La Naval v CA, 236 S 78
FACTS: Respondent Yao was the owner of a commercial building, a portion of
which is leased to herein petitioner. However, during the renewal of the
contract of lease, the two disagreed on the rental rate, and to resolve the
controversy, they submitted their disagreement to arbitration. Two arbitrators
(Alamarez and Sabile) has been appointed by the parties while the
appointment of the third arbitrator (Tupang) was held in abeyance because La
Naval Drug instructed its arbitrator to defer the same until its Board of
Directors could convene and approved Tupang’s appointment. This was
theorized by the respondent as dilatory tactics, hence, he prayed that a
summary hearing be conducted and direct the 2 arbitrators to proceed with
the arbitration in accordance with Contract of Lease and the applicable
provisions of the Arbitration law, by appointing and confirming the
appointment of the Third Arbitrator; and that the Board of Three Arbitrators
be ordered to immediately convene and resolve the controversy before it. The
respondent court announced that the two arbitrators chose Mrs. Eloisa R.
Narciso as the third arbitrator and ordered the parties to submit their position
papers on the issue as to whether or not respondent Yao's claim for damages
may be litigated upon in the summary proceeding for enforcement of
arbitration agreement. In moving for reconsideration of the said Order,
petitioner argued that in Special Case No. 6024, the respondent court sits as a
special court exercising limited jurisdiction and is not competent to act on
respondent Yao's claim for damages, which poses an issue litigable in an
ordinary civil action. However, respondent court was not persuaded by
petitioner's submission, hence, it denied the motion for reconsideration. While
the appellate court has agreed with petitioner that, under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 876, a court, acting within the limits of its special jurisdiction, may in
this case solely determine the issue of whether the litigants should proceed or
not to arbitration, it, however, considered petitioner in estoppel from
questioning the competence of the court to additionally hear and decide in the
summary proceedings private respondent's claim for damages, it(petitioner)
having itself filed similarly its own counterclaim with the court a quo.
ISSUE/S:
1.WON THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON.
2.WON THE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER?
RATIO:
As to the first issue, it was held that jurisdiction over the person must be
seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an
affirmative defense in an answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a
waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall
not be constructed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
With regard to the second issue, it was held that where the court itself clearly
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the
invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts
nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that
jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. Barring highly
meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as herein before exemplified,
neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply. The court must then refrain from taking
up the claims of the contending parties for damages, which, upon the other
hand, may be ventilated in separate regular proceedings.
ATWEL v CONCEPCION PROGRESSIVE ASSOC INC
Doctrine: Estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none
over the cause of action or subject matter of the case. It is neither fair nor
legal to bind a party to the result of a suit or proceeding in a court with no
jurisdiction. The decision of a tribunal not vested with the appropriate
jurisdiction is null and void.
Assemblyman Melgazo founded & organized Concepcion Progressive
Association (CPA) in Leyte. It aimed to provide livelihood and generate income
for its supporters.
Melgazo was elected president. He bought a parcel of land in behalf of the
association, which was later on converted into a wet market and cockpit. The
income generated, mostly rentals from the market, was paid to CPA.
When Melgazo died, his son, petitioner Manuel, succeeded him as president
and admin of the property. On the other hand, petitioners Atwel and Pilpil were
likewise elected as VP and Treasurer.
In the process of registering as a stock corporation, its other elected officers
formed their own group and registered themselves in the SEC as Concepcion
Progressive Association Incorporated (CPAI). Petitioners were not listed as
officers nor members.
Later, CPAI objected to petitioners’ collection of rentals from the market.
CPAI filed a case w/ SEC for injunction. With the passage of RA 8799 (Securities
Regulation Code), the case was transferred to RTC Leyte then later to RTC
Tacloban. Both were special commercial courts.
CPAI alleged that it was the rightful owner. Petitioners refuted by saying that it
was impossible for CPAI to have acquired ownership over the property in 1968
because only in 1997 was it incorporated.
RTC ruled that the property was in the name of CPA, not Melgazo. It considered
CPAI = CPAI
Petitioners appealed. According to them, they were not CPAI members, hence
the case did not involve an intra-corporate dispute "between and among
members" so as to warrant the special commercial court's jurisdiction over it.
CA held: “petitioners are admittedly not members of CPAI, then, the special
commercial court should not have taken cognizance of the case… However, as
correctly pointed out by CPAI, the acts of the petitioners, through their counsel,
in participating in the trial of the case...show that they themselves consider the
trial court to have jurisdiction over the case.”
Issue: Will estoppel bar petitioners from questioning the jurisdiction of the
special commercial court?
Held: NO. Originally, section 5 of PD902 conferred on the SEC original and
exclusive jurisdiction over “intra-corporate controversies.” However, the
jurisdiction of the SEC was later on transferred to the courts of general
jurisdiction pursuant to the enactment of RA 8799.
The conflict among the parties here was outside the jurisdiction of the special
commercial court.
The issue in this case does not concern the regulation of CPAI or even CPA. The
determination as to who is the true owner of the disputed property should be
threshed out in a regular court.
The rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that
has none over the cause of action or subject matter of the case. Jurisdiction by
estoppel is not available here. Consequently, CPAI cannot be permitted to
wrest from petitioners (as the remaining CPA officers) the administration of the
disputed property until after the parties' rights are clearly adjudicated in the
proper courts. It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party to the result of a suit or
proceeding in a court with no jurisdiction. The decision of a tribunal not vested
with the appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.
FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE ( G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008 )
FACTS:On July 8, 1994, an information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide was filed againstthe petitioner before the RTC. The trial court
convicted the petitioner as charged. In his appealbefore the CA, the petitioner
questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial court’sjurisdiction.The
appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner
to haveactively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the
jurisdiction of the RTC; thus,he was already estopped by laches from asserting
the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Is the petitioner estopped by laches from assailing the
jurisdiction of a tribunal?
RULING: NO. the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal
before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet
elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not
sustain the defense of estoppel by laches unless it further appears that the
party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of
the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot
be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of
evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying
the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the
Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of
having the judgment creditors go up their Cavalry once more after more or less
15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in this instant case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not
favored by law. It is to be applied rarely - only from necessity, and only in
extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great case and
the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of
estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.
Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is
void. Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking
judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction is null and
void for want of jurisdiction.
Samar II Electric Cooperative Inc. (SAMELCO II) et al. vs. Ananias Seludo Jr. G.R.
No. 173840, April 25, 2012
FACTS
Respondent Seludo is a member of SAMELCO II’s BOD. A board
resolution was issued disallowing respondent from attending meetings
of the BOD effective February 2005 until the end of his term as
directed and disqualified him for one term to run as candidate for director
in the upcoming district elections. Respondent then filed an Urgent Petition
for Prohibition against SAMELCO II with the RTC in Calbiga, Samar. RTC
granted a TRO in favour of Seludo effective for 72 hours and later extended for
another 17 days. Petitioners then raised an affirmative defense of lack of lack
of jurisdiction of RTC over subject matter, the same being with the
National Electrification Administration (NEA). RTC sustained its jurisdiction over
the matter, motion for reconsideration was denied. CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE: Does the NEA have primary jurisdiction over the question of
the validity of the Board Resolution issued by SAMELCO II?
