You are on page 1of 33

Analysis of Complex Negotiations in International Business: The RBC Perspective

Author(s): Stephen E. Weiss


Source: Organization Science, Vol. 4, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 269-300
Published by: INFORMS
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2635203
Accessed: 29/11/2009 20:39

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=informs.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

INFORMS is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Organization Science.

http://www.jstor.org
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
Vol. 4, No. 2, May 1993
Prinited in U.S.A.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN


INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: THE RBC PERSPECTIVE*
STEPHENE. WEISS

Faculty of Administrative Studies, York University,4700 Keele St.


North York, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3
Internationalnegotiationsbetween organizationsprojecta complexitythat makesthem a
challengeto describe,explain and improve.Their many elements and dynamicschallenge
especially those researchersand practitionerswho seek a comprehensiveyet essential
understandingof these negotiations.Towardthat end, this article develops a new analytic
perspectivethat focuses on three key facets of negotiation-parties' Relationships,parties'
Behaviors,and influencingConditions(RBC)-and their basic B N C interaction.
The first section defines internationalbusinessnegotiation,targetsthe subsetof complex,
interorganizational negotiations,presentsas an examplethe 1985-86 CGE-ITTtelecommu-
nicationsmerger,and considersthe partialviews of the mergertalks providedby existing
frameworks.Severalreasonsthen enumeratedunderscorethe need for andpotentialvalueof
an inclusive,generallyapplicableperspectivefor complexnegotiations.
The RBC Framework,coupledwith the Basic Model, are presentedin detail, with each
key facet defined, illustrated,and supportedwith referencesfrom diverse literatures.The
Relationshipand Behavior facets incorporatemultiple levels of analysis(organizational,
groupand individual).Conditionsencompassfour types(circumstances,capabilities,cultures
and environments).A temporaldimensioncompletesthe framework.
The last section of the paper proposes empirical and practical applicationsof this
perspectiveto internationalbusiness.The formerincludesquestion-asking,model-building
and testing,and cumulationof knowledge,and the latter,makingsense of myriaddetailsand
identifyingpotentialpointsof influenceon counterparts.In these ways,the RBC Perspective
integratesexistingknowledgeand will stimulatefutureworkin the field.
(NEGOTIATION; INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS; MULTILEVELANALYSIS; IN-
TERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS)

Overview
Many organizations engage in international negotiations. In the auto industry, all
major US manufacturers have discussed joint ventures with Japanese firms and
acquisitions with Europeans. In telecommunications equipment, national suppliers
throughout the world have pursued sales with foreign governments. Such negotiations
tend to involve "a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way" (Simon
1968, p. 86 quoted in Winham 1977, p. 350): many individual actors, several sets of
issues within overall agenda, various arenas of activity, and numerous other factors.
Carried out over many months, sometimes achieving agreement, sometimes not, these
complex, international negotiations are a challenge to manage and to understand.
Existing research on international business negotiation specifically, and on negotia-
tion generally, provides an important base of knowledge (e.g., for the former, Graham
1983; Grieco 1982; Smith and Wells 1976; and for the latter, Bazerman and Lewicki
1983; Lax and Sebenius 1986; Pruitt 1981), yet there is more to learn about complex
negotiations. With respect to outcomes, studies of multinational enterprise (MNE)-
host government bargaining have explained only a small portion (12-14% in Fagre
and Wells 1982; cf. 47% in Lecraw 1984) of the variance in outcomes that are
agreements. No-agreement outcomes remain relatively unexplored. For the

*Acceptedby Arie Y. Lewin;receivedJuly 1990.This paperhas been with the authorfor two revisions.
269
1047-7039/93/0402/0269/$01.25
Copyright C) 1993, The Institute of Management Sciences
270 STEPHEN E. WEISS

process-and structure-of negotiation, existing frameworks and models differ widely


in their foci (e.g., Graham 1987, cf. Fayerweather and Kapoor 1976), while relevant
empirical studies have concentrated on a few aspects at a time. As a result, it is not
clear from existing work how the pieces fit together (or which ones might still be
needed) to describe the dynamic whole of a complex, international negotiation or to
explain its outcome.
To further broad understanding of complex, international negotiation, this article
develops what Blalock (1989, pp. 2-3) has called a "highly inclusive perspective," one
that incorporates major features of several existing, simple theories (for supporting
views, see Poole and Van de Ven 1989; Runkel and McGrath 1972). Inclusiveness
corresponds with the apparent complexity of the phenomenon. Moreover, this kind of
perspective enables researchers to go on to see the circumstances under which, on the
basis of empirical evidence rather than a priori, certain kinds of variables can "safely"
be ignored (Blalock 1989, p. 3).
The article begins with an outline of the generic elements of complex, international
negotiation, a substantive example from the mid-1980s, and a review of existing,
analytic frameworks for negotiation. The review underscores the desirability of
further conceptual development. It also leads to the conclusion that an approach to
complex negotiation, even if motivated by international concerns, should be designed
for general (including intranational) use. The new perspective then developed focuses
on three essential facets of negotiation-parties' Relationships, parties' Behaviors,
and influencing Conditions (RBC)-and their causal interaction in a core, B, c
logic.
The RBC Framework for Complex Negotiations and accompanying Basic Model
not only integrate a number of existing perspectives; they carry several distinctive
features. They include: (1) a relationship orientation that emphasizes the interactive
nature of the negotiation process; (2) multiple levels and units for behavioral analysis
(see Rousseau 1985, p. 2); (3) an internationally-applicable representation of influ-
encing conditions; and (4) conjoint consideration of behavior and conditions (see
Pervin 1989), and structure and process, for multilateral as well as bilateral negotia-
tions. This perspective can significantly advance empirical and practical endeavors in
international business, which are addressed in the final section of the article.

Identifying the Phenomenon


There are very few definitions of international business negotiation in research
literature. Stoever (1981, p. 1) confined his definition to negotiations between foreign
investors and governments concerning direct investment. A more straightforward,
inclusive meaning based on the conduct of business across national borders (e.g.,
Kennedy 1985; Posses 1978; Robock and Simmonds 1989), combined with Walton
and McKersie's (1965, p. 3) widely-cited conceptualization of labor negotiation, leads
to a more suitable working definition for this article: the deliberate interaction of two
or more social units (at least one of them a business entity), originating from different
nations, that are attempting to define or redefine their interdependence in a business
matter. This includes company-company, company-government and solely interper-
sonal interactions over business matters such as sales, licensing, joint ventures, and
acquisitions.
The negotiations between organizations can be viewed as a subset of international
business negotiations. When organizations are the primary parties to a negotiation,
proceedings are often, if not always, complex. This article focuses on these negotia-
tions and uses the terms "complex" and "interorganizational" interchangeably.
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 271

A Substantive Illustration
The following account of the CGE-ITT telecommunications talks, as an example of
an interorganizational, international business negotiation, illustrates the complexity
involved. Concentrate on its substance as raw information to be organized later
according to existing analytic frameworks.
In mid-1985, the chairmen of ITT and Compagnie Generale d'Electricite (CGE) of
France, Rand Araskog and Georges Pebereau, began talking informally about linking
their telecommunications (telecom) businesses (Araskog 1989, pp. 159ff). ITT had
found itself seriously short of cash and confronted by raiders largely because of its
numerous acquisitions during the 1960s and '70s. In its telecom business, sales of
telecom equipment had leveled off at $4.6 billion in 1985, and ITT's System 12, an
advanced digital switching system whose development cost $1 billion, suffered from
technical problems and lower-than-anticipated levels of orders. In the $10 billion-a-
year worldwide market for digital central office switches, ITT faced fierce competition
from Northern Telecom, Ericsson, CGE, Siemens, and, increasingly, AT&T. CGE, a
state-owned holding company with interests in energy, construction and electrical
contracting, had seen its telecom business expand rapidly during the 1970s with the
growth of the protected French telecom market, but the early 1980s had brought a
slowdown. With only a 3% share of the world telecom market, CGE leadership felt
their survival in it depended upon reaching "critical size" ("France Allows ITT-CGE
Pact" 1986).
Araskog and Pebereau met secretly some 20 times. AraskQg quietly courted
Northern Telecom as an alternative partner, but, in June 1986, he and Pebereau
reached an agreement to establish a new joint venture company that would hold the
telecom businesses of both ITT and CGE-owned Alcatel. For ITT assets and a 70%
stake in the new company, CGE would pay ITT $1.8 billion (Sanger 1986).
The deal required approval from the newly established "co-habitation" government
in France-from Finance Minister Edouard Balladur, in particular. He added de-
mands. The Government also dismissed Pebereau as head of CGE and designated as
his successor, Pierre Suard. Suard and Araskog reduced the price to be paid by CGE
(to $1.5 billion, with ITT's stake in the new company rising to 37%), and on July 30,
the Government announced its approval.
From August to December 1986, intercompany negotiations over details involved
intracompany task forces, full negotiating teams comprising financial, legal and
operations specialists, and intercompany working groups. The negotiation agenda
entailed numerous issues related to acquisition of ITT's telecom businesses in 43
countries and establishment of the new joint venture company in the Netherlands. To
reduce its cost, CGE sought out prospective joint venture partners such as Telefonica
of Spain, Societe Generale de Belgique, and Credit Lyonnais. At the same time,
governments throughout Europe monitored the talks and became so embroiled over
France's likely inroads into their telecom markets via ITT's companies that journalists
predicted the collapse of the deal (Peterson 1986). Still, because of ITT's tax concerns
and CGE's financial closing and privatization program, the companies faced a firm
deadline of December 31.
After 21 months, on December 30, 1986, CGE and ITT completed a formal
agreement and necessary closings. Additional closings would take place in subsequent
months. On January 7, 1987, CGE and ITT launched the new company, Alcatel, n.v.

