the seized vehicles ineffectual
to the prejudice of the complaining owners.
It must be stressed that as court custodian, it was Andres responsibility to ensure that the motor vehicles
were safely kept and that the same were readily available upon order of the court or demand of the
parties concerned. Specifically, sheriffs, being ranking officers of the court and agents of the law, must
discharge their duties with great care and diligence. In serving and implementing court writs, as well as
processes and orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting adversely the proper
dispensation of justice. Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents of the
law, high standards of performance are expected of them. Hence, his failure to return the motor vehicles
at the time when its return was still feasible constitutes another instance of neglect of duty.

94 !
Fifth, as found by the OCA, we agree that Andres also disregarded the provisions of Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court with regard to payment of expenses.
In view of the foregoing, there is no doubt that Andres failed to live up to the standards required of his
position. The number of instances that Andres strayed from the regular course observed in the proper
implementation of the orders of the court cannot be countenanced. Thus, taking into account the
numerous times he was found negligent and careless of his duties coupled with his utter disregard of
legal procedures, he cannot be considered guilty merely of simple negligence. His acts constitute gross
negligence.
Good faith on the part of Andres, or lack of it, in proceeding to properly execute his mandate would be of
no moment, for he is chargeable with the knowledge that being an officer of the court tasked therefor, it
behooves him to make due compliance. He is expected to live up to the exacting standards of his office
and his conduct must at all times be characterized by rectitude and forthrightness, and so above
suspicion and mistrust as well. Thus, an act of gross neglect resulting in loss of properties in custodia
legis ruins the confidence lodged by the parties to a suit or the citizenry in our judicial process. Those
responsible for such act or omission cannot escape the disciplinary power of this Court.
Anent the allegation of grave abuse of authority (oppression), we likewise agree with the observations of
the investigating judge. Records show that Andres started enforcing the writ of replevin/order of seizure
on the same day that the order of seizure was issued. He also admitted that he took the vehicles of
persons who are not parties to the replevin case. He further admitted that he took one vehicle belonging
to a certain Junard Escudero without the latters knowledge and even caused the duplication of its keys in
order that it may be taken by Andres. Certainly, these are indications that Andres enforced the order of
seizure with undue haste and without giving the complainant prior notice or reasonable time to deliver
the motor vehicles. Hence, Andres is guilty of grave abuse of authority (oppression).
When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the
contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.
However, the prompt implementation of an order of seizure is called for only in instances where there is
no question regarding the right of the plaintiff to the property. Where there is such a question, the
prudent recourse for Andres is to desist from executing the order and convey the information to his judge
and to the plaintiff.
True, sheriffs must comply with their mandated ministerial duty to implement writs promptly and
expeditiously, but equally true is the principle that sheriffs by the nature of their functions must at all
times conduct themselves with propriety and decorum and act above suspicion. There must be no room
for anyone to conjecture that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs as officers of the court have conspired with any
of the parties to a case to obtain a favorable judgment or immediate execution. The sheriff is at the front
line as representative of the judiciary and by his act he may build or destroy the institution.
However, as to the charge of graft and corruption, it must be stressed that the same is criminal in nature,
thus, the resolution thereof cannot be threshed out in the instant administrative proceeding. We also take
note that there is a pending criminal case for carnapping against Andres; hence, with more reason that we
cannot rule on the allegation of graft and corruption as it may preempt the court in its resolution of the
said case.

95 !
Navarro vs. Escobido

G.R. No. 153788
November 27, 2009
Brion, J.
FACTS
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 98-599
(first complaint) and 98-598 (second complaint), before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with
damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for
the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession.
That for the cause of action against defendant ROGER NAVARRO, it is hereby stated that on August 8,
1997, the said defendant leased [from] plaintiff a certain motor vehicle.
In accordance with the provisions of the above LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE,
defendant ROGER NAVARRO delivered unto plaintiff six (6) post-dated checks each in the amount of
SIXTY-SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE & 33/100 PESOS (₱66,333.33) which were
supposedly in payment of the agreed rentals; that when the fifth and sixth checks, i.e. PHILIPPINE
BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS – CAGAYAN DE ORO BRANCH CHECKS NOS. 017112 and 017113,
respectively dated January 8, 1998 and February 8, 1998, were presented for payment and/or credit, the
same were dishonored and/or returned by the drawee bank for the common reason that the current
deposit account against which the said checks were issued did not have sufficient funds to cover the
amounts thereof.
The second complaint contained essentially the same allegations as the first complaint, except that the
Lease Agreement with Option to Purchase involved is dated October 1, 1997 and the motor vehicle.
The second complaint also alleged that Navarro delivered three post-dated checks, each for the amount of
₱100,000.00, to Karen Go in payment of the agreed rentals; however, the third check was dishonored
when presented for payment.
On October 12, 19989 and October 14, 1998,10 the RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a result,
the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them to the possession of Karen Go.
In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause
of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively,
the lease agreements) – the actionable documents on which the complaints were based.
On Navarro’s motion, both cases were duly consolidated on December 13, 1999.
In its May 8, 2000 order, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the complaints did not state a
cause of action.
In response to the motion for reconsideration Karen Go filed dated May 26, 2000, the RTC issued another
order dated July 26, 2000 setting aside the order of dismissal. Acting on the presumption that Glenn Go’s
leasing business is a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in his leasing
business to file the action against Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen Go should have included
her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court (Rules). Thus,
the lower court ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff.

