Pacana vs Pascual – Lopez

This case stems from an administrative complaint[1] filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez
charging the latter with flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[2] Complainant
alleges that respondent committed acts constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to
render an accounting of all the money and properties received by her from complainant.

On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC).
MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel International Holdings Corporation (Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC
changed its name to Precedent Communications Corporation (Precedent).[3]

According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and investors
because of the failure of its investment schemes. He alleges that he earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming
the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting
to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank.

Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be a member of the Couples for
Christ, a religious organization where complainant and his wife were also active members. From then on, complainant
and respondent constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent
and Precedents relation with Multitel. Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even helped him prepare
standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between
him and respondent although no formal document was executed by them at that time. A Retainer Agreement[4] dated
January 15, 2003 was proposed by respondent. Complainant, however, did not sign the said agreement because
respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as acceptance fee and a 15% contingency
fee upon collection of the overpayment made by Multitel to Benefon,[5] a telecommunications company based
in Finland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not within his means.[6] Hence, the retainer
agreement remained unsigned.[7]

After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from respondent[8]asking for the return and
immediate settlement of the funds invested by respondents clients in Multitel. When complainant confronted
respondent about the demand letter, the latter explained that she had to send it so that her clients defrauded investors
of Multitel would know that she was doing something for them and assured complainant that there was nothing to
worry about.[9]

Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent demands made by Multitel
investors against complainant. On these occasions, respondent impressed upon complainant that she can closely work
with officials of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Immigration and Deportations (BID),[10] and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)[11] to resolve complainants problems. Respondent also convinced complainant that in order to be
absolved from any liability with respect to the investment scam, he must be able to show to the DOJ that he was
willing to divest any and all of his interests in Precedent including the funds assigned to him by Multitel.[12]
Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be used only for his case whenever
necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her an initial amount of P900,000.00 which was received by respondent
herself.[13] Sometime thereafter, complainant again gave respondent P1,000,000.00.[14] Said amounts were all part of
Precedents collections and sales proceeds which complainant held as assignee of the companys properties.[15]

When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several messages from respondent sent through
electronic mail (e-mail) and short messaging system (SMS, or text messages) warning him not to return to the
Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was arrested and that complainant may later on be
implicated in Multitels failed investment system. Respondent even said that ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold
departure order had been issued against him. Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail messages from
respondent updating him of the status of the case against Multitel and promised that she will settle the matter
discreetly with government officials she can closely work with in order to clear complainants name.[16] In two
separate e-mail messages,[17] respondent again asked money from complainant, P200,000 of which was handed by
complainants wife while respondent was confined in Saint Lukes Hospital after giving birth,[18] and another P700,000
allegedly to be given to the NBI.[19]

Through respondents persistent promises to settle all complainants legal problems, respondent was able to convince
complainant who was still in the US to execute a deed of assignment in favor of respondent allowing the latter to
retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular phones and accessories stored in complainants house and inside a
warehouse.[20] He also signed a blank deed of sale authorizing respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper.[21]
Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his legal problems, complainant was advised
by his family to hire another lawyer. When respondent knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as
follows:

Dear Butchie,

Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer. The charges
are all non-bailable but all the same as the SEC report I told you before. The findings are the same, i.e. your company
was the front for the fraud of Multitel and that funds were provided you.

I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is willing to return the Crosswind, laptap (sic) and
[P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio really helped. Anthony na lang. Then, I will need the accounting of all the funds you
received from the sale of the phones, every employees and directors[] quitclaim (including yours), the funds
transmitted to the clients through me, the funds you utilized, and whatelse (sic) is still unremitted, every centavo must
be accounted for as DOJ and NBI can have the account opened.

I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the trust given [to] you. So we can inform them
[that] it was not touched by you.

I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister
Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. In this
cases (sic), you cannot be highprofile (sic) because it is the clients who will be sacrificed at the expense of the fame of
the lawyer. I have to work quietly and discreetly. No funfare. Just like what I did for your guys in the SEC. I have to
work with people I am comfortable with. Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. He can
help with all his connections. Vals friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized crime who is the entity
(sic) who has your warrant. My law partner was the state prosecutor for financial fraud. Basically we have it covered
in all aspects and all departments. I am just trying to liquidate the phones I have allotted for you s ana (sic) for your
trooper kasiwhether we like it or not, we have to give this agencies (sic) to make our work easier according to Val.
The funds with Mickey are already accounted in the quit claims (sic) as attorneys (sic) fees. I hope he will be able to
send it so we have funds to work with.
As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children who (sic) the irate clients and government
officials harass and kidnap to make the individuals they want to come out from hiding (sic). I do not want that to
happen. Things will be really easier on my side.

Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to
work with your case. Please trust me. I have never let you down, have I? I told you this will happen but we are ready
and prepared. The clients who received the phones will stand by you and make you the hero in this scandal. I will
stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! That is all. You have an angel on your side. Always pray
though to the best legal mind up there. You will be ok!

Candy[22]

On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondents advice, complainant returned to the country. On the eve of his departure
from the United States, respondent called up complainant and conveniently informed him that he has been cleared by
the NBI and the BID.[23]

About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and his wife and told them that she has already
accumulated P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to complainant in appreciation
for his help. Respondent allegedly told complainant that without his help, she would not have earned such amount.
Overwhelmed and relieved, complainant accepted respondents offer but respondent, later on, changed her mind and
told complainant that she would instead invest theP2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business venture. Complainant
declined and explained to respondent that he and his family needed the money instead to cover their daily expenses as
he was no longer employed. Respondent allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her promise.[24]

Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that she was able to help settle the ten (10)
warrants of arrest and hold departure order issued against complainant and narrated how she was able to defend
complainant in the said cases.[25]

By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading him. Respondent would either refuse to
return complainants call or would abruptly terminate their telephone conversation, citing several reasons. This went
on for several months.[26] In one instance, when complainant asked respondent for an update on the collection of
Benefons obligation to Precedent which respondent had previously taken charge of, respondent arrogantly answered
that she was very busy and that she would read Benefons letter only when she found time to do so.
On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondents arrogance and evasiveness, complainant wrote
respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the money, documents and properties given to the
latter.[27] Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter dated December 20, 2004.[28] When complainant found
respondents explanation to be inadequate, he wrote a latter expressing his confusion about the
accounting.[29] Complainant repeated his request for an audited financial report of all the properties turned over to her;
otherwise, he will be constrained to file the appropriate case against respondent.[30] Respondent replied,[31] explaining
that all the properties and cash turned over to her by complainant had been returned to her clients who had money
claims against Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was able to secure quitclaim documents clearing
complainant from any liability.[32] Still unsatisfied, complainant decided to file an affidavit-complaint[33] against
respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the
disbarment of respondent.

