onthly summary No. 1.

AAF Antisubmarine
ommand Jan 4

This Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE
ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES
FORT LEA NWORTH, KANSAS
DOCUMENT NO. B fi 454- COPY NO. - 1

- A C-P3-1966-20 Mar 53-5

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ANALYSIS OF SUBMARINE WARFARE

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CHART I

A. ALLIED SHIPPING LOSSES:

Sinkings of Allied and neutral merchant vessels by enemy submarines have continued
to decline, and in January amounted to thirty-three ships, totaling only 200,669 tons.
.The January losses, reported thus far, were the lowest for any month in more than a year
and were well below the average monthly loss since the beginning of the war.

Chart I shows the record of monthly tonnage losses as a result of submarine action
since September, 1939, as well as the tonnage loss of tankers and cargo-passenger vessels.
The curves shown on the chart are based on British figures prior to September, 1942; and
American figures thereafter. The American figures include ships that may have been used
for transporting troops, regardless of whether the ships were classified as commissioned
auxiliaries.

The loss of ships from enemy action of all types, including mines, air and surface'
craft, as well as submarines, is shown in the following table for the months of January,
1943 and December, 1942. The December figures have been revised upwards from the
totals shown, in the summary last month as more complete records of sinkings during
the month became available. Even,with these ad s ments, however, the December losses
were not great.
 SUMMARY OF SINKINGS
Mercnant Vessels Sunk By Enemy Action

January, 1943 December, 1942

Ships Tonnage Ships Tonnage

North Atlantic Convoy Area. ...... . 2 20,702 15 77,633

Canadian Coastal Zone . . . . . . . . . - - 1 6,089
Hid-Atlantic Area ..... ....... - - 3 31,246
Caribbean Sea Frontier, Western ..... 5 30,542 5 24,181
Caribbean Sea Frontier, Eastern ..... 1 8,093 4 19,888
Brazilian Area. . ............ . 3 11,684 12 59,596
Northeast Atlantic - Northern. . .... 5 24,306 18 70,385
Northeast Atlantic - Southern. . .. . 14 92,934 4 15,266
Mediterranean Sea . .... ... ..... 7 31,689 6 36,545
Indian Ocean.............. . - - 7 34,390
Pacific Areas . .......... ... . 3 10,267 - -
Unknown Areas . .......... ... . 2 12,747 - -
TOTAL 42 242,964 75 375,219

Tankers . ... , ............ 12 102,281 7 48,102

Cargo and Passenger Vessels . ...... 27 139,370 62 324,407
Small Vessels (50-1000 tons). ..... ... 2 197 6 2,710
Commissioned Auxiliaries ........ . 1 1,116 - -
TOTAL 42 242,964 75 375,219

AREAS:- The loss of merchant vessels diminished in every area except the Northeast Atlan-
tic (Southern portion) where the increase in sinkings was largely due to U-boat attacks on
two convoys bound for the Mediterranean. Unlike some previous months, no heavy surprise
attacks were made in distant areas such as the Cape of Good Hope or Mozambique Channel,
where traffic is relatively unprotected. It is significant, however, that recently a
steadily increasing proportion of the sinkings have occurred in areas relatively near the
U-boat bases, and in January, 670%of the sinkings due to enemy action occurred in the
North Atlantic Convoy Area, the Northeastern Atlantic Area and the Mediterranean. Sink-
ings by areas are shown in Chart II.

TYPE OF SHIPS SUNK:- As compared with other recent months, a larger proportion of the
ships lost in January consisted of strategically important tankers; they made up 29% of
the ships lost and they accounted for 42% of the tonnage sunk.

LOSS OF CONVOYED SHIPS:- As the convoy system for t~~ped a

more completely month by month, and as the U-boa heir attacks
against the convoys, it is natural that the prop a sunk from convoy should
increase. In January, 46% of
the ships and 38% of the tonnage
lost through enemy action were
vessels in convoy, while 10% of
the sinkings were ships strag- ,
gling from convoys at the time N.ATLANTIC CONVOY AREA
OO
they were attacked.
00000

TYPE OF ENEMY ACTION:- Of the o" N6T a

ships lost through enemy action ooo0
during the month of January, " NE.ATLANTICAREA

six ships of 26,619 gross ton- MID-ATLANTIC AREA 0000

nage were sunk by aircraft, all oo

but one of these sinkings oc- -a-
C.S.F. (WESTERN)
curring in the Mediterranean. ^
.. o0 \
o
C.S.F. (EASTERN)

Three ships sank as the result

of hitting enemy mines, while 6" o
the remaining thirty-three B ZL1AN
ships lost were sunk by.sub- AREA
marines. o 2

MARINE CASUALTIES:- Due in part

to severe winter weather, mar-
ine casualties due to ordinary ,, 8o 6o o'4 20o" o
perils of the sea continued to
take a rising toll, and twenty- CHART 11
three ships, totaling 96,243 Sinkings, January 1943
tons, were lost.

DAMAGED BUT NOT SUNK:- Thirteen other vessels were damaged by aircraft attack in the
Mediterranean and on the route to Murmansk, and two by submarine attack, but were not
sunk. It is known that four other ships also were attacked but the extent of damage
is not known at the present time.

B. ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS BY AIRCRAFT

EASTERN SEA FRONTIER AND GULF SEA FRONTIER.

Anti-submarine activities in these areas for the month of January were more produc-
tive, from the standpoint of sightings and attacks, than activities during December.
Nine sightings were reported, two of which resulted in attacks by the sighting aircraft.
Of the total sightings six were made by Army paroe?- nd three by Naval air patrols. In
none of the sightings or atta ,was thdrQ conclusive :evidence of the presence
of submarines. In fac est t ave 1 bmariedensity figure for the
7-,
month fell to 0.2, as compared with 0.7 in previous record low. An average
daily density of 0.2 submarines in an area of over 1,0 000 square miles is, of course,
negligible.

The weather was generally unfavorable for flying during the early and latter parts of
the month. Numerous missions had to be cancelled, and there was a virtual cessation of all
air activities in both Frontiers for one. three-day period. Mid-January, however, provided
a period of good flying weather.

The number of hours flown by Army and Navy aircraft. is shown in the accompanying
table. A detailed report of the operations of the 25th and 26th Wings of AAFAC is inclu-
ded at the end of this Summary.

Recon Escort Special Training Total Hrs.

Army Bomb. and Observ. 2368 772 475 2981 6596
Army CAP, CP ..... 8930 2993 - - 11923
Total Army 11298 3765 475 2981 18519

Navy Planes. . .... 6336 4242 702 - 11280

Blimps . ....... 1568 1261 161 - 2990
Total Navy 7904 5503 863 - 14270

TOTAL ARMY AND NAVY. . 19202 9268 1338 2981 32789

1ST ANTISUBMARINE SQUADRON.

Advance elements of the 1st Antisubmarine Squadron's air echelon arrived-in England
in the early part of November, 1942. Additional personnel and equipment continued to
arrive during the remainder of November and in December. At the close of the latter-
month the Squadron consisted of 36 officers and 137 enlisted men, and six B-24D aircraft.

Prior to the commencement of operations, it was necessary to indoctrinate the crews

with British procedure and methods. Numerous problems always attendant upon operations
from a new and foreign base had to be solved. Operations were begun with three planes on
November 16, 1942. By December 5 the number of planes had increased to six. The infor-
mation at present available indicates that 32 operational missions, totaling 257:25 hours,
and an additional 88 hours on training flights were flown during the period November 16
to December 26.

In a letter dated January 2, 1943, the Commanding Officer states that between Decem-
ber 1 and 31 six submarine sightings and four attacks on submarines were made by planes
of the R.A.F. and the 1st Antisubmarine Squadron in the Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic
between latitudes 3700N and 5200N. T f ,sightings and attacks in the Atlantic were
made by the 1st Antisubmarine Squadr ix ae+y 610 miles and the other 720
mpo
miles from the operating base. One o 'c i s ed> U-boat "Probably Sunk",

4
and
and is
is desbedF1Ei
described n Secti IVBf this Summary Assessment of the second
attack is not ye e "

Combat crews patrol e ions which normially require from 8 to 11

hours. The day of patrol is followe y relaxation and recreation for the-crew,
and this in turn by a day of training. Briefing and interrogation of the crews require
two hours each, and they are conducted by a joint British-American station control.

Weather conditions are reported as being none too favorable, requiring utmost skill
and judgment on the part of the pilot, navigator, radar and radio operators.

9TH ANTISUBMARINE SQUADRON OPERATIONS.

A noteworthy page in the operational records of the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine
Command has been written by the 9th Antisubmarine Squadron, operating in the Trinidad
area of the Caribbean Sea Frontier.

The air echelon of the Squadron, 42 officers and 72 enlisted men, in 10 planes,
B-18R type, arrived in Trinidad on December 2, 1942. Patrol missions were begun immedi-
ately thereafter, and a program of orientation and training was instituted.

The area of operations of the Squadron had become increasingly critical for the
United Nation's shipping. In November, for example, U-boats had taken a toll of thir-
teen vessels sunk in the waters around Trinidad. In December the toll in this area
dropped to five ships and none was reported in January. It is impossible to assay the
part played by any one unit that is cooperating with other well trained units, but it is
clear that the 9th Antisubmarine Squadron contributed to this favorable record.

The Squadron has been entirely dependent upon the ingenuity and skill of its Com-
manding Officer and personnel during the course of its operations. Most maintenance
work has been done by the air echelon and this in a latitude where climatic conditions
are particularly severe on virtually all types of equipment due to corrosion resulting
from salt and humidity. The measure of the Squadron's self-contained efficiency and
morale is best revealed by the fact that during the month of January 1134 hours were
flown, a higher total than that of any other squadron in the Command.