Views from Existing Frameworks


To analyze and make sense of negotiations like the CGE-ITT talks, a researcher
has available a variety of negotiation models and frameworks. Each offers a "lens"
272 STEPHEN E. WEISS

(Allison 1971). There are only a few designed specially for international business
negotiations (e.g., Tung 1988). Others originally designated for American arenas such
as collective bargaining have also been used internationally (e.g., Walton and
McKersie 1965, pp. 382ff), as have models designed to be generic (e.g., Wall 1985).
Even some US-oriented frameworks and models not yet used internationally offer
some insights for complex, international business negotiations.
The following section reviews examples of each type, collapsing them into two
categories: originally for international business, and US-oriented others. Notice what
each model or framework elucidates and when compared with others, what it neglects
or expressly sets aside. Collectively, they substantiate the complexity attributed to the
CGE-ITT talks and others like them.
US-OrientedModels and Frameworks
The most widely used analytic perspective for negotiation is grounded in the
strategic bargaining model, which addresses actors' goals or preferences, actions, and
outcomes. Both game theorists (Raiffa 1982; Schelling 1960) and social psychologists
(Deutsch 1973; Pruitt 1981) have used it to describe concession-making behavior and,
assuming preference maximization, to prescribe optimal outcomes. A corresponding
account of the CGE-ITT case would highlight facets such as the two companies' (or
Pebereau and Araskog's) respective objectives for the valuation of ITT's telecom
business, ITT's proposal for a $1.8 billion payment, and tangible outcomes such as
ITT's 37% stake in the new company.
In contrast, the "intraorganizational bargaining model" developed by Walton and
McKersie (1965, pp. 281ff) draws attention to internal conflict and conflict resolution,
particularly as expressed in negotiating representatives' boundary roles. Conflict is
caused by differences in motivations, emotions and perceptions (see also Colosi 1983,
p. 231; Lax and Sebenius 1986, pp. 339-340). Accordingly, in the CGE-ITT case, a
researcher would study Araskog's struggles with corporate raiders, consultations with
investment bankers, and limited communications with ITT directors, and Pebereau's
minimal contact with French government superiors.
The "structural model" of conflict behavior developed by Thomas (1976, pp.
912-930) offers another view by focusing not on behavior and outcomes, but on the
conditions that shape them. The model encompasses behavioral predispositions,
social pressures, incentive structure, and rules and procedures. For the CGE-ITT
negotiations, it would point, for example, to the interests of ITT subsidiaries and
customers, the US Department of Defense, and France's Finance Minister; the
CEOs' decision to proceed confidentially with "Project Roxane"; and the intermedi-
ary role played by a French banker.
Prescriptive, process-oriented frameworks for public disputes reinforce attention to
conditions and distinctively extend the temporal dimension. Carpenter and Kennedy
(1988) and Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) both recognize pre-negotiation, negotia-
tion, and implementation or post-negotiation phases. Thus the beginning of the
CGE-ITT talks might be found in some early social contact between Pebereau and
Araskog, and analysis of the talks would extend beyond the December 30, 1986
contract signings to the parties' behavior in additional closings and in the formation
of the new Alcatel, n.v.
One more US-oriented perspective deserves consideration: the collective bargain-
ing model of Kochan and Katz (1988, pp. 1-18). It offers the most encompassing view
of interorganizational negotiation of the frameworks sampled (see others in Lewicki,
Weiss and Lewin 1992). The model centers on the goals of three parties-labor,
management and government-and incorporates elements of the external environ-
ment, institutional structures and processes of bargaining (from several vantage
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 273

points), and the parties' goal attainment and administration of their relationship.
While no one seems to have advocated its use internationally, the model could be
adapted to bring out many factors in the CGE-ITT negotiations seen only separately
with the perspectives above.
Frameworksfor International Business Negotiations
Following the premise in Fayerweather and Kapoor's (1976, p. 26) seminal work
that international business negotiation is "unique," researchers in the US and
elsewhere have developed dedicated perspectives for it. Basically, they fall into two
categories: stage models of negotiation process and behavior motivated by cultural
concerns, and broad international frameworks or schemata.
Graham's (1987, p. 168) process (stage) model for all cultures keys on the purpose
or nature of negotiators' successive interactions. Its four phases are nontask sound-
ing, task-related information exchange, persuasion, and concessions and agreement.
Considering the first two phases, in particular, would shed new light on the CGE-ITT
illustration. (See other process models for international business in March 1985 and
McCall and Warrington 1984 and for diplomacy in Zartman and Berman 1982.)
Among broad frameworks, Fayerweather and Kapoor's (1976, pp. 29-45) contribu-
tion highlights the "wide variety of environments" in international business. Their
framework comprises: the negotiation situation, functional areas (e.g., finance), "four
C's" (common interests, conflicting interests, compromise, and criteria for undertak-
ing negotiation), the environment (political, economic, social and cultural systems),
and "perspective" (broad factors such as previous negotiation experiences that
influence the negotiation at hand). Though not all clearly defined, these "lenses"
would discern still more facets of the CGE-ITT case: for example, the activities of the
companies' financial, legal and operations representatives, and common interests
such as improved competitiveness and standing in the telecom equipment market.
Most recently, the "conceptual paradigm" of international business negotiation set
forth by Tung (1988) clearly describes environmental factors only alluded to in its
antecedents (e.g., Weiss and Stripp 1985, p. 5). In addition to this environmental
context (political, economic, institutional-legal, cultural), the paradigm consists of the
negotiation context, negotiator characteristics, strategic selections and process, and
the negotiation outcome. Thus, finally, in the CGE-ITT case, this view would include
factors such as the French and US economic contexts, the complexity of issues (e.g.,
valuation of assets in 43 countries), and the influence of Araskog's and Pebereau's
personalities on their selection of negotiation strategies.
Bases for Further Development
As the foregoing review has shown, existing frameworks and models project
considerably different views of the same phenomenon. What one perspective makes
obvious may remain hidden from another. Granted, some of these models (e.g., the
intraorganizational bargaining model) were not originally intended for more than a
limited set of aspects. But there is no framework that satisfactorily situates or
"synthesizes" them (Blalock 1989, p. 2).
Notwithstanding their original intent, a number of these models have come to be
treated as competing alternatives (Putnam 1990). Empirical research on international
business negotiations has long been split between two uncommunicative streams
(despite their common footing in a strategic perspective): a macro-strategic stream on
MNE-host government bargaining that concentrates on the organizations as unitary
wholes (e.g., Grosse and Aramburu 1990, Kobrin 1987, Vernon 1968); and a micro-
behavioral stream directed at bargaining between individuals in different cultures
(e.g., Adler, Graham and Schwarz Gehrke 1987; Harnett and Cummings 1980).
274 STEPHEN E. WEISS

Further, as mentioned earlier, there remains a fair amount of unexplained variance in


the proceedings and outcomes of complex, international negotiation.
For researchers interested in a broad understanding of the phenomenon, the views
from several existing frameworks can be seen as complementary rather than conflict-
ing parts of the same picture. They can be brought together in an "inclusive"
perspective (Blalock 1989, p. 2) in much the way that Kochan and Katz (1988) and
Tung (1988) augmented the strategic bargaining model. As Runkel and McGrath
have noted (1972, pp. 17-20), "laying out the boundaries and structure of the entire
domain of relevance" enhances the planning and interpretation of empirical research,
and can be guided by their concept of "facet design."
For such an undertaking, the review above raises one other basic issue: the need
for-and validity of-an explicitly international form for a framework for complex,
international negotiations. Many writers distinguish international negotiations from
domestic ones on the basis of the former's "complexity" (Fayerweather and Kapoor
1976, Newsom 1984). The evidence cited includes cultural differences, legal pluralism,
monetary factors, and ideological diversity (Salacuse 1988); and uncertainty
(Mascarenhas 1982). Still, with respect to complex, business negotiations, there are
two important reasons to develop an analytic approach not rigidly bound to an
international context.
First, the traditional criteria for distinguishing international from domestic are
difficult to operationalize, even questionable in their validity. As defined earlier,
international business negotiation is not always complex: Bargaining between an
American tourist and a street vendor in Hong Kong over the price of a T-shirt may
(or may not) present some hurdles in language and custom, but rarely entails
information overload and other features of complexity (Winham 1977, p. 350). And
not all domestic negotiation is contrastingly simple (recall Kochan and Katz 1988).
More poignantly, when the focus from the outset is on complex negotiation, "com-
plexity" offers little leverage for distinguishing between domestic and international
arenas.
The two arenas have also been analyzed differently on the assumption that the
international arena involves greater variation, especially with respect to "[national]
cultural differences." It seems more prudent, however, not to make an a priori
"assumption of (large) difference" and to allow for similarities and for small as well
as large differences. Besides the international negotiations in which a party's behavior
differs markedly from the counterpart's (e.g., typically, Americans and Soviets), there
are negotiations between parties who have much in common (e.g., Americans (US)
and Canadians; see Hofstede 1984, pp. 77, 122, 158). In the same vein, the "assump-
tion of similarity" concerning parties and conditions within a country, which lies
implicit in much literature on international negotiation, does not stand up against
studies of heterogeneous countries like the US (see Hopkins and Hopkins 1990).
Contemporary international business has blurred many of the traditional lines
between national cultural contexts. Some parties and their contexts are easily identi-
fied and located, but many others are not. A French-born, US-educated businessper-
son working in Paris for a subsidiary of an American firm may negotiate with an
American employed by a French company, or with any one of numerous other types
of counterparts. Besides, the effects of cultural factors on negotiation outcomes may
be overwhelmed by international or global factors such as industrial competition.
Second and most importantly, an internationally-motivated but generally-applicable
framework represents a more powerful analytic tool than one limited to international
business negotiation (Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey 1988, pp. 33-34; Janosik 1987).
The former would broaden understanding of complex, intranational negotiation by
pointing to variables often left aside as constants and would militate against simple
comparisons of negotiations in different countries. A general perspective allows a
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 275

researcher to follow an entire complex negotiation (even when its international and
domestic lines shift or blur over time) and to examine, from a consistent viewpoint, a
firm's full experience with interorganizational negotiations.

The RBC Perspective


The RBC Perspective introduced below is intended to be an inclusive, analytic
perspective that furthers broad understanding of complex negotiations. More specifi-
cally, it aims to enhance the meaningfulness and validity of descriptions and explana-
tions of complex negotiation processes and outcomes, and ultimately, to enhance the
effectiveness of prescriptions for negotiators. It applies to all complex negotiations,
not only the international ones of interest here.
Mnemonically labeled after its three key facets (Relationships, Behaviors, Condi-
tions), the RBC Perspective directs attention to parties' relationships as the crux of a
negotiation and its analysis. Describing and explaining various aspects of these
relationships entails consideration of constituent actors and their behaviors, and
relevant influencing conditions. Otherwise put, the core, driving logic of this approach
is a causal, B4 NC linkage.
This perspective incorporates the behavioral thrust of the strategic bargaining
model and the contexts attended in Thomas's (1976), Kochan and Katz's (1988), and
aforementioned international business negotiation frameworks. The B' c logic in
particular draws support from Snyder and Diesing's (1977, p. 47) threefold conceptu-
alization of intergovernmental crisis bargaining (structure, relations, interactions) and
from the "interactional view" (Chatman 1989; Pervin 1989) and other proponents
(Runkel and McGrath 1972, p. 32) of the effects of actors and situations, or contexts,
on behavior. Each RBC facet will be discussed in detail below.
The RBC Perspective is best represented by a framework and a complementary,
basic model, and they guide the detailed development in the next section. The RBC
Framework enables one to see the "entire domain" of complex, bilateral (two-organi-
zation) and multilateral negotiations: the three RBC facets, including associated
analytic levels and sets, and time periods (recall their inclusion in prescriptive
frameworks reviewed above). These analytic and temporal views are respectively set
forth as vertical and horizontal dimensions in Table 1. While its view of facets and
elements is comprehensive, this framework cannot project the dynamic B C logic

of the RBC Perspective. That logic is elaborated in the Basic Model in Figure 1. It
depicts a bilateral, complex negotiation and represents only one time period, or
segment of one, in Table 1, but should be considered iterative.
Since Table 1 identifies each facet of the RBC Perspective and provides a
comprehensive overview, it structures the following discussion of relationships, behav-
iors, conditions and time periods. The underlying B NC logic, and Figure 1
specifically, are referred to as needed. (Figure 1 is also discussed in the section on
Applications, under Developing RBC-Based Models.)

