G. R. No.

160188 June 21, 2007

ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal law jurisprudence. Petitioner
effectively concedes having performed the felonious acts imputed against him, but instead insists
that as a result, he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in its
consummated stage of which he was convicted. The proposition rests on a common theory
expounded in two well-known decisions1 rendered decades ago by the Court of Appeals,
upholding the existence of frustrated theft of which the accused in both cases were found guilty.
However, the rationale behind the rulings has never been affirmed by this Court.

As far as can be told,2 the last time this Court extensively considered whether an accused was
guilty of frustrated or consummated theft was in 1918, in People v. Adiao.3 A more cursory

treatment of the question was followed in 1929, in People v. Sobrevilla,4 and in 1984, in Empelis
v. IAC.5 This petition now gives occasion for us to finally and fully measure if or how frustrated
theft is susceptible to commission under the Revised Penal Code.

I.

The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The case stems from an Information6 charging
petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner) and Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft.
On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super
Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo
Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the
supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark
"Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-
known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon
was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged
with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the
open parking space.7

Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it
towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide
Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner
for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago
fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon
were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered.8 The filched items seized
from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three
(3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of ₱12,090.00.9

Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before they were transferred
on the same day to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police, Quezon City, for
investigation. It appears from the police investigation records that apart from petitioner and
Calderon, four (4) other persons were apprehended by the security guards at the scene and
delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in connection with the incident. However,
after the matter was referred to the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, only petitioner and
Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on
20 May 1994, the day after the incident.10

After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon both claimed
having been innocent bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club on the afternoon of
19 May 1994 when they were haled by Lago and his fellow security guards after a commotion
and brought to the Baler PNP Station. Calderon alleged that on the afternoon of the incident, he
was at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied by his neighbor,
Leoncio Rosulada.11 As the queue for the ATM was long, Calderon and Rosulada decided to buy
snacks inside the supermarket. It was while they were eating that they heard the gunshot fired by
Lago, leading them to head out of the building to check what was

transpiring. As they were outside, they were suddenly "grabbed" by a security guard, thus
commencing their detention.12 Meanwhile, petitioner testified during trial that he and his cousin,
a Gregorio Valenzuela,13 had been at the parking lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex
and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot.
The gunshot caused him and the other people at the scene to start running, at which point he was
apprehended by Lago and brought to the security office. Petitioner claimed he was detained at
the security office until around 9:00 p.m., at which time he and the others were brought to the
Baler Police Station. At the station, petitioner denied having stolen the cartons of detergent, but
he was detained overnight, and eventually brought to the prosecutor’s office where he was
charged with theft.14 During petitioner’s cross-examination, he admitted that he had been
employed as a "bundler" of GMS Marketing, "assigned at the supermarket" though not at SM.15

In a Decision16 promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 90, convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft.
They were sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years of prision correccional as
minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum.17 The RTC found credible the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and established the convictions on the positive
identification of the accused as perpetrators of the crime.

Both accused filed their respective Notices of Appeal,18 but only petitioner filed a brief19 with the
Court of Appeals, causing the appellate court to deem Calderon’s appeal as abandoned and
consequently dismissed. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be
convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a
position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.20 However, in its Decision dated 19 June
2003,21 the Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioner’s
conviction.22 Hence the present Petition for Review,23 which expressly seeks that petitioner’s
conviction "be modified to only of Frustrated Theft."24

Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, petitioner effectively conceded both his
felonious intent and his actual participation in the theft of several cases of detergent with a total
value of ₱12,090.00 of which he was charged.25 As such, there is no cause for the Court to
consider a factual scenario other than that presented by the prosecution, as affirmed by the RTC
and the Court of Appeals. The only question to consider is whether under the given facts, the
theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated.

II.

In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft, petitioner cites26 two decisions
rendered many years ago by the Court of Appeals: People v. Diño27 and People v. Flores.28 Both
decisions elicit the interest of this Court, as they modified trial court convictions from
consummated to frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present
case. Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his appeal to the Court of Appeals, yet the appellate
court did not expressly consider the import of the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.

It is not necessary to fault the Court of Appeals for giving short shrift to the Diño and Flores
rulings since they have not yet been expressly adopted as precedents by this Court. For whatever
reasons,

the occasion to define or debunk the crime of frustrated theft has not come to pass before us. Yet
despite the silence on our part, Diño and Flores have attained a level of renown reached by very
few other appellate court rulings. They are comprehensively discussed in the most popular of our
criminal law annotations,29 and studied in criminal law classes as textbook examples of frustrated
crimes or even as definitive of frustrated theft.

More critically, the factual milieu in those cases is hardly akin to the fanciful scenarios that
populate criminal law exams more than they actually occur in real life. Indeed, if we finally say
that Diño and Flores are doctrinal, such conclusion could profoundly influence a multitude of
routine theft prosecutions, including commonplace shoplifting. Any scenario that involves the
thief having to exit with the stolen property through a supervised egress, such as a supermarket
checkout counter or a parking area pay booth, may easily call for the application of Diño and
Flores. The fact that lower courts have not hesitated to lay down convictions for frustrated theft
further validates that Diño and Flores and the theories offered therein on frustrated theft have
borne some weight in our jurisprudential system. The time is thus ripe for us to examine whether
those theories are correct and should continue to influence prosecutors and judges in the future.

III.

To delve into any extended analysis of Diño and Flores, as well as the specific issues relative to
"frustrated theft," it is necessary to first refer to the basic rules on the three stages of crimes
under our Revised Penal Code.30
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies.
A felony is consummated "when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment
are present." It is frustrated "when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." Finally, it is attempted "when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance."

Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a "subjective phase," or that portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and
the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated
crime.31 After that point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and the objective phase
begins.32 It has been held that if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the
crime is merely attempted.33 On the other hand, the subjective phase is completely passed in case
of frustrated crimes, for in such instances, "[s]ubjectively the crime is complete."34

Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies on one hand, and
attempted felonies on the other. So long as the offender fails to complete all the acts of execution
despite commencing the commission of a felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted
stage. Since the specific acts of execution that define each crime under the Revised Penal Code
are generally enumerated in the code itself, the task of ascertaining whether a crime is attempted
only would need to compare the acts actually performed by the accused as against the acts that
constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code.

In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an

initial concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The
critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of
execution. The determination of whether the felony was "produced" after all the acts of execution
had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. It is the statutory
definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code,
while the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying
criminal intent.

The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea" supplies an important
characteristic of a crime, that "ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to
be a crime," and accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting.35 Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se,36mens rea has been
defined before as "a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent,"37 and
"essential for criminal liability."38 It follows that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes
must be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has
comfortably held that "a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement infringes on
constitutionally protected rights."39 The criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that
constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be
shown; there must also be an actus reus.40
It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find expression in the criminal statute, that the
felony is produced. As a postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws, it is
extremely preferable that the language of the law expressly provide when the felony is produced.
Without such provision, disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether or
not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the undesirable and legally dubious set-up under
which the judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately, our Revised
Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From the statutory definition of any felony, a
decisive passage or term is embedded which attests when the felony is produced by the acts of
execution. For example, the statutory definition of murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase
"shall kill another," thus making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the victim,
and conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.

We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, its
elements are spelled out as follows:

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.— Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter’s consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or
make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.

Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly
idiosyncratic means by which theft may be committed.41 In the present discussion, we need to
concern ourselves only with the general definition since it was under it that the prosecution of the
accused was undertaken and sustained. On the face of the definition, there is only one operative
act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another. It is
also clear from the provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft, there must
further be present the descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without
force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons; and it was without the consent
of the owner of the property.

Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be
done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use
of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.42
In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra traces the history of the definition of theft, which under
early Roman law as defined by Gaius, was so broad enough as to encompass "any kind of
physical handling of property belonging to another against the will of the owner,"43 a definition
similar to that by Paulus that a thief "handles (touches, moves) the property of
another."44 However, with the Institutes of Justinian, the idea had taken hold that more than mere
physical handling, there must further be an intent of acquiring gain from the object, thus:
"[f]urtum est contrectatio rei fraudulosa, lucri faciendi causa vel ipsius rei, vel etiam usus ejus
possessinisve."45 This requirement of animo lucrandi, or intent to gain, was maintained in both
the Spanish and Filipino penal laws, even as it has since been abandoned in Great Britain.46

In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with apoderamiento, or "unlawful taking," to
characterize theft. Justice Regalado notes that the concept of apoderamiento once had a
controversial interpretation and application. Spanish law had already discounted the belief that
mere physical taking was constitutive of apoderamiento, finding that it had to be coupled with
"the intent to appropriate the object in order to constitute apoderamiento; and to appropriate
means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing."47 However, a conflicting line of cases decided
by the Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that there must be permanency in the taking48 or an
intent to permanently deprive the owner of the stolen property;49 or that there was no need for
permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender or
disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner already constituted
apoderamiento.50 Ultimately, as Justice Regalado notes, the Court adopted the latter thought that
there was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an
unlawful taking.51

So long as the "descriptive" circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo
lucrandi and apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal
property of another establishes, at least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage.
As applied to the present case, the moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases
of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed
without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and
accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the
extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded him.

On the critical question of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft, we are obliged to
apply Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code to ascertain the answer. Following that provision, the
theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts committed by petitioner, if ordinarily
sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, "do not produce [such theft] by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator." There are clearly two determinative factors to
consider: that the felony is not "produced," and that such failure is due to causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator. The second factor ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in each
particular case. The first, however, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to the
individual felonies in the Revised Penal Code52 as to when a particular felony is "not produced,"
despite the commission of all the acts of execution.
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire
as to how exactly is the felony of theft "produced." Parsing through the statutory definition of
theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law — that
theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latter’s
consent."

U.S. v. Adiao53 apparently supports that notion. Therein, a customs inspector was charged with
theft after he abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a foreign national and secreted the
item in his desk at the Custom House. At no time was the accused able to "get the merchandise
out of the Custom House," and it appears that he "was under observation during the entire
transaction."54 Based apparently on those two circumstances, the trial court had found him guilty,
instead, of frustrated theft. The Court reversed, saying that neither circumstance was decisive,
and holding instead that the accused was guilty of consummated theft, finding that "all the
elements of the completed crime of theft are present."55 In support of its conclusion that the theft
was consummated, the Court cited three (3) decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the
discussion of which we replicate below:

The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of another. As he was in
the act of taking the fruit[,] he was seen by a policeman, yet it did not appear that he was at that
moment caught by the policeman but sometime later. The court said: "[x x x] The trial court did
not err [x x x ] in considering the crime as that of consummated theft instead of frustrated theft
inasmuch as nothing appears in the record showing that the policemen who saw the accused take
the fruit from the adjoining land arrested him in the act and thus prevented him from taking full
possession of the thing stolen and even its utilization by him for an interval of time." (Decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 14, 1898.)

Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while the latter was hearing mass in a church.
The latter on account of the solemnity of the act, although noticing the theft, did not do anything
to prevent it. Subsequently, however, while the defendant was still inside the church, the
offended party got back the money from the defendant. The court said that the defendant had
performed all the acts of execution and considered the theft as consummated. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, December 1, 1897.)

The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house and by means of a key opened up a case,
and from the case took a small box, which was also opened with a key, from which in turn he
took a purse containing 461 reales and 20 centimos, and then he placed the money over the cover
of the case; just at this moment he was caught by two guards who were stationed in another room
near-by. The court considered this as consummated robbery, and said: "[x x x] The accused [x x
x] having materially taken possession of the money from the moment he took it from the place
where it had been, and having taken it with his hands with intent to appropriate the same, he
executed all the acts necessary to constitute the crime which was thereby produced; only the act
of making use of the thing having been frustrated, which, however, does not go to make the
elements of the consummated crime." (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, June 13,
1882.)56
It is clear from the facts of Adiao itself, and the three (3) Spanish decisions cited therein, that the
criminal actors in all these cases had been able to obtain full possession of the personal property
prior to their apprehension. The interval between the commission of the acts of theft and the
apprehension of the thieves did vary, from "sometime later" in the 1898 decision; to the very
moment the thief had just extracted the money in a purse which had been stored as it was in the
1882 decision; and before the thief had been able to spirit the item stolen from the building
where the theft took place, as had happened in Adiao and the 1897 decision. Still, such intervals
proved of no consequence in those cases, as it was ruled that the thefts in each of those cases was
consummated by the actual possession of the property belonging to another.

In 1929, the Court was again confronted by a claim that an accused was guilty only of frustrated
rather than consummated theft. The case is People v. Sobrevilla,57 where the accused, while in
the midst of a crowd in a public market, was already able to abstract a pocketbook from the
trousers of the victim when the latter, perceiving the theft, "caught hold of the [accused]’s shirt-
front, at the same time shouting for a policeman; after a struggle, he recovered his pocket-book
and let go of the defendant, who was afterwards caught by a policeman."58 In rejecting the
contention that only frustrated theft was established, the Court simply said, without further
comment or elaboration:

We believe that such a contention is groundless. The [accused] succeeded in taking the pocket-
book, and that determines the crime of theft. If the pocket-book was afterwards recovered, such
recovery does not affect the [accused’s] criminal liability, which arose from the [accused] having
succeeded in taking the pocket-book.59

If anything, Sobrevilla is consistent with Adiao and the Spanish Supreme Court cases cited in the
latter, in that the fact that the offender was able to succeed in obtaining physical possession of
the stolen item, no matter how momentary, was able to consummate the theft.

Adiao, Sobrevilla and the Spanish Supreme Court decisions cited therein contradict the position
of petitioner in this case. Yet to simply affirm without further comment would be disingenuous,
as there is another school of thought on when theft is consummated, as reflected in the Diño and
Flores decisions.

Diño was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949, some 31 years after Adiao and 15 years
before Flores. The accused therein, a driver employed by the United States Army, had driven his
truck into the port area of the South Harbor, to unload a truckload of materials to waiting U.S.
Army personnel. After he had finished unloading, accused drove away his truck from the Port,
but as he was approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police, he was stopped by an M.P. who
inspected the truck and found therein three boxes of army rifles. The accused later contended that
he had been stopped by four men who had loaded the boxes with the agreement that they were to
meet him and retrieve the rifles after he had passed the checkpoint. The trial court convicted
accused of consummated theft, but the Court of Appeals modified the conviction, holding instead
that only frustrated theft had been committed.
In doing so, the appellate court pointed out that the evident intent of the accused was to let the
boxes of rifles "pass through the checkpoint, perhaps in the belief that as the truck had already
unloaded its cargo inside the depot, it would be allowed to pass through the check point without
further investigation or checking."60 This point was deemed material and indicative that the theft
had not been fully produced, for the Court of Appeals pronounced that "the fact determinative of
consummation is the ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it were
more or less momentary."61 Support for this proposition was drawn from a decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain dated 24 January 1888 (1888 decision), which was quoted as follows:

Considerando que para que el apoderamiento de la cosa sustraida sea determinate de la

consumacion del delito de hurto es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al
sustractor la libre disposicion de aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente, pues de
otra suerte, dado el concepto del delito de hurto, no puede decirse en realidad que se haya
producido en toda su extension, sin materializar demasiado el acto de tomar la cosa ajena.62

Integrating these considerations, the Court of Appeals then concluded:

This court is of the opinion that in the case at bar, in order to make the booty subject to the
control and disposal of the culprits, the articles stolen must first be passed through the M.P.
check point, but since the offense was opportunely discovered and the articles seized after all the
acts of execution had been performed, but before the loot came under the final control and
disposal of the looters, the offense can not be said to have been fully consummated, as it was
frustrated by the timely intervention of the guard. The offense committed, therefore, is that of
frustrated theft.63

Diño thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor to freely dispose of the items stolen at
the time of apprehension is determinative as to whether the theft is consummated or frustrated.
This theory was applied again by the Court of Appeals some 15 years later, in Flores, a case
which according to the division of the court that decided it, bore "no substantial variance
between the circumstances [herein] and in [Diño]."64 Such conclusion is borne out by the facts in
Flores. The accused therein, a checker employed by the Luzon Stevedoring Company, issued a
delivery receipt for one empty sea van to the truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty
sea van onto his truck at the terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck driver proceeded to
show the delivery receipt to the guard on duty at the gate of the terminal. However, the guards
insisted on inspecting the van, and discovered that the "empty" sea van had actually contained
other merchandise as well.65 The accused was prosecuted for theft qualified by abuse of
confidence, and found himself convicted of the consummated crime. Before the Court of
Appeals, accused argued in the alternative that he was guilty only of attempted theft, but the
appellate court pointed out that there was no intervening act of spontaneous desistance on the
part of the accused that "literally frustrated the theft." However, the Court of Appeals, explicitly
relying on Diño, did find that the accused was guilty only of frustrated, and not consummated,
theft.
As noted earlier, the appellate court admitted it found "no substantial variance"
between Diño and Flores then before it. The prosecution in Flores had sought to distinguish that
case from Diño, citing a "traditional ruling" which unfortunately was not identified in the
decision itself. However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the said "traditional ruling" was
qualified by the words "is placed in a situation where [the actor] could dispose of its contents at
once."66 Pouncing on this qualification, the appellate court noted that "[o]bviously, while the
truck and the van were still within the compound, the petitioner could not have disposed of the
goods ‘at once’." At the same time, the Court of Appeals conceded that "[t]his is entirely
different from the case where a much less bulk and more common thing as money was the object
of the crime, where freedom to dispose of or make use of it is palpably less restricted,"67 though
no further qualification was offered what the effect would have been had that alternative
circumstance been present instead.

Synthesis of the Diño and Flores rulings is in order. The determinative characteristic as to
whether the crime of theft was produced is the ability of the actor "to freely dispose of the
articles stolen, even if it were only momentary." Such conclusion was drawn from an 1888
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain which had pronounced that in determining whether theft
had been consummated, "es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al
sustractor de aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente." The qualifier "siquiera sea
mas o menos momentaneamente" proves another important consideration, as it implies that if the
actor was in a capacity to freely dispose of the stolen items before apprehension, then the theft
could be deemed consummated. Such circumstance was not present in either Diño or Flores, as
the stolen items in both cases were retrieved from the actor before they could be physically
extracted from the guarded compounds from which the items were filched. However, as implied
in Flores, the character of the item stolen could lead to a different conclusion as to whether there
could have been "free disposition," as in the case where the chattel involved was of "much less
bulk and more common x x x, [such] as money x x x."68

In his commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino makes the following pointed observation on the
import of the Diño ruling:

There is a ruling of the Court of Appeals that theft is consummated when the thief is able to
freely dispose of the stolen articles even if it were more or less momentary. Or as stated in
another case[69 ], theft is consummated upon the voluntary and malicious taking of property
belonging to another which is realized by the material occupation of the thing whereby the thief
places it under his control and in such a situation that he could dispose of it at once. This ruling
seems to have been based on Viada’s opinion that in order the theft may be consummated, "es
preciso que se haga en circumstancias x x x [70 ]"71

In the same commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino, concluding from Adiao and other cases, also
states that "[i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material
possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the
thing was frustrated."72
There are at least two other Court of Appeals rulings that are at seeming variance with the Diño
and Flores rulings. People v. Batoon73 involved an accused who filled a container with gasoline
from a petrol pump within view of a police detective, who followed the accused onto a passenger
truck where the arrest was made. While the trial court found the accused guilty of frustrated
qualified theft, the Court of Appeals held that the accused was guilty of consummated qualified
theft, finding that "[t]he facts of the cases of U.S. [v.] Adiao x x x and U.S. v. Sobrevilla x x x
indicate that actual taking with intent to gain is enough to consummate the crime of theft."74

In People v. Espiritu,75 the accused had removed nine pieces of hospital linen from a supply
depot and loaded them onto a truck. However, as the truck passed through the checkpoint, the
stolen items were discovered by the Military Police running the checkpoint. Even though those
facts clearly admit to similarity with those in Diño, the Court of Appeals held that the accused
were guilty of consummated theft, as the accused "were able to take or get hold of the hospital
linen and that the only thing that was frustrated, which does not constitute any element of theft,
is the use or benefit that the thieves expected from the commission of the offense."76

In pointing out the distinction between Diño and Espiritu, Reyes wryly observes that "[w]hen the
meaning of an element of a felony is controversial, there is bound to arise different rulings as to
the stage of execution of that felony."77 Indeed, we can discern from this survey of jurisprudence
that the state of the law insofar as frustrated theft is concerned is muddled. It fact, given the
disputed foundational basis of the concept of frustrated theft itself, the question can even be
asked whether there is really such a crime in the first place.

IV.

The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused was guilty of frustrated, and not
consummated, theft. As we undertake this inquiry, we have to reckon with the import of this
Court’s 1984 decision in Empelis v. IAC.78

As narrated in Empelis, the owner of a coconut plantation had espied four (4) persons in the
premises of his plantation, in the act of gathering and tying some coconuts. The accused were
surprised by the owner within the plantation as they were carrying with them the coconuts they
had gathered. The accused fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had seized, and were
subsequently arrested after the owner reported the incident to the police. After trial, the accused
were convicted of qualified theft, and the issue they raised on appeal was that they were guilty
only of simple theft. The Court affirmed that the theft was qualified, following Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code,79 but further held that the accused were guilty only of frustrated qualified
theft.

It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the issue of whether the theft was
consummated or frustrated was raised by any of the parties. What does appear, though, is that the
disposition of that issue was contained in only two sentences, which we reproduce in full:
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able
to perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the felony as a consequence.
They were not able to carry the coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely arrival of the
owner.80

No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment, whether Diño, Flores or the Spanish
authorities who may have bolstered the conclusion. There are indeed evident problems with this
formulation in Empelis.

Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because the actors "were not able to perform all
the acts of execution which should have produced the felon as a consequence."81 However, per
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime is frustrated "when the offender performs all the
acts of execution," though not producing the felony as a result. If the offender was not able to
perform all the acts of execution, the crime is attempted, provided that the non-performance was
by reason of some cause or accident other than spontaneous desistance. Empelis concludes that
the crime was

frustrated because not all of the acts of execution were performed due to the timely arrival of the
owner. However, following Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, these facts should elicit the
conclusion that the crime was only attempted, especially given that the acts were not performed
because of the timely arrival of the owner, and not because of spontaneous desistance by the
offenders.

For these reasons, we cannot attribute weight to Empelis as we consider the present petition.
Even if the two sentences we had cited actually aligned with the definitions provided in Article 6
of the Revised Penal Code, such passage bears no reflection that it is the product of the
considered evaluation of the relevant legal or jurisprudential thought. Instead, the passage is
offered as if it were sourced from an indubitable legal premise so settled it required no further
explication.

Notably, Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the Court, or even cited as authority on theft.
Indeed, we cannot see how Empelis can contribute to our present debate, except for the bare fact
that it proves that the Court had once deliberately found an accused guilty of frustrated theft.
Even if Empelis were considered as a precedent for frustrated theft, its doctrinal value is
extremely compromised by the erroneous legal premises that inform it, and also by the fact that it
has not been entrenched by subsequent reliance.

Thus, Empelis does not compel us that it is an insurmountable given that frustrated theft is viable
in this jurisdiction. Considering the flawed reasoning behind its conclusion of frustrated theft, it
cannot present any efficacious argument to persuade us in this case. Insofar as Empelis may
imply that convictions for frustrated theft are beyond cavil in this jurisdiction, that decision is
subject to reassessment.
V.

At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930, the 1870 Codigo Penal de España was
then in place. The definition of the crime of theft, as provided then, read as follows:

Son reos de hurto:

1. Los que con ánimo de lucrarse, y sin volencia o intimidación en las personas ni fuerza en las
cosas, toman las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueño.

2. Los que encontrándose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quién es su dueño se la apropriaren co
intención de lucro.

3. Los dañadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del daño causado, salvo los casos
previstos en los artίculos 606, núm. 1.0; 607, núms, 1.0, 2.0 y 3.0; 608, núm. 1.0; 611; 613;
Segundo párrafo del 617 y 618.

It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the aforecited Spanish Supreme Court
decisions were handed down. However, the said code would be revised again in 1932, and
several times thereafter. In fact, under the Codigo Penal Español de 1995, the crime of theft is
now simply defined as "[e]l que, con ánimo de lucro,

tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueño será castigado"82

Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the penal code of Spain, "la libre
disposicion" of the property is not an element or a statutory characteristic of the crime. It does
appear that the principle originated and perhaps was fostered in the realm of Spanish
jurisprudence.

The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer form in his 1926 commentaries on the
1870 Codigo Penal de España. Therein, he raised at least three questions for the reader whether
the crime of frustrated or consummated theft had occurred. The passage cited in Diño was
actually utilized by Viada to answer the question whether frustrated or consummated theft was
committed "[e]l que en el momento mismo de apoderarse de la cosa ajena, viéndose sorprendido,
la arroja al suelo."83 Even as the answer was as stated in Diño, and was indeed derived from the
1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, that decision’s factual predicate occasioning the
statement was apparently very different from Diño, for it appears that the 1888 decision involved
an accused who was surprised by the employees of a haberdashery as he was abstracting a layer
of clothing off a mannequin, and who then proceeded to throw away the garment as he fled.84

Nonetheless, Viada does not contest the notion of frustrated theft, and willingly recites decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain that have held to that effect.85 A few decades later, the esteemed
Eugenio Cuello Calón pointed out the inconsistent application by the Spanish Supreme Court
with respect to frustrated theft.
Hay frustración cuando los reos fueron sorprendidos por las guardias cuando llevaban los sacos
de harino del carro que los conducia a otro que tenían preparado, 22 febrero 1913; cuando el
resultado no tuvo efecto por la intervención de la policia situada en el local donde se realizó la
sustracción que impidió pudieran los reos disponer de lo sustraído, 30 de octubre 1950. Hay "por
lo menos" frustración, si existe apoderamiento, pero el culpale no llega a disponer de la cosa, 12
abril 1930; hay frustración "muy próxima" cuando el culpable es detenido por el perjudicado
acto seguido de cometer la sustracción, 28 febrero 1931. Algunos fallos han considerado la
existencia de frustración cuando, perseguido el culpable o sorprendido en el momento de llevar
los efectos hurtados, los abandona, 29 mayo 1889, 22 febrero 1913, 11 marzo 1921; esta doctrina
no es admissible, éstos, conforme a lo antes expuesto, son hurtos consumados.86

Ultimately, Cuello Calón attacked the very idea that frustrated theft is actually possible:

La doctrina hoy generalmente sustentada considera que el hurto se consuma cuando la cosa
queda de hecho a la disposición del agente. Con este criterio coincide la doctrina sentada
últimamente porla jurisprudencia española que generalmente considera consumado el hurto
cuando el culpable coge o aprehende la cosa y ésta quede por tiempo más o menos duradero bajo
su poder. El hecho de que éste pueda aprovecharse o no de lo hurtado es indiferente. El delito no
pierde su carácter de consumado aunque la cosa hurtada sea devuelta por el culpable o fuere
recuperada. No se concibe la frustración, pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario
para la consumación del hurto no lo consume efectivamente, los raros casos que nuestra
jurisprudencia, muy vacilante, declara hurtos frustrados son verdaderos delitos
consumados.87 (Emphasis supplied)

Cuello Calón’s submissions cannot be lightly ignored. Unlike Viada, who was content with
replicating the Spanish Supreme Court decisions on the matter, Cuello Calón actually set forth
his own thought that questioned whether theft could truly be frustrated, since "pues es muy
dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la consumación del hurto no lo consume
efectivamente." Otherwise put, it would be difficult to foresee how the execution of all the acts
necessary for the completion of the crime would not produce the effect of theft.

This divergence of opinion convinces us, at least, that there is no weighted force in scholarly
thought that obliges us to accept frustrated theft, as proposed in Diño and Flores. A final ruling
by the Court that there is no crime of frustrated theft in this jurisdiction will not lead to scholastic
pariah, for such a submission is hardly heretical in light of Cuello Calón’s position.

Accordingly, it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the Court to look at the question
from a fresh perspective, as we are not bound by the opinions of the respected Spanish
commentators, conflicting as they are, to accept that theft is capable of commission in its
frustrated stage. Further, if we ask the question whether there is a mandate of statute or precedent
that must compel us to adopt the Diño and Flores doctrines, the answer has to be in the negative.
If we did so, it would arise not out of obeisance to an inexorably higher command, but from the
exercise of the function of statutory interpretation that comes as part and parcel of judicial
review, and a function that allows breathing room for a variety of theorems in competition until
one is ultimately adopted by this Court.
V.

The foremost predicate that guides us as we explore the matter is that it lies in the province of the
legislature, through statute, to define what constitutes a particular crime in this jurisdiction. It is
the legislature, as representatives of the sovereign people, which determines which acts or
combination of acts are criminal in nature. Judicial interpretation of penal laws should be aligned
with what was the evident legislative intent, as expressed primarily in the language of the law as
it defines the crime. It is Congress, not the courts, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment.88 The courts cannot arrogate the power to introduce a new element of a crime which
was unintended by the legislature, or redefine a crime in a manner that does not hew to the
statutory language. Due respect for the prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies
constrains the Court to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws where a "narrow
interpretation" is appropriate. "The Court must take heed of language, legislative history and
purpose, in order to strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids."89

With that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with the Diño/Flores dictum. The ability of the
offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of
theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative
element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. To restate what this Court has
repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things.90

Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with intent to
gain, of personal property of another without the latter’s consent. While the Diño/Flores dictum
is considerate to the mindset of the offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the
perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of
property on the part of the victim.

For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage,
the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain
unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property
due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the
product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft,
is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner
alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief
Justice Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that "[i]n theft or robbery the crime is
consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the
same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated."91
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves
into the concept of "taking" itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains
such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to
downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the
acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking not having been accomplished." Perhaps
this point could serve as fertile ground for future discussion, but our concern now is whether
there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to
that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts of this particular case. We are
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case.
With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a
considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and
long enough to load these onto a taxicab.

Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from
the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose
of the same.92 And long ago, we asserted in People v. Avila:93

x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of the thing to be
appropriated into the physical power of the thief, which idea is qualified by other conditions,
such as that the taking must be effected animo lucrandi and without the consent of the owner;
and it will be here noted that the definition does not require that the taking should be effected
against the will of the owner but merely that it should be without his consent, a distinction of no
slight importance.94

Insofar as we consider the present question, "unlawful taking" is most material in this respect.
Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which
produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an
act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.

With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.

Neither Diño nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both fail to consider that once the offenders
therein obtained possession over the stolen items, the effect of the felony has been produced as
there has been deprivation of property. The presumed inability of the offenders to freely dispose
of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have already been deprived of
their right to possession upon the completion of the taking.

Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the rule —that the inability of the offender to
freely dispose of the stolen property frustrates the theft — would introduce a convenient defense
for the accused which does not reflect any legislated intent,95 since the Court would have carved
a viable means for offenders to seek a mitigated penalty under applied circumstances that do not
admit of easy classification. It is difficult to formulate definite standards as to when a stolen item
is susceptible to free disposal by the thief. Would this depend on the psychological belief of the
offender at the time of the commission of the crime, as implied in Diño?
Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances such as the size and
weight of the property, the location of the property, the number and identity of people present at
the scene of the crime, the number and identity of people whom the offender is expected to
encounter upon fleeing with the stolen property, the manner in which the stolen item had been
housed or stored; and quite frankly, a whole lot more. Even the fungibility or edibility of the
stolen item would come into account, relevant as that would be on whether such property is
capable of free disposal at any stage, even after the taking has been consummated.

All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the colorful detail, the
owner was indeed deprived of property by one who intended to produce such deprivation for
reasons of gain. For such will remain the presumed fact if frustrated theft were recognized, for
therein, all of the acts of execution, including the taking, have been completed. If the facts
establish the non-completion of the taking due to these peculiar circumstances, the effect could
be to downgrade the crime to the attempted stage, as not all of the acts of execution have been
performed. But once all these acts have been executed, the taking has been completed, causing
the unlawful deprivation of property, and ultimately the consummation of the theft.

Maybe the Diño/Flores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in common sense. Yet they do not
align with the legislated framework of the crime of theft. The Revised Penal Code provisions on
theft have not been designed in such fashion as to accommodate said rulings. Again, there is no
language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the "free disposition of the items
stolen" is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been produced. Diño itself
did not rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion, and the later Flores was
ultimately content in relying on Diño alone for legal support. These cases do not enjoy the
weight of stare decisis, and even if they did, their erroneous appreciation of our law on theft
leave them susceptible to reversal. The same holds true of Empilis, a regrettably stray decision
which has not since found favor from this Court.

We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As
petitioner has latched the success of his appeal on our acceptance of the Diño and Flores rulings,
his petition must be denied, for we decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has
taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised
Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. It will take considerable
amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our
deference to Viada yields to the higher reverence for legislative intent.
G.R. No. 182648 June 17, 2015

HERMAN MEDINA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the January 7, 2008 Decision1 and April 21, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29634, which affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal
Case No. 35-4021 convicting petitioner Herman Medina (Medina) of the crime of simple theft,
defined and penalized under Article 308, in relation to Article 309, Paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).

The Information4 filed against Medina states:

That on or about the 27th day of April, 2002 and for sometime thereafter, in the City of Santiago,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal, and carry away the following to wit: one (1) unit
alternator worth Php5,000.00, Starter worth Php5,000.00, battery worth Php2,500.00[,] and two
(2) sets of tire 2.75 x 15 with mugs worth Php10,000.00 all valued at Php22,500.00, owned by
HENRY LIM, represented by PURITA LIM[,] to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof
in the total amount of Php22,500.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW[.]

The factual antecedents appear as follows:

Henry Lim (Lim) is a resident of Calao West, Santiago City, Isabela. He is the registered owner
of a Sangyong Korando Jeep with Plate No. WPC-207, which was involved in an accident that
caused damage to its roof and door. On April 27, 2002,he engaged the services of Medina, who
is a mechanic and maintains a repair shop in Buenavista, Santiago City, Isabela. At the time the
jeep was delivered to Medina’s shop, it was still in running condition and serviceable because the
under chassis was not affected and the motor engine, wheels, steering wheels and other parts
were still functioning.

A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on the jeep. So, in the morning of
September 4, 2002, Purita Lim (Purita), Lim’s sister, instructed Danilo Beltran (Beltran) to
retrieve the jeep from Medina’s shop on the agreement that he would instead repair the vehicle in
his own auto shop. Beltran, however, was not able to get the jeep since its alternator, starter,
battery, and two tires with rims worth ₱5,000.00, ₱5,000.00, ₱2,500.00, and ₱10,000.00,
respectively, could not be found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him that he took and installed them
on Lim’s another vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired in the shop. Beltran
went back in the afternoon of the same day and was able to get the jeep, but without the missing
parts. He had it towed and brought it to his own repair shop. Before placing the jeep therein, he
reported the incident to Purita. Later, the jeep was fully repaired and put back in good running
condition.

On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint5 for simple theft was filed by Purita, representing
her brother. The City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Medina.6 Subsequently, an
Information was filed before the court a quo.

In his arraignment, Medina pleaded not guilty.7 No settlement, stipulation or admission was
made by the parties during the pre-trial.8 During the trial proper, Beltran and Lim were presented
as witnesses for the prosecution, while Medina and a certain Angelina Tumamao, a former
barangay kagawad of Buenavista, Santiago City, testified for the defense. Eventually, the case
was submitted for decision, but without the formal offer of evidence by the defense.9

The trial court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of
the March 31, 2005 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, and considering the absence of mitigating [or] aggravating circumstances and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional
as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify Henry Lim the total amount of ₱22,500.00. No
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.10

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Medina. While the trial court was not convinced
with Medina’s justification that he installed the jeep’s missing parts to the pick-up also owned by
Lim, the CA opined that his excuse is "so lame and flimsy." The CA agreed with the lower
court’s findings that Medina admitted that the jeep is more valuable than the pickup; that unlike
the pick-up, the needed repairs on the jeep is only minor in nature; that Medina failed to prove
that the pick-up was completely repaired and was placed in good running condition; and that he
failed to prove that the pick-up is owned by Lim. The CA also held that the positive testimony of
Beltran deserves merit in contrast with the self-serving testimony of Medina. Finally, no
credence was given to Medina’s assertion that the missing auto parts were turned over to Crispin
Mendoza, who is alleged to be an employee of Lim. For the CA, the trial court correctly ruled
that such claim was unsubstantiated in view of Medina’s failure to formally offer in evidence the
purported acknowledgment receipt. Assuming that the exception in Mato v. CA11 is taken into
account, the receipt could not still be considered because it was not incorporated in the records of
the case.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied, Medina filed this petition which alleges the
following errors:

I.

THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED

THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
PROSECUTION ONLY PRESENTED CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THEIR
ATTEMPT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. WORST, IT SPECIFICALLY ADVANCED ONLY ONE SINGLE
CIRCUMSTANCE[,] THAT IS[,] THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS
DANILO BELTRAN THAT THE STARTER, [ALTERNATOR], BATTERY[,] AND TWO (2)
PIECES [OF] TIRES WITH MUGS (MAG WHEELS) OF THE KORANDO JEEP WERE
SIMPLY MISSING, THUS[,] NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 4, RULE 133 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

II.

THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

CONVICTION OFTHE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION
RELIED NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS EVIDENCE BUT ON THE WEAKNESS OF
THE DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN
PHILIPPINES VS. ALVARIO.

III.

THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT [AFFIRMED]

THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE [THE] FACT [THAT] THERE WAS
NO FURTIVE TAKING OR UNLAWFUL ASPORTATION, IN THE CRIMINAL SENSE,
CONSIDERING THAT THE TAKING, IF AT ALL, WAS WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND
ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF
THE HONORABLE COURT IN ABUNDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL. AND THE
UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE RECEIPT

MARKED AS EXHIBIT "2" FOR THE DEFENSE, LIKEWISE MARKED AS EXHIBIT "C"
FOR THE PROSECUTION (COMMON EVIDENCE) NOT FORMALLY OFFERED IN
EVIDENCE DUE TO THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF THE FORMER COUNSEL FOR THE
PETITIONER IN THE GREATER INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ONE OFTHE EXCEPTIONS
PROVIDED FOR BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN SARRAGA, SR. VS. BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK.12
We deny.

Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
latter’s consent.13 As defined and penalized, the elements of the crime are: (1) there was taking
of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done with intent to
gain; (4) the taking was without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking was accomplished
without the use of violence against, or intimidation of persons or force, upon things. 14 Intent to
gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the
offender of the thing subject of asportation.15 Although proof as to motive for the crime is
essential when the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain is the usual motive to
be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.16 As to the concept of
"taking" –

The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that
it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as
"carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal
code does not require asportation or carrying away.

To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take" in the Revised
Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which x x x may be committed
through the use of the offenders' own hands, as well as any mechanical device x x x.17

In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep’s alternator, starter,
battery, and two tires with magwheels, but he put up the defense that they were installed in the
pick-up owned by Lim.18 With such admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove
that the missing parts were indeed lawfully taken. Upon perusal of the transcript of stenographic
notes, the Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the burden. Even bearing in mind
the testimony of Tumamao, he failed to substantiate, through the presentation of supporting
documentary evidence or corroborative testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the owner of the
pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were exactly the same items that were placed in the
pick-up; (3) Lim consented, expressly or impliedly, to the transfer of auto parts; and (4)
Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare parts from the jeep and their placement to the pick-
up. Neither did Medina adduce any justifying19 or exempting20 circumstance to avoid criminal
liability.

On the contrary, Lim firmly testified that when he entrusted to Medina the jeep’s repair it was
still in running condition and complete with alternator, starter, battery, and tires, which went
missing by the time the vehicle was recovered from the auto shop.21 Likewise, the testimony of
Beltran is definite and straightforward. He declared that he was not able to get the jeep in the
morning of September 4, 2002 because its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims
could not be found, and that when he asked Medina as to their whereabouts the latter told him
that he took them, placed the starter in Lim’s pick-up while the alternator was in the repair
shop.22 Medina informed him that the jeep’s missing parts were actually installed to Lim’s other
vehicle which was also being repaired at the time.23However, Beltran did not know or had not
seen other vehicles owned by Lim at Medina’s shop.24 In the afternoon of the sameday, he was
able to get the jeep but not its missing parts.25 He concluded that they were lost because he
inspected the jeep.26

Abundo v. Sandiganbayan,27 which was relied upon by Medina, does not apply. In said case, the
element of lack of owner's consent to the taking of the junk chassis was absent since the records
showed that Abundo made a request in writing to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis among
the pile of junk motor vehicles. His request was granted. A memorandum receipt was issued and
signed. Pursuant thereto, the chassis was taken out. There was no furtive taking or unlawful
asportation. The physical and juridical possession of the junk chassis was transferred to Abundo
at his request, with the consent or acquiescence of the owner, the Government, represented by
the public officials who had legal and physical possession of it. We noted that the crime of theft
implies an invasion of possession; therefore, there can be no theft when the owner voluntarily
parted with the possession of the thing. The Court agreed with the observation of the Solicitor
General that a thief does not ask for permission to steal. Indeed, a taking which is done with the
consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious.28

Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a purported acknowledgment receipt29 that he and
Tumamao identified during their presentation as witnesses for the defense. According to his
testimony, Mendoza came to his (Medina’s) place and saw the subject auto parts while being
transferred from the jeep to the pick-up and that, relative thereto, Medina even called barangay
officials and let them signed a document to bear witness on the matter.30 The document, dated
July 25, 2002, which was marked as Exhibit "2," was signed byMendoza, Jovy Bardiaga (said to
be Lim’s chief mechanic), Mario Pascual (said to be Medina’s helper), and Rosalina Bautista and
Tumamao (said to be barangay kagawads). Ostensibly, they signed the document while facing
each other in front of Medina’s house.31

In Mato v. CA,32 which referred to People v. Napat-a,33 citing People v. Mate,34 We relaxed the
application of Section 34, Rule 13235 of the Rules of Court by allowing the admission of
evidence not formally offered. To be admissible, however, two essential conditions must concur:
first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same
must have been incorporated in the records of the case.36

As regards this case, the acknowledgment receipt was not considered by the trial court because it
was not formally offered in evidence. While it was duly identified by the defense testimony that
was duly recorded, the receipt itself was not incorporated in the case records. For its part, the CA
opined that nowhere from the case records does Medina’s acknowledgment receipt appear. Yet,
upon examination, it appears that the July 25, 2002 acknowledgment receipt was attached as
Annex "3" of Medina’s Appellant’s Brief.37 Accordingly, the CA should have mulled over this
piece of document, especially so since the prosecution even prayed, and was granted, during the
trial proper that said receipt be marked as Exhibit "C."38
Nevertheless, even if this Court admits in evidence the acknowledgment receipt, the same would
still not exonerate Medina.1âwphi1 This is due to his admission that Bardiaga, Pascual, and
Bautista did not actually see him remove the alternator, starter, battery, and tires with rims from
the jeep and put the same to the pick-up.39 Likewise, while Medina asserted that Mendoza came
to his place and was shown that the missing auto parts were transferred from the jeep to the pick-
up, the latter was not presented as a hostile witness to confirm such expedient claim. As against
the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Medina’s mere denials
cannot prevail for being self-serving and uncorroborated. Denial is considered with suspicion
and always received with caution because it is inherently weak and unreliable, easily fabricated
and concocted.40

Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the fact.
Thus, courts – both trial and appellate – have generally viewed the defense of denial in criminal
cases with considerable caution, if not with outright rejection. Such judicial attitude comes from
the recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being an excuse too
easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy of consideration at all, denial
should be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her
negative and self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no greater
evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.41 Further, Medina did not demonstrate any evidence of ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against him. In the absence of any evidence that the
prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.42

There being no compelling reason to disregard the same, the Court yields to the factual findings
of the trial court, which were affirmed by the CA. This is in line with the precept that when the
trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon Us.43 It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial
court overlooked material and relevant matters, that We will recalibrate and evaluate the factual
findings of the court below.44 As held in Co Kiat v. Court of Appeals:45

It is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction, that factual findings of the trial court are entitled
to great weight and authority (Macua vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 29) and that
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought toit from the Court of Appeals, is limited
to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of facts being conclusive
(Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737).

In a petition for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is
confined to reviewing questions of law, unless the factual findings are totally bereft of support in
the records or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion (Canete, et
al. vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 13).

Except in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, appeals to
the Supreme Court are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and are allowed only
on questions of law and only when there are special and important reasons, which we do not find
in this case (Balde vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 365).46
Now on the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court:

Under Article 309 of the RPC, an accused found guilty of simple theft when the value of the
stolen property exceeds ₱22,000.00 shall be sentenced to:

Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing
stolen exceed the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.47

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that
which, taking into consideration the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the RPC.48 As the value of the auto parts stolen from Lim is in excess of ₱22,000.00, the penalty
imposable is the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by Article 309, which is the
maximum of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since the penalty prescribed is
composed of only two periods, Article 65 of the RPC requires the division into three equal
portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the three portions. Thus,
the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the penalty prescribed are:

Minimum - 6 years and l day to 7 years and 4 months

Medium - 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months

Maximum - 8 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 10 years

The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be-anywhere within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime.49 In this case, the pep.alty next lower in
degree to that prescribed for the offense is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, or anywhere from Two (2) years,. Four (4) months and One (1) day to Six (6) years.
Thus, the trial court did not err when it sentenced Medina to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of Three (3) years, Six (6) months and Twenty-One (21) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.50 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The January 7, 2008
Decision and April 21, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 29634,1
which affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3),
Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-4021 convicting Herman Medina for the crime
of simple theft, is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 200308 February 23, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MERA "JOY" ELEUTERIO

NIELLES, @ MERA NIELLES DELOS REYES, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Appellant Mera Joy Eleuterio Nielles @Mera Nielles Delos Reyes was charged with the crime of
Qualified Theft in an Information that reads as follows:

That on or about and sometime in July, 2004 in the City of Makati, Philippines and a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the cashier
of complainant Juanita J. Flores and as such enjoying the trust and confidence reposed upon her
by the said complainant, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal, and carry away collected money in the total amount of ₱640,353.86 to the damage
and prejudice of the complainant, in the aforementioned amount of ₱640,353.86. CONTRARY
TO LAW.1

In an Order2 dated January 18, 2005, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
132, ordered appellant's release from confinement after having posted a bond in the amount
₱100,000.00 undertaken by Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. under Bond No.
8385. Appellant was thereafter arraigned where she pleaded not guilty to the charges.3

Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution established that private complainant Juanita Flores (Flores) was engaged in the
business of guaranteeing purchase orders and gift checks of Shoemart and Landmark and
disposing, selling or transferring them for consideration. Appellant initially worked as Flores’
house help but was eventually hired to work at Flores’ office performing clerical jobs like sorting
invoices. When Flores’ business grew, appellant was assigned to bill and collect from sub-
guarantors, and to encash and deposit checks. On July 15, 2004, appellant collected ₱640,353.86
from the sub-guarantors. However, appellant did not remit the amount to Flores or deposit it in
her (Flores’) account. Instead, she issued 15 personal checks totaling ₱640,353.86 and deposited
them to Flores’ account. All the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to "account
closed." Appellant thereafter absconded.

For her part, appellant denied having stolen the amount of ₱640,353.86.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

In a Judgment4 dated March 26, 2008, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 132, found appellant
guilty of the crime of qualified theft, thus:
Given the foregoing, accused Nielles took ₱640,353.86 belonging to private complainant Juanita
J. Flores, without the latter’s consent. The taking was done with intent to gain because when the
accused’s checks bounced, she failed to remit or return the amount. The accused’s act was
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
but rather by the use of abuse of confidence reposed [by] private complainant [upon] her. Thus,
the elements of theft, as well as the circumstances that made the same as qualified theft, are
present in the instant case.

Accused Nielles, on the other hand, denied having stolen and carried away ₱640,353.86. Aside
from her bare denial, she did not present any evidence to support this claim. In fact, she did not
deny that the checks were issued and deposited by her. Furthermore, she did not provide any
reason or motive why Juanita would file the present case against her. Accordingly, her denial has
no basis and deserves no consideration.5

The dispositive portion of the RTC Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Mera "Joy" Eleuterio Nielles a.k.a. Mera Nielles
Delos Reyes, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft and hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years of prision correccional, as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. She is ordered to pay private
complainant Juanita J. Flores ₱640,353.86 as actual damages.

SO ORDERED.6

Aggrieved, appellant filed a notice of appeal. At the same time, she submitted a Renewal
Certificate7 of her bond effective for the period January 18, 2008 to January 18, 2009.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)

In her Brief, appellant asserted that since private complainant Flores was abroad on July 15,
2004, she could not have personally known whether appellant indeed collected amounts from the
sub-guarantors. She posited that mere issuance of the 15 checks is not proof that she
received/collected payments from the sub-guarantors or that she failed to remit the monies
belonging to Flores. She insisted that the prosecution failed to establish that she indeed collected
monies from the sub-guarantors amounting to ₱640,353.86. Appellant also theorized that she
might have issued the checks in favor of the sub-guarantors for whatever transactions they have
between them; and that thereafter, when she went to these sub-guarantors to collect their dues for
private complainant, these sub-guarantors used the same checks she previously issued as their
payment for private complainant. For that reason her personal checks were deposited in private
complainant’s account.

The CA, however, in its Decision8 dated May 26, 2011, was not impressed by appellant’s
protestations. It held that the fact that Flores was out of the country during the commission of the
offense is irrelevant since the prosecution has satisfactorily established that upon her arrival in
the Philippines, she immediately investigated the matter and talked to the sub-guarantors. Flores
also confirmed that indeed appellant issued 15 personal checks in lieu of the amounts collected
and deposited the same to Flores’ account but were all dishonored upon presentment.
Significantly, the CA noted that aside from her bare denial, appellant did not present any
evidence to support her claim that she did not steal the amount of ₱640,353.86 from Flores. In
fine, the CA found all the elements for the crime of qualified theft to be present.

Thus, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the
assailed 26 March 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 in
Criminal Case No. 04-3643 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. She is further ordered to pay Private
Complainant the amount of ₱640,353.86.

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, this appeal. In a Resolution10 dated April 18, 2012, we required both parties to file their
Supplemental Briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no longer filing its
supplemental brief. On the other hand, appellant maintains in her Supplemental Brief11 that the
prosecution failed to establish that she unlawfully took the amount of ₱640,353.86 belonging to
Flores. She claims that mere issuance of the checks does not prove unlawful taking of the
unaccounted amount. She insists that, at most, the issuance of the checks proves that the same
was issued for consideration. On February5, 2013, appellant furnished this Court her bond
renewal certificate12 issued by Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. effective for the period
January 18, 2013 to January 18, 2014.

Our Ruling

We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the prosecution
satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1) taking of personal
property;2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the said taking was done with intent to
gain; 4) that it was done without the owner’s consent; 5) that it was accomplished without the
use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and 6) that it was done
with grave abuse of confidence.13 As correctly found by the appellate court:

Private complainant testified that Accused-appellant took the amount of ₱640,353.86 from her
without her consent by failing to turn over the amount she collected from the former’s sub-
guarantors. Instead, she issued fifteen (15) personal checks and deposited the same to Private
Complainant’s account which however, all bounced for the reason "account closed". The taking
of the amount collected by Accused-appellant was obviously done with intent to gain as she
failed to remit the same to Private Complainant. Intent to gain is presumed from the act of
unlawful taking. Further, the unlawful act was accomplished by Accused-appellant without the
use of violence or intimidation against persons, [or] of force upon things as the payment to her of
the said amount was voluntarily handed to her by the sub-guarantors as she was known to be
entrusted with the collection of payments.
The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified theft was also
proven.1âwphi1 Accused-appellant herself testified that as a cashier, her functions and
responsibilities include billings and collections from their agents and making of deposits and
withdrawals in behalf of Private Complainant. Moreover, when the payment for the purchase
orders or gift checks becomes due, she would fill up the four (4) blank checks given by the sub-
guarantor with the knowledge and consent of Private Complainant. It is beyond doubt that an
employee like a cashier who comes into possession of the monies she collected enjoys the
confidence reposed in her by her employer, as in the instant case.14

We are one with the trial court and the appellate court in finding that the element of taking of
personal property was satisfactorily established by the prosecution. During her cross-
examination, private complainant Flores testified that upon having been apprised of the
unremitted collections, she conducted an investigation and inquired from her sub-guarantors who
admitted making payments to appellant.15 She also testified during cross-examination that when
appellant arrived from Hongkong, the latter went to Flores’ office and admitted to having
converted the collections to her personal use.16 Interestingly, when it was her turn to testify,
appellant did not rebut Flores’ testimony. During her direct examination, appellant only testified
thus:

Atty. Regino – Question:

Madam Witness, you are being charged here with taking, stealing and carrying away collected
money in the total amount of ₱640,353.86, that is owned by Juanita J. Flores. What can you say
about this allegation?

Witness:

That is not true, sir.

Atty. Regino – Question:

What is your basis in stating that?

Witness:

I never took that six hundred forty thousand that they are saying and, I never signed any
document with the sub-guarantors that I [took] money from them.17

Notably, when Flores testified during her cross-examination that she talked to the sub-guarantors
who admitted having made payments to appellant, the latter’s counsel no longer made further
clarifications or follow-up questions. Thus, Flores’ testimony on this fact remains on record
unrebutted. Clearly, it is futile on the part of the appellant to belatedly claim in her Brief before
the appellate court that the prosecution should have presented these sub-guarantors so they could
be cross-examined.18 There is likewise no merit in her contention that the prosecution is guilty of
suppression of evidence when they did not present these sub-guarantors19 simply because the
defense, on its own initiative, could very well compel, thru the compulsory processes of the
court, the attendance of these sub-guarantors as witnesses.20 Moreover, we note that appellant did
not even attempt to discredit the testimony of Flores to the effect that upon her arrival from
Hongkong, appellant went to Flores’ office and admitted to having committed the offense.

Significantly, when appellant was placed on the witness stand, she did not even make any
attempt to explain her issuance of the 15 checks. In fact, during her entire testimony, she never
made any mention about the personal checks that she issued and deposited in Flores’ account. It
was only in her Memorandum21 filed with the trial court and her Brief22 submitted to the
appellate court that the same was discussed. However, her explanation as to its issuance is so
convoluted that it defies belief. All that appellant could claim is that the issuance of the checks
only proves that the same was for a consideration – but omitted to explain what the consideration
was. She also theorized that she might have issued the checks to the sub-guarantors for her
personal transactions but likewise failed to elaborate on what these transactions were. In any
event, if indeed appellant did not steal the amount of ₱640,353.86 belonging to Flores, how
come she issued 15 personal checks in favor of the latter and deposited the same in her account,
albeit they were subsequently dishonored? Besides, we note that in appellant’s Counter
Affidavit23 dated August 20, 2004 subscribed before 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor Hannibal S.
Santillan of Makati City, she already admitted having taken without the knowledge and consent
of private complainant several purchase orders and gift checks worth thousands of pesos. She
claimed though that she was only forced to do so by Edna Cruz and cohorts.

We also concur with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the prosecution established
beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of ₱640,353.86 actually belonged to Flores; that
appellant stole the amount with intent to gain and without Flores’ consent; that the taking was
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon
things; and that it was committed with grave abuse of confidence.

Anent the penalty imposed, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state:

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen
is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

xxxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a
domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

Based on the foregoing, since the amount taken is ₱640,353.86, then the imposable penalty shall
be the maximum period of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or eight(8) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, adding one (1) year for each additional
₱10,000.00. Thus, from ₱640,353.86, we deduct ₱22,000.00, giving us a balance of ₱618,353.86
which we divide by ₱10,000.00. We now have sixty-one (61)years which we will add to the
basic penalty of eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. However, as
stated in Article 309, the imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of twenty
(20) years. Thus, if appellant had committed only simple theft, her penalty would be twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal. Considering however that in qualified theft, the penalty is two
degrees higher, then the appellate court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.24

Finally, we note that appellant has not yet been committed to prison. In view thereof and based
on our foregoing discussion, appellant must be ordered arrested and committed to prison to start
serving her sentence.

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed May 26, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31635 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 is DIRECTED
to issue a warrant for the arrest of appellant and to order her commitment at the Correctional
Institution for Women, and to submit to this Court a Report of such commitment, all within ten
(10) days from receipt of this Resolution. The Superintendent, Correctional Institution for
Women is DIRECTED to confirm to this Court the confinement of appellant within ten (10) days
therefrom.

G.R. No. 170863 March 20, 2013

ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta,
challenging the June 27, 2005 decision2 and the November 24, 2005 resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369. The CA decision affirmed the January 12, 2004
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No.
20109-R, convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft. The CA resolution denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Factual Antecedents

An April 26, 2002 Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner, together with
Concordia O. Loyao, Jr., with the crime of qualified theft, committed as follows:That sometime
in the month of October, 2001, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
[the] Honorable Court, xxx accused ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, being then the Project Manager
of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being undertaken then by the Construction
Firm, ANMAR, Inc. under sub-contract with A. Mojica Construction and General Services, with
the duty to manage and implement the fabrication and erection of the structural steel framing of
the Porta Varga building including the receipt, audit and checking of all construction materials
delivered at the job site – a position of full trust and confidence, and CONCORDIO O. LOYAO,
JR., alias "JUN", a telescopic crane operator of ANMAR, Inc., conspiring, confederating, and
mutually aiding one another, with grave abuse of confidence and with intent of gain, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the Porta Vaga project
site along Session road, Baguio City, wide flange steel beams of different sizes with a total value
of ₱2,269,731.69 without the knowledge and consent of the owner ANMAR, Inc., represented by
its General Manager LORNA LEVA MARIGONDON, to the damage and prejudice of
ANMAR, Inc., in the aforementioned sum of ₱2,269,731.69, Philippine Currency.5

Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty."6 Loyao remains
at-large.

In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the oral testimonies of Danilo Bernardo,
Edgardo Cano, Roberto Buen, Efren Marcelo, private complainant Engr. Lorna Marigondon, and
Apolinaria de Jesus,7 as well as documentary evidence consisting of a security logbook entry,
delivery receipts, photographs, letters, and sworn affidavits. The prosecution’s pieces of
evidence, taken together, established the facts recited below.

In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga
building construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication and
erection of the building’s structural and steel framing to Anmar, owned by the Marigondon
family. Anmar ordered its construction materials from Linton Commercial in Pasig City. It hired
Junio Trucking to deliver the construction materials to its project site in Baguio City. It assigned
the petitioner as project manager with general managerial duties, including the receiving,
custody, and checking of all building construction materials.8

On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking’s truck
driver, and about 10 Anmar welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 10 to 15 pieces
of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams at Anmar’s alleged new contract project along Marcos
Highway, Baguio City. Sometime in November 2001, the petitioner again instructed Bernardo
and several welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters and 40
feet long wide flange steel beams along Marcos Highway, as well as on Mabini Street, Baguio
City.9

Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS’ project manager, informed Engr.
Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams had been returned to Anmar’s warehouse on
October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in the security guard’s logbook. Engr. Marigondon
contacted the petitioner to explain the return, but the latter simply denied that the reported return
took place. Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo, her warehouseman, to conduct an inventory of
the construction materials at the project site. Marcelo learned from Cano that several wide flange
steel beams had been unloaded along Marcos Highway. There, Marcelo found and took pictures
of some of the missing steel beams. He reported the matter to the Baguio City police
headquarters and contacted Anmar to send a truck to retrieve the steel beams, but the truck came
weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could no longer be found. The stolen steel beams
amounted to ₱2,269,731.69.10

In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him. He claimed that
AMCGS, not Anmar, employed him, and his plan to build his own company had been Engr.
Marigondon’s motive in falsely accusing him of stealing construction materials.11

The RTC’s Ruling

In its January 12, 2004 decision,12 the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. It gave
credence to the prosecution witnesses’ straightforward and consistent testimonies and rejected
the petitioner’s bare denial. It sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from
10 years and 3 months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, to indemnify Anmar
₱2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001 until full payment, and to pay Engr.
Marigondon ₱100,000.00 as moral damages.

The CA’s Ruling

On appeal, the petitioner assailed the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ statements,
and reiterated his status as an AMCGS employee.13

In its June 27, 2005 decision,14 the CA brushed aside the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the
RTC’s decision convicting the petitioner of qualified theft. It found that the prosecution
witnesses’ testimonies deserve full credence in the absence of any improper motive to testify
falsely against the petitioner. It noted that the petitioner admitted his status as Anmar’s employee
and his receipt of salary from Anmar, not AMCGS. It rejected the petitioner’s defense of denial
for being self-serving. It, however, deleted the award of moral damages to Engr. Marigondon for
lack of justification.

When the CA denied15 the motion for reconsideration16 that followed, the petitioner filed the
present Rule 45 petition.

The Petition

The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed "sometime in
the month of October, 2001," he was convicted for acts not covered by the information, i.e.,
November 2001, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. He further argues that the prosecution failed to establish the
fact of the loss of the steel beams since the corpus delicti was never identified and offered in
evidence.
The Case for the Respondent

The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, counters
that the issues raised by the petitioner in the petition pertain to the correctness of the calibration
of the evidence by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, which are issues of fact, not of law, and
beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition. In any case, the respondent contends that the evidence on
record indubitably shows the petitioner’s liability for qualified theft.