RULING: Yes, pursuant to Subsection (a), Sec. 24, Chapter III of PD 269 as
amended by Sec. 7, PD 1645 clearly shows that, pursuant to its power of
supervision and control, NEA is granted the authority to conduct investigations
and other similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules and regulations with
respect to all matters affecting electric cooperatives. In addition, while the
RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition, the NEA, in its
exercise of its power of supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction
to determine the issue of the validity of the subject resolution. Petition granted.
BELLE CORP vs. ERLINDA DE LEON, et. Al (CASE DIGEST)
FACTS:
Plaintiffs-appellants herein respondents Erlinda Banks, Rhodora Tiatco, Betty
Torres,Gregorio De Leon, Alberto De Leon, Eufronio De Leon, Jr. and defendant-
appellee Nelia Allejewere seven of the eight children of the late spouses
Eufronio and Josefa De Leon, while plaintiff Maria Eliza De Grano also one
of herein respondents was the daughter and sole heir of the late
Angelina De LeonDe Grano, the eighth child. Defendant-
appellee Alfredo Alleje was thehusband ofNelia De Leon-Alleje (both
hereinafter referred to as SPOUSES ALLEJE), both of whom were the principal
stockholders and officers of defendant-appellee Nelfred Properties
Corporation (NELFRED). The disputed property was a 13.29 hectare parcel of
unregistered landoriginally belonging to the late spouses Eufronio and Josefa.
On February 9, 1979, a Deed of Absolute Sale (1979 DEED) was executed
between the LATE SPOUSES and NELFRED,
represented therein by Nelia, wherein ownership of the property was convey
ed to Neliafor P 60,000.00 and was thereafter registered with
the Register of Deeds.
Herein petitioner BELLE, on one hand, and NELFRED and SPOUSES ALLEJE on
the other executed a Contract to Sell covering the disputed property. Deed of
Absolute Sale (1998 DEED) was executed 24, 1998 between BELLE and
NELFRED wherein the latter transferred ownership of the disputed property to
the former. Meanwhile, on January 19, 1998, respondents filed a Complaint for
"Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance of Property with Prayer for
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages" against the SPOUSES
ALLEJE, NELFRED and BELLE wherein they sought the annulment of the Contract
to Sell. On February 9, 1998, BELLE filed a Motion to Dismiss wherein it alleged
that the Complaint stated no cause of action against BELLE, which was an
innocent purchaser for value. RTC dismissed the Complaint against BELLE for
failure to state a cause of action on the ground that there was no allegation in
the Complaint that BELLE was a purchaser in bad faith. Herein respondents
then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration. On November 11, 1998, pending the resolution of their
Motion for Reconsideration of the September 23, 1998 Order, herein respond
ents filed aManifestation/Motion to admit their Amended.
Complaint and at the same time, the RTCadmitted the Amended Complaint of
the plaintiffs-appellants. BELLE filed a "Motion for Reconsideration or to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint" wherein it alleged that the Amended
Complaint still stated no cause of action. RTC reconsidered its Order and lifted
the dismissal against BELLE. Aggrieved by the Order of the RTC, respondents
filed an appeal with the CA.CA, reversed and set aside RTC order. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON cause of action exists to warrant the right of herein respondents
to sue against BELLE.
RULING
The essential elements of a cause of action are (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. In determining whether
a complaint states a cause of action, the RTC can consider all the pleadings
filed, including annexes, motions, and the
evidence on record. The focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the ma
terialallegations. Moreover, the complaint does not have to establish facts
proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be
done at the trial on the merits of the case. It is evident from the allegations in
the Amended Complaint that respondents specifically alleged that they are
owners of the subject property being held in trust by their sister, Nelia Alleje,
and that petitioner acted in bad faith when it bought the property from
their sister, through her company, Nelfred, knowing that herein respondents
claim ownership over it. The Court, thus, finds no error on the part of the CA in
ruling that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to establish acause of
action for the nullification of the sale of the subject property to herein
petitioner.
City of Bacolod v. San Miguel
FACTS:
On February 17, 1949, the City Council of Bacolod passed Ordinance No. 66,
series of 1949 imposing upon "any person, firm or corporation engaged in the
manufacturer bottling of coca-cola, pepsi cola, tru orange, lemonade, and
other soft drinks within the jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod, ... a fee of ONE
TWENTY-FOURTH (1/24) of a centavo for every bottle thereof," plus "a
surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to exceed 24% for one whole
year," upon "such local manufacturers or bottler above-mentioned who will be
delinquent on any amount of fees due" under the ordinance. This ordinance
was subsequently amended by Ordinance No. 150 by increasing the fee to 1/8
of a centavo for every bottle thereof.
Such increase was opposed by the appellant San Miguel.
Appellee CoB sued appellant SM. Court rendered judgment in favor of CoB
ordering SM to pay it the sum of P26K and the tax at the rate of 3 centavos oer
case.
Appellant SM appealed from the said decision to this Court where it pressed
the question of the invalidity of the abovementioned taxing ordinances. In that
appeal, however, the Court affirmed the decision appealed from and upheld
the constitutionality of the questioned ordinances and the authority of the
appellee to enact the same.
For reasons not extant in the record, it was already after this decision had
become final when appellee moved for the reconsideration thereof, praying
that the same be amended so as to include the penalties and surcharges
provided for in the ordinances.
Said motion was denied, for the reason that "the decision is already final and
may not be amended." When execution was had before the lower court, the
appellee again sought the inclusion of the surcharges referred to; and once
again the move was frustrated by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental which denied the motion.
Failing thus in its attempt to collect the surcharge provided for in the
ordinances, appellee filed a second action to collection the said surcharges
(P36K).
Appellant SM filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that: (1) the
cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, and (2) a party may not institute
more than one suit for a single cause of action. This motion was denied by the
court a quo so appellant filed its answer wherein it substantially reiterated, as
affirmative defenses, the above-mentioned grounds of its motion to dismiss.
Thereafter, the parties submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings,
whereupon, the court rendered judgment ordering the defendant San Miguel
Brewery, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P36,519.10 representing the
surcharges as provided in section 4 of Ordinance 66, series of 1949 of the City
of Bacolod.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s act of filing another action for surcharges constitutes
splitting of action?
RULING: YES. Appellant SM’s position was upheld by the Court. There is no
question that appellee split up its cause of action when it filed the first
complaint seeking the recovery of only the bottling taxes or charges plus legal
interest, without mentioning in any manner the surcharges.
The rule on the matter is clear. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court
of 1940 which were still in force then provided:
SEC. 3. Splitting a cause of action, forbidden. — A single cause of action cannot
be split up into two or more parts so as to be made the subject of different
complaints. .
SEC. 4. Effect of splitting. — If separate complaints were brought for different
parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in
abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the merits in either is available
as a bar in the others.
Indeed, this rule against the splitting up of a cause of action is an old one. In
fact, it preceded the Rules of Court or any statutory provision.
The classical definition of a cause of action is that it is "a delict or wrong by
which the rights of the plaintiff are violated by the defendant." Its elements
may be generally stated to be (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a
corresponding obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right;
and (3) an act or omission of the plaintiff which constitutes a violation of the
plaintiff's right which defendant had the duty to respect. In the last analysis, a
cause of action is basically an act or an omission or several acts or omissions. A
single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as
when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct
legal obligations. On the other hand, it can happen also that several acts or
omissions may violate only one right, in which case, there would be only one
cause of action. Again the violation of a single right may give rise to more than
one relief. In other words, for a single cause of action or violation of a right, the
plaintiff may be entitled to several reliefs. It is the filing of separate complaints
for these several reliefs that constitutes splitting up of the cause of action. This
is what is prohibited by the rule.