The break-down f the flying hours for January is as follows:

Reco Escort Special Training Total

653: :25 26:00 130:25 1134:30

This record of one month's ope aQn t s especially significant because none of
the original equipment of the squa replaced.
C. ATTACKS ON ENEMY S

In the U.S. Strate attacksduring January, as com-

pared with thirty-one i on w ich the evidence obtained to date indicates that
a U-boat was present. Of these twenty-five attacks, fourteen were made by aircraft and
eleven by surface craft.

One of the aircraft attacks off the Coast of Brazil is believed to have resulted in
a kill since several mangled bodies as well as three live men were seen in the water after
the explosions. This attack is described in detail in Section IV-D of this Summary.

Five other aircraft attacks probably resulted in serious damage to the submarines.
One of these took place south of Iceland, the others off Trinidad and the Brazilian Coast.
One surface craft attack, near Newfoundland, is believed to have damaged a submarine
slightly.

Full reports of attacks on enemy submarines are always slow in arriving. Hence, it
is probable that this total of twenty-five attacks for the month of January will be in-
creased by later reports. It is almost certain that, in the final analysis, the number
of January attacks will exceed the number in December. If so, January will be the first
month since August in which the attacks in the U.S. Strategic,Area have not declined.

D. GERMAN STRATEGY AND DISPOSITION OF SUBMARINES

The best intelligence available, based on sinkings, attacks, contacts and other in-
formation, indicated a continued strategy on the part of the Germans during January of
maintaining defensive screens in an attempt to intercept north Atlantic and African con-
voys. -During the early part of the month submarines were widely scattered, and a large
number of them returned to their bases for repairs and supplies; but during the latter
part of the month the number of U-boats at sea increased steadily and tended to form
three rather definite screens. One of these was off the coast of Africa, in the vicinity
of the Azores; a second was south of Greenland; and the third was in the northeastern
Atlantic, almost directly west of the British Isles. At times, the latter two screens
tended to merge into one extending in a northwesterly direction, but the objective clearly
was to form two areas of possible attack on trans-Atlantic convoys. There is also evi-
dence that the U-boat packs which attacked convoys contained more U-boats than formerly -
a development that is perhaps significant of a change in tactics. Chart III shows a
typical distribution of U-boats during the latter part of January.

The outstanding strategical development of recent months, however, is the almost

sensational drop in attacks on merchant vessels. Sinkings began to decline shortly after
the landing of Allied forces in Africa and this trend has continued for a period of
three months. Bad weather, unwise disposition of U-boats to intercept convoys, and bet-
ter protection of convoys are all p o s that have been advanced to ex-
plain this notable lack of U-boat t srs, nor any combination
of them, appear to be an adequate aatio kings from nearly 140
ships in Novem d -.

uary - a decli
No- completely
planation is available at this
time, but it appears that * *"
either the large number of U- 1 * * *
boats estimated to be at sea r,
have been restricted in their * *
operations by some factor un- ' * *;.
known at present, or that an *p.
abnormal number of U-boats "
are in port and the number
estimated to be at sea is a _ * * *
gross exaggeration.

Adherents of the theory

that there are many U-boats at * -'o
sea which have a greatly re-
duced efficiency offer various
explanations for this develop-
ment; a shortage of oil which
is restricting the radius of
U-boats and forcing them to
operate in areas that are o
2o b
0o 20

heavily defended; a shortage

of torpedoes as a result of CHART III

bombing of German industrial Typical U-Boat Distribution in January

plants; the continued bombing
of U-boat bases forcing U-boats to stay at sea unduly long periods for their own protec-
tion, but with inadequate supplies and' tired crews of low morale. Such explanations,
however, are not quite consistent with the building up of a U-boat concentration south of
Greenland, and it would seem more logical under such conditions for the enemy to withdraw
U-boats to relatively safe areas in the Baltic in order to rest tired crews and conserve
supplies in anticipation of the necessity of blocking traffic later in the year when the
promised "Second Front" offensives become actualities. Continued operation of U-boats in
the cold north Atlantic with tired crews and low supplies mean not only inefficient oper-
ation but a further break-down of morale.

Adherents of the theory that large numbers of U-boats are not, in fact, at sea base
their argument on the fact that not only have sinkings declined sharply, but so also have
attacks by U-boats and even si ) They argue with logic that if a large number of
U-boats were at sea, they woul 1ttfo tack te t sghtings would be at least
normal. It is known, however, 8 eflate df t a bro U-boats at sea in the past
have been very accurate, and current estimates .r hae qubstantial evidence. One
hesitates to discard these estimates without daefihite proof that they have become inac-
curate.
 UNCLASSIFIED
It was announced with considerable fanfare during January that Admiral Doenitz had
been promoted to be supreme Commander of the German Naval Forces from his former position
of U-boat Commander-in-Chief. Such promotion would hardly seem logical in the face of
three months of outstanding U-boat failure unless the decline in sinkings resulted from a
planned policy. Doenitz, furthermore, is known to be an advocate of aggressive use of
U-boats, as typified by his often expressed policy of "Kill! Kill! Kill!". This promotion
and the. logic of the entire war situation indicates the necessity of a supreme Nazi effort
to cut Allied supply lines this year, - even if the U-boats must be regarded as "expend-
able." A major effort of this kind requires time for preparation, training and the accum-
ulation of supplies.

During three periods in the past - March, April and May, 1940; from November, 1940 to
January, 1941; and again during the months of October to December, 1941 - the activity of
U-boats, as indicated. by sinkings, was low, but a period of high activity and heavy sink-
ings extending from five to nine months followed each one of these lulls. Now again, we
have had nearly three months of reduced activity. Resting of crews, refitting and repair
of U-boats, accumulation of supplies, and possibly the fitting of U-boats with new equip-
ment such as radar or some entirely new weapon - all take time and cause reduced activity.
The Germans are estimated to have 425 U-boats, about 100 of which have been on shake-down
trials in the Baltic. It may be that some of these are now in the Atlantic and that the
apparently large number of relatively inactive U-boats at sea represent submarines on
practice cruises under combat conditions but operating under instructions not to accept
undue risks. Such a theory is the only one that squares with all the known facts.

Enemy capabilities include strong mid-ocean screens and other screens to form cor-
dons around Europe and off the American coast. Doubtless, he will exercise all of these
capabilities in part, but it is clear that his greatest efficiency would be near the
coastal areas in which it is easier to locate convoys than in the wide expanses of mid-
ocean. To the extent that these areas can be made so dangerous to U-boats as to force
them to remain 600 miles or more at sea, U-boat efficiency will be correspondingly re-
duced.

Much of this analysis is necessarily based on logical conjecture, but it does appear
that the enemy is capable of a major destructive campaign in the very near future, against
which immediate preparations are an urgent necessity. The acquisition of a greatly in-
creased number of surface craft within a few months is hardly possible. Other sections
of this summary are devoted to a discussion of the effectiveness of long range aircraft
in anti-submarine work, both as a destructive weapon and as a means of developing a
relatively safe zone for ships extending 300 to 600 miles at sea. It is feasible to
detail a large number of long range aircraft to this work with little delay ana such a
step appears essential in meeting the immediate threat of increased U-boat attack.

R
 AIRCRAFT PROTECTION OF CONVOYS

The November and December issues of this Summary contained charts which demonstrated
the effectiveness of the aircraft in driving U-boats away from coastal areas on both
sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Attention was not directed, however, towards the role of
aircraft in protecting convoys or the ways and means of extending the use of aircraft to
increase the safety. of trans-Atlantic convoys. Since the convoy system of protecting
ships undoubtedly will be continued, the battle in the future will be primarily one be-
tween convoys and submarine packs. It is of value, therefore, to analyze enemy strategy
in connection with attacks on convoys in order to clarify the particular function of
aircraft in convoy protection.

There has been discussion from time to time on the relative effectiveness of air-
craft and surface craft in defending convoys, but controversy is unnecessary and is based
primarily on a misunderstanding of the facts or a lack of knowledge of the proper coor-
dination of aircraft and surface craft in such work.

U-boats are assigned by the German High Command to patrol specific areas of the
ocean. As soon as a U-boat sights a convoy, it makes a first sighting report, called an
E bar report, which gets its name from the distinguishing letter "Accentuated E" which
prefaces the signal. The U-Boat High Command Headquarters then broadcasts the sighting
to all U-boats situated in the vicinity, ordering them to concentrate in the convoy area.
When these U-boats in turn sight the convoy, they also make E bars, with the result that
the U-Boat High Command knows accurately the position, course and speed of the convoy.
U-boat packs are known to have shadowed convoys for several days before attacking, par' icu-
larly if the first contact was made within the range of land-based aircraft. Shadowing is
usually done from the rear and well out on the flanks at the extreme range of surface
visibility during the day and from close range during darkness. The attack itself usually
takes place at night with the U-boats closing in at high speed while running on the sur-
face. They rely on the confusion following the mass torpedo attacks to draw clear of the
convoy, to reorganize and to reload torpedo tubes.