96 !
When the RTC denied Navarro’s motion for reconsideration on March 7, 2001, Navarro filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA, which the CA denied Navarro’s petition and affirmed the RTC’s order.
ISSUE
Whether or not demand is required for the order of replevin.
HELD
No, demand not required prior to filing of replevin action.
In arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of replevin is filed, Navarro
apparently likens a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.

The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession
thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under
a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is
exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as
stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be
adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in
the action.
We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor
of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition
precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
More importantly, Navarro is no longer in the position to claim that a prior demand is necessary, as he
has already admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters that Karen Go sent him, demanding
that he either pay his unpaid obligations or return the leased motor vehicles. Navarro’s position that a
demand is necessary and has not been made is therefore totally unmeritorious.

97 !
Agner vs. BPI Family Savings Bank

G.R. No. 182963
June 3, 2013
Peralta, J.
FACTS
On February 15, 2001, petitioners spouses Deo Agner and Maricon Agner executed a Promissory Note
with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citimotors, Inc. The contract provides, among others, that: for receiving
the amount of Php834, 768.00, petitioners shall pay Php 17,391.00 every 15th day of each succeeding
month until fully paid; the loan is secured by a 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport; and an interest of
6% per month shall be imposed for failure to pay each installment on or before the stated due date.
On the same day, Citimotors, Inc. assigned all its rights, title and interests in the Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage to ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc. (ABN AMRO), which, on May 31, 2002, likewise
assigned the same to respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.
For failure to pay four successive installments, respondent, through counsel, sent to petitioners a demand
letter dated August 29, 2002, declaring the entire obligation as due and demandable and requiring to pay
Php576,664.04, or surrender the mortgaged vehicle immediately upon receiving the letter. As the demand
was left unheeded, respondent filed on October 4, 2002 an action for Replevin and Damages before the
Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC).
A writ of replevin was issued. Despite this, the subject vehicle was not seized.
On August 11, 2005, the Manila RTC Br. 33 ruled for the respondent and ordered petitioners to jointly and
severally pay the amount of Php576,664.04 plus interest at the rate of 72% per annum from August 20,
2002 until fully paid, and the costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the lower court’s decision.
ISSUE
(1)Whether or not the order of replevin was proper.
(2)Whether or not the respondent’s remedy of resorting to both actions of replevin and collection of sum
of money is contrary to the provision of Article 14849 of the Civil Code and the Elisco Tool Manufacturing
Corporation v. Court of Appeals ruling.
HELD
(1)Yes, the order of replevin was valid.
Records bear that both verbal and written demands were in fact made by respondent prior to the
institution of the case against petitioners. Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that no demand letter was
sent by respondent, there is really no need for it because petitioners legally waived the necessity of notice
or demand in the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage, which they voluntarily and knowingly signed
in favor of respondent’s predecessor-in-interest. Said contract expressly stipulates:
In case of my/our failure to pay when due and payable, any sum which I/We are obliged to pay under this note and/
or any other obligation which I/We or any of us may now or in the future owe to the holder of this note or to any

