FIRST DIVISION Petitioner Ayala Land, Inc.
alleges that it is the registered owner
[G.R. No. 135899. February 2, 2000]
AYALA LAND, INC., petitioner, vs. MARIETTA
VALISNO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Rtcspped
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated May 29, 1998
and Resolution dated October 13, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 47122. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding AYALA guilty of deliberate and willful
"forum-shopping" in filing aforementioned five
(5) separate Civil Cases before the different RTCs;
and, in view thereof, said five (5) cases (Annexes
"C" to "G" of the petition) are hereby ordered
dismissed with prejudice as against petitioner;
and that the lower court’s Order of October 27,
1997 and the Order of January 5, 1998, for
finding otherwise, are hereby SET ASIDE for
being plainly contrary to law and issued in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.1 [Penned by Justice Demetrio G.
Demetria, concurred in by Justices Minerva P.
Gonzaga-Reyes and Ramon A. Barcelona; Rollo, p.
102.]
of several contiguous parcels of land in Las Piñas City. When it
began to develop its properties into a residential subdivision,
petitioner became aware of adverse claims of ownership over
the properties from several persons. Among these claimants is
respondent Marietta Valisno, who asserts ownership over
1,082,959 square meters of land registered in her name under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (273301) RT-4 of the Registry of
Deeds of Las Piñas, Metro Manila.2 [Rollo, pp. 268-273.] On the
premise that portions of respondent’s claimed land overlap
petitioner’s properties covered in fourteen of petitioner’s torrens
titles, petitioner instituted actions to quiet its titles. Since
petitioner’s entire property in Las Piñas is allegedly covered by
twenty-one separate torrens titles, petitioner contends that it
could have brought twenty-one distinct actions to quiet title.
Upon advice of counsel, however, petitioner resolved to file only
eight cases on a "per lot/per TCT (or sets thereof)" basis. Other
considerations dividing or grouping together petitioner’s causes
of action were the number of claimants, the sizes of the claims,
the contiguity of the lots involved, the manageability of litigating
its claims and the speed in the adjudication thereof. Among those
eight cases, respondent was named respondent in five of them, to
wit:
(a)......Civil Case No. 93-3685 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 56, filed on October
14, 1993;
(b)......Civil Case No. 94-467 originally of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City and
transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas City, Branch 275, filed on February 7, 1994;
(c)......Civil Case No. 94-468 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 64, filed on February
7, 1994;
 (d)......Civil Case No. 94-1432 originally of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City and
transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas City, Branch 275, filed on April 8, 1994; and
(e)......Civil Case No. LP-97-0058 of the Regional
Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 253, filed on
February 21, 1997. Kortex
Respondent, on the other hand, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 253, on March 6, 1997 an action
against petitioner and several others, docketed as Civil Case No.
LP-97-0064, wherein she claimed ownership of the 1,082,959
square meter tract of land covered by her TCT No. (273301) RT-
4 and prayed that petitioner’s TCT Nos. 41263, 41262, 41325,
41326, 15644, 26878 and 41259, among others, be declared null
and void.
Both parties accused each other of forum-shopping. Petitioner
moved to cite respondent in contempt of court for filing Civil
Case LP-97-0064. This, according to petitioner, constituted
forum-shopping inasmuch as respondent’s claims therein were
in reality compulsory counterclaims which she could have and
should have pleaded in the cases initiated by petitioner against
her. Respondent, for her part, filed motions to hold petitioner
guilty of forum-shopping for filing five distinct cases all on the
ground that her lands overlapped those of petitioner.
In the meantime, respondent filed a motion to transfer the venue
of Civil Case No. 94-468 from Makati City to Las Piñas City.
On January 8, 1998, the Hon. Jose F. Caoibes, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 253, before
whom Civil Cases Nos. LP-97-0058 and LP-97-0064 were both
pending, found petitioner guilty of forum-shopping, ordered the
dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. LP-97-0058, and
maintained Civil Case No. LP-97-0064 filed by respondent
against petitioner. After petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was denied, it appealed the order of dismissal of Civil Case No.