The primary function of aircraft in the defense of convoys is the prevention of the
gathering of U-boat packs capable of making destructive attacks. It accomplishes this
function in two ways: first, as a pack is gathering on a trailed and reported convoy,
protective sweeps far ahead and to the flanks of the convoy enable aircraft to make kill-
ing and damaging attacks or at least to force U-boats to remain submerged at slow speeds
sufficiently long to delay the formation of an effective pack. Second, through keeping
the trailing U-boats, on which the others are homing, submerged, aircraft can break the
enemy's contact enabling the convoy to escape through change of course. In both of these
activities aircraft are highly efficient, not only through actual kills but through the
frequent damaging attacks which, even if not lethal, are destructive of U-boat crew
morale. This function of impeding the gathering of packs is best accomplished by the
airplane due to its ability to search wide areas in a manner not possible for even the
fastest surface craft. The function of surface craft, on the other hand, is close-in
ILrc~i,

NyleI

CHART IV

Heaviest Attacks on Convoys - July-Decemnber 1942

protection of the convoy, particularly at night or in bad weather, after the pack has
succeeded in closing in. The two functions are in no sense competitive and, if sufficient
long range aircraft are made available, it should be possible to develop a high degree of
coordination that will give maximum protection.

Chart IV shows attacks on vessels in the nine most heavily attacked trans-Atlantic
convoys during the final six months of 1942. The arrows show the general course of indi-
vidual convoys, while the dots indicate approximate locations of individual attacks on
ships. The solid arc lines are drawn roughly three hundred miles from established or
possible air bases, while the dotted arc lines indicate a range of six hundred miles,
within which adequate air coverage was, or could have been, provided. Actually the air
coverage between three hundred and six hundred mile limits on the west side of the Atlan-
tic was inadequate during this period, while lack of equipment provided less than desir-
able coverage in this range from either England or Iceland. Air coverage from Greenland
was negligible. It is obvious from the chart that attacks on convoys began or broke off
when convoys were at least three hundred miles from land. Outbound convoys apparently
were trailed out of the air-coverage danger zone before the pack gathered and attacked,
and similarly, attacks on inbound convoys were given up as soon as the enemy reached the
area of effective air coverage.

Sporadic sinkings of one or two ships in the chart oc-

curred during this period within the three. once in the

10
 final six rted mass attack within the three hundred mile
areas. Ob angs did occur within the six hundred mile circles, but in these
areas lack of equipment prevented satisfactory air coverage. It is significant that the
three hundred to six hundred mile areas off Iceland and the British Isles, which were
covered more completely by the R.A.F. Coastal Command, showed a much greater freedom from
sinkings than the similar areas off Newfoundland and Greenland which had little air cover-
age. Even patrolling by the Coastal Command from three hundred to six hundred miles out
on the usual convoy routes has not been heavy and averaged only about 800 hours per month
between September and November, 1942.

In addition to the evidence presented by this chart, the great power of aircraft in
protecting convoys is to be found in the detailed histories of two convoys, SC 104 and
SC 107, which were presented in the November, 1942, issue of the Coastal Command Review,
and from which Charts V and VI have been drawn. SC 104 was given close air escort by
intermittent sorties, which are shown by cross hatched areas on the chart, from October
6th to the 13th, as it proceeded up the American Coast past Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.
The convoy probably was first sighted by U-boats on October 11th within three hundred
miles of Newfoundland and aircraft coverage ceased at 1938 on October 12th. Due to bad
weather no aircraft could be used thereafter until the morning of October 15th. Almost
immediately after aircraft coverage ceased, attacks were made, with the result that
three ships were lost during the night of the 12th-13th, and five more during the night
of 13th-14th. Further attacks on the 14th-15th were beaten off by surface craft. When
the convoy was six hundred miles from Iceland, on the 15th, a Liberator from the 120th
Squadron swept the area and made two sightings and attacks. On the 16th, a Liberator
from the same Squadron carried out close escort from 0900 to 1355 and put down one U-boat,
while a second Liberator failed to meet the convoy but sighted and attacked a U-boat
north of the convoy. Eight Catalinas and Liberators carried out offensive sweeps north
of the convoy on the 16th and 17th, making three sightings and two attacks. The convoy
arrived on the 21st with no additional sinkings after air protection was supplied on the
15th of the month. This convoy is a clear case of good coordination of air and surface
craft during which aircraft broke up and hampered the contact already established on the
15th, while protective sweeps prevented another pack from converging again on the 16th
and 17th. Surface craft provided efficient close-in escort, which resulted in sinkings
of three U-boats, - two of them by ramming.

SC 107 proceeded up the.American and Canadian Coast in poor weather with aircraft
coverage only on October 28th, and it is probable that it was sighted by a U-loat near
the coast of Newfoundland on the 29th. Aircraft coverage was light and insufficient on
the following days, but -- although details are not available -- it appears that two air
attacks were made by planes acting as close escort, while a single protective sweep pro-
duced one sighting and attack, and a fortuitous sighting and attack by a returning air-
craft was made considerably ahead of the convoy. These close-in air escorts, however,
were insufficient to break the contact, and when the convoy reached a point four hundred
miles off the Gtahdian Coast, sinkings began with fifteen ships lost between November 2nd
and 5th t e of whih were far from land and during a period in which no air
coverage w we herf On November 5th, with the convoy seven hundred

! 11
65_____ 600 6:0 400

600

J~4 r;?k' 15

ZII /
5d

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6S° 66' ° 60° ... 4/

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20

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ESCORT /63S-,2023
ESCORT 2/09 -2300
EJCORT//35- 225/
NO FL Y/NVG
ESCORT //46-225's
SC 1O4
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ESCORT 0 700 - 011 BY 4/PRPAFJ
ESCORT /042 -1938
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#O AlL V/MO 5AIt'!f SC/AK

2 Z1/8:f A4JTACKED JYJ8/IA//VE
ESCORT 0830-1355 SATTACKED JS/6/HTED
SWLY'J 0840-1/2,6
3 (1/8'S ATTACKED
2 (1/8'S S/6/HTED ". A/Y JZUNK'
/1/S J'i%'EEPS 0739-184J
3 (1/87 ATT1CKED BYF/1/F
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DAILY SLIMMARJE5
OC 7 PATROLS5 CANJCELLED-
WEATHER.
8-ESCO~R 1239-2244.
&5-i U/8 SIGHTED.
30-1 U/B ATTACKED.
3- if , ESCORT 1325-1850.
INL.'L- 1 U/B ATTACKED.

Sc
OCTOBER -
107
NOVEMBER
2-1I MV SJNJK , ESCORT 1655-1735.
3-1 MV SUNK, 6 MVs SUNK
-ON 2.Nb ORZ3 Ro.
4- NO COVER PFROA ICELAND
-DUE TO WEATHER
5- ESCORT 1108-1958
ATTACKED, 1 IU/8 2 U/Bs
ss&FTED.
F
M*-ESCORT
BY AIQCRAFT
SWEEPS -*FLJ
-

6 -ESCORT 1350-1530, 1645- 1815

-A/S SWEEP 10'f7-18I1 I7AC
Me .S1BMARINE 7- ESCOR.T 14-44-1~800
- A/5 SWEEP 08y,-7-1559, 7AC

'~m MVSUNK 8.-A/S .SWEE. 08Z0-1658 , AC

rr ~. .~ I
miles from Iceland, two Liberators provided close-in escort from 1108 to 1958, making
three sightings and two attacks, both of which were good and one of which is believed to
have been fatal to the submarine. On the same day, two Catalinas swept the area north of
the convoy and on the 6th two Catalinas provided escort and seven Hudsons carried out
offensive sweeps. On the 7th, one Catalina provided escort while four Hudsons and three
Fortresses carried out sweeps, and further protection was given on the 8th. Not a single
ship was sunk between the time aircraft coverage was provided on the 5th and the arrival
of the convoy in port on the 10th.

The above accounts of two convoys confirm the opinion of the Anti-Submarine Warfare
Division of the British Naval.Staff, which, in its October 1942 Anti-Submarine report,
states, "Experience is repeatedly affirming that a convoy, not protected by aircraft, may
be so disorganized by a concentrated attack and the resultant breaks in formation for
rescue work and other adjustment that the escorts may become comparatively ineffective
for either protection or offense, whereas the presence, even for a few hours, of one or
two aircraft has again and again prevented a concentrated attack from developing."

The accounts also are convincing arguments in favor of sufficient long-range land-
based aircraft to provide adequate air coverage six hundred miles from the American coast,
Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland and the British Isles. With these bases and equipment
available, convoys on the northern lanes could be then routed completely within the
range of air patrol and afforded substantial protection during good weather.

As of a recent date, surface craft used in anti-submarine warfare amounted to 46

fleet destroyers and 356 escort vessels, which include old destroyers, corvettes, PG's
and PY's. Naval authorities feel this force of more than four hundred surface craft, in-
volving a huge investment and personnel, is inadequate and without doubt additional craft
could be used to advantage. The current destroyer--escort building program calling for
300 vessels for delivery during 1943, and many more in 1944 should provide all the sur-
face craft necessary. In comparison there were on the same date 702 medium range air-
planes with an effective operating radius of 300 to 450 miles but only 95 aircraft with
the range necessary to cover the critical 300 to 600 mile danger area. The medium range
aircraft have been successful in protecting the near shore convoys, but roughly ten times
the present number of long range aircraft are necessary to give far off-shore convoys
adequate protection. Probably the total investment in all types of aircraft is hardly a
quarter of that in surface craft. Furthermore, if sufficient long range aircraft were
available, the existing 700 medium range aircraft in use in anti-submarine warfare could
be released for other service.

The need for an adequate number of long range aircraft is urgent and immediate in
view of the enemy's capability of inaugurating more violent U-boat warfare in the near
future. With adequate air coverage extending 600 miles from available air bases, sink-
ings can be held to a reasonable number or even reduced, and the cost would.soon be
repaid in savings of steel, essential war cargoes and lives.