98 !
other party whether as principal or guarantor x x x then the entire sum outstanding under this note shall, without
prior notice or demand, immediately become due and payable. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A provision on waiver of notice or demand has been recognized as legal and valid in Bank of the
Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals,13 wherein We held:
The Civil Code in Article 1169 provides that one incurs in delay or is in default from the time the obligor demands
the fulfillment of the obligation from the obligee. However, the law expressly provides that demand is not necessary
under certain circumstances, and one of these circumstances is when the parties expressly waive demand. Hence,
since the co-signors expressly waived demand in the promissory notes, demand was unnecessary for them to be in
default.
Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v. Escobidothat prior demand is not a condition precedent to an
action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires
the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin
could be filed.
The Court cannot yield to petitioners’ denial in receiving respondent’s demand letter. To note, their postal
address evidently remained unchanged from the time they executed the Promissory Note with Chattel
Mortgage up to time the case was filed against them. Thus, the presumption that "a letter duly directed
and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail" stands in the absence of satisfactory proof to
the contrary.
Petitioners cannot find succour from Ting v. Court of Appeals simply because it pertained to violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law. As a higher quantum of proof – that is, proof
beyond reasonable doubt – is required in view of the criminal nature of the case, We found insufficient
the mere presentation of a copy of the demand letter allegedly sent through registered mail and its
corresponding registry receipt as proof of receiving the notice of dishonor.
Perusing over the records, what is clear is that petitioners did not take advantage of all the opportunities
to present their evidence in the proceedings before the courts below. They miserably failed to produce the
original cash deposit slips proving payment of the monthly amortizations in question. Not even a
photocopy of the alleged proof of payment was appended to their Answer or shown during the trial.
Neither have they demonstrated any written requests to respondent to furnish them with official receipts
or a statement of account. Worse, petitioners were not able to make a formal offer of evidence considering
that they have not marked any documentary evidence during the presentation of Deo Agner’s testimony.
Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the
burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.
When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, proof of non-payment is not needed for it is
presumed. Respondent's possession of the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage strongly buttresses its
claim that the obligation has not been extinguished. As held in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses
Royeca:
xxx
The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been discharged by payment. A
promissory note in the hands of the creditor is a proof of indebtedness rather than proof of payment. In an action for
replevin by a mortgagee, it is prima facie evidence that the promissory note has not been paid. Likewise, an

99 !
uncanceled mortgage in the possession of the mortgagee gives rise to the presumption that the mortgage debt is
unpaid.
Indeed, when the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the
burden of proving that it has been extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such
defense to the claim of the creditor. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the
obligation has been discharged by payment.
(2)No, there is no violation of Article 1484 of the Civil Code and the Court’s decision in Elisco Tool
Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals. In that case, we ruled that:
The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are alternative, not cumulative. The exercise of one bars the exercise of the
others. This limitation applies to contracts purporting to be leases of personal property with option to buy by virtue
of Art. 1485. The condition that the lessor has deprived the lessee of possession or enjoyment of the thing for the
purpose of applying Art. 1485 was fulfilled in this case by the filing by petitioner of the complaint for replevin to
recover possession of movable property. By virtue of the writ of seizure issued by the trial court, the deputy sheriff
seized the vehicle on August 6, 1986 and thereby deprived private respondents of its use. The car was not returned
to private respondent until April 16, 1989, after two (2) years and eight (8) months, upon issuance by the Court of
Appeals of a writ of execution.
Petitioner prayed that private respondents be made to pay the sum of ₱39,054.86, the amount that they were
supposed to pay as of May 1986, plus interest at the legal rate. At the same time, it prayed for the issuance of a writ
of replevin or the delivery to it of the motor vehicle “complete with accessories and equipment." In the event the car
could not be delivered to petitioner, it was prayed that private respondent Rolando Lantan be made to pay petitioner
the amount of ₱60,000.00, the "estimated actual value" of the car, "plus accrued monthly rentals thereof with
interests at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per annum until fully paid." This prayer of course cannot be granted,
even assuming that private respondents have defaulted in the payment of their obligation. This led the trial court to
say that petitioner wanted to eat its cake and have it too.
Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to
respondent despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be
said that petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent
pursued, commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the
alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting fulfillment of the
obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of.