In her Answer-Affidavit,[34] respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for Precedent. She maintained that no
formal engagement was executed between her and complainant. She claimed that she merely helped complainant by
providing him with legal advice and assistance because she personally knew him, since they both belonged to the
same religious organization.[35]

Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely mediated in the
settlement of the claims her clients had against the complainant. She also averred that the results of the settlement
between both parties were fully documented and accounted for.[36] Respondent believes that her act in helping
complainant resolve his legal problem did not violate any ethical standard and was, in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[37]

To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent noted that a complaint for estafa was also filed
against her by complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon Cityciting the same grounds. The
complaint was, however, dismissed by Assistant City Prosecutor Josephus Joannes H. Asis for insufficiency of
evidence.[38] Respondent argued that on this basis alone, the administrative case must also be dismissed.

In her Position Paper,[39] respondent also questioned the admissibility of the electronic evidence submitted by
complainant to the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent maintained that the e-mail and the text messages
allegedly sent by respondent to complainant were of doubtful authenticity and should be excluded as evidence for
failure to conform to the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).

After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report and Recommendation[40] finding
that a lawyer-client relationship was established between respondent and complainant despite the absence of a written
contract. The Investigating Commissioner also declared that respondent violated her duty to be candid, fair and loyal
to her client when she allowed herself to represent conflicting interests and failed to render a full accounting of all the
cash and properties entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the Investigating Commissioner recommended her
disbarment.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,[41] but the IBP Board of Governors issued a Recommendation[42] denying the
motion and adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.

The case now comes before this Court for final action.

We affirm the findings of the IBP.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
full disclosure of the facts.

This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste[43] and, more importantly, upon necessity. In the
course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including its
weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be
given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss
thereof.[44] It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double ─ dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is paramount in the administration of justice.[45] It is for these reasons that we have described the attorney-client
relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[46]

Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with complainant, who, at that
time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client
relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that
the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of friendly accommodations,[47] precisely because at
the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had
been referred to her by the SEC.[48]

Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written contract for the
engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant.[49] This argument all the more reveals
respondents patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of basic ethical standards expected from an
advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:

The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between the
parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be
express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and
received in any matter pertinent to his profession.[50](Emphasis supplied.)

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was either to advise
complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to
desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be
permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,[51] we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.The test is
whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it
for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those
in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance
of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.[52]

Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and,
later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed upon complainant that she
had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from
any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants
against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. Respondent herself
admitted to complainant that without the latters help, she would not have been able to earn as much and that, as a
token of her appreciation, she was willing to share some of her earnings with complainant.[53] Clearly, respondents act
is shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[54]but also toyed
with decency and good taste.
Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever complained of respondents unethical
behavior.[55] This remark indubitably displays respondents gross ignorance of disciplinary procedure in the Bar. As a
member of the Bar, she is expected to know that proceedings for disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be
initiated and prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board
of Officers of an IBP Chapter[56] even if no private individual files any administrative complaint.

Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, on the admissibility of the electronic evidence submitted
by complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in toto.

Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar her on the grounds of
deceit, malpractice and other gross misconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyers Oath, has been rendered moot
and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP membership, allegedly after she had been placed under the
Department of Justices Witness Protection Program.[57] Convenient as it may be for respondent to sever her
membership in the integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this administrative case
against her.

The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in order to determine the degree of her
culpability and liability to complainant. The case may not be dismissed or rendered moot and academic by
respondents act of voluntarily terminating her membership in the Bar regardless of the reason for doing so. This is
because membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.[58] The conduct of a lawyer may make him or
her civilly, if not criminally, liable to his client or to third parties, and such liability may be conveniently avoided if
this Court were to allow voluntary termination of membership. Hence, to terminate ones membership in the Bar
voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first prove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to
further prejudice the public or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the present case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for representing conflicting
interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY MARCEL N. LUKBAN, ALBERTO I. GARCIA, JR., AND MA.
PAMELA ROSSANA A. APUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE D. PAJARILLO,

Before us is a verified complaint1 for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo for allegedly violating
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing
conflicting interests and Canon 15 of the same Code which enjoins a lawyer to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in
all his dealings and transactions with clients.

The salient facts of the case follow:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided into two opposing
factions. The first faction, called the Adeva Group, was composed of Romulo M. Adeva, Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro
D. Bicierro, and Pilar I. Andrade. The other faction, called the Lukban Group, was composed of Justo B. Lukban, Luz
I. Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and Marcel N. Lukban.

In 1996, the complainant appointed the respondent as its corporate secretary with a total monthly compensation and
honorarium of P6,000.

On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an unnumbered Board Resolution which authorized Pilar I. Andrade, the
Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the complainant at that time, and Lydia E. Cacawa, the Vice President for
Administration and Finance, to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch, Camarines
Norte in favor of the complainant.

On May 12, 1999, the Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application because the Adeva Group
appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were allegedly not registered as stockholders in the Stock and
Transfer Book of the complainant, as members of the Board of Trustees. The Lukban Group also alleged that the
complainant was having financial difficulties.

On May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of complainant's financial capacity to pay the
loan.

On July 13, 1999, RBP granted the loan application in the amount of P200,000 which was secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage over the properties of the complainant.

On September 27, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order which nullified the
appointment of Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano by the Adeva Group as members of the Board of Trustees of the
complainant. As a result, complainant sent a letter to RBP to inform the latter of the SEC Order.

On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order and informing the
latter that the SEC Order was referred to RBP's legal counsel, herein respondent. The complainant alleged that it was
only upon receipt of such letter that it became aware that respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP.

On April 18, 2000, complainant and RBP increased the loan to P400,000.

On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage.

On May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
against RBP. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for RBP.
On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment against the respondent for allegedly
representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness, and loyalty.