Relationships between Primary Parties


As the lead component of the RBC Perspective (see Table 1, Figure 1), Relation-
ships between Primary Parties represents a distinctive analytic orientation and focus.
Its basis, the nature of the parties involved, and types of relationships deserve
separate attention.

Relationships as a Focus. A "relationship" denotes two or more parties' being


connected. Writers have explicated "essential elements" (e.g., interdependence in
276 STEPHEN E. WEISS

TABLE 1
The RBC Frameworkfor ComplexNegotiations

ANALYTIC FOCUS (FACET)


Level/Set

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PRIMARY PARTIES


Interorganizational
Intergroup
Interpersonal
Cross-level

BEHAVIORS OF PRIMARY PARTIES


Organizations'
Groups' (Teams')
Individuals'

CONDITIONS
Circumstances
Capabilities
Cultures
Environments
Pre-negotiation Negotiation Post-negotiation
Time Period

2 -:s: rs ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..........................................--...............
..-.-s

Capabilities X
Culturesx c
Environment x

M3~~~~~~~~~~~~
BY Organization's
u
Groupe (Teams') B
RclatimshpsX-Y Coditions y RelatioshipsfX-
/t Individuale' fi \B

Interorganizational Circumstance Interorganizational _/


Intergroup > Culture XY- Intergroup,,>
Interpersonal Environmentxy Interpersonal
Cross-levelCrs-el

BeS.SU haviors of Y
. ........
O rg
o Organxzation's / DBy
N
Groups'(Teamspe T B
BX Individuals'Me

Fs oditionsy

|Capabilities y XCY
|Cultures y|
|Environmenty l

FIGURE 1. Basic RBC Model of Complex Negotiation: The Bilateral (X -Y) Case.
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 277

consequences of behavior, in Kelley 1979, p. 3) and have distinguished between


"continuing connectedness" and discrete interactions (e.g., Snyder and Diesing 1977,
p. 472). But their common thrust is what Saunders (1990) vividly refers to as "the
space in between" the parties.
That is the general sense of the term "relationships" for the RBC Perspective. The
term refers to all aspects of the parties' connectedness to each other as negotiators:
the overall pattern as well as discrete interactions (Saunders 1990); the dynamic and
the structural (Fombrun 1986); the task- and process-oriented (Collins and Guetzkow
1964, p. 81). The term is used analytically, "neutrally," not to connote any one kind of
relationship (e.g., a positive one).
Focusing on "the space in between" is central to meaningful analysis of negotia-
tion, as a growing number of writers have asserted (e.g., Fisher and Brown 1988;
Greenhalgh 1987; Greenhalgh and Kramer 1990; Saunders 1987, 1990), for three
major reasons. First, negotiation, by definition (see above), concerns a relationship
between two or more parties. Its vicissitudes and potentialities generate the issues to
be negotiated and the targets sought.
Second, from a methodological viewpoint, describing and explaining the ensuing
negotiation process as an essentially interactive, jointly determined phenomenon
requires an analytically complementary approach (see Zartman 1976, p. 8 on "mutual
movement"). Like conflict, communication and agreement, negotiation compels ana-
lysts to treat parties' actions as interrelated. To proceed otherwise, to use individu-
ally-oriented analyses, risks "ecological fallacy" (Waltz 1971).
Third, the outcome of a negotiation usually has multiple attributes, many of which
go unattended in the absence of an overarching, relationship-based perspective.
Existing frameworks (e.g., Tung 1988) set the outcome apart from the negotiation
process and the parties' relationship, define it in terms of each party's payoff or
tangible gain, and treat those gains as the parties' only purpose for negotiating.
Researchers' growing use of joint and individual measures of gain represents an
improvement. Still, in many non-Western cultures and arguably in many Western
ones, negotiators' paramount concern is the nature of the interaction or the broader
relationship (see Graham 1987 on client satisfaction and interpersonal attraction).
Some negotiations are simply not aimed at explicit or tangible outcomes (see Weiss
and Stripp 1985, p. 41; Ikle 1976, pp. 43ff).
As part of the RBC Perspective, the Relationships facet designates a number of
variables for investigation. It encompasses conceivable independent variables such as
the commonality of parties' interests, balance of power and levels of trust as well as
dependent variables such as the intensity of expressed conflict, occurrence of turning
points and the extent of agreement achieved. The outcome of a negotiation lies
within this facet, not within Behaviors, because of the argument above and its joint
determination by parties. Even impasses and unilateral withdrawals can be fully
characterized only with reference to the parties' relationship.
Parties to Complex Negotiation. The RBC Framework addresses parties to negotia-
tion (the "actors") indirectly, under Relationships and Behaviors, since the three
facets seem relatively more important and parsimonious as a set. Not all of a social
actor's constitutive characteristics and behaviors pertain to a negotiation analysis.
Still, to use the framework, a researcher must identify parties. That calls for two
considerations: the type of party, and level of behavior or activity.
Primary Parties and Others. Following Wehr (1979), there are three types of parties
to negotiation: primary, secondary and third. Primary parties have interrelated goals
and have become or plan to become engaged in direct talks. Secondary parties have
an indirect stake in the outcome but do not consider themselves directly involved. In
278 STEPHEN E. WEISS

the CGE-ITT case, the primary parties were CGE, ITT and the French Finance
ministry, and the secondary parties included competitors such as AT&T and cus-
tomers such as the Mexican government. Third-party neutrals (those who work
between primary parties toward an agreement satisfactory to all) did not play a
regular role, although Michel David-Weill of Lazard Freres facilitated several inter-
actions. (In order to maintain the RBC Framework's focus on primary parties'
negotiations, secondary and third parties are considered among Conditions (see
Table 1: Circumstances, Environment).)
The identification and classification of parties should take parties' perceptions into
account (Greenhalgh and Kramer 1990) but not depend entirely on them. Most
primary parties would probably identify each other. On occasion, however, primary
parties ignore or unintentionally exclude other parties who may have a primary or
secondary role. For research purposes, the key qualification should be that the actor
qua party can affect the negotiation process and the development of an outcome.
Levels and Units. The most obvious primary parties to complex negotiation, as it is
defined above, are organizations. The "CGE-ITT negotiation" label is a case in point.
Indeed, most studies of such negotiations treat organizations abstractly as parties
(e.g., Wall 1985) or as unitary wholes (e.g., Fagre and Wells 1982) in line with the
strategic bargaining model. But as Rousseau (1985, p. 2) concluded about manage-
ment research in general, they neglect "...the multi-level and cross-level character
of organizational phenomena."
Work in various fields suggests that, in complex social phenomena, actors exist on
more than one level, act differently as units and influence each other across levels.
This work includes in conflict literature, Boulding (1962) and Herman and Brady
(1972); in international relations, Crane (1984) and Ikle (1976); in organization
theory, Roberts (1970) and Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981); and in political
science, Allison (1971) and Waltz (1954). Accordingly, the RBC Perspective incorpo-
rates the three levels of analysis commonly acknowledged in the social sciences:
organizational (for definitions, see Daft 1983, p. 8; Scott 1987, pp. 20-23), group
(Condor and Brown 1989, p. 12; Gersick 1988, pp. 12-13; Hare 1982, p. 20), and the
individual human being.
That allows a researcher to study parties to complex negotiation either by sepa-
rately examining the three types of corresponding "focal units" (Rousseau 1985) as
Allison (1971) did, or by decomposing organizations into constitutive groups and
individuals (cf. Mayer's 1988 concept of "nested negotiations"). Groups may be
especially important to attend to since they "form a link between the individual and
the organization" (Gladstein, 1984, p. 499), play a prominent role in negotiations
involving Asian and other non-US cultures (see Stewart and Keown 1989, p. 71), and
have not been widely studied in the context of negotiation (see Brett and Rognes
1986, Carlisle and Leary 1981).
Relationships in Complex Negotiations. The foregoing distinctions among primary
parties suggest three corresponding relationship types: interorganizational, intergroup
and interpersonal (see Table 1 (top of the vertical, analytical dimension)). Relation-
ships between like units of analysis can be labeled "symmetric." Asymmetric or
cross-level relationships between unlike units also occur as a fourth type. For
example, a chief executive of one organization may meet with a second firm's
negotiating team.
Including four relationship types at the outset of an analysis complicates the task
considerably. Yet, as Morley, Webb and Stephenson (1988, p. 120) have observed
with respect to groups and intergroup relationships, to do otherwise is to "distort"
the social context of negotiation.
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 279