Pananampalataya.Pag-asa.Pag-big strengthens me.- Philippians 4:13 ! 100 of 125
!
E. Support
De Asis vs. CA G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999 Purisima, J. No compromise in
support.
People vs. G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999 Bellosillo, J. Support in
Manahan criminal cases - no
acknowledgement
if rapist is married.
Lim vs. Lim G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009 Carpio, J. Grandchildren can
ask for support
from their
grandparent if
parents cannot
sufficiently
provide.
Gotardo vs. Buling G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012 Brion, J. Support follows
proof of filiation.
Republic vs. Yahon G.R. No. 201043 June 16, 2014 Villarama, Jr., J. Automatic
deduction from
one’s retirement is
a valid means for
support.
Del Socorro vs. G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014 Peralta, J. A parent who is a
Van Wilsem foreigner has an
obligation to
provide support to
his child.
Lim-Lua vs. Lua G.R. Nos. June 5, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J. Gifts are excluded
175279-80 from support;
support is not
final.
Salas vs. G.R. No. 180284 September 11, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J. Support follows
Matusalem proof of filiation;
death of the
putative father
does not
extinguish the
action

!
De Asis vs. CA
G.R. No. 127578
February 15, 1999
Purisima, J.
FACTS
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her capacity as the legal
guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support
against Manuel de Asis, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, alleging that the
defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis,
and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated
demands.
In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot therefore be
required to provide support for him.
On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through counsel, sent in a manifestation the
pertinent portion of which, reads;
3. That under the foregoing circumstances it would be more practical that plaintiff withdraws the complaint against
the defendant subject to the condition that the defendant should not pursue his counterclaim in the above-entitled
case, xxx.
By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to move for the dismissal
of the case. Acting thereupon, the Regional Trial Court a quo issued the following Order of August 8,
1989, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-88-935 with prejudice.
On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A.
de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother,
Vircel D. Andres. Docketed as Civil Case No. C-16107 before Branch 130 of the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan.
On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata, alleging
that Civil Case C-16107 is barred by the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case
Q-88-935.
Both the RTC and CA denied the motion to dismiss
ISSUE
Whether or not the order of support in this case shall be dismissed due to res judicata.
HELD
No, res judicature cannot be invoked in the case of support.
The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the
Civil Code, the law in point, reads:
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can
it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. xxx

!
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.
Article 2035, ibid, provides, that:
No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
The raison d etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the
right to support is stated, thus:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not
entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life
itself. The right to life cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is the means to attain the former,
cannot be renounced.
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is

virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to
public policy.
In the case at bar, respondent minors mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she
was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity
over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation between the
minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such manifestation admitting
the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for
support.
The manifestation sent in by respondents mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would be
useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that
gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner.
Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondents mother for the
dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the
counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition
against any compromise of the right to support.
Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged in a motion of the husband, in
which the latter prayed that his obligation to support be extinguished cannot be considered as an assent
to the prayer, and much less, as a waiver of the right to claim for support.
It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the
claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that
must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to
the will or agreement of the parties.

!
The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is
derived being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative
declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause.
Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the respondent, such an
admission is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
Neither are we persuaded by petitioners theory that the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935
has the effect of res judicata on the subsequent case for support.
The case of Advincula vs. Advinculacomes to the fore. In Advincula, the minor, Manuela Advincula,
instituted a case for acknowledgment and support against her putative father, Manuel Advincula. On
motion of both parties and for the reason that the plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer interested in
continuing the case against the defendant and has no further evidence to introduce in support of the
complaint, the case was dismissed. Thereafter, a similar case was instituted by Manuela, which the
defendant moved to dismiss, theorizing that the dismissal of the first case precluded the filing of the
second case.
In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:

The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the amount may be increased or
decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to
receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person; neither can it be compensated with
what the recipient owes the obligator (Art. 301). Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or transferred
to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of compromise.
This being true, it is indisputable that the present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the
previous case filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And it also appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the right of herein plaintiff-appellant to
reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise,
she has the right to bring an action for support, for it is only then that her cause of action accrues.xxx
xxx
It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it
does the civil status of persons and future support, cannot be the subject of compromise. (pars. 1 & 4, Art.
2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing of
another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant.(emphasis supplied)
Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case 88-935 and the lower courts pronouncement
that such dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper.