Respondent raised three defenses against the complaint for disbarment. First, respondent argued that Marcel N.
Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana Apuya cannot represent the complainant in this disbarment
case because they were not duly authorized by the Board of Directors to file the complaint. Second, respondent
claimed that he is not covered by the prohibition on conflict of interest which applies only to the legal counsel of
complainant. Respondent argued that he merely served as the corporate secretary of complainant and did not serve as
its legal counsel. Third, respondent argued that there was no conflict of interest when he represented RBP in the case
for annulment of mortgage because all the documents and information related to the loan transaction between RBP
and the complainant were public records. Thus, respondent claimed that he could not have taken advantage of his
position as the mere corporate secretary of the complainant.

On February 14, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation2 finding respondent
guilty of representing conflicting interests and recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for at least one year. The Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent appeared for RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage filed by his former client, the complainant herein. The Investigating Commissioner cited cash
vouchers3 from 1994 to 2001 showing that respondent was paid by complainant for his retained legal services.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, these vouchers debunk respondent's claim that the complainant merely
appointed him as its corporate secretary. The Investigating Commissioner also held that the personality of
complainant's representatives to file this administrative case is immaterial since proceedings for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.

On June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-7704 which affirmed the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner and imposed a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year
against respondent.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-2905 which denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by respondent.

The issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he entered his
appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by complainant against RBP.

We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
Resolution Nos. XX-2013-770 and XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, respondent represented
conflicting interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts."

This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases.6 Based on the principles of
public policy and good taste, this prohibition on representing conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.7 In Maturan v. Gonzales8 we further explained the rationale for the
prohibition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his
client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and
guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client's secrets. A lawyer must have the
fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
Meanwhile, in Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we explained the test to determine the existence of conflict of
interest:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test
is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests
if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests
is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose
interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients.10 It also applies when the lawyer represents a client
against a former client in a controversy that is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous
litigation in which he appeared for the former client.11 This rule applies regardless of the degree of adverse
interests.12 What a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.13 A lawyer
may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially
adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation.14chanrobleslaw

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find that respondent represented conflicting interests when he served as
counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by the complainant, respondent's former client, against
RBP.

The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent was compensated by complainant for his retained legal
services is supported by the evidence on record, the cash vouchers from 1994 to 2001. Clearly, complainant was
respondent's former client. And respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by his former client against
RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests since respondent failed to show any written
consent of all concerned (particularly the complainant) given after a full disclosure of the facts representing
conflicting interests.15chanrobleslaw

We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's interest on the loan transaction between RBP and the
complainant when he sent a letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to assure the latter of the financial capacity of the
complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against
the interest of the complainant, his former client.

Contrary to the respondent's claim, it is of no moment that all the documents and information in connection with the
loan transaction between RBP and the complainant were public records. In Hilado v. David,16 we laid down the
following doctrinal pronouncements:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from thereafter appearing on
behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a
confidential nature was revealed to the attorney by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553,
Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)

Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly represented the adverse party
with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the
attorney acquired from his former client during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent
the adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)

In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it is unnecessary that the court
ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's affairs might have a bearing on the matters involved in the
subsequent litigation on the attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev.,
264.)

This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot
thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client,
he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment.
(Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his client is irrelevant in determining the
existence of conflict of interest.

Finally, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that a complaint for disbarment is imbued with public interest
which allows for a liberal rule on legal standing. Under Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, "[proceedings
for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person." Thus, in the present case, we find
that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana A. Apuya can institute the complaint for
disbarment even without authority from the Board of Directors of the complainant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2013-770 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-290 of the IBP
Board of Governors imposing a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year against respondent Atty.
Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
GENEROSA BUTED and BENITO BOLISAY, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. HAROLD M. HERNANDO, respondent.
Jorge A. Dolorfino for petitioners.
RESOLUTION

On 22 August 1974, spouses Generosa Buted and Benito Bolisay filed an administrative complaint for malpractice
against respondent Atty. Harold M. Hernando, charging the latter with having wantonly abused professional secrets or
information obtained by him as their counsel.
After respondent Hernando filed his Answer on 25 June 1974, the Court, in a resolution dated 4 October 1974 referred
the complaint to the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On 10 February 1975, complainants presented a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. 1
On 24 October 1975, the Solicitor-General conducted a hearing where respondent took the witness stand on his own behalf.
The record of the case shows the following background facts:
In an action for partition instituted by Generosa as compulsory heir of the deceased Teofilo Buted, respondent was counsel for Luciana Abadilla and a certain Angela Buted.
Involved in said partition case was a parcel of land Identified as Lot 9439-B. Respondent ultimately succeeded in defending Luciana Abadilla's claim of exclusive ownership
over Lot 9439-B. When Luciana died, respondent withdrew his appearance from that partition case.
It appears that Luciana Abadilla sold the lot to Benito Bolisay and a new Transfer Certificate of Title over the lot was issued in the name of complainant spouses.

When an action for specific performance was lodged by a couple named Luis Sy and Elena Sy against Benito Bolisay as one of the defendants, 2
the latter retained the
services of respondent Atty. Hernando however claims that he rendered his services to Benito Bolisay free of charge.
Subject of this case was a contract of lease executed by Benito's co-defendant therein, Enrique Buted, over a house
standing on a portion of Lot No. 9439-B. It appears that the Sy's were claiming that the lease extended to the
aforementioned lot. Benito was then asserting ownership over the realty by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by
Luciana Abadilla in his favor. Eventually, the Sy's were ordered to vacate the house subject of the lease. Respondent
avers that the relationship between himself and Benito Bolisay as regards this case was terminated on 4 December
1969. 3
On 23 February 1974, respondent Hernando, without the consent of the heirs of Luciana Abadilla and complainant spouses, filed a petition on behalf of the heirs of Carlos,
Dionisia and Francisco all surnamed Abadilla, seeking the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of complainant spouses over the lot. Carlos, Dionisia and
Francisco were Luciana's registered co-owners in the original certificate of title covering Lot No. 9439-B. 4
At the hearing, respondent Hernando testified
that if the petition for cancellation of TCT was granted, Lot 9439-B would no longer be owned by complainant
spouses but would be owned in common by all the heirs of Luciana Abadilla. 5
Complainant spouses, upon learning of respondent's appearance against them in the cadastral proceeding, manifested their disapproval thereof in a letter dated 30 July
1974. 6
Respondent however, pursued the case until it was eventually dismissed by the trial court on 2 September 1974
on the ground of prescription. 7
At the hearing before the Office of the Solicitor General and in his Answer, respondent Hernando admitted his involvement in the cadastral case as counsel for the Abadillas but
denied having seen or taken hold of the controversial Transfer Certificate of Title, and having availed himself of any confidential information relating to Lot 9439-B.