Specific Elements of Relationships and Other Facets. The rest of the RBC Frame-
work and the Basic Model may be more clearly understood and substantiated with
examples for each of the cells in Table 1. Replicating that structure, Table 2 furnishes
examples from international, company-company negotiations. (Company-government
or multilateral negotiations would require few modifications.) Illustrative rather than
exhaustive, the cell entries draw upon a number of sources-the frameworks re-
viewed earlier, other internationally-oriented and generic works on negotiation, and
negotiation lore.
Each entry represents an examinable area of variation. Some entries are generally
stated, but many others are well enough specified to be treated as variables. For
instance at the top of Table 2, in the middle, the "Relationships-Interpersonal/
Negotiation Period" cell includes number of issues and character of interaction. To
relate the variables to each other and designate them as dependent, intervening or
independent, a researcher may refer to Figure 1.
Table 2 contains distinctly objective and subjective elements as well as elements
that can be examined both ways (see Kelley and Thibaut 1978, p. 13; cf. North 1977,
p. 577). Staying with "Relationships/Negotiation Period" in Table 2, a researcher
could objectively measure the extent of use of working groups but subjectively
measure, via parties' self-perceptions and perceptions of the others' perceptions, trust
level and degree of rapport (see Greenhalgh and Kramer 1990, Hopmann and King
1976). The common interests involved, on the other hand, could be viewed both ways.
The viewpoint the researcher chooses should be based on the investigative purpose
(e.g., description, explanation, prescription), specific research questions, and knowl-
edge of the subjects' cultures (e.g., emic, etic). Similar observations hold for Behav-
iors and Conditions.
Behaviors of Primary Parties
The second major facet of complex negotiation highlighted by the RBC Framework
(the middle tier of the vertical dimension in Table 1) is primary parties' behaviors,
that is, the behaviors of a primary party directed toward or affecting the other party
as a party to the negotiation. The term covers behavior with unintended effects upon
the negotiating counterpart as well as intentional negotiating actions. Specifically, it
includes cognitive domains such as perception, information-processing and judgment
(Bazerman 1983); verbal styles; making substantive concessions; and general ap-
proaches such as integrative or "tough."
Focusing on parties' behaviors as part of a comprehensive, analytic perspective is
supported by the models reviewed earlier and by other research (e.g., Runkel and
McGrath 1972). Negotiation calls for action by parties. Their respective behaviors
influence the nature, course and results of their negotiations and relationships
(Goffman 1969, Hayley 1963). In other words, this focus shifts attention to each side
of "the space in between" (see Figure 1).
Table 1 and Figure 1 show three levels of behavior in complex negotiation:
organizations', groups' and individuals'. Some types of behavior (e.g., formulating a
proposal) are conceivable at every level; other behavior appears peculiar to or
characteristic of only one (e.g., perceptions, on the individual level).
The behavior of each focal unit can be investigated according to the "arena" in
which it occurs, or the targets to which it is directed. Colosi (1983) has suggested
three such arenas (cf. Kelley and Thibaut 1978, pp. 31ff, 283). The RBC Perspective
adds another three for a total of six postulated arenas for primary party behavior:
independent (undertaken by a party itself and relevant to the negotiation, but not
communicated to the other primary party, e.g., planning); horizontal (action directed
at the counterpart, typically at the negotiating table); internal (activity within a party
280 STEPHEN E. WEISS

CZ o
0
cn 0
0 la
0
+--
0 CZ
cn
cn CZ CZ

m 0
t4--4 cn
t4.., En
o -;5 - 4.0 CZ 4..4
0
0 > 0
cn co to cn
CZ m co
tD 0 ;- o =
o m 0 0

2.1

64

O
cn cn

=1
CZ
0 M o
to +-,
0-4 -
0 u -0 0 t+-4
0 4.4

w .0., um .a .-
co
0 CZ u
cn .
.0 .-
Cd co T M
C4 -4 =

0 0
z
T T T T T T T T ;.-4

tD 0

0 CZ
Cl
m
0

4--4
cn
> o
0
w C6

cn C"Z
:z 0 m 0 o o

ct

cn
.2:
co CZ
z
C)
4-4 m 0

0
4. . -r-,-S.
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 281

CZI

cj ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4
.cI CZ -

> . CZ
CZC-,O oc0 ~ CZ - I

= o
o~ j
,CZ
I I
=
-C,,- CZ CZ . I I

^t ~ i~ I

cn ^c T

0
282 STEPHEN E. WEISS

I . 13 |
O C13 Ci

o 1

0~~~*

c * S o E ; 3
i *
*~ E

1- E

o
Do
z T T ~od O~T T TT T TI T T.

~~~~~ -~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I~~~~~~~l

Cld~~~~~~~~~*
- C I
;.o~~~~~~~~~
> ~~~~~~~~cl
Cld Ct

Q~~~~ T
C ~~~~
c~~~~C ~4-~~~I~~~4-~ldO
~ Icl

CU
C~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C
l '
l '
0 = '
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 283

CZ

CZ

IR
u CZ
CZ

CZ

CZ
= CZ CZ

CZ
CZ CZ

CZ

CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
0 CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
T CZ T
z T T T T T T T T T T

CZ

CZ

CZ

cd
CZ +.,CZ U
tb
C'd CZ
CZ CZ
CZ 'm
C) CZ
+... 'n .- =
CZ tbCZ
CZ cd CZ
CZ .0 CZ
C'd
>
284 STEPHEN E. WEISS

co~~~~~ CZ~ ~~

I~~ ~~~~~~~~~
-

D~~~~~~~~ i

v |t
O~ -,C ~~~~~~~~- cj
b' z~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
B: > OCZ=

T T T T T T T T
T
cT
T~C~~
T O iT O
0
z T T T T

..

a:) QCI~
C~OC D

CZ -
cn
V V
n . 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C V C

o ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~~~~)t -

HZ -~~~~~~~T
C TT T T-' 4T T Tj T

>0 C~
U 4-1 0
CZ
CZ~0I~

c=
Cld ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o
. )C~

- 0 ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~0~~~~4 CZ >0C/)

CZ
C)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a
o-4 o. CZ
U ZC U
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 285
I cCn j#

I z 0

c r

-0 0Z i

~~) . ~ ~ ~ C) 6 C

O O~~
E E 0~ 0~cU = Io c0 0
o)0 o. o~ cn
CZO Z c 2 - -=- -)

[C~~~~~~~~~~~~~c r. c
0~~~~~~~~~to 0C

c o O -i CI CC

la cjcc

o In E 0 C)
C~~~~~c =D } Ui. = 0 + CZ
~~~~~~~~~
c~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t,
0Z C = c CZ
n
n+-
> C
0
C) p o c 0 o CZ c

CZ C
cn 0 cn '0 cO 0

cn~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~j

0 cn
0~~~~~~c
U~~~~~~~~~~~~,0 +. C
286 STEPHEN E. WEISS

COMPANY X FIRMY
Independent Independent
Arena Neaotiation A
i - ::
j ~~~~......
::: :: Z~~~Tble::
- .......i

*(
<~~~~~~~~~~~~~...
V \s J 0; HX X j
.......0iX

L \ -\L

Notes
E: External,H: Horizontal,I: Internal,L: Lateral,V: Vertical
0 representsan individualnegotiator
FIGURE 2. Primary Parties' Arenas of Activity.

such as a negotiating team); vertical (a party's communications with its superior or


subordinate); lateral (nonvertical, negotiation-relevant actions directed at a party's
peers or colleagues); and external (directed beyond the negotiation setting and the
primary parties, e.g., to mass media). (See Figure 2.)
With the exception of the internal arena, each arena is open to each of the three
focal units and its corresponding analytic level. An organization may behave vertically
if it is a subsidiary (e.g., ITT's West German subsidiary, SEL) or laterally, as a
member of an intercompany business group (e.g., the Japanese kigyoshudan). In every
one of these arenas, the focal unit-organization, group, or individual-is treated as
an indivisible whole.
The sixth arena-the internal workings of a party (recall the models of Walton and
McKersie 1965 and Kochan and Katz 1988)-requires special treatment because
internal behaviors cannot be studied on a single level of analysis or more accurately,
with only one focal unit. Organizations' Behaviors-Internal must be examined at the
group and/or individual levels, and Groups' Behaviors-Internal, at the individual
level. (Internal activity for individuals is not considered here.) Table 2 thus locates
internal arenas between levels of behavior.
These arenas underscore the relevance and potential value of multilevel behavioral
analysis for complex negotiations. Action apparent in the horizontal arena may
actually be intended for internal or external targets. Behavior on one level can affect
behavior on another. And behavior on one level can affect relationships on that level
or on a different one. In the CGE-ITT case, ITT's activities, the Araskog-Pebereau
(chairmen's) relationship and the CGE-ITT relationship were influenced by Araskog's
behavior, which included standing firm on the price of ITT's telecom business,
communicating regularly with Michel David-Weill and other ITT directors, and
contacting other possible suitors. (See Table 2: Behaviors/Negotiation Period for
general examples.)

Conditions
The third of the three major facets in the RBC Framework (the bottom tier of the
vertical dimension in Table 1) is Conditions: factors that stimulate, restrict or
otherwise modify the primary parties' behaviors and relationships in a complex
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 287

negotiation. These factors may be events, contexts, states of being or nonprimary


parties' actions (primary parties' previous behaviors or relationships will be placed
elsewhere in the framework).
Several of the frameworks reviewed above (e.g., Fayerweather and Kapoor 1976,
Kochan and Katz 1988, Thomas 1976, Tung 1988), various other works on negotiation
(Druckman 1971; Evans and Beltramini 1987; Jonsson 1978; Rubin and Brown 1975,
p. 36; Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965), and other behavioral research (Barker and Wright
1955, Oliver 1990, Pervin 1989) have underscored the analytic importance of address-
ing such factors. Certainly the interpretation of a CGE negotiator's reading aloud a
10-page proposal to an ITT counterpart depends in part on whether he does so in a
formal, intercompany negotiation session or in a public concert hall during a sym-
phony attended by the two companies' negotiating teams. At the same time, the
assortment of terms used in these studies ("conditions," "background factors,"
"context," "environment," "orientation," "situation" and "structural context") sug-
gests that this area of inquiry has not been systematically or sufficiently developed,
especially for international negotiations.
The RBC Perspective uses the word "conditions" to reflect the active, motivating
and influencing role of these factors and in order to augment existing work, distin-
guishes four sets of them: circumstances, capabilities, cultures, and environments (see
Table 1). Each set represents resources and constraints, and incentives and deterrents
for primary parties. The sets differ in the loci of their main impacts.
Circumstances refers to physical and social features of the negotiation "site(s)" (in
a broad sense) that apply to both primary parties. It parallels Rubin and Brown's
(1975, pp. 36-37) "structural context" of bargaining and includes the neutrality of the
site, the availability of diverse communication channels (e.g., face-to-face, telephone,
facsimile (see Carnevale, Pruitt and Seilheimer 1981; Rutter 1987)), commonality of
industry customs, coverage by mass media, and the presence of interpreters and third
party neutrals (see Table 2: Conditions-Circumstances/Negotiation Period). Al-
though the mere presence or absence of a prior primary party relationship is relevant
here, particular qualities of the relationship such as trust levels are assigned to the
Relationships (pre-negotiation) facet. Circumstances of the CGE-ITT negotiation
included the time pressure on both parties to reach an agreement before the end of
1986.
Such circumstances can affect the behavior and relationships of primary parties at
any level-organizational, group or individual (see Figure 1). Counterparts may
respond differently to a given set of circumstances, and the framework admits that
possibility. The approaching end of the Gregorian calendar year, for instance,
generally does not pressure Latins and Arabs as much as it does urban Americans
(Weiss and Stripp 1985).
Beyond Circumstances lie three sets of conditions that apply to each primary party
separately, for the most part, and reflect distinguishable emphases, if not clear-cut
boundaries. Their inclusion originated with each set's usual association with one type
of focal unit (individual, group and organization), but all three sets are seen as
potential influences on each unit's behavior. These conditions can be construed as
concentric rings around a primary party, with wider rings representing conditions
spatially and temporally more distant from the party (see Figure 3). This configura-
tion suggests that parties are more conscious of smaller ring conditions, but that has
yet to be empirically explored and validated.
Capabilities denotes the skills, resources and traits of a primary party that enable it
to influence and be influenced by a counterpart, either directly, or indirectly via
Behaviors (see Figure 1). Skills and resources have appeared in aforementioned
frameworks (e.g., Fayerweather and Kapoor 1976, Thomas 1976, Tung 1988) and in
288 STEPHEN E. WEISS