!
People vs. Manahan

G.R. No. 128157
September 29, 1999
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS
MANUEL MANAHAN alias Maning was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death by the court a quo.
He was also ordered to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages, pay the costs, and
acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. This case is now before us on automatic
review.
Complainant Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, worked at the Espiritu Canteen in Dagupan City. As a stay-in
waitress she slept at the second floor of the canteen. Manuel Manahan is the brother-in-law of Josefina
Espiritu, owner of the canteen. His wife Primadonna is the sister of Josefina Espiritu. Manuel and
Primadonna temporarily reside at the canteen together with the family of Josefina as Primadonna was
then pregnant.
On 5 January 1995, at about two oclock in the morning, Teresita who was asleep was suddenly awakened
when she felt someone beside her. Upon opening her eyes she saw accused Manuel Manahan as he
immediately placed himself on top of her. She tried to shout but the accused covered her mouth. He then
forcibly spread her legs. She cried; she pushed and kicked him many times in an effort to free herself but
the accused proved too strong for her. Soon enough she became weary and exhausted. Her condition
enabled the accused to pursue his immoral intentions. He lifted her skirt, removed her panty and then
inserted his penis into her vagina. He succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After satisfying his
lust, the accused warned the victim not to report the incident to anyone and threatened her that should
she squeal he would kill her and her family. Thereafter, he left her. She was terribly afraid and shaken and
could do nothing but cry until dawn.
Within the month Teresita left the canteen and returned home to her parents in Mangaldan, Pangasinan.
The sexual encounter resulted in her pregnancy. When her parents discovered it and learned of her story,
they brought her to the hospital where she was examined by Dr. Casimero Bacugan. From there they
proceeded to the police station where a statement of Teresita was taken by SPO1 Isagani L. Ico. Police
Chief Inspector Wendy G. Rosario later endorsed the complaining witness to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Dagupan City for appropriate legal action. Thereafter, with the assistance of her mother,
Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing Manuel Manahan alias Maning of rape.
Meanwhile, on 2 October 1995, she gave birth to a healthy baby girl and christened her Melanie Tibigar.
Accused Manuel Manahan has a different story. He denied having raped Teresita. He claimed they were
lovers. According to him, he met Teresita at the Espiritu Canteen in August 1994 and began courting her.
Subsequently, they became sweethearts and their first sexual intercourse occurred on 27 December 1994
followed by another on 28 December 1994. In the first week of January 1995 they again had a tryst in the
house of Teresitas Aunt Fely, their last intercourse being on 7 May 1995 in the house of one Maura
Manahan-Quinto, his sister.
We have painstakingly reviewed the records and we sustain the conviction of the accused. The
prosecution for rape almost always involves sharply contrasting and irreconcilable declarations of the
victim and the accused. At the heart of almost all rape cases is the issue of credibility of the witnesses, to
be resolved primarily by the trial court which is in a better position to decide the question, having heard
the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Accordingly, its findings are

!
entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any
showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight or substance which would otherwise affect the result of the case. The exception is nowhere
perceivable in the present case.
The accused banks heavily on his "sweetheart theory," a usual defense in rape cases, and vigorously
maintains that the sexual intercourse between him and Teresita was but the culmination of a mutual
passion. But we find otherwise primarily because the accused miserably failed to prove that he and the
complaining witness indeed had a romantic liaison as this claim was categorically denied by her.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the accused and the victim were really lovers, that fact alone
would not negate the commission of rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will.
Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ violence upon
her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.
Equally untenable is the accused's contention that there can be no rape since the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the element of intimidation. One of the modes of committing the crime of
rape is by having carnal knowledge of a woman using force and intimidation. Even if we concede the
absence of intimidation in this case, the fact remains that the accused employed force against his victim.
Thus, testifying in a clear, definitive and convincing manner as concluded by the trial court, Teresita
established beyond any scintilla of doubt the presence of force essential in rape.
ISSUE
Whether or not the rapist can be sentence for acknowledgement of the offspring and providing for
support.
HELD
No, only for support but not for acknowledgement of the offspring.
On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a quo is
in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be
sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in
every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory acknowledgment of the child
Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is
a married man.
As pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero, "the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he
cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly
deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance
with law.

!
Lim vs. Lim

G.R. No. 163209
October 30, 2009
Carpio, J.
FACTS
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl
bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward
and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards
ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards family business,
which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no
steady source of income.

On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all
minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua
Giak in what the trial court described a very compromising situation.

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered
Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.
The trial court rendered judgment wherein petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with
Edward because of the latters inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x.

In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

HELD
Yes, petitioners are concurrently liable.

Petitioners Liable to Provide Support but only to their Grandchildren
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their
descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the narrow
question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX
of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated
only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the
childrens minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latters
offspring ends with them.

Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the scope
of familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the governing text are the relevant provisions in
Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority.
While both areas share a common ground in that parental authority encompasses the obligation to
provide legal support, they differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and its
concurrence among relatives of differing degrees.

!
Thus, although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the
emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts
during the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental
rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation
to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the
latters inability to provide sufficient support. As we observed in another case raising the ancillary issue of
an ascendants obligation to give support in light of the fathers sufficient means:

Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This
is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. We agree with this view.
xxxx

There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to
prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal
support. x x x (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)

Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward
is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This
inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation
to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the
ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction the
anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to
give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed,
Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from
their marital bond. Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of monthly support the trial court
awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial
court for this limited purpose.