16
 - - CASUALTIES
CU-BOAT

LEVEl Y 4BOAT C4ASUAZTIE

.... S 'ubmarnrines nown sunk - --
"'nmmfefai^ probobn/y sun---- ----
- probca/y damaged -

_ * - m--
C --. _

__ I I I I
S OC.
DET AN. M. APR.
A JUNI JULY DEPTOC_ DC JXAEEC
N MA. APR. A JUNE/JULY J CT._? DEfC
JAN. MR. N.P JUNE JULY CPT?\
OCT DfC.

/939 / 940 / 94/ / 9 4 2

CHART VII

Five hundred and sixty-six German and Italian submarines have been sunk or damaged
as the direct result of Allied action since the beginning of the war. This number will
be further increased as additional reports are received on attacks made during the last
few months. The quarterly totals of submarines officially assessed as "Known Sunk",
"Probably Sunk" and "Probably Damaged" are indicated in Chart VII. It is clear that
there has been a generally steady upward trend in U-boat casualties, from an average of
ten per month in 1940 to over twenty-five per month in the first nine months of 1942.

In spite of this encouraging record, however, the German submarine fleet has grown
from about seventy-five in December, 1939 to more than four hundred in December, 1942.
This growth is probably continuing as it is believed that Germany is producing twenty
or twenty-five submarines per month, while an average of about ten per month are esti-
mated to h vbee 'destroyed in-l942- It is likely that most of the U-boats assessed
as "Probaby 6aged" succeed inreaching their bases and are only temporarily inacti-
vated for repairs.
 A further analysis of these statistics throws some light on the relative effective-
ness of aircraft and surface vessels as anti-submarine weapons. The assessed results of
attacks by aircraft and by all other agencies such as surface craft and mines which
caused damage during the first eleven months of 1942 are shown in the following table:

Known Probably Probably

Sunk Sunk Damaged Total
By Aircraft . ... . . . 18 17j* 118 * 154
By Other. . . . . .... 36 18- * 432* 98
Total 54 36 162 252
*Fractions indicate that both air and surface craft participated in attack.

The table indicates that over sixty per cent of the damaging or lethal attacks were
carried out by aircraft. Aircraft ability to cover wide areas and carry out attacks with
a minimum of warning is clearly shown, particularly in the "Probably Damaged" classifica-
tion. Only in the "Known Sunk" group, do the figures suggest a clear superiority of
surface craft, but it is almost certain that aircraft are in fact more lethal than indi-
cated by the statistics. Positive evidence is required before a submarine is evaluated
as "Sunk" or "Probably Sunk" and it is frequently impossible for aircraft to obtain such
evidence, whereas surface craft on the scene can remain to obtain evidence through re-
trieving wreckage, securing samples of oil and taking photographs. Detailed analysis of
attacks in the U.S. Strategic Area bear out this reasoning.

As pointed out in Section II, the role of aircraft in convoy protection is primarily
one of preventing U-boats from gathering around convoys in a position to deliver deadly
mass attacks. Its role is to kill, to harry, to damage, to force submergence, so fre-
quently that contact with the convoy will be lost and the gathering of a powerful strik-
ing force prevented. The statistics which show that seventy-three per cent of the
attacks assessed as "Probably Damaged" were made by aircraft, indicate that they are
capable of carrying out their mission.

The lethal quality of aircraft in anti-submarine warfare is being increased rapidly

through new technical developments. Longer range planes capable of carrying heavier bomb
loads, the development of the more accurate flat nosed depth bomb, the contact mousetrap
bomb, and the radio sonic buoy which will allow underwater listening from aircraft, are
all of primary importance and are expected to make aircraft even a more deadly anti-
submarine weapon.

Aircraft and surface craft, properly coordinated, are natural partners in convoy
protection and all of the evidence bears out the recent statement by Prime Minister
Churchill that "nothing is more clearly proved than that well-escorted convoys, especial-
ly when protected by long distance aircraft, beat the U-boat".

MI
 #s .IgG AIRCRAFT ATTACKS

( 4

--------------------
>~~~~~~~~~~------ ; 1-t --- ,,--;,
.6 7

CHART V III

A. FIRST ENGAGEMENT WITH AN ENEMY AIRCRAFT

The first action between an airplane of the Antisubmarine Command and one of the
enemy occurred on December 4, 1942, at 51-15 N 10-00 W. A B-24 of the 1st Antisubmarine
Squadron, piloted by Capt. Lueke, on A/S patrol, encountered a plane identified as a
JU-88. The. action as shown on Chart VIII progressed as follows:

1. B-24 on course 2540 T - 1500' altitude - sighted a JU-88 at 1 mile, 300 to star-
board.

2. JU-88 approached and passed B-24 500 yds. to starboard, and 1000 ft. above.
At 500 yds. to rear on the starboard JU-88 banded away into 3600 turn.

3. JU-88 pulled up into a parallel course 600 yards to rear and 500 ft. above -
still to starboard.

4. B-24 took evasive action, making a series of 900 turns to port and starboard
and 1000 ft. climbs and dives in and out of clouds.
During this phase, of 20 minutes, JU-88 maintained same relative position as
in #3.

5. JU-88 pulled up even with the B-24 and 1000 ft. above.

6. JU-88 immediately turned into the B-24 at a dive, crossing over about 800 ft.
above. The B-24 turned into a 450 starboard climb as the enemy approached. The
waist gunner fired two bursts at 600 yds., the top gunner one burst at approxi-
mately the same range. After the cross-over to port the top gunner fired three
more bursts at 1000 yds., as the JU-88 pulled into a moderate climb.
7. B-2 ,6 cd0o
turn to left and resumed normal course at 1500 ft. JU-88, after
di p rng, re urned ho }ds and followed B-24 1000 ft. above - 1 mile
to g o prtieE~ A s rt ;t later it headed westerly with no further action.
B. FIRST BLOOD.

Details of a 1st Antisubmarine Squadron attack on an enemy submarine in the Bay of

Biscay, briefly outlined ;n the December Summary, have since reached these Headquarters
and indicate that it was an excellently executed attack.

The attack was carried out by a B-24D, piloted by Captain Thorne, while on A/S
patrol at 1349 (GOT) on December 31, 1942 in 5120N 2058W. An A.S.V. contact was first
made while the airplane was eight miles distant at an altitude of 1000'. The pilot
homed on the signal, on acourse of 3000, gradually reducing altitude, and sighted the
submarine about 47 miles away traveling on the surface at a speed of approximately 8
knots, course 3300 T. No wake was visible because of the heavy rough seas. The submar-
ine began its crash dive as Pilot Thorne started his run. Attacking from 4 points abaft
the starboard beam of the submarine, at a speed of 200 mph from 175' altitude, 9 Torpex
MK XI depth bombs, were dropped with a fuse setting of 25 feet and at a spacing of six-
teen feet. The stick straddled the hull just behind the conning tower. Three depth
bombs fell to starboard, two over the hull, and the remainder to the port side. Approx-
imately 85 .50 calibre rounds were fired at the disappearing hull and conning tower by
the port ventral and tail gunners. The three depth bombs that fell to the starboard
should have moved in and exploded directly under the stern of the U-Boat, and the plume
of the depth bombs contained a black streak believed to have been oil. As the point of
attack was circled, an oil patch estimated to be 200 feet in diameter was observed; in
the center of which numerous small bubbles were noticeable. A flame float was dropped,
and the plane left the area on baiting procedure, returning 50 minutes later without
seeing any further evidence of damage.

This attack, which is considered to have been well planned and executed, received
a damage assessment of B (probably sunk). Detection of this target by Radar beyond
visual range under adverse sea conditions illustrates the value of efficient personnel
and effective equipment.

C. U-BOAT FIRES ON AIRPLANE.

Anti-aircraft fire from an enimy submarine directed against a Navy plane was the
experience of a PBY, 53-P-1, flying during the morning of January 5th off the coast of
Trinidad, British West Indies. Ensign J.E. Dryden, pilot, sighted a suspicious object
15 miles distant and turned at 4500' to an intersecting course of 1900. At 5 to 6 miles,
the sighting was definitely established as a gray U-boat with a black conning tower.

While the plane was still 2 to 3 miles distant, at 500 feet, and coming in for at-
tack, the submarine saw the PBY and immediately opened fire with her 3-inch bow gun
mounted forward of the conning tower. The U-boat fired 12 to 15 rounds of explosive
ammunition, the closest exploding 150 to 200 yards short and to the right of the plane.
Fire, which ceased when the plane was a half to a quarter of a mile away, was in rapid
bursts with sounds obf the explosion heard by the crew above the roar of the plane's
motors. There was no anti-aircraft basket on the conning tower, but there was a small

20
 c A_> I{I Is1
gun mounted on the after part of the tower. This latter gun was not manned'when the
plane passed over the submarine. No tracer bullets were seen coming from it and it is
not known if it was fired.

One man, dressed in a brown jacket or sweater and brown trousers, was firing the
3-inch gun, remaining there while the plane passed over the U-boat. No one was observed
passing ammunition to this gun. Another man dressed in dark clothes, possibly dungarees,
was seen forward of this gun and two men were observed on the conning tower during the
approach of the PBY, but apparently they had gone below by the time the plane passed over
the submarine. There were no uniforms being worn and no officers were identified. Be-
cause the aircraft was under fire, the observations of the crew were not as accurate as
normally could be expected in an approach of this type.