Notes
X: CompanyX, Y: FirmY
Ci: Circumstances,
Ca: Capabilities,Cu: Cultures,E: Environments
FIGURE 3. The FOUrSets of Conditions in the RBC Perspective.

empirical studies in international relations (e.g., Bennett and Sharpe 1979, p. 60;
Bueno de Mesquita 1990, p. 331; Maoz 1989; North 1977, p. 575; North and Choucri
1983). Traits are included in the RBC Perspective to further its cross-cultural
applicability, since, in many cultures, a negotiator's ability to influence others appears
to rest more on status than on skills (Graham 1983, Weiss and Stripp 1985). Table 2
lists specific elements such as a party's negotiating experience (Evans and Beltramini
1987, p. 61), disposition and motivations (Rubin and Brown 1975, pp. 158ff), personal-
ity (Herman and Kogan 1977), and authority (Pruitt 1981, pp. 41-43). More con-
cretely, in the CGE-ITT talks, one such capability was the financial expertise of CGE
staff needed to valuate ITT's worldwide telecom business.
Cultures refers to both the acquired knowledge used by a people to interpret their
world and to act purposefully (Spradley and McCurdy 1971, p. 2) and to the set of
learned behaviors they share (Gregory 1983, p. 364). The internationally-oriented
negotiation frameworks above that include a cultural component tend to refer solely
to national groupings of people, but primary parties to a negotiation also belong to
ethnic and organizational cultures (see Frost et al. 1985, Schneider 1988). For the
CGE-ITT talks, the RBC Cultures' view would encompass the extent of information-
sharing between finance and legal departments at ITT and the nature of French
negotiating practices. All such cultures can shape a party's basic concept of the
negotiation process, expectations concerning aspects of interaction with a counter-
part, and their actual behavior (Eldridge 1979, pp. 49ff; Weiss and Stripp 1985).
In complex negotiations, some cultural conditions of the parties may intersect or
apply jointly (see Figure 3). In a negotiation between a US-based Company X and a
French Firm Y, a French person employed by Company X faces a team of compatri-
ots. Less obviously, both primary parties may come from the cultural value cluster of
"Anglo countries" (Hofstede 1984, p. 191) or more broadly, from "modern" (e.g.,
industrial, high-tech), "western" or "traditional" cultures. They would fall under
Cu1tureXy in Figure 1.
Two other ostensibly cultural factors are specially classified. First, both parties may
come from or form a "negotiator subculture" or international business (or govern-
ment) elite (see Everett, Stening and Longton 1982; Zartman and Berman 1982, pp.
226-227). A CGE negotiator interviewed by the author spoke of the "M&A" [merger
and acquisition] nature of the talks, and how it brought into play certain M&A
procedures and behavior. Since these subcultures rest on the parties' roles as
negotiators, not their membership in broad collectivities, and extend beyond the
dimensions of a relationship, they fit within Circumstances. Second, the RBC view of
general characteristics of a particular kind of cross- or multicultural exchange (e.g.,
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 289

Franco-American) depends on the parties' awareness of them. Unattended, the


characteristics represent a possible output of analysis. In other cases, they show up in
planning (Pre-negotiation Behaviors), in parties' previous joint experiences (Relation-
ships/ Post-negotiation of a previous negotiation), or in the particular character of
the parties' interaction (Relationship).
In concept, capabilities and cultures apply to any type of primary party. Organiza-
tions as well as individuals can have negotiating experience and be influenced by
national or ethnic culture. There are organizations (pers. comm.) that compile their
negotiation experiences for use by their representatives in future negotiations.
Finally, Environments refers, as Aldrich (1979, p. xii) has written, not simply to
[non-cultural] "elements 'out there' beyond a set of focal organizations, but rather to
concentrations of resources, power, political domination, and most concretely, other
organizations." These environmental factors affect parties' behavior and relationships
(recall Fayerweather and Kapoor 1976, Kochan and Katz 1988 and Tung 1988). Table
2 (Conditions-Environments/Negotiation Period) thus includes commonly recognized
elements such as host and home governments' policies, respective economic and legal
systems, and elements that are not strictly country- or location-specific (e.g., multilat-
eral, regional and global conditions under Environmentxy in Figure 1). The CGE-ITT
case again offers concrete examples: the competitiveness of the worldwide telecom
market, the protectionist telecom policies of European governments, the EC92
movement, uncertain foreign exchange markets, the French government's pending
privatization of CGE, and concurrent negotiations with AT&T.
The discussion thus far has concentrated on the influence of conditions on parties'
behaviors and relationships, but parties can also act, individually or in concert, to
modify some conditions (see Figure 1). Consider, for instance, circumstances and
capabilities such as conference location, provision of a portable computer for joint
use, and excessive staff in the negotiating room. Similarly, cultures not only influence
parties' behavior, but adapt and change because of it. And while many environmental
conditions seem beyond the reach of primary parties to a negotiation, others can be
altered (cf. the immutability of the environment asserted by Rugman, Lecraw and
Booth 1985 and the incremental nature of change in Kochan and Katz 1988, p. 11).
Araskog (1989, p. 168) and other ITT executives persuaded the US Department of
Defense not to execute plans to cut off ITT's German subsidiary's access to classified
information (see also Murray 1983). Because complex negotiations often last months
or years, such changes may represent critical pieces of the picture.
Time Periods
The last dimension of the RBC Framework (depicted horizontally in Table 1)
represents the kind of temporal view espoused by the prescriptive frameworks above
(Carpenter and Kennedy 1988, Susskind and Cruikshank 1987) and other practi-
tioner-oriented work (e.g., Gray 1989, p. 5-7;McDonald 1986, pp. 311-315; Reck and
Long 1985). It is also important to incorporate given the emphasis on history,
tradition, and long-term futures in many nations and cultures (Weiss and Stripp
1985), and empirical evidence from American negotiators that parties' previous
experiences and concerns about the future affect their behavior and relationships
(Pruitt 1983, Thompson 1989). This temporal dimension applies to each of the three
RBC facets and consists of three time periods centering on the course of the primary
parties' relationship (as opposed to the parties' individual and potentially staggered
activities): pre-negotiation, negotiation and post-negotiation.
Pre-negotiation begins as soon as one party decides to negotiate with another
primary party, goes on to involve separate and joint planning (Morley 1982), and ends
when the parties begin responding to their counterparts' initial proposals for resolu-
290 STEPHEN E. WEISS

tion of outstanding issues (cf. Saunders 1985; Zartman 1989, p. 4). The negotiation
period commences when parties set forth an agenda with intentions to engage in
mutual give-and-take or when they both move from their initial positions; covers their
formal and informal negotiating behavior, explicit and "tacit" communications
(Schelling 1960); and continues through the attainment of a negotiation outcome,
whether it is an agreement, nonagreement or something in between. Post-negotiation
begins thereafter, when parties attempt to follow through or otherwise live with their
accomplishment. This period carries no fixed endpoint. (See specific elements in
Table 2.)
For the CGE-ITT negotiations, the pre-negotiation period reportedly ran from
April 11, 1985, when CGE's Pebereau informed ITT's Araskog that he had been
approached about a takeover of ITT, to November 1985, when Araskog proposed a
joint venture with CGE-majority ownership (Araskog 1989). The negotiation period
extended from that meeting to the December 30, 1986 signings of formal agreements.
And the post-negotiation period since then has included ITT's sale of 7% of Alcatel,
n.v. to CGE in June 1990.
Three clarifications ought to be made, however. First, some time boundaries of
actual negotiations (e.g., the very beginning of pre-negotiation (see Stein 1989); the
end of post-negotiation and the beginning of pre-negotiation in repeated or serial
negotiations) may be difficult for researchers and practitioners to pinpoint. Re-
searchers can handle that problem to some extent by investigating more than one set
of temporal specifications (Chan 1978, Hopmann and King 1976). Second, befitting
the definition of negotiation at the outset, the three time periods are defined with
respect to the parties' relationship, but that does not imply simultaneous or constant
activity by both parties. This conceptualization allows for times during a period when
only one party is active. And third, the three-period sequence does not constrain an
analyst to a linear view of the finer-grain activity within periods. Graham (1987) and
others have proposed stages primarily for the negotiation period, but evidence for
them is still sketchy, and other researchers (e.g., Gulliver 1979, p. 84) have pro-
pounded cyclical or uneven development of relationships. American negotiators have
reported no discernible pattern in their talks with Saudis (Weiss and Stripp 1985). At
this point in research, the three broad time periods of the RBC Framework appear
generally applicable and sufficiently useful for analysis.

Empirical and Practical Applications for International Business


Fully elaborated, the RBC Perspective presents a picture of complex, international
business negotiation considerably richer than existing analytic views and more useful
for a broad understanding. That would emerge in a complete RBC view of the
CGE-ITT talks, and although it cannot be laid out in this space, many components
have been identified and could be used in that effort. One can review the initial
illustration of the talks for all of the elements that this view does include.
More generally, the RBC Perspective can contribute in several ways to future
research and practice in complex, international business negotiation. The following
section addresses three basic research endeavors: asking questions, building and
testing RBC-based models, and cumulating knowledge. At this stage of research, each
endeavor plays a valuable role. Their benefits for practitioners, along with direct,
practical uses of this perspective, are taken up in the last part of the section.