In the case at bar, when appellant failed and refused to pay the difference in
bottling charges such act of appellant in violation of the right of appellee to be
paid said charges in full under the Ordinance, was one single cause of action,
but under the Ordinance, appellee became entitled, as a result of such non-
payment, to two reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the balance of the basic
charges; and (2) the payment of the corresponding surcharges, the latter being
merely a consequence of the failure to pay the former.
The obligation of appellant to pay the surcharges arose from the violation by
said appellant of the same right of appellee from which the obligation to pay
the basic charges also arose. Upon these facts, it is obvious that appellee has
filed separate complaints for each of two reliefs related to the same single
cause of action, thereby splitting up the said cause of action
Jalandoni v. Martir-Guanzon
FACTS:
On January 9, 1947, the appellant spouses began a suit (Case No. 573) against
the appellees Antonio Guanzon, eta al., for partition of various lots and for
recovery of damages caused by the defendants' unwarranted refusal to
recognize plaintiffs' right and partition said lots, as was to account for and
deliver plaintiff's share in the crops obtained during the agricultural years from
1941-1942 to 1946-1947.
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental held for plaintiffs and ordered the
partition of the lands involved, but denied their claim for damages because of
failure to "prove the exact and actual damages suffered by them.
The decision having become final because none of the parties appealed
therefrom, the plaintiffs instituted the present action seeking recovery from
the defendants for moral and exemplary damages, share of the products of the
property from 1947 until 1955, taxes due unpaid and attorney’s fees.
Upon motion of defendant's, the court a quo dismissed the second complaint
for failure to state a cause of action; and after their motion to reconsider was
denied, plaintiffs appealed to this Court on points of law.
ISSUE: W/N dismissal was proper?
RULING: YES. The Court found the dismissal of the lower court to have been
correctly entered. Except as concomitant to physical injuries, moral and
corrective damages (allegedly due to suffering, anguish and axiety caused by
the refusal of defendants in 1941 to partition the common property) were not
recoverable under the Civil Code of 1899 which was the governing law at the
time. Recovery of such damages was established for the first time in 1950 by
the new Civil Code, and action not be made to apply retroactively to acts that
occurred character of these damages. The rule is expressly laid down by
paragraph 1 of Article 2257 of the new Code.
As to the value of the plaintiff's share in the products of the land during the
time that the former action was pending (which are the damages claimed under
the second cause of action), their recovery is now barred by the previous
judgment.
In the same way that plaintiffs claimed for their share of the produce from 1941
to 1947, these later damages could have been claimed in the first action, either
in the original complaint or else by supplemental pleading. To allow them to be
recovered by subsequent suit would be a violation of the rule against
multiplicity of suits, and specifically of sections 3 and 4 of Rules 2 of the Rules
of Court, against the splitting of causes of action, since these damages spring
from the same cause of action that was pleading in the former case No. 573
between the same parties.
Anent the land taxes allegedly overdue and unpaid, it is readily apparent that,
taxes been due to the government, plaintiffs have no right to compel payment
thereof to themselves. Little need be said concerning the claim for attorney's
fees under the fourth cause of action. If they be fees for the lawyer's services
in the former case, they are barred from recovery for the reasons already given;
if for services in the present case, there is no jurisdiction therefor, since no case
is made out for the plaintiffs.
Joseph v. Bautista
FACTS:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying
cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila.
Said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to
Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan. Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock,
boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City. While said cargo truck was
negotiating the National Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant
Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same
direction.
At about the same time, a pick-up truck, supposedly owned by respondents
Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro
Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck thereby forcing the cargo truck to
veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result,
petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez,
as owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and
against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and
driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an
owner of the pick-up truck and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in
the future.
Petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed his amended complaint impleading
respondents Jacinto Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional
alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently could not ascertain who the real
owner of said cargo truck was, whether respondents Patrocinio Perez or
Rosario Vargas, and who was the real owner of said pick-up truck, whether
respondents Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.
Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her co-
defendants for indemnity and subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay
petitioner's claim, and therein impleaded cross-defendant Alberto Cardeno as
additional alternative defendant.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause
Respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against
Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid the defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents
petitioner's claim for injuries sustained. And by reason thereof, petitioner were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner
executed a release of claim releasing them from liability. under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence,
is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the
A few months after, they also paid respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for
same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule
damages to her cargo truck. Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan,
against unjust enrichment.
Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross
defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan
on the Instant Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already
There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to
paid damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that respondents
petitioner. On the evidence presented in the court below, the trial court found
Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid an amount to petitioner.
them to be so liable. It is undisputed that petitioner, in his amended complaint,
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion and prayed that the trial court holds respondents jointly and severally liable.
Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was
The respondents having been found to be solidarily liable to petitioner, the full
premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor
payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release
of the other respondents inured to the benefit of respondent Perez,
from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment
considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
and release from liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein
Respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing the case, and a respondent Patrocinio Perez.
motion for the reconsideration thereof was denied.

Petitioner, by way of appeal, contends that respondent judge erred in declaring

Republic vs Marcos – Manotoc et. al
that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson,
Villanueva and Pagarig. Facts:

ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s contention is correct?
RULING: NO. The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the-
delict or wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one
injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. In
the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury
on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the
correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the
appropriate remedies allowed by law.
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino
created the PresidentialCommission of Good Government (PCGG). The PCGG
filed a Complaint against Ferdinand Marcos, whohas later substituted by his
estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents
ImeeMarcos – Manotoc, Irene Marcos – Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas
Marcos, and Gregorio Araneta III.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners are parties in interest.
Ruling:
Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of judgment award, much less be deprived of the truck as a consequence of the
Ferdinand E. Marcos, it isimperative therefore that the estate be duly levy in execution.
represented. The purpose behind this rule is the protectionof the right to due
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ff. grounds: (1) respondent has no
process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the intervening
legal personality to sue, having no real interests over the property subject of
death.The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be properly
the instant complaint; (2) the allegations in the complaint do not sufficiently
represented in the suitthrough the duly appointed legal representatives of his
state that the respondent has cause of action; (3) the allegations in the
estate. On that note, we take judicial notice ofthe probate proceedings
complaint do not contain sufficient cause of action as against him; and (4) the
regarding the will of Ferdinand E. Marcos. In Republic of the Philippines
complaint is not accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit and Bond that would
v.Marcos II, we upheld the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of letters
entitle the respondent to the delivery of the truck pendente lite.
testamentary in sodium to Ferdinand R. Marcos , Jr. and Imelda
Romualdez – Marcos as executors of the last will and testament ofthe late The NLRC also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
Ferdinand E. Marcos and lack of cause of action.

Meanwhile, Lavarez filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Third-

Party Complaint. By way of special and affirmative defenses, he asserted that
Sarsaba v. Vda. De Te represented by Attorney-in-Fact Faustino Castaneda
the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the
FACTS: complaint does not state a cause of action.

A Decision was rendered in NLRC Case entitled, Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro RTC issued an Order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
Gasing/Truck Operator, finding Sereno to have been illegally dismissed and
Petitioner denied the material allegations in the complaint. Lavarez filed a
ordering Gasing to pay him his monetary claims in the amount of P43,606.47.