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Gotardo vs. Buling

G.R. No. 165166
August 15, 2012
Brion, J.
FACTS
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that
the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze.
In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the parties’ failure to amicably
settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the respondent
showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual employee, while the
petitioner worked as accounting supervisor. The petitioner started courting the respondent in the third
week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. The petitioner
gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, such as on Valentine’s Day and her birthday; she
reciprocated his love and took care of him when he was ill.
Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent in the
former’s rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle, on Tomas
Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte. The petitioner rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August
30, 1994. The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June 1994;
eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was pregnant. When told of the
pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the respondent. They in fact applied for a
marriage license. The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a wedding reception and the bridal
gown. Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out of the wedding plans.
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern
Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the petitioner
and the respondent amicably settled the case.
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up and
failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding
recognition of and support for their child. When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the
respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed paternity, claiming
that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not
have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy
on September 15, 1994.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation.
The CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, concluding that the latter
merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioner’s counsel.

!
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTC’s findings and ordered the
petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze.
HELD
No, there was no error on the part of the CA.
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also
to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or
inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative father
is the biological father of the child."
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We
have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission
by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.”
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support
his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on
the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged
to support.
In this case, we sustain the award of ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice to the filing of
the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears, considering the needs of
the child, Gliffze, during the pendency of this case.

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Republic vs. Yahon

G.R. No. 201043
June 16, 2014
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted personnel
of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were married on June
8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in
partner.
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO.
S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with copy of the TPO, appeared during the scheduled pre-
trial but informed the court that he did not yet have a counsel and requested for time to hire his own
counsel. However, he did not hire a counsel nor file an opposition or answer to the petition. Because of
his failure to appear in the subsequent hearings of the case, the RTC allowed the ex-parte presentation of
evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO).
Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately refused to give
her spousal support as directed in the TPO (she claimed that she had no source of livelihood since he had
told her to resign from her job and concentrate on keeping their house), the RTC issued another order
directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give respondent spousal support in the amount of ₱4,000.00 per month and fifty
percent (50%) of his retirement benefits which shall be automatically deducted and given directly to
respondent.
In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt. Yahon never complied with the TPO as he continued
making threats and inflicting physical abuse on her person, and failed to give her spousal support as
ordered by the court.
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision, allowing the permanency of the TPO.
Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), assisted by the Office of the
Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), AFP, filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion (To Lift
Temporary Protection Order Against the AFP) dated November 10, 2008.
Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged its obligation under the TPO, the RTC had
not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of summons, and hence the AFPFC
cannot be bound by the said court order. Additionally, petitioner contended that the AFPFC is not a party-
in-interest and is a complete stranger to the proceedings before the RTC on the issuance of TPO/PPO.
Not being impleaded in the case, petitioner lamented that it was not afforded due process and it was thus
improper to issue execution against the AFPFC.
In its Order dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the aforesaid motion.

Pananampalataya.Pag-asa.Pag-big strengthens me.- Philippians 4:13 ! 111 of !125
On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the assailed
orders and decision of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from
the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the latter’s lawful wife as
spousal support in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
HELD
Yes, petitioner can be ordered such.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC’s directive for the automatic deduction of 50% from
S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as it contravenes an
explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement and separation of military personnel.
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638, which states:
Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment,
garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third
person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under this
Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty
per centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this
Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.)
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the "Government Service Insurance
System Act of 1997," which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x x

xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the
benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by
the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances
and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or
occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection
with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.
In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that a court order directing the Philippine National
Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half of such
monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latter’s conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it violates Section 26
of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement benefits from execution.

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The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
which governs execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39 enumerates those
properties which are exempt from execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution.– Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property,
and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
xxxx
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity
from the Government;(Emphasis supplied.)
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. However, if
several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment. The later law is
the latest expression of the legislative will.
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down
an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law
itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman
"[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahon’s
retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys remain as public funds, citing the case of Pacific
Products v. Ong.
We disagree.
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage the
military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement
legislation. In the United States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act allow garnishment of
certain federal funds where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support.
As these provisions were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity problems" and provide that "moneys
payable by the Government to any individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings," the
law is clearly intended to "create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue
valid orders directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession."
This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal protection
clause. In Garcia v. Drilon the issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after the latter failed to
obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a protection order issued against him by
the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the classification
under the law: the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice against women.
We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law, viz:

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The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.– It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children
in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address one form of violence
committed against women – economic abuse.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes,
but is not limited to the following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as
defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community or property owned in common;
3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.
The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who are
victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats to their personal
safety and security.
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary
custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.”