Question-Asking
The RBC Framework in Tables 1 and 2 and Basic Model in Figure 1 elicit a wide
range of descriptive, explanatory, and prescriptive questions about complex, interna-
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 291

tional negotiation. They concern the nature of individual facets and cells as well as
the relationships between them, single as well as multiple analytic levels, and hitherto
neglected areas as well as new angles on previously-raised questions. This variety is
shown below in five questions.
Descriptions of Process
Q1. What kinds of communicative behavior used by negotiators to "fine-tune"
relationships in their own cultures are unreliable in cross-cultural and cross-linguistic
relationships?
Q2. How do teams in international negotiations tend to respond to the three,
simultaneous sets of pressures emanating from their own, their counterparts', and
common environments?
Answering Q2 could entail study of perception and the tension between environ-
mental constraints and incentives ("threats" and "opportunities" in Dutton and
Jackson 1987); variation, by national culture, in teams' responsiveness to environ-
ments (e.g., manipulation, resignation); the relative attention a team gives to each set
of pressures when the sets conflict; and the determinants of coordinated versus
independent responses by the teams.
Concentrating on Q1, one finds that research on negotiators' communicative
behavior has traditionally been limited in scope to "offers" and "threats," with
relatively few studies of the subtle ways American and other negotiators shape
relationships (see van der Wijst, forthcoming; Weiss 1985). Yet, popular treatments of
the Japanese language (e.g., Imai 1975) have underscored differences between pub-
licly expressed meanings (e.g., "We'll study it") and intended meanings ("No way").
And cross-cultural communication research proffers nonverbal variables such as
claiming space, touch, eye contact, and amount of silence (Gudykunst and Ting-
Toomey 1988, pp. 99-133) and the concept of communicative context, that is,
whether the information in a verbal message is primarily conveyed explicitly in the
speaker's code (low context culture) or in the circumstances (high context) (Hall 1976,
p. 79). That suggests the proposition:
P1.1. Statements typically used by high-context culture negotiators to convey rejec-
tion of a proposal are misinterpreted in cross-cultural negotiations with counterparts
from low-context cultures.
There is preliminary confirmatory evidence of P1.1 (see Chua and Gudykunst
1987). Going further, however, the RBC Perspective suggests mediating factors:
P1.2. The nature and magnitude of the effects of a negotiator's communicative
behaviors on his relationship with a counterpart from another culture depend on the
circumstances and on the counterpart's capabilities.
These propositions and others related to Q1 could be explored experimentally or
in situ, via direct observation, content analysis of transcripts, or questionnaires.
Additional confirmation of the first proposition would serve as a caution to practicing,
international negotiators. The second proposition could lead negotiators to be more
skeptical about popular maxims and to develop contingency guidelines for uses of
different communicative styles.
Explanation of Outcomes
Q3. During complex, international negotiations, how does incongruity in qualities
of relationships across the three main RBC levels affect development of an agree-
292 STEPHEN E. WEISS

ment? Do the perception of incongruity and its effect differ by organizational or


national culture?
Q4. How much variation in the outcomes of complex, international negotiations
can be explained by variables representing the following RBC facets from pre-negoti-
ation and negotiation periods: (a) the pre-negotiation, interorganizational relation-
ship, (b) organizations' environments during pre-negotiation, (c) circumstances during
negotiation, (d) organizations' capabilities during negotiation, (e) organizations' cul-
tures during negotiation, (f) groups' negotiating behaviors, and (g) individuals' negoti-
ating behaviors?
Question Q4 envinces the breadth and richness of the RBC Perspective and will be
considered in the section on models.
The first part of Q3 relates to Araskog's admission (1989, p. 195) that Suard's
succeeding Pebereau at CGE caused him to worry about achieving a final, CGE-ITT
agreement-notwithstanding the commonality of interests within the interorganiza-
tional relationship. Still, granting the desirability of congruity in relationship qualities
across all levels, especially in the long run, one could more intriguingly postulate that
it is not a necessary condition during the negotiation period for achievement of an
agreement. In one complex, US-Japanese negotiation that reached an agreement,
both sets of negotiators interviewed by the author (pers. comm.) characterized their
interpersonal relationships negatively. Hence:
P3.1. When incongruityoccurs in a complex, international negotiation, an interorga-
nizational agreement will still develop if there is an influential, agreement-promoting
relationship on at least one level.
P3.2. The salience and impact of relationships on different levels (e.g., intergroup,
interpersonal) vary with time in a negotiation.
P3.3. Incongruity in relationship qualities on different levels affect Asian and Arab
parties' behavior more negatively than it does American and French parties' behavior.
For empirical studies, a researcher could operationally define relationship quality
on a positive-negative scale (Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman 1989) or accord-
ing to types such as "symbiosis" and "enmity" (see Greenhalgh and Kramer 1990).
Data on the number, membership and quality of interpersonal and intergroup
relationships in a negotiation could be drawn from individual negotiators and their
counterparts in interviews or questionnaires. Interorganizational relationship quality
could be seen as an aggregate of the qualities of top executives' relationships, or
perhaps as the nature and number of current linkages between the organizations
outside the negotiation at hand. If validated, these propositions would encourage
practicing negotiators to pay greater attention to alternative relationship foci and to
the timing of their relationship-building efforts.
Prescriptions
Q5. In order to sustain movement toward a satisfactory outcome in complex
negotiations, how should executives manage the intraparty behaviors that occur in
diverse arenas and the interparty relationships in development on different levels?
Prompted by Figures 1 and 2, this question assumes that complexity threatens
rather than facilitates the creation of an agreement. That has yet to be established
empirically.
In the CGE-ITT talks, the dispersion of horizontal arenas in 43 countries led CGE
executives to set up an ad hoc management committee as an internal, coordinating
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 293

body. A CGE negotiator interviewed by the author (pers. comm.) also propounded
the importance of speed and limited participation in the first phase of negotiations.
Thus:
P5.1. Top executives who personally represent their organizations, restrict the num-
ber of participants, and rapidly develop a "heads of agreement" as a prelude to detailed
negotiations by others, realize a final, interorganizational agreement more often than
those who assign complete responsibilityfor a detailed agreement, from start to finish, to
negotiation teams.
Investigating this and other management responses (e.g., advisory committees for
the external arena) would require intensive negotiation simulation or field research,
but the results would have direct, practical implications.
These questions represent a small sample of the diverse possibilities raised by the
RBC Perspective. It poses a large research agenda. Nevertheless, for each query, the
framework provides the researcher with an overarching picture-the overall domain
of relevance.

Developing and Testing RBC-Based Models


In addition to distinguishing individual facets and elements of complex negotiation
(see Tables 1 and 2), the RBC Perspective suggests relationships between them that
have been discussed, up to this point, primarily in terms of the core B logic.
Elaborating on that, Figure 1 presented the Basic RBC Model, which sets forth major
-albeit not all conceivable-relationships between facets of a two-organiza-
tion (X, Y) negotiation. (The temporal dimension runs left to right in the figure.)
Corresponding equations include: (El) Rt = f(Bxt, Byt, Cxyt); (E2) Bxt =
f(Cxt_1, Cxyt-1, Byt_1, Rt-1); and (E3) Byt = f(Cyt-1, Cxyt-1, Bxt-1, Rt-1).
Several variables in these equations can be specified at different or at multiple
times, within or across the three basic time periods. Within periods, values of t to
examine can range from minutes to months, and may best be set according to the
sample of negotiations to be studied (e.g., single-lot toy sales versus multiyear
purchases of airplanes). Further, Figure 1 postulates the effect of Rt_1 on Rt as
mediated by Bx, By and Cxy but a direct Rt -1 effect could easily be incorporated in
(El) and examined empirically as (E1*). Notice also some secondary facet relation-
ships in Figure 1 that were mentioned in the section on Conditions: (E4) Cxt =
f(Cxt1, Bxt-1), and the direct effects of Cx on By, and of Bx, By and Rxy on
Cxy (specifically, Circumstances).
Testing the central part of the Basic RBC Model, as represented by Question Q4
and Equation (E1*), could proceed qualitatively or quantitatively. Case studies would
test the inclusiveness of the model, since they do not abstract from target phenomena
as drastically as other methods do (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1984). Observations of the
CGE-ITT negotiations throughout this article offer the rudiments of a case study.
The development of a series of RBC-based studies would further not only evaluation
and elaboration of the model, but also knowledge about and comparisons between
the cases (see Weiss 1987, 1990; cf. Dupont 1990).
Quantitatively rigorous tests could be designed for data from negotiation simula-
tions (e.g., Winham and Bovis 1979) and from topically wide-ranging surveys (Stewart
and Keown 1989; Tung 1982) used in combination with existing data bases on
organizational capabilities and environmental conditions (Grosse and Aramburu,
1990). Such investigations could begin with specifications and statistical techniques
well established in research on international business negotiation (e.g., Fagre and
Wells' 1982 use of percentage foreign ownership of subsidiaries as a proxy for
294 STEPHEN E. WEISS

Three-Facet Relationships (159 possible models)

P N T
> > ----- - - - - - >

(a) (b) (c) (d)

(e) (f)

Multilevel Configurations Related to Questions Q1-Q5

P N T

(g): Q1, P1.1 (h): P1.2 (i): Q2 (j): Q3

(k): Q4 (1): Q5
Notes
R: Relationships, B: Behaviors, C: Conditions
P: Pre-negotiation, N: Negotiation Period, T: PosT-negotiation
V7: target of analysis, shaded parts of cells correspond to levels displayed in Table 1, --->: direction of
causation between facets
FIGURE 4. Partial, RBC-Based Models of Complex Negotiation: Selected Examples.

outcomes of MNE-host government negotiations). Multi-method analysis (e.g.,


Druckman 1986) also promises to be useful for the RBC Model.
Beyond study of the Basic Model as a whole, a researcher can use the Framework
to build and to compare various partial models and secondary relationships, all while
remaining within the domain of the framework. Consider the partial models in
Figure 4. The six in the top half are a sample of the complete set of 159 possible
3-cell relationships identified by systematically varying the RBC facets and three time
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 295

periods (for a precedent, see Rapoport and Guyer 1966). Model (a) roughly reflects
Equation (El). (b)-(d) depict other explanations for parties' relationships during
negotiation: namely, pre-negotiation and negotiation behaviors (b); pre-negotiation
conditions and negotiation behaviors (c); and pre-negotiation relationships and expec-
tations concerning the post-negotiation relationship (d). Further examination may
effectively rule out a number of the 159 configurations as implausible (e.g., (e)) or
uninteresting ((f)), but their value lies in pushing out the territory initially considered.
The bottom half of Figure 4 consists of multilevel configurations, based on
Figure 1, that parallel Questions Q1-Q5. Models (g) and (h) both concern Qi, with
(g) reflecting Proposition P1.1 and (h) P1.2. Thus the framework facilitates quick,
visually dramatic comparisons of the models.
Cumulating Knowledge
This discussion has referred to existing views and numerous studies, but they do
not come out of a well-formulated, widely-recognized "base" of knowledge about
international business negotiations. Research studies explicitly concerned with the
subject have emerged from different paradigms, with different foci, and their findings
have generally remained apart. The RBC Perspective encourages assimilation and
provides a coherent structure-cement-for them.
Laying out the entire domain of relevance for complex, international negotiations
enables a researcher to consider segmented views and empirical results as pieces of a
larger puzzle and to see how and where they fit. One can bring together, for example,
the traditionally separate macro-strategic and micro-behavioral research on interna-
tional business negotiation. Further, RBC's inclusiveness reaches to negotiation-rele-
vant knowledge in different disciplines and fields (see Toyne 1989). References for
this article have come from psychology, sociology and political science; social psy-
chology, labor relations and international relations; diverse business areas (e.g.,
marketing); and fields within management (e.g., organization theory, organizational
behavior).
The same perspective can contribute to the development of future knowledge. In
Relationships, it provides a clear focus. When it places current knowledge among its
cells (Table 1, Figure 1), it also points, by the emptier cells, to facets of complex
negotiation that are still relatively unexplored.
Enhancing Practitioners' Effectiveness
Practitioners stand to gain from these research applications. Question-asking,
model-building and testing, and knowledge cumulation will lead to better descriptions
of the negotiation process and more powerful explanations of variation in outcomes.
From that, practitioners can better understand what conducting complex negotiation
entails. They may also learn which facets and elements of facets most strongly affect
outcomes, which ones to target to influence their counterpart's behavior, which
influences on themselves can be modified, and how, generally, individuals, groups and
organizations can achieve better outcomes. If these orders appear to be tall in light of
the frustrations of negotiation researchers in the 1970s (Bartos 1967), we ought to
bear in mind the innovations (e.g., win-win negotiation) that have benefitted practi-
tioners in the 1980s.
In the meantime, practitioners can put the RBC Perspective to use directly. Easily
remembered and plausible, it organizes detailed information according to key facets
and dynamics. Practitioners can thereby cope with the information overload that
characterizes many complex negotiations (Winham 1977) without holding overly
simplistic views. RBC reminds negotiators to attend not just to bargaining tactics but
also to relationships and conditions. That in itself will help them at the outset, to plan
296 STEPHEN E. WEISS

more thoroughly and to anticipate more eventualities, and afterwards, to gather the
information to learn from their own and others' experiences.