Motion for Inhibition which was opposed by respondent.
After the Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied, Labor Arbiter Newton R.
RTC issued an Order of inhibition and directed the transfer of the records. RTC
Sancho issued an Alias Writ of Execution, directing Fulgencio R. Lavarez, Sheriff
issued another Order denying the separate motions to dismiss filed by NLRC
II of NLRC, to satisfy the judgment award.
and Lavarez.
Lavarez, accompanied by Sereno and his counsel, petitioner Atty. Rogelio E.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Case on the ff grounds: (1)
Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck bearing License Plate No. LBR-514, which at that
lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants; and (2) to discharge
time was in the possession of Gasing. Said truck was sold at public auction, with
respondent’s attorney-in-fact for lack of legal personality to sue.
Sereno appearing as highest bidder.
Respondent Fe Vda. De Te DIED. Respondent, through her lawyer, Atty. William
Meanwhile, respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact,
G. Carpentero, filed an Opposition, contending that the failure to serve
Faustino Castañeda, filed with the RTC a Complaint for recovery of motor
summons upon Sereno is not a ground for dismissing the complaint, because
vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente lite against
the other defendants have already submitted their respective responsive
petitioner, Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC. She alleged the ff: (1) she is the wife
pleadings.
of the late Pedro Te, the registered owner of the truck; (2) Gasing merely rented
the truck from her; (3) Lavarez erroneously assumed that Gasing owned the RTC issued the assailed Order denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion to Dismiss.
truck because he was, at the time of the "taking," in possession of the same;
and (4) since neither she nor her husband were parties to the labor case Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Inhibition in
between Sereno and Gasing, she should not be made to answer for the which he claimed that the judge who issued the Order was biased and partial.
Petitioner then directly sought recourse from the SC via the present petition
involving purely questions of law, which he claimed were resolved by the RTC
contrary to law and existing jurisprudence.
Petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the effect of non-service of
summons following the death of the person to whom it should be served, and
the effect of the death of the complainant during the pendency of the case.
Petitioner argues that, since Sereno died before summons was served on him,
the RTC should have dismissed the complaint against all the defendants and
that the same should be filed against his estate.
Petitioner asks that the complaint should be dismissed, not only against
Sereno, but as to all the defendants, considering that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Sereno.
Petitioner also moves that respondent's attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda,
be discharged as he has no more legal personality to sue on behalf of Fe Vda.
de Te, who passed away on April 12, 2005, during the pendency of the case
before the RTC.
ISSUE: (Relevant in this topic) Effect of Death of party
RULING: Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the
sheriff, his deputy or other proper court officer, either personally by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant or by substituted service. On the other hand,
summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court may acquire
jurisdiction over his person.
Petitioner raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the person of Sereno, not
in his Motion to Dismiss or in his Answer but only in his Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss. Having failed to invoke this ground at the proper time, that is, in a
motion to dismiss, petitioner cannot raise it now for the first time on appeal.
The court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over one's person is a defense which
is personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno
to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can petitioner invoke such
ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case
dismissed against all of the defendants. Failure to serve summons on Sereno's
person will not be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint against the other
defendants, considering that they have been served with copies of the
summons and complaints and have long submitted their respective responsive
pleadings. In fact, the other defendants in the complaint were given the chance
to raise all possible defenses and objections personal to them in their
respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent answers.
Patricio Sereno died before the summons, together with a copy of the
complaint and its annexes, could be served upon him. However, the failure to
effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of the defendants herein
does not render the action DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three (3) other
defendants, namely, Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, Fulgencio Lavares and the NLRC,
were validly served with summons and the case with respect to the answering
defendants may still proceed independently. Be it recalled that the three (3)
answering defendants have previously filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
which was denied by the Court. Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno
will be DISMISSED and the same may be filed as a claim against the estate of
Patricio Sereno, but the case with respect to the three (3) other accused will
proceed.
As for the issue regarding the respondent’s attorney-in-fact, While it may be
true as alleged by defendants that with the death of Plaintiff, Fe Vda. de Te, the
Special Power of Attorney she executed empowering the Attorney-in-fact,
Faustino Castañeda to sue in her behalf has been rendered functus officio,
however, this Court believes that the Attorney-in-fact had not lost his
personality to prosecute this case.
Records reveal that the Attorney-in-fact has testified long before in behalf of
the said plaintiff and more particularly during the state when the plaintiff was
vehemently opposing the dismissal of the complainant. Subsequently thereto,
he even offered documentary evidence in support of the complaint, and this
court admitted the same. When this case was initiated, jurisdiction was vested
upon this Court to try and hear the same to the end. Well-settled is the rule to
the point of being elementary that once jurisdiction is acquired by this Court, it
attaches until the case is decided.
Thus, the proper remedy here is the Substitution of Heirs and not the dismissal
of this case which would work injustice to the plaintiff.
SEC. 16, RULE 3 provides for the substitution of the plaintiff who dies pending
hearing of the case by his/her legal heirs. As to whether or not the heirs will
still continue to engage the services of the Attorney-in-fact is another matter,
which lies within the sole discretion of the heirs.
Gonzales v. PAGCOR
FACTS:
Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar,
filed on September 28, 2000 the instant Petition as a class suit under Section
12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court seeking to restrain PAGCOR from continuing its
operations and prohibit it and its co-respondents from enforcing: (1) the "Grant
of an Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet
Gambling" executed between PAGCOR and SAGE; (2) the "Grant of Authority
to Operate Computerized Bingo Games"4 between PAGCOR and BEST WORLD;
and (3) the "Agreement” among PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME to conduct jai-
alai operations.
Petition was given due course. Consequently, the parties were required to
submit their respective Memoranda. Only respondents PAGCOR and SAGE
submitted their Memoranda, on December 6, 2001 and January 24, 2002,
respectively. Gonzales having failed to file his Memorandum within the
prescribed period, this Court which, in the meantime, was informed of the
alleged demise of Gonzales, required by Resolution 1) respondents to confirm
the death of Gonzales, and 2) the parties to manifest whether they were still
interested in prosecuting the petition, or whether supervening events had
rendered it moot and academic.
On September 10, 2002, Attys. Manuel B. Imbong and Jo Aurea M. Imbong filed
a Motion for Substitution stating, among other things, that (1) Gonzales died
on January 17, 2002; (2) his heirs are not interested to pursue and prosecute
the present special civil action or be substituted as petitioners herein; and (3)
the petition was instituted by Gonzales as a class suit in behalf of "all Filipino
citizens, taxpayers and members of the Philippine Bar" and, as such, survives
his death. They thus pray that as they are among the "Filipino citizens,
taxpayers and members of the Philippine Bar" for whom the herein class suit
was instituted and are both capable of prosecuting the instant case, they be
substituted as petitioners in lieu of Gonzales and that they be given thirty days
from notice within which to file their memorandum.
By Resolution of December 9, 2002, this Court required respondents to file
their Comments on the Motion for Substitution filed by Attys. Imbong and
Imbong.
In their separate Comments, respondents PAGCOR and SAGE both argue that,
among others things, movants Attys. Imbong and Imbong may not be
substituted for Gonzales as the former are neither legal representatives nor
heirs of the latter within the purview of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents PAGCOR and SAGE further argue that neither Gonzales nor
movants have substantiated the allegation that the instant case is a class suit
as defined under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Hence, so said
respondents argue, the petition should be considered a personal action which
was extinguished with the death of Gonzales.