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the
RTC’s decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Sufficiency of the allegation of date of the

commission of the crime

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays down the guidelines in
determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information, provides:

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information. (italics supplied; emphasis ours)

As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds:

Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of
the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to
the actual date of its commission. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]

Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of
the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof
shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations
and before the commencement of the action.
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the
information stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words
"sometime in the month of October, 2001." The petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of
the criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the contents of the information, as
well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to enable him to
prepare his defense.

We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, as to be inclusive of the month of "November 2001" since the date was not a material
element of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed
on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.17 Clearly, the month of
November is the month right after October.

The crime of qualified theft was

committed with grave abuse of discretion

The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property
belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the
owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated
in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.18

All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, through the
prosecution’s eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner’s instruction, several pieces of wide flange
steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001, along
Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction materials
from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the
construction materials.

Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission

of the crime

The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper because the alleged stolen beams or
corpus delicti had not been established. He asserts that the failure to present the alleged stolen
beams in court was fatal to the prosecution’s cause.

The petitioner’s argument fails to persuade us.

"Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered" or, in this case, to the stolen steel
beams. "Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled
that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and
warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial
evidence."19 "In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by
the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking."20

In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record fully established the corpus
delicti. The positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Bernardo, Cano and
Buen, stating that the petitioner directed them to unload the steel beams along Marcos Highway
and Mabini Street on the pretext of a new Anmar project, were crucial to the petitioner’s
conviction. The security logbook entry, delivery receipts and photographs proved the existence
and the unloading of the steel beams to a different location other than the project site.

Proper Penalty

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
from 10 years and three months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, and to indemnify
Anmar ₱2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001 until full payment. Apparently,
the RTC erred in failing to specify the appropriate name of the penalty imposed on the petitioner.

We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the proper legal terminology in
the imposition of penalties because of the substantial difference in their corresponding legal
effects and accessory penalties. The appropriate name of the penalty must be specified as under
the scheme of penalties in the RPC, the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific
duration and corresponding accessory penalties.21 Thus, the courts must employ the proper
nomenclature specified in the RPC, such as "reclusion perpetua" not "life imprisonment," or "ten
days of arresto menor" not "ten days of imprisonment." In qualified theft, the appropriate penalty
is reclusion perpetua based on Article 310 of the RPC which provides that "the crime of
qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in Article 309."221âwphi1

To compute the penalty, we begin with the value of the stolen steel beams, which is
₱2,269,731.69. Based on Article 309 of the RPC, since the value of the items exceeds
₱22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, to be
imposed in the maximum period, which is eight years, eight months and one day to 10 years
of prision mayor.

To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we deduct ₱22,000.00 from ₱2,269,731.69,

which gives us ₱2,247,731.69. This resulting figure should then be divided by ₱10,000.00,
disregarding any amount less than ₱10,000.00. We now have 224 years that should be added to
the basic penalty. However, the imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of
20 years. Therefore, had petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty would be 20 years
of reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the correct
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

The petitioner should thus be convicted of qualified theft with the corresponding penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an appeal by Trinidad A. Cahilig (Cahilig) from the Decision qf the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 137, Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2178 to 2207 finding her guilty
of thirty (30) counts of Qualified Theft.

The Facts

Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with handling,
managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI.1

It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the
funds ofWPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit.2 Cahilig would prepare
disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in
order to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its
other bank account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her
capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferringfunds from one bank account to
another was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer
the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made
into her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said
amount from her capital contribution.3

The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of qualified
theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAI’S funds a total of ₱6,268,300.00,
brokendown into the following amounts:

Criminal Case No. 03-2178 ₱200,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2179 ₱250,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2180 ₱200,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2181 ₱55,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2182 ₱55,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2183 ₱85,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2184 ₱350,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2185 ₱250,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2186 ₱20,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2187 ₱250,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2188 ₱60,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2189 ₱150,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2190 ₱50,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2191 ₱46,300.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2192 ₱205,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2193 ₱200,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2194 ₱25,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2195 ₱500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2196 ₱500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2197 ₱30,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2198 ₱400,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2199 ₱300,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2200 ₱500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2201 ₱65,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2202 ₱47,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2203 ₱500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2204 ₱40,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2205 ₱400,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2206 ₱35,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2207 ₱500,000.0

All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of the parties, only three of
the 30 cases went thru trial. The remaining 27 cases were the subject of a written stipulation of
facts, on the basis of which these were submitted for resolution. The stipulation stated, among
others: That for purposes of efficient and speedy administration of these cases, the parties herein
agreed, during the pre-trial conference and approved by the Honorable Court, that the actualtrial
and presentation of evidence will be done only on the first three (3) counts of the cases, i.e., on
Cases Numbers 03-2178 to 03-2180, with the understanding and agreement that after the
termination of the hearing onsaid three (3) cases, the parties shall adopt the results thereof in the
remaining twenty-seven (27) counts, considering that all the cases arose from similar
transactions with the same methods or modus operandi used in committing the crime charged,
and involving the same accused and the same offended party[.]4

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged, in a Decision dated 16 June 2005, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds Trinidad Cahlig guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft in each of the informations, and
sentences her to suffer the penalty of:

1. In Criminal Case No. 03-2178, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private

complainant in the amount of ₱200,000.00;

2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2179, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱250,000.00;

3. In Criminal Case No. 03-2180, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private

complainant in the amount of ₱200,000.00;

4. In Criminal Case No. 03-2181, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private

complainant in the amount of ₱55,000.00;

5. In Criminal Case No. 03-2182, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱55,000.00;

6. In Criminal Case No. 03-2183, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱85,000.00;

7. In Criminal Case No. 03-2184, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱350,000.00;

8. In Criminal Case No. 03-2185, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱250,000.00;
9. In Criminal Case No. 03-2186, ten (10) years and one (1) days (sic) as minimum to
twenty (20) years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱20,000.00;

10. In Criminal Case No. 03-2187, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱250,000.00;

11. In Criminal Case No. 03-2188, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱60,000.00;

12. In Criminal Case No. 03-2189, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱150,000.00;

13. In Criminal Case No. 03-2190, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱50,000.00;

14. In Criminal Case No. 03-2191, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty
(20) years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱4[6],300.00;

15. In Criminal Case No. 03-2192, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱205,000.00;

16. In Criminal Case No. 03-2193, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱200,000.00;

17. In Criminal Case No. 03-2194, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty
(20) years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱25,000.00;

18. In Criminal Case No. 03-2195, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱500,000.00;

19. In Criminal Case No. 03-2196, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱500,000.00;

20. In Criminal Case No. 03-2197, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty
(20) years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱30,000.00;

21. In Criminal Case No. 03-2198, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱400,000.00;

22. In Criminal Case No. 03-2199, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱300,000.00;
 23. In Criminal Case No. 03-2200, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱500,000.00;

24. In Criminal Case No. 03-2201, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱65,000.00;

25. In Criminal Case No. 03-2202, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱47,000.00;

26. In Criminal Case No. 03-2203, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱500,000.00;

27. In Criminal Case No. 03-2204, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty
(20) years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱40,000.00;

28. In Criminal Case No. 03-2205, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱400,000.00;

29. In Criminal Case No. 03-2206, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty
(20) years as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱35,000.00;

30. In Criminal Case No. 03-2207, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private
complainant in the amount of ₱500,000.00.

Costs against accused in eachof the above numbered cases.

SO ORDERED.5

The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the key
officers ofthe association. The RTC noted that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and financial
records of the association, a circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy withdrawal of
funds which she converted to her personal use in the manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly,
she betrayed the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer."6

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Cahilig appealed her conviction to the CA. In a Decision dated 18 February 2011, the CA denied
her appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

The CA held that all the elements of Qualified Theft were present in every charge:

x x x First, there was taking ofpersonal property, when accusedappellant took the proceeds of the
WPESLAI checks issued in her name as cashier of the association which are supposed to be
redeposited to another account of WPESLAI. Second, the property belongs to another, since the
funds undisputably belong to WPESLAI. Third, the taking was done without the consent of the
owner, which is obvious because accusedappellant created a ruse showing that the funds were
credited to another account but were actually withdrawn from her own personal account. Fourth,
the taking was done with intentto gain, as accused-appellant, for her personal benefit, took the
fundsby means of a modus operandi that made it appear through the entries inthe ledgers that all
withdrawals and deposits were made in the normal course of business and with the approval of
WPESLAI. Fifth, the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the
person [or] force upon things. And finally, the acts were committed with grave abuse of
confidence considering that her position as cashier permeates trust and confidence.7

The Court’s Ruling

The Court denies the petition. However, the penalties imposed by the trial court in six of the 30
cases are incorrect and, therefore, must be modified.

Qualified Theft

Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of Qualified
Theft:

Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by
two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a
domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish
taken froma fishpond or fishery, orif property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter’s consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lostproperty, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall
remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or
which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the
same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,

nor of force upon things;

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.8

It is clear that all the elements ofQualified Theft are present in these cases.

Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her
intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to
commit the theft.

Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must be the result of the relation
by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended
party that might create a high degree of confidence betweenthem which the appellant abused."9

Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves
"handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing" money from WPESLAI’s depositors and other
funds of the association.1âwphi1 Cahilig’s responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required
prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into her care.

However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into
authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that
Cahilig did not deny.

Proper Penalty

The trial court, however, erred inthe penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191,
03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206.

To recall, the amounts involved in the aforesaid cases are ₱20,000.00, ₱46,300.00, ₱25,000.00,
₱30,000.00, ₱40,000.00, and ₱35,000.00, respectively.

Article 310 provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article." Article 309, in turn,
states:
Art. 309. Penalties. -Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed
in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed pr is ion mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

xxxx

In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below ₱12,000.00. Hence, if the crime
charged had been simple theft, the penalty in any of these six cases would have been, at least,
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since it was established that the crime was
qualified by grave abuse of confidence, Article 310 provides that the penalty to be imposed shall
be the one "next higher by two degrees," which in this case is reclusion perpetua. Accordingly,
the penalty in these six cases should be reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In lieu of the penalties meted out by the trial court in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206, appellant
Trinidad A. Cahilig is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count
of qualified theft in the aforesaid cases. The judgment to indemnify the amounts in each of the
corresponding charges stands.
G.R. No. 212815 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs ENRILE DONIO
y UNTALAN, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the November 4, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 05418, which affirmed the Decision2 dated January 24, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Angeles City in Criminal Case No. 04-594.

The facts are as follows:

Accused-appellant Enrile Donio y Untalan (Donia) was charged with violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as AntiCarnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No.
7659. Co-accused Val Paulino (Paulino) and one @Ryan (Ryan), both remains at-large, were
similarly charged. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 26th day of November 2003, in the Municipality of Mabalacat, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away with them one (1) Honda TMX 155 tricycle, colored
black and with Body [No.] 817, valued at Ninety-Six Thousand ([P.]96,000.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency, and on the occasion thereof, Raul L. Layug, being the driver and owner of the said
Honda TMX 155 tricycle, was killed with the use of a mini jungle bolo.

Contrary to law.3

Pending Donio's arraignment, POI Emessito N. Bansagan and the National Bureau of
Investigation, Central Luzon Regional Office submitted the returns on the Warrant of Arrest
against Ryan and Paulino, respectively, stating that the said persons could not be located at the
given addresses, and requested for alias warrants against them. The trial court issued the Alias
Warrant of Arrest against accused Ryan on September 4, 2004 and against Paulino on November
4, 2004.4

At his arraignment, Donio, assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. During the pre-trial conference, it was stipulated that Donio is the same person whose
name appears in the Information and was arraigned before that court.

Thereafter, the trial on the merits ensued.

On November 26, 2003, six police officers of the Concepcion Police Station, Tarlac City, headed
by SP04 Leodegario Taberdo (SP04 Taberdo ), conducted a checkpoint along the junction of
MacArthur Highway in relation to the campaign of the Philippine National Police against
hijacking, camapping, and kidnapping, hailing cargo trucks and closed vans, and issuing cards to
southbound vehicles.5

At 2:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003, a speeding tricycle abruptly stopped a few meters
from the checkpoint and caught the attention of the police officers. SP04 Taberdo and two others
approached the vehicle. The driver, later identified as Donio, was noticeably agitated while
repeatedly kicking the starter of the tricycle. When asked for his identity, he introduced himself
as Raul Layug (Raul) and then handed to SP04 Taberdo a temporary license bearing the said
name. The police officers asked the driver and his companions, co-accused Paulino and Ryan, to
bring the vehicle, a Honda TMX 155 tricycle with Body No. 817, to the checkpoint when they
failed to produce its certificate of registration and the official receipt.6

Upon visual search of the vehicle, they discovered a bloodstained mini jungle bolo inside. They
seized the tricycle and the bolo, and then brought the three to the police station. At 9 o'clock in
the morning, Donio asked permission to leave in order to get the registration papers. The officers
allowed him, however, he did not return.7

Meanwhile, around 6:30 in morning of the same date, Rodrigo Layug (Rodrigo) was searching
for his brother Raul, the victim, who has not returned home since last night. Raul was the driver
of Rodrigo's Honda TMX 155 tricycle with Body No. 817. Rodrigo met with his tricycle driver
cousin from Mawaque to ask him if he saw his brother. His cousin accompanied him to
Barangay Madapdap where they found the remains of Raul. Words spread about his death.
Thereafter, a tricycle driver informed them that he saw a vehicle similar to Rodrigo's at the
Concepcion Police Station. Rodolfo, Raul and Rodrigo's other brother, went to the station where
he learned that Paulino and Ryan were released.8

Sometime in December 2003, the brothers returned to the station upon learning that Donio was
apprehended. On December 7, 2003, the Chief of

Police summoned SP04 Taberdo to identify the driver who asked permission to retrieve the
registration papers but did not return at the Concepcion Police Station. Upon seeing Donio, the
disgruntled SP04 Taberdo asked him, "Why did you do that?" He was referring to the incident
when Donio did not return. It was also that same day that he learned Donio's real identity.9

Dr. Reynaldo C. Dizon (Dr. Dizon) conducted the post-mortem examination of Raul's body and
determined that he sustained stab wounds caused by a sharp instrument.

Defense's sole witness, Donio, a 35-year-old grass cutter and a resident of Madapdap, Mabalacat,
Pampanga, denied the accusations. As a sugarcane plantation worker, he has a long palang for
harvesting and cutting. It was not similar to the sharp and pointed mini jungle bolo. As a stay-in
plantation worker, he does not leave the workplace for six months. His wife visits him instead.
On November 24, 2003, he was harvesting sugarcane in Capas, Tarlac. However, from the
evening of November 25, 2003 until the next day, he was at home after his wife fetched him to
tend to their sick child. He first learned of the carnapping charge when the police officers came
to his house looking for a certain Val Paulino. He was taken to the municipal hall where he was
investigated and detained for five days. Three officers beat and electrocuted him for three hours
forcing him to admit the crime.10

The RTC convicted Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ENRILE U. DONIO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of Carnapping as defined in Section 2 and penalized under Section 14 of Republic
Act No. 6539, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with credit of his preventive imprisonment.

Accused ENRILE U. DONIO is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Raul L. Layug the
following amounts: Fifty thousand pesos ([₱]50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Twenty-five
thousand pesos ([₱]25,000.00) as actual damages.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.11

The trial court ruled that the prosecution established all the elements of the crime. Donio failed
to substantiate his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense or the
physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of
the incident.12 Under the Rules, SP04 Taberdo's action as police officer enjoys the presumption
of regularity. In the absence of evidence showing that he was motivated by bad faith or ill-will to
testify against Donio, SP04 Taberdo's categorical identification of the accused stands.13

In a Decision dated November 4, 2013, the CA denied Donio's appeal and affirmed the decision
of the RTC. The CA found his averment that he was taken from his house, tortured and made to
sign a blank sheet of paper as highly implausible. His sworn affidavit was replete with details
which were unlikely the product of creative imagination of the police. There was no proof that
the police singled him out, or was impelled by an evil or ulterior motive. The said affidavit was
voluntarily and freely executed with the assistance of counsel.14 The fallo of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.15

Hence, the instant appeal was instituted.

In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Supplemental Brief,16 the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) informed this Court that it opted not to file a supplemental brief for the same
would only be a repetition of the raised arguments considering that all relevant matters regarding
Donio' s guilt for the crime of carnapping with homicide were extensively argued and discussed
in the People's Brief17 dated July 9, 2013.

Likewise, Donio, through the Public Attorney's Office, manifested his intention not to file a
supplemental brief and prayed that the case be deemed submitted for decision.18

In essence, the issue to be resolved by this Court in this appeal is whether the prosecution has
successfully proven beyond reasonable doubt that Donio is guilty of the crime of carnapping
with homicide.

After a judicious review of the records and the submissions of the parties, this Court finds no
cogent reason to reverse Donio' s conviction. At the outset, the CA noted that the prosecution
should have filed an Information for the special complex crime of qualified carnapping in
aggravated form.19 while it is necessary that the statutory designation be stated in the
information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the
offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged in
the information which determines the real nature of the crime.20 Recently, it was held that failure
to designate the offense by the statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or
an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged
therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged.21 The recital of the ultimate facts
and circumstances in the complaint or information determines the character of the crime and not
the caption or preamble of the information or the specification of the provision of the law alleged
to have been violated.22 In the case at bar, the acts alleged to have been committed by Donio are
averred in the Information, and the same described the acts defined and penalized under Sections
2 and 14 of R.A. 6539, as amended.

The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the R.A. No. 6539, as amended are
the following:

1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and

4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.23

Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. 6539, as amended, the prosecution has to prove
the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more
importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was camapping and that
the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof "24 In other words, to prove the special complex crime of camapping with homicide, there
must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of
the camapping or on the occasion thereof.25
Records show that all the elements of camapping in the instant case are present and proven
during the trial.

The tricycle was definitely ascertained to belong to Rodrigo, as evidenced by a Deed of

Conditional Sale in his favor.26 Donio was found driving the vehicle in the early morning of
November 26, 2003, the same day Rodrigo was looking for his missing brother Raul. Also, SP04
Taberdo positively identified Donio as the driver he flagged down at the checkpoint in his
testimony, viz.:

xxxx

Q- On or about that time 2:45 early in the morning of November 26, 2003, could you recall if
there was any unusual incident that required your attention as Police Officers manning the check-
point?

A- Yes, sir.

Q - What is that incident?

A - During that time, we are issuing pass card among vehicles going to South when suddenly a
speeding tricycle approaching our PCP its engine suddenly stop.

Q- Who was driving the tricycle when the engine suddenly stop[s]?

A-The one who gave me the Driver's License was Raul Layug.

Q - If this person who gave his license as Raul Layug is here present today, will you be able to
identify him?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Will you please look around the premises of the Court and point to him.

A - This one, sir. We came to know later on that his real name is Enrile Donio.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to accused Enrile Donio.

x x x27

"Unlawful taking" or apoderamiento is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the
owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
It is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has
no opportunity to dispose of the same.28 Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides
the presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act.

The presumption that a person found in possession of the personal effects belonging to the
person robbed and killed is considered the author of the aggression, the death of the person, as
well as the robbery committed, has been invariably limited to cases where such possession is
either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of
independent evidence inconsistent thereto.29 The said principle may be applied in this case as the
concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same.30 Here, Donio failed
to produce the vehicle's papers at the checkpoint. He impersonated the victim before the police
officers when his identity was asked, and left under the guise of getting the said documents. It
was also established that he and the others were strangers to Rodrigo. Donio's unexplained
possession, coupled with the circumstances proven in the trial, therefore, raises the presumption
that he was one of the perpetrators responsible for the unlawful taking of the vehicle and Raul's
death.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, which is an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking
of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.
The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in
any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use
of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent constitutes gain.31Donio's intent to gain
from the carnapped tricycle was proven as he and his companions were using it as means of
transportation when they were confronted by the Concepcion police officers.

Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in the instant case, We now
discuss the argument that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are
insufficient to convict Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide.

He alleges that while it is true that criminal conviction may be predicated on a series of
circumstantial evidence, the same must be convincing, plausible and credible. It cannot be
discounted that SP04 Taberdo testified only on the circumstances after the alleged carnapping.
He failed to establish his alleged participation prior to or during the actual taking of the vehicle.
The facts established by SP04 Taberdo' s testimony- the Concepcion police operatives caught
him in possession of the stolen tricycle on November 26, 2003; the tricycle was registered under
the name of Rodrigo; and he was in possession of Raul's license - are insufficient bases and do
not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Such contention fails scrutiny. The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean
that the guilt of the accused can no longer be proved by any other evidence. Circumstantial,
indirect or presumptive evidence, if sufficient, can replace direct evidence as provided by
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which, to warrant the conviction of an accused,
requires that: (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all these circumstances results in a
moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who committed the
crime.32 Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt
of the accused.33

After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds that the confluence of the following pieces
of circumstantial evidence, consistent with one another, establishes Donio's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt:

First, Donio was driving the tricycle when he, Paulino and Ryan were accosted during a
checkpoint at the junction of the MacArthur Highway by elements of the Concepcion Police
Station at around 2:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003;

Second, his possession of the vehicle was not fully explained as he failed to produce its
registration papers;

Third, he was in possession of the victim's temporary license. He even presented it and
introduced himself as Raul to the police;

Fourth, a bloodstained mini jungle bolo was found inside the tricycle;

Fifth, Rodrigo ascertained that Raul was the driver of his tricycle, and that he was looking for
him on the same day that Donio and the others were flagged down;

Sixth, Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the evening on November 25, 2003
when he passed by at the Mawaque Terminal at the comer of MacArthur Highway and Mawaque
Road.34

Seventh, the Bantay Bayan of Madapdap Resettlement found Raul's body at around 6:30 in the
morning on November 26, 2003 at a vacant lot towards the road to Sta. Lucia Resettlement
comer Barangay Dapdap.

Eighth, Raul sustained multiple stab wounds caused by a sharp instrument as depicted in the
post-mortem examination sketch by Dr. Dizon and reflected in the Certificate of Death, which
states:

17. CAUSES OF DEATH:

I. Immediate Cause: Cardio respiratory arrest

Antecedent Cause: Hemo-pneumothorax L

Underlying Cause: Penetrating Stab Wounds, Multiple.35

Ninth, Donio was subsequently apprehended and SP04 Taberdo positively identified him as the
driver they flagged down at the checkpoint.36
Likewise, the victim's lifeless body was found sprawled with multiple stab wounds and was
noted in a state of rigor mortis. Rigor mortis, which consists in the stiffening of the muscular
tissues and joints of the body setting in at a greater or less interval after death, may be utilized to
approximate the length of time the body has been dead. In temperate countries, it usually appears
three to six hours after death but in warmer countries, it may develop earlier. In tropical
countries, the usual duration of rigor mortis is twenty-four to forty-eight hours during cold
weather and eighteen to thirty-six hours during summer. When rigor mortis sets in early, it
passes off quickly and viceversa.37

From the foregoing, it was established that Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the
evening on November 25, 2003, and that his body was discovered at 6:30 in the morning the next
day. Considering the condition of the body upon discovery, he could have been killed between
10:00 in the evening and 3:30 in the morning on the next day. Donio and his companions were
hailed at the checkpoint at around 2:3038 in the morning on November 26, 2003 aboard the
missing tricycle. Taking into account the distance of the Mawaque Terminal area or of the vacant
lot near Barangay Dapdap from the junction of the MacArthur Highway in Concepcion, Tarlac
and the time they were hailed at the checkpoint, it can be logically concluded that Donio and the
others were in contact with Raul during the approximate period of the latter's time of death. Also,
it was during that period that they gained possession of the vehicle. Thus, the only rational
conclusion that can be drawn from the totality of the foregoing facts and circumstances is that
Donio and his companions, to the exclusion of others, are guilty of carnapping the tricycle and of
killing Raul in the course thereof.

Moreover, when Donio was brought to the police station, he asked permission from the officers
to get the registration papers but never returned. Undoubtedly, Donio's flight is an indication of
his guilt or of a guilty mind. Indeed, the wicked man flees though no man pursueth, but the
righteous are as bold as a lion.39

This Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand.
From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of
witnesses.40 The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even
more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the
findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion.41 In the case at bar, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness. Records are bereft of evidence which
showed ill-will or malicious intent on the part of SP04 Taberdo. In absence of evidence to the
contrary, this Court finds that the RTC and the CA did not err in the findings of facts and the
credibility of the witnesses.

As for Donio's defense of alibi, he argues that it must not be looked with disfavor, as there are
instances when the accused may really have no other defense but denial and alibi which, if
established to be truth, may tilt the scales of justice in his favor, especially when the prosecution
evidence is inherently weak. He insists that he was tortured and subjected to harsh treatment
during arrest.1âwphi1 He insinuates that the police arrested the first person they suspected
without conducting any in-depth investigation.
Donio maintained that he first learned of the camapping charge when the police came to his
house in Madapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga on December 6, 2003. However, he also alleged that
as a stay-in sugarcane plantation worker in Capas, Tarlac with a six-month work period ending in
January, he never left the workplace and that his wife visited him instead. Donio testified during
direct and cross examination as follows:

xxxx

ATTY. LOPEZ

Q: Mr. Witness, prior to your incarceration at the Angeles District Jail, where were you residing?

A: Madapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga, sir.

Q: On November 25, 2003 at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening to November 26, 2003, do you
remember where [you were] on the said dates?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where were you, Mr. Witness?

A: At home, sir.

Q: Who were your companions there?

A: My family, sir, my wife and child.

x x x x42

PROS. HABAN

Q: Where are you working again?

A: Capas

xxx

Q: How about on November 27, 2003, where were you then?

A: At work.

Q: How about on November 25 and 26?

A: At work.

Q: During the whole day?

A: Stay-in.

Q: So you never left work?

A: No, sir.

Q: Never, not even Saturday and Sunday?

A: No, sir.

Q: The whole year of 2003 you never left work?

A: We stayed there for six (6) months.

Q: When is the end of six months period?

A: January.

x x x 43

No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for
it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason, it is generally rejected. For
the alibi to prosper, the accused must establish the following: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at
the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene at the time of its commission.44 It must be supported by credible corroboration from
disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused.45

When he was confronted with his inconsistency, Donio clarified that he was in Capas, Tarlac and
was fetched by his wife in the evening to attend to his sick child. We note, however, the
proximity of the area of Donio’s residence with the Barangay Dapdap and Sta. Lucia
Resettlement area where the victim was found dead. To buttress his defense of alibi, Donio could
have presented the testimony of a fellow plantation worker or any disinterested witness who
could have substantiated the same. Aside from his bare allegations, he failed to present
convincing evidence of the physical impossibility for him to be at the scene at the time of
carnapping. Similarly, this Court is unconvinced of his insistence that he was tortured in view of
lack of any evidence to validate the same. Thus, the uncorroborated alibi and denial of Donio
must be brushed aside in light of the fact that the prosecution has sufficiently and positively
ascertained his identity. It is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative
testimony.46

In sum, the prosecution established through sufficient circumstantial evidence that the accused
was indeed one of the perpetrators of the crime of carnapping with homicide.
As to the imposable penalty, Section 14 of RA No. 6539, as amended, provides that:

Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. -Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or
intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen
years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or
on the occasion thereof.47

The RTC is correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua considering that there was no
alleged and proven aggravating circumstance.

However, in line with the recent jurisprudence,48 in cases of special complex crimes like
carnapping with homicide, among others, where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the
amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are pegged at ₱75,000.00
each .. This Court orders Donio to pay ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the award of
₱25,000.00 as actual damages. Also, Donio is ordered to pay the heirs of Raul interest on all
damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the
Decision.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 4, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 05418, finding accused-appellant Enrile Donio y Untalan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Carnapping with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS: accused-appellant Donio is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Raul L.
Layug the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00
as temperate damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of the Decision until fully paid.
G.R. No. 190475 April 10, 2013

JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of
violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.

Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:

That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with
intent of gain for himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
receive and acquire from unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth ₱65, 975.00,
belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing
the same to have been derived from the crime of robbery.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of
its Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the
guilt of the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1612 also known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary
disqualification.

SO ORDERED.4

Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the
RTC’s finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009.

Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.

The Facts

The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494
1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount of ₱223,401.81 from Philtread Tire
and Rubber Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of
Firestone tires. Private complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated
November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically
described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk
before storing them inside the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay
San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal,
Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires
sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.

On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight
(38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private
complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District
at Fort Bonifacio.

Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business
establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant
chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by
appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by
14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire
fitting the description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his
warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked
appellant if he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative.
Private complainant then left the store and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano
Fegarido of the Southern Police District.

On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members, led
by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's
companion Tito Atienza was appointed as the poseur-buyer.

On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western
Police District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around
3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team
posted themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by
14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display,
which Atienza bought for ₱5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.

Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse,
which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private
complainant entered the store, inspected them and found that they were the same tires which
were stolen from him, based on their serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the
prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the
same tires stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside
appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen
truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it
was already past 10:00 in the evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the
police station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate
thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires
were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his warehouse.5

For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the
business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any
knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18
February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires
allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for ₱3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for
₱45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead
Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link).6

Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega.
The poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten
minutes later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him
that those items were stolen tires.7

The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found
in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to
overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of P.D. 1612.8

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings with modification by reducing the minimum
penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.9

OUR RULING

The Petition has no merit.

Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain
for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,
or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which
he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft."

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of
the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one
accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.10

We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of
evidence in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.

First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were
stolen – testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was
able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November 1994
and an Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was
reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police District at
Fort Bonifacio.14 The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco,
Manila on 27 February 1995.

Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never
denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not
establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen
(13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the
serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession.15 Ong likewise
admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ₱45,500
where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.16

Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should
know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the
fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that
such fact exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four
(24) years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an
unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he
did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to
buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one day.20 His experience from the business
should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was
his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the
thirteen (13) tires in the streets.

In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:

Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the
object of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such
circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the
usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the
seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality
of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of any goods, . . ., object or anything of value
which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" — a
presumption that is, according to the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical inference
can arise from the established fact of . . . possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft." xxx.22

Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires.1âwphi1 Section 6
of P.D. 1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any
good, article, item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or
supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the
Integrated National Police in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located
before offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of
obtaining clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this
particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have
exercised prudence.

In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by
Go.1âwphi1 Logically, and for all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is
proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing;
however, that defense is disputable.23 In this case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was
disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were
fictitious.24Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the
legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under
Section 5 of P.D. 1612.

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust
operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.

Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value
of the 25 property.

The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on ₱5,075 for each tire
recovered, or in the total amount of ₱65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four
(44) tires from Philtread in the total amount of ₱223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides a disputable presumption that private transactions have been
fair and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of business is not
overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the regularity of the transaction between
Azajar ,and Phil tread.