In its Report and Recommendation dated 29 March 1990, the Solicitor General recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months for
violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics by representing clients with conflicting interests, and filed before this Court the corresponding Complaint 8
dated 30
March 1990.
The issue raised in this proceeding is: whether or not respondent Hernando had a conflict of interests under the
circumstances described above.
The Canons of Professional Ethics, the then prevailing parameters of behavior of members of the bar, defines a
conflict of interests situation in the following manner:
6. Adverse influence and conflicting interests.—
xxx xxx xxx
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also
the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the
client with respect to which confidence has been reposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Though as regards the first and second cases handled by respondent, no conflict of interest existed, the same cannot be
said with respect to the action for specific performance and the cadastral proceeding. By respondent's own admission,
he defended the right of ownership over Lot 9439-B of complainant Benito Bolisay in the action for specific
performance. He assailed this same right of ownership when he subsequently filed a petition for cancellation of
complainants' Transfer Certificate of Title over that same lot. Respondent Hernando was in a conflict of interest
situation.
It is clear from the above-quoted portion of the Canons of Professional Ethics that in cases where a conflict of
interests may exist, full disclosure of the facts and express consent of all the parties concerned are necessary. 9 The
present Code of Professional Responsibility is stricter on this matter considering that consent of the parties is now
required to be in written form. 10 In the case at bar, such consent was wanting.
Respondent persistently argues that contrary to the claims of complainant spouses, he had never seen nor taken hold
of the Transfer Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 9439-B nor obtained any confidential information in handling the
action for specific performance. 11 The contention of respondent is, in effect, that because complainant has not clearly
shown that respondent had obtained any confidential information from Benito Bolisay while representing the latter in
the action for specific performance, respondent cannot be penalized for representing conflicting interests. That is not
the rule in this jurisdiction. The rule here is, rather, that the mere fact that respondent had acted as counsel for Benito
Bolisay in the action for specific performance should have precluded respondent from acting or appearing as counsel
for the other side in the subsequent petition for cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the spouses
Generosa and Benito Bolisay. There is no necessity for proving the actual transmission of confidential information to
an attorney in the course of his employment by his first client in order that he may be precluded from accepting
employment by the second or subsequent client where there are conflicting interests between the first and the
subsequent clients. The reason for this rule was set out by the Court in Hilado v. David 12in the following terms:
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of
entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the
dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of
the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would be
productive of other unsalutary results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent; i.e.,
to make the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in
determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered,
to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for
an investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new
position. Litigants would be in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the
proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that
came to him.
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for
testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n. 183 III., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792) It is founded on principles of public policy,
on good taste. As has been said another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys,
like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. 13 (Emphasis supplied)
This Court went further in San Jose v. Cruz, 14
where the lawyer was charged with malpractice for having represented a new client
whose interest was opposed to those of his former clients in another case:
The record shows that the respondent offered his services to the Matienzo spouses knowing that the petitioner had
obtained a favorable judgment in the civil case No. 5480 and that his efforts in the subsequent civil case No. 5952
would frustrate said judgment and render it ineffectual, as has really been the result upon his obtaining the writ of
injunction above-mentioned. Obviously his conduct is unbecoming to an attorney and cannot be sanctioned by the
courts. An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the
relation of attorney and client has terminated and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in
another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent
of the former case. 15 (Emphasis supplied)
The appropriate rule has been expressed by Justice Malcolm in the following manner:

An attorney is not permitted, in serving a new client as against a former one, to do anything which will injuriously affect the former client in any manner in which the attorney
formerly represented him, though the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and the new employment is in a different case; nor can the attorney use against his former
client any knowledge or information gained through their former connection. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

The absence of monetary consideration does not exempt the lawyer from complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases where a conflict of interest exists. The
prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship.
The Court therefore agrees with the Solicitor-General that respondent Hernando is guilty of violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics by representing clients with
conflicting interests. We believe, however, that a heavier penaltyis appropriate.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Harold M. Hernando from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months, with a WARNING that repetition of the
same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty. A copy of this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts and to the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the
personal record of respondent.
GENE M. DOMINGO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent

A disbarred lawyer who is found to have committed an offense that constitutes another ground prior to his eventual
disbarment may be heavily fined therefor. The Court does not lose its exclusive jurisdiction over his other disbarrable
act or actuation committed while he was still a member of the Law Profession.

The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment instituted by Gene Domingo (complainant) against Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent),1 alleging that the latter deliberately and feloniously induced and persuaded the former into
releasing almost half a million pesos on the false pretense of having performed and accomplished legal services for
him.

Antecedents
The complainant is an American citizen of Filipino descent. During a visit to the Philippines in 2000, he sought the
services of a lawyer to handle the cases to be filed against his cousin Melchor Arruiza and to work on the settlement
of the estate of his late mother Judith Arruiza.2 In April 2000, petitioner met respondent, a lawyer recommended by a
friend. Petitioner informed respondent about his need for the services of a lawyer for the rescission of Melchor
Arruiza's adoption and for the settlement of his mother's estate.3
The complainant alleged that the respondent represented to him that he would take on the cases in behalf of the law
firm of Agabin Verzola Hermoso Layaoen & De Castro, where he worked as an associate. He assured petitioner that
the law firm was able and willing to act as his legal counsel in the cases he intended to institute against his adopted
brother, and to undertake the transfer of his mother's properties to his and his children's names.4 Trusting the
representations of respondent, the complainant agreed to engage respondent and his law firm, and paid the initial
amount of ₱80,000.00.