LP-97-0058 to the Court of Appeals.3 [CA-G.R. CV No.
59574.] Insofar as the order absolving respondent of liability for
forum-shopping, petitioner brought a special civil action
for certiorari also with the Court of Appeals.4 [CA-G.R. SP No.
48230.]
On the other hand, Judge Alfredo Enriquez of the Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas, Branch 275, before whom Civil Cases Nos. 94-
467 and 94-1432 were pending, denied respondent’s motion to
cite petitioner guilty of forum-shopping and found respondent
guilty of forum-shopping in filing Civil Case No. LP-97-0064 in an
Order dated June 8, 1998.5 [Rollo, pp. 326-328.]
In Civil Case No. 93-3685 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 56, Judge Nemesio Felix issued an Order on
March 4, 1998 dismissing the charges of both parties against
each other.
In the precursor to the instant petition, Civil Case No. 94-468,
Judge Delia Panganiban of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 64, issued an Order on October 27, 1997 the
pertinent portion of which reads:
In both instances, neither Ayala Land, Inc., nor
Marietta Valisno is guilty of forum shopping. The
Motions to Cite either party in Contempt of Court
are DENIED. Sclaw
WHEREFORE, the Motion praying for the transfer
of the records of this case to RTC of Las Piñas is
DENIED. Finding that neither party is guilty of
 forum shopping, the two (2) Motions to Cite in
Contempt are both DENIED.6 [Rollo, pp. 329-
333.]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 [Rollo, pp.
334-341.] while respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration8 [Rollo, pp. 342-347.] of the above Order, both
of which were denied by Judge Panganiban in an Order dated
January 5, 1998.9 [Rollo, p. 348.]
Respondent thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47122.10 [Rollo, pp. 349-
380.] On May 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered the
appealed Decision11[Rollo, pp. 92-103.] finding petitioner guilty
of forum-shopping and ordering the dismissal of the five cases
filed by petitioner notwithstanding that the subject of the
petition for certiorari was a mere incident in Civil Case No. 94-
468. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding AYALA guilty of deliberate and willful
"forum-shopping" in filing aforementioned five
(5) separate Civil Cases before the different RTCs;
and in view thereof, said five (5) cases (Annexes
"C" to "G" of the petition) are hereby ordered
dismissed with prejudice as against petitioner;
and that the lower court’s Order of October 27,
1997 and the Order of January 5, 1998, for
finding otherwise, are hereby SET ASIDE for
being plainly contrary to law and issued in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.12 [Rollo, p.102.]
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration13 [Rollo, pp. 416-
417.] was denied by the Court of Appeals in its assailed
Resolution14 [Rollo, pp. 105-113.] of October 13, 1998. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED. Let a copy hereof be furnished
the Fifteenth Division of this Court in CA-G.R. No.
48230 but only for its information, and the
Regional Trial Courts, to wit, RTC Makati, Br. 56
(in Civil Case No. 93-3685); RTC Las Piñas, Br.
64 [should be Br. 275] (in Civil Case Nos. 94-467
and 94-1432); RTC Makati, Br. 64 (in Civil Case
No. 94-468); RTC, Las Piñas, Br. 253 (in Civil Case
No. 97-0058), for their compliance and
implementation.