In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not
find sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong
for violation of P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6)
years of prision correccional.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 181184 January 25, 2012

MEL DIMAT, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the need to prove in the crime of "fencing" that the accused knew or ought to
have known that the thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or robbery.

The Facts and the Case

The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law1 before
the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03, in Criminal Case 02-202338.

Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben
Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from
accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH-569 for ₱850,000.00. The deed
of sale gave the vehicle’s engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-
YO3553.

On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG)
spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate
number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was
actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular
Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and
there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.

Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818,
which he mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on
May 25, 1998 at Robinsons Galleria’s parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.

For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari
in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its
engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold
the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and
the one which the police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not
actually the same vehicle.

On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and
sentenced him to an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years
of reclusion temporal. The court also ordered him to pay ₱850,000.00 as actual damages and
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.
On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR 297942 the RTC
decision but modified the penalty to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its
medium period, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period, as maximum, thus, the present appeal.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat
knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from
Mantequilla.

The Ruling of the Court

The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who
took no part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that
crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.3

Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in
December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for ₱850,000.00. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan
Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and
chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those transactions.
The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-119136
and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.

But Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped
on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the
Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the
correct numbers of the vehicle’s engine and chassis.

Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612
is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof
of criminal intent.4 Of course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have
known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or
robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.1âwphi1

Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan
Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of
registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of
registration and official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise.
Dimat insists that Tolentino’s failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any
way. Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official
receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped,
Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to
produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an
illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to
check the papers covering her purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no
moment since she did not stand accused in the case.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26,
2007 in CA-G.R. CR 29794.
G.R. No. 182424 September 22, 2014

NENITA CARGANILLO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, we review the decision1 and the resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29371 which denied the appeal of Nenita Carganillo
(petitioner). The CA affirmed, with modification as to penalty, the judgment3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, convicting the petitioner of the crime of estafa,
defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

THE CASE

On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija, gave the petitioner
the amount of ₱132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. The petitioner, who was alleged tobe
an "ahente" or agent in the buy-and-sell of palay, agreed to deliver the palayto the Lazaro Palay
Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998. According to the "Kasunduan" signed by the
petitioner, the parties agreed that for every kilo of palaybought the petitioner shall earn a
commission of twenty centavos (P0.20). But if no palayis purchased and delivered on November
28, the petitioner must return the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita within one (1) week after November
28.

After failing to receive any palayor the ₱132,000.00 on November 28 and one (1) week
thereafter, respectively, Teresita made oral and written demands to the petitioner for the return of
the ₱132,000.00 but her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed an affidavit-complaint for
estafa against the petitioner before the Fiscal’s Office. Thereafter, an Information4 for the crime
of estafawas filed in court.

The petitioner pleaded not guilty tothe crime and denied that she entered into a "principal-agent"
agreement with, and received the ₱132,000.00 from, Teresita. She alleged that she owedTeresita
a balance of ₱13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice that she purchased from the latter in 1995 and
1996,5 and that, in November 1996, she was made to sign a blank "Kasunduan" that reflected no
written date and amount.6 She likewise denied personally receiving any written demand letter
from Teresita.7

In a decision dated November 19, 2004, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime of
estafaand sentenced her to suffer, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imprisonment
ranging from four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum.8 Also, the RTC ordered the petitioner to indemnify
Teresita the sum of ₱132,000.00 representing the amount embezzled and to pay the costs of suit.9
On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction.10 The CA held that the prosecution
properly established the elements of the crime of estafa. In debunking petitioner’s claim that her
agreement with Teresita was merely a money loan, the CA stated that:

In this case, the Kasunduan dated September 23, 1998, which-accusedappellant admittedly
signed, is clear inits tenor and the failure to comply therewith makes out a case for estafa.
Accused-appellant’s insistence that she signed the said Kasunduan in blank is belied by her
admission of "the existence or authenticity of the documentary exhibits x x x" during the
prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and her own testimony x x x.

Further, the CA ruled as immaterial the petitioner’s defense that she did not personally receive a
writtenletter of demand from Teresita. The CA held that even a verbal query as tothe
whereabouts of the money suspected to be misappropriated isalready tantamount to a demand,
and that the petitioner failed to refute Teresita’s claim that she went to the petitioner’s house to
ask for the palayand/or the return of the ₱132,000.00.11

The CA, however, found error inthe RTC’s computation of the penalty and imposed upon the
petitioner an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each
additional ₱10,000.00 (in excess of ₱22,000.00), equivalent to eleven (11) years, or a total of
nineteen (19) years.12

The petitioner elevated her judgment of conviction to the Court by filing a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

THE PETITION

In her petition, the petitioner raisesthe sole issue of whether the CA erred in affirming (with
modification)the judgment of conviction against her, despite the prosecution’s failure to prove
her guilt of the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt.

The petitioner maintains that she isnot engaged in the business of buying and selling palayand
that the "Kasunduan" between her and Teresita does not contain their real agreement of a simple
money loan. She argues that the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of estafa because
she never received the ₱132,000.00 from Teresita; that an element of the crime is that "the
offender receives the money, or goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligations involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same."

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the present petition. The CA did not commit any reversible error in its decision of
September 10, 2007.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the offense of
estafacommitted with abuse of confidence requires the following elements:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, orfor administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same[;]

(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the

offender, or denial on his part of such receipt[;]

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.13

We find that all the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the petitioner received in trust
the amount of ₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palayand misappropriated it
when she failed to return the said amount to Teresita upon demand.

As the CA and the RTC did, we find worthy of credit and belief the "Kasunduan" presented in
evidence by the prosecution that was admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the
terms of agreement between her and Teresita. This document clearly stated that the petitioner
received in trust the amount of ₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palaywith
the corresponding obligationsto (1) deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or
before November 28, 1998, and (2) return the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita one week after November
28 in the event that the petitioner failed to make palay purchases.

It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of the
parties’ rights, duties, and obligations and is the best evidence of the parties’ intention.Thus,
when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.14However, this rule,
known as the Parol Evidence Rule, admits of exceptions.

Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a party to a written agreement may
present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading the following:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest
after the execution of the written agreement.
xxxx

In this case, the petitioner alleges that the subject "Kasunduan" failed to express the real
agreement between her and Teresita; that theirs was a plain and simple loan agreement and not
that of a principal-agent relationship in the buy-and-sell of palay. The documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by the petitioner, however, fail to support her claims.

The RTC found that the receipts presented by the petitioner to prove her loan obligation with
Teresitawere vague, undated and unsigned.15 Also, the RTC observed that the witnesses who
testified that they saw the petitioner sign the "Kasunduan" were not even certain of the real
transaction between the petitioner and Teresita.16 These findings of fact and evidence, which
were affirmed by the CA, are accorded respect and finality by this Court. Where the factual
findings of the trial court are affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, there is great reason not to
disturb these findings and to regard them not reviewable by this Court.17

Also, we cannot sustain the petitioner’s claim that she had been the victim of a fraud
becauseTeresita deceived her into signing a blank document; that she signed the "Kasunduan,"
even if it had no date and amount written on it, because Teresita led her to believe that the
document would be used merely for show purposes with the bank.18

For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception employed must be the causal (dolo causante)
inducement to the making of the contract,19 and must be serious in character.20 It must be
sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into account the
circumstances of each case.21

In this case, we find no vitiated consent on the part of the petitioner. In her Memorandum22 to
this Court, she narrated that after she signed the "Kasunduan," Teresita subsequently made her
execute a deed of sale over her property, which deed she refused to sign.23 This statement
negates the petitioner’s self-serving allegation that she was tricked by Teresita into signing a
blank "Kasunduan," as she was fully aware of the possible implications of the act of signing a
document.

We affirm the correctness of the penalty imposed by the CA, as it is fully in accordance with the
law.1âwphi1 We explained in People v. Temporada24 that:

"The prescribed penalty for estafaunder Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount
defrauded exceeds ₱22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The
minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional
minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). xxx

On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of
imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall
not exceed 20 years. xxx To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions
oftime each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65
of the RPC. Following this procedure,the maximum period of prisión correccional maximum to
prisión mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental
penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years, at the discretion of the court.

In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by ₱22,000.00,
and the difference shall be divided by ₱10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as
was done starting with the case of People v. Pabalan in consonance with the settled rule that
penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of the accused. xxx"25

In the recent case of Lito Corpuz v. People of the Philippines,26 we recognized the "perceived
injustice" brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes
against property, such as estafa, committed today based on the amount of damage measured by
the value of money eight years ago in 1932. This Court, however, cannot modify these range of
penalties in our decisions, as such action would be an impermissible encroachment upon the
power of the legislative branch of government and would constitute proscribed judicial
legislation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the
decision dated September 10, 2007 and the resolution dated March 18, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29371, finding petitioner Nenita Carganillo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa penalized under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of
the Revised Penal Code.

The antecedent facts follow.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of
lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry
for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said
pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he
turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet;
one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as
evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of
the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period
expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry.
When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will
pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:

That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from
one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht
men's bracelet, 22k, worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth ₱12,000.00,
or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under
expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items
or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to
defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his
aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the
proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to
return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00),
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned
amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo
Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be
summarized, as follows:

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged
in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they
earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.

However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made
to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as
evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he
did not even see.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal
Code;

there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the
penalty imposable;

accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty
consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS
AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum
period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of
₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed
the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the
RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the
imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the
decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present
petition stating the following grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION

AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE,
INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS
VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER

COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT
FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE
UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -

1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT
[PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY
TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;

2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE

INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM
THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02
MAY 1991;

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER

COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF]
JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER

COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -

1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE

INCIDENT;

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE

STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN
EXPERIENCE;

3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS

CASE;
 4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the
following counter-arguments:

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the
offense and the acts complained of.

The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight
when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are
totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual
findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive
issues.

According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in
evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the
same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show
that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly
pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's
formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established
doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they
were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.5

Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information
filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces
of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different
from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err
in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to
the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph
(b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice
of the owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of
the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused;

the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the
subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission
of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to
the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the
precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the
crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus,
aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the
crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the
Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which
accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as
testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-
appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the
charges proferred against him.7

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property; x x x

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on
the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant
narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave
the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay
them. Thus:

PROS. MARTINEZ

q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been
finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?

a I went looking for him, sir.

q For whom?

a Lito Corpuz, sir.

q Were you able to look (sic) for him?

a I looked for him for a week, sir.

q Did you know his residence?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you go there?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you find him?

a No, sir.

q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?

a I talked to him, sir.

q How many times?

a Two times, sir.

q What did you talk (sic) to him?

a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.

q Referring to Exhibit A-2?

a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are
and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.

q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?

a No, sir.9

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not even be
formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v.
People:13

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of
estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with
regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary,
the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general
meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to
present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to
the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:

x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime
of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property
held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be
established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of
jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation
when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took
place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite
demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the
same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court
gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court
is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the
CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies,
for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not
numbered.17

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the
question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property
came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and
property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division
reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided
to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae
were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among
those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria,
Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with
Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the
following:

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts
continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage
measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify
the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the
legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be
remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another
branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any
remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had
anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of
any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition
of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense.18

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which
is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the
proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that
a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked
to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation.
The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already
punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The
remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to
submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive,
this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.

In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in
Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation
for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:

This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is,
that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by
penal statute.

No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to
prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to
punish such act.

Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the
ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh
penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief
Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions
which it believes to be harsh.20

Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised
Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:

The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must
be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of
the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of
violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which
commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of
the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited
class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be
addressed to the Chief Executive.22

There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the
current inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be
dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the
penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of
the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus,
making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it
should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is
also improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to amend the
subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature
intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those punishable
acts which have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the
legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In
the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the
legislature lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold
amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to
₱500,000.00.

It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to
be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the
provisions state that:

Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value
of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of
the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos,
but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value
of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if
the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50
pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5
pesos.

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of
the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision
of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
 8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value
of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the
impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.

In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-provision states that the
penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the
penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum
period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem that under the present law,
the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by
one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum
period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole
after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the
proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor
in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too
far from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty
imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23

Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the
crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and
the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed,
would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act
committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:

I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the
penalties are not changed:

1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punished by

prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).

2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punished by

prision correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years).24

3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by prision

correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months).

4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor

medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1

month and 1 day to 6 months).
 6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor
medium.

x x x x.

II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the
penalties are not changed, as follows:

1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punishable

by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1
day to 8 years).25

2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punishable by

prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months).26

3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by arresto

mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months).

4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months
and 1 day to 6 months).

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the
incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a
valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial
distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which
violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher
amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a person
who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of
millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering
that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that
no longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental
penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the
penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds
₱22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads us
even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them
to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.

Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the
remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as
unconstitutional because it is absurd.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-
Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule
unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00)
Pesos ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE PERALTA:

For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you
right?
DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But if we de ... (interrupted)

DEAN DIOKNO:

....then....

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the
amount ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand

(₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The Court cannot do that.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Could not be.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The only remedy is to go to Congress...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and determine the value or the amount.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two
Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

Thank you, Dean.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Thank you.

x x x x29

Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal
Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court
therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a
specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the
penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e.,
whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3)
Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem
what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South
Dakota after it took into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for
uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have
been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute
because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different
from the present controversy.

With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for
the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a
domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially
gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and
allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon such person the
protection and safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of
that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the
commission of such wrongful acts.

There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the
subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications.
For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the
money malversed by the public official, thus:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property,
shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment
or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than
twelve thousand pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos.
If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value
of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which
he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that
he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.

The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the
unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is ₱200.00
(under the existing law), the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The
penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 compared to the
acts committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the
government is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month
to 15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case,
because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public position to
embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.

The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or
uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the
bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of
imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.

In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the
thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the
value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering the
premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling
under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a
fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the
premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas
in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6
years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the
fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful
taking.

Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be
imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months)
if the value of the damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the
damage will now become ₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month
and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not exceed ₱200.00, the
penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more
than ₱200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the
proposal, ₱200.00 will now become ₱20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of ₱200.00
under the existing law will now become ₱20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will
now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a
light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend
Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the
same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and
constitutionally feasible.

There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by
the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value
of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and
National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in
property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of
swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special
cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public
monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such
as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited
Transactions),

Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of
accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to
render accounts before leaving the country).

In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes
which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and
possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that
the penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest
products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will
this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned
because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the
negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.

With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special
Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is
needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that
should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of
the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the applicability of the
penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of
the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal
luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the
questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.

Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code.
During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six
(56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one
proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago
when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far different from today’s
conditions.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not
usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which
is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to
their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put,
the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of
the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.

Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it
can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291,
the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter
by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity.
Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the
offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly,
this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to
the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper
penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded
in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested
ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for
awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus,
although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded
as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants
it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the
amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the
mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can,
in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil
indemnity.

In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount
to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature.
Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to
lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and
not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly written.

Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that the
incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only
impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount
involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law is properly
amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty.
A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused
convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that
should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly
runs counter to what the law provides.

It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice
by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said
law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than
that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June
2006 by Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty
on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1), 42 Article III of
the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the
death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the
provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present
action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the concerned
parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must
be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues
never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally
aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or
amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for
instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on
the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the
prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe
does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under
the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to
the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."45

Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our
modern time.

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned
monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are
other factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated
upon before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society,
the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly
evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should
be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks
sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect
these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to
Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you
have to take into consideration several factors.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Per capita income.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Per capita income.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Consumer price index.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:

Inflation ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of
those economic terms.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, but ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to
One Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That is legislative in nature.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the
adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Thank you, Professor.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Thank you.46

Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that
the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent
injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not
impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of
1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into
consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.

Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the
substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in
crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in
the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my
Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being
repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to
legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from
crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to
civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly
based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated,
penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since
the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum
sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted
in light of current conditions.

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the
RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed
the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional
₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is
highly instructive, thus:

With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case,
Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three
equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three
portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the
penalty prescribed are:

Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days

Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to
prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which
portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 50 of the RPC.51 In the
present case, the amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum
penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the
penalty for every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall
the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the ₱22,000.00 ceiling set
by law, then, adding one year for each additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking
the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa
charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the
penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months.

One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making
and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito
Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision
dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
(1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.

Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 152065 January 29, 2008

BELEN REAL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 125 of the Revised Rules of Court, in relation to
Rule 45 thereof, is the August 3, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
13885, which affirmed the June 23, 1992 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Batangas City, in Criminal Case No. 4116 finding petitioner guilty of swindling (estafa) under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The facts appearing from the record are as follows:

Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of private complainant Benjamin Uy in his jewelry business.
On several occasions, Uy entrusted to petitioner pieces of jewelry with the obligation on the part
of the latter to remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a
specific period of time.

On January 10, 1989, around 8:30 a.m., petitioner arrived at Uy’s house at Nueva Villa
Subdivision, Barangay Alangilan, Batangas City and requested Uy to lend her some pieces of
jewelry as she had a buyer at that time. Because petitioner is his "kumadre," since Uy was one of
the sponsors in the wedding of petitioner’s daughter, and because petitioner was his agent for
quite a time, Uy agreed. He showed petitioner some pieces of jewelry and allowed the latter to
select from them.

Petitioner selected seven (7) pieces of jewelry. Uy prepared a receipt for the items selected by
petitioner and handed the same to the latter. After checking the receipt, petitioner wrote the name
Benjamin Uy at the upper portion thereof and affixed her signature at the lower portion including
her address. The receipt reads:

KATIBAYAN

PINATUNAYAN KO na aking tinanggap kay Benjamin Uy, ang mga sumusunod na

alahas: No. 1449

Bilang Kalakal Halaga

1 Collar Emerald Cut Diamond P155,000.00
1 Pendant Solo Diamante 4 kts 55,000.00
1 Set Solo Marquez Lequids 50,000.00
1 Set 3 Stones Diamante Lequids 47,000.00
1 Domino 12 Stones Men’s ring 35,000.00
 1 Set Blue Pearl with Lequids 25,000.00
1 Set Corrales with broach 4,500.00
KABUUANG HALAGA P371,500.00

nasa mabuting kalagayan upang ipagbili ng KALIWAAN lamang sa loob ng 10 araw

mula ng aking paglagda; kung hindi ko maipagbili ay isasauli ko ang lahat ng alahas
loob ng taning na panahong nakatala sa itaas; kung maipagbili ko naman ay dagli kung
[isusuli] at ibibigay ang buong pinagbilhan sa [may-ari] ng mga alahas. Ang aking
gantimpala ay ang mapapahigit na halaga sa nakatakdang halaga sa itaas ng bawat
alahas; HINDI AKO pinahihintulutang [ipautang] o ibigay na hulugan ang alin mang
alahas; ilalagak, ipagkakatiwala, ipahihiram, isasangla o ipananagot kahit sa anong
paraan ang alin mang alahas sa ibang tao.

NILAGDAAN ko ang kasunduang ito ngayon ika-10 ng January, 1989 sa Batangas City.

(Sgd) Belen Real Aplaya, Bauan, Bats.

LAGDA NG TAO NA TINITIRAHAN3

TUMANGGAP NG NASABING
ALAHAS SA ITAAS NITO

Ten days thereafter, Uy went to petitioner’s house at Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas and asked about
their transaction. Petitioner informed Uy that the pieces of jewelry were already sold but the
payment was in the form of check. Petitioner showed Uy five (5) pieces of checks all dated
January 31, 1989 and requested the latter to collect on said date. Uy acceded, but when he
returned on January 31, 1989, petitioner again requested him to return the following day as she
had not encashed the checks yet. Uy again agreed but when he demanded the payment the
following day, petitioner called him "makulit" and "could not sleep for that matter." Petitioner
further remarked that the more she would not pay Uy.

Constrained, Uy brought the matter to his lawyer, Atty. Dimayacyac, who thereafter sent a
demand letter to petitioner. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner failed to make good her obligation.
Consequently, Uy lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner before the City Prosecutor of
Batangas.

On April 13, 1989, an Information for estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC was filed
by Assistant City Prosecutor Amelia Perez-Panganiban against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Batangas City.

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty."

While admitting to have had several dealings with private complainant Uy, petitioner claimed
that her last transaction with him was on December 22, 1988. She denied the truth of
the Katibayan, alleging that there was a time, prior to January 10, 1989, when she got pieces of
jewelry from Uy that she was required by him to sign in a blank piece of paper.
On June 23, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision,4 the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Belen Real guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under the
provisions of Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and she is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify Benjamin Uy in the amount of P371,500.00, to pay the costs, and
to suffer all the accessories of the law.

SO ORDERED.5

The trial court ratiocinated:

From the evidence adduced during the trial of this case, it has been clearly established
that all the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence are present in the
commission of the offense and that the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

Undoubtedly, accused had received the seven (7) pieces of jewelry from Benjamin Uy on
January 10, 1989 at around 8:30 o’clock in the morning at Nueva Villa Subdivision,
Alangilan, Batangas City in trust or on commission[,] with the obligation on her part to
return the said pieces of jewelry if unsold, or to deliver the proceeds of the sale, if sold
within ten (10) days from receipt. This agreement is clearly embodied in the receipt dated
January 10, [1989] signed by the accused.

That there was misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the accused
is very evident in this case. The fact that the accused had failed to deliver the proceeds of
the sale of said jewelry items nor had she returned the same jewelry items when
demanded to do so by the private complainant shows that accused had misappropriated or
converted to her personal use the amount of P371,500.00. In fact, she even required the
private complainant to return to her house for several times so that she could remit the
proceeds of the sale to him. However, accused did not comply with her obligation.

In a litany of cases, the Supreme Court held that the failure to account upon demand, for
funds or property held in trust is a circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. In an
agency for the sale of jewelry, it [is] the agent’s duty to return the jewelry upon demand
by the owner and the failure to do so is evidence of that conversion of the property by the
agent.

It was also established that there was a demand made by the private complainant from the
accused, verbal and written[,] as shown by the letter of demand which was received by
the accused.

Notably in the instant case[,] accused enjoyed the full trust and confidence of Benjamin
Uy when the latter entrusted the pieces of jewelry to the accused, it being a fact that the
latter is a "kumadre" of Benjamin Uy, the latter having been a sponsor in marriage of a
 daughter of the accused, aside from the fact that previous to January 10, 1989 there had
been transaction between Benjamin Uy and accused involving a great amount of money.

Obviously, accused abused the trust and confidence reposed upon her by Benjamin Uy
when she refused and failed to comply with her obligation. Her intention to defraud
Benjamin Uy of P371,500.00 is[,] therefore, definitely clear.

The defense of the accused that she had not transacted with Benjamin Uy on January 10,
1989 and that her last transaction with the [latter] was on December 22, 1988 deserves
not even a scant consideration in the face of the positive declaration made by Benjamin
Uy and his witness and supported by the receipt, [Exhibit "A"], embodying their
agreement.

On the allegation of the accused that she was required by Benjamin Uy to sign blank
receipts [the same] is also unbelievable considering the fact that accused had reached
third year in college and had been a sales agent of private complainant for quite a time
before January 10, 1989.6

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, on August 3, 2000, affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.7 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.8

Petitioner now raises the following points:

1. That one element of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC does not exist,
hence, acquittal from the crime charged is proper; and

2. That the courts below erred in imposing a penalty that contravenes the imperative
mandate of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.9

Petitioner argues that a reading of the trial court’s decision reveals its total silence on the
presence of damage or prejudice caused to private complainant Uy; ergo, she could not be held
guilty of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. Moreover, petitioner advances that instead
of imposing a straight penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, the trial court should
have imposed a penalty with minimum and maximum periods in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The petition is in part meritorious.

The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC10 are as follows: (1) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another.11
Although the trial court only mentioned in passing that damage was caused to private
complainant Uy, it cannot be denied that there exists a factual basis for holding that petitioner’s
refusal to account for or return the pieces of jewelry had prejudiced the rights and interests of
Uy. Certainly, disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage and is in itself sufficient to
constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.12 In this case, Uy, who is
a businessman, not only failed to recover his investment but also lost the opportunity to realize
profits therefrom. Anxiety also set in as he ran the risk of being sued by the person who likewise
entrusted him the same pieces of jewelry. To assert his legal recourse, Uy further incurred
expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the case.

While sustaining the conviction of petitioner of the crime charged, this Court rules, however, that
the penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was improper.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,13 in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the RPC or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the RPC, and the minimum term of which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the offense. The penalty next
lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the RPC for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and can
be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into
which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.14

Specifically, the penalty provided in the RPC for estafa is as follows:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

The penalty prescribed by Art. 315 above-quoted is composed of two periods; hence, to get the
maximum period of the indeterminate sentence, the total number of years included in the two
periods should be divided into three. Article 65 of the RPC requires the division of the time
included in the prescribed penalty into three equal periods of time included in the penalty
imposed, forming one period for each of the three portions. Thus, the maximum, medium and
minimum periods of the penalty prescribed for estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are:
 Minimum – 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days

Medium – 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days

Maximum – 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years15

In the present case, as the amount involved is P371,500, which obviously exceeds P22,000, the
penalty imposable should be the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years
of prision mayor. However, Art. 315 further states that a period of one year shall be added to the
penalty for every additional P10,000 defrauded in excess of P22,000 but in no case shall the total
penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years. The amount swindled from Uy exceeds the
amount of P22,000 which, when translated to the additional penalty of one year for
every P10,000 defrauded, goes beyond 20 years (close to additional 35 years to be exact). Hence,
under the law, the maximum penalty to be imposed to petitioner should be 20 years of reclusion
temporal.

On the other hand, the minimum period of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC. In this case, the
penalty next lower to prision correccionalmaximum to prision mayor minimum is prision
correccional minimum (6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months) to prision
correccional medium (2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Therefore, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months.16

Considering the attendant factual milieu as well as the position of the Office of the Solicitor
General in the present case, this Court is convinced that the appropriate penalty to be imposed
upon petitioner, which is in accordance with law to best serve the ends of justice, should range
from four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusión temporal, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the August 3, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
13885, which affirmed the June 23, 1992 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Batangas City, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Petitioner
is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prisión correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal as maximum.

Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. of the Court of Appeals is hereby required to explain why he
concurred in the decision aforementioned applying the wrong penalty, the explanation to be
submitted in thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, which copy is hereby
directed to be furnished upon him forthwith upon finality of this Decision.
G.R. No. 190970 November 24, 2014 VILMA M. SULIMAN, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated July 21, 2009, in CA-G.R. CR No. 30693 which denied herein petitioner's Motion to
Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, as well as the appellate court's Resolution2 dated
January 8, 2010, which likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA
Resolution dated July 21, 2009.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

In six (6) Informations,3 all dated June 6, 2003,herein petitioner and one Luz P. Garcia were
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with two (2) counts of illegal
recruitment under Section 6, paragraphs (a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as well as four (4) counts of
estafaunder Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

Only petitioner was brought to trial as her co-accused, Garcia, eluded arrest and remained at-
large despite the issuance of a warrant for her arrest.

The six cases were consolidated and, after trial, the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, rendered
judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of illegal
recruitment and three (3) counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision,4 dated
June 7, 2006, reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds as follows:

1) In Crim. Case Nos. 03-216188 and 03-216189, accused VILMA SULIMAN GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubtas principal of the crimes charged and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS each and to pay fine of ₱200,000.00
for each count.

2) In Crim. Case No. 03-216190, accused VILMA SULIMAN GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWO (2) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correctional (sic) and to indemnify Anthony Mancera y Rey the amount of
₱120,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

3) In Crim. Case No. 03-216191, accused VILMA SULIMAN GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Estafa and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
 penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correctional (sic) and to
indemnify private complainant Perlita A. Prudencio the amount of ₱132,460.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

4) In Crim. Case No. 03-216192, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused VILMA SULIMAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.

5) In Crim. Case No. 03-216193, accused VILMA SULIMAN is GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional
(sic) and to indemnify Jimmy Tumabcao the amount of ₱21,400.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in cases of insolvency and to pay the cost.

Accordingly, the bond posted for her provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.

Considering that the accused Vilma Suliman was detained from January 6, 2003 to July 23, 2004
prior to her posting bond for her provisional liberty, her period of detention shall be credited in
the service of her sentence.

Considering that Luz Garcia has not been apprehended nor voluntarily surrendered to date, let
warrantbe issued for her arrest and let the case against her be ARCHIVED to be reinstated upon
her apprehension.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,6 but the RTC denied it in its Order7 dated January
23, 2007 for lack of merit.

Petitioner then filed an appeal with the CA.

On May 21, 2009, the CA promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appeal filed in this case is hereby
DENIED and consequently, DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated June 7, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, in the City of Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-216188, 03-
216189, 03-216190, 03-216191 and 03-216193 are hereby AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:

1. In Criminal Case Nos. 03-216188 and 03-216189 for illegal recruitment, the Court
sentences accused-appellant VILMA SULIMAN to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay
a fine of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) for each count.

2. In Criminal Case No. 03-216190 for estafa involving private complainant Anthony
Mancera, the Court sentences accused-appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer a minimum
 period of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to a maximum term of
fifteen (15) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal.

3. In Criminal Case No. 03-216191 for estafa involving private complainant Perlita A.
Prudencio, the Court sentences accused-appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer the minimum
period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional to maximum term of
seventeen (17) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal.

4. In Crim. Case No. 03-216193 for estafa involving private complainant Jimmy
Tumabcao, the Court sentences accused-appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer the minimum
term of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to maximum term of six
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner's counsel received a copy of the above CA Decision on May 26, 2009. 9 However,
neither petitioner nor her counsel filed a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day
reglementary period for filing the said motion. Hence, on June 11, 2009, the subject CA Decision
became final.

On July 3, 2009, petitioner, through her new collaborating counsel, filed a Motion to Admit
Attached Motion for Reconsideration10 praying that the same be admitted in the higher interest of
"substantial justice and due process." Petitioner contended that her former counsel committed
gross and inexcusable neglect of his duty as counsel in failing to immediately inform petitioner
about his receipt of the subject CA Decision, thereby depriving petitioner of her right to file a
motion for reconsideration which, in turn, is a violation of her right to due process.

On July 21, 2009, the CA issueda Resolution denying petitioner's Motion to Admit Attached
Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,11 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated
January 8, 2010.

Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING THE MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE PETITIONER

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING [THAT]

PETITIONER SHOULD NOTBE BOUND BY THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF ATTY.
MAYO IN NOT INFORMING HER ABOUT HIS RECEIPT OF THE DECISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS ADVERSE TO HER ON MAY 26, 2009 OR IN NOT FILING A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS AND INTEREST OF
THE PETITIONER.12

The petition lacks merit.