Being based in the United States of America, the complainant maintained constant communication with respondent
often through electronic mail (e-mail) and sometimes by telephone to get updates on the cases. The complainant
alleged that based on his correspondences with respondent, the latter made several misrepresentations, as follows:
[a)] He [had] filed the annulment of adoption of Melchor Arruiza in Abra, stating that the hearing would commence
by the end of May 2000; and that the trial had been brought to completion;
[b)] He was processing the transfer of the titles of the properties [in the names of petitioner and his children;]
[c)] He processed the cancellation of the adverse claim of Melchor Arruiza annotated on the two titles of the
properties, claiming that he was there at the Land Registration Authority in Quezon City for the final approval of the
cancellation;
[d)] He was processing the payment of taxes and other fees on the properties to be transferred, including capital gains
tax, transfer tax, registration fees and documentary stamp tax;
[e)] That he was negotiating with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to reduce the tax from ₱80,000.00 to ₱10,000.00;
[f)] That the new titles in the names of petitioner's children would be ready by July 20, 2000;
[g)] That the new titles in the children's names were issued;
[h)] That Melchor Arruiza opposed the cancellation of the adoption, and boasted that he knew many big time
politicians in Abra who would help him;
[i)] That the Judge x x x handling the case for the cancellation of the adoption [would] rule in petitioner's favor only if
he would give to the Judge 10% of the value of the property in Better Living Subdivision, Parafiaque City;
[j)] That the Judge agreed on x x x ₱200,000.00 but he (respondent) needed an additional ₱50,000.00 "for the boys" in
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court;
[k)] That the Judge [already wrote] a decision in petitioner's favor, but [for his protection insisted upon a kaliwaan of
the copy of the decision and the payment;]
[l)] That the Judge received the money and [already promulgated the] decision in petitioner's favor;
[m)] That said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals and eventually to the Supreme Court where respondent
was working doubly hard to influence [a favourable] outcome;
[n)] That the Supreme Court had to meet en bane on the decision of the Abra Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge in
petitioner's favor; and
[o)] That in consideration of all the above transactions, he (respondent) needed money [totalling] ₱433,002.61 [as
payment to the Judge, BIR and related agencies, actual expenses and legal fees], [but requested] the payment in
staggered amounts and on different dates.5

Based on the respondent's representation as to how justice was achieved in the Philippines, the complainant was
constrained to give to the respondent the requested amounts in the belief that he had no choice.6 The complainant
would repeatedly request the original or at the very least copies of the decisions and the titles by e-mail, facsimile
(fax) or courier service, but respondent repeatedly failed to comply with the requests, giving various reasons or
excuses. The respondent even volunteered to meet with the complainant in the United States of America to personally
deliver the promised documents. The respondent never went to the United States of America to meet with the
complainant. He also did not turn over the requested documents to the latter. Even worse, the respondent ultimately
tried to avoid the complainant by cutting off communications between them.
Given the respondent's evasion, the complainant decided to write the law firm of Agabin Verzola Hermoso Layaoen
& De Castro to inform them of the fraudulent actions of the respondent.7 The complainant was surprised to be
informed by the law firm that he had never been its client.8 The law firm also told him that the respondent had been
forced to resign from the law office because of numerous complaints about his performance as a lawyer.9
Hence, the complainant terminated the services of the respondent for refusal to respond and to surrender the alleged
documents in his possession. He engaged the services of another law firm to verify the status of the cases allegedly
brought by respondent in petitioner's behalf. The new law firm secured a certification from the RTC of Abra to the
effect that no case against Melchor Arruiza had been filed. The complainant also discovered that none of the
representations of the respondent, as enumerated above, had come to pass because all of such representations were
sham and intended to induce him to remit almost half a million pesos to the respondent.10

On July 24, 2001, the complainant filed his complaint for disbarment in this the Court accusing the respondent of
committing acts in violation of Canons 1, 2, 13, 15 & 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.11
On August 22, 2001, the Court required the respondent to comment.12

In his comment dated October 21, 2001,13 the respondent denied the accusations, and countered as follows:
a) Petitioner wanted to have the adoption of Melchor D. Arruiza by his late mother Judith D. Arruiza granted by the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dolores-San Juan in the Province of Abra annulled because he had not been
informed about the adoption which affected his inheritance, particularly with respect to the two parcels of land located
in Parañaque City. Petitioner related to respondent why he (petitioner) filed the action for annulment of adoption in
the RTC in Parañaque City, but Branch 258 of the RTC dismissed the petition on January 19, 2000 for lack of
jurisdiction over the case;
b) Following the dismissal of the case, petitioner desperately wanted to revive it in the RTC in Abra. Petitioner also
wanted the annotation of rights, title and interest of Melchor Arruiza as a legally adopted son of his late mother on the
two titles cancelled, and to have the properties transferred in the names of petitioner's children;
c) Respondent explained to petitioner that it would be very hard to revive the case because the order of adoption
issued on May 25, 1979 had long become final and executory;
d) It would also be inconvenient for petitioner to pursue the cancellation case considering that he was a permanent
resident of the United States of America and the need for his personal presence at the RTC in Abra to testify against
his adopted brother;
e) Respondent further told petitioner that his law firm at the time did not allow its members to handle personal cases,
especially if the cases were filed in far flung provinces; and that the particular case of annulment of the judgment of
adoption, being a special proceeding, would take years to finish inasmuch as the losing party would likely elevate the
matter up to the Supreme Court and would be very costly in terms of expenses and attorney's fees;
f) Respondent claimed that petitioner still profusely pleaded with him to pursue the case no matter how much it would
cost him, as long as his adopted brother was prevented from inheriting from the estate of his mother;
g) Respondent tried to talk some sense into petitioner, particularly that it was only just and fair that his adopted
brother would inherit from their mother, but petitioner could not be swayed;
h) Even though respondent sensed the greediness, wickedness and scheming design of petitioner, he still accepted the
engagement to handle the case of annulment of the judgment of adoption, as well as to have the annotations at the
back of the titles cancelled and eventually have the properties transferred in the names of petitioner's children;
i) Respondent proposed that petitioner pay ₱500,000.00, more or less, as the total package of expenses and attorney's
fees; petitioner agreed to the proposal and promised to remit the amount by installment upon his return to the United
States of America, and to send the special power of attorney authorizing respondent to bring the case against Melchor
Arruiza;
j) As a means of protecting the interest of petitioner, respondent offered to issue a check for ₱500,000.00 as a security
for the amount to be remitted by petitioner from his United States of America account; his offer of the check was to
give a sign of his good faith, because his primary aim was to provide the best and effective legal services petitioner
needed under the circumstances;
k) Respondent then prepared an affidavit of self-adjudication for petitioner respecting the two properties registered in
the name of petitioner's late mother; he caused the publication of the affidavit in a tabloid;
l) Respondent informed petitioner that there was no way for him to win the annulment case unless he personally
appeared and testified against his adopted brother, but petitioner said that he could not personally testify because he
feared for his life due to Abra being an NPA- infested area;
m) On August 27, 2001, respondent went on and filed the complaint for annulment of the adoption in the RTC in
Abra, docketed as Civil Case No. 1989, even without any firm assurance from petitioner that he would personally
appear in court;
n) After the filing of the case, petitioner started making unreasonable demands, like having an immediate decision
from the RTC in Abra in his favor, the cancellation of the adverse claim of his adopted brother on the titles of the
properties, and transferring the titles in the names of petitioner's three children;
o) Respondent tried to explain to petitioner that his demands were impossible to meet because civil and special
proceedings cases take years to finish inasmuch as the aggrieved parties would elevate the cases up to the Supreme
Court; and that the cancellation of the adverse claim would depend on the outcome of the case they filed, but his
refusal to appear and testify was still a problem;
p) Petitioner still adamantly insisted that respondent comply with his demands, or else he would sue him if he did
not.14