The submarine was about 200 feet long with the conning tower painted black or very
dark gray. No insignia were visible. The hull-was a dark gray with paint in good condi-
tion and black below the water line. There was a net cutter on the bow but no jump wire,
radio masts or life lines. No blister tanks were seen on the hull, as the boat was defi-
nitely of very sleek, trim lines. No water came over the bow or splashed on the planked
deck, although the U-boat was making 12 knots in a choppy sea. From the general descrip-
tion, it is believed to be an Italian craft of either the Gemma or Sirena class.

The attack was made at 1156Q, position 10-45N, 54-55W, on January 5, 1942. As the
plane made the attack approach at 160 knots, 75' altitude, the fully surfaced U-boat
altered its course from 250 to 220 degrees just before D/C's were released. The plane
dropped four Mark 29 D/C's in salvo, all exploding about 40 to 50' short on the starboard
side and about 15' forward of the conning tower.

The U-boat was so rocked by the explosion that the black paint was visible on the
hull below the water line. It is believed that the three men were still on deck at this
time. The U-boat continued to alter her course to about 190 degrees and crash dived,
submerging from 40 to 50 seconds after explosion of the D/C's. A small oil slick was
observed about 50 to 100' away from the cordite slick, but no oil or air bubbles or
debris were observed. The plane stayed in the area about an hour after the attack, but
no further action was observed.

Because of an unsuccessful attempt to take pictures, the 30 caliber bow gun was not
brought to bear until the run ended and the plane circled the U-boat. Ten rounds were
fired when the gun jammed. The .50 caliber guns at the port and starboard waists fired
a total of 18 rounds with hits on the deck forward of the conning tower. Hits were also
made by 10 to 15 rounds fired by the tunnel gun as the plane was directly overhead.

D. SUBMARINE DESTROYED BY PBY.

A Navy PBY-5A, from Squadron 83-P-2, based at Natal, Brazil, attacked and destroyed
a submarine on January 7, 1943, at 1153, in 0158S 3923W.
0
The PBY was flying a course of 015 T when the pilot sighted the submarine. Appar-
ently the was at a relatively high altitude, for the pilot states that when he
et the~~la _1 _ el i __
: c ~L .--
turned 900 to port to intercept the submarine, he pulled props and throttles nearly all
the way back and began to lose altitude at the rate of 2000 feet per minute with an indi-
cated air speed of 184 knots. The submarine proceeding at an estimated 15-20 knots was
fully surfaced on a course of 125 0T. Several men were lying on the deck apparently sun-
bathing.

The pilot, after turning to
between the submarine and plane.
power to 2500 RPM and 45 inches.
a considerable time as no effort
and ran toward the conning tower
make the interception, endeavored to keep a small cloud
When about 3 to 4 miles from the target, he increased
The submarine apparently failed to sight the plane for
was made to submerge and the men lying on deck jumped up
only about the time the D.C.'s were released.

The plane approached the target at a 60 to 80 degree angle, and four Mark 17 D.C.'s,
25 foot setting, were released manually by the second pilot. Three dropped simultaneously
and the fourth a split second later. At the moment of release, the plane was at an alti-
tude of 35 feet and flying an indicated 225 knots. After passing over the submarine, the
pilot turned steeply left to observe the results.

One very large explosion, believed to be caused by the simultaneous detonation of

3 D.C.'s, occurred within five feet of the submarine, to port abeam the conning tower.
One small explosion was observed about 60 feet to starboard slightly abaft the conning
tower.

The submarine appeared to rise out of the water and break partially into two pieces.
Three large tanks emerged from the broken area as the bow settled. The stern rose almost
vertically until 8 to 10 feet were visible above the water. It remained in this position
between 25 seconds and three minutes, then sank straight down. Miscellaneous debris and
several mangled bodies were observed momentarily and three men were noted swimming and
trying to wave to the plane.

V.
NEW TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. THE EXPENDABLE RADIO SONO-BUOY.

An underwater ear would be valuable in many ways to an airborne anti-submarine oper-

ator. It is one of the major handicaps of aircraft on anti-submarine missions to be
almost wholly insulated from their quarry by a few feet of water. Direct listening to
underwater noises is impossible, and devices dangled from an airplane into the water are
impractical. A third obvious method is to use a radio transmitting set to broadcast to
the aircraft from an underwater microphone. Such a device has been developed to the
point of extensive service testing.

A glance at the tactical uses and limiting conditions will show the obstacles that
have to be overcome. First, the overside gear must be small, easily stowed, quickly
launched, and light in weight. Secondly, it must be rugged, able to stand the shock of

22
 to
1 i i;

impact with the sea, and waterproof. Third, it must be acoustically sensitive and must
transmit accurately over a wide frequency range to allow various underwater noises to be
heard and identified. Finally, it must be expendable.

The solution to these problems is the expendable radio sono-buoy; a frequency-

modulated transmitter, battery powered, with a service life of four hours. Its overall
length is some forty-six inches, including attached parachute, and its diameter is four
and one half inches. It is provided with a collapsible antenna and an underwater hydro-
phone with twenty feet of supporting cable. The total weight -- buoy, parachute, trans-
mitter, hydrophone, batteries, etc., -- is fifteen pounds. Broadcast signals are re-
ceived in the plane through a special FM receiver, provided with six frequency channels.

Tactically,. the buoy is used either as a stethoscope or as a pointer. As a stetho-

cope, it can be used to decide whether an MAD contact is a wreck or a submarine, whether
a bombed submarine is running away or standing by, and, finally, it can be used at the
scene of a disappearing ASV contact to determine the nature of the target. As a pointer,
it is used to narrow the search area for a lost MIAD contact, or what amounts to the same

23
K Ii
thing, to convert a disappearing ASV contact into a live MAD contact. Several buoys are
dropped and search carried out in the vicinity of the buoy registering the most pro-
nounced U-boat noise.

A fair amount of training is required to create a skilled operator. Underwater

noises are complex and confusing, but to a trained listener yield a good deal of informa-
tion. With increasing information on sounds made by enemy submarines, operators should
be able to determine the approximate distance of the U-boat from the buoy and get a good
idea of the speed it is making.

B. MARK 20 "MOUSETRAP" BOMBS FOR AIRCRAFT

The Mark 20 "Mousetrap" bomb was originally developed as a rocket propelled contact
weapon for use by surface craft against U-boats. The bomb has an overall weight of about
60 pounds and carries 30 pounds of TNT. The charge is set off by contact with any hard
object after arming has occurred. Its light weight and excellent ballistic characteris-
tics suggest using it as an airborne contact bomb launched by normal release. When used
in this way, the rocket motor with which the bomb is fitted is useless but not harmful.

Full scale model tests have been made both in this country and in England, which
indicate a high probability of doing lethal damage if the bomb explodes on contact with
a U-boat. Experiments have shown no ricochets up to speeds of 250 miles per hour from
altitudes as low as 75 feet. Underwater trajectory tests indicate approximately 35 feet
forward travel and very little side travel.

The bombs will form a closed stick for a 500 ton U-boat with a fifteen foot spacing
on a direct beam attack. A stick of twelve has, therefore, a length of 180 feet and
weighs only 720 pounds. This contrasts with a stick of four Mark 17 depth charges having
an effective length.of 160 feet and weighing about 1300 pounds. However, since the
"Mousetrap" is unarmed until it reaches a depth of about six feet, it is not suitable
for attack on a surfaced U-boat, and depth charges are recommended for this purpose.
Moreover, the width of the contact bomb stick is, of course, only 15 feet, so that if
line errors must be seriously considered, the increased length of stick is offset by
narrowness as compared with a stick of depth charges.

"Mousetrap" bombs have been dropped on a U-boat by aircraft on two occasions. In

the first case, on December 24, a PBY carrying two Mark 17, two Mark 29 and twelve Mark
20 bombs, operating in the Trinidad area, dropped a pattern of twelve Mark 20 bombs on
a fully surfaced U-boat. This drop was in error, since the intent was to drop the depth
charges. As was to be expected. although two hits were made,-arming had niot taken place,
and no explosions occurred. In the second case, correct tactics were used. On December

29, a PBY attacked a fully surfaced U-boat with depth charges, after which the plane
made a sharp turn and came over the U-boat again while the conning tower was just sub-
merging. .Mark 20 bombs were dropped on this run over the U-boat and one, or possibly
two, contact bombs exploded. No positive evidence of a kill was obtained, though a
large oil slick was found on the ai r t een the same spot.

24 4it
C. ADMIRALTY NET DEFENS

This defense consists of a large net made of heavy wire with a mesh of five feet
horizontal and two and one half feet vertical dimensions. It is carried on large booms
seventy to seventy-five feet long projecting fifty feet out from the ship's side. The
defense extends between the two masts on a freighter, giving protection to number two to
number five holds, inclusive.

When the net is streamed and in position, one of four things will happen if it is
struck by a torpedo:

(1) If a tropedo pistol hits the mesh wire or grip joining the mesh, the torpedo
will probably detonate, and, as this will occur some fifty feet away from the ship's side,
there will be only minor damage to the ship. This will happen to some forty per cent of
all torpedoes fired at the defense, no matter what speed they are running. This estimate
is based on the size of the mesh and the diameter of the modern German torpedo pistol
whiskers.

(2) The torpedo may pass through the net until such time as its propellers get
fouled by the mesh wires, in which case the torpedo may be caught and held fast by the
net.

(3)The torpedo may pass through the net and in doing so, have its tail deflected
up and forward so that it may be deflected under and aft of the vessel's hull.

(4) If the torpedo is running at a speed in excess of thirty-five knots, it may

pass straight through the defense and hit the ship.