The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's contention that she should not be bound by her
counsel's gross neglect of duty in not informing her of the adverse decision of the CA. The Court
agrees with the observation of the CA that petitioner is not entirely blameless as she was not
vigilant in monitoring the progress of her case. Evidence of her negligence is the fact that she did
not make any effort to personally follow up her appeal with her counsel. Instead, she merely
relied on a certain Conrad Lucero, the person who referred her to her counsel, regarding updates
ofher appeal with the CA. In this respect, the Court's ruling in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People13 is
instructive, to wit:

The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the
realm of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule isthat a counsel, once retained, holds the
implied authority to do all acts necessary or, atleast, incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within
the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client
himself. A recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the
counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the gross
negligence should not be accompanied by the client’s own negligence or malice, considering that
the client has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on
the status of the case. Failing in thisduty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is
rendered against him.

Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party
leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the client’s duty to be in
contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of the progress and
developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that
everything is being taken care of is not enough.14

It may not be amiss to add that this Court notes the propensity of petitioner and her counsel to
disregard the Rules and directives of the Court. In a Resolution15 issued by this Court on March
14, 2011, petitioner's counsel was admonished for his failure to file petitioner's Reply to
Comment which was required in an earlier Resolution issued by this Court.

Moreover, it is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provision of law.16 An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing
party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from
the Rules cannot be tolerated.17 The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate
as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases.18 In an age where
courts are be devilled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to befollowed by appellants with
greater fidelity.19 Their observance cannot be leftto the whims and caprices of appellants. In the
instant case, petitioner remained obstinate in her non observance of the said Rules. Such
obstinacy is incongruous with her late plea for liberality in construing the Rules. On the above
basis alone, the Court finds that the instant petition is dismissible.

In any case, even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, as it appears that
petitioner assails not only the denial by the CA of her motion to admit her belated Motion for
Reconsideration but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for illegal recruitment and
estafa, the Court still finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA. Indeed,
after a careful and thorough review of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the lower
courts did not commit any error in convicting petitioner of the crimes of illegal recruitment and
estafa.

At this point, it bears reiterating that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
generally held binding and conclusive on the Court.20 We emphasize that while jurisprudence has
provided exceptions21 to this rule, the petitioner carries the burden of proving that one or more
exceptional circumstances are present in the case.22 The petitioner must additionally show that
the cited exceptional circumstances will have a bearing on the results of the case.23 In the instant
case, the Court finds that none of the exceptions are present . Thus, there is no cogent reason to
depart from the findings of both the RTC and the CA that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged.

The crime of illegal recruitment is defined under Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which provides as follows:

Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes
referring, contact services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit
or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article
13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines. Provided, that such non-license or non-holder, who, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It
shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any persons, whether a non-
licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority.

(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to
make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or
advance;

(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to

recruitment or employment;

(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor
Code;

(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in
order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from
oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
 (e) To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity not to employ any worker
who has not applied for employment through his agency;

(f) To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health
or morality or to dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;

(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and

Employment or by his duly authorized representative;

(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies,

remittances of foreign exchange earnings, separations from jobs, departures and such
other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment;

(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved
and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing
thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without
the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;

(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or

member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged
directly orindirectly in the management of a travel agency;

(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for
monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code
and its implementing rules and regulations;

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined by the Department of
Labor and Employment; and

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment
when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving
economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of
their business shall be liable.24
As to the charge of estafa, the act complained of in the instant case is penalized under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud
another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud. It is committed by using fictitious name, or by pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
by means of other similar deceits. The elements of estafaby means of deceit are the following,
viz.: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that
such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d)
that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.25

In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. It was proven beyond reasonable
doubt, as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and her co-accused
misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had the capacity to deploy the private
complainants for employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada. The
misrepresentation was made prior toprivate complainants' payment of placement fees. It was the
misrepresentation and false pretenses made by petitioner and her co-accused that inducedthe
private complainants to part with their money. As a result of such false pretenses and
misrepresentations, the private complainants suffered damages as the promised employment
abroad never materialized and the various amounts of money they paid were never recovered.
Petitioner argues that she could not be held liable because she was not privy nor was she aware
of the recruitment activities done by her coaccused. Petitioner avers that when her co-accused
received several amounts of money from the private complainants, she acted in her personal
capacity and for her own benefit without the knowledge and consent of petitioner. The Court is
not persuaded. As owner and general manager, petitioner was at the forefront of the recruitment
activities of Suliman International. Undoubtedly, she has control, manage mentor direction of the
business of the said company. Petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense, especially in
the face of positive assertions made by the private complainants who had no ill motive to falsely
testify against her. Indeed, of marked relevance is the absence of any showing that the private
complainants had any ill motive against petitioner other than to bring her to the bar of justice to
answer for the crime of illegal recruitment. Besides, for strangers to conspire and accuse another
stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings would certainly be against
human nature and experience.26 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the
witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence.27 In any case,
petitioner cannot deny participation in the recruitment of the private complainants because the
prosecution has established that petitioner was the one who offered the private complainants an
alleged alternative employment in Ireland when their original deployment did not materialize.
G.R. Nos. 209655-60 January 14, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PALMY TIBAYAN and RICO Z. PUERTO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants Palmy Tibayan (Tibayan) and Rico
Z. Puerto (Puerto) (accused-appellants) is the Decision2 dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562, 33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398 which
modified the Decisions dated December 4, 2009,3 June 24, 2010,4August 2, 2010,5 August 5,
2010,6 January 21, 2011,7 and August 18, 20118 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City,
Branch 198 (RTC) and convicted accused appellants of the crime of Syndicated Estafa, defined
and penalized under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in
relation to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1689.9

The Facts

Tibayan Group Investment Company,Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment company

registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 21,
2001.10 Sometime in 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI and its subsidiaries. In
the course thereof, it discovered that TGICI was selling securities to the public without a
registration statement in violation of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as "The Securities
Regulation Code," and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent Treasurer’s Affidavit before the SEC.
Resultantly, on October 21, 2003, the SEC revoked TGICI’s corporate registration for being
fraudulently procured.11 The foregoing led to the filing of multiple criminal cases12 for
Syndicated Estafa against the incorporators and directors of TGICI,13namely, Jesus Tibayan,
Ezekiel D. Martinez, Liborio E. Elacio, Jimmy C. Catigan, Nelda B. Baran, and herein accused-
appellants.14 Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against all of them; however, only
accusedappellants were arrested, while the others remained at large.15

According to the prosecution, private complainants Hector H. Alvarez, Milagros Alvarez, Clarita
P. Gacayan, Irma T. Ador, Emelyn Gomez, Yolanda Zimmer, Nonito Garlan, Judy C. Rillon,
Leonida D. Jarina, Reynaldo A. Dacon, Cristina DelaPeña, and Rodney E. Villareal16 (private
complainants) were enticed to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as
the assurance that they will recover their investments. After giving their money to TGICI, private
complainants received a Certificate of Share and post-dated checks, representing the amount of
the principal investment and the monthly interest earnings, respectively.17 Upon encashment, the
checks were dishonored, as the account was already closed, prompting private complainants to
bring the bounced checks to the TGICI office to demand payment. At the office, the TGICI
employees took the said checks, gave private complainants acknowledgement receipts, and
reassured that their investments, as well as the interests, would be paid. However, the TGICI
office closed down without private complainants having been paid and, thus, they were
constrained to file criminal complaints against the incorporators and directors of TGICI.18

In their defense, accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI incorporators
to defraud private complainants. Particularly, Puerto claimed that his signature in the Articles of
Incorporation of TGICI was forged and that since January 2002, he was no longer a director of
TGICI. For her part, Tibayan also claimed that her signature in the TGICI’s Articles of
Incorporation was a forgery,as she was neither an incorporator nor a director of TGICI.19

The RTC Rulings

On various dates, the RTC issued six (6) separate decisions convicting Tibayan of 13 counts and
Puerto of 11 counts of Estafa under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to
PD 1689, to wit: (a) in a Joint Decision20 dated December 4, 2009, the RTC found accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa, sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporalfor each count and
ordering them to pay the amounts of ₱1,500,000.00 to Hector H. Alvarez, and 119,405.23 and
₱800,000.00 to Milagros Alvarez;21 (b) in a Joint Decision22 dated June 24, 2010, the RTC
acquitted Puerto of all the charges, but found Tibayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of Estafa, sentencing her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20 years of
reclusion temporal for each count, and ordering her to pay the amounts of ₱1,300,000.00 and
US$12,000.00 to Clarita P. Gacayan and ₱500,000.00 to Irma T. Ador;23 (c) in a Joint
Decision24 dated August 2, 2010, the accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of Estafa, and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
period of 20 years of reclusion temporal for each count, and ordered to pay the amounts of
₱1,000,000.00 to Yolanda Zimmer and ₱556,376.00 to Nonito Garlan;25 (d) in a Joint
Decision26 dated August 5, 2010, the RTC found the accused appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Estafa, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporaland ordering them to pay Emelyn
Gomez the amount of ₱250,000.00;27 (e) in a Decision28 dated January 21, 2011, accused-
appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Estafa each, and were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporal
and ordered to pay Judy C. Rillon the amount of ₱118,000.00;29 and (f) in a Joint
Decision30 dated August 18, 2011, accused-appellants were each convicted of four (4) counts of
Estafa, and meted different penalties per count, as follows: (i) for the first count, they were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correcional medium, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium,
as maximum, and to pay Reynaldo A. Dacon the amount of ₱100,000.00; (ii) for the second
count, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of ten (10) years of
prision mayor medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to pay Leonida D. Jarina the amount of ₱200,000.00; (iii) for the third count, they
were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of ten (10) years of prision
mayormedium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum,
and to pay Cristina Dela Peña the amount of ₱250,000.00; and (iv) for the last count, they were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correcional medium, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporalmedium,
as maximum, and to pay Rodney E. Villareal the amount of ₱100,000.00.31

In the aforesaid decisions, the RTC did not lend credence to accused appellants’ denials in light
of the positive testimonies of the private complainants that they invested their money in TGICI
because of the assurances from accused-appellants and the other directors/incorporators of
TGICI that their investments would yield very profitable returns. In this relation, the RTC found
that accused-appellants conspired with the other directors/incorporators of TGICI in
misrepresenting the company as a legitimate corporation duly registered to operate as a mutual
fund to the detriment of the private complainants.32 However, the RTC convicted accused-
appellants of simple Estafa only, as the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that
accused-appellants and the other directors/ incorporators formed a syndicate with the intention of
defrauding the public, or it failed to adduce documentary evidence substantiating its claims that
the accused-appellants committed Syndicated Estafa.33

Aggrieved, accused-appellants separately appealed the foregoing RTC Decisions to the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562, 33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398. Thereafter, the
CA issued a Resolution34 dated February 19, 2013 ordering the consolidation of accused-
appellants’ appeals.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision35 dated June 28, 2013, the CA modified accused appellants’ conviction to that of
Syndicated Estafa, and accordingly, increased their respective penalties to life imprisonment for
each count.36 The CA also increased the amount of actual damages awarded to private
complainant Clarita P. Gacayan from ₱1,300,000.00 to ₱1,530,625.90, apart from the award of
US$12,000.00.37

It held that TGICI and its subsidiaries were engaged in a Ponzi scheme which relied on
subsequent investors to pay its earlier investors – and is what PD 1689 precisely aims to punish.
Inevitably, TGICI could no longer hoodwink new investors that led to its collapse.38 Thus, the
CA concluded that as incorporators/directors of TGICI, accused-appellants and their cohorts
conspired in making TGICI a vehicle for the perpetuation of fraud against the unsuspecting
public. As such, they cannot hide behind the corporate veil and must be personally and
criminally liable for their acts.39 The CA then concluded that since the TGICI
incorporators/directors comprised more than five (5) persons, accused-appellants’ criminal
liability should be upgraded to that of Syndicated Estafa, and their respective penalties increased
accordingly.40 Undaunted, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not accused-appellants are guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized under Item 2
(a), Paragraph 4,

Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants.

Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC provides:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).– Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or

simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar
deceits.

xxxx

The elements of Estafa by means of deceit under this provision are the following: (a) that there
must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or
fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.41

In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows:

Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined
in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life
imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or
more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed
by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers’
associations, or funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.

Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang
nayon(s)," or farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.42
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICI’s modus operandiof inducing the
public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would be returned with a very high
monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%).43 Under such
lucrative promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However, as the
directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that TGICI is operating withoutany paid-up
capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its investors,44 they
cannot comply with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors’ money.
Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-appellants, along with the other accused who are still at
large, used TGICI to engage ina Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI
investors.

To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a typeof investment fraud that involves the payment of purported
returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often solicit
new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with
little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting new money to make
promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false appearance that investors are
profiting from a legitimate business.45 It is not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme,
which works only as long as there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining the
scheme.46 It is difficult to sustain the scheme over a long period of time because the operator
needs an ever larger pool of later investors to continue paying the promised profits toearly
investors. The idea behind this type of swindle is that the "con-man" collects his money from his
second or third round of investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect.
Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the most.47

In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Esta/a, committed through a Ponzi
scheme, are present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI
comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses
and representations to the investing public - in this case, the private complainants - regarding a
supposed lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b)
the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard earned
money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the
private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.

Corollary thereto, the CA correctly upgraded accused-appellants' conviction from simple Estafa
to Syndicated Estafa.1âwphi1 In a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for
review. Issues whether raised or not by the parties may be resolved by the appellate
court.48 Hence, accused appellants' appeal conferred upon the appellate court full jurisdiction and
rendered it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.49

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562, 33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, accused appellants Palmy Tibayan and Rico Z. Puerto are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of 13 and 11 counts, respectively, of Syndicated Esta/a and
are sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for each count. Accused-appellants are
further ordered to pay actual damages to each of the private complainants in the following
amounts: (a) ₱1,500,000.00 to Hector H. Alvarez; (b) ₱119,405.23 and ₱800,000.00 to Milagros
Alvarez; (c) ₱1,530,625.90 and US$12,000.00 to Clarita P. Gacayan; (d) ₱500,000.00 to Irma T.
Ador; (e) ₱1,000,000.00 to Yolanda Zimmer; (f) ₱556,376.00 to Nonito Garlan; (g) ₱250,000.00
to Emelyn Gomez; (h) ₱118,000.00 to Judy C. Rillon; (i) ₱100,000.00 to Reynaldo A. Dacon; (j)
₱200,000.00 to Leonida D. Jarina; (k) ₱250,000.00 to Cristina Dela Pefia; and (l) ₱100,000.00 to
Rodney E. Villareal.
G.R. No. 183345 September 17, 2014

MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
filed by Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao (petitioners). They seek the reversal of the Court of
Appeals' (CA) decision2 dated February 28, 2006 and resolution3 dated June 13, 2008 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 86289. These CA rulings affirmed the February 26, 20044 and July 26, 20045 orders
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which respectively denied the petitioners' motion
to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest.6

Factual Antecedents

On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy y Awiten (Dy) filed a criminal complaint
against the petitioners and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa penalized under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation with Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1689.7

Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo was the
manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngo’s advice to deposit his
money in an investment house that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo then introduced him to
Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia), also known as Mina Tan Hao, who presented herself as an officer of
various reputable companies and an incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation
(State Resources), the recommended company that can give Dy his higher investment return.8

Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the
approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00). This initial investment earned the
promised interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, toincrease his investment to almost One
Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments through several checks
he issued in the name of State Resources.9 In return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy
representing his earnings for his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One
Hundred Fourteen Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen
Centavos (₱114,286,086.14). All these checks10 were subsequently dishonored when Dy
deposited them.

Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks. Ngo
promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned from
Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he confronted Gracia regarding the
dishonored checks. He eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in the construction and
realty business of Gracia’s husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the
petitioners never returned Dy’s money.
On July 17, 2003, Dy filed a supplemental affidavit to include in the criminal complaint Chester
De Joya, Allan Roxas, Samantha Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas – all incorporators
and/or directors of State Resources.11

On the basis of Dy’s complaint12 and supplemental affidavit,13 the public prosecutor filed an
information14 for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-accused. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-219952 and was raffled to respondent RTC of Manila, Branch
40.

Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other accused.
Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift
warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of probable cause against them
and the pendency of their petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ).15

In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the petitioners’ twin motions. 16 The
petitioners moved for reconsideration but the trial court also denied this in its July 26, 2004
order. Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA.

The CA’s Ruling

The CA affirmed the denial ofthe petitioners’ motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift
warrant of arrest.

In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a judge is mandated to
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.17 The CA noted
that Judge Marquez only issued the warrants of arrest after his personal examination of the facts
and circumstances of the case. Since the judge complied with the Rules, the CA concluded that
no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to him.18

In its decision, however, the CA opined that the evidence on record and the assertions in Dy’s
affidavits only show probable cause for the crime of simple estafa,not syndicated estafa. Under
PD No. 1689, in order for syndicated estafato exist, the swindling must have been committed by
five or more persons, and the fraud must be against the general public or at least a group of
persons. In his complaint-affidavit, Dy merely stated that he relied on the petitioners’ false
representations and was defrauded into parting with his money, causing him damage.19 Since
there was no evidence that State Resources was formed to defraud the public in general or that it
was used to solicit money from other persons aside from Dy, then the offense charged should
only be for simple estafa.20

Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the warrants of arrest against the petitioners as there was still probable cause to believe
that the petitioners committed the crime of simple estafa.21
The Petition

The petitioners submit that an examination of Dy’s affidavits shows inconsistencies in his cited
factual circumstances. These inconsistencies, according to the petitioners, negate the existence of
probable cause against themfor the crime charged.

The petitioners also contend thatit was only Ngo who enticed Dy to invest his money. As early as
August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved, thus negating the assertion that Dy
advanced funds for this corporation.22 They question the fact that it took Dy almost five years to
file his complaint despitehis allegation that he lost almost ₱100,000,000.00.23

Lastly, the petitioners claim that the warrants of arrest issued against them were null and void.
Contrary to the trial court’s findings, the CA noted in the body of its decision, that PD 1689 was
inapplicable to their case. There was no evidence to show that State Resources was formed to
solicit funds not only from Dy but also from the general public. Since simple estafaand
syndicated estafaare two distinct offenses, then the warrants of arrest issued to petitioners were
erroneous because these warrants pertained to two different crimes.24

The Court’s Ruling

We resolve to DENYthe petition.

Procedural Consideration

We note that the present petition questions the CA’s decision and resolution on the petition for
certiorarithe petitioners filed with that court. At the CA, the petitioners imputed grave abuse of
discretion against the trial court for the denialof their twin motions to defer arraignment and to
lift warrant of arrest.

This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in the case of Montoya v. Transmed
Manila Corporation25 where we faced the question of how to review a Rule 45 petition before us,
a CA decision made under Rule 65. We clarified in this cited case the kind of review that this
Court should undertake given the distinctionsbetween the two remedies. In Rule 45, we consider
the correctness of the decision made by an inferior court. In contrast, a Rule 65 review focuses
on jurisdictional errors.

As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the same context that the petition for
certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the CA decision from the
prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court and not on the basis of whether the trial court’s denial of petitioners’
motions was strictly legally correct. In question form, the question to ask is: did the CA correctly
determine whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’
motions to defer arraignment and lift warrant of arrest?
Probable Cause for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest

Under the Constitution26 and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,27 a judge is mandated to
personally determine the existence of probable cause after hispersonal evaluation of the
prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged. These provisions
command the judge to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor’s findings
and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties.

Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grantsthe trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
complaint orinformation. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c) order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause.28

In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and their co-
accused.To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after compliance with the requirement
that probable cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is
tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused.In doing so,
he need not conduct a de novohearing; he only needs to personally review the prosecutor's initial
determination and see if it is supported by substantial evidence.29

The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did not present
any evidence to controvert this. As the trial court ruled in its February 26, 2004 order:

The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to surrender practically resulted in the
suspension of arraignment exceeding the sixty (60) days counted from the filing of co-accused
De Joya’s motions, which may be considered a petition for review, and that of co-accused
Spouses Hao’s own petition for review. This is not to mention the delay in the resolutionby the
Department of Justice. On the other hand, co-accused DeJoya’s motion to determine probable
cause and co-accused Spouses Hao’s motion to lift warrant of arrest have been rendered moot
and academic with the issuance of warrants of arrest by this presiding judge after his personal
examination of the facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that
they are guilty of the crime that in fact happened.30 [Emphasis ours]

Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants of
arrest against the petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only issuedafter his personal
evaluation of the factual circumstances that led him to believe that there was probable cause to
apprehend the petitioners for their commission of a criminal offense.

Distinction between Executive and Judicial Determination of Probable Cause

In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages. The first is at the executive
level, where determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary investigation, before
the filing of the criminal information. The second is at the judicial level, undertaken by the judge
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial determination of probable cause.
In order to properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s issuance of the warrants
of arrest against the petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime of estafa, whether
committed as a simple offense or through a syndicate.

The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. In these provisions,
the different modes by which estafa may be committed, as well as the corresponding penalties
for each are outlined. One of these modes is estafaby means of deceit. Article 315(2)(a) of the
RPC defines how this particular crime is perpetrated:

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior toor
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business orimaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) the reliance by
the offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which induced him
to part withhis money or property; and 4) as a result, the offended party suffered damage.31

As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with State
Resources and promised him a higher rate of return.32 Because of his good business relationship
with Ngo and relying on Gracia’s attractive financial representations, Dy initially invested the
approximate amount of ₱10,000,000.00.

This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest more so that he
eventually advanced almost ₱100,000,000.0033 with State Resources. Gracia’s succeeding
checks representing the earnings of his investments, however, were all dishonored upon
deposit.34 He subsequently learned that the petitioners used his money for Danny’s construction
and realty business.35 Despite repeated demands and the petitioners’ constant assurances to pay,
they never returned Dy’s invested money and its supposed earnings.36

These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafaby means of deceit. The petitioners
inducedDy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But unknown to Dy, what
occurred was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in Danny’s construction and realty
business. The petitioners’ deceit became more blatant when they admitted in their petition that as
early as August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved.37This admission strengthens
the conclusion that the petitioners misrepresented facts regarding themselves and State
Resources in order to persuade Dy to part with his money for investment with an inexistent
corporation.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners’ deceit. "Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or is
intended to deceive another, so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury."38

Thus, had it not been for the petitioners’ false representations and promises, Dy would not have
placed his money in State Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but lead us to the
conclusion that probable cause existed as basis to arrest the petitioners for the crime of estafa by
means of deceit.

We now address the issue of whether estafain this case was committed through a syndicate.

Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689,39 there is syndicated estafaif the following elements are
present: 1) estafaor other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was
committed; 2) the estafaor swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and
3) the fraud resulted inthe misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members
of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers associations or of funds solicited
by corporations/associations from the general public.40

The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second elements of
syndicated estafaare present; there is probable cause for violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC
against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dy’s supplemental complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the
fraud perpetrated against him was committed, not only by Ngo and the petitioners, but also by
the other officers and directors of State Resources. The number of the accused who allegedly
participated in defrauding Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement for the existence of
a syndicate.

However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently solicited by
the corporation must come from the general public. In the present case, no evidence was
presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State Resources, also sought
investments from other people. Dy had no co-complainants alleging that they were also deceived
to entrust their money to State Resources. The general public element was not complied with.
Thus, no syndicated estafaallegedly took place, only simple estafa by means of deceit.

Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial court’s denial
ofthe petitioners’ motion to lift warrant of arrest.

A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and
circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.

Probable cause for the issuance ofa warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believethat an offense
was committed by the person sought to be arrested.41 This must be distinguished from the
prosecutor’s finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal information.
Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.42
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,43 we explained the distinction between the two kinds of probable
cause determination:

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function
that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine
whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the
crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the
quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether
or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the
judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.44 [Emphasis ours]

With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa and that the
petitioners have probably committed it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners remains to be valid and proper. To allow them to go scot-free would
defeat rather than promote the purpose of a warrant of arrest, which is to put the accused in the
court’s custodyto avoid his flight from the clutches of justice.

Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely different crimes.
Simple estafais a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is necessarily
included in another offense when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part
of those constituting the latter.45

Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court46 is necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners
should not be nullified since probable cause exists for simple estafa.

Suspension of Arraignment

Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if there is
a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the Office
of the President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21, 2003.
Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be
suspended indefinitely.
We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an
unqualified right.1âwphi1 In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang,47 we explained that while the pendency of
a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment
of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial
court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.48

As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving the
petitioners' petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the
petitioners' arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the petitioners'
motion to suspend completely lacks any legal basis.

As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed because of the
petitioners' refusal to submit to the trial court's jurisdiction and their erroneous invocation of the
Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the petitioners' commission of a crime, their
arrest and arraignment should now ensue so that this case may properly proceed to trial, where
the merits of both the parties' evidence and allegations may be weighed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATION the February 28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 86289. We hereby order that petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny
Hao be charged for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
and be arraigned for this charge. The warrants of arrest issued stand.
G.R. No. 157943 September 4, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, vs. GILBERT REYES

WAGAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to
adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in
relation to the elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the offender. If the
Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be
freed, it becomes the Court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.

The Case

Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision rendered on July 11, 2002
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the indeterminate
penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 30 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum.

Antecedents

Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:

That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in
the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, to wit: knowing that
he did not have sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of Philippine Islands, and without
informing Alberto Ligaray of that circumstance, with intent to defraud the latter, did then and
there issue Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the
amount of ₱200,000.00, which check was issued in payment of an obligation, but which check
when presented for encashment with the bank, was dishonored for the reason "drawn against
insufficient funds" and inspite of notice and several demands made upon said accused to make
good said check or replace the same with cash, he had failed and refused and up to the present
time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Alberto Ligaray in the amount
aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1
After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty,2 the pre-trial was held, during which the Defense
admitted that the check alleged in the information had been dishonored due to insufficient
funds.3 On its part, the Prosecution made no admission.4

At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray as its lone witness. Ligaray
testified that on April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone;
that he and his wife would not agree at first to the proposed payment of the order by postdated
check, but because of Wagas’ assurance that he would not disappoint them and that he had the
means to pay them because he had a lending business and money in the bank, they relented and
accepted the order; that he released the goods to Wagas on April 30, 1997 and at the same time
received Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0011003 for ₱200,000.00 payable to
cash and postdated May 8, 1997; that he later deposited the check with Solid Bank, his
depository bank, but the check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds;5 that he called
Wagas about the matter, and the latter told him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and
that despite repeated demands, Wagas did not pay him.6

On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas because they
transacted through telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert
Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice.7

After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the following: (a) BPI Check No.
0011003 in the amount of ₱200,000.00 payable to "cash;" (b) the return slip dated May 13, 1997
issued by Solid Bank; (c) Ligaray’s affidavit; and (d) the delivery receipt signed by Cañada.
After the RTC admitted the exhibits, the Prosecution then rested its case.8

In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having issued BPI Check No. 0011003 to
Cañada, his brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or any
dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the check was intended as payment for a portion of
Cañada’s property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale did not push through, he did not
anymore fund the check.9

On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter dated July 3, 1997
apparently signed by him and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he admitted owing
Ligaray ₱200,000.00 for goods received, to wit:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 23, 1997 which is self-explanatory. It is
worthy also to discuss with you the environmental facts of the case for your consideration, to
wit:

It is true that I obtained goods from your client worth ₱200,000.00 and I promised to settle the
same last May 10, 1997, but to no avail. On this point, let me inform you that I sold my real
property to a buyer in Manila, and promised to pay the consideration on the same date as I
promised with your client. Unfortunately, said buyer likewise failed to make good with such
obligation. Hence, I failed to fulfill my promise resultant thereof. (sic)
Again, I made another promise to settle said obligation on or before June 15, 1997, but still to no
avail attributable to the same reason as aforementioned. (sic)

To arrest this problem, we decided to source some funds using the subject property as collateral.
This other means is resorted to for the purpose of settling the herein obligation. And as to its
status, said funds will be rele[a]sed within thirty (30) days from today.

In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and promise to settle said obligation on or
before August 15, 1997.

Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away from any financial
obligation.

xxxx

Respectfully yours,

(SGD.)
GILBERT R. WAGAS10

Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who had transacted with Ligaray, and
that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband (Cañada) had begged him to
assume the responsibility.11 On redirect examination, Wagas declared that Cañada, a seafarer,
was then out of the country; that he signed the letter only to accommodate the pleas of his sister
and Cañada, and to avoid jeopardizing Cañada’s application for overseas employment.12 The
Prosecution subsequently offered and the RTC admitted the letter as rebuttal evidence.13

Decision of the RTC

As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as charged and he is hereby sentenced as follows:

To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve (12) years of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to
thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum;

To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in the sum of ₱200,000.00;

To pay said complainant the sum of ₱30,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; and the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.14

The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
constituting the crime of estafa, namely: (a) that Wagas issued the postdated check as payment
for an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (b) that he failed to deposit an
amount sufficient to cover the check despite having been informed that the check had been
dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt of the postdated check and upon
Wagas’ assurance that the check would be funded on its date.

Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration,15 arguing that the Prosecution did not
establish that it was he who had transacted with Ligaray and who had negotiated the check to the
latter; that the records showed that Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and that Ligaray’s
testimony on their alleged telephone conversation was not reliable because it was not shown that
Ligaray had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also sought the reopening of the case based on
newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the testimony of Cañada who could not testify
during the trial because he was then out of the country, and (b) Ligaray’s testimony given against
Wagas in another criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, opining
that the evidence Wagas desired to present at a new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and
that there was no compelling ground to reverse its decision.16

Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal.17

Prior to the elevation of the records to the Court, Wagas filed a petition for admission to bail
pending appeal. The RTC granted the petition and fixed Wagas’ bond at ₱40,000.00.18 Wagas
then posted bail for his provisional liberty pending appeal.19

The resolution of this appeal was delayed by incidents bearing on the grant of Wagas’
application for bail. On November 17, 2003, the Court required the RTC Judge to explain why
Wagas was out on bail.20 On January 15, 2004, the RTC Judge submitted to the Court a so-called
manifestation and compliance which the Court referred to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.21 On July 5, 2005, the Court, upon the
OCA’s recommendation, directed the filing of an administrative complaint for simple ignorance
of the law against the RTC Judge.22 On September 12, 2006, the Court directed the OCA to
comply with its July 5, 2005 directive, and to cause the filing of the administrative complaint
against the RTC Judge. The Court also directed Wagas to explain why his bail should not be
cancelled for having been erroneously granted.23 Finally, in its memorandum dated September
27, 2006, the OCA manifested to the Court that it had meanwhile filed the administrative
complaint against the RTC Judge.24

Issues

In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends nor personally known to
one other; that it was highly incredible that Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered into a
transaction with him involving a huge amount of money only over the telephone; that on the
contrary, the evidence pointed to Cañada as the person with whom Ligaray had transacted,
considering that the delivery receipt, which had been signed by Cañada, indicated that the goods
had been "Ordered by ROBERT CAÑADA," that the goods had been received by Cañada in
good order and condition, and that there was no showing that Cañada had been acting on behalf
of Wagas; that he had issued the check to Cañada upon a different transaction; that Cañada had
negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the element of deceit had not been established because
it had not been proved with certainty that it was him who had transacted with Ligaray over the
telephone.