SO ORDERED.15 [Rollo, p. 113.] Sclex
Petitioner, thus, brought the present petition for review relying
on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
RULES OF COURT, PRECEDENTS AND REMEDIAL
LAW AUTHORITIES, WHEN IT DECLARED
PETITIONER TO HAVE SHOPPED FOR A FORUM,
DESPITE ITS EXPRESS FINDING THAT THE
CASES FILED BY PETITIONER INVOLVED
DISTINCT CAUSES OF ACTION.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LAWS ON HUMAN RELATIONS AND APPLICABLE
PRECEDENTS, WHEN IT DECLARED
PETITIONER’S FILING OF CASES FOR DISTINCT
CAUSES OF ACTION AS AN ABUSE OF
RIGHT. Xlaw
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE
RULES OF COURT AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT REFUSED TO
HOLD RESPONDENT GUILTY OF FORUM
SHOPPING IN FILING A CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 97-
0064) IN WHICH THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR
WERE ESSENTIALLY COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIMS IN RELATION TO THE CASES
FILED BY PETITIONER.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT ORDERED THE
DISMISSAL OF CASES NOT BEFORE IT.
V.
AS AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND, THE COURT OF
APPEALS DISREGARDED APPLICABLE
PRECEDENTS AND DEPARTED FROM THE
USUAL AND ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PRECEDENTS WHEN IT DISMISSED THE CASES
FILED BY AYALA, INSTEAD OF ORDERING
CONSOLIDATION.16 [Rollo, pp. 51-52.]
On March 3, 1999, this Court denied the petition for "failure to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the
exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction
in this case."17 [Rollo, p. 499.]
On May 4, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En
Banc.18 [Rollo, pp. 500-527.] Petitioner insisted that inasmuch as
both the Court of Appeals and respondent Marietta Valisno
acknowledged that every overlap on its titles presented a distinct
cause of action which may or may not be joined in one suit, there
could have been no forum-shopping. And even assuming that
there was, petitioner contended that the same was neither willful
nor deliberate; hence, the dismissal of the cases was unduly
harsh. Petitioner further argued that the Court of Appeals could
not have validly ordered the dismissal of cases not before it, and
that what it could have done was to order the consolidation of
the cases rather than their dismissal. In support of its motion to
refer the case to the Court en banc, petitioner pointed to the
conflicting rulings of the different trial courts on the matter of
whether or not petitioner forum-shopped, thus, necessitating a
referral to the banc. Xsc
In a Resolution dated August 18, 1999, this Court granted
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, reinstated the petition
and required respondent to comment on the petition. However,
petitioner’s motion to refer the case to this Court en banc was
denied.
In her comment, respondent argued, in fine, that the Court of
Appeals did not commit any reversible error; that petitioner’s act
of filing five separate actions against her before different courts
praying for exactly the same relief to declare her TCT No.
(273301) RT-4 null and void constitute forum-shopping, bad
faith and abuse of right; and that the Court of Appeals has the
competence and jurisdiction to dismiss all five actions filed by
petitioner.
Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another.19 [Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, 295
SCRA 536, 554 (1998); Philippine Woman’s Christian
Temperance Union, Inc. v. Abiertas House of Friendship, Inc., 292
SCRA 785, 794 (1998)] Litis pendentia requires the concurrence
of the following requisites:
1.......Identity of parties, or at least such parties as
those representing the same interests in both
actions;
2.......Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;
and
3.......Identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases, such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending
case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res adjudicata in the other
case.20 [Philippine Woman’s Christian
Temperance Union, Inc. v. Abiertas House of
Friendship, Inc., supra., at 791; citations omitted.]
As explained by this Court in First Philippine International Bank
v. Court of Appeals, forum-shopping exists where the elements
of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is
forum-shopping when, between an action pending before this
Court and another one, there exist: "a) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions,
b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts, and c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites
also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis
pendens." Another case elucidates the consequence of forum-
shopping: "[W]here a litigant sues the same party against whom
another action or actions for the alleged violation of the same
right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending,
the defense of litis-pendentia in one case is a bar to the others;
and, a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata and
thus would cause the dismissal of the rest."21 [Prubankers
Association v. Prudential Bank & Trust Company, 302 SCRA 74,
83-84 (1999)] Sc
In this case, while there may be identity of parties and of some
reliefs prayed for, any judgment rendered in one of the actions
filed by petitioner will not amount to res judicata in the other
actions. The following are the elements of res judicata:
1.......The former judgment must be final;
2.......The court which rendered judgment must
have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter;
3.......It must be a judgment on the merits; and
4.......There must be between the first and second
actions identity of parties, subject matter, and
 cause of action.22 [Saura v. Saura, Jr., G.R.