Conclusion
The original impetus for this work came from several directions: a desire to
understand CGE-ITT-like negotiations more thoroughly, the exhaustiveness of
research on interpersonal negotiations, the paucity of research on interteam negotia-
tion, and the schism created by "forest-or-trees" perspectives in international busi-
ness literature. That dichotomy, in particular, seemed unsatisfactory and unnecessary.
In short, there was a call for an inclusive yet parsimonious and meaningful approach
to complex, international business negotiations.
In the RBC Perspective, this article has presented such an approach. Based on an
extensive literature, its focus on three key facets of negotiation and their dynamic,
multilevel interaction clearly furnishes analytic and organizing power for various
applications. While complex negotiations in international business are indeed a
challenge to understand, the RBC Perspective offers much to advance that under-
standing, in research and in practice.

Acknowledgements
Most of this work was completed while the author served on the faculties of New York University's Stern
School of Business and Dartmouth College's Tuck School. Portions of the material herein were presented
at annual meetings of the International Studies Association (1987) and the Academy of Management
(1988) and at various research seminars. For comments on earlier drafts, special thanks go to Ellen Auster;
thanks also go to Art Brief, Susan Douglas, Len Greenhalgh, Stephen Kobrin, Naveen Seth, Jim Tiessen
and anonymous reviewers.

References
Adler, N. J., J. L. Graham and T. Schwarz Gehrke (1987), "Business Negotiations in Canada, Mexico, and
the United States," Journal of Business Research, 15, 411-429.
Aldrich, H. E. (1979), Organizations & Environments, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Allison, G. T. (1971), The Essence of Decision, Boston: Little, Brown.
Araskog, R. V. (1989), The ITT Wars, New York: Henry Hold & Co.
Barker, R. G. and H. F. Wright (1955), Midwest and Its Children, Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson & Co.
Bartos, 0. J. (1967), "How Predictable Are Negotiations?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11, 481-495.
Bazerman, M. H. (1983), "Negotiator Judgment," American Behavioral Scientist, 27, 211-228.
and R. J. Lewicki (Eds.) (1983), Negotiating in Organizations, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Bennett, D. C. and K. E. Sharpe (1979), "Agenda-Setting and Bargaining Power: The Mexican State
Versus Transnational Automobile Corporations," WorldPolitics (October), 57-89.
Blalock, H. M., Jr. (1989), Power and Conflict: Toward a General Theory, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Boulding, K. E. (1962), Conflict and Defense: A General Theory, New York: Harper & Row.
Brett, J. M. and J. K. Rognes (1986), "Intergroup Relations in Organizations: A Negotiations Perspective,"
in P. Goodman & Associates (Eds.), Designing Effective Work Groups, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
202-236.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1990), "Multilateral Negotiations: A Spatial Analysis of the Arab-Israeli Dispute,"
International Organization, 44, 317-340.
Carlisle, J. and M. Leary (1981), "Negotiating Groups," in R. Payne and C. Cooper (Eds.), Groups at
Work, Chicester, England: John Wiley and Sons, 165-188.
Carnevale, P. J. D., D. G. Pruitt and S. D. Seilheimer (1981), "Looking and Competing: Accountability and
Visual Access in Integrative Bargaining," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 1,
111-120.
Carpenter, S. L. and W. J. D. Kennedy (1988), Managing Public Disputes, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Chan, S. (1978), "Temporal Delineation of International Conflicts: Poisson Results from the Vietnam War,
1963-1965," International Studies Quarterly, 22, 237-266.
Chatman, J. A. (1989), "Improving Interactional Organizational Research: A Model of Person-Organiza-
tion Fit," Academy of Management Review 14, 333-349.
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 297

Chua, E. G. and W. B. Gudykunst (1987), "Conflict Resolution Styles in Low- and High-Context Cultures,"
Communication Monographs, 4, 1, 32-37.
Collins, B. E. and H. Guetzkow (1964), A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making, New
York: Wiley.
Colosi, T. (1983), "Negotiation in the Public and Private Sectors," American Behavioral Scientist, 27,
229-254.
Condor, S. and R. Brown (1989), "Psychological Processes in Intergroup Conflict," in W. Stroebe et al.
(Eds.), The Social Psychology of Group Conflict, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 3-28.
Crane, B. B. (1984), "Policy Coordination by Major Western Powers in Bargaining with the Third World:
Debt Relief and the Common Fund," International Organization, 38, 399-428.
Daft, R. L. (1983), Organization Theory and Design, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.
Deutsch, M. (1973), The Resolution of Conflict, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Druckman, D. (1971), "The Influence of the Situation in Interparty Conflict," Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 15, 523-554.
(1986), "Stages, Turning Points, and Crises: Negotiating Military Base Rights," Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 30, 327-360.
Dupont, C. (1990), "The Channel Tunnel Negotiations, 1984-86: Some Aspects of the Process and Its
Outcome," Negotiation Journal, 6, 71-80.
Dutton, J. E. and S. E. Jackson (1987), "Categorizing Strategic Issues: Links to Organizational Action,"
Academy of Management Review, 12, 76-90.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989), "Building Theories from Case Study Research," Academy of Management
Review, 14, 532-550.
Eldridge, A. F. (1979), Images of Conflict, New York: St. Martin's Press.
Evans, K. R. and R. F. Beltramini (1987), "A Theoretical Model of Consumer Negotiated Pricing: An
Orientation Perspective," Journal of Marketing, 51, 58-73.
Everett, J. E., B. W. Stening and P. A. Longton (1982), "Some Evidence for an International Managerial
Culture," Journal of Management Studies, 19, 2, 153-162.
Fagre, N. and L. T. Wells, Jr. (1982), "Bargaining Power of Multinationals and Host Governments,"
Journal of International Business Studies, 13, 2, 9-23.
Fayerweather, J. and A. Kapoor (1976), Strategy and Negotiation for the International Corporation,
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Fisher, R. and S. Brown (1988), Getting Together, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Fombrun, C. J. (1986), "Structural Dynamics within and between Organizations," Administrative Science
Quarterly, 31, 403-421.
"France Allows ITT-CGE Pact to Go Ahead" (1986), The Wall Street Journal (July 31), 2.
Frost, P. J. et al. (Eds.) (1985), Organizational Culture, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Gersick, C. J. G. (1988), "Time and Transition in Work Teams: Toward a New Model of Group
Development," Academy of Management Journal, 31, 9-41.
Gladstein, D. L. (1984), "Groups in Context: A Model of Task Group Effectiveness," Administrative
Science Quarterly, 29, 499-517.
Goffman, E. (1969), Strategic Interaction, New York: Ballantine.
Graham, J. L. (1983), "Business Negotiations in Japan, Brazil and the United States," Journal of
International Business Studies, 14 (Spring/Summer), 47-61.
(1987), "A Theory of Interorganizational Negotiations," in Research in Marketing. Vol. 9,
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 163-183.
Gray, B. (1989), Collaborating, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Greenhalgh, L. (1987), "Relationships in Negotiations," Negotiation Journal, 3, 3, 235-243.
and R. M. Kramer (1990), "Strategic Choice in Conflicts: The Importance of Relationships," in
R. L. Kahn and M. Zald (Eds.), Nations and Organizations, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 181-220.
Gregory, K. L. (1983), "Native-View Paradigms: Multiple Cultures and Culture Conflicts in Organizations,"
Administrative Science Quarterly, 28, 359-376.
Grieco, J. (1982), "Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's Experience with the International
Computer Industry," International Organization, 36, 609-632.
Grosse, R. and D. Aramburu (1990), "A Bargaining View of Government/MNE Relations," International
Trade Journal, 6, 2, 209-238.
Gulliver, P. H. (1979), Disputes and Negotiations, New York: Academic Press.
Gudykunst, W. B. and S. Ting-Toomey (1988), Culture and Interpersonal Communication, Newbury Park,
CA: Sage.
Hall, E. T. (1976), Beyond Culture, New York: Doubleday.
Hare, A. P. (1982), Creativityin Small Groups, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Harnett, D. L. and L. L. Cummings (1980), Bargaining Behavior: An International Study, Houston, TX:
Dame.
298 STEPHEN E. WEISS

Hayley, J. (1963), Strategies of Psychotherapy, New York: Grune and Stratton.