The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt the
existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime?

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xxxx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that
said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence
of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means
that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of
the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show
that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or
property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender.25

The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of
funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof.26 It is the criminal fraud or deceit
in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a debt.27 Prima facie
evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada because of the
postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented
for payment because of the insufficiency of funds.

In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.28 In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish
beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.

Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was
transacting over the telephone, thus:

Q:

On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with the accused in this case?

A:

Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from me.

Q:

How did this purchase of rice transaction started? (sic)

A:

He talked with me over the phone and told me that he would like to purchase two hundred bags
of rice and he will just issue a check.29

Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and meet whoever he had
dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him
only over the telephone, to wit:

Q:

After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next?

A:

I made a demand on them.

Q:

How did you make a demand?

A:
I called him over the phone.

Q:

Who is that "him" that you are referring to?

A:

Gilbert Wagas.30

Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere
delivery without the need of an indorsement.31 This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had
issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then
negotiated it to Ligaray.1âwphi1 Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or
meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person
who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Cañada.

It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in
order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere
issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had
issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had
been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.

Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who delivered
the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Cañada was then
acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that
Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so
obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s brother-in-law.

Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone
was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he had
the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then.
We deem it essential for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness that a telephone conversation
like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be first authenticated before it
could be received in evidence. Among others, the person with whom the witness conversed by
telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other
means.32 Without the authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to the
telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In this respect, an identification based on
familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly recognizable peculiarities of the
caller would have sufficed.33 The identity of the caller could also be established by the caller’s
self-identification, coupled with additional evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone
call, the contents of the statement challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive
characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller.34
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication
is accorded probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or
circumstantial evidence. According to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:

Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to the fact or
facts in issue, and admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence concerning face-to-
face conversations except the party against whom the conversations are sought to be used must
ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary that the witness be able, at the time of the
conversation, to identify the person with whom the conversation was had, provided subsequent
identification is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the development of
the case. The mere statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of
such identity, in the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the conversation
admissible. However, circumstances preceding or following the conversation may serve to
sufficiently identify the caller. The completeness of the identification goes to the weight of the
evidence rather than its admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the first instance with the
district court to determine within its sound discretion whether the threshold of admissibility has
been met.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)

Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to definitely
establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the telephone. The
Prosecution did not show through Ligaray during the trial as to how he had determined that his
caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit from him was whether he had known
and why he had known Wagas, and he answered as follows:

Q:

Do you know the accused in this case?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

If he is present inside the courtroom […]

A:

No, sir. He is not around.

Q:

Why do you know him?

A:
I know him as a resident of Compostela because he is an ex-mayor of Compostela.36

During cross-examination, Ligaray was allowed another opportunity to show how he had
determined that his caller was Wagas, but he still failed to provide a satisfactory showing, to wit:

Q:

Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused entered into [a] transaction of rice selling,
particularly with these 200 sacks of rice subject of this case, through telephone conversation?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you are talking with?

A:

I know it was him because I know him.

Q:

Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you had a transaction with the accused through
telephone conversation, and as a consequence of that alleged conversation with the accused
through telephone he issued a check in your favor?

A:

No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.

Q:

But still through the telephone?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see you personally regarding the 200 bags
rice transaction?

A:
No. It was through telephone only.

Q:

In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice through the accused himself?

A:

Yes. It was through Robert.

Q:

So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of rice through somebody other than
the accused?

A:

Yes, sir.37

Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice because he
"know[s]" him was still vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the identification,
and should not support a finding of Ligaray’s familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his voice. It
was evident from Ligaray’s answers that Wagas was not even an acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior
to the transaction. Thus, the RTC’s conclusion that Ligaray had transacted with Wagas had no
factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC was speculating on a matter as decisive as the
identification of the buyer to be Wagas.

The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had conversed
with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as
the State’s rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any
transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be considered and appreciated only for that
purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for
which it is offered,38 not for any other purpose.39 Fairness to the adverse party demands such
exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the
letter only because his sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be taken
for granted.

It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei
incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove,40 and as a means of respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or
woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the
correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the
offense with the participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond
reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the
defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first
place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption
of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the
accused to establish innocence.41 Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no
burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to
prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the commission of the crime
can be established, without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, there can be no conviction.42

There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of
mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.43 Thus, considering that the circumstances of
the identification of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a
reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to the standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. Perforce, the accused’s constitutional right
of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an
acquittal,44 even though his innocence may be doubted.45

Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the
preponderance of the established facts so warrants.46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check
was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course. 47 Consequently, we
pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the dishonored check, plus legal
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on July 11, 2002
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the
crime of estafa on the ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay Alberto Ligaray the
amount of ₱200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
decision.
G.R. No. 163662 February 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JULIE GRACE K.

VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Under review is the decision promulgated on May 25, 2004,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed with modification the judgment rendered on January 24, 2002 by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, in Makati City convicting Julie Grace K. Villanueva of estafa as
defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. 2 The
decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting accused-appellant Julie Grace K.

Villanueva of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is
AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed as hereinabove indicated. The
Resolution of January 15, 2004 granting her bail pending appeal is REVOKED and her
profferred bail bond is REJECTED. Pursuant to Section 13, second paragraph, Rule 124 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the case, inclusive of the entire record thereof, is
CERTIFIED and ELEVATED to the Supreme Court for review. Costs against the accused-
appellant.

SO ORDERED.3

Antecedents

Villanueva stands charged with estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2
(d), of the Revised Penal Code under the information that reads:

That on or about the 16th day of August 1994, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, following PNB checks, [to] wit:

Check No. Date Amount

031526 9-02-94 ₱185,000.00
031527 9-17-94 185,000.00
031528 10-02-94 185,000.00
031529 10-17-94 185,000.00
031532 9-16-94 85,000.00
 031533 10-16-94 85,000.00
031534 11-16-94 85,000.00

as payment for various jewelries (sic) purchased to (sic) the said complainant, the accused well
knowing that at the time of issue thereof, the said checks have no sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank to cover the amount of the said checks, neither will said checks be honored
or paid upon presentment, the bank dishonored and returned the said checks for the reason
"account closed" or "stopped payment" or should have been dishonored for insufficiency of
funds had not the said accused, without any valid reason, ordered her drawee bank to stop
payment and despite repeated demands accused failed and refused to deposit the amount
necessary to cover the aforesaid check or to pay the value thereof, to the damage and prejudice of
the said complainant in the aforesaid amounts.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Version of the Prosecution

In August 1994, Loreto Madarang met Villanueva through a townmate. The latter was interested
in buying jewelry. Being then engaged in the business of selling jewelry, Madarang went to
Villanueva's residence at the Galeria de Magallanes, and was able to sell to Villanueva five sets
of jewelry worth ₱1,010, 000. 00.5 Villanueva made out nine checks drawn against Philippine
National Bank (PNB), eight of which were postdated. Villanueva signed a receipt reading as
follows:6

August 16, 1994

Received from MRS. LORETO A. MADARANG the following jewelries (sic) with the
corresponding amount

1 set diamond - ₱70,000

1 set South Sea Black
w/ necklace & bracelet - 220,000
1 set heart shape diamond
w/ pendant (4.56 cts) - 450,000
1 set marquee xxx dia. 2 cts. - 220,000
1 bracelet diamond - 50,000

₱1,010,000
paid by the following checks issued by me

PNB #031501 - August 6, 1994 ₱5,000

PNB #031531 - August 19, 1994 10,000
PNB #031526 - Sept. 2, 1994 185,000
PNB #031527 - Sept. 17, 1994 185,000
PNB #031528 - Oct. 2, 1994 185,000
PNB #031529 - Oct. 17, 1994 185,000
PNB #031532 - Sept. 16, 1994 85,000
PNB #031533 - Oct. 16, 1994 85,000
PNB #031534 - Nov. 16, 1994 85,000

₱1,010,000

with a total of One Million Ten Thousand pesos.

(sgd)
JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA

Madarang received the checks because of Villanueva's assurance that they would all be honored
upon presentment.7 However, the drawee bank paid only PNB Check No. 031501 and PNB
Check No. 131531, the remaining seven checks being dishonored either by reason of Account
Closed or Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.8Madarang tried to call and see Villanueva at her
residence to inform her of the dishonored checks, but Madarang was barred by security guards
from reaching Villanueva.9 Madarang resorted to sending demand letters, but her effort to
contact Villanueva proved futile.10 After Villanueva did not settle her obligations, Madarang
brought the criminal complaint for estafa,11 and the corresponding information for estafa was
ultimately filed in court on September 4, 1995. On arraignment, Villanueva pleaded not guilty.12

Version of the Defense

Villanueva denied the accusation. She claimed that she met Madarang three times. The first was
at the residence of Cheng Diaz Davis, where Madarang was then selling jewelry. The second
time was at her residence in the Galeria de Magallanes where Madarang arrived without prior
notice at around 7:00 or 7:30 in the evening. Madarang was persistent that Villanueva buy
jewelry on credit, and even assured Villanueva that she could replace the same if she was
dissatisfied with her purchase. Madarang prevailed on Villanueva to buy six pieces of jewelry,
for which she issued six checks as payment, five of which were postdated. On August 16, 1994,
Villanueva saw Madarang for the last time to have the jewelry replaced. Villanueva retrieved the
checks she had previously issued and replaced them with another set of postdated checks that
were the subject of the criminal case against her. Villanueva maintained that the second set of
checks were issued as guarantee under the agreement that they were not to be deposited until
Villanueva advised Madarang of the sufficiency of funds in her account. Villanueva insisted that
she did not receive any notice from Madarang regarding the dishonor of the checks.13 Ruling of
the RTC

On January 24, 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Villanueva guilty as charged,14 viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing this Court finds accused Julie Grace K. Villanueva
GUILTY of the crime of estafa as punished under Art. 315 par. 2( d) of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to Presidential Decree No. 818, said crime having been committed in the manner
described in the information filed on September 4, 1995.

As a consequence of this judgment, accused shall suffer the penalty of punishment for a period
of Fourteen Years Eight Months and One Day to Twenty Years which is within the range of
Reclusion Temporal in its medium and maximum periods.

She is also ordered to pay the private complainant Mrs. Loreto Madarang the sum of Nine
Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (₱995,000.00) plus interest at the legal rate of 12% per
annum until the mount is fully paid with said interest accruing at the time the information was
filed on or October 25, 1995.

The period of accused's detention shall be credited in her favor conformably with Art. 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.

She shall serve her entire sentence at the Correccional Institute for Women at Mandaluyong City.

SO ORDERED.15

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but differed on the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, to wit:

Nonetheless, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial court, which is 14 years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, both of reclusion temporal, is erroneous. Said court
did not pay obeisance to the teaching of People v. Hernando, viz:

Presidential Decree No. 818 provides:

"SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal of the amount of fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;

x x x x."

"x x x x

Hence, if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty two thousand pesos, the penalty of reclusion
temporal is imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional ten thousand
(₱10,000.00) pesos but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years, which shall be termed
reclusion perpetua. As used herein, reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the
offense. It merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud
involved, which exceeds twenty two thousand (₱22,000.00) pesos.

"Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code,
such as estafa, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." "The
penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime.
The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and
it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the
periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in
the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence." Here, complainant was
defrauded in the amount of seven hundred [thousand] (₱700,000.00) pesos. The fact that the
amount involved in the instant case exceeds ₱22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial
determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead the matter would be so taken as analogous to
modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate
sentence. This accords with the rule that penal laws are construed in favor of the accused.

Applying the above-cited provision, accused shall be meted an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum of which shall be taken from the maximum period of the basic penalty, that is,
reclusion temporal, to be imposed in its maximum period, plus one (1) year for each additional
₱10,000.00 of the amount of the fraud, but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years. On
the other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance nor the incremental penalty for the amount of the fraud
in excess of twenty two thousand (₱22,000.00) pesos. Such penalty is prision mayor, with a
duration of six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day to twelve (12) years."
Accordingly, the accused-appellant in the case at bar should be, as she is hereby, sentenced to
suffer the penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to
THIRTY (30) YEARS of reclusion perpetua as maximum.

x x x x.16

The CA then certified the case to the Court pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 124, Rules of Court.

Issues

Villanueva submits the following errors for our consideration:

THE LOWER COURT ORA VEL Y ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

THE LOWER COURT ORA VEL Y ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO
THE DEFENSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III

WHETHER THERE WAS FRAUD PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE

ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT POST-DATED CHECKS.

IV

WHETHER THE ACCUSED APPELLANT IS GUILTY, BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT, OF EST AF A.17

Villanueva insists on the absence of fraud when she drew the postdated checks, averring that: (a)
the checks were issued as replacement; (b) the checks could only be deposited or encashed after
Madarang was notified of the sufficiency of funds; and (c) the receipt presented by the
Prosecution failed to embody the real intention of the parties.18 She argues that estafa under
paragraph 2( d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code was not committed because the checks
were not executed prior to or simultaneous with the alleged fraud; and because Madarang had
instigated her to issue the checks.19

Did Villanueva commit estafa punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised
Penal Code in issuing the seven postdated checks?

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the conviction.

Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa) - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xxxx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that
said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence
of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when: (1) the offender has
postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating
or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in
the bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the
payee has been defrauded.20 The deceit should be the efficient cause of the defraudation, and
should either be prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud.21

All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who
confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had
purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the assurance of
Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that Madarang would not
have parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely
knew unless Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The second element was likewise
established because the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to insufficiency of funds
or because the account was already closed. The third element was also proved by the showing
that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from Villanueva the balance of
₱995,000.00.

In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby the latter would
deposit or encash the checks only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds in Villanueva's
account. Villanueva posits that the receipt the Prosecution presented in evidence did not embody
such agreement.

This defense of Villanueva is actually anchored on the rule that estafa will not lie when the
parties waive the negotiable character of the check, and instead treat the same as proof of an
obligation. For instance, when there is an agreement between the parties at the time of the
issuance and postdating of the checks that the obligee shall not encash or present the same to the
bank, the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. When
the payee was informed that the checks are not covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa
shall not arise.22

Villanueva does not impress. Her defense crumbles because she did not present proof of the
supposed agreement.1âwphi1The receipt signed by her proved the transaction and her issuance
of the postdated checks by listing the items bought and the postdated checks issued as payment.
If the parties really agreed for Madarang to deposit the checks only after notice of the sufficiency
of funds, then such agreement should have been incorporated in the receipt as an integral part of
the transaction, or simply written in another document with Madarang's express conformity for
Villanueva's protection. We simply cannot accept that Villanueva signed the receipt despite not
including the supposed agreement that would shield her from probable criminal prosecution. In
that regard, her being a businesswoman23 presumably made her aware of the consequences of
issuing unfunded checks.24 All that she is claiming here is that the receipt did not express the true
intention of the parties, implying that no written document substantiated her alleged defense. She
did not claim at all that she had been coerced or intimidated into signing the receipt as written.
Her self-serving statements on the agreement were entirely inadequate to establish her assertions,
for they were not proof.25

Under Article 315 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. 818, the penalty for
estafa when the total value of the checks exceed ₱22,000.00 is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four moths and one day to 20 years), plus one year for each
additional Pl0,000. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be from
six years and one day to 12 years of prision mayor. In imposing the indeterminate sentence of
eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirty years of reclusion perpetua as
maximum, the CA correctly applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law. It is well to state that
reclusion perpetua merely describes in this instance the penalty actually imposed on account of
the amount of the fraud involved.26

We note, however, that the CA affirmed the imposition by the RTC of 12% interest accruing
from the time that the information was filed until the full satisfaction of the obligation in the
amount of ₱995,000.00. Conformably with the ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames27 applying
Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), said amount
should earn interest of 12% per annum from the filing of the information on September 4, 1995
until June 30, 2013, and interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 25, 2004 by the Court of
Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION that the amount of ₱995,000.00 shall earn interest 12%
per annum from the filing of the information on September 4, 1995 until June 30, 2013, and
interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

G.R. No. 171672 February 2, 2015

MARIETA DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The court should prescribe the correct penalties in complex crimes in strict observance of Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code. In estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the court
should impose the penalty for the graver offense in the maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty
prescribed is invalid, and will not attain finality.

Antecedents

The petitioner, a bank teller of the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) at its branch in
Malibay, Pasay City, appeals the affirmance of her conviction for four counts of estafa through
falsification of a commercial document committed on separate occasions in October and
November 1993 by forging the signatures of bank depositors Amparo Matuguina and Milagrosa
Cornejo in withdrawal slips, thereby enabling herself to withdraw a total of ₱65,000.00 and
₱2,000.00 from the respective savings accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo.

The antecedent facts were summarized in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals (CA),1 as
follows:

As culled from the evidence, Matuguina and Cornejo left their savings account passbooks with
the accused within the space of a week in October - November 1993 when they went to the
bank's Malibay branch to transact on their accounts. Matuguina, in particular, withdrew the sum
of ₱500 on October 29 and left her passbook with the accused upon the latter's instruction. She
had to return two more times before the branch manager Cynthia Zialcita sensed that something
wrong was going on. Leaming of Matuguina's problem, Zialcita told the accused to return the
passbook to her on November 8. On this day, the accused came up with the convenient excuse
that she had already returned the passbook. Skeptical, Zialcita reviewed Matuguina's account and
found three withdrawal slips dated October 19, 29 and November 4, 1993 containing signatures
radically different from the specimen signatures of the depositor and covering a total of ₱65,000.
It was apparent that the accused had intervened in the posting and verification of the slips
because her initials were affixed thereto. Zialcita instructed her assistant manager Benjamin Misa
to pay a visit to Matuguina, a move that led to the immediate exposure of the accused.
Matuguina was aghast to see the signatures in the slips and denied that the accused returned the
passbook to her. When she went back to the bank worried about the unauthorized withdrawals
from her account, she met with the accused in the presence of the bank manager. She insisted
that the signatures in the slips were not her, forcing the accused to admit that the passbook was
still with her and kept in her house.
Zialcita also summoned Juanita Ebora, the teller who posted and released the November 4
withdrawal. When she was asked why she processed the transaction, Ebora readily pointed to the
accused as the person who gave to her the slip. Since she saw the accused's initials on it attesting
to having verified the signature of the depositor, she presumed that the withdrawal was genuine.
She posted and released the money to the accused.

On the same day, November 8, Zialcita instructed Misa to visit another depositor, Milagrosa
Cornejo, whom they feared was also victimized by the accused. Their worst expectations were
confirmed. According to Cornejo, on November 3, she went to the bank to deposit a check and
because there were many people there at the time, she left her passbook with the accused. She
returned days later to get it back, but the accused told her that she left it at home. Misa now
showed to her a withdrawal slip dated November 4, 1993 in which a signature purporting to be
hers appeared. Cornejo denied that it was her signature. As with the slips affecting Matuguina,
the initials of the accused were unquestionably affixed to the paper.

Zialcita reported her findings posthaste to her superiors. The accused initially denied the claims
against her but when she was asked to write her statement down, she confessed to her guilt. She
started crying and locked herself inside the bathroom. She came out only when another superior
Fed Cortez arrived to ask her some questions. Since then, she executed three more statements in
response to the investigation conducted by the bank's internal auditors. She also gave a list of the
depositors' accounts from which she drew cash and which were listed methodically in her diary.

The employment of the accused was ultimately terminated. The bank paid Matuguina P.65,000,
while Cornejo got her refund directly from the accused. In the course of her testimony on the
witness stand, the accused made these further admissions:

(a) She signed the withdrawal slips Exhibits B, C, D and H which contained the fake
signatures of Matuguina and Cornejo;

(b) She wrote and signed the confession letter Exhibit K; (c) She wrote the answers to the
questions of the branch cluster head Fred Cortez Exhibit L, and to the auditors' questions
in Exhibit M, N and O;

(d) Despite demand, she did not pay the bank.2

Judgment of the RTC

On July 13, 1998, the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City (RTC) rendered its judgment,3 finding
the petitioner guilty as charged, and sentencing her to suffer as follows:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, involving the withdrawal of ₱20,000.00 from the
account of Matuguina, the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of
prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 20 days of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family ₱20,000.00 and the costs of suit;
 (b) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving the withdrawal of ₱2,000.00 from Cornejo's
account, the indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one year and eight months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family
₱2,000.00 and the costs of suit;

(c) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving the withdrawal of ₱10,000.00 from the
account of Matuguina, the indeterminate sentence of four months and 20 days of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to pay BPI Family ₱10,000.00 and the costs of suit;

and

(d) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, involving the withdrawal of ₱35,000 from
Matuguina's account, the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
pay BPI Family ₱35,000.00 and the costs of suit.

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the petitioner contended in the CA that: (1) her conviction should be set aside
because the evidence presented against her had been obtained in violation of her constitutional
right against self-incrimination; (2) her rights to due process and to counsel had been infringed;
and (3) the evidence against her should be inadmissible for being obtained by illegal or
unconstitutional means rendering the evidence as the fruit of the poisonous tree.

On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision4 affirming the judgment of the RTC, to
wit:

In summary, we find no grounds to disturb the findings of the lower court, except the provision
of the dispositive portion in case 94-5525 requiring the accused to pay BPI Family ₱2,000. This
must be deleted because the accused had already paid the amount to the depositor.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the award of ₱2,000 to the complainant in case 94-5525 be deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner still insists that her conviction was invalid because her constitutional
rights against self-incrimination, to due process and to counsel were denied. In behalf of the
State, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that she could invoke her rights to remain
silent and to counsel only if she had been under custodial investigation, which she was not; and
that the acts of her counsel whom she had herself engaged to represent her and whom she had the
full authority to replace at any time were binding against her.
Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

We first note that the petitioner has accepted the findings of fact about the transactions that gave
rise to the accusations in court against her for four counts of estafa through falsification of a
commercial document. She raised no challenges against such findings of fact here and in the CA,
being content with limiting herself to the supposed denial of her rights to due process and to
counsel, and to the inadmissibility of the evidence presented against her. In the CA, her main
objection focused on the denial of her right against self-incrimination and to counsel, which
denial resulted, according to her, in the invalidation of the evidence of her guilt.

Debunking the petitioner's challenges, the CA stressed that the rights against self-incrimination
and to counsel guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during the custodial interrogation
of a suspect. In her case, she was not subjected to any investigation by the police or other law
enforcement agents. Instead, she underwent an administrative investigation as an employee of
the BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation being conducted by her superiors. She was not
coerced to give evidence against herself, or to admit to any crime, but she simply broke down
bank when depositors Matuguina and Cornejo confronted her about her crimes. We quote with
approval the relevant portions of the decision of the CA, viz:

The accused comes to Us on appeal to nullify her conviction on the ground that the evidence
presented against her was obtained in violation of her constitutional right against self-
incrimination. She also contends that her rights to due process and counsel were infringed.
Without referring to its name, she enlists one of the most famous metaphors of constitutional law
to demonize and exclude what she believes were evidence obtained against her by illegal or
unconstitutional means - evidence constituting the fruit of the poisonous tree. We hold, however,
that in the particular setting in which she was investigated, the revered constitutional rights of an
accused to counsel and against self-incrimination are not apposite.

The reason is elementary. These cherished rights are peculiarly rights in the context of an official
proceeding for the investigation and prosecution for crime. The right against self-incrimination,
when applied to a criminal trial, is contained in this terse injunction - no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. In other words, he may not be required to take the
witness stand. He can sit mute throughout the proceedings. His right to counsel is expressed in
the same laconic style: he shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. This means
inversely that the criminal prosecution cannot proceed without having a counsel by his side.
These are the traditional rights of the accused in a criminal case. They exist and may be invoked
when he faces a formal indictment and trial for a criminal offense. But since Miranda vs. Arizona
384 US 436, the law has come to recognize that an accused needs the same protections even
before he is brought to trial. They arise at the very inception of the criminal process - when a
person is taken into custody to answer to a criminal offense. For what a person says or does
during custodial investigation will eventually be used as evidence against him at the trial and,
more often than not, will be the lynchpin of his eventual conviction. His trial becomes a parody
if he cannot enjoy from the start the right against self-incrimination and to counsel. This is the
logic behind what we now call as the Miranda doctrine.
The US Supreme Court in Miranda spells out in precise words the occasion for the exercise of
the new right and the protections that it calls for. The occasion is when an individual is subjected
to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom in a
significant way. It is when custodial investigation is underway that the certain procedural
safeguards takes over - the person must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning.

We must, therefore, be careful to note what the Miranda doctrine does not say. It was never
intended to hamper the traditional law-enforcement function to investigate crime involving
persons not under restraint. The general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process, as the
US Supreme Court recognizes, which is not preceded by any restraint on the freedom of the
person investigated, is not affected by the holding, since the compelling atmosphere inherent in
in-custody interrogation is not present.

The holding in Miranda is explicitly considered the source of a provision in our 1987 bill of
rights that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, a
provision identical in language and spirit to the earlier Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution. People vs. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2. As we can see, they speak of the companion rights
of a person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel, to ensure which the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine had also to be institutionalized by declaring that any confession or
admission obtained in violation of these rights is inadmissible. But to what extent must the rights
to remain silent and to counsel be enforced in an investigation for the commission of an offense?
The answer has been settled by rulings of our Supreme Court in Caguoia and in the much later
case of Navallo vs Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 175 incorporating in toto the Miranda doctrine into
the above-cited provisions of our bill of rights. Thus, the right to remain silent and to counsel can
be invoked only in the context in which the Miranda doctrine applies - when the official
proceeding is conducted under the coercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There are no
cases extending them to a non-coercive setting. In Navallo, the Supreme Court said very clearly
that the rights are invocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation. A person
undergoing a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation and, hence, the audit
examiner may not be considered the law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule.

By a fair analogy, the accused in the case before us may not be said to be under custodial
investigation. She was not even being investigated by any police or law enforcement officer. She
was under administrative investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary
manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go. There
was no evidence that she was forced or pressured to say anything. It was an act of conscience
that compelled her to speak, a true mental and moral catharsis that religion and psychology
recognize to have salutary effects on the soul. In this setting, the invocation of the right to remain
silent or to counsel is simply irrelevant.
The accused makes a final argument against her conviction by contending that she did not get
effective legal representation from her former counsel who was already old and feeble when the
case was being heard. In fact, the records show, her counsel died during the pendency of the
case, an octogenarian at that. One can truly make a case from one's lack of a competent and
independent counsel, but we are not prepared to say that the accused was so poorly represented
that it affected her fundamental right to due process. Except for the several postponements
incurred by her counsel, there is really no showing that he committed any serious blunder during
the trial. We have read the transcripts of the trial and failed to get this impression. The evidence
against the accused was simply too overwhelming. We may take note that once, the trial court
admonished the accused to replace her counsel due to his absences, but she did not. She must
live by that.5

Considering that the foregoing explanation by the CA was justly supported by the records, and
that her investigation as a bank employee by her employer did not come under the coverage of
the Constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination, right to counsel and right to due
process, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the conviction of the
petitioner by the RTC.

The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document was established beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the
bank depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks with her upon her
instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she signed,
and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due
course. Her misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in
the withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI
Family Savings, her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of
Matuguina and Cornejo; and falsification of a commercial document, by forging the signatures of
Matuguina and Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned
had signed the respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses
were complex crimes, because the estafa would not have been consummated without the
falsification of the withdrawal slips.

Nonetheless, there is a need to clarify the penalties imposable.

According to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,6 the penalty for a complex crime is that
corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Otherwise, the penalty will be void and ineffectual, and will not attain finality.

In the four criminal cases involved in this appeal, the falsification of commercial documents is
punished with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years, four
months and one day to six years) and a fine of ₱5,000.00.7 In contrast, the estafa is punished
according to the value of the defraudation, as follows: with the penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (i.e., four years, two months and one
day to eight years) if the amount of the fraud is over Pl2,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00,
and if such amount exceeds ₱22,000.00, the penalty is imposed in the maximum period, adding
one year for each additional Pl0,000.00, but the total shall not exceed 20 years, in which case the
penalty shall be termed pris ion mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be, in connection
with the accessory penalties that may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
the Revised Penal Code; with the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods (i.e., six months and one day to four years and two months) if the amount of the fraud is
over ₱6,000.00 but does not exceed ₱12,000.00; with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to
two years and four months) if the amount of the fraud is over ₱200.00 but does not exceed
₱6,000.00; and with the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two
months and one day to six months) if the amount of the fraud does not exceed ₱200.00.8

In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, estafa was the graver felony because the amount of the fraud was
₱20,000.00; hence, the penalty for estafa is to be imposed in its maximum period. However, the
RTC and the CA fixed the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prison
correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 20 days of prision mayor, as maximum.
Such maximum of the indeterminate penalty was short by one day, the maximum period of the
penalty being six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years. Thus, the indeterminate
sentence is corrected to three years of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight
months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving ₱2,000.00, the estafa is punished with four months and
one day of arresto mayor in its maximum period to two years and four months of prision
correccional in its minimum period. The falsification of commercial document is penalized with
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years, four months and one
day to six years) and a fine of ₱5,000.00. The latter offense is the graver felony, and its penalty is
to be imposed in the maximum period, which is from four years, nine months and 11 days to six
years plus fine of PS,000.00. The penalty next lower in degree is arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to two years
and four months). Thus, the indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one year and eight months of prision correccional, as maximum that both the RTC
and the CA fixed was erroneous. We rectify the error by prescribing in lieu thereof the
indeterminate sentence of two years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four years, nine
months and 11 days of prision correccional plus fine of PS,000.00, as maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving ₱10,000.00, the RTC and the CA imposed the
indeterminate sentence of four months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years,
11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as maximum. However, the penalty for the
falsification of commercial documents is higher than that for the estafa. To accord with Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for falsification of commercial documents (i.e., prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of ₱5,000.00) should be imposed in
the maximum period. Accordingly, we revise the indeterminate sentence so that its minimum is
two years and four months of prision correccional, and its maximum is five years of prision
correccional plus fine of ₱5,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, where the amount of the fraud was ₱35,000.00, the penalty for
estafa (i.e., prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
or four years, two months and one day to eight years) is higher than that for falsification of
commercial documents. The indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum, was prescribed.
Considering that the maximum period ranged from six years, eight months and 21 days to eight
years, the CA should have clarified whether or not the maximum of eight years of prision mayor
already included the incremental penalty of one year for every ₱10,000.00 in excess of
₱22,000.00. Absent the clarification, we can presume that the incremental penalty was not yet
included. Thus, in order to make the penalty clear and specific, the indeterminate sentence is
hereby fixed at four years of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21
days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one year incremental penalty. In other words, the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence is seven years, eight months and 21 days of prision
mayor.