136159, September 1, 1999.]

It should be recalled that the five actions filed by petitioner were

for quieting of title based on separate certificates of title. Hence,
the subject matters involved are different in each case. As such,
the cases alleged different causes of action. Corollarily, a
judgment in any one case will not affect the issue in the other
cases inasmuch as those pertain to different lands covered by
different certificates of title. Consequently, petitioner could not
have been guilty of forum-shopping.

Therefore, all five cases filed by petitioner against respondent

Marietta Valisno, which were ordered dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, are hereby revived, and ordered consolidated to be
jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City,
where the real property is situated, pursuant to Rule 4, Section 1,
first paragraph of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to enable
petitioner and respondent to fully ventilate all issues between
them in one proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Cases Nos. 93-3685, 94-467, 94-
468, 94-1432 and LP-97-0058, which were ordered dismissed by
the Court of Appeals, are ORDERED REVIVED AND
CONSOLIDATED together with Civil Case No. LP-97-0064, to be
heard and tried with Civil Case No. 94-467 before the Regional
Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126153. January 14, 2004]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. MORDENO
CUA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, filed by petitioner Philippine National
Bank (PNB), of the Decision[1] dated July 22, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals which reversed and set aside the Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24 in Civil Case
No. 90-423, an action for a sum of money filed against the private
respondent Atty. Mordeno Cua.
On September 6, 1990, the petitioner filed a complaint
against the private respondent with the Regional Trial Court,
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, wherein it alleged, inter alia, that:
...
2. Sometime on December 18, 1985, the PNB thru its Cable
Division received a tested message from Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., New York (Mantrust) to remit proceeds in the amount
$14,056.25 to Philippine National Bank, Cagayan de Oro Branch
under Account No. 16087. This message was implemented
on December 20, 1985 in the Peso Conversion rate
of P262,793.04.
3. On December 26, 1985, after a thorough but futile search for
Cagayan de Oro Branch for Account No. 16087, PNB Manila was
notified that the account was not carried or maintained by
Cagayan de Oro.With this Notice, it was later discovered that said
Account No. 16087 was carried with PCI Bank Cagayan de Oro in
the name of CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
STUDIES with the Defendant Mordeno Cua as the sole signatory.
4. With the discovery mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the
PNB Cagayan de Oro Branch transferred and delivered the
amount of $14,056.25 to Account No. 16087 with the PCI Bank,
Cagayan de Oro Branch and funds were withdrawn by the
defendant Mordeno Cua.
5. About the same time when the PNB Cagayan de Oro Branch
transferred and delivered the amount of $14,056.25 to the PCI
Bank Cagayan de Oro Branch, Mantrust rectified their tested
message and recalled the fund stating that the money was not
intended for PNB. This recall Order was complied by PNB
on January 21, 1986 thru telex message sent to Mantrust, New
York.
6. Upon request for PCI Bank Cagayan de Oro to return the
amount thus transferred and delivered, the PNB was informed
that the whole amount was already withdrawn by Mordeno Cua,
the sole signatory for the Center for Economic and Social Studies.