Extensive tests against German, British and U.S. torpedoes have shown that the nets
stop or divert about eighty per cent of the thirty-five knot, twenty-one inch torpedoes
and about fifty per cent of the forty knot, twenty-one inch torpedoes, that hit the net.
The speed lost by a freighter when towing a net on both sides of the vessel is about one
and a half knots, and by a tanker about two knots.

Only a few reports of actual operations of this defense have been received, but in-
dicated results appear satisfactory. The British steamship Fort Fork was equipped with
a torpedo net in San Francisco, and caught three torpedoes on a trip from San Francisco
to Trinidad. One exploded but caused no damage. During the African operation, twenty-
seven British ships were fitted with the Admiralty Net Defense. Two of these vessels

were attacked. One torpedo exploded in the net of the Ocean Pilgrim with no damage to
the vessel. Torpedoes were caught in the nets on each side of the Hardingham. These did
not explode but later dropped out of the net with no damage to the ship. On the other

hand, in the case of the Empire Celt, a British tanker, the torpedo broke one strand of
the net, penetrated, and the vessel subsequently sank.

D. CAMOUFLAGE; AIRCRAFT vs. SUBMARINE

A submarine in a crash dive moves forward ten to thirteen feet in one second; an
airplane in an attack moves nearly three hundred feet in a second. One second may mean
the difference beteen life or death to a submarine, and between a miss or a kill for an
airman. Camouflage o th airplanes and suibarines, therefore, is of considerable importance.
} _ ,l 25
~I /l
 - - - --. The British have experi-
mented at great length with white
/ camouflage for aircraft on anti-
aI
__ _submarine patrol. Most signifi-
4-,
o cant, perhaps, are a recent ser-
/I ies of tests to determine the
O / I chances of aircraft approaching
a, I
a0.0 within any given distance of a
-3 4submarine without being spotted
by the lookout, and the variation
I in this chance when the aircraft
04 is given white camouflage. Whit-
0 I ley type planes, flying at one
thousand feet and at a speed of
4 )one hundred forty knots, were
O - _ ,- used as test models. All vari-
o ables such as atmospheric condi-
tions, lookouts and their equip-
-f -x- ment were carefully controlled so
6,000 1,000 4,000ooo oo
3,000 000 1oo,000 /0,000 go000o that any change could be attri-

Range in Yards buted directly to the camouflage.

CHART IX
Some of the results of the'se
experiments are indicated on the
accompanying graph. It will be noted, for instance, that at twelve thousand yards the
chance of spotting an uncamouflaged Whitley is .87, whereas the chance of spotting a
white camouflaged Whitley is .42. At this distance, the latter plane is only half as apt
to be spotted as the former because of its camouflage. The graph - it must be remembered
- applies only to a Whitley flying at one thousand feet at one hundred forty knots, and
the effectiveness of this camouflage will vary as the type of plane, altitude, speed and
atmospheric conditions vary.

No single method of camouflaging an airplane, however, is perfect or even efficient

under varying conditions. If the undersurface of the wings of an airplane could be
painted.white so as to reflect 100% of the light falling on them, they would still appear
dark -since they could reflect only light from the-sea, which is approximately 5% of the
light from the sky. Experiments are now going forward on artificial lighting of planes
in addition to using the light reflective power of paint.

Vertical surfaces also present a problem in variables, since they may be seen against
a dark cloud, a clear sky or a brilliantly lit thunderhead. Thus white vertical surfaces
would be nearly perfect in a misty overcast area but not suitable in a sun-lit, cloudless
sky such as the Mediterranean or where the airplane might be subject to enemy air attack.

Camouflage is of no value when a plane is approaching from.the direction of the sun,

since the plane necessarily will appear dark unless it is directly in front of the sun so
that the watcher is dazzled. The idea directly out of the sun

26
 Experimental "White" Camouflaged B-25

appears to be at such an angle that the lower wing surfaces are not seen and the color of
the plane itself matches the sky background. The accompanying photograph shows an experi-
mental camouflaged plane on which, however, the de-icers have not been painted white.
Paints which can be used on rubber recently have been developed for this purpose. The
most effective variations of aircraft camouflage for different geographical areas and at-
mospheric conditions have not yet been completely determined. It is expected, however, that
all Antisubmarine Command aircraft will be suitably camouflaged in the near future.
The submarine is anxious also to gain every second before it is sighted and conse-
quently has exploited the possibilities of camouflage. The most common color used in the
past by a majority of submarines has been dull black - chosen because it reflects less
light than any other. Its use in the past, however, cannot be taken as an indication of
its predominance in the future. U-boats operating in the North Atlantic, for example,
have sometimes been painted a combination of light green, pale brown and sea-green blue,
a camouflage decidedly effective under conditions of low visibility and disturbed surface
conditions. The crew of a plane operating out of Nova Scotia in September, 1942, sighted
a fully surfaced U-boat which had a sea-green hull and a white conning tower. They stated
it was a very effective form of camouflage, giving the U-boat the appearance of a sail
boat even in the excellent weather conditions prevailing at the time. Likewise in Septem-
ber, Pan American pilots reported U-boats in the vicinity of Ascension Island were painted
white, which constituted an almost perfect camouflage for that particular area. Reports
from the Mediterranean show a German preference for dark neutral, and an Italian for dark
green with brown spots.
The Many different combinations of colors employed in camouflaging their U-boats
are indicative of German interest and effort in this field. Review of sightings of German
and Italian submarines by Allied Air and naval craft reveals that the following colors
have been used camouflage their U-boats: gray; light blue with alternate green and
sky blue stripesacd conning tower; sea green with white conning tower; dark neutral gray
and green; dark ray; light gray green; green white and dark green with brown spots.
 VI
ATTACKS ON GERMAN U-BOAT BASES

Admiral Doenitz' U-boat installations in Europe felt the weight of the RAF and USAAF
ten times during the month of January. Lorient, St. Nazaire, Brest and other submarine
bases were raided. Seven attacks were carried out by the RAF and three by the USAAF.
Hamburg, largest submarine manufacturing center in Europe, suffered its 94th raid, while
Cherbourg's 77th raid was executed by RAF Bostons. RAF Mosquito bombers attacked the
shipyards and U-boat engine plants at Copenhagen. The first American bombing raid on
Germany proper was made by Fortresses and Liberators over Wilhelmshaven and Emden.
Seventy-nine took part in the attack and nine of forty-five enemy interceptors were
shot down.

St. Nazaire was the objective of "the most successful raid to date" on January 3rd,
when USAAF bombers scored several hits on sub pens and docks and demolished a torpedo
storehouse. The most popular target, however, was Lorient which was blasted five times -
one pair of raids on the 14th and 15th, another pair on the 23rd, and a single long raid,
which included Bordeaux as well as Lorient, on the night of the 26th. The RAF stated
"the biggest force of British bombers sent against Europe so far this year" was employed
at Lorient on the 14th, and thirty-five aircraft bombed Lorient and Brest on the 23rd.

Announced losses in eight of the raids totalled twenty-eight aircraft, an average of

3* per raid. The largest loss in one raid was seven in the attack on St. Nazaire. Enemy
losses at St. Nazaire and Lorient were conservatively estimated at 23 destroyed, 25 prob-
ably destroyed, and 6 damaged.

Two examples of new tactics were displayed, one of deception by USAAF bombers, the
other by German fighters. The VIII Bomber CoL1mand in operations from England against
submarine pens along the west coast of France dispatched the main effort out to sea at
an altitude below 500 feet, thus concealed from Radar detection, until it was 115 miles
west of the target. At. this point the main effort climbed to normal altitude and,
simultaneously, fighter or other diversions were flown toward the French north coast.
Both the main effort and feint appeared on the enemy radio detection screen at the same
time indicating approaches from widely separated directions. The low-altitude approach
gave the enemy a minimum of warning and the enemy was compelled to split it's fighter
force in half.

Unable to make the long flights to Lorient and St. Nazaire, Allied escort fighters
went as far as Brittany with the bombers, then picked them up again on the return home.
Taking advantage of this situation, Nazi fighters waited till the attackers were over
the target area, then swarmed in against our bombers, attacking head-on from below in
pairs and turning away on their sides so that only their heavily armored bellies were
exposed to return fire. Despite heavy AA fire and frequent attempts at interception by
fighters, the German defense was not generally effective.

There is little detailed evidence of the amount of damage inflicted, but the raids
appear to have been highly suc ess u ACr eaux fires were left burning

28
on the docks. Hits were scored on the shipyards and U-boat engine plants at Copenhagen
and Hamburg. The Wilhelmshaven and Emden raids also were rated successful. -Lorient
suffered numerous hits on the sub pens, docks and other installations, as well as several
fires and RAF reconnaissance has shown that at least 10 acres of the base and naval ar-
senal at Lorient have been damaged by bombings.

German propaganda maintains that it is ridiculous to bomb the sub pens at Lorient
whose walls are 11 feet thick and roofs impregnable, but this contention is denied by
accounts from Berne, Switzerland, reporting the evacuation from Lorient of all persons
whose presence "is not necessary for the maintenance of the economic life." This report
possibly emanates from French authority, but the inspiration is necessarily German, as
Lorient is in the Forbidden Zone. Whether or not U-boats themselves were hit, the magni-
tude of the damage inflicted can be measured by the necessity of mass evacuation of the
people and the devastation recorded by the RAF reconnaissance.

VII

SUMMARY OF JANUARY WEATHER

The average contact weather during operating hours for the 25th Wing in the Eastern
Sea Frontier area was 7470, with the area north of Cape Hatteras averaging 78% contact
weather and the area south of Cape Hatteras averaging 70%. The lowest average was 67%
in the Charleston, S.C. to Langley Field, Va. area.