The CA deleted the order for the restitution of the ₱2,000.00 involved in Criminal Case No. 94-
5525 on the ground that such amount had already been paid to the complainant, Milagrosa
Cornejo. There being no issue as to this, the Court affirms the deletion.

The Court adds that the petitioner is liable to BPI Family for interest of 6% per annum on the
remaining unpaid sums reckoned from the finality of this judgment. This liability for interest is
only fair and just.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
August 18, 2005, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
three years of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of
prision mayor, as maximum;

(2) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
two years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 11 days of
prision correccional plus fine of ₱5,000.00, as maximum;

(3) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
two years and four months of prision correccional, as the minimum, to five years of
prision correccional plus fine of ₱5,000.00, as the maximum; and

(4) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven years, eight months and 21 days
of prision mayor, as maximum.

The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BPI Family Saving Bank interest of 6% per annum
on the aggregate amount of ₱65,000.00 to be reckoned from the finality of this judgment until
full payment.
G.R. No. 211917

NORMA C. GAMARO and JOSEPHINE G. UMALI, Petitioners vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
seeks the reversal of the Decision2 dated November 25, 2013, and Resolution3 dated February
21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34454. The CA affirmed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, San Pablo City in Criminal Case No. 15407
finding petitioner Norma C. Gamaro guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, while exonerating petitioner Josephine G. Umali from the crime charged.
The RTC also adjudged the petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay the monetary awards in
favor of private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On March 1, 2005, the petitioners were charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of
the Revised Penal Code before Branch 3 2 of the RTC of San Pablo City under the following
Information:

That on or about January 2, 2002, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, defraud one JOAN
FRUCTOZA E. FINEZA, in the following manner, to wit: That Norma C. Gamaro, pretending
that she is knowledgeable in the business of buy and sell of jewelry, other merchandise and
financing, assuring complainant of a sure market and big profit lure and entice complainant Joan
Fructoza E. Fineza to enter into the business and the latter purchased and delivered to her the
jewelry amounting to ₱2,292,519.00 with the obligation to manage the business for private
complainant and remit the proceeds of the sale to her, but accused, far from complying, with her
obligation, managed the business as her own, failing to remit the proceeds of the sale and
pledging jewelries to Lluillier Pawnshop where accused Josephine Umali work while the checks
issued by respondent Rowena Gamaro to guarantee their payment were all dishonoured for
having been drawn against insufficient funds, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party
in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned on August 4, 2005, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, while
accused Rowena C. Gamaro remained at-large.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence disclosed the following facts:

Sometime in 2002, private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza (Fineza) engaged in a business
venture with petitioner Norma C. Gamaro and her daughters - petitioners Josephine G.
Umali (Umali) and accused Rowena Gamaro Fineza would buy any foreclosed pieces of jewelry
from M. Lhuillier Pawnshop whenever informed by Umali who was then the manager of the said
pawnshop located at Basa St., San Pablo City, Laguna. The pieces of jewelry would then be sold
for profit by Norma Gamaro to her co-employees at the Social Security System (SSS) in San
Pablo City. The proceeds of the sale would then be divided among them in the following
manner: fifty percent (50%) would go to Fineza, while the other fifty percent (50%) would be
divided among Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro. As security for the pieces of
jewelry which were placed in the possession of Norma Gamaro and her daughter Rowena
Gamaro, the two would issue several checks drawn from their joint bank account in favor of
Fineza reflecting the appraised amount of the pieces of jewelry.6

The business venture was initially successful. However, when Fineza discovered that Norma
Gamaro, together with her daughters Rowena Gamaro and Umali, also engaged in a similar
business with other suppliers of pieces of jewelry, she decided to terminate the business. To wind
up the business, it was agreed that Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro would just dispose or
sell the remaining pieces of jewelry in their possession. But when Fineza tried to encash the
checks which were issued to her by Rowena Gamaro, the same were dishonored because the
account of the Gamaros had been closed. Fineza then confronted petitioner Norma Gamaro about
the dishonored checks, and the latter confessed that she did not have enough money to cover the
amount of the checks. Fineza also learned that the pieces of jewelry were pawned to several
pawnshops and private individuals contrary to what they had agreed upon. Petitioner Norma
Gamaro furnished Fineza with a list of the pawnshops, such that, the latter was compelled to
redeem the pieces of jewelry with her own money. It appeared in the pawnshop tickets that it was
the nephew of Norma Gamaro named Frederick San Diego who pledged the pieces of jewelry.7

To settle the matter, Fineza asked Norma Gamaro to return the remaining pieces of jewelry in
her possession but the latter failed to do so, and instead, offered her house and lot as payment for
the pieces of jewelry. Fineza, however, did not accept the said offer.8

A demand letter was then sent by Fineza to Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro, dated
February 16, 2004, asking for the return of the amount of ₱2,292,519.00 as payment for all the
pieces of jewelry which were not returned to her, including the cash given by Fineza for the
rediscounting business. The demand letter was left unanswered.9

For her part, Norma Gamaro, averred that she had no involvement in the jewelry business of her
daughters. Umali likewise denied having any business dealings with her sister Rowena Gamaro
and with Fineza. While admitting that there were pieces of jewelry pledged by her cousin,
Frederick San Diego, in the pawnshop where she was the manager, Umali denied that she knew
where those pieces of jewelry came from.10
On July 25, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby renders judgment, as follows:

a. FINDING accused Norma Gamaro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa as
defined and penalized under Section 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences her to suffer the indeterminate prison term of Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months
of Prision Correccional, as Minimum, to Twenty (20) Years of Reclusion Temporal, as
Maximum;

b. EXONERATING accused Josephine G. Umali of any criminal liability;

c. DIRECTING both accused Norma Gamaro and Josephine Umali to pay the private
complainant jointly and solidarily the following amounts:

1. ₱1,259,841.46, plus legal interest from date of demand on February 16, 2004, until fully paid;

2. ₱50,000.00 for and by way of moral damages;

3. ₱25,000.00, for and by way of exemplary damages;

4. ₱50,000.00, for and by way of attorney's fees; and

5. To pay the costs.

Let a warrant issue for the arrest of Rowena Gamaro. The Bureau of Immigration is likewise
directed to issue a HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER against ROWENA GAMARO, her personal
circumstances are as follows:

Name: ROWENA C. GAMARO

Former Residence: Lot 20, Block 16, National Housing Authority (NHA), Brgy. San Jose, San
Pablo City

SO ORDERED.11

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA. In a Decision dated November 25, 2013,
the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. The fallo of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2011 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, San Pablo City, in Criminal Case No. 15407 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.12
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but the same was denied by the CA on
February 21, 2014.

Hence, this petition, raising the following errors:

A) THE CA COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN AFFIRMING THE RTC DECISION FINDING NORMA GAMARO GUILTY OF THE
CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER SECTION l(B), ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE DESPITE THE INFORMATION ACCUSING HER OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA
UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(A) ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN GRAVE
VIOLATION OF THE PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF
THE CHARGE AGAINST HER;

B) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR

IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC
DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT (RTC) RELIED ON THE FINDINGS ON THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE WITH SSS AGAINST NORMA
GAMARO;

C) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR

IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC
DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT (RTC) CONSIDERED THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS ATTY. BALDEO DESPITE CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN
THAT SHE (ATTY. BALDEO) GAVE NORMA GAMARO ADVISE REGARDING HER
CASE; AND

D) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR

IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
RTC THAT NORMA GAMARO RECEIVED THE SUBJECT JEWELRIES DESPITE THE
INCOMPETENT AND CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION ITSELF.13

The first issue for resolution is whether a conviction for the crime of Estafa under a different
paragraph from the one charged is legally permissible.

The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution guarantees some rights to every person accused of a
crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz.:

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable.14

The constitutional provision requiring the accused to be "informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him" is for him to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The
prosecutor is not required, however, to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its
formal name in the law. It is hornbook doctrine that what determines the real nature and cause of
the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or
complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.15

The controlling words of the information are found in its body. Accordingly, the Court explained
the doctrine in Flores v. Hon. Layosa16as follows:

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed
sufficient if it states, among others, the designation of the offense given by the statute and the
acts of omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, the Court has clarified in
several cases that the designation of the offense, by making reference to the section or subsection
of the statute punishing, it [sic] is not controlling; what actually determines the nature and
character of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the information. The Court's ruling
in US. v. Lim San is instructive:

x x x Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we
ought to say and hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the
information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts stated in the body of the pleading
must determine the crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which he must be tried.
The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is
thoroughly in accord with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice x x x.17

In the instant case, the crime of estafa charged against petitioners is defined and penalized by
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned herein below shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case maybe.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of
the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos,
provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following
means:

x x xx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,

qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of
other similar deceits.18

The elements of the said crime are as follows: (1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts
or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party
must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus induced
to part with his money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.19

However, the crime petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of is estafa under Article 315,
paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa).

x x x x the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

x x xx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any

other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.

x x x20
The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) are as follows: (1) that money, goods,
or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return,
the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.21

The question then is whether the facts in the Information do indeed constitute the crime of which
petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted. In other words, was the RTC correct in convicting her
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b) instead of paragraph 2(a)?

What is of vital importance to determine is whether or not petitioner Norma Gamaro was
convicted of a crime charged in the Information as embraced within the allegations contained
therein. A reading of the Information yields an affirmative answer. The Information filed
sufficiently charges estafa through misappropriation or conversion. Fineza entrusted petitioner
Norma Gamaro with the pieces of jewelry amounting to ₱2,292,5l 9.00 on the condition that the
same will be sold for profit. Petitioner Nonna Gamaro was under obligation to turn over the
proceeds of the sale to Fineza. However, instead of complying with the obligation, she pawned
the pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop where petitioner Umali worked as Branch
Manager and kept the proceeds thereof to the damage and prejudice of Fineza.

Paragraph 1 (b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the
prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even though that obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
This, at least, is very clearly shown by the factual allegations of the Information.22

There is, therefore, no ambiguity in the Information. The factual allegations therein sufficiently
inform petitioners of the acts constituting their purported offense and satisfactorily allege the
elements of estafa by misappropriation. Petitioners are fully apprised of the charge against them
and for them to suitably prepare their defense. Therefore, petitioner Norma Gamaro was not
deprived of any constitutional right. She was sufficiently apprised of the facts that pertained to
the charge and conviction for estafa, because the RTC has the discretion to read the Information
in the context of the facts alleged. In the case of Flores v. Hon. Layosa,23 We explained the
rationale behind this discretion in this manner:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result is to enable the accused to vex the court and
embarrass the administration of justice by setting up the technical defense that the crime set forth
in the body of the information and proved in the trial is not the crime characterized by the fiscal
in the caption of the information. That to which his attention should be directed, and in
which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real
question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name,
but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set
forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive
right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the
crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that
pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused
never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not
know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his
substantial rights ... If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner, stated, the law
determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province
of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named x x x. 24

Also, the prosecution was able to prove the crime of estafa under paragraph 1 (b). As held by the
CA, Fineza positively and categorically testified on the transaction that transpired between her
and petitioners and accused Rowena Gamaro. The failure to account upon demand, for funds or
property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. As mentioned, petitioner
Norma Gamaro failed to account for, upon demand, the jewelry which was received by her in
trust. This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion to
petitioner's own personal use. The failure to return upon demand the properties which one has
the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal use.25 As in fact,
in this case, Fineza, herself redeemed the pieces of jewelry using her own money.

The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words convert and
misappropriate connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own,
or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's
own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to
deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of
their whereabouts.26

Thus, petitioners having been adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them, petitioner Norma Gamaro could be convicted of the said offense, the same having
been proved.

Furthermore, We are not persuaded by the argument raised by petitioners that the testimony of
prosecution witness Atty. Baldeo violated the rule on "privileged communication between
attorney and client" for the reason that Atty. Baldeo allegedly gave petitioner Norma Gamaro
"advise" regarding her case.

The factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege are:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and

it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication;
(2) The client made the communication in confidence;

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.27

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The
client must intend the communication to be confidential. A confidential communication refers to
information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence
and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. The communication made by a client to
his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal
advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been
transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.28

Applying the rules to the case at bar, We hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate
petitioner's allegation. The testimony of Atty. Baldeo consisted merely of observations that
petitioner Norma Gamaro was indeed engaged in the business of selling jewelry supplied by
private complainant Fineza. We note that the testimony is merely corroborative to the testimony
of private complainant Fineza. Atty. Baldeo is an officemate of petitioner Norma Gamaro. Atty.
Baldeo testified primarily on the fact that she personally saw petitioner Gamaro, on several
occasions, showing the jewelry for sale to their officemates. As in fact, Atty. Baldeo was offered
to buy the pieces of jewelry on some instances, and she was told by petitioner Norma Gamaro
that the pieces of jewelry came from Fineza.29

The aforesaid testimony of Atty. Baldeo was considered by the RTC to dispute the defense of
petitioner Norma Gamaro that she had no involvement in the jewelry business of her daughters:

Thus, based on the testimony of Atty. Baldeo in this case and in the aforementioned
administrative case, accused Norma Gamaro's defense of denial of her participation in the
business transaction involving the sale of jewelry supplied by private complainant, fall flat on its
face.30

Lastly, the argument of petitioner Norma Gamaro that the RTC erred in finding that she was the
one who received the pieces of jewelry is a finding of fact. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that
factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded
the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties. Though
jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of them obtain herein which would
warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision.31

We stick to the findings of fact of the RTC which was sustained by the CA that petitioner Norma
Gamaro received some pieces of jewelry from Fineza, and accused Rowena Gamaro pawned the
jewelry entrusted to them by Fineza which is a clear act of misappropriation, thus:
x x x x. The attempt of the defense to exculpate Norma and Josephine through the testimony of
Frederick San Diego is understandable.1âwphi1 The argument, however, that it was Frederick
San Diego, upon instructions of RowenaGamaro who pledged the jewelry, without the
knowledge of Norma or Josephine is unavailing. The records show that Frederick San Diego is
not only a mere nephew of Norma, and cousin to Rowena and Josephine, but also the messenger
and collector of Rowena, who had knowledge of the fact that Rowena's partner was the private
complainant, Frederick San Diego also knew that the private complainant went to the house of
Norma asking the missing jewelry.

As earlier stressed, some of the jewelry were delivered by the private complainant to Norma
Gamaro, not Rowena Gamaro. Yet the defense admits that Frederick San Diego pledged the
same pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Cebuana Lhuillier, and the owner of Collette's
upon instructions of Rowena Gamaro. Clearly then, Norma turned over the said jewelry to
Rowena with knowledge that they will be pledged to the pawnshops and to the owner of
Collette's. To hold otherwise would run counter to human nature and experience.32

It must be stressed that the prosecution offered in evidence the eighteen (18) index cards given
by accused Rowena Gamaro to Fineza stating the pieces of jewelries that were given to them by
Fineza, with the corresponding appraised values. The due dates of the checks issued in favor of
Fineza (Exhibits "F" to "F-7"and "F-11""F-27") were also indicated on the index cards.33 The
pieces of jewelry were pawned to various pawnshops and individuals, instead of offering them
for sale. Hence, petitioner Norma Gamaro failed to return the jewelry to the damage and
prejudice of Fineza. She even offered her house and lot to Fineza as payment for the jewelry.

We agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of estafa. The CA ruled that the prosecution's evidence showed that
Fineza entrusted the possession of the jewelry to petitioner. The CA observed that the
prosecution duly proved petitioner's misappropriation by showing that she failed to return the
diamond ring upon demand. That misappropriation took place was strengthened when petitioner
Norma Gamaro informed Fineza that they pawned the jewelry, an act that ran counter to the
terms of their business agreement.

Likewise, as to the civil liability of Umali despite her acquittal, We note the declaration of the
RTC that Umali had knowledge as to who owned the jewelry pledged with M. Lhuiller
Pawnshop. The RTC further pointed out that Umali was part of the business transaction between
Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro with Fineza, as she too signed the Joint Solidary Account
Agreement with Banco Filipino to enable them to open a checking account. It was against this
account that Norma and Rowena Gamaro drew the checks that they issued to guarantee the share
of Fineza from the proceeds of the sale of the pieces of jewelry. These findings support the
conclusion of the CA that Umali's acquittal was based on reasonable doubt. Hence, Umali's civil
liability was not extinguished by her discharge.34 We, therefore, concur with the findings of the
CA:
On the other hand, We likewise find appellant Umali civilly liable to private complainant Fineza.
As may be recalled, appellant Umali was exonerated from the crime of estafa. Notwithstanding,
she is not entirely free from any liability towards private complainant Fineza. It has been held
that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime charged does
not necessarily exempt her from civil liability where a mere preponderance of evidence is
required.35 There is no question that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is preponderant
enough to sustain appellant Umali's civil liability. Accordingly, We agree with the court a
quo’s ratiocination in this wise:

"What militates against the posture of Josephine is the admission by Frederick that it was
Rowena Gamaro who instructed him to pledge the jewelry to M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. If this were
true, then, with more reason Josephine had knowledge as to who owns the jewelry. It may well
be pointed out, as earlier stated, that Josephine is part of the business transaction between Norma
and Rowena with the private complainant, as she too signed the Joint Solidary Account
Agreement with Banco Filipino purposely to enable them to open a checking account, and it was
against this account that Norma and Rowena drew the checks that they issued to guarantee the
share of Joan from the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry. It follows then that Josephine also
knows beforehand who owns the jewelry pledged with her (sic) M. Lhuillier Pawnshop Branch.
x x x"

With the foregoing premises considered, We sustain the court a quo’s ruling that herein
appellants be held jointly and solidarily liable to herein private complainant Fineza. Thus, there
is no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the court a quo.36

There is no reason for this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and the trial
courts agree on the facts.37 We, therefore, adopt the factual findings of the lower courts in
totality, bearing in mind the credence lent to their appreciation of the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 25, 2013, and its Resolution dated February 21, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR No. 34454
are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 187401 September 17, 2014

MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FIRST
WOMEN'S CREDIT CORPORATION, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ma. Rosario P. Campos
(Campos) to assail the Decision1 dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution2 dated February 16, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468, which affirmed the conviction of Campos
for fourteen (14) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as
The Bouncing Checks Law.

On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First
Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of ₱50,000.00. She issued several postdated
checks in favor of FWCC to cover the agreed installment payments.3 Fourteen of these checks
drawn against her Current Account No. 6005-05449-92 withBPI Family Bank-Head Office,
however, were dishonored when presented for payment, particularly:

Check No. Date Amount

138609 August 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138610 August 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138611 September 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138612 September 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138613 October 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138614 October 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138615 November15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138616 November30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138617 December15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138618 December31, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138619 January 15, 1996 ₱3,333.33
138620 January 31, 1996 ₱3,333.33
138621 February 15, 1996 ₱3,333.33
138622 February28, 1996 ₱3,333.33
 ₱46,666.62

The checks were declared by the draweebank to be drawn against a "closed account."4

After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand, she was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City, Branch 48, with violations of
B.P. 22. Campos was tried in absentia, as she failed to attend court proceedings after being
arraigned.5

On December 7, 1999, the MeTC rendered its decision with dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the accused is hereby CONVICTED of fourteen
(14) counts of violations of BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22. She is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment for each violation and to indemnify the complainant
the sum of ₱46,666.62 representing the total value of the checks, plus legal interest from date of
default until full payment.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.6

Feeling aggrieved, Campos appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July 30, 2007, the
RTC of Pasay City, Branch108 rendered its decision upholding Campos’ conviction. A motion
for reconsideration filed by Campos was denied for lack of merit.7

Unyielding, Campos appealed the RTC decision to the CA, which rendered on July 21, 2008 its
decision8 affirming the ruling of the RTC. Campos moved to reconsider, but her motion was
denied via a Resolution9 dated February 16, 2009. Hence,this petition for review on certiorari
which cites the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT A DEMAND LETTER THAT WAS SENT THROUGH

REGISTERED MAILIS SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF [B.P.
22] AS TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT OF THE DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT
CHECKS.

2. WHETHER OR NOT [CAMPOS’] WANT OF INFORMATION OF THE FACT OF

THE CHECKS’ DISHONOR AND HER SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR
THEIR PAYMENT [ARE] TANTAMOUNT TO GOOD FAITH SO AS TO
PERSUADE THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT TO EXERCISE ITS EQUITY
POWERS AND TO LEND SUCCOR TO [CAMPOS’] CASE.10

Campos argues that the crime’s element requiring her knowledge at the time of the check’s
issuance that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon presentment was not established by the prosecution. She denies having received a
notice of dishonor from FWCC. Insisting on an acquittal, Campos discredits the MeTC’s reliance
on a supposed notice of dishonor that was sent to her by FWCC through registered mail. She also
invokes good faith as she allegedly made arrangements with FWCC for the payment of her
obligation after the subject checks were dishonored.

The petition lacks merit.

To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge
of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or creditor
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.11

The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by Campos
through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter from
FWCC, the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court
has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor,12 although not as
an element of the offense,but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of
insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the
second element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P. 22. Considering that the second element
involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds,13 as it reads:

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing, and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with
such bank, when presented within ninety days fromthe date of the check, shall be prima facie
evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of fundsor credit unless such maker or drawer pays
the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee.

In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC’s finding that the required
notice of dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still maintains
that her personal receipt of the notice was not sufficiently established, considering that only a
written copy of the letter and the registry return receipt covering it were presented by the
prosecution. The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return
receipts that cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor
had been sent to or served on issuers of checks.1âwphi1 The authentication by affidavit of the
mailers was necessary in order for service by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the
giving of notices of dishonor and to predicate the existence of the second element of the
offense.14
In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos' defense
that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks which
she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI Family Bank. Campos categorically
declared in her petition that, "[she] has in her favor evidence to show that she was in good faith
and indeed made arrangements for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the
dishonor of the checks."15 Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she actually received
the required notice of dishonor from FWCC. The evidence referred to in her statement were
receipts16 dated January 13, 1996, February 29, 1996, April 22, 1998 and May 26, 1998 issued
by FWCC to Campos for payments in various amounts ranging from ₱2,500.00 to ₱15,700.00.
Campos would not have entered into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996 until May
1998 if she had. not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the
insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.

Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or making
arrangements for payment in full within five ( 5) days after receiving notice. Unfortunately for
Campos, these circumstances were not established in the instant case. She failed to sufficiently
disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with FWCC, and to establish that the same had
been fully complied with so as to completely satisfy the amounts covered by the subject checks.
Moreover, documents to prove such fact should have been presented before the MeTC during the
trial, yet Campos opted to be tried in absentia, and thus waived her right to present evidence.
While Campos blamed her former counsel for alleged negligence that led to her failure to be
present during the trial,17 it is settled that the negligence of counsel binds his or her client. Given
the circumstances, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA which
affirmed the conviction of Campos.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution dated
February 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 129764 March 12, 2002

GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE

EDWIN A. VILLASOR, MTC JUDGE MANUEL D.L. VILLAMAYOR and PHELPS
DODGE PHILS., INC., respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Assailed in this petition is the decision1 dated March 14, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 19621, affirming the Regional Trial Court's decision2 finding petitioner Geoffrey F.
Griffith guilty on two counts for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks
Law), and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for a period of six months on each count, to be
served consecutively. Also assailed is the Court of Appeals' resolution3 dated July 8, 1997
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard, Inc.
for a term of two years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln Gerard, Inc. incurred rental
arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued the
following checks:

Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075065, dated April 15, 1986
for P100,000.00, payable to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.; and

Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075066, dated May 1, 1986
for P115,442.65, payable to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.4

The voucher for these checks contained the following instruction:

These checks are not to be presented without prior approval from this Corporation to be
given not later than May 30, 1986.

Also written on the face of the voucher was the following note:

However, if written approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. is not given before May 30, 1986,
Phelps Dodge, Phils. shall present the cheques for payment. This is final and irrevocable.5

On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for payment on
May 30, 1986 because they could not be funded due to a four-week labor strike that had earlier
paralyzed the business operations of Lincoln Gerard.6

Previously, in a letter dated May 20, 1986, Phelps Dodge, through its treasurer Ricardo R.
Manarang, advised Lincoln Gerard that it was transferring the contents of the Lincoln Gerard
warehouse in the leased premises since a new tenant was moving in. Phelps Dodge told Lincoln
Gerard that its properties would be placed "in our compound and under our custody."7
On June 2, 1986,8 when no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps
Dodge presented the two checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank for having
been drawn against insufficient funds. Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to
Lincoln Gerard, apprising Griffith of the dishonor of the checks and asking him to fund them
within the time prescribed by law.9 Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the checks but Griffith sent
a letter to Phelps Dodge, explaining Lincoln's inability to fund said checks due to the
strike.10Subsequently, on June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard that its properties
would be foreclosed. Phelps Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure and auction sale on June 20,
1986,11 despite Lincoln Gerard's protest.12

On May 10, 1988, two informations for violation of B.P. 22 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
73260 and 73261 were filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. The motion for
reconsideration filed by Griffith was dismissed, and so were his petition for review filed before
the Department of Justice and later on his motion to quash filed before the RTC. Griffith then
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals that was likewise denied.1âwphi1.nêt

Meanwhile, on November 6, 1987, Lincoln Gerard lodged a complaint for damages docketed as
Civil Case No. 55276 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69, against Phelps Dodge
and the notary public who conducted the auction sale.13 On July 19, 1991, the trial court ruled
that the foreclosure and auction sale were invalid, but applied the proceeds thereof to Lincoln
Gerard's arrearages. It also ordered Phelps Dodge to return to Lincoln Gerard the P1,072,586.88
as excess.14 The court stated:

The evidence shows that defendant corporation had already received the amount
of P254,600 as a result of the invalid auction sale. The latter amount should be applied to
the rental in arrears owed by the plaintiff corporation to the defendant corporation
(P301,953.12). Thus, the plaintiff corporation still owes the defendant corporation the
amount of P47,953.12 as rental arrears. In order to get the true and real damages that
defendant corporation should pay the plaintiff corporation, the balance of the rental
arrears should be deducted from the amount of P1,120,540.00, the total value of the items
belonging to the plaintiff corporation and sold by the defendant corporation at a public
auction. The net result is P1,072,586.88.15

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and this became final and
executory.16

On August 25, 1994, the criminal cases against Griffith pending before the RTC were remanded
to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), in view of Republic Act No. 7691 that expanded the
jurisdiction of the MeTC.

On July 25, 1995, the MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679, found Griffith guilty on
both counts for violation of B.P. 22,17 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six months
on each count, to be served consecutively. Thus:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused GEOFFREY F.
GRIFFITH, GUILTY OF VIOLATION of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law on two counts.

The accused is therefore hereby sentence (sic) to suffer imprisonment for a period of SIX
(6) MONTHS in Criminal Case No. 41678 and another SIX (6) MONTHS in Criminal
Case No. 41679, both of which shall be served consecutively.

Considering that the civil aspect of these cases has already been decided by the Regional
Trial Court Branch 69, Pasig, regardless of its finality, of which this court has no record,
this Court shall not resolve the same because they are either "Res Judicata" or "Pendente
Litis".

SO ORDERED.18

On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.

Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. In a consolidated decision dated
March 14, 1997, the appellate court ruled:

WHEREFORE, absent any prima facie merit in it, the Petition for Review under
consideration is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision but this was denied by the appellate court
in a resolution dated July 8, 1997.20 Hence, this petition seeking reversal of the CA decision and
resolution on the criminal cases, anchored on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS

RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE CONTRARY TO THE RULING IN
MAGNO V. COURT OF APPEALS, WHERE THIS HONORABLE COURT LAID
DOWN THE DOCTRINE THAT A CONVICTION UNDER B.P. 22 CANNOT BE
BASED ON AN INVERSE APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTON DATED 8 JULY 1997 RESULT IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF B.P. 22.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 STATING THAT PAYMENT THROUGH
NOTARIAL FORECLOSURE BEFORE THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL
INFORMATIONS UNDER B.P. 22 DOES NOT ABATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY,
ARE ERRONEOUS AND RESULT IN THE INIQUITOUS INTERPRETATION OF
THE LAW.
 IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN A RELATED CASE (CA-G.R. NO. 20980)
INVOLVING THE SAME PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AND THE SAME
TRANSACTION SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS

RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 WHICH RELIED ON THE RULING IN THE
CASE OF LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS ON VENUE TO JUSTIFY ITS FINDING
THAT PETITIONER HAS COMMITTED TWO COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF B.P.
22, ARE CONTRAY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.21

Petitioner points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note on the voucher
attached to the checks, the fact that said checks were unfunded at the time of their issuance.
Petitioner contends that this good faith on his part negates any intent to put worthless checks in
circulation, which is what B.P. 22 seeks to penalize. Moreover, as regards the second check that
was postdated, petitioner contends that there could not be any violation of B.P. 22 with said
check since the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds is absent. Petitioner could not
have known at the time of its issuance that the postdated check would be dishonored when
presented for payment later on.

Petitioner argues that his conviction in this case would be violative of the constitutional
proscription against imprisonment for failure to pay a debt, since petitioner would be punished
not for knowingly issuing an unfunded check but for failing to pay an obligation when it fell due.

Petitioner also asserts that the payment made by Lincoln Gerard through the proceeds of the
notarial foreclosure and auction sale extinguished his criminal liability.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that all the elements that comprise violation of
B.P. 22 are present in this case. Moreover, the payment in this case was made beyond the five-
day period, counted from notice of dishonor, provided by the law and thus did not extinguish
petitioner's criminal liability.

For the State, the Solicitor General contends that Lincoln Gerard assured Phelps Dodge, through
the note on the voucher attached to the checks, that said checks would be covered with sufficient
funds by May 30, 1996, which assurance was "final and irrevocable".22 The OSG also argues that
B.P. 22 does not distinguish between a check that is postdated and one that is not, for as long as
the drawer issued the checks with knowledge of his insufficient funds and the check is
dishonored upon presentment.

There is no unconstitutional punishment for failure to pay a debt in this case, since according to
the OSG, what B.P. 22 penalizes is the act of making and issuing a worthless check that is
dishonored upon presentation for payment, not the failure to pay a debt.23
The OSG asserts that the supposed payment that resulted from Phelps Dodge's notarial
foreclosure of Lincoln Gerard's properties could not bar prosecution under B.P. 22, since damage
or prejudice to the payee is immaterial. Moreover, said payment was made only after the
violation of the law had already been committed. It was made beyond the five-day period, from
notice of dishonor of the checks, provided under B.P. 22.