7. Thereafter, requests both verbal and written were made upon
the defendant Mordeno Cua to restitute the amount of
$14,056.25 but all efforts failed as Mordeno Cua refused and
continue to refuse to restitute or make necessary arrangement
for the restitution.[3]
The petitioner, as plaintiff, prayed that after due proceedings,
judgment be rendered in its favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that
after due hearing, the defendant be adjudged liable with PNB for:
1. The amount of P262,793.04 with interest until full
payment;
2. Moral damages and legal fees in the amount as may
be proven during the trial;
3. Such other remedies as may be available under the
premises.[4]
In his Answer to the complaint, the private respondent, as
defendant, admitted to being the sole signatory to the account of
the Center for Economic and Social Studies (CESS) with Philippine
Commercial Industrial Bank (PCIB), Cagayan de Oro Branch. He,
however, alleged that the petitioner had no causes of action
against him, and that he had no knowledge sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegations alleged in paragraphs 2, 3,
5, 7, 8, and 9 of the complaint, the truth being that with reference
to paragraph 4 thereof, he never withdrew money from PCIB from
the fund transfer of the petitioner nor was he notified of the said
fund transfer to the account of CESS with the PCIB. The private
respondent interposed counterclaims for damages against the
petitioner.[5]
The petitioner adduced evidence that on December 18, 1985,
the Head Office of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Manila
received a secret coded message thru its Cable Division from
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., New York (Mantrust) directing
the petitioner bank to remit the proceeds in the amount of
US$14,056.25 to PNB Cagayan de Oro Branch under Account No.
16085 of CESS.[6] The petitioner implemented the message
on December 20, 1985 at the prevailing peso conversion rate in
the amount of P262,793.04.
However, after thorough verification, it turned out that
Account No. 16087 was not maintained with the PNB, Cagayan de
Oro Branch. The latter forthwith informed the petitioner of the
said fact.[7] Upon further verification, it was found that the said
account was maintained by the PCIB, Cagayan de Oro Branch
under the name of CESS, with private respondent Mordeno Cua as
sole signatory. At about the same time, Mantrust rectified its
secret coded message and recalled the fund, stating that the
money was not intended for PNB. This recall message was
complied with by the petitioner on January 21, 1986 thru a telex
message sent to Mantrust, New York.[8] Written demands were
then sent to respondent Cua to return or restitute the amount, but
the latter failed to do so.[9] After the petitioner rested its case, the
private respondent opted not to adduce evidence in his
behalf. After due hearing, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant ordering
the latter to pay the former the following sums:
(a) P262,793.04 pesos equivalent of $14,056.25; and
(b) P662.00 for docketing fees.[10]
The trial court ruled that the petitioner adduced the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove its claim against the private
respondent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court, holding that the petitioner failed to prove that the
private respondent withdrew the money remitted to the account
of CESS with the PCIB, Cagayan de Oro Branch by the PNB,
Cagayan de Oro City Branch.[11]
The petitioner avers in this case that the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the decision of the trial court, and insists that:
THE CA CONCLUSION THAT THE TESTIMONIES AND EVIDENCE
ON RECORD ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT THE AMOUNT
OF REMITTANCE EQUIVALENT TO US$14,056.25 (P260,793.04)
WAS INDEED RECEIVED BY THE APPELLANT IS ERRONEOUS
CONSIDERING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO
SPECIFICALLY DENY THE ALLEGATION OF PETITIONER UNDER
PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE COMPLAINT CONSTITUTES A JUDICIAL
ADMISSION BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT THAT HE WITHDREW
THE WHOLE AMOUNT OF REMITTANCE TRANSFERRED BY
PETITIONER TO PCIB FOR CREDIT TO CESS ACCOUNT.
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE
COMPLAINT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED JUDICIALLY ADMITTED
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT, THE CA CONCLUSION THAT THE
TESTIMONIES AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD ARE INSUFFICIENT
TO PROVE THAT THE AMOUNT OF REMITTANCE WAS IN FACT
CREDITED INTO THE ACCOUNT OF CESS WITH PCIB IS
ERRONEOUS CONSIDERING THAT THE TESTIMONIES AND
EVIDENCES ON RECORD PARTICULARLY THE LETTER OF
PETITIONER DATED AUGUST 10, 1988 ADDRESSED TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT, WHICH LETTER WAS ADMITTED BY
THE LOWER COURT AS EXHIBIT D, CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
THAT PCIB MANILA CREDITED TO FCDU ACCOUNT NO. 16087
OF CESS WITH THEIR CAGAYAN DE ORO BRANCH THE AMOUNT
OF US$14,114.33 (US$14,056.25).[12]
Since the issues raised by the petitioner are interrelated, we
shall delve into and resolve them simultaneously.