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Del Socorro vs. Van Wilsem

G.R. No. 193707
December 10, 2014
Peralta, J.
FACTS
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage
in Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to
the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since
then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree
Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. To date, all the parties,
including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for
the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal
case.
ISSUES
(1)Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law.
(2)Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.
HELD
(1)Yes, a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the
legal obligation to support exists.
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil
Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil
Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned,
specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By

!
analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with
respect to family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to
the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does
not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national
of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.
While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well
as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter
of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is
notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s
allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his
child is specifically stated, which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that
parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said
law would still not find applicability, in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American
Realty Corporation, to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

!
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

—If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied
when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the
most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his
child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former
wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties
and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and
(i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son,
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered
an act of violence against women and children.
(2)Yes, a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil
Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of
public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have
territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal
basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been
extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides
that:

!
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.
Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,
which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has
clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts
being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
jurisdiction over the case.

!
Lim-Lua vs. Lua

G.R. Nos. 175279-80
June 5, 2013
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS
On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of
₱500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several
companies and businesses here and abroad.
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order dated March 31, 2004 granting support
pendente lite in = the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (₱250,000.00) per month.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, finding merit in respondent’s contention that the trial
court gravely abused its discretion in granting ₱250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner without
evidence to prove his actual income and reduced it to f ₱115,000.00.
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a Compliance dated June 28, 2005, respondent
attached a copy of a check he issued in the amount of ₱162,651.90 payable to petitioner. Respondent
explained that, as decreed in the CA decision, he deducted from the amount of support in arrears
(September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA -- ₱2,185,000.00 -- plus ₱460,000.00 (April, May,
June and July 2005), totaling ₱2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his children and petitioner in the
sum of ₱2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings).
ISSUE
Whether or not certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total
support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant to the Decision dated April 12, 2005 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
HELD
No, such expenses should not be deducted.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his
schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall
include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (Emphasis supplied.)
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is
generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to
the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.

!
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of
voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio
or upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may temporarily
grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its provisional
nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application
for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may
suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits
or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children was
determined after due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although the
amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support pendente lite
of ₱115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her
children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses.
Petitioner’s testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and vitamins/
medicines.
Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and petitions for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage are guided by the provisions of the Rule on Provisional
Orders.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider the following factors:
(1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the physical
and emotional health of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the
child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the
care and well-being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party,
there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions
made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued support, we find as relevant the
following rulings by US courts.
In Bradford v. Futrell, appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court which found him in arrears
with his child support payments and entered a decree in favor of appellee wife. He complained that in determining
the arrearage figure, he should have been allowed full credit for all money and items of personal property given by
him to the children themselves, even though he referred to them as gifts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled
that in the suit to determine amount of arrears due the divorced wife under decree for support of minor children, the
husband (appellant) was not entitled to credit for checks which he had clearly designated as gifts, nor was he entitled
to credit for an automobile given to the oldest son or a television set given to the children. Thus, if the children
remain in the custody of the mother, the father is not entitled to credit for money paid directly to the children if such
was paid without any relation to the decree.
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse to allow a husband to dictate
how he will meet the requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is fixed by a decree
of court. Thus he will not be credited for payments made when he unnecessarily interposed himself as a

!
volunteer and made payments direct to the children of his own accord. Wills v. Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748
(Mo. 1948); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1935).
In the latter case the court said in part: "The payments to the children themselves do not appear to have been
made as payments upon alimony, but were rather the result of his fatherly interest in the welfare of those children.
We do not believe he should be permitted to charge them to plaintiff. By so doing he would be determining for Mrs.
Openshaw the manner in which she should expend her allowances. It is a very easy thing for children to say their
mother will not give them money, especially as they may realize that such a plea is effective in attaining their ends.
If she is not treating them right the courts are open to the father for redress."
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the
accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the
trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house
helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by
respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli,
purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been
disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is true that
the dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to
pay the support in arrears "less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent
as her and their two (2) children monthly support," the deductions should be limited to those basic needs
and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge
deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her children, while correct insofar as it
commends the generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent with the executory
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner, should be
continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate income on her own because
she presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and at the same time engages in
the business of lending money. He also claims that the two children have finished their education and are
now employed in the family business earning their own salaries.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be submitted to the trial court
in which the action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of facts. The
amount of support may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of
the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. As we held in
Advincula v. Advincula
…Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially
provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified
or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be
regarded as subject to final determination.