On November 26, 2001, the Court referred the complaint for disbarment and the comment to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.15
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP conducted hearings. The case was then submitted for resolution
after the complainant and the respondent submitted their manifestation and reply/counter manifestation, respectively.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation dated September 6, 2002,16 the IBPCBD found the respondent guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility with respect to negligence in the performance of his duties towards his client,
and recommended the penalty of reprimand with a stem warning that a repetition of the offense would warrant a more
severe penalty. It ruled that the proceeding before it was basically a disciplinary proceeding; that it could only decide
on the fitness of respondent to continue in the practice of law;17 that it could not go beyond the sanctions that could be
imposed under the Rules of Court; that it had the power to require the restitution of the client's money as part of the
penalty; that it could only order the restitution of whatever amount that was given by petitioner to respondent but not
other monetary claims of petitioner like travel and plane fare and litigation expenses, which were properly within the
jurisdiction of other authorities;18 and that, accordingly, it ordered respondent to immediately deliver to petitioner the
amount of ₱513,000.00, plus interest computed at the legal rate.

In Resolution No. XV-2002-597 passed on October 19, 2002,19 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation dated September 6, 2002 of the Investigating Commissioner.

On January 14, 2003, the complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 praying that Resolution No. XV-2002-
597 be reconsidered and set aside, and that the appropriate penalty of disbarment, or, at the very least, suspension be
imposed on the respondent.

On January 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed and adopted Resolution No. XV-2003-4921 denying the
complainant's Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the Board had no jurisdiction to consider and resolve the
matter by virtue of its having already been endorsed to the Court.
Meanwhile, on January 29, 2003, the Court issued a resolution: (1) noting the resolution of the IBP-CBD
reprimanding the respondent; and (2) directing him to inform the IBP of his compliance with the resolution.22
After the IBP denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, the complainant filed his petition dated March 6, 2003.23

On April 3, 2003, the respondent filed his Manifestation and Motion praying that the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors be reconsidered and set aside.24

On April 30, 2003, the Court noted the IBP's denial of the complainant's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
jurisdiction, and the respondent's Manifestation and Motion; and took cognizance of the March 6, 2003 petition of the
complainant, and required the respondent to file his Comment.25

On October 20, 2003, the Court took note of the respondent's Comment with Motion for Reconsideration, and
required the complainant to file his Reply.26 After requesting an extension of time to file his Reply, the complainant
filed his Reply on December 8, 2003.27

Ruling of the Court

In its findings, the IBP concluded that the respondent was guilty ofnegligence in the performance of his duties to his
client, and recommended that: (a) he be reprimanded with a stem warning that any repetition of his conduct would be
dealt with more severely; and (b) he be ordered to return the sums of money totalling ₱513,000.00 he had received
from the complainant.

After reviewing the established circumstances of the case, the Court accepts the findings against the respondent but
modifies the recommended penalty considering that his violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibilityconstituted deliberate defraudation of the client instead of mere negligence.

Firstly, the respondent misled the complainant into thinking that it would be his law firm that was to take on the case.

Secondly, despite the fact that he had intimated to the complainant that it would be highly unlikely to still have the
adoption decree nullified due to the decree having long become final and executory, he nonetheless accepted the case.

Thirdly, he told the complainant that he had already instituted the action for the annulment of the adoption despite not
having yet done so. Fourthly, he kept on demanding more money from the complainant although the case was not
actually even moving forward. Fifthly, he continued to make up excuses in order to avoid having to furnish to the
complainant the requested copies of court documents that, in the first place, he could not produce. And, lastly, he
claimed that he intended to return the money to the complainant but instead sent the latter a stale check.

All these acts, whether taken singly or together, manifested the respondent's dishonesty and deceit towards the
complainant, his client, in patent violation of Rule 1.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

We note that the respondent filed the case for the annulment of the adoption decree only on August 27, 200129 after
the complainant had sent him the demand letter dated April 10, 2001.30 Such filing was already during the pendency
of the administrative investigation of the complaint against him in the IBP. Had the complainant not threatened to
charge him administratively, he would not have filed the petition for annulment of the adoption at all.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

The Court has consistently held, in respect of this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations
due to the client is considered per se a violation.31

Despite the fact that the complainant engaged his services and advanced sums of money to cover the court fees and
related expenses to be incurred along the way, the respondent did not file the petition for annulment. His conduct was
reprehensible because it amounted to dishonesty and plain deceit. His filing of the petition for annulment later on did
not mitigate his sin because he did so only because he had meanwhile received the complainant's demand letter that
contained the threat of filing administrative charges against him. Moreover, he repeatedly did not inform the
complainant on the actual status of the petition although the latter regularly sought to be updated. Instead, the
respondent kept on making up excuses and conjured up pretenses to make it appear that the case was moving along.
His conduct of accepting money for his legal services in handling the annulment of the adoption decree, and of failing
to render the contracted legal services violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.32 Also, the highly
fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and client required that he as the lawyer should promptly account for all
the funds received from, or held by him for, the complainant as the client.33
Furthermore, the respondent did not abide by the mandate of Canon 15 that required members of the Legal Profession
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients.
In their conversations, the respondent told the complainant that the judge handling the case would rule in their favor
only if he would be given 10% of the value of the property at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, and that the
handling judge consequently agreed on the fee of ₱200,000.00 but needed an additional ₱50,000.00 "for the boys" in
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In doing so, the respondent committed calumny, and thereby violated
Rules 15.06 and 15.07 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body.

Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and principles of fairness.
Members of the Bench are tasked with ensuring that the ends of justice are served.1âwphi1 Such negative imputations
against them and the collegial bodies of the Judiciary on the part of the respondent tended to erode the trust and
confidence of the people in our judicial system. The Court should not take such conduct of the respondent lightly
considering that the image of the Judiciary was thereby diminished in the eyes of the public; hence, the Court must
severely reprove the respondent.

The respondent's commission of various offenses constituting professional misconduct only demonstrated his
unworthiness to remain as a member of the Legal Profession. He ought to be disbarred for such offenses upon this
complaint alone. A review of his record as an admitted member of the Bar shows, however, that in Que v. Revilla,
Jr.,34 the Court had disbarred him from the Legal Profession upon finding him guilty of violations of the Lawyers
Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. In view of
his prior disbarment, we can no longer impose the appropriate penalty of disbarment as deserved because we do not
have double or multiple disbarments in this jurisdiction.35
In the meanwhile, on February 15, 2016, the respondent filed a so-called Most Respectful Motion to Dismiss36in which
he adverted to the earlier submission through his Manifestation filed on April 24, 201537 of the copy of the amicable
settlement he had concluded with the complainant to the effect that, among others, he had already paid back to the
latter, through his lawyer (Atty. Hope Ruiz Valenzuela), the amount of ₱650,000.00 "as full and complete settlement
of the Complainant's claims against the Respondent." He thereby sought the dismissal of the complaint out of "justice
and fairness."

In the resolution promulgated on September 22, 2015, the Court merely noted without action the Manifestationdated
April 21, 2015.38
The Most Respectful Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the amicable settlement between the parties cannot be
granted. Although the amicable settlement obliterated the legal obligation to return to the complainant the amounts
obtained by deceit, the respondent was not entitled to demand the dismissal of the charges against him for that reason.
He ought to have known that his professional responsibilities as an attorney were distinct from his other
responsibilities. To be clear, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and
the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of
their Lawyer's Oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the Bar.39
Moreover, the practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions.40 Every attorney is a vanguard of our
legal system, and, as such, is expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing in order that the people's faith and confidence in the legal system are ensured. 41 He
must then conduct himself, whether in dealing with his clients or with the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at
all times.42 Any violation of the high moral standards of the Legal Profession justifies the imposition on the attorney
of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.43 Verily, the respondent's deceitful conduct as an
attorney rendered him directly answerable to the Court on ethical, professional and legal grounds despite the fact that
he and the complainant had amicably settled any differences they had that might have compelled the complainant to
bring the complaint against him.

In fine, the gravity of the respondent's professional misconduct and deceit should fully warrant his being permanently
barred from reinstatement to the ranks of the Philippine Bar and from having his name restored in the Roll of
Attorneys.

However, circumstances attendant in his case should be considered and appreciated in mitigating the penalty to be
imposed.44

The first of such circumstances related to the context of the engagement between the parties. Upon reflecting on the
adverse effects on his inheritance from his late mother of his cousin's adoption by her, the complainant had engaged
the respondent's legal services and representation for the purpose of nullifying or undoing the adoption. At the outset,
the respondent was candid in explaining to the complainant that the prosecution of the case would be complicated
mainly because the adoption had been decreed in 1979 yet, and also because the complainant, as a permanent resident
of the United States of America, would be thereby encountering difficulties and high costs, aside from untold
inconvenience due to his physical presence in the country being needed every now and then.45 The respondent's
candid explanations notwithstanding, the complainant persisted in pursuing the case, impelling the respondent to take
on the engagement.

Another circumstance is that the respondent had already returned to the complainant the amount of ₱650,000.00 the
former had received from the latter on account of the professional engagement. The returned amount was in full and
complete settlement of the latter's claims.46 Judicial precedents exist in which the Court treated the return in full of the
money the respondent attorneys had received from their complaining clients as mitigating circumstances that lowered
the penalties imposed.47 For sure, the voluntary restitution by the respondent herein of the amount received in the
course of the professional engagement, even if it would not lift the sanction meted on him, manifested remorse of a
degree on his part for his wrongdoing, and was mitigating in his favor.

And, thirdly, the Court cannot but note the respondent's several pleas for judicial clemency to seek his reinstatement
in the ranks of the Philippine Bar.48 He has backed up his pleas by adverting to his personal travails since his
disbarment. He claims, too, that his health has been failing of late considering that he had been diagnosed to be
suffering from chronic kidney disease, stage five, and has been undergoing dialysis three times a week.49 His
advancing age and the fragile state of his health may also be considered as a mitigating factor.50 In addition, it is
noteworthy that he has been devoting some time to Christian and charity pursuits, like serving with humility as a Lay
Minister at St. Peter Church in Quezon City and as a regular lecturer on the Legal Aspects of Marriage. 51
Pleas for judicial clemency reflected further remorse and repentance on the part of the respondent.52 His pleas appear
to be sincere and heartfelt. In human experience, remorse and repentance, if coupled with sincerity, have always been
regarded as the auspicious start of forgiving on the part of the offended, and may eventually win even an absolution
for the remorseful. The Court will not be the last to forgive though it may not forget.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, perpetual disqualification from being reinstated will be too grave a penalty in
light of the objective of imposing heavy penalties like disbarment to correct the offenders.53 The penalty ought to be
tempered to enable his eventual reinstatement at some point in the future. Verily, permanently barring the respondent
from reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by virtue of this disbarrable offense will deprive him the chance to return
to his former life as an attorney.

To start the respondent on the long road to reinstatement, we fine him in the amount of ₱100,000.00, a figure believed
to be a fair index of the gravity of his misdeeds. Less than such amount might undeservedly diminish the gravity of
his misdeeds. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that he committed the offense complained of herein before the
Court disbarred him in A.C. 7054. Meting the stiff fine despite his disbarment is a way for the Court to assert its
authority and competence to discipline all acts and actuations committed by the members of the Legal Profession. The
Court will not waver in doing so.