Herman, C. F. and L. P. Brady (1972), "Alternative Models of International Crisis Behavior," in C. F.
Herman (Ed.), International Crises, New York: Free Press, 281-303.
Herman, M. G. and N. Kogan (1977), "Effects of Negotiators' Personalities on Negotiating Behavior," in
D. Druckman (Eds.), Negotiations: Social Psychological Perspectives, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
247-274.
Hofstede, G. (1984), Cultures' Consequences, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Hopkins, W. E. and S. A. Hopkins (1990), "The Strategic Management of Cultural Risk in Domestic
Firms," International Journal of Management, 7, 2, 158-165.
Hopmann, P. T. and T. King (1976), "Interactions and Perceptions in the Test Ban Negotiations,"
International Studies Quarterly, 20, 1, 105-142.
Ikle, F. C. (1976), How Nations Negotiate, Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint.
Imai, M. (1975), Never Take Yes for an Answer, Tokyo: Simul Press.
Janosik, R. J. (1987), "Rethinking the Culture-Negotiation Link," Negotiation Journal, 3, 385-395.
Jonsson, C. (1978), "Situation-Specific versus Actor-Specific Approaches to International Bargaining,"
European Journal of Political Research, 6, 381-398.
Kelley, H. H. (1979), Personal Relationships, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. Pub.
and J. W. Thibaut (1978), InterpersonalRelations, New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Kennedy, G. (1985), Doing Business Abroad, New York: Simon & Schuster.
Kobrin, S. J. (1987), "Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in Developing
Countries," International Organization, 41, 609-638.
Kochan, T. A. and H. C. Katz (1988), Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations (2nd Ed.), Homewood,
IL: Irwin.
Lax, D. A. and J. K. Sebenius (1986), The Manager as Negotiator, New York: Free Press.
Lecraw, D. J. (1984), "Bargaining Power, Ownership, and Profitability of Subsidiaries of Transnational
Corporations in Developing Countries," Journal of International Business Studies, 15, 1, 27-43.
Lewicki, R. J., S. E. Weiss and D. Lewin (1992), "Models of Conflict, Negotiation and Third Party
Processes: A Review and Synthesis," Journal of Organizational Behavior, 13, 209-252.
Loewnstein, G. F., L. Thompson and M. H. Bazerman (1989), "Social Utility and Decision Making in
Interpersonal Contexts," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 426-441.
Maoz, Z. (1989), "Power, Capabilities, and Paradoxical Conflict Outcomes," World Politics, 41, 239-266.
March, R. (1985), "East Meets West at the Negotiating Table," Winds (April), 55-57.
Mascarenhas, B. (1982), "Coping with Uncertainty in International Business," Journal of International
Business Studies, 13, 2, 87-98.
Mayer, F. W. (1988), "Bargains within Bargains: Domestic Politics and International Negotiation," Ph.D.
dissertation in public policy, Harvard University, Kennedy School.
McCall, J. B. and M. B. Warrington (1984), Marketing by Agreement: A Cross-Cultural Approach to
Business Negotiation, Chicester, England: John Wiley and Sons.
McDonald, J. W., Jr. (1986), "Case Studies in International Conflict Management," in D. B. Bendahmane
and J. W. McDonald, Jr. (Eds.), Perspectives on Negotiation, Washington, DC: US Department of
State, 311-315.
Morley, I. (1982), "Preparation for Negotiation: Conflict, Commitment, and Choice," in H. Brandstatter,
J. H. Davis and G. S. Stocker-Kreichgauer (Eds.), Group Decision-Making, New York: Academic,
387-419.
, J. Webb and G. M. Stephenson (1988), "Bargaining and Arbitration in the Resolution of
Conflict," in W. Stroebe et al. (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict, Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 117-134.
Murray, E. A., Jr. (1983), "Negotiation: Escape from Strategic Stalemate," in M. Bazerman and R. J.
Lewicki (Eds.), Research on Negotiation in Organizations, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 249-271.
Newsom, D. (1984), "Domestic Models of Conflict Resolution: Are They Relevant in the International
Context?" in D. B. Bendahmane and J. W. McDonald, Jr. (Eds.), International Negotiation: Art and
Science, Washington, DC: US Department of State, 35-38.
North, R. C. (1977), "Toward a Framework for the Analysis of Scarcity and Conflict," International Studies
Quarterly, 21, 569-591.
and N. Choucri (1983), "Economic and Political Factors in International Conflict and Integra-
tion," International Studies Quarterly, 27, 443-461.
Oliver, C. (1990), "Determinants of Interorganizational Relationships: Integration and Future Directions,"
Academy of Management Review, 15, 241-265.
Pervin, L. A. (1989), "Persons, Situations, Interactions: The History of a Controversy and a Discussion of
Theoretical Models," Academy of Management Review, 14, 350-360.
Peterson, T. (1986), "Europe's Family Feud over the ITT Deal," Business Week (September 29), 39.
COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 299

Poole, M. S. and A. H. Van de Ven (1989), "Using Paradox to Build Management and Organization
Theories," Academy of Management Review, 14, 562-578.
Posses, F. (1978), The Art of International Negotiation, London: Business Books.
Pruitt, D. G. (1981), Negotiation Behavior, New York: Academic.
(1983), "Strategic Choice in Negotiation," American Behavioral Scientist, 27, 167-194.
Putnam, L. L. (1990), "Reframing Integrative and Distributive Bargaining: A Process Perspective," in B. H.
Sheppard, M. H. Bazerman and R. J. Lewicki (Eds.), Research on Negotiation in Organizations. Vol.
2, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 3-30.
Raiffa, H. (1982), The Art and Science of Negotiation, Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
Rapoport, A. and M. Guyer (1966), "A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games," General Systems, 203-214.
Reck, R. R. and B. G. Long (1985), The Win-WinNegotiator, New York: Basic.
Roberts, K. (1970), "On Looking at an Elephant: An Evaluation of Cross-Cultural Research Related to
Organizations," Psychological Bulletin, 74, 5, 327-350.
Robock, S. H. and K. Simmonds (1989), International Business and Multinational Enterprises (4th Ed.),
Homewood, IL: Irwin.
Rousseau, D. M. (1985), "Issues of Level in Organizational Research: Multi-level and Cross-level
Perspectives," in B. M. Staw and L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior. Vol.
7, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1-37.
Rubin, J. Z. and B. R. Brown (1975), The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, New York:
Academic.
Rugman, A. M., D. J. Lecraw and L. D. Booth (1985), International Business: Firm and Environment, New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Runkel, P. J. and J. E. McGrath (1972), Research on Human Behavior, New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston.
Rutter, D. R. (1987), Communicating by Telephone, Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Salacuse, J. W. (1988), "Making Deals in Strange Places: A Beginner's Guide to International Business
Negotiations," Negotiation Journal, 4, 5-13.
Sanger, D. E. (1986), "ITT in $1.8 Billion Sale of Business to French," The New York Times (29 April), D4.
Saunders, H. H. (1985), "We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-negotiating
Phases," Negotiation Journal, 1, 3, 249-262.
(1987), "International Relationships-It's Time to Go Beyond 'We' and 'They'," Negotiation
Journal, 3, 3, 245-274.
(1990), "An Historic Challenge to Rethink How Nations Relate," in V. D. Volkan, D. A. Julius,
and J. V. Montville (Eds.), Psycho-Dynamics of International Relationships. Vol 1. Concepts and
Theories, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1-30.
Sawyer, J. and H. Guetzkow (1965), "Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations," in
H. Kelman (Ed.), International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, New York: Holt, Rine-
hart, Winston, 465-520.
Schelling, T. C. (1960), The Strategy of Conflict, London: Oxford University Press.
Schneider, S. C. (1988), "National vs. Corporate Culture: Implications for Human Resource Management,"
Human Resource Management, 27, 2, 231-246.
Scott, W. R. (1987), Organizations (2nd Ed.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Simon, H. A. (1986), The Sciences of the Artificial, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Smith, D. N. and L. T. Wells, Jr. (1976), Negotiating Third World Mineral Agreements, Cambridge, MA:
Ballinger.
Snyder, G. H. and P. Diesing (1977), Conflict Among Nations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Spradley, J. P. and D. W. McCurdy (Eds.) (1971), Conformity and Conflict, Boston: Little, Brown.
Staw, B. M., L. E. Sandelands and J. E. Dutton (1981), "Threat-Rigidity Effects in Organizational
Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly, 26, 501-524.
Stein, J. G. (Ed.) (1989), Getting to the Table, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Stewart S. and C. F. Keown (1989), "Talking with the Dragon: Negotiating in the People's Republic of
China," Columbia Journal of WorldBusiness (Fall), 68-72.
Stoever, W. A. (1981), Renegotiations in International Business Transactions, Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books.
Susskind, L. E. and J. Cruikshank (1987), Breaking the Impasse: ConsensualApproaches to Resolving Public
Disputes, New York: Basic.
Thomas, K. W. (1976), "Conflict and Conflict Management," in M. Dunnette (Ed.), Handbook of Industrial
and Organizational Psychology, Chicago: Rand McNally, 839-935.
Thompson, L. (1989), "Negotiation Behavior: Effects of Task, Partner, and Structural Similarity," in
F. Hoy (Ed.), Academy of Management Best Papers Proceedings, 376-380.
Toyne, B. (1989), "International Exchange: A Foundation for Theory Building in International Business,"
Journal of International Business Studies, 20, 1-18.
300 STEPHEN E. WEISS

Tung, R. (1982), "U.S.-China Trade Negotiations: Practices, Procedures, and Outcomes," Journal of
International Business Studies, 13, 2, 25-38.
(1988), "Toward a Conceptual Paradigm of International Business Negotiations," in R. D.
Farmer (Ed.), Advances in International Comparative Management. Vol. 3, Greenwich, CT: JAI
Press, 203-219.
van der Wijst, P. (forthcoming), "The Perception of Politeness in Dutch and French Indirect Requests," in
N. J. Holden and J. Ulijn (Eds.), Global Cross-Cultural Communication and Negotiation: Linguistic,
Psychological and Technical Aspects, London: Longman.
Vernon, R. (1968), "Conflict and Resolution between Foreign Direct Investment and Less Developed
Countries," Public Policy, 17, 333-351.
Wall, J. A., Jr. (1985), Negotiation: Theory and Practice, Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.
Walton, R. E. and R. B. McKersie (1965), A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Waltz, K. N. (1954), Man, the State, and War, New York: Columbia University Press.
(1971), "Conflict in World Politics," in S. Spiegel and K. Waltz (Eds.), Conflict in WorldPolitics,
Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 454-474.
Wehr, P. (1979), Conflict Regulation, Boulder, CO: Westview.
Weiss, S. E. (1985), The Language of Successful Negotiators: A Study of Communicative Competence in
IntergroupNegotiation Simulations, Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms.
(1987), "Creating the GM-Toyota Joint Venture: A Case in Complex Negotiation," Columbia
Journal of WorldBusiness, 22, 2, 23-37.
(1990), "The Long Path to the IBM-Mexico Agreement: An Analysis of the Microcomputer
Investment Negotiations, 1983-1986," Journal of International Business Studies, 21, 565-596.
and W. G. Stripp (1985), "Negotiating with Foreign Businesspersons," Working Paper #85-6,
Stern School of Business, New York University, New York.
Winham, G. R. (1977), "Complexity in International Negotiation," in D. Druckman (Ed.), Negotiations:
Social Psychological Perspectives, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 347-366.
and H. E. Bovis (1979), "Distribution of Benefits in Negotiation," Journal of Conflict Resolution,
23, 408-424.
Yin, R. K. (1984), Applied Social Research Methods. Vol. 5. Case Study Research, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Zartman, I. W. (1976), "The Analysis of Negotiation," in I. W. Zartman (Ed.), The 50% Solution, Garden
City, NJ: Anchor, 2-41.
(1989), "Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions," in J. G. Stein (Ed.), Getting to the Table,
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1-17.
and M. R. Berman (1982), ThePracticalNegotiator,New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

You might also like