Movants argue, however, that "unless the herein substitution is allowed, the
citizens and taxpayers represented by Gonzales in this class suit will be denied
due process."
ISSUE: Duty of counsel upon death of party.
RULING: See Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
*Take note that even if the SC in this case were to consider the Motion for
Substitution as a seasonably filed Motion for Intervention (Sec. 12, Rule 3),
instant petition would have to be dismissed for being moot and academic.

[Bonilla v. Barcena]
x x x The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the
nature of the action and the damage sued for. If the causes of action which
survive the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property
and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in
the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the
person the property and rights of property affected being incidental. x x x
United Overseas Bank v. Rosemoore Mining & Dev’t Co.
FACTS:
Respondent Rosemoor a Philippine mining corporation with offices at Quezon
City, applied for and was granted by petitioner Westmont Bank (Bank) a credit
facility in the total amount of P80 million consisting of P50,000,000.00 as long
term loan and P30,000,000.00 as revolving credit line.
To secure the credit facility, a lone real estate mortgage agreement was
executed by Rosemoor and Dr. Lourdes Pascual (Dr. Pascual), Rosemoor’s
president, as mortgagors in favor of the Bank as mortgagee in the City of
Manila. The agreement, however, covered six parcels of land located in San
Miguel, Bulacan, all registered under the name of Rosemoor and two parcels
of land situated in Gapan, Nueva Ecija (Nueva Ecija properties), owned and
registered under the name of Dr. Pascual.
Rosemoor subsequently opened with the Bank four irrevocable Letters of
Credit (LCs) totaling US$1,943,508.11.
To cover payments by the Bank under the LCs, Rosemoor proceeded to draw
against its credit facility and thereafter executed promissory notes amounting
collectively to P49,862,682.50. Two other promissory notes were also executed
by Rosemoor in the amounts of P10,000,000.00 and P3,500,000.00,
respectively, to be drawn from its revolving credit line.
Rosemoor defaulted in the payment of its various drawings under the LCs and
promissory notes. In view of the default, the Bank caused the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the Nueva Ecija properties and the Bulacan properties. The Bank
was the highest bidder on both occasions.
The Bank then caused the annotation of the Notarial Certificate of Sale covering
the Nueva Ecija properties on the certificates of title concerned. Later, the
Notarial Certificate of Sale covering the Bulacan properties was annotated on
the certificates of title of said properties. The foregoing facts led to Rosemoor’s
filing of separate complaints against the Bank, one before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual filed a Complaint, originally captioned as one for
"Damages, Accounting and Release of Balance of Loan and Machinery and for
Injunction" before the Manila RTC. Impleaded as defendants were the Bank and
Notary Public Jose Sineneng, whose office was used to foreclose the mortgage.
The complaint was twice amended, the caption eventually reflecting an action
for "Accounting, Specific Performance and Damages." Through the
amendments, Pascual was dropped as a plaintiff while several officers of the
Bank were included as defendants.
The Bank moved for the dismissal of the original and amended complaints on
the ground that the venue had been improperly laid. The motion was denied
by the trial court through an Omnibus Resolution.
Plaintiff Rosemoor prayed for the ff: (1) Bank to render an acctg; (2) actual
damages for operational losses; (3) exemplary damages; (4) indemnity and
other relief.
The Bank filed another motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on
the ground of forum-shopping since, according to it, Rosemoor had filed
another petition earlier before the Malolos RTC. The Bank contended that as
between the action before the Manila RTC and the petition before the Malolos
RTC, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same set of facts. The Bank further claimed that any
judgment that may be rendered in either case will amount to res judicata in the
other case.
Manila RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It also denied the Bank’s motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial.
The Bank challenged the Manila RTC’s denial of the Bank’s second motion to
dismiss before the Court of Appeals, through a petition for certiorari. The
appellate court dismissed the petition. The Bank filed a motion for
reconsideration which, however, was denied through a Resolution.
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Bank argues that the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that no forum-shopping attended the actions brought
by Rosemoor.
ISSUE: (Central issue) W/N Rosemoor committed forum-shopping in filing the
Malolos case during the pendency of the Manila case?
RULING: NO.
The rule on venue of real actions is provided in Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads in part:
Section 1. Venue of Real Actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court
which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly
laid with the Malolos RTC although two of the properties together with the
Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. The venue of real actions
affecting properties found in different provinces is determined by the
SINGULARITY or PLURALITY of the transactions involving said parcels of land.
Where said parcels are the object of one and the same transaction, the venue
is in the court of any of the provinces wherein a parcel of land is situated.
Elements of forum-shopping: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such
that any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other case.
As to the existence of identity of parties, several bank officers and employees
impleaded in the Amended Complaint in the Manila case were not included in
the Malolos case.
As regards the identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the main
contention of Rosemoor in the Manila case is that the Bank had failed to deliver
the full amount of the loan, as a consequence of which Rosemoor demanded
the remittance of the unreleased portion of the loan and payment of damages
consequent thereto.
In contrast, the Malolos case was filed for the purpose of restraining the Bank
from proceeding with the consolidation of the titles over the foreclosed
Bulacan properties because the loan secured by the mortgage had not yet
become due and demandable. Moreover, the Malolos case is an action to annul
the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an action affecting the title of the
property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and
tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies.
The Manila case, on the other hand, is a personal action involving as it does the
enforcement of a contract between Rosemoor, whose office is in Quezon City,
and the Bank, whose principal office is in Binondo, Manila.Personal actions may
be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendants or any of the principal defendants resides, at
the election of the plaintiff.
Clearly, with the foregoing premises, it cannot be said that respondents
committed forum-shopping.
Magaspi v. Ramolete
FACTS:
On September 16, 1970, the petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages against The Shell
Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. and/or The Shell Refining Co. (Phil.) Inc., Central
Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings & Loan Association
in the CFI of Cebu. Upon filing and the payment of P60.00 as docketing fee and
P10.00 for sheriff fees, the case was assigned.
Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings and Loan
Assn. filed a motion to compel the plaintiffs to pay the correct amount for
docket fee within the time prescribed by Court, as properly computed by the
Clerk of Court and failing to pay the same within the prescribed period to
dismiss the case. Further, until such time as the correct docket fee is paid, the
time for filing of responsive pleadings by the defendants be suspended. The
motion was opposed by the petitioners who claimed that the main cause of
action was the recovery of a piece of land and on the basis of its assessed
valued, P60.00 was the correct docketing fee and that although the Revised
Rules of Court do not exclude damages in the computation of the docket fee,
damages are nonetheless still to be excluded.
On October 5, 1970, the presiding judge ordered the Clerk of Court to comment
on the motion and the opposition which it assessed that the correct fees shall
be fixed at of P3,164.00 plus P2.00 Legal Research fee (the value of the land,
which is P17,280.00, plus the damages amounting to P3,390,633.24). Hence,
petitioner shall pay P3,104, net of the P60.00 already paid. However, private
respondents filed their respective answers that the same was exclusive of
exemplary damages must be included in the computation therein.
On November 3, 1970, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the
complaint so as to include the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
as a defendant. Nine days after, respondents filed an opposition to the
admission of the amended complaint.
On November 16, 1970, Judge Canonoy admitted the amended complaint
although the plaintiffs had not yet complied with his Order that they should
pay an additional P3,104.00 docket fee. On April 3, 1971, Judge Jose R.