The 26th Wing averaged 79%0 contact weather condition during operating hours in the
Gulf Sea Frontier area. Florida stations reported 84% contact weather and the remainder
of the Gulf area 70%. The highest average of contact weather was found to be the south-
ern part of Florida with 90%o. This is due mainly to the southward seasonal migration of
the Doldrum Belt at this time of the year.

The lower average of contact weather in the Gulf and South Atlantic states was due
mainly to the advection of the warm and moist tropical maritime air from the Gulf of
Mexico and the tropical'Atlantic moving inland up the land slope to the condensation
level to the vicinity of Cape Hatteras, and occasionally as far north as New England,
producing low ceilings, poor visibility and widespread precipitation. Fog increased
over the Gulf.and South Atlantic states as is characteristic during the winter months.
In addition, the fronts of cold dry air masses of high pressure areas moving southeast-
ward from Canada had the tendency of stagnating in the vicinity of the Cape Hatteras
area.

The usual path of most cyclonic disturbances at this time of year through the New
England states resulted in a more or less regular succession of bi-weekly low pressure
storm area with accompanying fronts producing a considerable amount of snow or rain.
An intervening ito 3 day period of good weather would be accompanied by cold northwest
winds. Patrol operations were considerably restricted in this area since about the time
the front &d oved far enough eastwrd over the Atlantic Ocean to permit extended
 UNCLASSIF ED
patrols, another front would be moving in upon the Atlantic Coast operating bases from
the west or northwest. Ice on runways at bases north of Delaware restricted operations
for several days or approximately 5% to 10% of the month.
The most active precipitation producing storms were those which formed from a wave
formation on cold fronts that had previously moved off the coast and developed into a
deep and intense low pressure area in the vicinity of Cape Hatteras, centered 100 to 300
miles offshore near the Gulf Stream, and moving generally northeast to the vicinity of
New England coast where it is called the ,"Northeaster". The east wind that is produced
on the Atlantic east coast causes the moist maritime air to flow inland aloft over the
colder air over the land surfaces to condensation levels. This type of storm continues
until a wedge of cold dry air from a high pressure area.from the northwest displaces the
moist air and there follows the prevailing northwest winds accompanied by clearing skies
and the temperature often falling below zero degrees Fahrenheit even south of New York
City.

VIII
NOTES ON BOMBING AND GUNNERY TRAINING

A short time ago questionnaires were sent to all units of this Command concerning
the availability of, bombing and gunnery ranges. A directive was issued to initiate the
construction of more or less uniform range facilities at all airdromes occupied by our
units. Reports now being received from Heavy Bombardment and our own anti-submarine
squadrons outside the United States indicate that bombing and gunnery training is not
entirely satisfactory. It is our objective to provide all necessary training facilities
at each of our stations for the present units and for newly activated squadrons. These
new squadrons in particular will need every facility for bombing and gunnery training
that can be made available.

BOMBING: Submarine bombing peculiar to this type of attack requires specialized training
because: (1) a submarine is a moving and elusive target; (2) attack is largely a matter
of opportunity and seldom can an ideal run be made; (3) present bomb sights are unsatis-
factory for submarine bombing. Results now depend upon the skill and proficiency of the
bombardier which can only be developed and maintained by regular and planned practice.
In conjunction with this training, much needed study on the accuracy of present sub-
marine bombing methods will be undertaken and data compiled. Such information is neces-
sary, for example, to determine the ideal length of train. The length of train in turn
determines the spacing of bombs. Spacing, if too great, can result in a perfect straddle
without a bomb within lethal distance of the pressure hull, and, consequently, the train
should be as short as possible consistent with the expected accuracy.
AAFAC Circular 50-6 Antisubmarine Bombing practice, recently revised to authorize
additional types of targets, is based on the above considerations. Since it is a first
attempt, the methods advised cannot be considered final. As new training equipment,
ammunition and bombing methods are obtained the cg g be revised. It is
 /tW 11So

necessary that all of this circular in submarine bombing

practice, in order that uniform results can be iled for study. Two civilian special-
ists of the antisubmarine warfare unit of NDRC, stationed at Command Headquarters, will
compile the bombing accuracy data from practice records forwarded from lower units.
Suggestions for revisions of this circular will be welcomed by the Command Headquarters.

The 26th Antisubmarine Wing initiated a comprehensive submarine bombing program

prior to the receipt of AAFAC Circular 50-6, which calls for practice bombing of towed
water targets and actual practice bombing on submarines stationed at Key West. A similar
program has been arranged and will be soon initiated by the 25th Wing.

The towed diving target has been tested by the first Sea-Search Attack Group and
will be procured and distributed to units of the Command. A study is being made to lo-
cate suitable towing vessels. It is hoped that they will be made available to the Com-
mand by the Navy.

AERIAL GUNNERY TRAINING:

A circular will soon be issued concerning the training of aerial gunners. This
training has been seriously handicapped by a lack of facilities for ground training and
of aircraft equipped for towing targets. To rectify this situation several E-5 trainers
and turrets have been obtained and shipped to Headquarters Squadrons of the 25th and 26th
Wings and the 18th ARON. The use of this equipment will be coordinated by the A-3 of the
two wings. Twelve B-34 airplanes will be equipped for tow reel installation and dis-
tributed to the same units. A plan to request authorization of a tow target flight
assigned to each Wing Headquarters Squadron is under consideration. The airplanes and
personnel of the flights would be made available to the squadrons by the A-3 of each Wing..

Ground gunnery ranges should be selected close to the airdromes. The report of the

committee of officers of the VIII Bomber Command, European Theater of Operations, stresses
the importance of ground ranges being easily accessible to the units concerned. Ground
training is often a matter of opportunity. If time is lost through transportation, little
training can be accomplished during the short periods between flights.

It is agreed in this Command that graduates from flexible gunnery courses are well
instructed in the theory of aerial gunnery, but a great deal of practical training is re-
quired on their return to the squadron and they should be given the maximum that the
situation will permit. The same committee of the VIII Bomber Command stresses the neces-
sity for aerial gunners, armament and ordnance maintenance personnel to be thoroughly
trained in methods of handling ammunition and machine gun care and that the largest per-
centage of turret failures can be traced directly to improper maintenance operation.
"GUNNERS SHOULD LIVE BY THEIR GUNS FOR BY CARELESSNESS THEY MIGHT DIE BY THEM."
Our training is conducted within the United States and therefore there is a tendency
to slight training of aerial gunners. Each squadron commander must realize that next
month he an,-his unit may be in a theater of operations where losses may be expected from
enemy aer ac o. /It, behooves him to accomplish his aerial gunnery training now. Up
until no ought has Pee gv' to the inclusion of offensive formation and
evasive tactics e 's,.ommand..
ingo However, we do have a striking force
 Anow

mission and normal bombardment tactics must be practiced. For the time being, all train-
ing of this phase of operation will be guided by WD Training Circular, Number 60 and WD
Training Circular Number 84.

TRAINING IN THE USE OF SMALL ARMS:

This training must be accomplished so that each squadron will be prepared to take an
active part in airdrome defense. Recent reports reaffirm the value of the hand grenade
in close-in fighting. For this reason it has been decided to. include such training for
all our units. Parachute troops and airborne troops are most vulnerable and their disor-
ganization is more easily accomplished during the first thirty minutes after landing. If
landing of hostile troops takes place in dispersal areas a great deal of close-in fighting
may be expected to take place. These hostile troops will be carrying hand grenades and
the old solution of fighting fire with fire still holds.

IX

HISTORY OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

ANTISUBMARINE COMMAND

On the morning of December 8, 1941, the Commanding General of the First Air Force
issued an order to the Commanding General of the I Bomber Command to institute imnmediate
overwater reconnaissance by all available aircraft to locate and attack any enemy surface
forces which might be approaching our coast for raids or invasion. At 1005 that same
morning, Majors Lyon and Feagin of the I Bomber Command, together with a group of seven
enlisted men, arrived at Mitchel Field to begin operations. In the early afternoon,
patrols by planes of the 20th, 43rd and 96th Bombardment Squadrons were flown along the
coastline. Thus, although there was no mention of providing air coverages for the pro-
tection of merchant shipping or for the seeking out and destruction of enemy U-boats,
these December 8th operations were the beginning of the Antisubmarine Command.

It can be considered a real stroke of good fortune that enemy U-boats did not put in
their appearance for the first few weeks of the war. The I Bomber Command, on December
8, was part of the First Air Force, assigned to the northeastern section of the United
States. The Command at that time was able to send out planes equipped with demolition
bombs, capable of conducting high-level bombing attacks against any enemy surface craft
which might have presented themselves but the tactics and technique necessary for the
conduct of anti-submarine warfare were non-existent. In addition, there were no facili-
ties for joint Army-Navy operations, although the idea had at least been discussed on
paper. The original plan called for a joint operational headquarters for the First Army
and North Atlantic Naval Frontier. The Atlantic Naval Frontier, however, became the
Eastern Sea .Frontier, and the I Bomber Command operated with the ESF from the very first
day. Operations under a formal unity of command, however, did not begin until March
26 1942.

After four days at M pFieldthte Headquarters moved to the 14th

floor of the Federal Bull V l t 90 Q c ,k, and officially began opera-
tions from there at 1520, December 12th, with a message sent to all units notifying them
of the new address.