But the fine comes with the stem warning to the respondent that he must hereafter genuinely affirm his remorse and
start to demonstrate his readiness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of
every member of the Bar in good standing and of every officer of the Court;55 otherwise, he would be be sanctioned
with greater severity.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. GUILTY of violating
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 15.06 and 15.07 of Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, but, in view of his continuing disbarment, hereby METES the penalty of FINE of ₱l00,000.00.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY

Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office
of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.

PACES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Petitioner

vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO M. SALANDANAN, Respondent

This is a complaint which Paces Industrial Corporation (Paces) filed against its former lawyer, Atty. Edgardo M.
Salandanan, for allegedly committing malpractice and/or gross misconduct when he represented conflicting interests.

The procedural and factual antecedents of the instant case are as follows:

Sometime in October 1973, Salandanan became a stockholder of Paces, and later became its Director, Treasurer,
Administrative Officer, Vice-President for Finance, then its counsel. As lawyer for Paces, he appeared for it in several
cases such as in Sisenando Malveda, et al. v. Paces Corporation (NLRC R-04 Case No. 11-3114-73) and Land &
Housing Development Corporation v. Paces Corporation (Civil Case No. 18791). In the latter case, Salandanan failed
to file the Answer, after filing a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, which the court had denied. As a result, an order of
default was issued against Paces. Salandanan never withdrew his appearance in the case nor notified Paces to get the
services of another lawyer. Subsequently, a decision was rendered against Paces which later became final and
executory.

On December 4, 1973, E.E. Black Ltd., through its counsel, sent a letter to Paces regarding the latter's outstanding
obligation to it in the amount of ₱96,5 l 3.91. In the negotiations that transpired thereafter, Salandanan was the one
who represented Paces. He was likewise entrusted with the documents relative to the agreement between Paces and
E.E. Black Ltd.

Meanwhile, disagreements on various management policies ensued among the stockholders and officers in the
corporation. Eventually, Salandanan and his group were forced to sell out their shareholdings in the company to the
group of Mr. Nicolas C. Balderama on May 27, 1974.

After said sell-out, Salandanan started handling the case between E.E. Black Ltd. and Paces, but now, representing
E.E. Black Ltd. Salandanan then filed a complaint with application for preliminary attachment against Paces for the
collection of its obligation to E.E. Black Ltd. He later succeeded in obtaining an order of attachment, writ of
attachment, and notices of garnishment to various entities which Paces had business dealings with.
Thus, Paces filed a complaint against Salandanan. It argued that when he acted as counsel for E.E. Black Ltd., he
represented conflicting interests and utilized, to the full extent, all the information he had acquired as its stockholder,
officer, and lawyer. On the other hand, Salandanan claimed that he was never employed nor paid as a counsel by
Paces. There was no client-lawyer contract between them. He maintained that his being a lawyer was merely
coincidental to his being a stockholder-officer and did not automatically make him a lawyer of the corporation,
particularly with respect to its account with E.E. Black Ltd. He added that whatever knowledge or information he had
obtained on the operation of Paces only took place in the regular, routinary course of business as him being an
investor, stockholder, and officer, but never as a lawyer of the company.

After a thorough and careful review of the case, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) recommended Salandanan's suspension for one (1) year on November 2, 2011.1 On September 28,
2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-1202 adopting and approving, with modification,
the aforementioned recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A, " and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that the Respondent violated the conflict of interest rule, Atty. Edgardo M
Salandanan is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.

On August 8, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-413,3 denying Salandanan's motion
for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XX-2013-120.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate from the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provide:
CANON 15 - A LA WYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
Rule 15. 03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Under the aforecited rules, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases.4 Conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is
his duty to oppose it for the other client. In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests
if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests
is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of said
duty.5 The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.6

The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on the following five (5) rationales:7
First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided loyalty. A client is entitled
to be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling such confidence is an objective important in itself.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal representation. To the
extent that a conflict of interest undermines the independence of the lawyer's professional judgment or inhibits a
lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the client's behalf, the client's expectation of effective representation
could be compromised.
Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard confidential information pertaining to it. Preventing the
use of confidential information against the interests of the client to benefit the lawyer's personal interest, in aid of
some other client, or to foster an assumed public purpose, is facilitated through conflicts rules that reduce the
opportunity for such abuse.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a client to make a gift or
grant in the lawyer's favor.1âwphi1
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining adequate presentations to
tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer might appear on both sides of the litigation,
complicating the process of taking proof and compromise adversary argumentation.

Even the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or
in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given should
not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a
lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the
previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the CPR expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." The lawyer's highest and most
unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself. The protection given to the client is
perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client's ceasing to employ
the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the
client.8

It must, however, be noted that a lawyer's immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred
beyond the lawyer's employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect
the client's interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose
after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.9

Here, contrary to Salandanan's futile defense, he sufficiently represented or intervened for Paces in its negotiations for
the payment of its obligation to E.E. Black Ltd. The letters he sent to the counsel of E.E. Black Ltd. identified him as
the Treasurer of Paces. Previously, he had likewise represented Paces in two (2) different cases. It is clear, therefore,
that his duty had been to fight a cause for Paces, but it later became his duty to oppose the same for E.E. Black Ltd.
His defense for Paces was eventually opposed by him when he argued for E.E. Black Ltd. Thus, Salandanan had
indisputably obtained knowledge of matters affecting the rights and obligations of Paces which had been placed in
him in unrestricted confidence. The same knowledge led him to the identification of those attachable properties and
business organizations that eventually made the attachment and garnishment against Paces a success. To allow him to
utilize said information for his own personal interest or for the benefit of E.E. Black Ltd., the adverse party, would be
to violate the element of confidence which lies at the very foundation of a lawyer-client relationship.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a
client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be
allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the
former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation
of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the
client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of
the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care.10 It behooves lawyers, not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.11 The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.12
In the absence of the express consent from Paces after full disclosure to it of the conflict of interest, Salandanan
should have either outrightly declined representing and entering his appearance as counsel for E.E. Black Ltd., or
advised E.E. Black Ltd. to simply engage the services of another lawyer. Unfortunately, he did neither, and must
necessarily suffer the dire consequences.13

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP's finding that Salandanan represented conflicting
interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable for the same.14

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan from the
practice of law for three (3) years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his commission of a
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan and entered in his file
in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.

SO ORDERED.