Ramolete who had replaced Judge Canonoy, issued the same order.
ISSUE:W/N the case may be considered as having been filed and docketed
when P60.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court even on the assumption that said
payment was not sufficient in amount?
RULING:The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment
of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. The Court
holds that it was docketed upon the payment of P60.00 although said amount
is insufficient. Accordingly, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the
case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular.
The next question is in respect of the correct amount to be paid as docket fee.
Judge Canonoy ordered the payment of P3,104.00 as additional docket fee
based on the original complaint. However, the petitioners assert as an
alternative view, that the docket fee be based on the amended complaint. The
petitioners have a point. "When a pleading is amended, the original pleading is
deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any further function as a
pleading. The case stands for trial on the amended pleading only. On the basis
of the foregoing, the additional docket fee to be paid by the petitioners should
be based on their amended complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted: the petitioners shall be assessed
a docket fee on the basis of the amended complaint; and after all of the lawful
fees shall have been paid, the proceedings in Civil Case No. R-11882 shall be
resumed.
Manchester Dev’t v. CA
FACTS:
- This was originally a case of an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with a prayer for temporary restraining order. The damages were
not specifically stated in the prayer but the body of the complaint assessed a P
78.75 M. damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of docket fee paid
was only P410.00. The petitioner then amended the complaint and reduced the
damages to P10 M only.
ISSUE/S:
When does a court acquire jurisdiction?
Does an amended complaint vest jurisdiction in the court?
HELD:
The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. All complaints,
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for. Damages shall be considered in the assessment of
the filing fees in any case.
Sun Insurance v. Asuncion
FACTS:
Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) filed a complaint for the annulment of a
decision on the consignation of fire insurance policy.
Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) filed a complaint for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case
against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorney’s fees, litigation
costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought
although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of
P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.
The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for
subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the
corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to
abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
ISSUE: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private
respondent did not pay the correct or sufficient docket fees?
RULING: YES. It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party
claims and similar pleadings.
In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the
government of the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint
but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, a more liberal
interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester,
the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required.
Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect
the additional fee.
Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso Jr. v. CA
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period
is mandatory.
In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict
application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein the Court decreed that where
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but
in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. This
ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required.
Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros, the Court
explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the
court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the
rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal
doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations
set in Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the Court, in several
instances, allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket fees in
order to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the
merits.
In the case of La Salette College v. Pilotin, the Court stated:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of
appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified
by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period
allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should
be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal
of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.
While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there is,
on the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and
equitably, for it is far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a
primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in injustice.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC and
said trial court had already rendered a decision. While it was at that level, the
matter of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was only the CA
which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of
the rules so that the petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute
their claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to secure justice
on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate
the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing
always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice
As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly unjust if P’s claim
would be dismissed on a strict application of the Manchester doctrine, the
appropriate action, under ordinary circumstances, would be for the Court to
remand the case to the CA. Considering, however, that the case at bench has
been pending for more than 30 years and the records thereof are already
before the Court, a remand of the case to the CA would unnecessarily prolong
its resolution. In the higher interest of substantial justice and to spare the
parties from further delay, the Court will resolve the case on the merits.
Kilusan-Olalia v CA 528 S 45 (2007)
FACTS:Within the freedom period after CBA between Kimberly Clark
(Company) and the incumbent UKCEO-PTGWO (United Kimberly Clark
Employees Union) had expired, KILUSAN-OLALIA, a newly-formed labor
organization filed a certification election with DOLE-QC. Thereafter, DOLE
declared the incumbent Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of
Kimberly’s employees, having garnered the highest votes in the election.
though remained uncounted were 64 challenged votes by 64 casual workers
whose regularization was in question.
During the pendency of Kilusan-Olalia’s petition for certiorari assailing the petition was signed by the union’s lawyer, who had been authorized by a
DOLE Order, Kimberly dismissed several employees thereby impelling Kilusan majority of the petitioners to represent them and to sign on their behalf all
to stage a strike charging the company thereby with Unfair Labor practice, pleadings and appeals relative to the labor dispute.
union-busting and refusal to bargain. NLRC rendered decision in favor of
Kimberly. Aggrieved, Kilusan-Olalia instituted with CA a Petition for Certiorari
but CA dismissed Kilusan’s petition on procedural grounds: With regard to the certification against forum shopping, suffice it to state that
in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, we took cognizance of a petition although its
“The verification was signed only by petitioners’ president, sans any board
certification was executed and signed by only one of several petitioners, thus:
resolution or power of attorney authorizing anybody to sign the same and the
certificate on non-forum shopping”.

The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the
petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the signing by only one of them is
ISSUE: W/N the disputed requirements of Verification & Certification against
insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum
Forum Shopping was sufficient in form (therefore the respondent CA
shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
committed error in dismissing the case based on sheer technicality and in the
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute
merit of the petition itself)
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.The rule of
substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the
certification.
SC: We find as sufficient in form the disputed verification and certification
against forum shopping.

Verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite, as it is mainly intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith
or are true and correct and not mere speculation.
The Court may order the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on
the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that a strict
compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may be served
This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions
regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with
or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The petition is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for adjudication on the merits

In the instant case, despite the fact that Ernesto Facundo, the union president,
was not shown to have been duly authorized to sign the verification on behalf
In-n-Out burger, Inc. V. Sehwani, Incorporated and/or Benitas Frites, inc.
of the other petitioners, the CA should not have been too strict in the
application of the Rules. G.R. No. 179127 December 24, 2008 J. Chico-Nazario

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, which
Necessarily, Facundo, being the union president, was in a position to verify the
reversed the Decision of the Director General of IPO. CA decreed that the IPO
truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. Further, the
Director of Legal Affairs and the IPO Director General do not have jurisdiction
over cases involving unfair competition.
FACTS:
1) Petitioner, In-N-Out Burger, Inc. is a business entity incorporated under the
laws of California, mainly engaged in the restaurant business which never
engaged in business in the Philippines while Respondents Sehwani, Inc and
Benita Frites, Inc. are corporations organized in the Philippines.
2) In-N-Out Burger, Inc. filed trademark and service mark applications (1997)
with the Bureau of Trademarks of IPO for “IN-N-OUT” and “IN-N-OUT Burger &
Arrow design” but through Action Papers issued by IPO, it found out that such
mark was already registered to Sehwani, Inc. and is used by Benitas Frites, Inc.
by virtue of a licensing agreement.
3) Petitioner filed before the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the IPO an
administrative complaint (2001) against respondents for unfair competition
and cancellation of trademark registration arguing that the these marks are: a)
Registered in the Office of the US and internationally well-known in various
parts of the world; and b) Petitioner’s use misleads ordinary and unsuspecting
consumers that they are purchasing petitioner’s products.
4) In-N-Out Burger, Inc. then sent a demand letter to Sehwani, Inc. to cease and
desist from caliming ownership of the mark and to voluntarily cancel its
trademark registration. Sehwani, Inc., in its reply, refused to accede to the
demand but expressed willingness to surrended for a fair and reasonable
consideration.
5) Respondents, on their part, filed an Answer with Counterclaim, asserting
that: a) They have been using the mark in the Philippines since 1982; b) Such
mark was registered in the name of Sehwani, Inc. as early as 1991; c) They were
issued a certificate of registration by the IPO; d) There is presumption of valid
registration in their favor; and e) In-N-Out Burger, Inc. had no legal capacity to
sue because it never operated in the Philippines.