The Command, by the middle of January, was able to set up a wire system of communica-
tions to all bases, and had begun to establish a system through which intelligence could
be communicated from Bomber Command Headquarters to squadron operations rooms, and from
airplane to Headquarters. Also, at this time, Colonel Bob Williams, who had been with the
A-3 Section of the First Air Force, was assigned to the Command as Executive Officer and
served in this capacity until he was promoted to Brigadier General in October. On March
1, Colonel Larson, Commanding Officer of the 13th Bombardment Group at Westover Field,
was promoted to Brigadier General, and within a few days assumed command of the I Bomber
Command, which now had a staff of sixteen officers, including Special Staff members. Units
were located as follows: 92nd Reconnaissance Squadron, Dow Field, Me.; 45th Bombardment
Group, Grenier Field, Manchester, N.H.; 13th Bombardment Group, Westover Field, Mass.;
20th Bombardment Squadron, Mitchel Field, N.Y.; and the 2nd Bombardment Group, Langley
Field, Va. There was also a "striking force" of a few B-18's under the command of Col.
Merrick, located at Charlestown, S.C.

The aircraft employed at that time were for the most part unsatisfactory for anti-
submarine work. The only type of plane available in any number was the old B-18 which,
at that time, was not equipped with Radar. There was one squadron of B-17's and a group
of DB-7's. At this time, all the observation aircraft were operating under the control
of the 1st Air Support Command.

It was soon realized that separate control rooms for the Army and Navy were unsatis-
factory and steps were taken to set up a joint control room. With the aid of Wing Com-
manders Canning and Gibbs of the Royal Air Force Coastal Command, and, under the direction
of Commander Robert Payne of Eastern Sea Frontier a new joint Army-Navy control organi-
zation was planned and construction begun.

Meantime the Army and Navy began joint operations in early April in what was then
the Navy Control Room. Here the Army and the Navy Air Controllers and the Navy Surface
Controller sat side by side for joint control. This system worked so well that a
similar control room was organized at Headquarters of the Gulf Sea Frontier at Miami.
The Army unit sent by Command Headquarters became known as Gulf Sea Frontier. At the
same time work was begun on standardization of all station controls similar to the con-
trol room at Headquarters.

Finally in October, the permanent Joint Control Room in the Federal Building was
completed, and at 0800, October 9, operations were begun. The control room is located in
the center of the building while office space for Army and Navy personnel is on either
side. Controllersiton a raised platform overlooking a situation map which covers the
entire wall and includes all the coastal and water area from Halifax to the Caribbean.'
In the rear of the platform, Army and NavyjIntelligence Officers receive and evaluate
incoming intelligence messages.~"~~c
-
which ar ~ thenreerred
htlfrr d to
to the Senior Controller
the Senior for ac-
Controller for ac-
tion. Previously, the Intelligence Officers were located in separate rooms, but it was
found that by working together, the evaluation of information was more accurately and
quickly accomplished.

33
 F CLRF
., ED
Due to the-geographical divisions of various commands, administrative difficulties
were encountered in the shifting of squadrons to new areas of submarine activity. Al-
though a squadron could "pick up" and shift from Maine to Mexico in a day after receiving
the necessary orders, the processing of the move through the various channels of Army and
Navy command would take a long time. To correct this situation, the Army Air Force units
engaged in hunting submarines along the Atlantic Coast were organized as the Army Air
Forces Antisubmarine Command. This organization was created under the direction and ap-
proval of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The
field of operations of the Command was also greatly expanded. The directive stated in
effect that the Antisubmarine Command was to have no geographical limitations but would
operate against enemy submarines wherever they might be located.

In accordance with the directive,- the Antisubmarine Command was activated on October
13, 1942, and was organized into two Wings. The 25th Wing took over the physical set-up
of the I Bomber Command at 90 Church Street and the Gulf Task Force at Miami became the
26th Wing. The Command itself also established its Headquarters in the Federal Office
Building in New York. The Antisubmarine Command now consists of twenty permanently as-
signed squadrons and three others that are attached. Three of the permanently assigned
squadrons are on.detached service outside the continental limits of the United States,
while one is a training squadron directly under the Command. Eight are observation
squadrons which are currently making the transition to four-engine bombardment planes.

The equipment for the Antisubmarine Command has been standardized with the B-24 for
heavy aircraft and the B-25 for medium aircraft. It is expected that the rate at which
the Command will receive new aircraft will gradually increase as the overall production
of these plane types increases.

From a tiny nucleus of December 8, 1941, the I Bomber Command found itself within
ninety days as the only tactical Army command in the United States actually engaging the
enemy. The war in which it was engaged was with a singularly elusive and ruthless enemy
who was destroying hundreds of ships and thousands of lives in our own home waters. With
victory on the Atlantic Coast won, the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command now faces
the greatest expansion in its history and its greatest task,--seeking out and destroying
enemy submarines wherever they may be located. It is being called upon to do its part,
in cooperation with the Air Forces and Navies of the Allied Nations, in destroying the
enemy's one remaining hope of victory through cutting the supply lines to our armed
forces.

x
AMERICAN THEATER CAMPAIGN RIBBON

Many of the officers and men of this Command are now entitled to wear the American
Theater Campaign Ribbon. The Secretary of War has ruled that the duty performed by the
combat crew members of the Army Air Forces Ant rine Command while on anti-submarine'
patrol at sea is considered as perice e e ntinental United States for the
purpose of authority jm 1 Arbon.
 ~L

OPERATIONAL STATISTICS

25TH WING Operations Table - January, 1943

BOMBARDMENT RECON ESCORT SPECIAL TRAINING TOTAL

3 ARON. ~ e~o 175:20 149:40 63:15 162:15 550:30

4 ARON. ro r 175:50 202:30 113:00 47:40 539:00
5 ARON. 226:10 43:15 95:45 94:45 459:55
6 ARON. 80:40 7:45 49:30 40:40 178:35
11 ARON. 5:50 0:45 104:55 111:30
12 ARON. 101:40 244:25 346:05
13 ARON. 4:40 134:20 139:00.
14 ARON. . . . . . . . .. . 64:00 9:00 26:00 288:50 387:50
16 ARON. 3:35 161:40 165:15
19 ARON. 120:35 142:40 97:45 95:55 456:55
46 BS. . 488:05 44:35 10:45 214:15 757:40

TOTAL BOMBARDMENT 1438:10 599:25 465:00 1589:40 4092:15

CIVIL AIR PATROL,

COASTAL PATROL RECON ESCORT SPECIAL TRAINING TOTAL

# 1 ATLANTIC CITY, N.J . 240:55 949:15 1190:10

# 2 REHOBOTH, DELAWARE . . 407:00 168:50 575:50
# 4 PARKSLEY, VIRGINIA 174:30 175:20 349:50
# 6 ST. SIMON'S ISLE, GA . 373:43 127:02 500:45
# 8 ST. JAMES ISLE, S.C. . 259:37 198:30 458:07
#16 MANTEO, N.C. . . . . . 464:15 29:10 493:25
#17 SUFFOLK, L.I . . . . . 518:55 518:55
#18 FALMOUTH, MASS . 276:25 184:10 460:35
#19 PORTLAND, MAINE. . 362:20 255:05 617:25
#20 BAR HARBOR, MAINE. . . 369:35 123:50 493:25
#21 BEAUFORT, N.C. . . 408:17 113:10 521:27

TOTAL CAP, CP. 3855:32 2324:22 6179:5.4

TOTAL 25TH WING 5293:42 .i ";%2923:47465:00 1589:40 10,272:09

18 ARON, AAFAC O.T.U... 245:35 448:50 694:25

 " ' L"
COMb . EAVENWORI I"I,
N,

3 1695
008513

26TH WING Operations Table - January, 1943

BOMBARDMENT RECON ESCORT SPECIAL TRAINING TOTAL

7 ARON . .. . . . . . 17:55 29:35 198:55 246:25

8 ARON . .. . . . . 322:45 9:45 400:15 732:45
10 ARON . . . . . . . . 128:45 9:40 130:55 269:20
15 ARON . . ......... 16:25 16:25
17 ARON . . ......... 27:20 61:15 88:35
76 BS . . . . . . . . . .. 193:50 106:00 247:45 547:35

TOTAL BOMBARDMENT 690:35 145:15 9:45 1055:30 1901:05

OBSERVATION RECON ESCORT SPECIAL TRAINING TOTAL

124 OBSN . . . . . . . 65:25 104:15 169:40

128 OBSN . . . . . . . . . 174:05 27:10 231:40 432:55

TOTAL OBSERVATION 239:30 27:10 335:55 602:35

TOTAL BOMBARDMENT
AND OBSERVATION 930:05 172:25 9:45 1391:25 2503:40

CIVIL AIR PATROL,

COASTAL PATROL RECON ESCORT SPECIAL TRAINING TOTAL

# 3 LANTANA, FLA . . . . . 552:25 224:50 777:15

# 5 DAYTONA, FLA . . . . . 624:35 114:20 738:55
# 7 MIAMI, FLA . . . . . . 546:05 117:15 663:20
# 9 GRAND ISLE, LA . . . . 342:45 6:10 348:55
#10 BEAUMONT, TEXAS . . . 461:30 37:05 498:35
#11 PASCAGOULA, MISS . . . 472:10 6:10 478:20
#12 BROWNSVILLE, TEXAS . . 477:,30 54:10 531:40
#13 TAMPA, FLA . . . . .. 580:35 580:35
#14 PANAMA CITY,. FLA . . . 574:15 19:10 593:25
#15 CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS. 443:00 90:30 533:30

TOTAL CAP, CP. 5074:50 669:40 5744:30

TOTAL 26TH WING 6004:55 842:05 9:45 1391:25 8248:10

CLINTON A. BURROWS,
Air Corps, A. C. of S., A-2.