!
Salas vs. Matusalem

G.R. No. 180284
September 11, 2013
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against
Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born on
December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years
old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed
and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and
hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner's family to take the child
from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and
friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner
refused to support her and their child.
Petitioner filed his answer with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He described
respondent as a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child also out of wedlock when she went
to work in Italy. Jobless upon her return to the country, respondent spent time riding on petitioner's
jeepney which was then being utilized by a female real estate agent named Felicisima de Guzman.
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioner's appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent and her child is entitled to support.
HELD
No, the respondent and her child is not entitled to support.
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that
respondent's evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of
petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

!
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit "A-1") of Christian Paulo Salas in which the
name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only
respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it was petitioner
who supplied the information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of
the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth
certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to establish
filiation to the alleged father.
As to the Baptismal Certificate (Exhibit "B") of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the
father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can
only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
The rest of respondent's documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and
photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to
prove paternity. Exhibits "E" and “F" showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit
thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account (Exhibit "C") from the Good Samaritan
General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove
that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner's admission in his answer that he
shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondent's child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes (Exhibits "D" to "D-13") of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange
of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo's
filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by
petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify
under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of
illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
Petitioner's reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals is misplaced. In the said case, the
handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission that he is the father of private respondent's
daughter and were signed by him. The Court therein considered the totality of evidence which
established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of private respondent's
daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals, the Court sustained the appellate court's
finding that private respondent's evidence to establish her filiation with and paternity of petitioner was
overwhelming, particularly the latter's public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private
respondent's mother, and private respondent as his own child through acts and words, her testimonial
evidence to that effect was fully supported by documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that
respondent had adduced sufficient proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child.

!
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and continuous possession of
status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to
establish his filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[38]
Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent's evidence insufficient to establish that
petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo,
petitioner's financial support while respondent lived in Murillo's apartment and his regular visits to her
at the said apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the "overwhelming evidence,
documentary and testimonial" presented in Ilano. In that case, we sustained the appellate court's ruling
anchored on the following factual findings by the appellate court which was quoted at length in the
ponencia.
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof
of paternity and the totality of respondent's evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo's filiation to
petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant
to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established
by clear and convincing evidence.
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner's counsel informing this Court that
petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still alive, it is not barred
under Article 175 (2) of the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the putative father is not a
bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child. The rule on
substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the
fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to
comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime
of the alleged parent.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.

!
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail
to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to
procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

!

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Remedial Law Review PANGANDOY ZBA Notes

Case Name Reference Date Ponente Summary

Luzon G.R. No. 203530 April 13, 2015 Peralta, J Requirements -

Watercraft Venture G.R. No. 181721 September 9, 2015 Peralta, J. Grounds

Phil. G.R. No. 193821 November 23, 2015 Brion, J. Discharge of

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Lim Jr. vs. Lazaro

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Ligon vs. RTC - Makati

I can do all things through CHRIST who

CA denied the petition.

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Chuidian vs. Sandiganbayan

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

NO, the order of attachment cannot be lifted.

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

We have uniformly held that:

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Torres vs. Satsatin

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Luzon Development Bank vs. Krishnan

CA sided with RTC.

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Northern Luzon Island Co. vs. Garcia

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Excellent Quality Apparel vs. Visayan Surety

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Visayan surety’s liability

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Sec. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond.

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Sec. 17. Recovery upon the counter-bond.

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Watercraft Venture Corp. vs. Wolfe

On March 7, 2002, Watercraft terminated the employment of Wolfe.

Aggrieved, Wolfe filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

The CA granted Wolfe's petition in a Decision dated September 27, 2007, t

I can do all things through CHRIST who

1. that a sufficient cause of action exists;

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Meanwhile, Watercraft's reliance on Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan is misplaced. It is well settled that:

I can do all things through CHRIST who

I can do all things through CHRIST who

Phil. Airconditioning Center vs. RCJ Lines

The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

I can do all things through CHRIST who

RCJ Lines availed of the first mode by posting a counter-bond.