6) IPO Director of Legal Affairs, Estrelita Beltran-Abelardo decided in favor of
petitioner In-N-Out Burger, Inc. and held that petitioner had legal capacity to
sue in the Philippines since its country of origin was a member and signatory of
the Convention of Paris on Protection of Industrial Property and that the mark
was widely known in this country and are internationally well-known, given the
world-wide registration of the mark. However, it also ruled that respondents
used the mark in good faith and were not guilty of unfair competition.
7) Both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration. Both
motions were denied which thus led to two separate cases.
8) Case by respondents Sehwani, Inc. and Benitas Frites, Inc. (G.R. No. 171053)
Upon receipt of Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration,
respondents filed an appeal to the IPO Director General, which was later
dismissed. An appeal was filed before the CA. CA later ordered the cancellation
of the registration of Sehwani, Inc. and to enjoin respondents from using the
same. Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied hence, Sehwani,
Inc. filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.
SC held that:
a) In-N-Out Burger, Inc. had legal capacity to sue for protection of its
trademarks even though it was not doing business in the Philippines;
b) Appeal for the decision of IPO Director General was out of time;
c) Registration in favor of Sehwani, Inc. must be cancelled.
Another Motion for Reconsideration was filed by respondents but it was later
denied with finality in a Resolution by the Court (2008).
Case by petitioner In-N-Out Burger, Inc. (G.R. No. 179127)
In-N-Out Burger, Inc. was able to file a timely appeal before the IPO Director
General;
During the pendency of the appeal, CA rendered a decision dismissing
respondent’s petition.
IPO Director General later held that Sehwani, Inc. and Benitas Frites, Inc. were
guilty of unfair competition as the sole distinction of having a star inside the
“O” was insufficient and the non-use of the mark was immaterial.
In-N-Out Burger, Inc. was entitled to actual and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
10) Respondents filed another Petition for Review under Rule 43 before the
Court of Appeals which ruled that IPO did not have jurisdiction to try the case
because Article 168 of the IP Code provides that the regular courts, not the BLA-
IPO, had sole jurisdiciton to thear and decide cases involving provisions of the
IP Code, particularly trademarks. CA granted the petition by Sehwani, Inc.,
reversed the decision of the IPO Director General and dismissed the claims by
In-N-Out Burger, Inc. Hence, the present petition by In-N-Out Burger, Inc.
12) As one of the defenses of respondent Sehwani, Inc., it raised questions
pertaining to formal defects in the present petition by In-N-Out Burger, Inc. and
argued that due to In-N-Out Burger, Inc.’s failure to comply with formal
requisites, the petition must be dismissed outrightly.
Respondents contend that the Verification/Certification executed by Atty.
Edmund Barranda attached to the present petition is defective because the
Secretary’s Certification executed by Arnold Wensinger, stating that petitioner
had authorized lawyers of Villaraza & Angangco to represent it in the present
Petition and to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping,
was not properly notarized and hence are invalid.
ISSUE: Whether the petition by In-N-Out Burger, Inc. contained formal defects,
which can cause its outright dismissal by the Court. (Verification by Counsel)
RULING: NO.
The Secretary’s Certificate was valid because it requires only a jurat and not an
acknowledgment. (Discussion about difference between jurat and
acknowledgment)
However, assuming arguendo that the Secretary’s Certificate was flawed, Atty.
Barranda may still sign the Verification attached to the present Petition
because a party’s representative, lawyer or any other person who personally
knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the Verification.
The purpose of the Verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of
the petition has been made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely
speculative. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.
Atty. Barranda, as In-N-Out Burger, Inc.’s counsel, was in the position to verify
the truth and correctness of the allegations of the present petition. Hence, the
Verification signed by Atty. Barranda substantialy complies with the formal
requirements for such.
Finally, the SC ruled that verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional
requirement. In the interest of substantial justice, strict observance of
procedural rules may be dispensed with for compelling reasons. WHEREFORE,
petition is hereby GRANTED.
Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance vs. Jorge Valdez
January 28, 2008, Sandoval-Gutierrez, j:
FACTS: Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company Incorporated is a domestic
corporation engaged in the insurance business. The individual petitioners are
its corporate officers.
Jorge Valdez (respondent) was a former unit manager of Tokio Marine pursuant
to a Unit Management Contract entered into between them on August 16,
1977.
On October 15, 1998, respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for damages
against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91356. He alleged therein
that petitioners violated the terms of the Unit Management Contract by
refusing to pay him, among others, his commissions, and bonuses. Petitioners
filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint.
On December 17, 1998, respondent manifested before the trial court that he
filed various criminal complaints against petitioners with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City.
Trial Court denied petitioners’ motions to dismiss. TC and CA did not find
respondent guilty of forum shopping.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
HELD:NO. Respondent is not guilty of forum shopping.
Forum shopping is described as: “the act of a litigant who repetitively availed
of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively,
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raisingsubstantially the same issues either pending
in, or already resolved adversely by some other court to increase his chances
of obtaining a favorable decision of not in one court, then in another.Differently
put, it is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause
of action, either simultaneously or for the purpose of obtaining favorable
judgment.”
The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to
pursue simultaneous remedies in two different courts as it constitutes abuse
of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice,
wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of
the heavily burdened dockets.
Section 5, Rule 7 provides:
“The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
… (c) if he should thereafter learn that same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.”
The Court took note that in respondent’s certification against forum shopping,
respondent manifested that he filed criminal charges against petitioners.
SC agreed with CA that the certification of respondent is a substantial
compliance with Section 5 Rule 7. Moreover, it should be recalled that
respondent manifested before the trial court on December 16, 1998 that he
actually filed criminal charges against petitioners.
Negros Slashers v Teng - 666 S 629 G.R. No. 187122; February 22, 2012
FACTS: Respondent Alvin Teng is a basketball player for the Negros Slashers
team of the now defunct Metropolitan Basketball Association (MBA).Because
of below par performance, he was pulled from the line up in the middle of the
game and "untied his shoelaces". In the succeeding game, he called in sick, to
the consternation of his teammates. Negros Slashers consequently terminated
Teng. On July 28, 2001, Teng filed a complaint with the Commissioner of the
MBA. Later, on November 6, 2001, and because of the inaction of the MBA
commissioner, Teng filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. The
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Teng. The NLRC however dismissed the case for
being premature considering that there was a pending arbitration case before
the MBA commissioner. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Teng violated the rule on forum shopping.
HELD: NO. There was no forum shopping. The following are the elements need
to be present for there to be forum shopping:
a. There must be identity of the parties, or at least the parties represent the 94 requiring that the Petition must be accompanied by a Certification against
same interests in both actions; Non-Forum Shopping signed by the Petitioner.

b. There must be identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts;
In this case, the Petition of Digital Microwave was signed by its counsel hence
c. Any judgment in one of the two actions will, regardless of which party is it was dismissed by CA. Petitioner then filed an MR and submitted a
successful, amount to res judicata for the other. Certification against Non-Forum Shopping signed this time by the Corporation’s
Senior Officer but the CA still dismissed the MR for failure to explain its failure
to comply with the Circular at the onset
The first two elements in this case, however, the third element, res judicata is
missing. Any judgement of the MBA commissioner will not render a bar
preventing redress in other courts. Issue: WON the Court erred in denying the petitioner’s MR and for disallowing
the new Certification against Non-Forum Shopping?
Under the doctrine of res judicata, an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter
within its jurisdiction, is conclusive upon the rights of the parties and their
Held: NO. The petitioner and NOT the Counsel must sign the Certification
privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.
against Non-Forum Shopping. It is the petitioner who has actual knowledge
Res judicatamust contain the following elements:
whether or not he initiated a similar action in different courts or agencies. The
a. Judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; petitioner also failed to explain why the first certification was not signed by the
Corporate Officer and why the same should be justified. The Court held that
b. Decision must be made by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
the petitioner cannot disregard the strict compliance of the circular and the
and the parties;
subsequent filing of the correct certification does not cure its defect.
c. Disposition must be a judgment on the merits; and
Guy v Court of Appeals (GR 163707, September 15, 2006)
d. There must be as between the actions, identity of the parties, subject matter
FACTS:
and causes of action.
1. The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima
The arbitration commission of the MBA is not a court of competent jurisdiction,
Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged
therefore, any decision it renders cannot produce res judicatatherefore, there
that they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died
is no forum shopping.
intestate. The minors were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of
Makati City.
Digital Microwave Corp. vs. CA
2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving
FACTS: Asian High Tech Corp. filed a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no
against Digital Microwave. Digital Microwave filed a Motion to Dismiss but was debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters
denied- Filed an MR but was likewise denied by Court. Hence Petitioner filed administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the
Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA denied the same for its failure to comply
with Revised Circular No. 28-91, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 04-
certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and
not by counsel.
3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason
of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and
educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.
4. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the
supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted
guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver. It
also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: whether private respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure to
comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping;
Held:
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-
forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party.
Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case.
However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest
of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,11 we ruled that while
a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping
was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse may be
overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.12 So it is in the present
controversy where the merits of the case and the absence of an intention to
violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to
temper the strict application of the rules.
Sy Chin v Court of Appeals (GR 136233, November 23, 2000)
1. In 1952, the brothers Tang Chin, Feliciano Tang, Ricardo Alonzo a.k.a. Tang
Kong Suy, Tang Chin Heng and William Tang a.k.a. Tang Kong Sia formed a
partnership under the name of Tan Chin Heng & Company.
2. After the death of Tang Chin, Feliciano Tang and Tang Kong Suy, the parties
agreed to refer the matter to the Federation of Filipino Chinese Chamber of
Commerce via an agreement they executed on March 11, 1975.
3. On February 5, 1991, the petitioners filed a petition for dissolution and
liquidation of the partnership with the SEC.
4. On February 9, 1993, the Hearing Officer of the SEC rendered a decision
affirming the list of the partnership’s properties which shall be distributed to
the partners/heirs in proportion to their contribution in accordance with the
Articles of the Partnership.
5. The petitioners moved for partial reconsideration contending that the
properties should be divided equally in accordance with the 1975 Agreement.
The motion was denied by the hearing officer on August 11, 1993.
6. The petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal but this was not perfected due to
their failure to file the Memorandum on Appeal and to pay the docket fees
within the period provided for by the Revised Rules of Procedure of the SEC.
7. Consequently, a motion for execution was filed by respondents on October
28, 1993 which was granted by the hearing officer on January 5, 1994.
Petitioners filed an opposition thereto asserting that there was a need to
check/investigate the information that some of the partnership properties
were already adjudicated to Feliciano Tangs heirs in an Intestate Proceeding
before the then Court of First Instance of Manila in 1964. The Opposition was
denied.
8. Thus, petitioners went up to the Commission En Banc. Private respondents
filed an opposition asserting that the SEC no longer had jurisdiction over the
case considering that the decision of the hearing officer had already become
final and executory.
9. The SEC, nonetheless, took cognizance of the case and disposed it in this
wise:
“Since the alleged CFI adjudication in the Intestate Proceeding has not, as yet,
been duly established however, and this appeal, having been treated as an
action to annul the questioned orders of the hearing officer, we are
constrained, as we HEREBY RESOLVE to remand the case to the department of
origin for proper action. All other motions filed in relation herewith are, by this
DECISION, likewise referred to the Securities Investigation and Clearing
Department of (sic) its disposition. SO ORDERED.”
10. A Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification was filed by the private
respondents but this was denied by the SEC Commission en banc.
11. A petition for certiorari was consequently filed with the Court of Appeals
assailing the SEC decision. On August 18, 1998, the CA ruled that the SEC acted
in excess of its jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the Court issues the writ of certiorari
and annuls the Decision dated December 6, 1995 and the Resolution dated July
25, 1997 of the respondent Commission.
12. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied. Hence,
this petition
Issue related to topic:
W/N THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
DISMISS AND/OR DENY DUE COURSE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PETITION
Held:
The Decision of the Hearing Officer rendered on February 9, 1993 to which a
timely motion for partial reconsideration was filed had already become final
and executory for petitioners failure to perfect their appeal to the SEC en banc.
Section 3. How Appeal is Taken: When Perfected Appeal may be taken by filing
with the Hearing Officer who promulgated the decision, order or ruling within
thirty (30) days from notice thereof, and serving upon the adverse party, notice
of appeal and a memorandum on appeal and paying the corresponding docket
fee therefor. The appeal shall be considered perfected upon the filing of the
memorandum on the appeal and payment of the docket fee within the period
hereinabove fixed. (Amended).
It is clear that the appeal to the SEC en banc was not perfected and resultantly,
the Decision of February 9, 1993 has become final and executory. There was,
therefore, nothing for the SEC en banc to review. It must be noted that
petitioners’ appeal to the Commission en banc was an appeal on the order of
execution which is not permissible under the rules. The order granting the
motion for writ of execution is not appealable as provided under Rule 41,
Section 1.
Clearly, therefore, the SEC committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction when it entertained petitioners appeal and treated it as a
direct attack against the orders of the hearing officer. This in effect re-opened
the case that has already become final and executory.
A careful perusal of the records reveals that the list of partnership properties
was never an issue in this case. No one questioned the list of properties or
asserted that some of the properties belong to any of the heirs particularly to
the heirs of Feliciano Tang. In the March 11, 1975 Agreement executed before
the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and notarized by
Atty. Eriberto H. Decena, the parties acknowledged that the properties listed
therein are partnership assets commonly owned by the partners although the
titles thereto may have been placed in the names of one or more of them. The
prefatory clause of said agreement reads as follows:
“WHEREAS, the above parties are the common owners of the following
properties, both real and personal, although the titles thereto may have been
in the names of one or more of them.”
NOTE:
THE ONLY PART PERTINENT TO THE TOPIC, “COUNSEL CANNOT SIGN
CERTIFICATION; EXCEPTION” WAS TACKLED FLEETINGLY AND ONLY ON THE
LAST PARAGRAPH BEFORE THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE CASE:
“Finally,the petitioners aver that the respondent court should have outrightly
dismissed the petition for certiorari for failure to comply with the requirements
on non-forum shopping. While it is true that the petition may have been flawed
as the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by
the party, suffice it to say that this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the
interest of substantial justice. Given the facts and circumstances of the case,
we likewise find no reversible error with the respondent courts evaluation that
there is prima facie merit in the petition.”
Co-owner or co-party may sign in behalf of co-owners or co-parties