The petitioner avers that the ruling of the CA, that it failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to prove the material allegations in its
complaint, is erroneous. According to the petitioner, the private
respondent failed to specifically deny the material allegations in
paragraph 6 of the complaint, and that the private respondents
denial in paragraph E of his Answer to the Complaint was an
ineffective denial. Thus, the private respondent is deemed to have
admitted that he withdrew the amount for the account of CESS
with the PCIB. The reason for this, the petitioner contends, is that:
... [T]he information on whether Mordeno Cua actually withdrew
the whole amount of remittance from CESS account with
PCIBank Cagayan de Oro is within the knowledge or control of
Mordeno Cua being the sole signatory to the said CESS
Account.[13]
The private respondent, for his part, avers that he specifically
denied having withdrawn or received remittances by the
petitioner to the account of CESS with the PCIB, Cagayan de Oro
Branch. The petitioner was burdened to prove that (a) it remitted
the amount of US$14,056.25 to the PCIB, Cagayan de Oro Branch
for the account of CESS; and that (b) the private respondent
withdrew the said amount. He asserts that while the petitioner
proved that the said amount was remitted to the account of CESS
with the PCIB, it failed to prove that he withdrew the said amount
from the bank.
The petitioners contention has no merit.
Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, as
amended,[14] require a defendant to specify each material
allegations of fact, the truth of which he does not admit, and
whenever practicable, to set forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant
desires to deny part of an averment for a qualification thereof, he
is mandated to specify so much of the averment as true and
material and shall deny the remainder. If a defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of a material averment in the complaint, he is bound to so state
and this shall have the effect of a denial. In such a case, it is
indispensable that the matter regarding where lack of knowledge
is alleged be clearly set forth so that the adverse party is informed
of what is denied. The purpose of requiring the defendant to make
a specific denial is to make him disclose the matters alleged in the
complaint which he succinctly intends to disprove at the trial,
together with the matter which he relied upon to support the
denial.[15] The parties are compelled to lay their cards on the table.
A denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the
defendant. A general denial does not become specific by the use of
the word specifically. When the matters of whether the defendant
alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief, are plainly and necessarily within the defendants
knowledge, his alleged ignorance or lack of information will not
be considered as a specific denial.[16] Section 11, Rule 8 of the said
Rule,[17] provides that material averments in the complaint other
than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
In his Answer to the complaint, the respondent alleged inter
alia that:
A. Paragraph 1 of the complaint is ADMITTED.
B. Paragraphs 2 and 3 is (sic) DENIED, defendant has no
knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof
except the averment that defendant is a signatory for CENTER
FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STUDIES for the bank account of
the latter at PCIBank.
C. Paragraph 4 is DENIED, the truth being that defendant never
withdrew money from PCIBank, from the funds transfer of
plaintiff-bank nor notified of the fund transfer thereof by
plaintiff-bank.
D. For reason stated above, paragraph 5 is DENIED, defendant
never knew of the transaction between PCIBank and the plaintiff
and the consequent rectification of the so-called tested message
from Mantrust Bank that the money was not intended for the
plaintiff.
E. Paragraph 6 is again DENIED, defendant has no business
interfering bank-to-bank transactions, that whether the Center
for Economic and Social Studies withdrew an amount at PCIBank
is purely an exercise of a bank-to-client relationship.
F. Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 are DENIED, defendant has no
knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof; and
as AFFIRMATIVE/SPECIAL DEFENSES, defendant repleads the
above statements and further aver;
G. That plaintiff has no cause of action against therein defendant.
H. Granting that there is a cause of action, the same is barred by
prescription and/or laches and/or estoppel; as COUNTERCLAIM,
paragraph A to H are repleaded and furthermore aver;
I. That this suit could have been avoided by the plaintiff had it
exercise (sic) sound banking practices and without being
arrogant, reckless, grossly negligent, baseless and irresolute
which gravely caused irreparable injury to the rights of the
defendant as the latter is suffering untold misery, wounded
feelings, moral shock, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights,
fright, serious anxiety and social humiliation, by reason of this
suit, which plaintiff be condemned to pay ONE MILLION PESOS
as moral damage and to caution other banking institution not to
repeat this totally erroneous case, the plaintiff be imposed and
made to pay defendant exemplary damage of the same amount,
reasonable attorneys fees and costs of the suit.[18]
Thus, in paragraph B, the private respondent denied the
averments in paragraph 3 of the complaint, including the
averment that Account No. 16087 was carried with the PCIB,
Cagayan de Oro Branch in the name of CESS. Nevertheless, this
denial was ineffective because such fact was within the knowledge
of the private respondent, being the signatory thereto.The
defendants denial is, thus, equivalent to an admission. Likewise, thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter within which to submit
the private respondents failure to specifically deny, in paragraph an acceptable proposal regarding the amount of US$14,056.25,
C of his Answer, the allegation in paragraph 4 of the complaint that otherwise, the petitioner will initiate legal action. The petitioner
the PNB, Cagayan de Oro Branch transferred and delivered the never claimed in the said letters that the private respondent had
amount of US$14,056.25 to Account No. 16087 carried by the withdrawn the amount, nor did it demand that the private
PCIB, Cagayan de Oro Branch was equivalent to his admission of respondent remit the said amount to it. The petitioner even failed
the truth thereof. to adduce evidence that the private respondent actually received
the said letters.
Undeniably, the private respondent did not specifically deny
in paragraph E of his Answer the material averment in paragraph IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
6 of the complaint, that is, that the petitioner received information DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.
that the entire remittance of US$14,056.25 had already been
SO ORDERED.
withdrawn by the private respondent. However, such failure did
not constitute as an admission that the said amount was
withdrawn by the private respondent. In Paragraph C of his
Answer to the averment in paragraph 4 of the complaint, the
private respondent specifically alleged that he never withdrew
from the fund transfer of the petitioner-Bank and that he was not
notified of the fund transfer by the petitioner to the PCIB, Cagayan
de Oro Branch. The private respondents admissions/denials in his
Answer to the complaint should be considered in their entirety
and not truncated parts. In sum then, the petitioner was able to
prove that, indeed, the US$14,056.25 was remitted to PCIB
Account No. 16087 under the name of CESS with the private
respondent as the depositors sole signatory. However, the
petitioner failed to prove that the private respondent withdrew
the amount from the said account. We agree with the private
respondents contention that the petitioner was burdened to
prove not only that the amount was remitted to Account No.
16087, but also that the private respondent withdrew the same in
his capacity as the sole signatory of the owner of the account.
The petitioners reliance on the letters[19] is misplaced. The
Letter dated August 10, 1988 is merely a request for the private
respondent to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the request for
funds from Mr. Konrad Adenaver made by CESS. The Letter dated
March 8, 1989 merely warned the private respondent that he had
DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles
of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary
injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later,
in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on
the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3,
1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed
a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court
issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on
July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal,
holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by
petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of
appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed
that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued
that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the
final order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July
27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within
the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the
CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the
day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the
“final order” appealable under the Rules.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of
the 15-day reglmentary period to appeal, the February 12, 1998
order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration should be deemed as the final order. In the case
of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared
petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.
Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus
motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12
days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He
later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus
motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise
dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. The court a quo
ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after
the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that
was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court
and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised
there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent
case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered
the order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the
final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the
case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period
the Rules. of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted
resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver
motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule”
justice fairly.
shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of
be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC’s decision or file it
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”)
final order or resolution. denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22,
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided
1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with
on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall
their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the
be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies
days, as already discussed.
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes
that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final
order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39
of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15