The principal issue in this case is whether petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith, president of Lincoln
Gerard, Inc., has been erroneously convicted and sentenced for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22). His conviction on two counts and sentence of six months
imprisonment for each count by the respondent MTC Judge Manuel Villamayor was upheld by
respondent RTC Judge Edwin Villasor and affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. But
private respondent appears to have collected more than the value of the two checks in question
before the filing in the trial court of the case for violation of B.P. 22. Hence, petitioner insists he
has been wrongfully convicted and sentenced. To resolve this issue, we must determine whether
the alleged payment of the amount of the checks two years prior to the filing of the information
for violation of B.P. 22 justifies his acquittal.

Whether there is an unconstitutional application of the provisions of B.P. 22 in this case,

however, does not appear to us an appropriate issue for consideration now. A purported
constitutional issue raised by petitioner may only be resolved if essential to the decision of a case
and controversy. But here we find that this case can be resolved on other grounds. Well to
remember, courts do not pass upon constitutional questions that are not the very lis mota of a
case.24

In the present case, the checks were conditionally issued for arrearages on rental payments
incurred by Lincoln Gerard, Inc. The checks were signed by petitioner, the president of Lincoln
Gerard. It was a condition written on the voucher for each check that the check was not to be
presented for payment without clearance from Lincoln Gerard, to be given at a specific date.
However, Lincoln Gerard was unable to give such clearance owing to a labor strike that
paralyzed its business and resulted to the company's inability to fund its checks. Still, Phelps
Dodge deposited the checks, per a note on the voucher attached thereto that if written approval
was not received from Lincoln Gerard before May 30, 1986, the checks would be presented for
payment. "This is final and irrevocable", according to the note that was written actually by an
officer of Phelps Dodge, not by petitioner. The checks were dishonored and Phelps Dodge filed
criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner. But this filing took place only after
Phelps Dodge had collected the amount of the checks, with more than one million pesos to spare,
through notarial foreclosure and auction sale of Lincoln Gerard's properties earlier impounded by
Phelps Dodge.

In our view, considering the circumstances of the case, the instant petition is meritorious.

The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account user."25 It was not designed to favor or encourage those who
seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the
law.26 Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a policy
preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to "best
serve the ends of criminal justice."

Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school
that imposes penalties for retribution,27 such retribution should be aimed at "actual and potential
wrongdoers".28 Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the
checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for a valid
reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge, through a
notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared invalid, sold Lincoln
Gerard's property for cash amounting to P1,120,54029 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid
rentals. Said property was already in Phelps Dodge's custody earlier, purportedly because a new
tenant was moving into the leased premises. The obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge
for said rentals was only P301,953.12.30 Thus, by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and
auction sale, Phelps Dodge was able to collect the face value of the two checks,
totalling P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess
of the debt or the checks. This was the situation when, almost two years after the auction sale,
petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of B.P. 22. By that time, the civil obligation
of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer subsisting, though respondent
Court of Appeals calls the payment thereof as involuntary.31 That the money value of the two
checks signed by petitioner was already collected, however, could not be ignored in appreciating
the antecedents of the two criminal charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure
and sale, Phelps Dodge was ordered to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69, which became final after it was
affirmed by the appellate court. We cannot, under these circumstances, see how petitioner's
conviction and sentence could be upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and
justice. For Phelps Dodge has, in our view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through
foreclosure and auction sale as its chosen remedy.

That is why we find quite instructive the reasoning of the Court of Appeals earlier rendered in
deciding the petition for Certiorari and Injunction, Griffith v. Judge Milagros Caguioa, CA-G.R.
SP No. 20980, in connection with the petitioner's motion to quash the charges herein before they
were tried on the merits.32

Said Justice C. Francisco with the concurrence of Justices Reynato S. Puno and Asaali S. Isnani:

"…We are persuaded that the defense has good and solid defenses against both charges in
Criminal Cases Nos. 73260-61. We can even say that the decision rendered in Branch 69
in Civil Case No. 55276, well-written as it is, had put up a formidable obstacle to any
conviction in the criminal cases with the findings therein made that the sale by public
auction of the properties of Lincoln was illegal and had no justification under the facts;
that also the proceeds realized in the said sale should be deducted from the account of
Lincoln with Phelps, so that only P47,953.12 may only be the rentals in arrears which
Lincoln should pay, computed at P301,953.12 less P254,600.00; that out of what had
happened in the case as the trial court had resolved in its decision, Phelps is duty bound
to pay Lincoln in damages P1,072,586.88 from which had been deducted the amount
 of P47,953.12 representing the balance of the rental in arrearages; and that consequently,
there is absolutely no consideration remaining in support of the two (2) subject checks."33

Petitioner's efforts to quash in the Court of Appeals the charges against him was frustrated on
procedural grounds because, according to Justice Francisco, appeal and not certiorari was the
proper remedy.34 In a petition for certiorari, only issues of jurisdiction including grave abuse of
discretion are considered, but an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review.

While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the
issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should
not apply penal laws mechanically.35We must find if the application of the law is consistent with
the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the
law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life.
This is especially so in this case where a debtor's criminalization would not serve the ends of
justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount
to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the
debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection,
is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.

In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been
effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this
petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for
violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks issued determines the number of violations
of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a distinction between postdated and other kinds of checks
need no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 19621 dated March 14, 1997, and its resolution dated July 8, 1997,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith is ACQUITTED of the
charges of violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679.

Costs de officio.
G.R. No. 163938 March 28, 2008

DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO BUEBOS, Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE law on arson has always been a constant source of confusion not only among members of
the bar, but also among those of the bench. The bewilderment often centers on what law to apply
and what penalty to impose.

In this case, the Court is again tasked to determine whether petitioners are liable for simple arson
or arson of an inhabited house which merits a penalty of up to reclusion perpetua.

Before the Court is a petition to review on certiorari under Rule 45 the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that2 of the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay,
finding petitioners Dante Buebos and Sarmelito Buebos guilty of arson.

The Facts

On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her house at
Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child.3 She was lying down when
she heard some noise around the house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the
four accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr.
congregating in front of her hut.4 When she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut already on
fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her immediate succor, the four fled.5

At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was then
drinking with Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Year’s Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place
and saw a number of people jumping over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he
was able to identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr.6 He also saw
Rolando Buela running away.7

On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando Buela
and Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson in an Information bearing the following
accusations:

That on or about the 1st day of January, 1994 at 3:00 o’clock in the Barangay Hacienda, Island
of San Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to
the latter’s damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.8

The prosecution evidence portraying the foregoing facts was principally supplied by private
complainant Adelina Borbe and Olipiano Berjuela.

Upon the other hand, denial and alibi were the main exculpating line of petitioners and their co-
accused. The trial court summed up the defense evidence in the following tenor:

The defense contended that the accused were at different places at the time of the incident;
Rolando Buela claimed to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay as there was a
novena prayer at his parents’ house on occasion of the death anniversary of his late grandfather;
Dante Buebos also claimed to have been at Romeo Calleja’s having gone there in the evening of
December 30, 1993 and left the place at 12:00 o’clock noontime of January 1, 1994; Sarmelito
Buebos asserted that he was at his residence at sitio Malictay, Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco,
Albay on the day the incident happened and that he never left his house; Antonio Cornel, Jr.
likewise claimed to be at his residence at Añgas after having visited his in-laws; that he only
came to know of the accusation five (5) days after the incident happened when he visited his
parents at Malictay; witnesses were likewise presented by the accused to corroborate their
testimonies.9

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson. The
dispositive part of the judgment of conviction reads:

WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROLANDO BUELA, DANTE
BUEBOS, SARMELITO BUEBOS and ANTONIO CORNEL, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged; accordingly, each of the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and
to pay the cost.

SO ORDERED.10

Via a notice of appeal, the four accused elevated the matter to the appellate court. In their appeal,
they contended that (1) the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime of arson; (2) that
the trial court erred in finding conspiracy; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to give weight
and credence to their defense of denial and alibi.

On November 13, 2003, through an eight-page decision penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R.
de los Santos, the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Each of the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten
(10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.11

In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the accused could only be convicted of simple
arson, punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house, which is
punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to
the appellate court, the information failed to allege with specificity the actual crime committed.
Hence, the accused should be found liable only for arson in its simple form.12

Issues

Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted to the present recourse. The following
arguments are now raised for the Court’s consideration:

I.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING

THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE;

II.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.13

Our Ruling

Overview of the law on arson

The confusion surrounding arson has been confounded by the dearth of annotation on this part of
our penal law. Certainly, the law on arson is one of the least commented in this jurisdiction. For
the guidance of the bench and bar, a brief legislative history of the body of laws on arson is in
order.

Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine different articles of the Revised Penal
Code: Article 320 (destructive arson), Article 321 (other forms of arson), Article 322 (cases of
arson not included in the preceding articles), Article 323 (arson of property of small value),
Article 324 (crimes involving destruction), Article 325 (burning one’s own property to commit
arson), Article 326 (setting fire to property exclusively owned by the offender, Article 326-a (in
cases where death resulted as a consequence of arson), and Article 326-b (prima facie evidence
of arson).

On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the successful enforcement and
prosecution of arsonists, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D)
No. 1613. P.D. 1613 supplanted the penal code provisions on arson. The pertinent parts of the
said presidential issuance read:
SECTION 1. Arson. – Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall be
punished by prision mayor.

The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under
circumstances which expose to danger the life or property of another.

SECTION 2. Destructive Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any ammunition factory and other establishments where explosives, inflammable or

combustible materials are stored;

2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to culture,
education or social services;

3. Any church or place of worship or other building where people usually assemble;

4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for

transportation of persons or property;

5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative
or other official proceedings;

6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping center,
public or private market, theater or movie house or any similar place or building;

7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested

area.

SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;

4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or
forest;

5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and

6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.

SECTION 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. – The penalty in any case of arson
shall be imposed in its maximum period:

1. If committed with the intent to gain;

2. If committed for the benefit of another;

3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the
property burned;

4. If committed by a syndicate. The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or

carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons.

SECTION 5. Where Death Results from Arson. – If by reason of or on the occasion of arson
death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.

SECTION 6. Prima Facie Evidence of Arson. – Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute prima facie evidence of arson:

1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or
establishment.

2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored within the

building not necessary in the business of the offender nor for household use.

3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible substances or

materials soaked therewith or containers thereof, or any mechanical, electrical, chemical,
or electronic contrivance designed to start a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing
are found in the ruins or premises of the burned building or property.

4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the
time of the issuance of the policy.

5. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two fires
have occurred in the same or other premises owned or under the control of the offender
and/or insured.

6. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored in a
building or property had been withdrawn from the premises except in the ordinary course
of business.

7. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire in
exchange for the desistance of the offender or for the safety of other person or property of
the victim.
SECTION 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. – Conspiracy to commit arson shall be punished by
prision mayor in its minimum period.

SECTION 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. – The building which is the object of arson
including the land on which it is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless
the owner thereof can prove that he has no participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite
the exercise of due diligence on his part.

On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again revisited via P.D. No. 1744. The new law
expanded the definition of destructive arson by way of reinstating Article 320 of the Revised
Penal Code. The amendatory legislation also paved the way for the reimposition of the capital
punishment on destructive arsonists.

When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous
Crimes) was passed on December 13, 1993, Article 320 again underwent a revision. As it now
stands, Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code is worded, thus:

Art. 320. Destructive Arson. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon
any person who shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a
result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.

2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where
people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to,
official governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade,
workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as
but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or
terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said
building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building
is actually inhabited or not.

3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or

conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.

4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities.

5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or
defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed
by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is
merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the
commission or another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall
burn:

1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,

storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.

2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death
results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

Of course, with the repeal of the Death Penalty Law on June 24, 2006 through R.A. No. 9346,
arson is no longer a capital offense.14

We proceed to the crux of the petition.

Circumstantial evidence points to petitioners’ culpability

Petitioners score the CA for convicting them of arson based on circumstantial evidence. They
argue that the inference that they were responsible for the burning of private complainant’s hut
was not duly proven by the People.

Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in issue through
an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is
essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free."15

At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not
the only basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a chain of
circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a
conviction.16 Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence.17

The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for a conviction: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.18
After a careful review of the evidence presented by both parties, We find that the circumstantial
evidence extant in the records is sufficient to identify petitioners as the authors of the burning of
the hut of private complainant Adelina Borbe:

1. Private complainant heard some noise emanating from outside her house at around
3:00 a.m.;

2. When she went out to check the disturbance, private complainant saw petitioners,
together with their two other co-accused, standing in front of the house;

3. Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;

4. Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private complainant desperately shouted
for help.

The facts from which the cited circumstances arose have been proved through positive
testimony.19 Evidently, these circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair
conclusion – the culpability of petitioners for the burning of the hut. The Court is convinced that
the circumstances, taken together, leave no doubt that petitioner perpetrated the arson.

Conspiracy evident from coordinated action of petitioners

Petitioners next contend that conspiracy was erroneously appreciated by both the trial and
appellate courts. They posit that the finding of conspiracy was premised on speculation and
conjecture.

The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of
the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of
the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of
the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and
entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by
which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof
that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design. In
such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed
equally guilty of the crime committed.20

In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of petitioners
Dante and Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood outside the house of private complainant
Adelina. They were part of the group making boisterous noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also
fled together while the roof of Adelina’s house was ablaze. These acts clearly show their joint
purpose and design, and community of interest.
We quote with approval the CA observation along this line:

Accused-appellant’s assertion that conspiracy has not been established is belied by the accounts
of the prosecution witness. The manner by which the accused-appellants behaved after the
private complainant shouted for help clearly indicated a confederacy of purpose and concerted
action on the part of the accused-appellants. Even if there is no direct evidence showing that all
of the accused had prior agreement on how to set the roof of the house on fire, the doctrine is
well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit
the crime. Very seldom such prior agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things,
criminal undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in writing.21

Crime committed and the penalty

The RTC sentenced all four accused to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and
one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. On appeal, the CA reduced the sentence to six (6) years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. The CA
ratiocinated:

The information charges accused-appellants with "violation of P.D. 1613" without specifying the
particular provision breached. The information having failed to allege whether or not the burnt
house is inhabited, and not having been established that the house is situated in a populated or
congested area, accused-appellants should be deemed to have only been charged with plain arson
under Section 1 of the decree. Under Section 1 of the decree, the offense of simple arson
committed is punishable by prision mayor.

There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the case at bar accused-
appellants should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period as
provided under Article 321, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Presidential
Decree No. 1613. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be
anywhere within the range of prision correccional.22

The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is Section 3, paragraph 2 of
P.D. No. 1613. The said provision of law reads:

SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

xxxx

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.23 Admittedly, there is a confluence of the
foregoing elements here. However, the information failed to allege that what was intentionally
burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.
Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure state:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances for the court to pronounce judgment.

Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given
by the statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated,
the accused will not be convicted of the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly
alleged in the information.24

Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally burned by
petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited that "accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of
ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter’s damage and prejudice."25

Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000, while the petitioners were convicted by
the RTC on April 7, 1998, it may be applied retroactively. It is elementary that rules of criminal
procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.26

In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1, paragraph 1 of P.D.
No. 1613, punishable by prision mayor.

This is not a case of first impression. This Court has, on a number of occasions, modified the
RTC and CA judgments for having applied the wrong law and penalty on arson. In People v.
Soriano,27 the accused was found guilty of destructive arson, then a capital offense. On automatic
review, the Court held that he should be held liable only for simple arson. The explanation:

However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613,
which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as
the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating
inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second
Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or
edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par.
1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that
such laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and literally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and
(b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements
concur in the case at bar.

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity
or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal
Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple
Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances
present.

In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from those acts
punishable under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was
established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance
that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the
property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting
more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him
to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate
father under the prevailing circumstances that surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house.
Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of
PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.28

An oversight of the same nature was addressed by this Court in the more recent case of People v.
Malngan.29 Said the Court in Malngan:

The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of?

As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson,
under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple
arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character and
location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused, 48 to wit:

Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious
burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft,
factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons. The classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively
discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of
properties and protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves
only destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors
of this heinous crime. The exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime takes into
consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the malicious burning of these
structures; the danger to property resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is normally
difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the
perpetrators; and, the greater impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the
nation. [Emphasis supplied]

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death should
result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code
remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of
public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA
7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government
buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial
establishments. Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high
incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy and
preserve the social, economic and political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to
be meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen
the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed, depending on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied]

To emphasize:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity
or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal
Code (as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On the
other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser
degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words,
Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances
present. [Emphasis supplied.]

Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as stated in the
accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged with
the crime of Simple Arson – for having "deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential
house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family x x x knowing the same to be an inhabited house and
situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the
said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire."
[Emphasis supplied]
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People v. Soriano. The
accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular house. Unfortunately, the blaze
spread and gutted down five (5) neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the accused guilty
of destructive arson under paragraph 1 of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659. This Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:

"x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties
burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited
houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended
Information particularly refer to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The
applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the
Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws
shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and
(b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements
concur in the case at bar."

As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having
intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration
likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was
proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple
arson. Such is the case "notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the
information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime
alleged therein." "What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violate, x x x but the description of
the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited."

There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613
categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:

SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. – If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death
results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied]1avvphil

Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information, the imposable
penalty on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.30

Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty should range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the
offense, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1) day to
ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is prision correccional, which has a
range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods.

The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it.

G.R. No. 188708 July 31, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ALAMADA MACABANDO, Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando assailing the February 24, 2009
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA decision
affirmed in toto the August 26, 1002 judgment2of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25,
Cagayan de Oro City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of destructive arson,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

THE CASE

The prosecution's evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant
broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even
("manabla ko").3 Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.4

At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire.
When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant’s
house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire.5 Eric Quilantang, a neighbor
whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to the barangay headquarters to
get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the appellant, who was
carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3)
shots in the air.6 The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire
would be killed.7

Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces.8 Eric
also returned to his house to save his belongings.9

Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the
incident, and concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellant’s house; and that it
had been intentional.10 Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many
houses in his barangay, and that he assisted the City Social Welfare and Development
Department personnel in assessing the damage.11

The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the events.

The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the twostorey house in Barangay 35,
Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal.12 He admitted that he
felt angry at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001 because one of his radio cassettes for sale
had been stolen.13 The appellant claimed that he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio
cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied making a threat to
burn his house, and maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by
his neighbors came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New
Year celebration.14

Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant’s cousin, stated, among others, that he did not see the
appellant carry a revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001.15 Dimas Kasubidan, the
appellant’s brother-in-law, stated that he and the appellant lived in the same house, and that the
latter was asleep in his room at the ground floor before the fire broke out.16

The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC.17 The appellant pleaded not guilty
to the charge on arraignment.18 In its judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTC’s factual
findings since these findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence.
The CA held that the totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that
the appellant was guilty of the crime charged.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the appellant and the penalty imposed
on him.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire to his house in Barangay 35,
Limketkai Drive, Cagayan de Oro City. The trial and appellate courts thus resorted to
circumstantial evidence since there was no direct evidence to prove the appellant’s culpability to
the crime charged.

It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
sustain a conviction provided that: "(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the
one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused."19

In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads to an
unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house: first,
the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke bottles near his house at
around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant
stated that he would get even, and then threatened to burn his own house; third, Judith
Quilantang saw a fire in the appellant’s room approximately two hours after the appellant
returned to his house; fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people
from putting out the fire in his house; fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then
threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his house; sixth, the appellant
carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the investigation conducted by the fire
marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s house,
and that it had been intentional.

The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the
appellant set fire to his house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to
prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did,
if he had nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house is on fire
is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural
order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning
property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination
to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a
traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate planning and preparedness on
his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside his
house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the
appellant’s indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried
to put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of
innocence. Notably, the appellant failed to impute any improper motive against the prosecution
witnesses to falsely testify against him; in fact, he admitted that he had no misunderstanding with
them prior to the incident.

The Crime Committed

The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended,
which reads:

Article 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a
result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.

2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where
people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to,
official governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade,
workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as
but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or
terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said
building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building
is actually inhabited or not.

3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or

conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.1âwphi1
 4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities.

5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or
defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.

xxxx

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall
burn:

1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,

storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.

2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.

In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons."20

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the other hand, currently governs simple arson. Section
3 of this law provides:

Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;

4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or
forest;

5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and

6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and emphasis ours]

P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of
size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. 22 This law
punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree
of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson.23
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these
elements have been proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire
to his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were
established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and
appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire
Protection which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been
intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development
Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as dwellings. The appellant
likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That the appellant’s act
affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellant’s act
does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when
compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only
showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the
neighboring houses.

In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly instructive, thus:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity
or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal
Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple
Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson.

The Proper Penalty

Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is
reclusion temporal, which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion
perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an
indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower
in degree, which is prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and
whose maximum should be the medium period of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or
sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, taking into account the absence of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime. Taking these
rules into account, we therefore impose on the appellant the indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts' findings that the records do not
adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. To
seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable.25

WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 00208-MIN is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple
arson under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613; and

(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG,

represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil liability shall
result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by the following persons:

1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;

2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased
spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and

3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.

The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the
commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)

For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the
husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives
of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created
such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification?

Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix1 of petitioner

intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a
complaint-affidavit2 for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her
complaint-affidavit read:

I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident

of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being
duly sworn, depose and state that:

1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong

Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters
of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex "A" to form an
integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the
Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds
and/or properties as property belonging to the estate but are presently in the possession or
control of other parties.

3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the children
of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.

4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d]
27 and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father
William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and
thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy
Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to
sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of
Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko
Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato told her that
the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother
was completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.

5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of
Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor
Josephine Ramirez who later became the second wife of my sister’s widower William
Sato.

6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the
belief that they were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that
the same was in fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.

7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers
for the property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute
sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of
Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book
No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai
(Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D.
Labid). x x x

8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the
deeds of absolute sale were not the true and actual considerations received by her father
William Sato from the buyers of her grandmother’s properties. She attests that Anita Ng
actually paid ₱7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148 and
₱7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds
were turned over to William Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting thereof
to my mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
 9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid
₱8,000,000.00 for the property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the
proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to William Sato.

10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko
C. Sato has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her
Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].

11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to
refuse her father’s orders.

12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of
attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, which total ₱22,034,000.00, William Sato
failed to account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong
Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8, 1994.

13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the
proceeds of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother’s estate, but he refused and
failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include
his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x3

Wendy Mitsuko Sato’s supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by
the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the
complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.

In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the
complaint.4 On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution
dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information
against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code. 5 Thus, the
following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
87:6

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par.
3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and
79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in
favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said
document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes
Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any
person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City, as follows:

1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less and
covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;

2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3148
with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;

3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3149
with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;

4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax Declaration
No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;

registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the possession of
the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy
Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title
[TCT] No. 3148 for ₱250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for ₱250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-
016-0735 for ₱650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above
properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong who died in 1994.

Contrary to law.7

Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the
amount of damages from ₱1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to
₱22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato.

Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was
his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.

The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.

In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the dismissal
of the criminal case:

The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the
relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of
protection provided to the accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.

A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces this
Court of the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of
Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase
the fact that accused and Zenaida’s mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and
mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond the death of
Zenaida.

Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal,
but only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and
descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."

Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves
family harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief, where
the crime is committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather,
by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente
Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).

Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.

WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is
GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)

The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.11

Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by
Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals12 which, however, in a
decision13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:

[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the
relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita,
and does not bar the application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the
Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.

We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing
in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the fact of death
of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita and private respondent Sato,
and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code from said
private respondent; and that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato
remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As
further pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the criminal case for estafa against private
respondent Sato already created havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato families as
private respondent’s daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her aunt [Mediatrix]
Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private respondent, William Francis and
Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of Article
332 of the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the
exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita, they being
"relatives by affinity in the same line" under Article 332(1) of the same Code. We cannot draw
the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991, private respondent Sato is no longer
the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former from the exempting circumstance
provided for in Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction
that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no
distinction in the application of law where none is indicated. The courts could only distinguish
where there are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or
qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the lawgiver’s intent. The
solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to
correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.

Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be
resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code’s simple language is most favorable to Sato.14

The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial court. It
cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the rationale of
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal
liability is that the law recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property between the
offender and the offended party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by
Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s wife), died on January 28, 1991.
Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three
parcels of land could have arisen only after her mother’s death. Since
Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and the mantle of
protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.

Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in
case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death
of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-
law relationship between Sato and Zenaida’s mother, Manolita.

For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal
liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports petitioner’s
claim that Zenaida’s death dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As
it is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc among the members of the Carungcong and
Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332’s provision exempting
a family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability and
reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only.

The petition has merit.

The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code.
In particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the
relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.

Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause

Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and
malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from
criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended party.

In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that included in
the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.17 By virtue thereof, no
criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious mischief against his
stepson;18 by the stepmother who commits theft against her stepson;19 by the stepfather who
steals something from his stepson;20 by the grandson who steals from his grandfather;21 by the
accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with him;22 and by the son who steals a ring from
his mother.23

Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a
relationship by marriage or

a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in
connection with the institution of marriage and family relations.

If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one’s spouse, does
the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?

Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this case.
That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or
commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are two views on
the subject. As one Filipino author observed:

In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting views.
There are some who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether there are
children or not in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better
view supported by most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no
living issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It
follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution of the marriage which
produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the
relationship by affinity is continued despite the death of one of the spouses where there are living
issues or children of the marriage "in whose veins the blood of the parties are commingled, since
the relationship of affinity was continued through the medium of the issue of the marriage"
(Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).25

The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with
the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of
affinity between the parties.26 Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive
and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily
determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage
subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the
surviving spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood relatives.

The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death
of one spouse when there is a surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship is preserved
because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is
commingled.28

The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between
the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the
deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.29 Under this view,
the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a
result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where
statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between
these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of
one of the married parties.30

After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the
second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised
Penal Code.

First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification
and incest.31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the
interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of
the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity
within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more
appropriate.

Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same
line" is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction
between the spouse of one’s living child and the surviving spouse of one’s deceased child
(in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law)32 can
be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its
language.

Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a
basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the
 State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a State
and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family. 34 In this
connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate
scandal.35The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the
parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and
harmony.

Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to

resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the
accused.36 This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall
be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.37

Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies when
the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the
accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation
which is more lenient to the accused.

Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic
purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an
absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should
adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that
interpretation is the continuing affinity view.

Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by
affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse
survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle
applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one’s relatives under Article 11[2] of the
Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense
committed against one’s relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause
of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)

Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code

The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the
criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an
act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the
private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.

However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The
plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to
the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the
crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through
falsification or estafa through falsification.39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense.40 What
controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts
recited in the Information.41 In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the
offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the
Information.42 It is the exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is
named.43 The determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed
is merely an opinion which is not binding on the court.44

A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with
simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. In
particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita
committed as follows:

(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and
induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;

(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes
when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter
Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolita’s properties in Tagaytay
City;

(c) relying on Sato’s inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked
the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;

(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the
proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and

(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage
and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.

The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to
Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document) statements other than those in fact
made by her. Manolita’s acts of signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document
were the very expression of her specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her
signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only
signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read) because of Sato’s
representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the
document, Manolita showed that she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what
the document was all about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark,
therefore, served as her conformity to Sato’s proposal that she execute a document to settle her
taxes.

Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his
daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or
otherwise disposing of Manolita’s Tagaytay properties when the fact was that Manolita signed
and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes.
Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to
Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.

Moreover, the allegations in the Information that

(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent
documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale"
and

(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit"
raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one
who benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the
Information so as to increase the amount of damages from ₱1,150,000 to ₱22,034,000. This was
granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that
the amended Information would now state that, while the total amount of consideration stated in
the deeds of absolute sale was only ₱1,150,000, Sato actually received the total amount of
₱22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolita’s properties.45 This also meant that the deeds of
sale (which were public documents) were also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the
amounts of consideration stated in the deeds.

Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple
estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of
attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.

Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory
cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.

Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The Complex
Crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents

The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by
virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not be
absolved also from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents? No.

True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public
document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.46 It means that the
prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of a public document as a
necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, simply because the
accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause
under Article 332.

The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property,
namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes,
whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said
provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of
the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that
complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332
to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly
treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that
situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification
of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through
falsification of public document.

Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender
criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers
the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain family
members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not
apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably
intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of
public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the
property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest.

The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.47 Thus, the action
provided under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family
members and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party. When
estafa is committed through falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a
very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family
members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public
interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family
member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.

In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from each
other. While there may be two component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both
felonies are animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent for which there is only
one criminal liability.48 That is the concept of a complex crime. In other words, while there are
two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.

As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g., homicide
which violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to property),49 a complex crime
constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of
which is a simple crime in itself.50 Since only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts,
however, the component crimes are considered as elements of a single crime, the complex crime.
This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code.

In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where
the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex crime
for which there is only one criminal liability.51 (The complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is different from a material (or
real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for each of
which the accused incurs criminal liability.52 The latter category is covered neither by the
concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus
delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the
imposition of a single penalty:

Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one crime in
law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting the same are
more conveniently termed as component crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)

—∞——∞——∞—

In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only
one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has
only one criminal intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one.54

For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires
that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability
for estafa may be determined and considered independently of that for falsification. The two
crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but component
crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.

Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered
separately from the liability for falsification of public document. Such approach would disregard
the nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and material
plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the felonies are considered as
separate crimes to be punished individually.

Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing Estafa Even
Under Article 315 (3[a])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal
Code are as follows:

(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;

(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;

(3) the offended party personally signed the document and

(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.

While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the
document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the
document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.

The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the
offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the
latter and would be an ingredient thereof.55 In People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary means"
merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the
other.57 In this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a
"necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more effectively his
evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay
properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.

When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like
estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same
Code.58 The falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of
committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another,
the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not
being an element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document.59 In
other words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of
estafa.60 Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud
another is estafa.61 The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document.621avvphi1

Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the
falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to
Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While
the falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the
estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the
properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita
was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property
rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of
the said document. That is why the falsification of the public document was used to facilitate and
ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made Manolita
sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that case, the
damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the
document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple
crime of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been
the one who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what
was presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple
crime of falsification.64

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the
resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is directed to
try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents.